Managing: Jonathan Liebenau MG 305 LSE, 20 OCT 2020
Managing: Jonathan Liebenau MG 305 LSE, 20 OCT 2020
JONATHAN LIEBENAU
MG 305
LSE, 20 OCT 2020
PART 1
AGENDA
Reality:
innovation is a company-wide
competency
Reality:
innovation often creatively combines
pieces of the past
Reality:
early mistakes are profitable
Reality:
detours may be the destination
• Concentrate effort
USEFUL THEORY BEHIND MANAGING
INNOVATION (II): ‘CAPABILITIES’
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J. Liebenau
DYNAMICS (II)
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J. Liebenau
INSTITUTIONS OF TECHNOLOGY
CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY, FOSTER POWERFUL/INCUMBENT
INTERESTS, REDUCE TRANSACTION COSTS
• Legal institutions: property (incl. I.P.), contracts (incl. de facto), duties (e.g. ‘of
care’)
• Standards (incl. procedural & prescribed by communities such as industrial
associations), codes (e.g. ’of conduct’)
• Community-led practices (ex. ‘Internet Society.org’ & Domain Name Registry &
Internet Research Task Force)
• Self-regulatory practices associated with e.g. risk & safety, privacy & security,
misuse & abuse, etc.
• expenditure
• characteristics: types, scale and scope
• models & trends
• competition
• open, outsourced, cooperation & alliances
• spillover effects & social welfare
R&D EXPENDITURES
APPROX. PROPORTION OF PROFITS
• Aerospace 23%
• Electronics 10%
• Drug industry 9%
• Food < 1%
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CHARACTERISTICS OF R&D
• Types
• Process innovation
• Product innovation
• Scope
• Large
• The new monopoly price is lower than the previous competitive price;
• Small
• Innovator can only extract part of the monopoly rent.
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R&D MODELS
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R&D IN PRIVATE FIRMS
• Budget planning
• Top-down for market & product-related objectives; but
• Bottom-up for projects.
• Patents
• Performance & strategic indicator;
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R&D TRENDS
• Cyclical changes in R&D with increases in the 1990s, decreases in the early 2000
• Increased inter-firm R&D
• Increased outsourcing
• Increased use of joint ventures and alliances; but
• Decreased in-house R&D
• Increased globalization of R&D
• External R&D support even at strategic levels &
• High returns on R&D decentralization
• Problems with cyclicality:
• Consider sources of cyclicality (patents, business cycles, contract periods & lock-in)
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• Typically, downturns are not managed as well as upturns.
R&D ALLIANCES &/OR OUTSOURCING
• Forms
• Horizontal
• alliances with competitors
• “classical” outsourcing
• Vertical
• Customer &/or supplier
• innovation at the borderlands 30
R&D COOPERATION
In general:
• Cooperation in R&D often increases profits for all
• If large spillover effects, then firms will spend more through cooperative R&D
than otherwise
• Small spillover effects may result in lower R&D expenditures where firms
cooperate.
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BENEFITS FROM OPEN R&D STRATEGY
• Knowledge transfer
• Contracting & other transaction costs
• Low appropriability
• Low control over innovation process
• Incentives problems for quality & time-to-market
• Conflict resolution across stakeholders.
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FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN
PARTNERING &/OR OUTSOURCING
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BUSINESS-LEVEL MOTIVATING FACTORS
• Time-to-market
• Expanding technological opportunities
• Increased cost & risk of innovation (especially pharmaceuticals)
• Is the increase in R&D through alliances &/or outsourcing cyclical?
• How are R&D cutbacks managed?
• How do the costs of R&D vary across regions?
• Higher in the US;
• Higher fixed labor cost in Europe,…
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INNOVATION RACE
• R&D timing
• Early deployment provides a comparative advantage, especially when combined
with patents.
• Branding effect: early entrant is often perceived as a higher quality producer, i.e., it
may be able to charge more.
• Early entrant is likely to be a monopoly in the early period, i.e., it might be able to
charge a monopoly price.
• Firms compete through R&D
• Studied through game theory models, typically with 2 competing firms
• High entry barriers, standards & regulatory capture
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SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF
THE INNOVATION RACE
• Timing of R&D
• The deployment of an R&D-based innovation may come, from a social perspective:
• Too fast
• Too slowly
• Competition may result in
• Too much R&D if firms are overly concerned by the innovation race; &
• Too little R&D if firms are able to collude
• Externalities
• One firm’s R&D benefits other firms
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