Restoring American Seapower

Bryan Clark, Peter Haynes, Bryan McGrath, Craig Hooper,

Jesse Sloman, and Tim Walton

1
 Objectives of a new architecture
• More effective at great power competition
– Deterring escalation by being able to deny, delay, and punish aggression
– Countering sub-conventional or “gray zone” aggression in contested areas

• Improved capacity for training and preparation

– Faster incorporation of lessons and learning from real-world ops and tests
– Better process for maintaining proficiency for high-end conflict

• Better integrated with allies and partners

– And accounting for likely seams in capability or employment

• More options for platforms, payloads, and sensors

– Enabling greater flexibility in “kill chains” or webs

• Exploit manned-unmanned teaming

– Particularly in ISR/counter-ISR competition

• Achievable fiscally and with industrial base

– Including maintenance industrial base
2
 Return of great power competition
NOTE: Range arcs are illustrative Northern Military District
of possible threats rather than an
actual force laydown.

SS-N-27A (500 km)

dius
JH-7 Combat Ra
(1650 km)

3
Central Military

km od
00 5 M
District

)
(15 CSS-
D/
-21
H-6K (1800 km)

DF
Western Military District OTH-R
Receivers
CJ-10 (2,200 km)

Eastern Military
District DF-11A/ CSS-7 Mod 1
0
OTH-R (350 km) J-1
0/ C m)
Receiver - 1 k
DH 2200
(
Southern Military District
DDG (3 days, 1200 km)
OTH-R Chinese IRBMs/ICBMs
Receivers SS-N-22 (240 km) DF-26 4,000+ km
S-300PMU (90 km)
S-300PMU1 (150 km) DF-4 Oahu
5,300+ km
S-300PMU2/ HQ-9 (200 km) (CSS-3) 7000 km
S-400 (400 km) DF-5A
12,000+ km
(CSS-4 Mod 2)
DF-31 CONUS
Su-3 7,500+ km 7500+ km
0M (CSS-9 Mod 1)
KK C DF-31A
om 11,000+ km
( 134 bat Rad (CSS-9 Mod 2)
9km ius
) SSK (18 days, 1730 km)

SS-N-27A (350km) -3
HN km)
0 0
(30

500 km
SSN (75 days, 3250 km)

Improving capabilities and revisionist objectives of China and Russia will YJ-82 (33km)

require changes to strategy, mission priorities, and fleet architecture 2

 Study Methodology
Demands for
Naval Strategic Operational Deterrence and
missions approach concepts Maneuver forces in: Fleet Architecture
• North & South
• Air and Missile America Platforms
Deter conflict Defense
Packages
• Northern Europe
• EMS warfare Payloads
Denial and
delay or • Mediterranean
punishment • Anti-submarine
warfare • Africa
Win the War
at Sea • Undersea Basing
• Persian Gulf
Warfare
• Gulfs of Aden /
• Anti-surface Oman Readiness
and Strike
Respond to warfare model
humanitarian • Indian Ocean
crisis • Mine warfare
Cooperative • South China Sea
efforts with Number and type of
allies and • Mine counter-
partners measures • East China Sea platforms, payloads
Maintain
security • Amphibious • Pacific
operations Assess
• Arctic
architecture
4
 New strategic approaches needed

(500 k RBM
er-M S
m)
Iskand
250 km 250 km

Western Military District

OTH-R Transmitter
Su-35 Combat Radius
Missile
(1500-1600 km) Brigade Base Central Military District

OTH-R Receiver

S-300PMU (90 km)

S-300PMU1 (150 km)
S-300PMU2 (200 km)
S-300VM (250 km)
250 km S-300V4/S-400/S-500 (400 km) 250 km

Southern Military District

Aegis Ashore
NOTE: Range arcs are illustrative BMD Location
of possible threats rather than an
actual force laydown.

In the future, U.S. forces will not be able to use same mobilization and
250 km response after aggression that it did in Iraq or Kosovo
55
New operational concepts

6
 Increase AMD capacity w/new concept

ASBMs

ASCM 10-30 nm defense anti- HVPs

Salvo air warfare
5-10 nm ship self-
Lasers defense systems

RAM

ESSM

EW, HPM

CIWS

Medium range AMD approach increases defensive capacity by using smaller

interceptors and new technologies including lasers, HPMs, and EW
N u m b e r o f s h o t s a g a in s t 2 m in u t e s a lv AMD capacity could dissuade attacks
Weapon Notional current VLS Proposed VLS allocation
allocation
SM-3 10% 10%
SM-6 20% 20%
SM-2 30% 15%
ESSM 10% 25%
Tomahawk 25% 25%
VLA 5% 5%
1 Mk-45 gun with HVP 0 20 rounds per minute
1 400kW laser 0 6 seconds per missile
350 defeat

300

250
Mk45 gun w/HVP
200 Laser
HPRF
150 EW
ESSM
100
N u m b e r o f s u c ce s s fu l e n g a g e m e n t s

SM-2/6

50

0
Today 100 nm Today 10-30 nm Proposed 100 nm Proposed 30 nm

Weapon Notional probability of kill

SM-6 0.7
SM-2 0.7
ESSM 0.7
Mk-45 gun with HVP 0.4
120 Laser 0.4
EW 0.4
100 HPRF 0.4
Mk54 gun wHVP
Laser
80
HPRF
EW
60
ESSM

40 SM-2/6
EW
20 ESSM
SM-2/6
0
Today's defenses Proposed defenses

New AMD approach also provides more repeatable capacity for multiple salvos –
EW, HPRF, laser, and Mk-54
 Hide with EMCON & stand-in jamming
Ship and UUV-deployed
systems emit low-power cover
pulse to mask strike group

Ship uses agile, wideband

jammer to disrupt and
offboard, expendable decoys
to attract ASCMs

UUV-launched UAVs jam

enemy communications

Strike group moves

through contested
space at EMCON

Decoy commander
observes UAS activity via
Autonomous USV and passive methods to
UUV decoys minimize detection risk

New approaches for operating inside contested areas will rely on EMCON,
decoys, and LPI-LPD defensive jamming–need to address EO/IR 9
 Enemy EW drives new C4ISR concepts

Multi-static
detection

UAV illuminators

LIDAR or multi-
static laser Background EM energy
detection enables passive
coherent location

Passive
targeting
UAVs

Naval forces will need to shift to passive and LPI/LPD sensors and LPI/LPD line-
of-sight comm networks–long-haul networks will be challenged 10
 Offensive ASW by unmanned systems
“Pouncer” aircraft

XLUSV w/ Variable
Depth Sonar Glider USV w/
Unmanned Gateway
Buoy towed array
receiver

Moored Gateway
Buoy
Submarine ASW missile
Contact

Sub-Surface
Repeater
Deep Sound Channel Weapons range too
Communications
short to have UxV in
position to engage
Transformational
Reliable Acoustic
Path System
(TRAPS)

Passive TRAPS & Active LF sonar provide targets for manned and unmanned
pouncer aircraft to engage 11
 Defensive ASW focused on suppression
“Pouncer” aircraft

XLUSV w/ Variable
Depth Sonar
Unmanned Gateway
Buoy

Submarine ASW missile

Contact

Transformational
Reliable Acoustic
Path System
(TRAPS)

LF active sonar and unmanned sensors find subs; standoff or air-launched

weapons suppress and drive them off
 Distributed strike and SUW
MALE UAVs

USVs w/ CVL
SIGINT
XLUUV w/UAV for
targeting, EW

SSNs w/
ASCM

Passive targeting from Tern UAVs, UAVs from XLUUVs, and XLUSVs;
Surface combatants and CVL conduct high-volume, short-duration attacks
 Amphibious ops add cross-domain fires

Small UAVs
for OTH Ship magazines
Direction of targeting deepen fires capacity
aggressor forces

MV-22s and UAV

Runway resupply

Refueling
area

Amphibs serve as
Maintenance
mobile logistics hubs
area Sustain
FARPs

LCACs bring EPF deliver

in HIMARS aviation fuel and
and IFPC support equipment

Small UAVs
for OTH
MV-22s deliver
targeting
troops to establish
lodgment

Expeditionary bases can support air operations, anti-air & anti-ship weapons,
or logistics inside contested areas
 Mine warfare with unmanned systems

UAV with mine

detection system

Unmanned vehicle
support ship

XLUSV/CUSVs
clear mines

Red micro-UUV smart

mines XLUUVs w/ micro-UUV
smart mines

Mines and UUVs merging; will be deployed or found and cleared by larger
UUVs and USVs; keeps manned ships out of minefield
 New logistic concept for distributed ops

Direction of aggressor forces Unmanned Vehicle Support Ships

maintain XLUUVs and XLUSVs

T-AOEs refuel and reload

ammunition and dry stores of
ships at sea
T-AKEs deliver dry cargo
and ammunition to
Maneuver Force ships

T-AKs reload ammunition

CONSOL T-AOTs refuel
and dry stores of T-AOE T-AOEs underway
T-AOEs refuel
and T-AKE
Maneuver Force ships

CONSOL T-AOTs & T-AKs could reduce number and risk to T-AOEs (and possibly
T-AKEs) through expeditionary refuel/reload at relatively secure locations 16
 Force packages for new opn’l concepts
• Counter-C4ISR Group
• FF / FFG w/ 2 TERN UAV
• 2 CUSV decoys
• 2 XLDUSV w/ ICADS package

• Anti-Submarine Warfare Group TERN UAV FF (today)

• FFG w/ VDS, LR ASROC, TERN UAV

• P-8A
• SSN
• XLDUSV and XLDUUV w/TA

XLDUUV XLDUSV
• Mine Countermeasures Group
• Unmanned vehicle support ship
• 3-4 CUSVs
• 2 XLDUSVs
• 2 MH-60S P-8A CUSV

• Unmanned Vehicle Detachment

• Unmanned vehicle support ship
• 3-4 CUSV
• 4 TERN UAVs
• 3-6 XLDUSVs & 3-6 XLDUUVs ESB (UxV Support Vessel) EPF (UxV Support Vessel)
 Force packages for new opn’l concepts
• Mining Group
• FFG
• 2-3 XLDUUVs
• Micro-UUV smart mines
XLDUUV FF (today)

• 4-ship Amphibious Ready Group

• CVL
• 3 LPDs or L(X)Rs
Tender XLDUSV

CVL (today)

• Surface Warfare group

• 1 DDG
• 2 FFG with TERN UAVs
• XLDUSV w/SIGINT, TA for targeting CVL (future)

Patrol vessel

• Littoral combat group

• FFG
• 3 Patrol vessels
• Tender FFG (future)
 Naval posture
Force packages, presence ,and basing

19
 Deployed fleet needs to be redesigned
• Today’s “presence” force is not designed to deter
– It’s a small version of “war winning” force that responds after the fact
– Not designed to deter or counter particular adversaries
– Able to do many different ops, but not the most important ones
– Optimized for efficiency, not effectiveness

• “Deterrence Forces” should be designed to deny & punish

– Lethal – to interdict aggression and impose costs
– Survivable – to provide staying power until offensive capacity is depleted
– Tailored – to geography, alliances, adversaries in each region

• “Maneuver Force” reinforces and sustains combat operations

– Falls in on Deterrence Force to counter-concentrate at point of conflict
– Provides high-capacity offensive capabilities
– Conducts training, experimentation, exercises, demonstrations

Deployed fleet should consist of “Deterrence Forces” in each region and a

“Maneuver Force” not tied to a particular region 20
 Deterrence Forces tailored by region
CVN
Arctic
CVL
Destroyer
DDG-1000
Frigate
SSN
Small Deck Amphib Norwegian Sea /
Patrol Ship North Atlantic

North Sea /
Baltic Sea
East China
Sea
CONUS Extra Mediterranean /
Rotation Base Black Sea Persian Gulf
Western
Pacific

South China
Arabian Sea Sea

West
Latin Africa
America

Maneuver Force

4
 Aligning forward force to combat needs
1400.00 Number of weapons delivered in 2 days 40 Force composition

35

Number of ships
1200.00 Small Deck
Amphib

30
1000.00 SSN

Patrol ship 25
800.00
LCS
20
FFG
600.00
DDG-51 and 15
CG
400.00
DDG-1000 10

CVL
200.00
5
CVN

0.00 0
1
Proposed 2
Planned
Deterrence Presence
Forces Force

Comparison of forward-deployed Western Pacific forces

Missile-centric deterrence forces for short-duration, high-capacity combat;

CSG-centric force better able to sustain combat over time 22
 Deterring rapid Russian aggression
Location of Forward Basing or
Stationing

1 (stationed)
Platform 1 (based)
Operational
Ships Presence
Frigate 1.1
XLDUSV 2.6
XLDUUV 2.6
Unmanned Vehicle
Iceland Support 0.8
Operational Vessel
Ships Presence Allies UUV / USV Det 1
Salvage / Fleet Tug 1.0
CVN (CONUS) 0.9 P-8 detachment 1.0
Destroyer 4.3
Frigate 3.3 1
XLDUSV 5.1
SSN 5.6
Norway
XLDUUV 5.1
Large Multi-Product Logistics UUV / USV Det 1
Ships (AOE) 2.5
T-AKE 1.0
T-AGOS 1.0 Germany
UK
Unmanned Vehicle Support DDG 4 FFG 2
Vessel 2.0
FFG 4
Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 2.0
SSN 4
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
P-8 detachment 2.0

Spain
DDG 5
FFG 2

Naval forces provide unilateral options to promptly deny

Russian aggression in
 Engaging adversary forces globally
Location of Forward Basing or
Stationing

1 (stationed)
Platform 1 (based)

Romania
UUV / USV Det 1
Italy
FFG 4

Spain Greece
DDG 5 Patrol vessel 10
FFG 2 Tender 1 Turkey
UUV / USV Det 1
Operational
Ships Presence Allies
CVL (CONUS) 1.3
Destroyer 2.1
Frigate 4.4 1
Patrol ship 5.0
XLDUSV 5.1
XLDUUV 5.1
Small Deck Amphib (CONUS) 2.6
Large Multi-Product Logistics Ships (AOE) 3.0
Command Ship 1.0
Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 3.0
Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 1.0
Tender 1.0
Salvage / Fleet Tug 1.0
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
P-8 detachment 2.0

Naval forces in Mediterranean support steady state ops

and deter Russian or Chinese aggression by holding their
fleets and expeditionary bases at risk
 Countering threats proportionally
Location of Forward Basing or
Stationing
Ships Operational Allies
1 (stationed) Presence
Platform 1 (based) East Africa/GOO/West Indian Ocean
CVL 1.2
Frigate 2.3
SSN (CONUS) 1.0
Small Deck Amphib (CONUS) 2.4
Large Multi-Product Logistics 1.7
Ships (AOE)
Bahrain
West Africa
UUV / USV Det 1 Small Deck Amphib (CONUS) 1.3
Persian Gulf
FFG 3
Frigate 1.7
Patrol vessels 10 Patrol ship 7.0 2
XLDUSV 2.6
AFSB 1
XLDUUV 2.6
Unmanned Vehicle Small Deck Amphib 1.2
Support Vessel 2 Large Multi-Product Logistics 1.0
Ships (AOE)
Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 2.0
Afloat Forward Staging Base 1.0
Tender 1.0
Salvage / Fleet Tug 1.0
Command Ship 1.0
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
P-8 detachment 1.0
Djibouti
FFG 4

MCM and SUW in Gulf with smaller ships and UxVs;

larger ships, CVL, and
 Regaining escalation dominance in
SCS
Operational
Ships
Presence
Destroyer 2.6
Frigate 3.4
Patrol ship 5.0
XLDUSV 5.1
SSN 2.1
XLDUUV 5.1
Small Deck Amphib 1.5
Large Multi-Product Logistics Ships
(AOE) 3.0 Philippines

T-AGOS 2.0 UUV / USV Det 1

Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 2.0 Patrol vessels 10
Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 1.0 Vietnam AFSB 1
Tender 1.0 UUV / USV Det 1
Afloat Forward Staging Base 1.0 Tender 1
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
P-8 detachment 2.0

Singapore
FFG 6

South China Sea force can proportionally counter PRC sub-

conventional
 Complementing capabilities of allies
East China Sea
Ships Operational Allies Japan
Presence
CVN 1
DDG-1000 1.5
Destroyer 4.5 1 CVL 2
Frigate 5.4 2 DDG 13
XLDUSV 2.6
SSN 2.2 Small Amphib 6
XLDUUV 2.6 FFG 6
Small Deck Amphib 1.5
Tender 1
Large Multi-Product
Logistics Ship (AOE) 4.2
Unmanned Vehicle Support
Vessel 2.0
Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 1.0 Western Pacific
Tender 1.0 Ships Operational
Presence
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
P-8 detachment 1.0 CVL 1.0
Destroyer 3.0
Korea
XLDUSV 2.6
SSN 3.1
DDG-1000 3 XLDUUV 2.6
Large Multi-Product Logistics Ships (AOE) 5.0
Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 1.0
Large Multi-product ship hull w/VLS 1.0
Tender 1.0
Salvage / Fleet Tug 2.0
Guam Oceanographic Research Ship 2.0
SSN 5 Command Ship 1.0
MQ-4 detachment 1.0
Tender 1
P-8 detachment 2.0

Providing SUW & strike capacity; counter-ISR, MIW, and

ASW capability; and sustainment to complement
 Maneuver Force for sustained
offense
Operational
Ships Allies
Presence
CVN 2.0
Destroyer 6.0
Frigate 7.0 1
XLDUSV 3.0
SSN 4.0
XLDUUV 3.0
Large Multi-Product Logistics Ships (AOE) 4.0
Large Multi-Product Logistics Ship (AKE) 2.0
Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 2.0
MPS Squadron 1.0

Not as effective in early stage of conflict due to size and vulnerability;

has time and “bandwidth” to prepare for high-end, sustained conflict
 Implementing a new logistics
concept
Ports not used or likely unavailable
Minimum Wartime for resupply; highly vulnerable
Ships
Requirement
Ports in use
Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE) 38
CONSOL T-AOT and T-AK Locations
Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (T-AKE) 18
CONSOL Tanker (T-AOT) 13 T-AOEs/T-AKE support Deterrence Force Operating Area
deterrence operations against
Geared Containerships (T-AK) 5 opportunistic Russian Maneuver Force Operating Area
Total 74 aggression

T-AKE reload in rear-

area ports or more T-AOE and T-AKE support
distant CONSOL Maneuver Force groups
locations

T-AOE support
Deterrence Force groups

T-AOEs refuel T-AOT and T-AK refuel and

transiting surge forces reload T-AOEs at CONSOL
points

Using CONSOL tankers and geared containerships for at-sea resupply to

reduce the need for T-AO and T-AKE shuttle ships to do long contested transits
Implications for
naval aviation

30
 CVW must support Deterrence Forces

48 hours at 25
knots

UC
AV
Co
20 mba
00 t R
nm ad Hawaii
ius Wake Island

Guam
Position at the start
ius H+48 Position at the start of
of conflict ad
atR conflict
mb m Marshall Islands
Co 0 n

nm
CAV 200

00
U

20
H+48
Diego Garcia

nm
00
32
1000 nm

Maneuver Force CVW will be first element to relieve Deterrence Forces as they
retire after 1-2 days of combat–drives 2000 nm UCAV range
 Maneuver Force combines 2 CVWs
Two V(U)AE squadrons:
Each with 6 x long-range, low-
observable unmanned strike aircraft

Two VF squadrons:
Each with 12 x low-observable fighters

Four V(F)A squadrons:

Each with 10 x F-35 multi-mission tactical
aircraft

Two VAQ squadron:

Each with 6 E/A-18G Electronic
Warfare aircraft

Two VAW squadrons:

Each with 5 E-2D
AEW/C2 aircraft

Two VRC squadrons:

Each with 6 unmanned
utility/tanker aircraft
 CVL air wing focused on new
concepts
Current ARG: 6x AV-8B, 12x MV-22, 3x UH-1, 4x AH-1, 4x CH-53
1x LHA 1x LPD 1x LSD

Four-Ship ARG Strike Optimized: 20x AV-8B/ F-35B, 4x MV-22, 3x UH-1, 4x AH-1, 4x CH-53
1x CVL 1x LPD 1x LXR 1x LXR

Four-Ship ARG Fast Assault Optimized: 10x AV-8B/ F-35B, 12x MV-22, 7x CH-53, 2 K-MAX
1x CVL 1x LPD 1x LXR 1x LXR

ARG air combat element shifts to support strike, SUW, and distributed
amphibious operations
Training, maintenance, and
readiness

34
 Today’s readiness cycles must change

Optimized Fleet Response Plan Submarines

(CVN, CVW, CG, DDG) (24 months)
(36 mos)
3 1 8
Deployment 6 6
Deployment
Sustainment 9
Sustainment, Rest &
Maintenance & Maintainenance
Basic Training
Integrated Training 15 Pre-Overseas Movement 12
Stand Down

Forward Deployed Naval Forces

Amphibious Ships (12 months)
(27 months)

3
Deployment 7
Deployment 6
Sustainment 5
Maintenance Maintenance &
Training
Basic Training 2
Integrated
10 6
Training

Amphibious ship and FDNF do not have sufficient time for maintenance;
O-FRP model does not efficiently use surface combatants 35
 Deterrence Forces w/higher
OPTEMPO
Deterrence Forces
(CVN, CVW, DDG) 2
(months)

Deployment
4
Maintenance
6
Training

Deterrence Forces
(multi-crewed FFG & patrol vessels) Gold Crew
(months) Maintenance; 1 Blue Crew
Operations; 2

Blue Crew Operations

Blue Crew Maintenance Gold Crew
Operations; 2
Turnover Blue Crew
Gold Crew Operations Maintenance; 1
Turnover; 1
Gold Crew Maintenance

Deterrence Forces have a more limited set of geographic areas, threats, and
potential operations than today’s FDNF; can employ high OPTEMPO cycle
 Maneuver Force uses O-FRP cycle

Maneuver Force
1
(CVN, CVW, DDG)
6 8

Deployment Sustainment

Maintenance Basic and Integrated Training

9
Experimentation
12

Maneuver Force could operate over wide range of areas, against many
different threats, and in multiple scenarios–needs more training and prep time
Force structure requirements

38
 Proposed Fleet Architecture
Total Fleet Additional Wartime
Required Capacity Needed

CVN 12
CVL 10
Very Large Surface Combatant (DDG-1000) 3
Destroyer 71
Frigate 71
Patrol vessel 42
SSN 66
SSBN 12
Small Deck Amphib 29
Oiler (T-AOE) 26 12
Dry Stores Ship (T-AKE) 4 14
Unmanned Vehicle Support Vessel 14
Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 6
Afloat Forward Staging Base 2
Large Dry Stores Transport Ship w/VLS 1
Tender 5
Salvage / Fleet Tug 6
Oceanographic Research Ship 5
Command Ship 3
Total ships (using today's rules) 340
Total ships (adding patrol vessel) 382
MQ-4 detachment (3 A/C) 14
P-8 detachment (3 A/C) 44
XLDUSV 40
XLDUUV 40

6
 CSBA architecture larger, more
diverse
Unmanned subs* 0 40

Unmanned ships* 0 40 CSBA

Navy FSA
Patrol vessels* 42
13

Afloat Forward Staging Bases 2

6

Fast Transports (JHSV/EFP) 14

10

Supply/Support ships 50
55

Ballistic missile submarines 12

12

Attack submarines 66
66

Frigates/Littoral Combat Ships 71

52

Destroyers & Cruisers 74

104

Amphibious ships 39
38

Nuclear carriers 12
12

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

* ship type not currently counted in Battle Force

Required fleet achieved in 2030s

41
Architecture costs 16% more to
build

8
Architecture costs 15% more to own

9
 Questions to address going forward
• How will challenges from Russia and China develop?
– Could identify areas to accept risk by reducing size and cost of fleet

• How can the U.S. fleet work better with allies and partners?
– Identify new contributions, synergies, and new opportunities

• How will logistics requirements change for future operations?

– Addressing likely new operating concepts and postures

• To what degree can unmanned replace manned platforms?

– Autonomy constrained by sensors; deterrent effect limited by self-defense

• Can new sensors and weapons significantly change the fleet?

– Long-range, LPD systems enable fewer, highly distributed platforms

10
• Designed for great power competition
– Posture to deny objectives and punish aggression in contested areas

• More time and focus for learning and adaptation

– Deterrence Forces focused on their regions
– Maneuver Forces with time for experimentation and exercises

• Improved integration with allies and partners

– Focused Deterrence Forces build stronger relationships and interoperability

• Increased options for platforms, payloads, and sensors

– New force packages increase ways naval forces can attack and defend

• Achievable fiscally and with industrial base

– Some additional cost, but risk can be taken in more expensive platforms

• Exploits manned-unmanned teaming

– New operating concepts built to leverage UxVs and unmanned sensors
– Assumes realistic levels of autonomy and endurance