Canon 1

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CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
CANON 1
THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

CANON 1

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE


CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
 Rule 1.01

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,


immoral, or deceitful conduct.

(Figueroa v. Barranco, 216 SCRA 445)


(Leslie Ui v. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38)
Rule 138, Rules of Court
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. —
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear
in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears,
and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.
An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless
by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Figueroa v. Barranco, 216 SCRA 445
Facts of the case:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in
1971, against respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar candidate in the
1970 Bar examination, praying thereto that herein respondent be denied
admission to the legal profession. In her petition, complainant averred that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born
to them and that respondent failed to fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in
1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence,
complainant charged him of gross immorality.
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period
of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon
payment of the required fees.

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when


the Court, in response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of
the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with the complainant and promises
to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute gross immoral conduct. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral.

The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must be grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
Additionally, even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.


Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
Leslie Ui v. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38
Facts of the case:
Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband
of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him
about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said
respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is a
victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but
with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two
got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the
real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and
Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept
the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice
of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics.

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).
“A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.” Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies
just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the
contrary deserve no credit.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy


of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future.
 Rule 1.02

A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at


defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465)


Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465
Facts of the case:
1. Atty. Allan Paguia the legal counsel for the deposed president Joseph Ejercito Estrada
filed
a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Seeking the following relief:
***“1.That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court
disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
“2.That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
“3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
2. Atty. Paguia further asserts that members of the Supreme Court should inhibit in deciding
on the case as justices are prohibited in any partisan political activity as some have
participated in the EDSA 2 rally, which is a violation of Rule 5.10 of Code of Judicial
3. Several Resolution had been filed by the legal counsel which is in the disguise of forum
shopping, to which the court issued a resolution on July 08, 2003 with a warning to Atty. Allan
Paguia it states, “ on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.”

4. Atty. Paguia even after the court’s warning persist on filing cases after cases, to which the
Supreme Court rendered its decision dismissing the certiorari and demanding the petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estradato show cause and provide a valid reason on why the Supreme Court
should not suspend the legal counsel for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and officer of the court.

5. Atty. Allan Paguia submitted a response with a continuous claim of political partisan ship of
some of the member of the court, and quoting Canon 5.10 to attack the member of the the
court. Canon 5(10) “A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But
to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other
partisan political activities”
6. The court responded on the allegations of Atty. Paguia, citing Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code defines the term “partisan political activities;” the law states:
“The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which
shall include:
“(1)Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;
“(2)Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other
similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
“(3)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
“(4)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
“(5)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate.” Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465, G.R. Nos. 159486-88
November 25, 2003
7. The court then flagged Atty. Paguia on possible nonobservance of, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist
on similar conduct by others.
8. The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say—

“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the
other party—GMA—with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit
the unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
In the petition for certiorari filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, through his counsel
Attorney Allan F. Paguia, which was dismissed by this Honorable Court, the Court ruled
that Atty. Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his client's case within
the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and
print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member
of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Atty. Paguia may have stoked the fires
of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of
justice. Thus, the Court ordered Atty. Paguia to show cause, within ten days from notice,
why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court. In his compliance, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his
earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
The Court ruled that Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from


the practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
 Rule 1.03

A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,


encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.

(De Ysasi v. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173)


De Ysasi v. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173
Facts of the case:
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The private
respondent (father) owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental while petitioner (son) is
employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. After marriage, the petitioner moved
abode yet still continue to work in the farm. Sometime June and August 1982, De Ysasi III
had acquired various ailments and was hospitalized such that later November 1982,
underwent surgery and so he missed work. While under recovery, several instances also that
the petitioner had acquired other illness like acute gastroenteritis and thereafter, infectious
hepatitis. During the entire periods of petitioner’s illnesses the respondent took care of his
medical expenses while the petitioner continued to receive compensation. De Ysasi III was
confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was terminated, without due
process, by his father thus filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his work.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The court find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the
flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating
a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with
mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them
acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints
the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in
court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. The court reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in
every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of
them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.

The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad
taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition
and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually
see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is


hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction
of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
 Rule 1.04

A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or


settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.

(Castañeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975))


Castañeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)

Facts of the case:


In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries. Judgment in favor of Castaneda
and Henson. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961, in Ago vs. Castaneda, L-14066, affirmed the
judgment. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago’s
house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25,
1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied. Sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda
and Henson, Ago failed to redeem. Sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to
the properties.
Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the
replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in
their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of
Quezon City issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda to
Registered of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the
battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued.

Ago filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from
enforcing writ of possession where Supreme Court dismissed. Ago filed a
similar petition with the Court of Appeal which also dismissed the petition; Ago
Appealed to Supreme Court which dismissed the petition. Ago filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeal which gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal
court cannot apply in the case at bar. The CFI of Manila, which issued the writ
of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the CFI
of Quezon City, as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession. It is the Court
of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot be availed of to protect a
wife's half-share in the conjugal properties for her share is merely an inchoate
interest, not a right in esse. It likewise condemned respondents and their
counsel's misuse of legal remedies and maneuver of tactics for fourteen years to
resist satisfaction of judgment. It motu proprio examined the records of Civil
Case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present action) and found that the alleged
causes of action in the complaint, supplemented and amended, are all untenable.
Where counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and
a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice,
he has forgotten his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court.

Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed; the civil case, in which Ago
was joined by his wife ordered dismissed without prejudice to the re-filing of
petitioner's counterclaim in a new and independent action; treble costs
against respondents to be paid by their lawyer.

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