Gujarat State Fire Prevention Services: AA: Advance Assignments

Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 58

Gujarat State Fire

Prevention Services

Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM)

Training of FSO

Fire Prevention, Life Safety & Fire Protection

AA: Advance Assignments


UPHAAR CINEMA FIRE ACCIDENT
- CASE STUDY (WHAT WE LEARNT)
PREPARED BY:
SWASTIK JADEJA
PRESENTATION LARGELY COVERS:

• WHAT WAS IT ABOUT • WHAT WE LEARNT ?


• CLASSIFICATION AS PER NBC
• SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
• LEGAL COURSE
• AGENDA
• WHAT WE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND WHILE
• WHAT WENT WRONG ? DESIGNING ?
• RESPONSE • WHAT AND HOW WE NEED TO PLAN ?
• WHAT WENT WELL ? • MASTER CHECKLIST
WHAT WAS IT ABOUT ?
• DATE OF TRAGEDY - JUNE 13, 1997
• LOCATION – UPHAAR CINEMA, GREEN PARK, SOUTH DELHI
• NO. OF PEOPLE KILLED – 59
• SEATING CAPACITY – 700 PEOPLE
• CAUSE OF FIRE – SPARK CAUSED IN TRANSFORMER B AFTER
POOR REPAIRS (EXPLAINED LATER IN DETAIL)
• CINEMA OWNERS – SUSHIL ANSAL & GOPAL ANSAL
LOCATION

BLOCK A, GREEN PARK EXTENSION, GREEN PARK, SOUTH DELHI


SUMMARY OF THE
INCIDENT
i. SHOW OF THE MOVIE BORDER – 3 TO 6 PM.
ii. FIRE STARTS AT – 4:55 PM.
iii. 59 PEOPLE DIED INSIDE (MOSTLY DUE TO ASPHYXIATION).
iv. 103 PEOPLE SERIOUSLY INJURED (MOSTLY STAMPEDE).
v. BECAUSE OF NO ANNOUNCEMENT OF FIRE TILL THE END,
STAMPEDE TOOK PLACE WHEN PEOPLE REALISED IT.
vi. ABOUT 27 CARS BURNT DUE TO FIRE CAUSED BY OIL
LEAKAGE AND SPILLS FROM TRANSFORMER.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
6:55 AM - Basement Transformer
catches fire and fire is controlled.

10:30 AM - Repaired by the DVB, but


repairs were unsatisfactory.

11:00 AM - Transformer is recharged


and ready to use.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Cables came off and dangled along


with the radiator and burnt a hole in
the radiator fin.

4:55 PM - Transformer oil started


leaking out of hole and heat
generated by the cable touching
the ground ignited the oil.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
FIRE BEGINS WITH A BLAST ARRIVAL OF FIRE TENDER RESCUE OPERATION COMPLETED

CALL AT FIRE IS
NEAREST FIRE DOUSED
4:55 PM STATION LARGELY
5:20 PM 7:50 PM

5:05 PM 6:25 PM
FEW IMAGES FROM THAT TRAGEDY
FEW IMAGES FROM THAT TRAGEDY
FEW IMAGES FROM THAT TRAGEDY
FEW IMAGES FROM THAT TRAGEDY
AGENDA
• THE FIRE INCIDENT AT UPHAAR WAS NOT THE FIRST ONE.
• OUR MAIN AGENDA SHOULD BE TO STRESS ON -
A. ASSESS THE ROOT CAUSE/CAUSES THAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT.
B. STUDY THE LAPSES CAUSED DUE TO LACK OF FIRE SAFETY AND
PREVENTION MEASURES.
C. TAKE LESSONS FOR FUTURE AND FOCUS MORE ON PREVENTION AND
SAFETY.
WHAT WENT WRONG ?
• ACTUALLY A LOT OF IT.
• FIRE COMPLIANCE NORMS WERE NOT
STRINGENTLY ENFORCED SINCE THE
BEGINNING.
• UPHAAR CINEMA ALSO HAD A FIRE
INCIDENT ON 6TH JULY, 1987 DUE TO A
FAULT IN THE SUBSTATION.
WHAT WENT WRONG ?
• LICENSE OF UPHAAR CINEMA WAS EARLIER
CANCELLED FOR NON COMPLIANCE ALONG
WITH 12 OTHER BUILDINGS AFTER FIRE AT
GOPAL TOWERS, RAJENDRA GARDEN.
• DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (LICENSING)
HAD ENLISTED AT LEAST 10 SERIOUS NON
COMPLIANCES DURING INSPECTION.
WHAT WENT WRONG ?
• ADDITION OF PRIVATE 8 SEATER BOX BLOCKING
THE RIGHT SIDE ENTRY.
• EXTRA SEATS ADDED (ABOUT 52) BLOCKING THE
PATHWAY TO BALCONY
• THE TRANSFORMERS WERE INSTALLED AT THE
GROUND LEVEL.
• QUALITY OF REPAIRS BY DVB WAS UNSATISFACTORY
AND EVENTUALLY LED TO THE INCIDENT.
WHAT WENT WRONG ?
• INSPECTION BY DVB SUPERITENDENT ENGINEER REVEALED THAT 3 OF THOSE LOOSE TENSION CABLE
LEADS OF THE TRANSFORMER HAD BEEN PARTIALLY BURNT.
• AT AROUND 10:30 AM, INSPECTORS FROM DVB AND SENIOR FITTER CONDUCTED REPAIRS ON THE
TRANSFORMER BY REPLACING TWO ALUMINUM SOCKETS ON THE B PHASE OF THE LOW TENSION CABLE
LEADS.
• THE REPAIRS WERE CARRIED OUT APPARENTLY WITH THE HELP OF A DIE AND HAMMER, AND WITHOUT T
A CRIMPING MACHINE.
• REPAIRS WERE DONE QUICKLY IN A MATTER OF 30 MINUTES.
FIRST RESPONDERS - PEOPLE
• THE VIEWERS CONTACTED POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT AROUND 5:00 PM.
• THE SECURITY GUARD HEARD THE BLAST IN THE TRANSFORMER AT 4:55 PM.
• RESPONSE FROM DELHI FIRE BRIGADE WAS PROMPT.
LOCATION

• NEAREST FIRE STATION -


DELHI FIRE STATION
• DISTANCE - 3. 8 KM
• RESPONSE TIME - 6 TO 10
MINUTES
RESPONSE
• ABOUT 48 FIRE TENDERS WERE DISCHARGED INTO SERVICE BY 5.20 P.M. AND IT TOOK THEM AROUND 50
TO 60 MINUTES TO PUT OUT THE FIRE.
• PEOPLE ON THE FIRST FLOOR ESCAPED
(AROUND 700-750) BUT PEOPLE IN THE BALCONY
AND 8 SEATER BOXES COULD NOT BECAUSE OF
BLOCKED EXITS.
• MANY PEOPLE TOOK REFUGE IN THE TOILET AND
LATER WERE TRAPPED AND THE SMOKE
ENGULFED THEM.
RESPONSE
SUPREME SACRIFICE

CAPT. MANJINDER SINGH BHINDER OF THE 61ST


CAVALRY OF THE INDIAN ARMY, WHO WAS OUT WITH
HIS FAMILY AT THE UPHAAR, GAVE HIS AND HIS
FAMILY’S LIVES WHILE SAVING OVER A 150 PEOPLE.
HOW DID FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY?
• THE HOLE IN THE RADIATOR FIN BECAME THE
CAUSE OF OIL LEAKAGE WHICH EVENTUALLY LED
TO THE FIRE CAUSING THE EXPLOSION.
• NO SOAK PIT – LEADING TO THE SPILLAGE OF OIL
IN NEARBY PARKING AREA AND CARS ENDED UP
BURNING.
• SMOKE STARTED TO BILLOW OUT FROM THE GF
PARKING LOT TOWARDS N-S DIRECTION
HOW DID FIRE SPREAD RAPIDLY?
• ALL THE CARS PARKED IN THE PARKING AREA ON GF WERE ABLAZE.
• THE NORTHERN BOUND SMOKE MET THE GATE, WHICH WAS ADJACENT TO A STAIRCASE
LEADING TO THE CINEMA AUDITORIUM ON THE FIRST FLOOR.
• BECAUSE OF CHIMNEY EFFECT, THE SMOKE OOZED INTO THE STAIRS AND EVENTUALLY ENTERED
THE CINEMA AUDITORIUM THROUGH A DOOR AND THROUGH THE AIR CONDITIONING DUCTS.
• THE SOUTHWARD BOUND SMOKE SIMILARLY MOVED ALOFT THROUGH ANOTHER STAIRCASE AND
INTO THE LOWER PORTION OF THE BALCONY OF THE AUDITORIUM FROM THE LEFT SIDE.
WHAT WENT RIGHT?
• ALL THE INJURED PEOPLE WERE IMMEDIATELY RUSHED TO SAFDARJUNG HOSPITAL AND AIIMS.
• FIRE BRIGADE WAS PROMPT IN THEIR RESPONSE AND THEY RUSHED THROUGH TRAFFIC TO
REACH QUICKLY.
• AMIDST THE CHAOS, PEOPLE TRIED TO HELP EACH OTHER.
• HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR OBSTRUCTIONS NEAR BALCONY AND ILLEGAL BLOCKING OF EXIT, MOST
PEOPLE WOULD HAVE SURVIVED IT. (CINEMA WAS ALSO OPERATING ON A CANCELLED LICENSE).
WHAT WE LEARNT?
• TRANSFORMER-WHERE THE FIRE HAD STARTED IN (VIOLATION OF INDIAN ELECTRICITY RULES) NO
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE, NO FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, NO ISOLATION DEVICE, HAPHAZARD ELECTRICAL
CABLES.
• BLOCKED EXITS - MANY EXIT DOORS INCLUDING THE ONE LEADING TO THE TERRACE AND GATES WERE
LOCKED.
• NO EMERGENCY LIGHTS, FOOT LIGHTS, EXIT LIGHTS.
• UNAUTHORISED USE OF PREMISES - SHOPS WERE BEING RUN ON THE FLOOR.
WHAT WE LEARNT?

•NO FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE WHEN THE FIRE BROKE OUT.
•THE SPACE PROVIDED FOR EXHAUST FANS ON THE WALLS WAS FOUND BLOCKED WITH THE
HELP OF A CARDBOARD.
•BLOCKED WAYS - THE OWNERS HAD MADE UNAUTHORIZED EXTENSIONS AND ADDITIONS TO
SEATS.
CLASSIFICATION AS PER NBC

• AS PER NBC 2016 PART 4


CLASSIFICATION AS PER NBC
• TYPE OF FIRE - E
LEGAL COURSE – 16 YEARS
LEGAL COURSE
• AFFECTED FAMILIES WHO LOST THEIR LOVED ONES IN THE FIRE
TRAGEDY FORMED THE ASSOCIATION OF THE VICTIMS OF THE
UPHAAR TRAGEDY (AVUT).
• 30 FAMILIES CONSTITUTED AVTU AND THEY FILED THE CIVIL
COMPENSATION CASE AND WON RS 25 CRORE IN
COMPENSATION BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT.
• TOTAL NO. OF PEOPLE ACCUSED – 16 INCLUDING THEATRE
OWNERS SUSHIL AND GOPAL ANSAL.
• SECTIONS APPLIED - 304 (CULPABLE HOMICIDE), 304 A (CAUSING
DEATH BY NEGLIGENT ACT) AND 337 (HURT) OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE (IPC).
FIRE RULES

Microsoft Edge
PDF Document
REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL BUILDINGS -
MULTIPLEX
• AS PER SECTION
29 OF GFPLSM
REGULATIONS 2016
FOR SPECIAL
BUILDING (MULTIPLEX/
MOVIE CINEMA)
BYE LAWS
BYE LAWS
APPENDIX K
APPENDIX F
FORMS FOR APPLICATION - MULTIPLEX
FIRE OFFICER/DRILLS/LIFTS
REGARDING AIR CONDITIONING & SUB
STATIONS
RELATED IS CODES
WHAT WE NEED TO TAKE CARE
ABOUT
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
• ORGANISE MOCK DRILLS
• DESIGNING AS PER RELEVANT CODES
• NO UNAUTHORISED CONSTRUCTION ALLOWED
• SURPRISE VISIT BY FSOs
• FREQUENT AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS
• ELECTRIC REPAIRS TO BE DONE BY COMPETENT PERSONS
• COOLING OFF PERIOD AFTER REPAIRS IS A MUST (18 HOURS AT LEAST)
WHAT WE NEED TO TAKE CARE
ABOUT
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
• EXIT SIGNAGES AS PER INSTRUCTIONS AND STANDARDS SHOULD BE PUT ACROSS PATHS.
• PROPER SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEMS THAT FUNCTION ARE A MUST.
• SPRINKLER SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INSTALLED PROPERLY AND REGULARLY INSPECTED.
• EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN SHOULD BE DISPLAYED ON EVERY FLOOR.
• PROPER COMPARTMENTATION WITH APPROVED FIRE RATED WALLS ARE NEEDED FOR TRANSFORMERS.
• EXTINGUISHERS SHOULD BE WELL MAINTAINED AND REFILLED AS PER REGULATIONS.
WHAT WE NEED TO TAKE CARE
ABOUT WHILE DESIGNING
CODE REVIEW FOR THEATRES AND PROPS HAVE SPECIFIC GUIDELINES
REGARDING THIS

Microsoft Edge
PDF Document
CHECKLIST
CHECKLIST

Microsoft Edge
PDF Document
CHECKLIST

Microsoft Excel
97-2003 Worksheet
CHECKLIST

Microsoft Excel
97-2003 Worksheet
FAQs REGARDING THIS

Microsoft Edge
PDF Document
SOME KEY INFOGRAPHICS AND DATA
BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES
• https://
www.news18.com/news/india/delhis-uphaar-cinema-fire-tragedy-know-what-
happened-today-22-years-ago-2184517.html
• https://www.scribd.com/presentation/472444528/Case-Study-Uphaar-Cinema
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uphaar_Cinema_fire
• https://fireaccidentsindia.com
• IS 4878 -1986
• NBC 2016 PART 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• FACULTIES AT GIDM /GSFSIT
• SUPPORT STAFF AT GIDM/GSFSIT
• COLLEAGUES FROM FSO SPECIALIST BATCH
THANK YOU!
DEDICATED TO THE PEOPLE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE UPHAAR
TRAGEDY DUE TO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OF THE OWNERS AND SOME
PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH DVB.

You might also like