Java Security
David A. Wheeler
[email protected] (703) 845-6662 April 24, 2000
Outline
Java Basics
Whats Java, Modes of Use, major components, implications, implementations, politics
Security-related capabilities (JDK 1.0, 1.1, 1.2) Selected upcoming developments Miscellaneous
Past breaches, malicious applets, advantages & disadvantages, key points
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Whats Java?
Java Technologies:
Java language Virtual machine (VM)/class file format Libraries Source code Compiler
Can use only VM or language Developed by Sun Not related to Javascript Cross-Platform (WORA)
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Class files
Libraries
Virtual Machine
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User
Developer
Java Modes of Use
Applets: Auto-run when view web page Applications: Traditional program (performance?) Beans: Component (like OLE object) Servlets: Server-side applications Aglets: Intelligent Agents Doclets: Configurable doc generator Embedded Systems Smart Cards (JavaCard)
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Java Language
Modern object-oriented (OO) language
OO with single inheritance + multiple interfaces Classes grouped into hierarchical packages Strong static typing (no arbitrary pointers) Automatic garbage collection Exceptions Multithreaded
Lacks enumerations and templates (generics) Syntax ~C++, semantics ~Ada95/Smalltalk
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Java Virtual Machine (VM) and Class File Format
Class file defines names/types/values of class variables, constants, & methods Methods stored as instructions to stack-based VM
Very similar to UCSD p-code
VM executes class files (inc. collections of them)
By interpretation, run-time compilation, or combination; performance is a significant issue
Before execution, VM usually runs bytecode verifier to check legality of class file
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Java Libraries
Set of built-in APIs, including:
GUIs Networking Computation
Growth area Several classes are security-related
This presentation will skim ordinary crypto functions such as ones for encryption/decryption, certificate management, etc., since they are not essentially unique
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Class and Method Access Control Modifiers
Access Control Modifier Public Class or Interface Accessibility All Member (Field or Method) Accessibility All if class or interface is accessible; interface members always public Same package OR subclass Same package Only same class (not subclass)
8
Protected default (Package private) Private
N/A Same package N/A
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Implications of Java Basics
No arbitrary pointers: references ~ capabilities
Only creator & createe have reference for new object If objectset doesnt pass a reference, you cant manipulate that object
Can only manipulate objects in limited ways
If data private, can only manipulate via methods Methods can be used to protect data Constructor method can limit who can create an object
Software-enforced protection (small slips break it)
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Notes on Java Implementations
Java is the general technology Multiple Java Implementations
Sun, Microsoft (derived), Kaffe, This presentation emphasizes Suns implementations Sun essentially controls the interface and reference implementation
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Microsoft
Java: Caught in Political Cross-fire
Intentionally polluted with incompatible unmarked extensions to fool developers into unportable code Sun sued & won court injunction partly forbidding this
Sun
Promised to support standardization (they have before) Customers trusted Sun & committed major resources Sun flirted with ISO & ECMA, then halted cooperation Greatly angered users: Sun lied Linux port taken without warning or acknowledgement Suddenly charged royalties on enterprise edition, even to those who had partially funded its development
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Java: Current Political Situation
Sun controls spec & primary implementation
Community license means Sun controls everything Java is essentially Sun proprietary language/technology
Disincentive for other organizations
IBM, etc., dont want to depend on a competitor Sole-source dangerous: surprise fees, nasty changes
User best interests not in Sun/Microsoft interests To avoid total dependence on a capricious vendor:
Consider open source, Linux, standardized languages
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Security-Related Capabilities (1 of 2)
JDK 1.0 (Fall 1995)
Policy: Sandbox for applets; others unlimited Mechanisms: SecurityManager, Bytecode verifier, Classloader
JDK 1.1 (Spring 1997)
Policy: can also grant total trust to signed applets Mechanisms: Java Archive (JAR), crypto-related APIs
Inflexible: Too little or too much privilege
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Security-Related Capabilities (2 of 2)
Netscape & Microsoft Extensions
Enabled more flexible approaches Incompatible with each other and with Sun
J2SE (Java 2 Platform Standard Edition) (Fall 1998)
Includes SDK 1.2 and runtime Policy: can also grant fine-grained privileges to specific applets/classes based on source and/or signatures Mechanisms: AccessController, ProtectionDomain, CodeSource, Permission, GuardedObject, Java Plug-in supports both Microsoft & Netscape
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Java 1.0 Security Policy
Sandbox Policy (for applets)
Cannot access local filesystem or devices Network connections only to applet load source Cannot invoke any local program or library Untrusted indicator on top-level windows Cannot manipulate basic classes or another ThreadGroup Appletviewer CL can be initialized to vary these
Applications unlimited in 1.0; can code a policy
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SecurityManager
Class defines check methods called by system
E.G. checkRead(String filename) Method throws exception if invalid
To create a security policy from scratch:
Create a subclass (code) & instantiate Install using System.setSecurityManager; this cannot be revoked or replaced This is used to create the Sandbox If no SecurityManager installed, all privileges granted
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Bytecode Verifier
Checks a classfile for validity:
Code only has valid instructions & register use Code does not overflow/underflow stack Does not convert data types illegally or forge pointers Accesses objects as correct type Method calls use correct number & types of arguments References to other classes use legal names
Goal is to prevent access to underlying machine
via forged pointers, crashes, undefined states
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ClassLoader
Responsible for loading classes
given classname, locates/generates its definition always looks at standard classes first every class has a reference to the classloader instance that defined it keeps namespaces of different applets separate (different ClassLoader instances) each ClassLoader instance ~ OS process CLASSPATH classes trusted in JDK 1.0-1.1, system classes trusted, otherwise invokes bytecode verifier
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Java Archive (JAR) Format (1.1)
Format for collecting & optionally signing sets of files
ZIP format + manifest + optional signatures
Manifest
In file META-INF/MANIFEST.MF Lists (some) JAR filenames, digests, digest algorithm(s) (MD5, SHA)
Signatures
Separate manifest-like file, separate signature
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Java Cryptography Architecture (Added in 1.1)
Java cryptography architecture (JCA)
Framework (API) for access to services implemented by pluggable providers digital signature algorithms (DSA), message digest algorithms (MD5 & SHA-1), key-generation algorithms, simple certificate management (1.1 had no API for specific formats) Simple key management tool (simple database)
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Problems with 1.0 through 1.1
Sandbox too limiting Trusted programs given too much power Hard to define new security policy
Must write own SecurityManager Must install it on its own JVM
New privileges difficult to add
New method must be added to SecurityManager Creates a backward incompatibility for each addition
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Netscape Extensions
Navigator 4.0 added Capabilities API:
Call to request privilege enable (string) If not been granted before, UI asks if ok Privilege disabled when method returns, but can be reenabled without UI Can disable or revert, can select which certificate to use
May grant privileges to certificates or codebase Problems: Incompatible (Netscape only)
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Microsoft Extensions
Used CAB not JAR for signatures (incompatible) IE 3.0: Selected signed applets trusted IE 4.0: Fine-grained Trust-Based Security
User defines zones (stnd: Local, intranet, trusted sites, Internet, untrusted sites) Each zone given privileges; standard privilege sets: High, Medium (UI file I/O), Low security CAB file includes privilege request; query if beyond preapproved set (& okay with admin)
Problem: Incompatible (IE on Win32 only)
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Security-Related Capabilities in Java 2 (SDK 1.2)
Fine-grained configurable policies
Sample Security Policy Runtime State: ProtectionDomain/CodeSource/Policy Java 2 Runtime Security Check Algorithm Permission & Its Subclasses SecurityManager & AccessController GuardedObject & Guard
Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) changes Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
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Sample Fine-Grained Security Policy for One User
Source of Code (CodeSource) Base URL Signature
http://www.schwab.com/ classes/stockeditor.jar http://*.schwab.com/ Schwabs signature
Permissions
Read/write file /home/daw/stocks Connect/accept bankofamerica.com ports 1-1023 Read file /home/daw/logo.png
(not required)
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Java 2: Each Class Has A ProtectionDomain
ProtectionDomain1 PermissionCollection CodeSource
1
ProtectionDomain2 PermissionCollection CodeSource
1
Class1 Instance1
...
1
Class2
...
Instance2
Asks
ClassLoader1
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Policy
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ProtectionDomain Class
ProtectionDomain class
Created from a CodeSource and a PermissionCollection Defines the set of permissions granted to classes; change the PermissionCollection to change permissions Each class belongs to ONE ProtectionDomain instance, set at class creation time (and never changed again) Access to these objects restricted; getting its reference requires RuntimePermission getProtectionDomain
One ClassLoader can have >1 protection domain
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CodeSource Class
Created from:
a source (base) URL and array of certificates
Immutable implies method implements URL partial matches
Permits policies to use URL patterns
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Policy Class
Provides interface to user policy
Given a CodeSource, returns a PermissionCollection Used during setup of ProtectionDomain to set a class permissions
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How a Class and ProtectionDomain Are Loaded
1. Loaded class C1 requests an unloaded class C2 2. C1s ClassLoader called, loads C2s class file, calls bytecode verifier 3. C2s CodeSource determined 4. Policy object given CodeSource, returns Permissions 5. If an existing ProtectionDomain has same CodeSource & Permissions, reused, else new ProtectionDomain created; C2 assigned to it
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Java 2 Runtime Security Check Algorithm
If method M requires permission P
Ms implementation calls current SecurityManagers checkPermission(P)
By default this calls new AccessController class
For each call stack entry, unwind from caller: if callers ProtectionDomain lacks P, exception (fail) if caller called doPrivileged without context, return if caller called doPrivileged with context, check it: return if context permits P else exception (fail).
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Examples of Algorithm At Work
Multiple ProtectionDomains:
Instance1 M1 calls Instance2 M2 calls System1 M3 System1 M3 (in Systems ProtectionDomain) asks for a permission check Permissions checked against the ProtectionDomains for System1, then Class2, then Class1
doPrivileged call (without context):
Same example, but first System1 M3 calls doPrivileged When permission check requested, ProtectionDomain for System1 checked and no others checked
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Context
getContext() takes a snapshot of current execution context (stack trace)
snapshot includes ancestor threads stored in type AccessControlContext results can be stored & can used later to limit privileges (instead of enabling all privileges)
Purpose: support actions on behalf of another
one thread posts event to another delayed actions (cron job)
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Algorithm Implications
Default privileges are the intersection (minimum) of all class permissions in call tree
Without doPrivilege, permissions only decrease
doPrivilege enables all class privileges
Like Unix setuid; enables trusted classes to use their full set of privileges but only when requested Without context enables all privileges With context enables only those privileges also in given context; safe because resulting privileges always less than without context
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Warning: Dont Mix Protected Variables and Permission Checks
If a method M1 is not overridden, the ProtectionDomain of its defining superclass used Methods running (even indirectly) with privilege shouldnt depend on protected variables
Attacker creates subclass with new method M2 M2 modifies protected variable used by M1 Cause M1 to be invoked; M1 influenced by M2!
Identified by David A. Wheeler Oct 1999
Have not seen this in the literature
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Permission Class
Permission class
Encapsulates a permission granted or requested Can be set readonly (from then on immutable) Can be grouped using classes PermissionCollection and Permissions
This briefings terminology:
permissions granted to a ProtectionDomain also called privileges no separate Privilege class
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Permission Subclasses: FilePermission Class
Gives rights to local files/directories Path name/pattern
Specific path: file, directory, directory/file All files in directory: directory/* All files recursively in directory: directory/For current directory, omit directory/ For all files (dangerous), <<ALL FILES>>
Rights set (1+): read, write, execute, delete
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Permission Subclasses: SocketPermission
Host
Local machine: , localhost Given machine: IP address or hostname All hosts in a domain: *.domain All hosts: *
Portrange
Single port: portnumber Port range: port1-port2, port1-, -port2
Actions (1+): accept, connect, listen, resolve
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Permission Subclasses: PropertyPermission
Gives rights to properties
Similar to OS environment variables
Target
Specific property: os.name Pattern: java.*
Actions (1+): read, write
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Permission Subclasses: Other Permission Subclasses
RunTimePermission: string with permission name
createClassLoader getClassLoader setSecurityManager exitVM ...
Many other specialized Permission subclasses AllPermission
special class meaning all permissions
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SecurityManager Changes
New method checkPermission(P)
Throws exception if permission P not held, else returns All previous check methods rewritten in terms of checkPermission Permits creation of new Permissions without changing SecurityManager
By default, calls on AccessController class
AccessController implements the new algorithm
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GuardedObject (1 of 3)
To protect one method in all instances, use SecurityManager directly as shown so far To protect a reference to an individual instance, consider using GuardedObject:
requesting class
getObject()
1 3
reply with object-toguard
GuardedObject 2
checkGuard()
object-to-guard
Guard
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GuardedObject (2 of 3)
GuardedObject class encapsulates object-to-guard
asks Guard interface to determine if access ok Permission implements Guard by calling SecurityManager. checkPermission(self) PermissionCollection doesnt implement (Ive reported)
Provider of object-to-guard does the following:
Instantiates new Guard (e.g., a Permission) Instantiates GuardedObject, using object-to-guard and the guard Gives GuardedObjects reference to requestors
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GuardedObject (3 of 3)
Clients who wish to use object-to-guard call GuardedObjects getObject()
GuardedObject instance calls its Guards checkGuard() if ok, object-to-guards reference returned if not ok, security exception thrown
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Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) Changes in 1.2
Adds more APIs that providers can support
Keystore creation and management Algorithm parameter management Algorithm parameter generation Conversions between different key representations Certificate factory support to generate certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) from their encodings (Sun implements X.509s) Random-number generation (RNG) algorithm
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Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
Adds encryption, key exchange, key generation, message authentication code (MAC)
Multiple providers supported Keys & certificates in keystore database
Separate due to export control
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Other Areas In Development: JSSE and JAAS
Java Secure Socket Extension
Implements SSL
Java Authentication and Authorization Service
Based on PAM: pluggable authenticators for passwords, smart cards, biometric devices, etc. Authenticators may be required, requisite (stop on failure), sufficient (but not required), or optional Adds user-centric (vs. code-centric) control: permissions granted to Principal (not just CodeSource), implemented through a modified SecurityManager
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Past Java Security Breaches (1 of 2)
8 Serious Breaches listed in Java Security (1997)
Jumping the Firewall (DNS interaction) Slash and Burn (slash starts classname) Applets running wild (evil class loader installed and creates type confusion) Casting Caution (failed to test if method private, type casting) Tag-Team Applets (create type confusion)
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Past Java Security Breaches (2 of 2)
Youre not my type (flaw in array implementation type confusion) Casting Caution #2 (as before, but in a loop test wasnt repeated) Big Attacks Come in Small Packages (untrusted code could be loaded into sensitive packages, e.g. com.ms, and gain their privileges)
Others have been announced since
See http://java.sun.com/sfaq/chronology.html Many are problems in bytecode verifier or classloader
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Malicious Applets (Staying Within the Sandbox)
Denial of Service
Deny platform use (busy threads, loop, exhaust GUI resources) Kill other threads
Invasion of Privacy Annoyance: constant sound Flashing display (causes seizures in some users) Steal CPU cycles (e.g. crack encryption)
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Java Advantages
Permits controlled execution of less trusted code (vs. ActiveX) Permits fine-grained permission control Attention paid to security Portability Instant installation Suns source reviewable (not open source)
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Java Security Disadvantages (1 of 3)
Hard to prove correct
complex from security point-of-view rapidly expanding/changing VM+libraries lacks formal security model
Many internal interdependencies (vs. reference monitors); often breaks all the way Complex dependencies on other systems
OS, browsers, network (DNS), PKI
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Java Security Disadvantages (2 of 3)
Applets evade many security measures (e.g. most firewalls) Breaches demonstrated Many areas immature No standardized auditing (MS extension) Simplifies reverse engineering of code (problem?) Poor performance may encourage securityweakening shortcuts
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Java Security Disadvantages (3 of 3)
Weak against denial-of-service & nuisances Insecure implementation defaults (e.g. null ClassLoader or SecurityManager) Security policy management too complex for endusers and weak administrative support Flexible policies accepted by users may permit hidden breaching interactions
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Key Points
Progression of Access Control Flexibility
JDK 1.0: Sandbox + total trust of local applications JDK 1.1: Above + optional total trust with signature SDK 1.2: Above + Fine-grained access control
Java 2 ProtectionDomains
Checks call tree, by default intersection of permissions doPrivilege permits permissions to be re-enabled
GuardedObject to protect specific objects
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Useful References
Li Gong, Inside Java 2 Platform Security, 1999, Palo Alto, CA: Addison-Wesley. G. McGraw & E. Felten, Java Security: Hostile Applets, Holes, and Antidotes, 1997, NY: John Wiley & Sons. G. McGraw & E. Felten, Securing Java: Getting Down to Business with Mobile Code, 1999, NY: John Wiley & Sons, http://www.securingjava.com
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Useful Websites
Suns Java website: http://java.sun.com Existing Java programs/info available at:
http://www.gamelan.com http://www.jars.com (Java Applet Rating Service)
RSTs Java Security Hotlist
http://www.rstcorp.com/javasecurity/links.html
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About this Briefing
This briefing is at: http://www.dwheeler.com This entire briefing is GPLed:
(C) 1999-2000 David A. Wheeler. This information is free information; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the license, or (at your option) any later version. This information is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU GPL for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU GPL along with this information; if not, see http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt or write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
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Backup Slides
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Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI)
Unified interface to multiple naming & directory services
E.G.: LDAP (v2 & v3), NIS(YP), NIS+, CORBAs COS Naming, Novell NDS, DNS
Application
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API
JNDI Impl. Manager
SPI
Service
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Java Card (Smart Cards)
Limited space:256bytes RAM, 8K EEPROM, 16K ROM ISO 7816: command sent, card responds Multiple applets/card supported Subset JVM
Omits dynamic class loading, security manager, threads/synchronization, object cloning, finalization, large primitive data types (float, double, long, char)
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