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Computer Security PRESENTATION CHAPTER 5

The document summarizes key aspects of designing trusted operating systems from a security perspective. It discusses four main requirements: security policies, models, design, and trust. It also outlines several security features important for trusted operating systems, including mandatory access control, discretionary access control, object reuse protection, and complete mediation. Finally, it discusses the importance of assurance methods like testing, penetrating testing, and formal verification to evaluate the trustworthiness of an operating system.

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238 views12 pages

Computer Security PRESENTATION CHAPTER 5

The document summarizes key aspects of designing trusted operating systems from a security perspective. It discusses four main requirements: security policies, models, design, and trust. It also outlines several security features important for trusted operating systems, including mandatory access control, discretionary access control, object reuse protection, and complete mediation. Finally, it discusses the importance of assurance methods like testing, penetrating testing, and formal verification to evaluate the trustworthiness of an operating system.

Uploaded by

awankilat
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© © All Rights Reserved
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TEAM R H osmah idup

Computer Security:
Chapter 5
( Designing Trusted Operating System )
Presented By: Harikeesh A/L Mohanan
Mohan A/L Selvaraj
Ong Zheng Young
Sahfrie Yue Chai
Trusted Operating Systems
Four Requirements from Designers Perspective
• Security Policy
– A set of rules that lay out what is to be secured and why.
– A statement of the security we expect the system to enforce.
• Model
– Construct model for environment to be secured.
– Model represents policy to be enforced.
• Design
– How do you implement the security policy?
– Several choices to choose from.
• Trust
– Assurance from users that OS meets security expectation.
– OS will enforce security correctly.
Security Policies
Military Security Policy
• Based on protecting classified information
• Information is ranked at different sensitivity level,
e.g.
– Unclassified
– Restricted
– Confidential
Figure 5-1  Hierarchy of Sensitivities.
– Secret
– Top Secret
• Each piece of classified information may be
associated with one or more projects, called
compartments.
• A compartment may include information at only one
Figure 5-2  Compartments and Sensitivity Levels.
or several sensitivity levels
Models Of Security
• Why study Models Of Computer Security?
– To determining the policies a secure system should enforce
– To understand the properties of protection systems

• Models are essential in the design of security policies


• Multilevel Security
– Lattice Model of Access Security
– Bell–La Padula Confidentiality Model
– Biba Integrity Model
• Models Proving Theoretical Limitations of Security Systems
– Graham–Denning Model
– Harrison–Ruzzo–Ullman Results
– Take–Grant Systems
Trusted System Design Elements
• Design Principles for Good Security
– Least privilege. Users and programs should use the fewest privileges possible to minimize
malicious attack
– Economy of mechanism. The protection system should be small, simple, and straightforward
– Open design. The protection mechanism should be public, depending on secrecy of
relatively few key items, such as a password table
– Complete mediation. Every access attempt must be checked
– Permission based. The default condition should be denial of access
– Separation of privilege. Access to objects should depend on more than one condition, e.g.
authentication plus a cryptographic key
– Least common mechanism. Shared objects provide potential channels for information flow.
Systems employing physical or logical separation reduce the risk from sharing
– Ease of use. If a protection mechanism is easy to use, it is unlikely to be avoided
Security Features of Trusted Operating Systems

• Regular OS –
addresses features
only
• Trusted OS –
addresses features
and assurance (Figure
5-11) Figure 5-11  Security Functions of a Trusted Operating System.
Key Features of Trusted Operating Systems

• User Identification and Authentication


• Know who is requesting access and verify identity
• Mandatory Access Control
• Access control policy decisions are beyond the control of the individual
• Discretionary Access Control
• Owner determines who should have access rights to an object and what those rights should
be
• Object Reuse Protection
• Ability to control reusable resources from serious vulnerability

• Complete Mediation
• All access are controlled
Key Features of Trusted Operating Systems

• Trusted Path
• Allow users to supply protected information only to a legitimate receivers

• Accountability and Audit


• Create audit log – list events and people responsible for addition, deletion and change
• Audit Log Reduction
• Audit log may be too difficult to handle, owing to volume and analysis
• Problem is simplified by an audit of only the opening (first access to) and closing of (last access
to) files or similar objects
• Objects such as individual memory locations, hardware registers, and instructions are not
audited
• Intrusion Detection Software
• Builds patterns of normal system usage and triggers an alarm when usage seems abnormal
Virtualization
• Virtualization
– The operating system emulates or simulates a
collection of a computer system’s resources
(processor , storage, and some I/O devices)
– Allows users to access complex objects in a
carefully controlled manner
Figure 5-18  Conventional Operating System.
• Virtual Machine
– Collection of real or simulated hardware
facilities
– A virtual machine gives the user a full set of
hardware features/complete machine that may
be substantially different from the real machine
– Virtual memory gives the user a memory space
that is logically separated from real memory
and may be larger than real memory
Figure 5-19  Virtual Machine.
Assurance in Trusted Operating Systems
• Assurance methods - ways of convincing others that a model,
design, and implementation are correct
– Testing
• widely accepted assurance technique
• Conclusion based on actual product tested
– Penetrating testing
• Also called tiger team analysis, or ethical hacking
• Experts crack the system being tested
– Formal verification
• most rigorous method of analyzing security
• confirms whether the operating system provides the security features it should and
nothing else.
Evaluating Trustworthiness of an Operating System
• Desirable Qualities
– Extensibility – Can the evaluation be extended as the product is enhanced?
– Granularity – Does the evaluation look at the product at the right level of detail?
– Speed – Can the evaluation be done quickly enough to allow the product to compete in
the marketplace?
– Thoroughness - Does the evaluation look at all relevant aspects of the product?
– Objectivity – Is the evaluation independent of the reviewer's opinions?
– Portability – Does the evaluation apply to the product no matter what platform the product
runs on?
– Consistency – Do similar products receive similar ratings?
– Compatibility – Could a product be evaluated similarly under different criteria?
– Exportability – Could an evaluation under one scheme be accepted as meeting all or
certain requirements of another scheme
So that's all for the CHAPTER 5,
THANKS FOR WATCHING

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