2 Adasa Herlene Nub Employees Vs Lazaro

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G.R. No.

L-56431 January 19, 1988

NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES


vs.

THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO M. LAZARO


"Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part
for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment.

"Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof.

"Company union" means any labor organization whose formation, function or administration has
been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this Code.

"Bargaining representative" means a legitimate labor organization whether or not employed by


the employer.

"Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined by the Code.
Facts:
● On July 1, 1977, the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company, a Philippine banking institution, entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the
Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union,
representing the rank and file of the bank with a
membership of over one thousand employees, and an
affiliated local of the National Union of Bank
Employees, a national labor organization.

● The agreement was effective until June 30, 1980,


with an automatic renewal clause until the parties
execute a new agreement.
● On May 20, 1980, the union, together with the National Union of
Bank Employees, submitted to the bank management proposals for
the renegotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The
following day, however, the bank suspended negotiations with the
union. The bank had meanwhile entered into a merger with the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, another Philippine banking
institution, which assumed all assets and liabilities thereof.

● As a consequence, the union went to the then Court of First


Instance of Manila, presided over by the respondent Judge, on a
complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary
injunction against the private respondents.
● Predictably, the private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground, essentially, of lack of jurisdiction of the court.

● On November 26, 1980, the respondent Judge issued an order,


dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

● According to the court, the complaint partook of an unfair labor


practice dispute notwithstanding the incidental claim for damages,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter. This order, as
well as a subsequent one denying reconsideration, is now alleged as
having been issued 'in excess of his jurisdiction amounting to a grave
abuse of discretion."
Issue:
Whether or not the court may take cognizance of claims for damages
arising from a labor controversy.
Ruling:

In sum, the public respondent has not acted with grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.


Jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases, moreover, belongs generally to the
labor department of the government, never the courts. In Associated Labor Union v.
Gomez, the court held:

“A rule buttressed upon statute and reason that is frequently reiterated in jurisprudence
is that labor cases involving unfair practice are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIR. By now, this rule has ripened into dogma. It thus commands adherence, not
breach.”
The fact that the Bank of the Philippine Islands is not a party to the collective
bargaining agreement, for which it "cannot be sued for unfair labor practice at the time of
the action," cannot bestow on the respondent court the jurisdiction it does not have.

In Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers' Union, the Court held:

xxx xxx xxx

There is no merit in the allegation. In the first place, it must be remembered that jurisdiction is conferred by law; it is not
determined by the existence of an action in another tribunal. In other words, it is not filing of an unfair labor case in the
Industrial Court that divests the court of first instance jurisdiction over actions properly belonging to the former. It is the
existence of a controversy that properly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and to which the civil
action is linked or connected that removes said civil case from the competence of the regular courts. It is for this reason
that civil actions found to be intertwined with or arising out of, a dispute exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial
Relations were dismissed, even if the cases were commenced ahead of the unfair labor practice proceeding, and
jurisdiction to restrain picketing was decreed to belong to the Court of Industrial Relations although no unfair labor
practice case has as yet been instituted. For the court of first instance to lose authority to pass upon a case, therefore, it
is enough that unfair labor practice case is in fact involved in or attached to the action, such fact of course being
established by sufficient proof.
The petitioners' reliance upon Calderon v. Court of Appeals is not well-taken.
Calderon has since lost its persuasive force, beginning with our ruling in PEPSI-COLA
BOTTLING COMPANY v. MARTINEZ, EBON v. DE GUZMAN, and AGUSAN DEL NORTE
ELECTRIC COOP., INC. v. SUAREZ, and following the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, restoring the jurisdiction to decide money claims unto the labor arbiters.

Neither does the fact that the Bank of the Philippine Islands "was not an employer at
the time the act was committed' abate a recourse to the labor arbiter. It should be noted
indeed that the Bank of the Philippine Islands assumed "all the assets and liabilities" of the
Commercial Bank and Trust Company.

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