Operational Art Review
Operational Art Review
Operational Art Review
REVIEW
Joint Warfighting
Four Questions
• What are the objectives and desired end state? (Ends)
• What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve
those objectives and end state? (Ways)
• What resources are required to accomplish that
sequence of actions? (Means)
• What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable
results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)
JP 3-0
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Elements of National
Power
Diplomatic
D
Chuck Hagel
Secretary of Defense Informational
I Jacob Lew
Secretary of Treasury
Military
M
Economic
E
John Kerry
Secretary of State
James R. Clapper, Jr.
Director of National Intelligence
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Regressive Planning
HERE
ULTIMATE
AND OBJECTIVE
NOW
PROGRESSIVE PLANNING
NEAR FUTURE
TASK TASK
Op
Obj Strat
Obj
Military
Power Op
Obj Op
Obj Op
Obj
Other
Elements
Of Power
Desired End State
The safety of the American people
depends on ending this direct and growing
threat. Acting against the danger will also
contribute greatly to the long-term safety
and stability of our world. The current Iraqi
regime has shown the power of tyranny to
spread discord and violence in the Middle
East. A liberated Iraq can show the power
of freedom to transform that vital region,
by bringing hope and progress into the
lives of millions. America's interests in
security, and America's belief in liberty, President George Bush
both lead in the same direction: to a free February 26, 2003
and peaceful Iraq.
OIF Strategic Objectives
• Eliminate Weapons of
Mass Destruction
• Eliminate terrorists
training bases
NATIONAL STRATEGIC
President Policy / Grand Global
SECDEF Strategy
STRATEGIC
26
COMMAND ORGANIZATION
COMMAND ORGANIZATION refers to
both the physical and human elements of
the military organization established to
ensure the most effective employment of
one’s forces for accomplishing the
assigned military objective(s). In general,
command organization is intended to
provide a structure for establishing the
chain of command and the command
support relationships within a command or
force.
Vego
27
COMMAND & CONTROL
COMMAND and
CONTROL encompasses
the exercise of authority
and direction by a
commander over
assigned and attached
forces to accomplishment
the mission.
Joint Pub 3-0
Allied Command Structure
October 1944
PRESIDENT
JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF (JCS)
TF17
SUBMARINES
VADM
CHIEF OF STAFF 1ST AUSTRALIAN ALLIED NAVAL C.A. LOCKWOOD
GEN J.W. STILLWELL ARMY FORCES
U.S. ARMY LTGEN V.A.H. STURDEE VADM T.C. KINKAID
COMMANDER
6TH U.S. ARMY ALLIED LAND WESTERN PACIFIC TASK
FORCES
LTGEN W. KRUGER, USA
GEN SIR T. BLAMEY
FORCES
COMMANDER GENERAL ADM W. HALSEY
US ARMY FORCES,
C-B-I THEATER ALLIED AIR
USA SOS
GEN J.W. STILLWELL, USA FORCES
TF57
MAJGEN J.L. FRINK, USA
LTGEN G.C. KENNEY, USA TF30
THIRD FLEET FORWARD AREA
ADM W. HALSEY CENTRAL
8TH ARMY PACIFIC
LTGEN R.L. VADM J.H.
EICHELBERGER HOOVER
Japanese Command Structure
October 1944
BOARD OF
SUPREME
FIELD MARSHALS Consultation
EMPEROR
Consultation
WAR
AND
COUNCIL
FLEET ADMIRALS
IMPERIAL GHQ
NAVY SECTION ARMY SECTION
(NAVAL GENERAL STAFF) (ARMY GENERAL STAFF)
ADM K. OIKAWA GEN Y. UMEZU
SURFACE ESCORT
CINC OTHER ARMIES
ADM N. NAUMURA
NAVAL DISTRICTS
AND
GUARD DISTRICTS
COMMAND & CONTROL WARFARE
31
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ALASKA
TKA
HA
MC
KA
AL NS
EU TIA
OC T 44’
M A N C H U R IA
S
LE
R
I N O RTH
TF 38 S OR TIE S KU PAC IFIC
9 C V s/C VL s FO R M O S A - 1,987
1,00 0 A /C LU Z O N - 1 52 AR EA
5 B Bs N AN S E I S H O TO - 26
4 C As S H IPP ING - 4 21
10 C Ls IN TE R CE PT - 2 91
58 D D s
Peiping
KO
N
RE
X VI AR M Y A IR FO RC E
A
A
17 O CT
P
C H IN A Shanghai
YE LLOW J A PAC IFIC O CEA N A REA S
Chengtu
SE A
US
X VI AR M Y AIR FO R CE KY
1 6 O CT
X X B O M BER C O M M A N D U O KINAWA C EN TRAL
15 O CT RY 10 O C T
V OLCA NO S
IW O J IM A
Kunming
109 B -2 9s Canton
FO RM OS A
B O NIN S
8 -10 OC T PAC IFIC
HAWA II
Takao
Hong Kon g 12-14 OCT ARE A
IN
22
F R O -C
TF38
1 5-25 O C T S EP T 17-19 OCT
D
EN HI
10 O C T M A RIA N AS
E NIW E TOK
1, 2 70
Ban gkok
A N D AM AN S Ca m
(M arshalls)
Rahn
1 7-2 1 OCT
LS
11-20 SE P T
Bay
1 2 OC T Saigon PALAWAN
LEYTE
625 PA LA U
1 ,0 0 0 M
BU
S OU TH
CE
YA P
NEGRO S
C HIN A MINDANAO TR UK
PA LA U S
S EA 1,2 (C arolin es )
IS
1 ,5 .
6 00
50 00 TG 30.2
O P E R ATIO N 2 C As
M ILLE R M OR O TA I 6 D Ds
BO RNEO FE AF E M IR A U
TF 63 Singap ore Balikpapan (St. Ma thia s)
2 CVs EE SS Vog elkop
M A NU S
1 BB LL EEBB Ge elvink
H olland ia
NE
Bay
CC EE TOR O K IN A
3 C As W G
11 D D s
Makassa r
ARU U IN (Bo uga inv ille)
JAVA TANIMBAR IS. IS. EA SO
S EA LO
FLO RES
TIMOR IS.
MO
NS SO UTH
PACIFIC
SOUTHE AST SOUTH W E ST A REA
ARE A CO M M AN D PAC IFIC A REA
39
LOGISTICS
LOGISTICS deals with planning and
carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. Logistics
encompasses those aspects of military
operations that deal with design and
development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition of material…
Maneuver
Deployment from points of
concentration to operational
depths in preparation for
employment with the aim of
achieving positional advantage.
DESER T STORM: GROUND OFFENSIVE, 24-27 FEB 1991
AS SAMAWAH
e r
AN N ASIRIYAH
IRAN
v
AL QU RNA H
IRAQ
TA LL IL HA MMA R
u
CA U SEW A Y
ne BA SR A
a
XX
6 FR R U MA ILA
JALIBA H
M
AS SALMAN OIL F IELD AZ ZU BAYR
FOB FOB XX
COB R A COBR A
1 RU MAILA
AL BUSAY YA H
XX SAFWA N
3
III
3
III BU B IYA N
2 ISLA N D
XX
6 FR
XX
82 XX
RA FH A FAYLAKA H
10 1 ISLA ND
KUWAIT
K UWAIT C ITY
X B R I GADE M E CHAN IZED PERSIAN
XX III XX
X XX 2 GULF
X X D IV I SION A RMOR E D CAL VA RY 24 3 XX
XVIII XX XX
II I R E GIMENT F ORWA R D OPE RA TIN G BASE 1 3 1 1
XX
IN FANTR Y 7 UK XX
M A RSH
A RMOR E D 1
A IR BAS E
A IR ASSA ULT
XXX
SAUDI
STATUTE MI LES VII
0 25 50 LOG ARABIA
BA SE
EC HO HA FAR AL- BATIN
0 25 50
KI LOM ETER S
29 APR
CC or OP
17 APR
10 MAY
14 APR
21 APR
6 MAY
Function
JPOTF Counter Adversary IO tgting Muslims & Info to support US/Coalition Legitimacy
Critical COG
6
Vulnerability C.R. CC
CC
C.R.
COG 4
3 CC Critical
Strategic Capability
and CV CV
CV
Operational 5 CV
C.R. C.R. C.R.
C.R.-Critical Requirement
CV CV 6 CV CV CV-Critical Vulnerability
Critical Strengths
Resupply Replacements
Combat Power
Culmination Point
Offense
Defense
Exterior P osition
Inte rior
Line s
EXTER Central
Position
PPT-99-VEGO-08 (PFR)
F ig u re 7: M A IN A N D IN T E R M ED IATE B A S E O F O PE R AT IO N S
P E R AT IO N S
LO O s
LO O s
ASE
O F O P E R AT IO N S
IN T ER M ED I AT E B
M A IN B A S E O F O
LO O s LO O s
PHYSICA L
OB JEC TIVE
LO O s
LO O s
00-V EG O -5 (J RN )
Lineof Operations(LOOs)
CONVERGING
SINGLE (CONCENTRIC)
PARALLEL
DOUBLE
DIVERGING
(ECCENTRIC) EXTERIORPOSITION
MULTIPLE
CENTRALPOSITION
98-CD-23-VEGO-(PFR)
Japanese Lines of
Operation at
Leyte Gulf
THE PHILIPPINES – DECISIVE POINTS
OPERATIONAL ART REVIEW
• Strategy
• Elements of National Power
• Regressive Planning
• Desired End State
• Levels of War
• Operational Factors
• Operational Functions
• Principles of War
• Center of Gravity
• Culmination Point
• Theater Geometry
• Lessons Learned
• Exam Prep
Lessons Learned
Purpose:
• To achieve decisive victory in war
• To avoid future errors and mistakes
Lessons Learned
Should:
• Consider both sides in the conflict
• Address issues regardless of the
consequences
Should Not:
• Promote self interest or service interest
• Justify certain courses of action
Lessons Learned
• Strategic – derived from the study of the war
as a whole
• Operational – derived from plans, procedures
and doctrine
• Tactical – derived from the use of weapons or
equipment
Lessons Learned
– Strategic – Strategic
• War • Strategic Lift
• Change in Policy inadequate
– Operational
• Plan – Operational
• Change in Doctrine • Insufficient theater
– Tactical logistic support
• Equipment – Tactical
• Need more helos
• Change in TTPs
Lessons Learned Statement
Example: Operational commanders need to
ensure adequate logistic support is available in
the joint operating area before engaging in
hostilities.
DETERMINATION