Wireless Network Security

Wireless Security Overview

 concerns for wireless security are similar to those found in a wired
environment

 security requirements are the same:

 confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability

 most significant source of risk is the underlying communications medium

Wireless Network Threats
 Wireless Network Threats
Accidental association: Company wireless LANs or wireless access points to wired LANs in close proximity may
create overlapping transmission ranges. A user intending to connect to one LAN may unintentionally lock on to a
wireless access point from a neighboring network.
Malicious association: here a wireless device is configured to appear to be a legitimate access point, enabling the
operator to steal passwords from legitimate users and then penetrate a wired network through a legitimate
wireless access point.
Ad hoc networks: These are P2P networks between wireless computers with no AP between them. Such networks
can pose a security threat due to a lack of a central point of control.
Nontraditional networks: such as personal network Bluetooth devices, barcode readers, and handheld PDAs pose
a security risk both in terms of eavesdropping and spoofing.
Identity theft (MAC spoofing): occurs when an attacker is able to eavesdrop on network traffic and identify the
MAC address of a computer with network privileges.
Man-in-the middle attacks: This attack involves persuading a user and an access point to believe that they are
talking to each other when in fact the communication is going through an intermediate attacking device. Wireless
networks are particularly vulnerable to such attacks.
Denial of service (DoS): occurs when an attacker continually bombards a wireless access point or some other
accessible wireless port with various protocol messages designed to consume system resources. The wireless
environment lends itself to this type of attack, because it is so easy for the attacker to direct multiple wireless
messages at the target.
Network injection: targets wireless access points that are exposed to non-filtered network traffic, such as routing
protocol messages or network management messages. An example of such an attack is one in which bogus
reconfiguration commands are used to affect routers and switches to degrade network performance.
 Wireless Security Measures
 Securing Wireless Transmissions

 signal-hiding techniques
 encryption

 Securing Wireless Access points

 IEEE 802.1X

 Securing Wireless Networks

 Various Techniques
Wireless Network Security
Techniques
IEEE 802.11 Terminology
 Wireless Fidelity
(Wi-Fi) Alliance
 802.11b
 first 802.11 standard to gain broad industry acceptance

 Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA)

 industry consortium formed in 1999 to address the concern of products
from different vendors successfully interoperating
 later renamed the Wi-Fi Alliance

 term used for certified 802.11b products is Wi-Fi

 has been extended to 802.11g products

 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

 Wi-Fi Alliance certification procedures for IEEE802.11 security
standards
 WPA2 incorporates all of the features of the IEEE802.11i WLAN
security specification
IEEE 802 Protocol Architecture
General IEEE 802
MPDU Format
 IEEE
802.11
Extended
Service
Set
IEEE 802.11 Services
 Distribution of Messages
Within a DS
 the two services involved with the distribution of
messages within a DS are:
 distribution
 integration
 Distribution & Integration
 The two services involved with the distribution of messages in a DS are distribution & integration.

 Distribution is the primary service used by stations to exchange MPDUs when the MPDUs must
traverse the DS to get from a station in one BSS to a station in another BSS.
 For example, suppose a frame is to be sent from station 2 (STA 2) to station 7 (STA 7) in Figure
24.4 . The frame is sent from STA 2 to AP 1, which is the AP for this BSS. The AP gives the frame
to the DS, which has the job of directing the frame to the AP associated with STA 7 in the target
BSS. AP 2 receives the frame and forwards it to STA 7. How the message is transported through
the DS is beyond the scope of the IEEE 802.11 standard.

 If the two stations that are communicating are within the same BSS, then the distribution service
logically goes through the single AP of that BSS.

 The Integration service enables transfer of data between a station on an IEEE 802.11 LAN and a
station on an integrated IEEE 802.x LAN. The term integrated refers to a wired LAN that is physically
connected to the S and whose stations may be logically connected to an IEEE 802.11 LAN via the
integration service. The integration service takes care of any address translation and media
conversion logic required for the exchange of data.
 Association-Related Services
 transition types, based on mobility:
 no transition
 a station of this type is either stationary or moves only within
the direct communication range of the communicating stations
of a single BSS
 BSS transition
 station movement from one BSS to another BSS within the
same ESS; delivery of data to the station requires that the
addressing capability be able to recognize the new location of
the station
 ESS transition
 station movement from a BSS in one ESS to a BSS within
another ESS; maintenance of upper-layer connections
supported by 802.11 cannot be guaranteed
Services
 Services
 To deliver a message within a DS, the distribution service needs to know where the
destination station is located. Specifically, the DS needs to know the identity of the AP
to which the message should be delivered in order for that message to reach the
destination station. To meet this requirement, a station must maintain an association
with the AP within its current BSS. Three services relate to this requirement:
 • Association: Establishes an initial association between a station and an AP. Before a
station can transmit or receive frames on a wireless LAN, its identity and address must
be known. For this purpose, a station must establish an association with an AP within a
particular BSS. The AP can then communicate this information to other APs within the
ESS to facilitate routing and delivery of addressed frames.
 • Reassociation: Enables an established association to be transferred from one AP to
another, allowing a mobile station to move from one BSS to another.
 • Disassociation: A notification from either a station or an AP that an existing
association is terminated. A station should give this notification before leaving an ESS
or shutting down. However, the MAC management facility protects itself against
stations that disappear without notification.
 WEP Cracking

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77IBk-wUAVg
 Wireless LAN Security

 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm

 802.11 privacy

 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)

 set of security mechanisms that eliminates most 802.11
security issues and was based on the current state of the
802.11i standard
 Robust Security Network (RSN)
 final form of the 802.11i standard

 Wi-Fi Alliance certifies vendors in compliance with the

full 802.11i specification under the WPA2 program
Elements of IEEE 802.11i
IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
 IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
 The operation of an IEEE 802.11i RSN can be broken down into five distinct phases. The exact
nature of phases will depend on the configuration & end points of communication. Possibilities
include (see Figure 24.4 ):

 1. 2wireless stations in the same BSS communicating via the access point for that BSS.

 2. 2 wireless stations (STAs) in same ad hoc IBSS communicating directly with each other.

 3. 2wireless stations in different BSSs communicating via APs across a DS.

 4. A wireless station communicating with an end station on a wired network via its AP and the DS.

 IEEE 802.11i security is concerned only with secure communication between the STA and its AP. In
case 1 in the preceding list, secure communication is assured if each STA establishes secure
communications with the AP. Case 2 is similar, with the AP functionality residing in the STA. For
case 3, security is not provided across the distribution system at the level of IEEE 802.11, but only
within each BSS. End-to-end security (if required) must be provided at a higher layer. Similarly, in
case 4, security is only provided between the STA and its AP.
 IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
 With these considerations in mind, Figure 24.6 depicts the five phases of operation for an RSN and maps them to the network
components involved. One new component is the authentication server (AS). The rectangles indicate the exchange of sequences
of MPDUs. The five phases are defined as follows:

 • Discovery: An AP uses messages called Beacons and Probe Responses to advertise its IEEE 802.11i security policy. The STA uses
these to identify an AP for a WLAN with which it wishes to communicate. The STA associates with the AP, which it uses to select
the cipher suite and authentication mechanism when the Beacons and Probe Responses present a choice.

 • Authentication: During this phase, the STA and AS prove their identities to each other. The AP blocks non-authentication traffic
between the STA &AS until the authentication transaction is successful. The AP does not participate in the authentication
transaction other than forwarding traffic between the STA and AS.

 • Key generation & distribution:

distribution: The AP &the STA perform several operations that cause cryptographic keys to be generated
and placed on the AP and the STA. Frames are exchanged between the AP and STA only.

 • Protected data transfer: Frames are exchanged between the STA and the end station through the AP. As denoted by the
shading and the encryption module icon, secure data transfer occurs between the STA and the AP only; security is not provided
end-to-end.

 • Connection termination: The AP and STA exchange frames. During this phase, the secure connection is torn down and the
connection is restored to the original state.
IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
802.1X Access Control
 MPDU Exchange

 authentication phase consists of three phases:

 connect to AS
 the STA sends a request to its AP that it has an association with
for connection to the AS; the AP acknowledges this request and
sends an access request to the AS
 EAP exchange
 authenticates the STA and AS to each other
 secure key delivery
 once authentication is established, the AS generates a master
session key and sends it to the STA
IEEE 802.11i Key Hierarchies
IEEE 802.11i Keys for Data Confidentiality and
Integrity Protocols
Phases of Operation
 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
(TKIP)
 designed to require only software changes to devices that
are implemented with the older wireless LAN security
approach called WEP

 provides two
services:
 Pseudorandom Function

Above illustrates the function PRF( K , A , B , Len ). The parameter K serves as the key input to HMAC.
The message input consists of four items concatenated together: the parameter A , a byte with value 0,
the parameter B , and a counter i . The counter is initialized to 0. The HMAC algorithm is run once,
producing a 160-bit hash value. If more bits are required, HMAC is run again with the same inputs,
except that i is incremented each time until the necessary number of bits is generated.
 Can you crack WPA/WPA2?

 WPA/WPA2 supports many types of authentication

beyond pre-shared keys.
 aircrack-ng can ONLY crack pre-shared keys.

 So make sure airodump-ng shows the network as having

the authentication type of PSK, otherwise, do not bother
trying to crack it.
 Can you crack WPA/WPA2?
 There is another important difference between cracking WPA/WPA2
and WEP. This is the approach used to crack the WPA/WPA2 pre-
shared key.
 Unlike WEP, where statistical methods can be used to speed up the
cracking process, only plain brute force techniques can be used
against WPA/WPA2. That is, because the key is not static, so
collecting IVs like when cracking WEP encryption, does not speed up
the attack.
 The only thing that does give the information to start an attack is
the handshake between client and AP. Handshaking is done when
the client connects to the network. Although not absolutely true,
for the purposes of learning how to hack, consider it true.
 Since the pre-shared key can be from 8 to 63 characters in length, it
effectively becomes impossible to crack the pre-shared key.
 Can you crack WPA/WPA2?
 The only time you can crack the pre-shared key is if it is a dictionary word or
relatively short in length. Conversely, if you want to have an unbreakable
wireless network at home, use WPA/WPA2 and a 63 character password
composed of random characters including special symbols.
 The impact of having to use a brute force approach is substantial. Because it is
very compute intensive, a computer can only test 50 to 300 possible keys per
second depending on the computer CPU. It can take hours, if not days, to crunch
through a large dictionary. If you are thinking about generating your own
password list to cover all the permutations and combinations of characters and
special symbols.
 IMPORTANT This means that the passphrase must be contained in the dictionary
you are using to break WPA/WPA2. If it is not in the dictionary then aircrack-ng
will be unable to determine the key.
 There is no difference between cracking WPA or WPA2 networks. The
authentication methodology is basically the same between them. So the
techniques you use are identical.
 Cracking WPA/WPA2

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3P8l-PsvYak

• There are lots of tutorials online on how to

do this using Linux.

• http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php?id=cracking_wpa
 Question

 What kind of types of denial-of-service (DOS)

attacks may be performed on IEEE 802.11 wireless
networks at different layers of the protocol stack?
 Answer
 At the physical layer, a device may generate random RF
noise, making the medium appear constantly busy.
 At the datalink (MAC) layer, a device may generate random
packets, which violates the ‘‘polite’’ RTS/CTS sequence.
 At the network layer, any device may masquerade as an
access-point and gather and drop packets.
 At the application layer, an application may naively
perform a large file transfer, dominating the medium.
 Summary

 wireless security overview  IEEE 802.11i

 wireless network threats  IEEE 802.11i Services
 wireless security measure  IEEE 802.11i Phases of Operation
 IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN  Discovery Phase
overview  Authentication Phase
 Wi-Fi alliance  Key Management Phase
 IEEE 802 protocol architecture  Protected Data Transfer Phase
 IEEE 802.11 network  the IEEE 802.11i Pseudorandom
components and architectural Function
model
 IEEE 802.11 services