Literal Rule: Words Have To Be Read and Understood in Their True Literal Sense. The

Literal Rule
The purpose of interpretation is always to find out what the statute stands for,
what is the defect it intends to remove and what is the remedy it seeks to
advance. The basic principle of the construction of statutes is that, the
words have to be read and understood in their true literal sense. The
Literal Rule is the first rule applied by the judges. The literal rule is also called
grammatical rule by some jurists
• The words of a statute are to be first understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed
according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some
absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object
of the statute to suggest the contrary
• The advantages of the literal rule:
• The literal rule enables the common man to understand the statue.
• The intent of the legislature is simple and clear.
• The literal rule respects the parliamentary supremacy in
administration of justice.
• Under literal rule the law is quite predictable
Tej Kiran Jain v. N.Sanjiva Reddy (1970) 2 SCC 272
• The appellant claim to be the admirers and followers of Jagaduru

Shakaracharya of Goverdan Peeth, Puri. They claim a decree for Rs.
26000/- as damages for defamatory statements made by shri Sanjiva
Reddy (Former Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Shri Y.B Chavan (Home
Minister) and three members of Parliament on the floor of the Lok
Sabha during a calling Attention Motion.
• The high court held that no proceedings could be taken in respect of
what was said on the floor of Parliament in view of Article 105(2) of
the Constitution.
Issue
• Whether a suit of defamation is maintainable against A.105 (2) of the

Constitution?
Article 105(2) in The Constitution Of India 1949
• (2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in

any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in
Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable
in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House
of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings
Arguments
• Mr. Lekhi
• It was contended on behalf of the appellants by reference to the
observations of this Court in Special reference No. 1 of 1964 dealing
with the provisions of Art. 212, that the immunity under 'that Article
was againstan alleged irregularity of procedure but not against an
illegality, and contended that the same principle should be applied in
the present case to determine whether what was said was outside the
discussion on a calling attention motion; that the immunity granted by
Art. 105(2) was to what was relevant to the business of Parliament
and not to something which was irrelevant.
Observation
• In our judgment it is not possible to read the provisions of the article in

the way suggested. The article means what it says in language which
could not be plainer. The article confers immunity inter alia in respect of
'anything said........ in Parliament". The word 'anything' is of the widest
import and is equivalent to 'everything'. The only limitation arises
from the words 'in Parliament' which means during the sitting of
Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament.
Observation
• We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was

proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being
transacted, anything said during the course of that business was
immune from proceedings in any court. This immunity is not only
complete but is as it should be. It is of the essence of Parliamentary
system of Government that people's representa- tives should be free to
express themselves without fear of legal consequences. What they say
is only subject to the discipline of the rules of Parliament, the good
sense of the members and the control of proceedings by the Speaker.
The courts have no say in the matter and should really have none.
Observation
• The word ‘any thing’ in A. 105 (2) of the Constitution is of widest
import and is equivalent to ‘everything’.

• The Article confers immunity inter alia in respect of “anything
said….in Parliament”.
• What they (members of Parliament) say is only subject to the discipline

of the rules of Parliament, the good sense of the members and the
control of proceedings by the speaker.
Conclusion
• No proceedings could lie against what is said under A. 105(2) of the

Constitution.

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Literal Rule

• The appellant claim to be the admirers and followers of Jagaduru

• Whether a suit of defamation is maintainable against A.105 (2) of the

• (2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in

• In our judgment it is not possible to read the provisions of the article in

• We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was

• What they (members of Parliament) say is only subject to the discipline

• No proceedings could lie against what is said under A. 105(2) of the

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