Major Points of Mahan's Sea Power Theory

Major Points of Mahan’s Sea
Power theory in operational and

political terms
Presented by:
Madhulika
Introduction
 It was Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840 - 1914) who first coined the term “sea
power.”
 As per Mahan, Sea power has two aspects:
o Command of the sea through naval superiority
o Combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access
to foreign markets that produce national “wealth and greatness”
 The maritime strategy of Mahan is mainly based on the strategic theory of Swiss-
born French General Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869).
Sea Power: Concept and theories
 Mahan adopted three key ideas from Jomini:
o Inherent value of a strategic central or interior position
o Principle of concentration
o Close relationship between logistics and combat
 Mahan outlined six “principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations:
o Geographical position
o Physical conformation
o Extent of territory
o Number of population
o National character
o Character and policy of governments
Sea Communications
 Mahan defined sea communications ―as a line of movement by which a military
body is kept in living connection with the national power.
 Sea communications are the most important of all ―strategic lines, that is, those
lines connecting what he called ―strategic points
 Sea communications meant not geographical lines, like the roads an army has to
follow, but those ―necessaries, supplies of which the ships cannot carry in their
own hulls beyond a limited amount.
 In order of priority, the most important logistical supplies are fuel, ammunition,
and food.
Methods of commanding the Sea
 Mahan contemplated two main methods in obtaining and maintaining command
of the sea: decisive battle and blockade.
 The primary mission of all naval actions is the destruction of the enemy organized
force and the establishment of one’s control of the water.
 Mahan firmly believed that acquisition and control of the sea’s communications
could be obtained only in a decisive and clear-cut victory, which came to be
known as the ―decisive battle.
 In Mahan’s view, a close blockade might succeed in keeping both merchant and
naval vessels bottled up in their own harbors; however, in case the enemy’s fleet
escapes from its base, then it must be pursued and ultimately destroyed.
WWI: The real test of Mahan’s teachings
 Germans became so fascinated with the idea of the major battle that they barely
paid attention to trying to attack British maritime trade and preventing the landing
of British troops in France.
 They also did not make an effective use of their naval superiority against the
Russians in the Baltic.
 The Germans forgot the most important element of Mahan’s teaching: the critical
value of maritime positions in successfully operating on the open ocean.
 The German ships were prevented from reaching the open waters of the Atlantic.
German high seas traffic was stopped, and the fleet was incapable of preventing a
British blockade
US Navy after WW1
 In the aftermath of World War I, the U.S. Navy remained focused on the need to
build and maintain a battle fleet.
 The focus of the U.S. Navy’s tactics was to prepare to fight a decisive battle with
the Japanese fleet somewhere in the western Pacific.
 The U.S. Navy’s tactical doctrine envisaged using carriers to sink or disable
enemy carriers, while carrier-based aircraft would be used as gun spotters for the
battle line that would engage the Japanese battle fleet in a Jutland-like decisive
battle.
 The Japanese navy had views almost identical to the U.S. Navy’s about the nature
of the potential conflict in the Pacific
 In the interwar years, capital ships remained a centerpiece of the Japanese navy.
Aircraft carriers and submarines were considered auxiliaries to the battle fleet.
Criticism of Mahan’s ideas
 Failed to consider factors such as social and cultural conditions in the rise of sea
power, the rise of the English middle class, American agrarian discontent, and the
rise of Russia.
 Neglect of the importance of the navy’s support of friendly troops on the coast
had a negative influence on generations of U.S. naval officers.
 Neglect of the need for cooperation between the navy and the army was
surprising because his study of England’s rise as a sea power should have
convinced him of the importance of such cooperation.
 Mahan’s strong support for convoying as the most effective method for defense
and protection of shipping was virtually ignored.

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Major Points of Mahan’s Sea

Power theory in operational and

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