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Applications of Quantum Cryptography - QKD: Cs551/851 Yptography Pplications Istro Mike Mcnett

This document summarizes an article about applications of quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD). It provides an overview of the basics of QKD, the history and development of QKD protocols like BB84, and implementations of QKD networks including a DARPA project. It discusses how QKD works, allows two parties to generate and share encryption keys in a way that detects eavesdropping, and has benefits like security but also limitations like distance and availability issues.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
59 views27 pages

Applications of Quantum Cryptography - QKD: Cs551/851 Yptography Pplications Istro Mike Mcnett

This document summarizes an article about applications of quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD). It provides an overview of the basics of QKD, the history and development of QKD protocols like BB84, and implementations of QKD networks including a DARPA project. It discusses how QKD works, allows two parties to generate and share encryption keys in a way that detects eavesdropping, and has benefits like security but also limitations like distance and availability issues.
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Applications of Quantum

Cryptography – QKD
CS551/851CRyptographyApplicationsBistro

Mike McNett
6 April 2004

Paper: Chip Elliott, David Pearson, and Gregory Troxel.


“Quantum Cryptography in Practice”
Outline
• Basics of QKD
• History of QKD
• Protocols for QKD
• BB84 Protocol
• DARPA / BBN Implementation
• Other Implementations
• Pro’s & Con’s
• Conclusion
Quantum Cryptography
• Better Name – Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) – It’s NOT a new crypto algorithm!

• Two physically separated parties can create


and share random secret keys.

• Allows them to verify that the key has not


been intercepted.
Basic Idea
History of QKD
• Stephen Wiesner – early 1970s wrote paper
"Conjugate Coding”

• Paper by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard


in 1984 is the basis for QKD protocol BB84.
Prototype developed in 1991.

• Another QKD protocol was invented


independently by Artur Ekert in 1991.
Two Protocols for QKD
• BB84 (and DARPA Project) – uses
polarization of photons to encode the bits of
information – relies on “uncertainty” to keep
Eve from learning the secret key.

• Ekert – uses entangled photon states to


encode the bits – relies on the fact that the
information defining the key only "comes into
being" after measurements performed by Alice
and Bob.
BB84
• Original Paper: Bennett: “Quantum cryptography
using any two nonorthogonal states”, Physical
Review Letters, Vol. 68, No. 21, 25 May 1992, pp
3121-3124
BB84
• Alice transmits a polarized beam in short bursts. The
polarization in each burst is randomly modulated to one of
four states (horizontal, vertical, left-circular, or right-circular).
• Bob measures photon polarizations in a random sequence of
bases (rectilinear or circular).
• Bob tells the sender publicly what sequence of bases were
used.
• Alice tells the receiver publicly which bases were correctly
chosen.
• Alice and Bob discard all observations not from these
correctly-chosen bases.
• The observations are interpreted using a binary scheme: left-
circular or horizontal is 0, and right-circular or vertical is 1.
BB84
• representing the types of photon measurements:
+ rectilinear
O circular
• representing the polarizations themselves:
< left-circular
> right-circular
| vertical
− horizontal
• Probability that Bob's detector fails to detect the
photon at all = 0.5.
Reference: http://monet.mercersburg.edu/henle/bb84/demo.php
BB84 – No Eavesdropping
• A  B: |<−−−<<−−<>>−<>||−−<
• Bob randomly decides detector:
++++O+O+OO+O+++++O+O
• For each measurement, P(failure to detect photon) = 0.5
• The results of Bob's measurements are:
− >− −<< |||
• B  A: types of detectors used and successfully made (but not the
measurements themselves):
+ O+ +OO +++
• Alice tells Bob which measurements were of the correct type:
. . . . (key = 0 0 0 1)
• Bob only makes the same kind of measurement as Alice about half the
time. Given that the P(B detector fails) = 0.5, you would expect about 5
out of 20 usable shared digits to remain. In fact, this time there were 4
usable digits generated.
BB84 – With Eavesdropping
• A  B: <|<−>−<<|<><−<|<−|−<
• Eavesdropping occurs.

To detect eavesdropping:
• Bob only makes the same kind of measurement as Alice about
half the time. Given that the P(B detector fails) = 0.5, you would
expect about 5 out of 20 usable shared digits to remain.
• A  B: reveals 50% (randomly) of the shared digits.
• B  A: reveals his corresponding check digits.
• If > 25% of the check digits are wrong, Alice and Bob know that
somebody (Eve) was listening to their exchange.

• NOTE – 20 photons doesn’t provide good guarantees of


detection.
DARPA Project
DARPA Project Overview
• Combined Effort – BBN, Harvard, Boston
University
• DARPA Project
• Provides “high speed” QKD. Keys are
used by a VPN.
• Tests against eavesdropping attacks
DARPA Project Overview
• QKD Network – Requires a set of trusted network
relays
• Uses Phase Shifting instead of Polarization
• Uses a VPN – Uses QKD to generate VPN keys
• Fully compatible with conventional hosts, routers,
firewalls, etc.
• Quantum Channel also used for timing and
framing
• Eve is very capable – just can’t violate Quantum
Physics
QKD Attributes
• Key Confidentiality
• Authentication – Not directly provided by
QKD – need alternative methods
• “Sufficiently” Rapid Key Delivery
• Robustness
• Distance (and Location) Independence
• Resistant to Traffic Analysis
DARPA Quantum Network
Randomly selects Phase and Value Measures Phase & Value

Timing and Framing

Randomly chooses Phase Basis


1’s and 0’s
• Unbalanced Interferometers
• Provides different delays
• Must be “identical at Sender and Receiver
1’s and 0’s
• Photon follows both paths
• Long path lags behind short path
• Travels as two distinct pulses
• Bob receives
• Pulses again take long & short paths
1’s and 0’s
• Waves are Summed
• Center Peak –
Provides the Bases
1’s and 0’s
• 1’s and 0’s represented by adjusting the relative
phases of the two waves (SALB and LASB). This
is the Δ value.
QKD Protocols

• Sifting –Unmatched Bases; “stray” or


“lost” qubits
• Error Correction – Noise & Eaves-
dropping detected – Uses “cascade”
protocol – Reveals information to Eve
so need to track this.
• Privacy Amplification – reduces Eve’s
knowledge obtained by previous EC
• Authentication – Continuous to avoid
man-in-middle attacks – not required
to initiate using shared keys – Not
well explained in Paper.
IPSEC
• “Continually” uses new keys obtained from
QKD
• Used in IPSEC Phase 2 hash to update AES
keys about once / minute
• Can support:
– Rapid reseeding, or
– One-time pad
• Supports multiple tunnels, each uniquely
configured
Issues
• Time outs (due to insufficient bits
available)
• Noise affects on key establishment. This
can’t be detected by IKE.
Other Implementations
• Two Other Implementations of Quantum Key Distribution:
– D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy, and H Zbinden.
Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play
system. New Journal of Physics 4 (2002) 41.1–41.8.
– ID Quantine: http://www.idquantique.com/files/introduction.pdf

• MagiQ. Whitepaper:
http://www.magiqtech.com/registration/MagiQWhitePaper.
pdf
• Satellite-based QKD:
http://ej.iop.org/links/q68/BKUvFWVrm756,uxc76lU,Q/nj21
82.pdf
Pros & Cons
• Nearly Impossible to steal
• Detect if someone is listening
• “Secure”

• Distance Limitations
• Availability
– vulnerable to DOS
– keys can’t keep up with plaintext
Questions?
• Back to Richard!

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