2022 Strategic Forecasting and Risk Analysis - Lecture 6
2022 Strategic Forecasting and Risk Analysis - Lecture 6
Dr. V. MAGADZIRE
Ph.D. in Economics, United Kingdom
Ph.D. in Public Policy, South Korea
Master of Public Policy, Japan
Master of International Business, The Netherlands
Master of Science in Finance and Investment, NUST Zim
B.Com (Hons) in Banking, NUST Zimbabwe
Strategic Intelligence and Game Theory
Objectives
Strategic moves
A strategic move:
e.g.
e.g.
Credibility
requires a
commitment to the strategic move
Strategic moves
Strategic moves thus contain two
elements:
i. threats and
ii. promises
Threats and promises
e.g.
e.g.
A strategicmove is always a
preemptive action
As a result -:
commitment to an action or
response rule transforms an
otherwise simultaneous-move game
into a sequential-move game
Threats and promises
Example -:
Example cont’ -:
Example cont’ -: