Computer Security: Principles and

Practice

Chapter 3: User Authentication

EECS710: Information Security
Professor Hossein Saiedian
Fall 2014
Chapter 3 overview
• Electronic user authentication principles
• Password-based authentication
• Token-based authentication
• Biometric authentication
• Remote user authentication
• Security issues for user authentication
• Practical application: an iris biometric system
• Case stury: security problems for ATM systems

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Learning objectives
• Discuss the four general means of authenticating a
user’s identity
• Explain the mechanism by which hashed passwords
used for user authentication
• Understand the use of the Bloom filters in password
management
• Present an overview of token-based user
authentication
• Discuss the issues involved and the approaches for
remote user authentication

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User Authentication
• Fundamental security building block
– basis of access control & user accountability
• The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a
system entity
• Two steps:
– identification: specify identifier
– verification: bind entity (person) and identifier
• Distinct from message authentication (when communicating
parties are concerned with the integrity of the exchanges messages)

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A model for electronic user
authentication
• NIST SP 800-63-2 defines EUA as: the process of establishing
confidence in user identity that are electronically presented
• The NIST SP 800-63-2 model
– User applies to registration authority (RA) and becomes a subscriber
of a credential service provider (CSP)
– RA is a trusted entity
– The CSP exchanges with the subscriber
– The credential (a data structure) binds an identity to a token
possessed by the subscriber
– Claimant: the party to be authenticated
– Verifier: the party verifying
– The verifier passes an assertion about the subscriber to the relaying
party (PR)

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A model for electronic user
authentication

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Means of user authentication

• Four means of authenticating user's identity

• Based one something the individual
– knows, e.g. password, PIN
– possesses, e.g. key, token, smartcard
– is (static biometrics), e.g. fingerprint, retina
– does (dynamic biometrics), e.g. voice, sign
• Can use alone or combined
• All can provide user authentication
• All have issues

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Risk assessment for user authentication
• Assurance level: the degree of certainty that a user
has presented a credential that refers to his/her
identity
– Level 1: little confidence (an online forum)
– Level 2: some confidence (professional organizations)
– Level 3: High confidence (patent office applicants)
– Level 4: Very high confidence (employees accessing
restricted/sensitive services)
• Potential impact: low, moderate, impact

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Risk assessment for user authentication

Assurance Level Impact Profiles

Potential Impact Categories for Authentication Errors 1 2 3 4

Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation Low Mod Mod High

Financial loss or organization liability Low Mod Mod High

Harm to organization programs or interests None Low Mod High

Unauthorized release of sensitive information None Low Mod High

Mod/
Personal safety None None Low
High

Civil or criminal violations None Low Mod High

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Password authentication
• Widely used user authentication method
– user provides name/login and password
– system compares password with that saved for specified
login
• Authenticates ID of user logging and
– that the user is authorized to access system
– determines the user’s privileges
– is used in discretionary access control

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Password vulnerabilities
• offline dictionary attack
• specific account attack (user john)
• popular password attack (against a wide range of IDs)
• password guessing against single user (w/ previous
knowledge about the user)
• workstation hijacking
• exploiting user mistakes
• exploiting multiple password use
• electronic monitoring

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Countermeasures for password
vulnerability
• stop unauthorized access to password file
• intrusion detection measures
• account lockout mechanisms
• policies against using common passwords but
rather hard to guess passwords
• training & enforcement of policies
• automatic workstation logout
• encrypted network links

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Countermeasures for password
vulnerability
• It is worthwhile to study/research password and
password vulnerabilities
– Most common
– Still the most efficient

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Use of hashed
passwords

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Why a salt value?
• Prevents duplicate passwords from being visible in
the password file
• Increases the difficulty of offline dictionary attacks
• Nearly impossible to tell if a person used the same
password on multiple systems

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UNIX Implementation
• Original scheme
– 8 character password form 56-bit key
– 12-bit salt used to modify DES encryption into a one-way
hash function
– output translated to 11 character sequence
• Now regarded as woefully insecure
– e.g. supercomputer, 50 million tests, 80 min
• Sometimes still used for compatibility

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Improved implementations
• Have other, stronger, hash/salt variants
• Many systems now use MD5
– with 48-bit salt
– password length is unlimited
– is hashed with 1000 times inner loop
– produces 128-bit hash

• OpenBSD uses Blowfish block cipher based and hash

algorithm called Bcrypt
– uses 128-bit salt to create 192-bit hash value

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Password Cracking

• Dictionary attacks
– try each word then obvious variants in large
dictionary against hash in password file
• Rainbow table attacks
– a large dict of possible passwords
– for each password:
• precompute tables of hash values for all salts
• a mammoth table of hash values: e.g. 1.4GB table cracks
99.9% of alphanumeric Windows passwords in 13.8 secs
– not feasible if larger salt values used

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Password choices/concerns
• users may pick short passwords
– e.g. 3% were 3 chars or less, easily guessed
– system can reject choices that are too short
• users may pick guessable passwords
– so crackers use lists of likely passwords
– e.g. one study of 14000 encrypted passwords guessed nearly
1/4 of them
– would take about 1 hour on fastest systems to compute all
variants, and only need 1 break!

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Another case study
• An analysis of passwords used by 25,000 students
• Over 10% recovered after 10^10 guesses

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Password File Access Control
• Can block offline guessing attacks by denying access
to encrypted passwords
– make available only to privileged users
– often using a separate shadow password (for su only)
• Still have vulnerabilities
– exploit O/S bug
– accident with permissions making it readable
– users with same password on other systems
– access from unprotected backup media
– sniff passwords in unprotected network traffic

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Using Better Passwords
• Clearly have problems with passwords
• Goal to eliminate guessable passwords
– Still easy for user to remember
• Techniques
– user education
– computer-generated passwords
– reactive password checking (periodic checking)
– proactive password checking (at the time of selection)

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Proactive Password Checking
• Rule enforcement plus user advice, e.g.
– 8+ chars, upper/lower/numeric/punctuation
– may not suffice
• Password cracker
– list of bad passwords
– time and space issues
• Markov Model
– generates guessable passwords
– hence reject any password it might generate
• Bloom Filter
– use to build table based on dictionary using hashes
– check desired password against this table

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Token-based authentication
• Object user possesses to authenticate, e.g.
– memory card (magnetic stripe)
– smartcard

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Memory Card
• store but do not process data
• magnetic stripe card, e.g. bank card
• electronic memory card
• used alone for physical access (e.g., hotel rooms)
• some with password/PIN (e.g., ATMs)
• Drawbacks of memory cards include:
– need special reader
– loss of token issues
– user dissatisfaction (OK for ATM, not OK for computer
access)

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Smartcard
• credit-card like
• has own processor, memory, I/O ports
– ROM, EEPROM, RAM memory
• executes protocol to authenticate with reader/computer
– static: similar to memory cards
– dynamic: passwords created every minute; entered
manually by user or electronically
– challenge-response: computer creates a random number;
smart card provides its hash (similar to PK)
• also have USB dongles

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Electronic identify cards
• An important application of smart cards
• A national e-identity (eID)
• Serves the same purpose as other national ID cards
(e.g., a driver’s licence)
– Can provide stronger proof of identity
– A German card
• Personal data, Document number, Card access number (six digit
random number), Machine readable zone (MRZ): the password
• Uses: ePass (government use), eID (general use), eSign (can have
private key and certificate)

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User authentication with eID

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Biometric authentication
• Authenticate user based on one of their physical
characteristics:
– facial
– fingerprint
– hand geometry
– retina pattern
– iris
– signature
– voice

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Operation of a
biometric
system

Verification is analogous to
user login via a smart card
and a PIN

Identification is biometric info

but no IDs; system compares
with stored templates

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Biometric Accuracy
• The system generates a matching score (a number) that quantifies
similarity between the input and the stored template
• Concerns: sensor noise and detection inaccuracy
• Problems of false match/false non-match

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Remote User Authentication
• Authentication over network more complex
– Problems of eavesdropping, replay
• Generally use challenge-response
– user sends identity
– host responds with random number r
– user computes f(r,h(P)) and sends back
– host compares value from user with own computed value,
if match user authenticated
• Protects against a number of attacks

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Protocol for a password verification
• Similar approach for
token and biometric
verification

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Authentication Security Issues

• Client attacks: attacker attempts to achieve user

authentication without access to the remote host
– Masquerade as a legitimate user (e.g., guess the password
or try all passwords)
– Countermeasure: strong passwords; limit number of
attempts

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Authentication Security Issues

• Host attacks: attacker attacks the host where

passwords/passcodes are stored
– Countermeasure: hashing, protect password databases

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Authentication Security Issues

• Eavesdropping: attacker attempts to learn

passwords by observing the user, finding written
passwords, keylogging
– Countermeasures
• diligence to keep passwords
• multifactor authentication
• admin revoke compromised passwords

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Authentication Security Issues

• Replay: attacker repeats a previously captured user

response
– Countermeasure
• Challenge-response
• 1-time passcodes

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Authentication Security Issues

• eavesdropping
• replay
• trojan horse

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Authentication Security Issues

• Trojan horse: an application or physical device

masquerades as an authentic application or device
– Countermeasure: authentication of the client within a
trusted security environment
• Denial of service: attacker attempts to disable a user
authentication service (via flooding)
– Countermeasure: a multifactor authentication with a
token

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Practical Application

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Summary
• Introduced user authentication
– using passwords
– using tokens
– using biometrics
• Remote user authentication issues
• Example application and case study

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