JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NATIONAL COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, SHIMOGA

DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE & ENGINEERING

Presented by
Manoj N. Revankar, (4JN06CS042)
Under the Guidance of
Mr. Manohar Nelli V. B.E. ,
Lecturer, Dept. of CS&E

Technical Seminar Coordinators

Mr. Chetan K.R., Sr. Lecturer
Mr. Vedananda D.E., Lecturer
 ABSTRACT
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is considered as the de
facto standard for information processing and exchange on the
Internet and in the enterprise services domain. The standardization
bodies of the Internet domain such as W3C and OASIS have defined
specifications for cryptography-based security solutions using XML
technology that is mainly aimed for web applications. This
prasentation presents various scenarios where XML Security can be
applied to markup based interactive applications in the context of a
next generation Consumer Electronic Optical Disc Player.

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 CONTENTS
1. Abstract.
2. Introduction.
3. End-to-End Usage Model.
4. A Markup Based Content Hierarchy.
5. XML Based Security Mechanisms.
6. Signing/Verification at different Levels.
7. Structure and Result of XML Signing.
8. Providing End to End Security.
9. XML in Blu-ray.
10. Conclusion.
11. References.
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 INTRODUCTION

 Till now, the diverse and well-established domains of Personal

Computers (PC), Web (Internet), Consumer Electronics (CE) and
Broadcast domains have had their own autonomous realms of existence.
 As an example, the content creators could author multi-domain
interoperable applications which could be packaged in a disc and
additional application extensions such as bonus materials, clips etc
could be downloaded from a content server or a set top box in a home
network.
 One of the possible candidates for this cross-domain sharing is the XML
and its related technologies.

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End-to-End Usage Model

Figure 1: End-to-End Usage Model

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Security
 Careful consideration should go into the interactive application security issues
while considering the usual issues of copy protection of audio and video
content.
Consider a malicious application loaded from an external server
that could corrupt the local storage of the player.
The user could try to create his/her own application, load to the
system and try to access content where he has no access rights.

 The security mechanisms that could prevent such issues must be non-invasive
to the users, should be capable of being applied easily by the content creators.
 W3C and OASIS, the major standardization bodies within the Internet
domain, have been working on creating XML based security standards for
web-based applications.

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A Markup Based Content Hierarchy

Figure 2: markup based content hierarchy

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 Cont…

•The interactive cluster contains several tracks, which form chapters for
video/audio playlist and optionally manifest (application).
•It is used to representing interactive applications. The interactive
application refers to a part of the overall content that can be executed by
the optical disc player.

Manifest
Markup
Submarkup

Code
Script

•XML based languages such as SMIL,SVG,XHTML is used at markups.

•ECMAScript is used at programmable part of manifest.

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 Identifying Security Using Threat Model

•The threat model provides a comprehensive list of threats to the

application security and the various mitigation strategies that can be
applied.
•Widely adapted mitigation strategies are
Authentication & Integrity
Encryption
Key Management
Access Control

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 XML Based Security Mechanisms

Authentication and Integrity

•The issues of authentication and integrity can be mitigated by

digital signatures,
• Digital signatures can be used to verify the integrity of the
interactive application.
•It is useful for signing and verifying entire or portion of the markup,
which may be of binary content and/or include multiple documents.

Access Control
•XACML specification proposed by OASIS.
•XACML describes how to interpret the policies.

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 Encryption

•XML encryption can handle both XML and non-XML data.

•XML encryption can be done at two levels.
Cluster level
Manifest level
•The content could be encrypted and stored in parts or as a
whole.
•XML encryption ensures confidentiality of information, both while
in transit as well as when stored.

Key Management
•Using XKMS given by W3C.

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 Global Signing/Verification Scenario in Blu-ray

Figure 3: Global Signing/Verification Scenario in Blu-ray

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Signing/Verification at Interactive Cluster Level

 Since the interactive cluster is markup based, the XML digital signature can be
used to sign/verify the interactive cluster in its entirety or can be used to
sign/verify at track level.

Figure 4: Signing/Verification Scenarios in the Interactive Cluster Level

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 Signing/Verification at the Manifest Level

 Control of authentication becomes much fine-grained or more granular.

 Author can selectively sign only the code or the markup part.
 Capability of the script to dynamically manipulate the interactive application
makes it much more suited for authentication using XML digital signature.

Figure 5: Signing/Verification Scenario at the Manifest Level

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Structure and Result of XML Signing on markup Targets

<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
<SignatureMethod />
<CanonicalizationMethod />
<Reference>
<Transforms>
<DigestMethod>
<DigestValue>
</Reference>
<Reference /> etc.
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue />
<KeyInfo />
<Object />
</Signature>

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 Canonicalization Method
 XML based markups allows syntactic variations while remaining semantically
equivalent.
 Little complex then ordinary digital signature- more then one serialized
representation.
ex: <Elem > & <Elem> treated differently.
 Since the digital signature is created by using an asymmetric key
algorithm (RSA) and  Cryptographic hash function (SHA1) a single-byte
difference would cause the digital signature to vary.
 As XML document is transferred from comp to comp
-line terminator may change.
-program that digest and validates an XML document may later render
the document in different way.
 To avoid all these problems XML canonicalization is applied to produce
exactly identical serialized representation.

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 SignatureMethod
 The SignatureMethod is the algorithm that is used to convert the
canonicalized SignedInfo into the SignatureValue.
 Combination of digest algorithm(MD2,MD4,MD5) & other algorithms such as
RSA-SHA1.
 For application interoperability set of signature algorithms are specified- use
of it is left to the signature creator.

Reference
 DigestMethod specifies the hash algorithm before applying the hash.
 DigestValue contains the result of applying the hash algorithm to the
transformed resource(s).

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 Applying XML Encryption to Markups

 Encryption of non-markup content is an encryption data, which is

either created and embedded in the interactive cluster or dropped as a
separate markup.

Figure 7: Result of XML Encryption on Track Target

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  Encryption of markup content results in the encryption data being embedded
in the manifest itself.

Figure 8: Result of XML Encryption on Manifest Target

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Providing End to End Security

Figure 9: Encryption and Decryption process end-to-end

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 XML in Blu-ray

Reference Blu-Ray Interactive Application

Figure 10: Reference Blu-ray Markup Target, Script and SubMarkups

XML Security Library

 Apache security project & IBM alpha works.
 In apache two XML security implementations are available, Java and C++.
 Apache XML security uses Java Cryptography Extension (JCE).

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 Layered View of the Software Architecture

Figure 11 Software Architecture for feasibility – Layered View

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 CONCLUSION

The XML security offers a standard and interoperable mechanism that

can be used by content providers to accommodate necessary security
requirements for next generation optical discs. The content authors may use
the flexibility of partially signing or encrypting the applications. Additionally,
the current prototype could be extended to other underlying platforms, with
respect to optical disc formats, operating systems and hardware platforms to
account for the interoperability. A scalable interactive application engine
library could be developed enabling ease of deployment.

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 REFERENCES
1. XML Security in the Next Generation Optical Disc Context, By Gopakumar G.
Nair, Ajeesh Gopalakrishnan, Sjouke Mauw, Eindhoven University of
Technology, Eindhoven, Netherland and Erik Moll Philips Applied
Technologies, Eindhoven, Netherland.
2. Tim Bray et al., Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Third Edition),
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Recommendation.
3. Intel et al., Advanced Access Content System (AACS), Technical Draft, July 14
2004, http://www.aacsla.com/home
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blu-ray_Disc
5. http://www.w3.org/TR/2010/WD-xmlenc-core1-20100316/
6. http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/

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 THANK YOU

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