The End of

Military
Rule
THE FALL OF DICTATORSHIP
I. Introduction
 President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed power on December
30,1965, and become the second president reelected to office in 1969.
There were efforts to maneuver the 1971 Constitutional Convention
to permit his continuing in office. With the swell of student
radicalization and increasing number of violent demonstrations,
Marcos played up middle-class fears and used these to justify the
imposition of Martial law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of
Proclamation No.1081.
 Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under
the 1935 Constitution – Marcos went further to assume all governing powers
excluded civilian courts, and systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the
1973 Constitution for his own ends. The replacement of the Constitution was done
under dubious circumstances.

 First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10 – 15, 1973 in which the
voting age was reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution. Military men were
placed prominently to intimidate voters. Results report that 90% of the citizens have
voted for the Constitution even though some communities did not participate in the
“citizens assemblies”. Over the next few years, Marcos would hold four more
plebiscites – in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978 - through citizen assemblies to
legitimize the continuation of martial rule.
 Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the stick and
carrot method on the justices of the Supreme Court, Ferdinand Marcos was able
to force the Supreme Court to uphold martial law and the new Constitution.
Previously, around 8,000 individuals , including senators, civil libertarians,
journalists, students, and labor leaders, were arrested and detained without due
process upon the declaration of martial law. With many of them filing petitions to
the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, they challenged the constitutionality of the
proclamation. However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision and
dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political
question beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had
already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935
Constitution.
 Martial Law imposed government control over all forms of media. On
September 22, 1972, Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No.1, ordering the Press
Secretary and Defense Secretary to assume control over all media outlets.
 Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed press
freedom. Journalists who did not comply with the new restrictions faced physical
threats, libel suits, or forced resignation. With such stringent censorship
regulations, most of the periodicals that were allowed to operate were crony
newspapers, such as Benjamin Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans Menzi’s
Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s Philippine Daily Express. These
newspapers offered “bootlicking reportage” on the country’s economy while
completely eschewing political issues. Hence, President Marcos’ absolute rule
had a “cloak of legality” and incontestability, making it nearly impregnable.
 However, specific factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the dictatorship and
the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines.

 The factors that led to the fall of the dictatorship includes:

- Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s (Reformist, Revolutionary, and
Religious Opposition)
- Marcos’ Health and the Issue of Succession
- The collapse of the Philippine Economy
- The assassination of Ninoy Aquino
- The failure of the snap election of 1986
- The coup plot by the RAM
II. Factors that led to the fall of
the Dictatorship
A. Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s
- Popular anti-Marcos sentiment existed for the duration of Martial
Law. According to David Wurfel, there were three (3) paramount
types of opposition to martial law during the 1970s: reformist
opposition, revolutionary opposition, and religious opposition.
• Reformist Opposition – also known as the legal opposition, was composed of members of
the upper-middle class.
 Using nonviolent tactics, they advocated political reforms. However, the reformist
opposition was not a united movement, but an amalgamation of different middle and upper
class groups who had different motives. It was for this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so
long as they were incapable of viably replacing him or attaining the support of the masses.
The reformist opposition was divided on the issue of boycotting the Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7. The most prominent opposition movement that
participated the IBP elections was the newly formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of
former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was imprisoned at that time. Ninoy
decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a chance to air out their
frustration against the government. However, the elections were a total shutout for LABAN,
with Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) winning 91% of the seats in the IBP.
• Revolutionary Opposition – the government’s use of communist and secessionist
threats as justification for Martial Law only contributed to the growth of the political
opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the 1970s. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal” firearms supplied by Libya,
sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to 1977. Over the course of the war, 13,000
people were killed while over a million were displaced. In contrast, the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship weakened; as
opposed to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974.
Following the principle of “centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP
established autonomous, regional, self-sustaining chapters all over the Philippines. Not
only did this give CPP cadres more freedom to experiment with tactics appropriate to
their localities, it also helped them survive the loss of many original leaders, either to
prison or death.
•Religious Opposition – Martial law also faced opposition from the religious sector.
Mainline Protestant churches have been vocal in their opposition of the dictatorship since 1972; by
1978, they were holding mass protest actions and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April
plebiscite and the June presidential elections. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church, which sympathized
with Marcos’ anti-communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while paying attention
to the opposition among its members. This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying
out their social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the poor against
communism.

However, the provincial clergy started becoming radicalized after seeing the effects of the Marcos
dictatorship on the poor. They formed Christians for National Liberation, which clandestinely used
Church “social action” programs to get foreign funding through private donor agencies that shared the
same views. On January 17, 1981, in an effort to calm the growing opposition of the Catholic Church,
President Marcos lifted martial law (if by name only) via Proclamation No. 2045 in preparation for the
first state visit of Saint Pope John Paul II on February 17, 1981.
B. Marcos’ Health and the Issue of
Succession
 As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating. This was kept a secret at first,
but it was common knowledge then that Marcos was already sick, especially at the time of the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of 1984. Blas Ople,
Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on record on December 3, 1984,
saying that Marcos was “in control but cannot take major initiatives at this time.” He stated that, “The
health of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems which started a year ago.”
On October 28, 1985, according to congressional and US intelligence sources quoted by the Washington
Post, Marcos was diagnosed with an “incurable, recurring sickness” called systemic lupus erythematosus.
This disease was further complicated by Marcos’ diabetes. Marcos’ failing health, coupled with the
looming threat from the anti-capitalist left, led to widespread concern for a stable succession among the
country’s economic elite—the main beneficiaries of Martial Law’s crony capitalism.
C. The collapse of the Philippine
Economy
In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was almost
grinding to a halt. This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos administration
implemented its three-pronged development strategy: the green revolution in
agriculture, growth and diversity in agricultural and forestry exports, and
massive external borrowing. The profit from these three strategies were amassed
disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population, thereby causing a large
disparity between the rich and the poor.
 In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant
—then considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with
Marcos’ ostentatious vision of himself and the country.
However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the power
plant would have generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s population.
Security was another issue: there were four active volcanoes located within 100
miles from the proposed site. Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the poorest
nations setting out on the nuclear path; only Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea
were building nuclear power plants in East Asia, and they were far better off
economically and technologically. The power plant was the largest and most
expensive construction project in the country’s history. 
 The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,” relatively tolerated the
systematic favoritism of the administration on crony companies. This changed In 1981, when
Filipino Chinese business tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo Central Bank left the country for
Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously compromising the crony corporations.
Government banks announced a rescue fund of approximately P5 billion in credit and equity
capital, which the old elite found unfair, launching a barrage of public criticism.
The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the middle class and the
small-time landowners and farmers in the regions on the Marcos administration. Poverty, aside
from human rights violations by the military, also became a means for rebel groups to recruit
citizens to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) grew
from 6,900 to over 20,000 regulars. In 1980, the New People’s Army formed 26 guerrilla fronts
with over 16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the Philippines have attracted 40,000
mass activists.
D. The Assassination of Ninoy Aquino
 After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., the foremost leader
of the Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore democracy
in the country and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession. Previously, Aquino had
been incarcerated by the military for seven years before being released for bypass surgery in the
United States. Ninoy Aquino’s conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr. before he went
back to the Philippines was revealing. Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China
Airlines Flight 811 at 1:05 p.m. on August 21, and was escorted by armed men out of the plane.
Minutes later, gunshots were heard. The former senator was shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the
head. When the news of Ninoy’s death spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral
procession on August 31, the biggest and longest in Philippine history. This singular event further
eroded the people’s support of the Marcos regime.
E. The Failure of the Snap Election of
1986
 In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David
Brinkley Show, he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far as to invite the
members of the US Congress to observe, calling the accusation of fraud as unfounded.  This, it
seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the United States the legitimacy of the
Marcos administration. The announcement for a snap election within three months was ahead of
schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be held in 1987. The President was
overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his family, his Cabinet, and his party. Meanwhile,
prior to the snap election announcement, a “Convenor Group” was formed, composed of Lorenzo
Tañada, Jaime V. Ongpin, and Cory Aquino, to select a presidential candidate for the opposition.
Cory was regarded as the rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,” who was also promoted by
Jaime Cardinal Sin.
 For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization
(UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party (LP) formed the National Unification Committee’s
(NUC). Laurel was nominated by the NUC’s Nominating Convention held at the Araneta
Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the opposition party for the coming Snap elections.
Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap election was to be held, and
if she had the support of a million citizens. he was successful in gaining this support. The
opposition, therefore had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador “Doy” Laurel.
However, in the same year, on December 7, Laurel decided to give way to Aquino. Though
initially reluctant, Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was the only way the
opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos and the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s vice president. In Teodoro L. Locsin
Jr.’s article in the Philippine Free Press, Cory served as the “symbol of unity.” Aquino and
Laurel ran together under the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).
 During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos used gender as an issue in his
campaign broadcast against rival for the presidency, Corazon C. Aquino. This broadcast warns
that a woman would not be able to handle the challenges of the post.
Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of the elections, February
7, 1986. Thousands of registered voters—who had voted successfully in previous elections—
found their names suspiciously missing from the lists. On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees
and computer operators at the COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the
wide discrepancy between the computer tabulation and the tally board, showing blatant
manipulation of electoral results. In the countryside, precincts were hounded by the military and
ballot-rigging was rampant. NAMFREL, in turn, showed Aquino in the lead with almost
70 percent of the votes canvassed.
By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met with public outrage, the
Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo Tolentino as the winners of the presidential
and vice-presidential race respectively, by virtue of Resolution No. 38. Opposition assemblymen
walked out of the Session Hall in protest.
 This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day where
Cory Aquino spoke to around two million people in Luneta, in what would be
known as the Tagumpay ng Bayan rally. At the event, Aquino called for massive
civil disobedience and boycott of Marcos-crony owned companies and products.
The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed victory.
The International Observer Delegation, composed of 44 delegates from 19
different countries who observed the electoral process, also released their report
citing disturbing anomalies in the election results and subsequent intimidation of
voters. Because of the calls for a boycott of crony companies announced by Cory
Aquino, San Miguel Corporation fell in the stock market. The Manila
Bulletin also lost a significant number of readers.
F. Coup Plot by the RAM
 The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a small, secret group
intent on strengthening military rule through a coup d’état. Initially, it was composed of Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of regular officers from the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). By early 1985, the RAM was a fully organized group
with a leadership committee of 11 men and a membership base of around three hundred.
Although relatively small, the RAM had the support of a majority of AFP officers, especially the
PMA regulars. By the middle of the year, the RAM went public, yet popular suspicion regarding
the movement’s integrity arose due to its inclusion of former military torturers. Still, most media
outlets ignored their human rights record, choosing instead to paint the RAM as reformers.
 Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when President Marcos unexpectedly
called for snap elections in November, RAM leaders had to rethink their strategy, and the coup was
postponed for the following year. When Marcos was proclaimed the winner in the fraudulent February 7
elections, the RAM leaders agreed to launch their coup at 2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23,
1986.

Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not have the command experience to
successfully carry out the complicated operation, after almost ten years of sitting in air-conditioned offices.
 And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On the Thursday before the planned coup, he summoned
his senior officers and engineered a trap. He ordered a navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines
along the palace riverfront.

 As the rebels made their way toward the palace on rafts, Ver would blind them with powerful spotlights.
Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out with a loud hailer, giving the rebels a
final chance to surrender. If the rebels did not stand down, they would be blown sky high. The rebels only
realized that their plan had been compromised on the Friday night before the coup, when Honasan and
Kapunan saw a large number of troops amassing at Malacañang. They informed Enrile about the situation,
and the assault on the palace had to be called off.
Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the “more
honorable” option. He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a press
conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos, Ver’s deemed
successor. In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on former PMA
classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very least neutrality, thus undermining
Marcos’ defenses. Aquino was at an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City. She was informed of the
coup, but she was also suspicious of Enrile’s motives. Half a day later, she announced her
support for the rebellion and asked the people to help.
 On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with whatever provisions they could
offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza, tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas. Edwin Lacierda,
presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S. Aquino III, was there to witness: “More than a
rally,” he recalls, “all of us came to EDSA to break bread and fellowship with all who were
willing to stand in the line of fire and take the bullet, as it were, for freedom and change of
government.”
 Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution. The revolution was a
peaceful one, with soldiers being coaxed with food, prayers, flowers, and cheers
by people from all walks of life who sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the
tanks. In the evening of February 22, Marcos  personally telephoned General
Prospero Olivas five times, ordering him to disperse the crowd at Camp
Aguinaldo, because their presence would complicate an assault. A mentee of
Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded Marcos’ orders. Marcos
then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district commander, but Lim
was also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’ orders. On February 24,
Marcos was heard over the radio, “We’ll wipe them out. It is obvious they are
committing rebellion.”
 On that Monday morning, government troops headed by Marine battalions
began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen of
helicopters encircled the camp. The tensed crowd around the Constabulary
Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the helicopters approached.
The government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo and trained their
howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. General Josephus Ramas gave the
Fourth Marine brigade the “kill order” while civilians were still inside, but the
brigade’s commander Colonel Braulio Balbas hesitated. Ramas would ask Balbas
to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled. Marcos lost control of the
Marines.
 At around the same time, a rebel frigate anchored at the mouth of the Pasig River had its guns aimed
at Malacañan, just three kilometers away. Earlier that morning, Naval Defense Force chief Commodore
Tagumpay Jardiniano told his men that he had declared himself for Enrile and Ramos. His men stood
up and applauded, and Marcos lost control of the navy. Marcos, together with Ver appeared on
television for a Press Conference. Ver requested Marcos permission to attack Camp Crame. But Marcos
postured on TV to restrain Ver, saying “My order is to disperse without shooting them”.
However, when Marine commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver later, Ver confirmed that
Marcos approved the kill order on Crame. Following a rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General
Ver radioed the wing commander of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them to bomb Camp Crame.
Francisco Baula, the squadron leader and RAM member, answered sarcastically: “Yes, sir, roger.
Proceeding now to strafe Malacañang.”
General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente Piccio to launch an air attack on Camp
Crame, to which General Piccio replied, “But, sir, we have no more gunships. They have just been
destroyed.” Marcos lost control of the air force. After Marcos lost complete control of the military, his
presidency came to an end the following day, on February 25, 1986.
SOURCE :
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