Canon 1
Canon 1
Canon 1
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
CANON 1
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of
the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with the complainant and promises
to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute gross immoral conduct. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must be grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
Additionally, even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor.
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).
“A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.” Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
4. Atty. Paguia even after the court’s warning persist on filing cases after cases, to which the
Supreme Court rendered its decision dismissing the certiorari and demanding the petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estradato show cause and provide a valid reason on why the Supreme Court
should not suspend the legal counsel for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and officer of the court.
5. Atty. Allan Paguia submitted a response with a continuous claim of political partisan ship of
some of the member of the court, and quoting Canon 5.10 to attack the member of the the
court. Canon 5(10) “A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But
to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other
partisan political activities”
6. The court responded on the allegations of Atty. Paguia, citing Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code defines the term “partisan political activities;” the law states:
“The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:
“(1)Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;
“(2)Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
“(3)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
“(4)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
“(5)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.” Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465, G.R. Nos. 159486-88
November 25, 2003
7. The court then flagged Atty. Paguia on possible nonobservance of, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist
on similar conduct by others.
8. The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say—
“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the
other party—GMA—with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit
the unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
In the petition for certiorari filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, through his counsel
Attorney Allan F. Paguia, which was dismissed by this Honorable Court, the Court ruled
that Atty. Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client's case within
the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member
of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Atty. Paguia may have stoked the fires
of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of
justice. Thus, the Court ordered Atty. Paguia to show cause, within ten days from notice,
why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court. In his compliance, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his
earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
The Court ruled that Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad
taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition
and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually
see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
Ago filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from
enforcing writ of possession where Supreme Court dismissed. Ago filed a
similar petition with the Court of Appeal which also dismissed the petition; Ago
Appealed to Supreme Court which dismissed the petition. Ago filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeal which gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal
court cannot apply in the case at bar. The CFI of Manila, which issued the writ
of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the CFI
of Quezon City, as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. It is the Court
of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot be availed of to protect a
wife's half-share in the conjugal properties for her share is merely an inchoate
interest, not a right in esse. It likewise condemned respondents and their
counsel's misuse of legal remedies and maneuver of tactics for fourteen years to
resist satisfaction of judgment. It motu proprio examined the records of Civil
Case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present action) and found that the alleged
causes of action in the complaint, supplemented and amended, are all untenable.
Where counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice,
he has forgotten his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed; the civil case, in which Ago
was joined by his wife ordered dismissed without prejudice to the re-filing of
petitioner's counterclaim in a new and independent action; treble costs
against respondents to be paid by their lawyer.