CHAPTER III

THE LAWYER AND THE

COURTS
 CANON 10
A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT
 COBB – PEREZ V. LANTIN
24 SCRA 291 (1968)
Facts:
Basically, the spouses Perez were involved in a civil case where a simple money
judgment was rendered against them. To execute the judgment, the court levied
upon shares of stock of the spouses.
With the help of the spouses counsels Attys. Baizas and Bolinas, they resorted to a
series of actions and petitions for the sole purpose of delaying the execution of the
simple money judgment which has long been final and executory.
What they did was attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the
postponement of the execution sale six times. More than eight years after the
finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In the court’s final judgment, the writ of execution
against the spouses Perez was upheld, and in addition,
the Supreme Court assessed treble costs against
petitioners, to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Crispin
D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, while submitting to the
judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the
decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
"professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the
treble costs adjudged against their clients.
 COBB – PEREZ V. LANTIN
24 SCRA 291 (1968)

ISSUE:

W/N Attys. Baizas and Bolinas should be made to pay treble

costs.
 COBB – PEREZ V. LANTIN
24 SCRA 291 (1968)
HELD:
YES. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao contends that if there was delay it was because they
happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned. The court
replied that a counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client's cause
must been couraged and is to be commended; what the court does not and cannot countenance
isa lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position. It is the duty of a
counsel to advise his clients if he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
client's propensity to litigate. Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty tohis
client and that to the court, he should resolve the conflict against the former and in favor of
the latter, his primary responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to
discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case
pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not
only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on
Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, denied the said motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging
that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without
the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according
to the prosecution here are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand,
after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar
on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be
resumed. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the
accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17,1963, June 13,
1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963,February 11,
1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7,1964."
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO 57 SCRA 473 (1974)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as counsel

de oficio
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO 57 SCRA 473 (1974)

RULING:
If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due
to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath
and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be
prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. The
admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal
practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to
court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self interest.
 RULE 10.01
A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO ANY
FALSEHOOD, NOR CONSENT TO THE
DOING OF ANY IN COURT; NOR SHALL HE
MISLEAD, OR ALLOW THE COURT TO BE
MISLEAD BY ANY ARTIFICE.
 YOUNG V. BATUEGAS, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)
FACTS:
The Complainant - private prosecutor filed an Affidavit-Complaint by for
disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood
in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for
Murder, entitled People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27.On December 13,
2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily
surrendered toa person in authority and is under detention.
However, upon personal verification with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he
surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the
Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M.
Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI.
The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the
custody of the NBI on December13, 2000 was false.
They craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and were under
detention.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila,
Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000
lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant,
violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach
the Certificate of Detention.
The instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, and recommended
that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of
their profession as a lawyer for six (6) months. The complaint
against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa is dismissed for lack of merit.
 YOUNG V. BATUEGAS, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)

ISSUE:
W/N Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and
Franklin Q. Susa shall be disbarred for allegedly committing deliberate
falsehood in court and violating the lawyer’s oath.
 YOUNG V. BATUEGAS, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)
RULE:
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.
He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The
courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at
the expense of truth.
To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath
when they resorted to deception.
Respondent clerk of court; should not hesitate to inform the judge if he
should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to
the established rules of procedure. Respondent clerk of court should not be
made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the
trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge.
However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not
involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and
sound administration of justice. Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the
judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are
contrary to the established rules of procedure.
 RULE 10. 02
A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY MISQUOTE OR
MISREPRESENT THE CONTENTS OF A PAPER, THE
LANGUAGE OR THE ARGUMENT OF OPPOSING
COUNSEL, OR THE TEXT OF A DECISION OR
AUTHORITY, OR KNOWINGLY CITE AS LAW A
PROVISION ALREADY RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY
REPEL OR AMENDMENT, OR ASSERT AS A FACT THAT
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN PROVED.
 INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE LTD. EMPLOYEES
ASSO. V. INSULAR LIFE, 37 SCRA 244
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., et. al. (hereinafter referred to as the Unions),
while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into
separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as
the Companies).
The Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary
and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel
manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on
the Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop,
as a result of which the Unions filed a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective
bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently. But, the parties negotiated on the
labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a deadlock on the matter of
salary increases.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31,
1958,some management men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines succeeded in
penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to
the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some
picketers. Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies then filed
criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila. Another
letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers telling them to report
back to office on or before June 2, 1958 or else the company will hire people to
replace them in their positions.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies
required them not only to secure clearances from the City
Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee among the members of which were
Enaje and Garcia. Subsequently, when practically all the
strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal’s office, the
Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions
who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed “acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,”
without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed.
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE LTD. EMPLOYEES
ASSO. V. INSULAR LIFE, 37 SCRA 244

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the
Court of Industrial Relations be cited in contempt for not quoting the
Supreme Court’s decision properly
 INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE LTD. EMPLOYEES
ASSO. V. INSULAR LIFE, 37 SCRA 244
HELD:
NO. Hereunder stated is the copy of the decision made by Judge Arsenio Martinez:
For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal
charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline
on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charged was
based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest...The act of the employees now under consideration may be
considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez,
Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-
20179-81, December 28, 1964.)
Hereunder stated is the copy of the Supreme Court’s decision where Judge Martinez
copied his judgment:
For it must be remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on
its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's interest.
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60un-underscored words of the paragraph
quoted by the respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this
Court's decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the
quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..."whereas it reads, "For it must
be remembered ...,"in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision,
appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence
is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment
for contempt against the respondent Judge. We are inclined to believe that the
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate
attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. Anyway, the
import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent
Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the
particular ruling in this Court's decision.
In citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of
courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word
and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. It is because ever present is
the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and
rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled.
 RULE 10. 03
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
SHALL NOT MIUSE THEM TO
DEFEAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
 CANON 11
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
 IN RE SOTTO, 82 PHIL. 595 (1949)

FACTS:
Atty. Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt in connection with his written statement of the SC’s
decision in the matter of Angel Parazo’s case which was published in
Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality.
Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to
file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of
the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not
deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published.
He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has no power
to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive.
He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the
honesty or integrity of any one.”
 IN RE SOTTO, 82 PHIL. 595 (1949)

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Vicente Sotto is guilty of contempt?

 IN RE SOTTO, 82 PHIL. 595 (1949)
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its
members. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices
deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators
of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were
the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be
rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and
no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are
based on fact.
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from
office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD V.
CLORIBEL, 31 SCRA 1 (1970)
FACTS:
In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24 SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which
was not favorable to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latter’s lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago then
filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by him where
the following paragraph was stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen
messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their
judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or
unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala
daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court —seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved —and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to
inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the 1968 decision of
the Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago soughtthe inhibition of two Justices: Justice
Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of the vice president of the
opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion because immediately after
the 1968 decision, his son was appointed to a significant position in the government.
(Here Atty. Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their decision was
influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the above paragraph and
was only included due to inadvertence. But that any rate, he averred that the language
he used was necessary to defend his client.
 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD V.
CLORIBEL, 31 SCRA 1 (1970)

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.

 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD V.
CLORIBEL, 31 SCRA 1 (1970)
HELD:
Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first
duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to
this, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and
must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiago’s defense is
not tenable
.A lawyer must avoid language that tend tocreate an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief in the judicial system. Alawyer’s duties to the Court have become
common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one
such duty: ‘To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers.’
 RULE 11.01
A LAWYER SHALL APPEAR
IN COURT PROPERLY
ATTIRED.
 RULE 11.02
A LAWYER SHALL
PUNCTUALLY APPEAR AT
COURT HEARINGS.
 RULE 11.03
A LAWYER SHALL ABSTAIN FROM
SCANDALOUS, OFFENSIVE OR
MENACING LANGUAGE OR
BEHAVIOR BEFORE THE COURTS.
 IN RE ALMACEN, 31 SCRA (1970)
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “ peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice...”. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice... is not only blind, but
also deaf and dumb.”. The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of
time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court
of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he
thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is
only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence
in the justice system.
 IN RE ALMACEN, 31 SCRA (1970)

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for
his acts.
 IN RE ALMACEN, 31 SCRA (1970)
HELD:
YES. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty.
Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so
noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners but the
sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular
case is sui generisin its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases
were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was
imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may
be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
atrial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the ltgal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. Atty. Almacen is
suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
 SANGALANG V. IAC, 177 SCRA 87 (1989)
FACTS:
Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of Jupiter Street, Makati
Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter
Street initially filed a case against Ayala to enforce by specific performance
restrictive easement upon property pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of
sale covering the subdivision, and for damages. The other petitions were also for the
enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by
the Ayala Corporation.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC subject to
certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a
part of each deed of sale. When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to
appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block
between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to
Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped. Altough it was not part of the
original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along
Jupiter.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing
for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village
was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south
extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. Under the zoning classifications,
Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common boundary of Bel-Air Village and the
commercial zone.
The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC
subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions
which formed a part of each deed of sale. When MDC sold the above-
mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the whole stretch of the
commercial block between Buendia Avenue and Jupiter Street, from Reposo
Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was still undeveloped. Altough
it was not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or wall on the
commercial block along Jupiter.In 1975, the municipal council of Makati
enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh.
18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line
of Jupiter Street. Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is
a common boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the
defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of
contract and on tort or quasi-delict. After trial on the merits, the then
Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and awarded damages.
Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall at
its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac
Street in the east, at its own expense.
On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed
from as not supported by the facts and the law on the matter, it was set
aside and another one entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause of
action.
 SANGALANG V. IAC, 177 SCRA 87 (1989)

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Ayala Corporation is liable for damages as a

result of the destruction of the perimeter wall.
2. Whether or not the exercise of police power is valid.
 SANGALANG V. IAC, 177 SCRA 87 (1989)

HELD:
1. NO. Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and
Ayala Corporation's commercial section, it had been considered as a
boundary not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of
Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects, hence it cannot be
said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents.
Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of
Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves
reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air
Village Association itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was
intended for the use by both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not
originally constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of either block, least of all the
residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from
the general public. When the wall was erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and
1972, it was not for the purpose of physically separating the two blocks. According to
Ayala Corporation, it was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better
control of the security in the area, and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill".
That maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual obligation on the part of
Ayala, to be pure conjecture. In fine, we cannot hold the Ayala Corporation liable for
damages for a commitment it did not make, much less for alleged resort to
machinations in evading it.
2. Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably
described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense,
the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power
may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical,
unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the
western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise
of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality.
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY, ETC., A.M. NO. 10-
10-4- SC MARCH 8, 2011
FACTS:
Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves. The right to criticize
the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the
equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics
are noton ly citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has
repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving
the Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the
counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of states
in protecting its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to
jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement thereto asserting that the
Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true
intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice
Marianodel Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments
laid down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Court’s formation of an ethics committee
tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism,
the authors who were purportedly plagiarized sent their
respective letters to the Supreme Court, noting the misreading
and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their articles,
they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can be
classified as crimes against humanity, thus attaining the jus
cogens status; consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to
seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the
Vinuya decision cited them to support the contrary stand.
In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with
a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” (Restoring Integrity Statement),
which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the
same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted
online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme
Court. The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein,
the Court believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are
lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing
respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of
the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conversely,
compliance to such resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one respondent.
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY, ETC., A.M. NO. 10-
10-4- SC MARCH 8, 2011

ISSUES:

1.)Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution denies

respondents their freedom of expression
2.)Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates
respondents’ academic freedom as law professors
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY, ETC., A.M. NO. 10-
10-4- SC MARCH 8, 2011

HELD:
Petition DENIED.
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom
of expression A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show
that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of
the Court nor tha tthey had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution .It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the “proper disposition” and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show
Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the
Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances
surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court
of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom
with responsibility. Thus, proscribed are the use of unnecessary language
which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust
in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of the Court.
In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the right to
criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced
against the equally primordial concern that the independence of
the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the
Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this
Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency
The Show Cause Resolution does not violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors. There is nothing in
the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the
manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for
this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary
action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case,
without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly
done in their capacity as teachers.
Academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Barmay be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give
due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith
in the legal profession and the justice system. The Court
believes that the reason that freedom of expression may
beso delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
The Court reiterates that lawyers when they teach law
are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers
who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must
be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is
inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers
 RULE 11.04
A LAWYER SHALL NOT ATTRIBUTE
TO A JUDGE MOTIVES NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR
HAVING NO MATERIALITY TO THE
CASE.
 RULE 11.05
A LAWYER SHALL SUBMIT
GRIEVANCES AGAINST A
JUDGE TO THE PROPER
AUTHORITIES ONLY.
ART. VIII, SEC. 6; CONSTITUTION

THE SUPREME COURT SHALL HAVE

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ALL
COURTS AND THE PERSONNEL THEREOF.
 THANK YOU
AND
GOD BLESS EVERYONE!!!

PAQUEO, LEONOR ATOM JR. D. ATTY. MIEL

JURIS DOCTOR 1 PROFESSOR, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS