Computer Network Assignment Help
Computer Network Assignment Help
Problem 3 (Cournot Competition with Different Costs): Suppose each of two firms
produces a homogeneous good and the two firms simultaneously choose quatities
q1, q2 ∈ (0, ∞) to produce. Inverse demand given total quantity Q = q1 + q2 is P(Q)
= a Q for some a > 0. Both firms have constant marginal costs of production, but
firm 1 has a higher cost: c1 > c2.
Problem 4 (Bertrand Competition with Discrete Pricing): Suppose each of two firms
produces a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost 1 2 . The two firms
simultaneously set integer valued prices (that is, pi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} for each firm i ∈
{1, 2}). Total demand is 1 at any price less than 4, and total demand is zero if the
price is 4 or higher.
(a) Suppose the two firms split demand evenly if they choose the same price;
otherwise the full demand goes to the lower priced firm. Charactcerize the set
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
(b) Suppose firm 1 is the “incumbent,” and will retain all demand unless firm 2
undercuts firm 1’s price. That is, if the two firms charge the same price, firm 1
receives the full demand. Characterize the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
That is, player i earns a unit of utility for each red neighbor she matches and loses
a unit of utility for each blue neighbor she matches. Show that this is an (exact)
potential game.
Problem 6: Consider the traffic flow game pictured in the figure below. There are
two origindestination pairs. A unit of traffic needs to flow from the upper left to
the upper right, and another unit needs to flow from the lower left to the lower
right. The cost functions are given in the figure.
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/
(a) What is the socially optimal routing, and what is its total cost?
(b) What is the equilibrium routing? What is the welfare loss relative to the optimum?
(c) Suppose you can impose constant tolls on some edges and constant subsidies on
others. Design a system of tolls and subsidies to implement the social optimum as
an equilibrium.
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/
Solution
Problem 3
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/
Problem 4
(a) Firm i earns profit (pi 1/2)qi where pi is its own action and qi is 4 if pi < pj
∧ 4, 2 if pi = pj < 4, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the normal form game is given by
The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (p1, p2) = (1, 1) and (2, 2).
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/
(b) Now, the normal form game is given by
Therefore, the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is (p1, p2) = (1, 1).
(c) Compared to (1, 1) in (a), firm 1 benefits for payoff 1 by its incumbency;
however, relative to (2, 2) in (a), firm 1 loses payoff of 1.
Problem 5
Define Φ : S → R by
Problem 6
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/
For any Assignment related queries, Call us at : - +1 678 648 4277
You can mail us at : - [email protected] or
reach us at : - www.computernetworkassignmenthelp.com/