THE STRICT GAME

The class will be divided into two groups

Rules are established which must be STRICTLY
observed during the discussion.
Each group will be given 100 initial points. Such
will be reduced for every violation.
The group with most points at the end of the
discussion will be declared winner and will
receive a reward
The Rules
 Seat erect (1 point)
 Hands on your lap (1 point)
 Feet together (1 point)
 No chatting with seatmate (3 points)
 No side comments (5 points)
 No using of cellphone (10 points)
 If you have any questions, raise your hands first, stand,
then proceed with the question (5 points)
 Be alert! Follow commands that may be given at any
time (3 points)
 Violation of this rule may be given mitigating
circumstances at our discretion
STRICT CONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER VII
STRICT CONSTRUCTION, Defined

 Construction according to the LETTER

 Recognizes nothing that is NOT EXPRESSED
 Takes the language used in its EXACT meaning
 Admits NO EQUITABLE consideration

 Shall not be EXTENDED or ENLARGED by IMPLICATION,

INTENDMENT or EQUITABLE consideration

STRICT construction is the ANTITHESIS of LIBERAL construction

APPLICABLE LEGAL MAXIMS

 Index animi sermo est – speech is the index of intention

 Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of the
statute there should be no departure
 Dura lex sed lex – the law may be harsh but it is the law
 Littera scripta manet – the written word endures
 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of all others
 Expressum facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts
an end to that which is implied
1. PENAL STATUTES

 Define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for

punishment

 STRICTLY construed against the State and LIBERALLY in favor of

the accused

 Not to bring cases within the provision that are not clearly
embraced by it

Reason: to carefully safeguard the rights if the defendant and

preserve the intention of the legislature
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos
FACTS:
The officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang
Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose
of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner
Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, and his company
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and
solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.
As a consequence, a complaint was filed by Judge Angeles against
Centeno and his company for violation of P.D. 1564, or the Solicitation
Permit Law.
In response, Petitioner contend that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense. Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not
those made for a religious purpose.
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos

ISSUE:

Whether or not solicitations for “religious

purposes” are within the extent of P.D. 1564
or the Solicitation Permit Law.
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos

RULING:
NO, solicitations for “religious purposes” are not within the extent
of P.D 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law.

P.D 1564,as amended, provides:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association
desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public
welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development
as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. xxx
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church
are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for
their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious
purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression
"charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the
converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable"
purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term.
Although the term "charitable" may include matters which
are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters
which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a
distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious
purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used
synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away
with by statute. The word "charitable," therefore, like most
other words, is capable of different significations.
Acts Mala in se and Mala prohibita

GR: Commission of criminal acts requires

INTENT

Mala in se – requires intent

Mala prohibita – intent not necessary

Words “voluntarily” – “knowingly” – “willfully”

Limitations

Defeats the intent, policy and purpose of

the statute
Literal meaning would lead to Abusrdity,
Contradiction, Injustice
2. Statutes in Derogation of Rights

Rights are inherent or guaranteed by the

Constitution or protected by Law

Not Absolute – the State may enact laws

restricting their enjoyment

Strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases

clearly within there scope or purpose
3. Statutes Authorizing Expropriations

Eminent Domain – expropriations of property by

the government or its agents for public purpose,
with payment of just compensation

Strictly construed against the expropriating

authority and liberally in favor of the property
owners
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. vs.
Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila

Facts:
4. Statutes granting Privileges

Strictly construed against those who invoke a

special privilege

Failure to strictly comply = loss of privilege

5. Legislative grants to local government
units
These are grants of public nature.
They should be construed against the grantee
Reason: These grants may carry the potentiality of
unjust public money or property which results in an unfair
advantage to the grantee and for that reason the grant
should be narrowly restricted in favor of the public.
6. Statutory grounds for removal of officials

 Statutes relating to suspension or removal of public

officials are strictly construed
 Removal of office must be confined within the limitation
prescriptions and specifications provided for statute
 Consider: causes, manners and conditions fixed by the
statute
 Reason: The removal of is drastic and penal in nature.
Injustice and harm to the public interest might become
a result of such removal from office.
 Lacson v. Roque
(GR No. 6225, January 10, 1953)

FACTS:
Following the acquittal of the Deputy Chief of Police, in a
criminal prosecution for malversation of public property
instituted at the instance of Mayor Arsenio Lacson, the
latter broadcasted on the radio some allegedly
defamatory and libelous utterances against the trial judge.
The judge then filed a libel case against Lacson.
Following the filing of the complaint, the President, issued a
suspension order against Lacson.
 Lacson v. Roque
(GR No. 6225, January 10, 1953)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his
post.

HELD:
 NO. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that
the President “shall exercise general supervision over all local
governments,” but supervision does not mean control.
 The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or
suspend municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of
public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable
and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.
 8. Naturalization Laws
These are strictly construed against the
applicant.
 Right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is
a statutory rather that a natural one, and it does not
become vested until he files a petition and establishes
by competent and satisfactory evidence that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
specified by law
 Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila
(G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004)

FACTS:
HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was
born May 19, 1975.
In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO
BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS.
CO BOON PENG filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under LOI No. 270.
His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship
under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and
consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, Tan Co filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules
of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied
Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila
(G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004)

ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on

account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.

HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate
of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They
are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their
petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a
Filipino citizen.
11. Statutes authorizing suits against government

 General Rule: "Sovereign is exempt from suit“

“Nullum tempo occurit regi”

 Exception: in the form of Statute, “State may give its

consent to be sued.”
12. Statutes prescribing formalities of the will
 "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are
strictly construed.“

Isabel Herreros Vda. De Gil vs. Pilar Gil Vda. Murciano

(G.R. No. L-3362)

Facts:
Carlos Gil executed a last will and testament. After his death, it was presented
for probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. This was opposed by his
nephew, Roberto Toledo y Gil and sister, Pilar Vda. de Murciano.
The will was initially destroy and was reconstituted. The parties all agree that
the reconstituted will is a copy of the original will. In the said will, the attestation
clause does not state that the testator signed the will. It only declares that it was
signed by the witnesses. Despite this defect, the Court of First Instance admitted to
probate the will. Pilar opposed such probate and appealed the decision of CFI to
the Supreme Court. The latter, reversed the decision of the CFI. Not contended
with the decision, Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, the administratrix, filed a motion for
reconsideration to the Supreme Court.
 Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, contends that defective attestation clause
may be cured by inferring in the other parts of the will and inserting a missing
phrase to complete the whole meaning of the attestation clause.
On the other hand, Pilar contends that the will should not be probated
since the will did not comply with the requirement of Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and
all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid despite its defective attestation clause?
Held:
The will is valid. It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left
out from the copy. The problem posed by the omission in question is
governed, not by the law of wills which require certain formalities to be
fulfilled in the execution but by the rules of construction applicable to
statutes and documents in general. The court may and should correct
the error by supplying the omitted word or words.
14. Exceptions and Provisos

 General Rule :
“All doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exceptions.”