Operational Art Review

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OPERATIONAL ART

REVIEW

PROFESSOR JIM BUTLER


C-429 / 841-6478
What is Operational Art?
“A component of military art
concerned with the theory and
practice of planning, preparing,
conducting, and sustaining
campaigns and major operations
aimed at accomplishing strategic or
operational objectives in a given
theater”
(Vego, 2007)

“The bridge between strategy and tactics”


Operational Art

“Operational art is the application


of creative imagination by
commanders and staffs—supported
by their skill, knowledge, and
experience—to design strategies,
campaigns, and major operations
and organize and employ military
forces.”
JP 3-0 and JP 5-0
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
ia l
er
• Desired End State
• Levels of War at
• Operational Factors O M
J M
• Operational Functions
h er
• Principles of War
Ot
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
What is Strategy?

A prudent idea or set of ideas for


employing the instruments of national
power in a synchronized and
integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or multinational
objectives.
JP 3-0

IDEA EMPLOYING INSTRUMENTS ACHIEVE


OF NATIONAL POWER OBJECTIVES
Linking Strategy to Operations
Geo-Political/Geo-Economic Space
National
Security
 National Strategy
Interests, Goals
and Priorities
National Political-Military Space
 Strategic
 Integrating Context
Defense
Instruments of Strategy
National Power
 Strategic
Objectives  National National Military-Operational Space
 National Military
Security
 How we will Objectives Military
Directives
accomplish Strategy Battlefield
objectives  Missions, Space
Tasks & End
states Joint
US Government  Implementation
 Joint
Operations
Guidelines  Desired Principles & Concepts
Capabilities Attributes
 Strategic Risk & Attributes
Management  Force Application
 Joint
Department of  Priorities Operating
 Strategic and Military  Command and Control
Concepts
Defense Risk Assessments  Battlespace Awareness
 Regional Assessments  Functional
Concepts  Focused Logistics
 Full-  Protection
Armed Forces Spectrum
Dominance

Joint Warfighting
Four Questions
• What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends)
• What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve
those objectives and end state? (Ways)
• What resources are required to accomplish that
sequence of actions? (Means)
• What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable
results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)
JP 3-0
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Elements of National
Power

Diplomatic
D
Chuck Hagel
Secretary of Defense Informational
I Jacob Lew
Secretary of Treasury
Military
M
Economic
E

John Kerry
Secretary of State
James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Regressive Planning

(MAJOR OPERATIONS OR CAMPAIGNS)


INTERMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVES
INVERSE (REGRESSIVE) PLANNING

HERE
ULTIMATE
AND OBJECTIVE
NOW

PROGRESSIVE PLANNING

NEAR FUTURE
TASK TASK

(BATTLES / ENGAGEMENTS, ETC.)


TACTICAL PLANNING
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
End State

“The set of required conditions that


defines achievement of the
commander’s objectives.”
political leader’s strategic objectives.”

Joint Pub 3-0


11 August 2011
Desired End State
Op Strat
Obj Obj DES

Op
Obj Strat
Obj
Military
Power Op
Obj Op
Obj Op
Obj

Other
Elements
Of Power
Desired End State
The safety of the American people
depends on ending this direct and growing
threat. Acting against the danger will also
contribute greatly to the long-term safety
and stability of our world. The current Iraqi
regime has shown the power of tyranny to
spread discord and violence in the Middle
East. A liberated Iraq can show the power
of freedom to transform that vital region,
by bringing hope and progress into the
lives of millions. America's interests in
security, and America's belief in liberty, President George Bush
both lead in the same direction: to a free February 26, 2003
and peaceful Iraq.
OIF Strategic Objectives

• End the regime of


Saddam Hussein

• Eliminate Weapons of
Mass Destruction

• Eliminate terrorists
training bases

• Security and stability of


the region
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Military Objectives
SecDef Speech, March 21, 2003

• End regime of Saddam


• Eliminate Iraq’s WMD
• Capture/drive out terrorists
• Collect intelligence on terrorist networks
• Collect intelligence on global network of illicit WMD
• Secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources for Iraqi people
• Immediately deliver humanitarian relief
• Help Iraqi people restore/rebuild their country, rapidly
transitioning to representative form of gov’t.
Military Objectives Strategic Objectives DES

End Regime of End Regime of “Free and


Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein Peaceful Iraq”

Eliminate Iraq’s Eliminate Weapons of


WMD Mass Destruction

Collect Intelligence Eliminate terrorists


on Global Network training bases
of illicit WMD
Capture/Drive Out
Terrorist Security and Stability
of the Region
Collect Intelligence
on Terrorist Networks

Secure Iraq’s oil fields Immediately deliver Help Iraqi people


and resources for Iraqi people Humanitarian relief Restore country
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
THE LEVELS OF WAR
LEVEL OF WAR WHO WHAT WHERE

NATIONAL STRATEGIC
President Policy / Grand Global
SECDEF Strategy
STRATEGIC

Combatant Theater / Campaign AOR / Theater


THEATER STRATEGIC Commander Strategy / Plans of War
(CCDR)

OPERATIONAL CCDR / Major Theater of Operations/


JFC Operations JOA

OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL JFC / Area of Operations


Missions
Components Combat Zone

Components / Kill Box


TACTICAL Engagements
Unit Level Engagement Area
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Operational Factors
Space Time Force
• geography • preparation • Tangible
• shape • training •size
•type
• size • reconstruction •mix
• population • planning •flexibility
• mobilization •combat power
• oceanography •organization
• deployment •logistics
• topography
• decision cycle •mobility
• resources •equipment
• sequencing
• climate •
• Intangible
reaction •will to fight
• culture • processing •training
•morale
•discipline
•combat readiness
Balancing Operational Factors
Space – Time
Moving time of amphibious landing up to
keep enemy off-balance
Time – Force
Alternating Fleet commanders and staff to
permit high tempo operations
Space – Force
Adding Sea Bee Construction Battalion to
force mix to allow construction of runway in
marshy area
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
JOINT/OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

26
COMMAND ORGANIZATION
COMMAND ORGANIZATION refers to
both the physical and human elements of
the military organization established to
ensure the most effective employment of
one’s forces for accomplishing the
assigned military objective(s). In general,
command organization is intended to
provide a structure for establishing the
chain of command and the command
support relationships within a command or
force.
Vego

27
COMMAND & CONTROL
COMMAND and
CONTROL encompasses
the exercise of authority
and direction by a
commander over
assigned and attached
forces to accomplishment
the mission.
Joint Pub 3-0
Allied Command Structure
October 1944
PRESIDENT

JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF (JCS)

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS


THEATER

SUPREME COMMANDER COMMANDER IN CHIEF


SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS (POA)
CHINA THEATER (SOWESPAC) COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GENERALLISSIMO COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF US PACIFIC FLEET
CHIANG KAI-SHEK SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES ADM CHESTER W. NIMITZ
GEN DOUGLAS A. MACARTHUR, USA

TF17
SUBMARINES
VADM
CHIEF OF STAFF 1ST AUSTRALIAN ALLIED NAVAL C.A. LOCKWOOD
GEN J.W. STILLWELL ARMY FORCES
U.S. ARMY LTGEN V.A.H. STURDEE VADM T.C. KINKAID

COMMANDER
6TH U.S. ARMY ALLIED LAND WESTERN PACIFIC TASK
FORCES
LTGEN W. KRUGER, USA
GEN SIR T. BLAMEY
FORCES
COMMANDER GENERAL ADM W. HALSEY
US ARMY FORCES,
C-B-I THEATER ALLIED AIR
USA SOS
GEN J.W. STILLWELL, USA FORCES
TF57
MAJGEN J.L. FRINK, USA
LTGEN G.C. KENNEY, USA TF30
THIRD FLEET FORWARD AREA
ADM W. HALSEY CENTRAL
8TH ARMY PACIFIC
LTGEN R.L. VADM J.H.
EICHELBERGER HOOVER
Japanese Command Structure
October 1944
BOARD OF
SUPREME
FIELD MARSHALS Consultation
EMPEROR
Consultation
WAR
AND
COUNCIL
FLEET ADMIRALS

IMPERIAL GHQ
NAVY SECTION ARMY SECTION
(NAVAL GENERAL STAFF) (ARMY GENERAL STAFF)
ADM K. OIKAWA GEN Y. UMEZU

SURFACE ESCORT
CINC OTHER ARMIES
ADM N. NAUMURA

COMBINED FLEET SOUTHERN ARMY


CINC FIELD MARSHAL
ADM S. TOYODA H. TERAUCHI

CHINA AREA FLEET


CINC OTHER ARMIES
ADM N. KONDO

NAVAL DISTRICTS
AND
GUARD DISTRICTS
COMMAND & CONTROL WARFARE

COMMAND and CONTROL WARFARE


is the integrated use of operations
security, military deception, psychological
operations, electronic warfare, and
physical destruction, all supported by
intelligence, to influence, degrade, deny
information to, or destroy adversary
command and control capabilities while
protecting one’s command and control
against such actions.
Vego

31
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence tells JFCs what the enemy is doing, is capable of


doing, and may do in the future.
Joint Pub 3-0
INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE is described as the product resulting from


the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,
and interpretation of available information on potential
opponents or enemies. It can also be defined as
knowledge about the enemy obtained through observation,
investigation, analysis, or understanding.
Vego
FIRES
To employ fires is to
use available
weapons and other
systems to create a
specific lethal or
nonlethal effect on a
target.
Joint Pub 3-0
OPERATIONAL FIRES
Fires are considered operational when:
– Their application constitutes a decisive impact on the
conduct of a major operation or campaign
– They are planned and executed by the operational echelon
of command
– They are provided by forces and assets other than those
required for the support of tactical operations
– They are conducted at the operational and strategic depth
of the enemy and of the enemy’s battlespace
OPERATIONAL FIRES

Operational Fires can be described as the application of


one’s lethal and/or nonlethal firepower for generating a
decisive impact on the course and outcome of a campaign
or major operation. They represent today an inherently
multi-service or joint function. They are not simply fire
support; hence, the success of an operational maneuver
is not necessarily dependent on these fires. However,
they can facilitate one’s operational maneuver. They are
conducted in the operational and/or strategic depths of the
enemy’s defenses.
Vego
36
O PE R ATION A L FIRE S IN SU PP O R T O F LE YTE O PER ATION , 10 SEP T - O C T 1944

ALASKA

TKA
HA
MC
KA
AL NS
EU TIA
OC T 44’

M A N C H U R IA

S
LE
R
I N O RTH
TF 38 S OR TIE S KU PAC IFIC
9 C V s/C VL s FO R M O S A - 1,987
1,00 0 A /C LU Z O N - 1 52 AR EA
5 B Bs N AN S E I S H O TO - 26
4 C As S H IPP ING - 4 21
10 C Ls IN TE R CE PT - 2 91
58 D D s
Peiping

KO

N
RE
X VI AR M Y A IR FO RC E

A
A
17 O CT
P
C H IN A Shanghai
YE LLOW J A PAC IFIC O CEA N A REA S
Chengtu
SE A

US
X VI AR M Y AIR FO R CE KY
1 6 O CT
X X B O M BER C O M M A N D U O KINAWA C EN TRAL
15 O CT RY 10 O C T
V OLCA NO S
IW O J IM A
Kunming
109 B -2 9s Canton
FO RM OS A
B O NIN S
8 -10 OC T PAC IFIC
HAWA II
Takao
Hong Kon g 12-14 OCT ARE A
IN

22
F R O -C

TF38
1 5-25 O C T S EP T 17-19 OCT
D
EN HI

Ran goon P HILIP PIN E S M A R C US


TF38 S AIPA N
C H NA

10 O C T M A RIA N AS
E NIW E TOK
1, 2 70
Ban gkok
A N D AM AN S Ca m
(M arshalls)
Rahn
1 7-2 1 OCT
LS

11-20 SE P T
Bay

1 2 OC T Saigon PALAWAN
LEYTE
625 PA LA U
1 ,0 0 0 M

BU

S OU TH
CE

YA P
NEGRO S

C HIN A MINDANAO TR UK
PA LA U S
S EA 1,2 (C arolin es )
IS
1 ,5 .
6 00

50 00 TG 30.2
O P E R ATIO N 2 C As
M ILLE R M OR O TA I 6 D Ds
BO RNEO FE AF E M IR A U
TF 63 Singap ore Balikpapan (St. Ma thia s)
2 CVs EE SS Vog elkop
M A NU S
1 BB LL EEBB Ge elvink
H olland ia
NE
Bay

CC EE TOR O K IN A
3 C As W G
11 D D s
Makassa r
ARU U IN (Bo uga inv ille)
JAVA TANIMBAR IS. IS. EA SO
S EA LO
FLO RES
TIMOR IS.
MO
NS SO UTH
PACIFIC
SOUTHE AST SOUTH W E ST A REA
ARE A CO M M AN D PAC IFIC A REA

A U S TR A L IA A ll a rro w s poin t to Leyte


A ll dis tances in statute m iles

98-C D-62-VEG O (P FR)


OPERATIONAL PROTECTION
A series of actions and
measures conducted in
peacetime, crisis, and war
which is designed to
protect one’s own forces
and establishments.
PROTECTION

A series of actions and


measures conducted in
peacetime, crisis, and war
aimed at preserving the
effectiveness and
survivability of military and
nonmilitary sources of
power deployed or located
within the boundaries of a
given theater.
Vego WWII Chemical Suit

39
LOGISTICS
LOGISTICS deals with planning and
carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. Logistics
encompasses those aspects of military
operations that deal with design and
development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition of material…

Its ultimate purpose is to extend


operational reach or to prevent the
enemy from extending operational
reach of his own combat forces.
Vego
Logistics Core Capabilities
• Supply
• Maintenance Operations
• Deployment and Distribution
• Health Services Support
• Logistic Services
• Engineering
• Operational Contract Support
OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services


necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission
accomplishment and redeployment of the force.

What is operational logistics?


What does the Universal Joint
Task List say about operational
functions?
MOVEMENT & MANEUVER
Movement
Deployment of forces from base(s)
to their point of concentration.

Maneuver
Deployment from points of
concentration to operational
depths in preparation for
employment with the aim of
achieving positional advantage.
DESER T STORM: GROUND OFFENSIVE, 24-27 FEB 1991

AS SAMAWAH

e r
AN N ASIRIYAH

IRAN

v
AL QU RNA H
IRAQ
TA LL IL HA MMA R

u
CA U SEW A Y

ne BA SR A

a
XX
6 FR R U MA ILA
JALIBA H

M
AS SALMAN OIL F IELD AZ ZU BAYR
FOB FOB XX
COB R A COBR A
1 RU MAILA
AL BUSAY YA H
XX SAFWA N
3
III
3

III BU B IYA N
2 ISLA N D
XX
6 FR
XX
82 XX
RA FH A FAYLAKA H
10 1 ISLA ND
KUWAIT

K UWAIT C ITY
X B R I GADE M E CHAN IZED PERSIAN
XX III XX
X XX 2 GULF
X X D IV I SION A RMOR E D CAL VA RY 24 3 XX
XVIII XX XX
II I R E GIMENT F ORWA R D OPE RA TIN G BASE 1 3 1 1
XX
IN FANTR Y 7 UK XX
M A RSH
A RMOR E D 1
A IR BAS E
A IR ASSA ULT
XXX
SAUDI
STATUTE MI LES VII
0 25 50 LOG ARABIA
BA SE
EC HO HA FAR AL- BATIN
0 25 50
KI LOM ETER S

SOURC E : M ICHAEL R. GORDON AN D BERN ARD E . TRAINOR, G ENER AL’S WAR.

CD- 98- VE GO-1 14 (JR N)


SYNCHRONIZATION
The arrangement of military
actions in time, space, and
purpose to produce
maximum relative combat
power, or desired effects, at
a decisive place and time.

Joint Pub 1-02


Synchronization Matrix
Time: C Day/D Pre- Phase I Phase II
Phase III Decisive OPS
Day Phase I Deploy/Deter Shaping OPS

29 APR
CC or OP

17 APR

10 MAY
14 APR

21 APR

6 MAY
Function

CVBG deploys MIO/Sea Control OPS OCA/DCA & CAS

MCM deploys MCM Ops MCM Ops Secondary Ports


JFMCC ARG deploys MEU Supports NEO ARG Sortie > MEU MEU Reembark as Reserve
Raid into XXX.
MPS to port w hen mine lane clrd Offload

MEB Arr/Dep MEB & English Bdes CA


to XXX
82nd Abn deploys 82nd Defends XXX
JFLCC
101st CA > SW XXX
101st deploys

Air Superiority & Tactical Support to JFLCC


AEW Dep to Air/ISR
JFACC XXX Def vic Strat Tgts & OP Fires
XXX
ISR Trans Prime LLOC & OP Ldrshp
JSOTF

JPOTF Counter Adversary IO tgting Muslims & Info to support US/Coalition Legitimacy

Loc Strat/Op Cdrs BDA / Adversary IIntentions


Situation
INTEL CCIR Collection Plan
Assessmnt
PSYOPS Tgts
FIRES Adversary C2/Strat
Initial Log Element Res.Establish BOOs Establish FOBs
LOG Sustainment
Force Flow
COMMAND & Dev Plan & Cmd Rel
CONTROL Req Sup ROE
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Principles of War
o MASS
o OBJECTIVE • What they mean?
o OFFENSIVE
o SURPRISE
o ECONOMY OF FORCE
o MANEUVER
• How they apply?
o UNITY OF COMMAND
o SECURITY
o SIMPLICITY
Other principles
o RESTRAINT
o PERSEVERANCE
o LEGITIMACY
Mass
o Focus on one point
in space and time;
o Concentrates the
effects of combat
power at a decisive
time and place;
o Superiority of effort
at the point of contact
Objective
o Focus on one
purpose
o A clearly defined,
decisive, and
achievable goal
Offensive
o To seize, retain,
and exploit the
initiative
o “He will win who
has the resolution
to advance”
o Soldiers can’t fight
facing backwards!
Surprise
o Strike in a manner
for which the
enemy is
unprepared
o One side preempts
the other
o Creation of the
unexpected
Economy of Force
o Minimize divergent activity
o Wise spending
o Allocate minimum essential combat power to
secondary efforts
o Judicious employment and distribution of forces
Maneuver
o One side dislocates the other;
o Movement of forces in relation to the
enemy to secure a positional advantage;
o Movement of forces to seize the initiative

Invasion of Hollandia April 22, 1944


Unity of Command
o Have one
commander
o Unity of command
in multinational
operations may not
be possible, but
unity of effort is
paramount
Security
o Protection
o One side forestalls the
other
o The ability to prevent
hostile interference
o The purpose is to never
allow the enemy to acquire
an unexpected advantage
o Enhances freedom of
action by reducing
vulnerability to hostile acts
Simplicity
o Focus on one idea
o Orders and plans
should be clear,
uncomplicated, and
brief
Other Principles
Restraint
oLimit collateral
damage and
prevent the
unnecessary use of
force.
Perseverance
o Ensure commitment
necessary to attain
national objectives
o Preparation for
protracted operations
in pursuit of national
objectives
Legitimacy
o Maintain legal and
moral authority in
the conduct of
operations
o Doing the right
thing, legally and
morally.
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Center of Gravity
Center of Gravity

“…the hub of all power and movement,


on which everything depends. That is
the point at which all our energies
should be directed.”
Clausewitz
Center of Gravity

“Primary sources of moral or physical


strength, power and resistance.”

Dr. Joe Strange


Center of Gravity

The source of moral or physical


strength, power, and resistance—what
Clausewitz called “the hub of all power
and movement, on which everything
depends…the point at which our
energies should be directed.”
Joint Pub 3-0
Center of Gravity

That source of massed strength—


physical or moral, or a source of
leverage—whose serious degradation,
dislocation, neutralization, or
destruction would have a decisive
impact on the enemy’s or one’s own
ability to accomplish a given objective.
-Vego
Center of Gravity

“The primary source of strength whose


destruction will prevent accomplishment
of the objective.”
Prof Jim Butler
OBJECTIVE Vego

1 Strategic Center of Gravity Strange


Operational
Critical Factors C.R.
Critical Strengths Critical Weaknesses
2 CC
C.R. C.R
CC CC

Critical COG
6
Vulnerability C.R. CC
CC
C.R.
COG 4
3 CC Critical
Strategic Capability
and CV CV
CV
Operational 5 CV
C.R. C.R. C.R.
C.R.-Critical Requirement

CV CV 6 CV CV CV-Critical Vulnerability
Critical Strengths

Those capabilities or characteristics that are


essential to the accomplishment of a given
objective (and which are adequate to
accomplish that mission).
Vego
Critical Weaknesses
Those capabilities or characteristics that
while essential to the accomplishment of
the objective are themselves grossly
inadequate.
Vego
Critical Vulnerabilities

Critical vulnerabilities are those elements


(critical strength or a critical weakness)
vulnerable to attack.
Critical Capabilities
Things the Center of Gravity is capable of
doing.

Examples: sink ships, deep strike, hold territory


Critical Requirements

Things required for a Critical


Capability to be fully
operational.

Examples: spare parts, ammunition, command


and control
Godzilla
1. Identify strategic and
operational objectives
2. Identify critical strengths,
weaknesses, and
vulnerabilities
3. From list of critical strengths,
identify the one critical
strength required to
accomplish the operational
objective
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
CULMINATION POINT
• The point at which a force no longer has the
capability to continue its form of operations, offense
or defense.
• In the offense, the point at which continuing the
attack is no longer possible and the force must
consider reverting to a defensive posture or
attempting an operational pause.
• In the defense, the point at which counter offensive
action is no longer possible.
(JP-05)
CULMINATION POINT
24th ID

Resupply Replacements
Combat Power

Culmination Point

Offense

Defense

D+7 Time D+17


D+25
D+1 D+5 D+15
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Operations on Interior and Exterior Lines

Exterior P osition

Inte rior
Line s
EXTER Central
Position

CD-97V EG O95 (PFR)

PPT-99-VEGO-08 (PFR)
F ig u re 7: M A IN A N D IN T E R M ED IATE B A S E O F O PE R AT IO N S

P E R AT IO N S

LO O s
LO O s

ASE
O F O P E R AT IO N S
IN T ER M ED I AT E B
M A IN B A S E O F O

LO O s LO O s
PHYSICA L
OB JEC TIVE

LO O s
LO O s

00-V EG O -5 (J RN )
Lineof Operations(LOOs)
CONVERGING
SINGLE (CONCENTRIC)
PARALLEL

DOUBLE

DIVERGING
(ECCENTRIC) EXTERIORPOSITION
MULTIPLE

CENTRALPOSITION
98-CD-23-VEGO-(PFR)
Japanese Lines of
Operation at
Leyte Gulf
THE PHILIPPINES – DECISIVE POINTS
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Lessons Learned
Purpose:
• To achieve decisive victory in war
• To avoid future errors and mistakes
Lessons Learned
Should:
• Consider both sides in the conflict
• Address issues regardless of the
consequences

Should Not:
• Promote self interest or service interest
• Justify certain courses of action
Lessons Learned
• Strategic – derived from the study of the war
as a whole
• Operational – derived from plans, procedures
and doctrine
• Tactical – derived from the use of weapons or
equipment
Lessons Learned
– Strategic – Strategic
• War • Strategic Lift
• Change in Policy inadequate
– Operational
• Plan – Operational
• Change in Doctrine • Insufficient theater
– Tactical logistic support
• Equipment – Tactical
• Need more helos
• Change in TTPs
Lessons Learned Statement
Example: Operational commanders need to
ensure adequate logistic support is available in
the joint operating area before engaging in
hostilities.

Who - Operational commanders


What - Ensure adequate logistic support available
Where - In joint operating area
When - Before engaging in hostilities
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of war
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Exam Preparation

1. Identify strategic and operational objectives


- Friend and Foe
2. Assess Operational Factors
- Space, Time, and Force
3. Evaluate Operational Functions
- Not all may apply
4. Identify relationships between Factors & Functions
5. Conduct Center of Gravity analysis (enemy & friendly)
6. Analyze aspects of theater geometry
7. Identify operational lessons learned
This is an open-book examination which requires individual
work. Answers should be in essay form, double-spaced
typed or legibly handwritten. Please limit responses to not
more than 9 typed pages (approximately 1800 words-12 pt.
font, if typed) for the entire assignment. Each response
(original and two copies) shall be returned to your moderator
NLT 1230, 8 September 2010.

Notes: (1) It is not necessary to define operational terms.


Questions:

1. Assess how well the Japanese used operational functions


to address time, space, and force advantages or disadvantages
in their planning and execution of the invasion of Malaya and
Singapore in 1941-1942.

2. Using the concepts of theater geometry, assess British


defensive planning and execution for the defense of the
Malayan Peninsula and Singapore Island.
This is an open-book examination which requires individual
work. Your answer should be a double-spaced, typed essay
and must be based on the information provided in the
reading package you were provided on 9 December 2004.
Please limit your response to no more than 10 typed pages
(maximum of 2500 words). Your hard-copy response (one
paper original and two paper copies) shall be returned to
your senior seminar moderator not later than 1600 on
Monday 13 December 2004.

Address all three of the following assignments based on your


knowledge and understanding of the key concepts of operational
art. It is not necessary to provide definitions of operational
art terms.
Questions:
1. From the reading, analyze the Allied planning for the Marianas
in terms of the operational factors space, time, and force in
relation to the operational objectives.

2. Analyze the US integration and synchronization of any three


Operational functions into the planning and execution of the
invasion of Saipan, Operation Forager. Use specific examples
from the assigned reading to illustrate your analysis.

3. As highlighted in the Professor Gatchel reading, the


Operational Commander, Admiral Spruance made two
controversial decisions. Using operational art as the basis,
assess both decisions. Provide in your response opposing
arguments and the potential and real effects on Operation
Forager and the larger campaign to defeat Japan.
QUESTIONS?

DETERMINATION

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