Game Thoery: Dr. Keerti Jain NIIT University, Neemrana
Game Thoery: Dr. Keerti Jain NIIT University, Neemrana
If the player select the same strategy each time, then it is referred to a pure
strategy.
In this case each player know exactly what the other is going to do.
There is a deterministic situation and the objective of the player is to
maximize gain or to minimize losses.
When the players use a combination of strategies in each player always kept
guessing as to which course of action is to be selected by the other player at
a particular occasion then this is known as a mixed strategy
There is probabilistic situation
The objective of the player is to maximize expected gains or to minimize
losses.
Makes this strategy is a selection among pure strategies with fixed
probabilities
A course of action or play which puts the player in most preferred position,
irrespective of the strategies of his competitor is called our optimum strategy
Any deviation from this strategy results in a decreased payoff for the player
Players know all possible available choices but does not know which one is going to
be chosen.
Players simultaneously select their respective courses of action.
The payoff is fixed and determined in advance.
Players have to make individual decisions without direct communication.
Player
Player 1 takes evens, player 2 takes odds
Strategy 2
Each player simultaneously shows 1 or 2 fingers\
(odd)
Player 1 wins if total of fingers is even and loses if it
is odd;
1 2
vice‐versa for Player 2
Player 1 1 1 ‐1
2 ‐1 1
Each player has 2 strategies: which?
(even)
Payoff table:
• Nash equilibrium is a concept within game theory where the optimal outcome of
a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from their initial strategy.
Payoff Matrix
Total Net Votes Won by Politician
1
(in Units of 1,000 Votes)
Politician 2
1 2 3
Strategy
Politician 1 1 2 4
1
2 1 0 5
Dr. Keerti Jain, NIIT University, Neemrana
3 0 1 ‐1
10/03/2020 22
Maximin-Minimax principle
Politician 1 1*# 2* 4
1
2 1 0# 5*
Interpretation
# stands 3for minimum
0 value and1* stands for ‐1#
Maximum Value
• Since Maximin =Minimax =1 =Value of the game(v)
(Game is Unfair)
• Saddle point exist at (1,1) implies optimum pure
strategy for politician 1 is 1 and for politician 2 is 1.
Saddle Point
Given the payoff table, which strategy should each player select? (equilibrium solution)
A1 0# 4* 0
A2 8* 4*# 4*
Column maxima 8 4#
# stands for minimum value and * stands for Maximum Value
Interpretation
• Since Maximin =Minimax =4 =Value of the game(v) (Game is Unfair)
• Saddle point exist at (2,2) implies optimum pure strategy for player A is A2 and
for Player B is B2.
Dr. Keerti Jain, NIIT University, Neemrana 10/03/2020 26
Example 2: Method of Pure Strategy games (With
Saddle Point) mxn two- person zero sum game
Determine the optimal strategies for both firm A and firm B and the value of
the game using maximin-minimax principle.
It is a 4X5 two-person zero sum game
Firm A Firm B Row Interpretation
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 Minima
Since Maximin =Minimax =6
=Value of the game(v)
A1 3 -1# 4 6 7 -1 (Game is Unfair)
A2 -1# 8 2 4 12* -1
A3 16* 8 6#* 14* 12* 6* Saddle point exist at (3,3)
implies optimum pure
A4 1 11* -4# 2 1 -4
strategy for firm A is A3 and
Column 16 11 6# 14 12 for firm B is B3.
Maxima
Determine the optimal strategies for both Player A and Player B and the value
of the game.
It is a 2X2 two-person zero sum game
Player A Player B Row Minima
B1 B2
A1 25* 5# 5
A2 10# 15* 10*
Column maxima 25 15#
# stands for minimum value and * stands for Maximum Value
Here Maximin is not equal to minimax, therefore saddle point does not exist
We need to determine mixed strategies.
Dr. Keerti Jain, NIIT University, Neemrana 10/03/2020 28
Solution
Step 1: Subtract the smaller payoff in each row from the larger one and the smaller
payoff in each column from the larger one
Player A Player B Difference
B1 B2
A1 25 5 20
A2 10 15 5
Difference 15 10
Step 2: Interchange each of these pairs of subtracted numbers found in step one as :
A1 25 5 5
A2 10 15 20
Interchanged
Dr. Keerti Jain, NIIT University, Neemrana 10 15 10/03/2020 29
Difference
Step 3: Put each of the interchanged numbers over the sum of the pair of
numbers
A1 25 5 [5/(5+20)]=1/5
A2 10 15 [20/(5+20)]=4/5
Probability [10/(10+15)]= 2/5 [15/(10+15)]=3/5
Therefore the strategies for Player A are (A1, A2) =(1/5, 4/5)
for player B are (B1, B2)= (2/5, 3/5)
Such a strategy would not be worth playing if it is never better and sometimes worse
than some other strategy, regardless of the strategies of other players.
For a given player, strategies that are never better and sometimes worse than other
strategies are
called dominated strategies. (We can think of this as equal or worse than all of the other
strategies.)
On the other hand, a dominant strategy is one that is sometimes better and never
worse than all other strategies, regardless of the strategies of the other players. (We can
think of this as equal or better than all of the other strategies.)
Dominance rule
The principle of dominance states that if one strategy of a player dominates over
the other strategy in all conditions then the later strategy can be ignored. A
strategy dominates over the other only if it is preferable over other in all
conditions.
The concept of dominance is especially useful for the evaluation of two-person
zero-sum games where a saddle point does not exist.
Rule: 1. If all the elements of a column (say ith column) are greater than or
equal to the corresponding elements of any other column (say jth column), then
the ith column is dominated by the jth column and can be deleted from the
matrix.
Rule: 2. If all the elements of a row (say ith row) are less than or equal to the
corresponding elements of any other row (say jth row), then the ith row is
dominated by the jth row and can be deleted from the matrix.
Player A A2
5 -10 -10 -10 Given game have no saddle point
5 -20 -20 because Maximin is not equal to
A3 -20 Minimax. Therefore, further we
Must try to reduce the size of the
Maximum 5 20 given payoff matrix as further as
of 10 possible .
column Minimax
Note that : every element of column B3 is more than or equal to every corresponding element
of Row B2 Evidently , the choice of strategy B3, will always result in more losses as compared to
that of selecting the strategy B2.Thus , strategy B3 is inferior to B2. Hence, delete The B3
strategy from the payoff matrix. Reduced payoff matrix is …
Player B
B1 B2
A1
-5 10
Player A
A2 5 -10
5 -20
• Now, it may be noted that strategy A2 of player A is dominated by his A3 strategy (every
element of column A2 is more than or equal to every corresponding element of Row A3 ),
since the profit due to strategy A2 is greater than or equal to the profit due to strategy A3.
Hence, strategy A3(row 3) can be deleted from further consideration.
Thus the reduced payoff matrix becomes:
Player B
Minimum of row
B1 B2
Player A
A1 -5 10 -5 Maximin
A2 5 -10 -10
Maximum 5 10
of column
Minimax
Note : the maximin value is not equal to minimax value, hence there is no saddle point.
For this type of game situation, it is possible to obtain a solution by applying the concept
of mixed strategies.
Stable and Unstable solutions
Given the payoff table, which strategy should each player select?
Politician 1 1 0 -2 2 -2
2 5 42 -3 -3
3 2 3 -4 Saddle
-4 Point does not exist
Dr. Keerti Jain, NIIT University, Neemrana
Minimum 10/03/2020 37
Maximum 5 4 2
Value
Example 3 (Cont…)
given player should select the mixed strategy that maximizes the minimum
A
expected payoff to the player.
Optimal mixed strategy for player 1 is the one that provides the guarantee
(minimum expected payoff) that is best (maximal).
Value of best guarantee is the maximum value v
Optimal strategy for player 2 provides the best (minimal) guarantee
(maximum expected loss)
Value of best guarantee is the minimax value