Module16 Emergency Preparedness and Response-SHORT COURSE

BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE
Module XVI
Emergency preparedness and response
Version 1.0, November 2015

SHORT COURSE
This material was prepared by the IAEA and co-funded by the

European Union.
2
INTRODUCTION
Learning objectives
After completing this chapter, the trainee will be able to:
1. Get to know the fact that no nuclear power plant is 100%
safe.
2. Understand the need for the emergency preparedness
process to support an effective emergency response.
3. Get to know basic terminology such as nuclear emergency,
on-site and off-site areas.
4. Distinguish on-site and off-site emergency preparedness
and response.
5. Get to know how this module is organised.
Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI
3
Electricity is essential today
• Different types of power plants

• Nuclear power plants generate
11% of electricity
• All power plants have benefits
and drawbacks
• Nuclear accident is the biggest drawback of NPPs
− New designs are safer
− But nothing is 100 % safe
 We still need to be prepared, to the extent practicable, to

respond to nuclear emergencies!

4
When one is prepared enough?
• Preparing for emergencies should be adequate to enable effective

response
• It is difficult to draw a line where one is prepared enough
• In practice it also depends on available resources
• Nuclear emergency preparedness and response is not
proportional to country size!

5
Scope of the Module and terms used
• EPR = Emergency Preparedness and Response

• Emphasis given to an emergency at NPP
− Nuclear emergency = Emergency in which the hazard is due to nuclear
chain reaction or from decay of its products
• This module is based on current good practices and international
safety standards
− IAEA safety standards in EPR

6
On-site & Off-site
• On-site = Area within the security perimeter, fence or other

designated property marker under control of the facility
• Off-site = Area beyond that under control of the facility
 Our topic is EPR of local, regional and national response

organizations and the operating organization
 Aspects of coping with the accidents within NPP is also

covered in Module 15

7
Road book for this Module
• Basic Concepts - Facts and phenomena for better understanding

• Past nuclear accidents - Practical reasoning for EPR
• Establishing EPR - Setting up EPR
• Functional & Infrastructural elements – All the functions to be
performed in emergency response and infrastructure necessary to
support them
• Role of the IAEA in EPR
• Overview of the IAEA publications
− Safety standards
− Technical guidance and
− Other technical tools

8
BASIC CONCEPTS
Learning objectives
1. List specific characteristics of nuclear emergency.
2. List goals of emergency response.
3. Explain goals of emergency preparedness.
4. List the radiation exposure pathways.
5. Explain the different radiation exposure pathways.
6. Explain the term “Source Term”.
7. Understand differences between controlled and uncontrolled release.
8. Get to know background of dose calculations.
9. Understand limitations of dose calculations.
10. Get to know radiation exposure in relation to protective actions.

9
Natural disasters
• Brought about by change in

natural phenomena
• Earthquakes, flooding …
• Man has no influence on

10
Manmade disasters
• Result of
− System failure
− Human or organizational failure
− Intentional acts
• Nuclear accident at NPP
− Can be triggered by
a natural disaster as well

11
Particularities of nuclear accidents
• Danger is coming
− From highly complex manmade machine
− In a form of ionizing radiation
− Less known to population and general rescue services
− Induces fear and other psychological effects
• Consequences to population and environment

− Can be prevented if accident is contained within the NPP safety barriers
− Can be devastating to population, environment and nation’s economy
• Nuclear accident is quite different from natural disasters
 Even though probability is very low, we need to prepare
thoroughly for nuclear accidents and maintain adequate
capability

12
Challenge of competence
• Understanding of ionizing radiation and nuclear technology is

primarily limited to:
− Operator of nuclear power plant and its competent employees
− Government authority responsible for nuclear and radiation safety
• Government authority responsible for dealing with all types of
emergencies may not necessarily have knowledge and
competences in nuclear and radiation safety
− However, they provide rescue and relief services in nuclear emergency
as well
 Thus, good cooperation and coordinating mechanism are

essential for successful EPR

13
Response goals
Primary emergency response goals

• Take control of situation and mitigate the consequences
• Prevent severe deterministic effects
• Reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects

14
Additional response goals
• Rendering first aid

• Providing critical medical treatment
• Managing treatment of radiation injuries
• Keeping public informed
• Maintaining public trust
• Mitigating non-radiological consequences
• Protecting property and the environment
• Preparing for the resumption of normal social and economic activity

15
Preparedness goals
Emergency preparedness makes sure that

• Adequate response capability exists
Always ready - to mitigate consequences!

16
Preparedness in a nut shell
• Documents
− Legal framework
− National nuclear emergency plan
− To set roles and responsibilities for all parties involved in preparedness
process and response
− Under effective management system
• People
− Sufficient number of people: qualified , trained, fit for duty
− To run the preparedness process
− To take positions in emergency response

17
Preparedness in a nut shell /cont.
• Communication & Equipment

− Reliable, secure and redundant communication systems
− Equipment to support response
• Training, testing, exercising

− Process needs to be set up to regularly
− Train people for their positions, applying SAT
− Test all communication and other equipment to assure operability
− Exercise response
 Everything must be set on all levels for all involved

organizations - from national down to local and the operator

18
Doses
• For evaluating radiological consequences on human health

• Can be calculated or measured
• To be associated with health effects:
− How the doses are measured and calculated, i.e. what type of dose it is
− Knowing the exact exposure pathway
− Who is exposed
− Radionuclides involved

19
Deterministic and stochastic effects
• Deterministic effects
− Early or acute health effects
− Relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed dose to an
organ or tissue
− Unit is the gray (Gy)
• Stochastic effects
− Late health effects
− Equivalent dose to an organ or tissue
− Unit is the sievert (Sv)
• Stochastic effects in exposed population
− Effective dose
− Unit is the sievert (Sv)

20
Protective actions
• When doses are to exceed those at which radiation induced health

effects can be expected, protective actions are almost always
justified to be taken, such as:
− Iodine thyroid blocking
− Evacuation
− Sheltering
− Restrictions on contaminated food, milk, drinking water and other
commodities
− Relocation

21
Types of releases
• Nuclear emergency can produce two types of releases:

− Airborne goes into the atmosphere, forming a plume
− Liquid is discharged into water bodies (ground water, rivers, lakes
and the sea)

22
Airborne release
• Usually main concern as it may result to exposures of population

with serious health consequences
• Radionuclides released to environment as
− Gases
− Aerosol particles
− Water soluble substances
− Slightly soluble oxides

23
Ground contamination
• Deposition can be increased by precipitation (rain)

− Washes down radionuclides
− Hot spots along the rainwater path
• Hot spots = areas
with higher radiation or
contamination levels

24
Exposure pathways
The plume and deposition are primary sources of dose via:

1. Inhalation
2. Cloud shine
3. Ground shine
4. Ingestion
5. Inadvertent ingestion
6. Skin contamination
inadvertent
ingestion

25
Relevance of the pathways
During release, the following pathways are predominant:

• Inhalation
• Cloud shine
• Ground shine
• Skin contamination and
After plume has passed, the following pathways are predominant:

• Ground shine
• Intake of contaminated food, milk, water and
• Inadvertent ingestion

26
Actual doses received
Actual doses received depend on

• Release itself (source term)
− Composition and
− Released activities
• Weather (wind, rain etc.)
− During release
− After the release
• Protective actions taken

27
Source term
Source term = ?
• The composition of release itself
• Defined by characteristics of radioactive material released
− Quantity or magnitude
− Timing
− Chemical species and
− Physical forms
• Source term is always subject to uncertainty

28
Big uncertainty
• Early - before or during initial release

− Very little is known with certainty
• The operators should know
− If there is core damage
− But not the size or timing of a release
• Behaviour of released material
− Very complex and
− Unpredictable
 Only information early on that can be used confidently is

the core status!

29
Dose calculations
• Potential dose is
calculated by dose
models and software
− e.g. InterRAS, RODOS
• This is projected dose
• Used for
− Planning purposes
− Easier decision making
later in an emergency
response

30
Protective actions should not be based on
dose calculations
• Protective actions must be initiated BEFORE a major release

 Protective action decisions to be based on core damage
• Because of:
− High probability of a major release given core damage
− Relative ease to detect major core damage
− Large uncertainties associated with projecting containment failure
− Great difficulties to make accurate dose calculations

31
PAST NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
Learning objectives
1. Understand the reasoning for nuclear emergency
preparedness and response through brief overview of the
most well known past nuclear accidents.

32
To remind us all!
• Even today we can never be 100% sure that nothing would happen
• Past accidents provide lessons identified and hopefully learned
• Major nuclear accidents:
− Three Mile Island (1979)
− Chernobyl (1986)
− Fukushima Daiichi (2011)

33
Three Mile Island accident (TMI)
• 28 March, 1979, USA

• Partial core meltdown
• Radioactive impact not
significant
• But immense non-radiological
impact
• Rated INES 5

34
Chernobyl accident
• 26 April, 1986, USSR

Ukraine today
• Significant amounts of radioactive
material released
• High into the atmosphere,
and far away
• Significant increase in thyroid
cancer among children more
than 350 km from the site
• Contamination levels exceeded
in agricultural products more
than 1000 km away
• Rated INES 7
35
Fukushima Daiichi accident
• 11 March, 2011, Japan

• As a consequence of extreme
natural disaster, strong
earthquake followed by tsunami
• Multiple core meltdowns
• Multiple releases over a couple
of weeks to the atmosphere and
for months to the ocean
• Evacuation of 20 km and 30 km zone
• Rated INES 7
 It confirmed we always need to be prepared for the worst!

36
ESTABLISHING RESPONSE CAPABILITY
Learning objectives
1. Describe the planning basis for establishing response
capability.
2. Explain the importance of hazard assessment.
3. Get to know the concept of protection strategy.
4. Distinguish between reference levels and generic criteria.
5. Understand the concept of EALs and OILs.
6. Describe the IAEA emergency planning zones and
distances.

37
ESTABLISHING RESPONSE CAPABILITY /cont.
Learning objectives
7. Understand the need for introducing emergency planning
zones and distances.
8. Get to know concept of operation during a general
emergency at NPP.
9. Describe the three levels of responsibilities in emergency
response.
10. Describe developing emergency plans and procedures.

38
Assessment of hazards
• Establishing emergency response capability to be based on

potential hazards and associated consequences
− Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) provides essential information for
the types of accident sequences and their probability
− Safety analysis report (SAR), the facility licensing document, contains
description of the site, as well as detailed description of design basis
accidents and design extension conditions
− Hazard assessment, a comprehensive assessment for emergency
preparedness and response purposes
− Where and for whom protective actions may be required
− Identifies actions that are most effective in mitigating the consequences and
protecting individuals including the timing of actions required
− Allows for applying a graded approach
− PSA and SAR provide relevant inputs

39
Off-site emergency zones and distances
• The hazard assessment of NPPs

results in off-site emergency
zones and distances where:
− Appropriate arrangements are
established in advance to ensure
effective and prompt response
• The IAEA nomenclature

− Precautionary action zone (PAZ)
− Urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ)
− Extended planning distance (EPD)
− Ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD)

40
Off-site emergency zones and distances /cont.
• Roughly circular areas

• Defined by local
landmarks
• Do not stop at national
borders
• Emergency will not stop at
the planning zone
boundary!
• Special attention for
personnel of special
facilities in PAZ and UPZ

41
Protection strategies
• General approach to achieving goals of emergency response:

− To guide development of emergency arrangements
− To guide emergency response operations
• Justified and optimized set of protective actions
• Developed on the basis of hazard assessment
• Justification and optimization not limited to radiation protection
alone
− To take into account social, economic, environmental and psychological
factors
− To take into account the impact of each protective action on the
economy, society, public welfare etc.

42
Reference level
• Represents the level

− Above which it is inappropriate to plan to allow exposures to occur and
− Below which optimization takes place
• It is expressed in terms of residual dose
− Dose expected to be incurred by an individual in the emergency after
protective actions have been fully implemented or in absence of
protective actions if decided so (e.g. no any actions taken and
protective actions being terminated)
• Set typically for an effective dose in the range 20–100 mSv acute or
annual effective dose from all exposure pathways
• The actual national value(s) within this band need to be chosen on
the basis of prevailing conditions of the emergency situation and on
national particularities.

43
Generic criteria
• To be used for implementing protective actions either individually or

in combination
− Used in the process of developing the protection strategy and during its
implementation
• Expressed in terms of
− Projected dose, or
− Received dose
• Given for
− RBE weighted absorbed dose in an organ or tissue
− Equivalent dose in an organ and tissue
− Effective dose

44
Operational criteria
• An example of generic criterion

− When projected dose exceeds 100 mSv in the first 7 days, urgent
protective action, e.g. evacuation, is warranted
• It is impossible to use this criterion (100 mSv in the first seven days)
directly to initiate protective actions because:
− Projected dose cannot be measured
− Nearly impossible to calculate it accurately and timely to allow for
effective response
• Therefore there is a need for criteria based on the generic criteria
that can be used directly during an emergency without any need for
a further assessment
 Operational criteria

45
System of Generic and Operational criteria
• EALs, OILs and observables at the scene make a system of operational

criteria for use within the protection strategy, satisfying the generic criteria
and ultimately the reference level

46
Emergency Action Levels (EALs)
• EALs are predetermined, site-specific, observable criteria

• Can be observed by control room staff
− Instrument readings, status indications, observable events, etc.
• To early detect initiating condition of an emergency
• To trigger protective actions when results from field monitoring may
not yet be an appropriate indicator for doing so
• EALs form the basis of emergency classification system
(discussed later)

47
Operational Intervention Levels (OILs)
• After the release monitoring teams can be deployed to take

measurements and samples OILs are used to determine where
protective actions are necessary
• OILs are measured with instruments in the field or in the laboratory:
− They are associated with dose rates, ground or surface contamination,
radionuclides in environmental, food or water samples etc.
• OILs are derived from generic criteria. They are calculated and
agreed upon in the preparedness as part of the protection strategy.
• OILs can be revised during emergency to meet the prevailing
conditions

48
Concept of operations
T=0 - Emergency at NPP starts

T=15 min - Operator declares General Emergency on the basis EALs
T=30 min - Operator notifies the off-site and mitigates on-site
consequences
T=45 min - Off-site authorities order urgent protective actions
T=1 h - Public promptly take recommended actions
Within hours
− Authorities issue press release to general public
− IAEA is notified; international assistance is requested if needed
Within a day - Controlling of potentially contaminated goods is in place
Within a week - Controlling of food, milk and drinking water is in place

49
Allocation of responsibilities
• One of the most important parts of emergency preparedness

• To assign roles and responsibilities
− For each action there is responsible organization
• Should be assigned
− Officially, in legislation and
− Documented in plans
• Organizations have to embrace their roles
− Internal rules and procedures
− Employees or members be aware them and be trained
− Designated coordinators

50
Three levels of responsibilities
OPERATOR OFF-SITE INTERNATIONAL

(facility staff) (local and national (IAEA)
authorities)
• mitigate the • implement • Notify and exchange
emergency protective actions official information among
• protect people on- off-site international community,
site • provide support to • Provide advice and
• notify and keep the facility assistance, if requested,
off-site authorities • public • Perform assessment of
informed, communication the situation and
including • provide medical prognosis of its
international treatment development,
community • notify IAEA, etc. • Provide information to
• provide initial general public and
radiological media, and
monitoring, etc. • Coordinate the inter-
agency response.
51
Developing emergency plans and response
capability
Emergency response planning Implementation

• Hardware installations
Done on paper • Communication
setups
• Training
Plans • Exercises
• Etc.
• National
• Regional
• Local
• Operator
• Procedures
• Checklists …

52
Hierarchy of radiation emergency plans
(example)
NATIONAL RADIATION
EMERGENCY PLAN (NREP)
LOCAL PARTICIPATING
OPERATORS'
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION'S
PLANS
PLANS PLANS
Procedures, Procedures, Procedures,

Checklists Checklists Checklists

53
Emergency plans, procedures etc.
• Should provide for all functions necessary to be performed in the

emergency response, such as
− Initial accident assessment and classification
− Notification and activation
− Accident mitigation
− Public protective actions and other response actions
− Protection of emergency workers
− Public communication
− Non-radiological consequences mitigation
− Recovery
 All emergency functions are covered in the next chapter

54
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS
Learning objectives
1. Describe emergency management.
2. Explain the need for emergency classification.
3. Describe the purpose of mitigatory actions in a nuclear
emergency.
4. Distinguish between urgent and early protective actions.
5. List urgent protective actions.
6. List early protective actions.
7. Describe mechanism of iodine thyroid blocking.
55
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS /cont.
Learning objectives
7. Explain the difference between evacuation and relocation.
8. Distinguish between informing the general public and
giving instruction to the affected public during emergency.
9. Explain what arrangements for protecting emergency
workers encompass.
10. Describe the purpose and importance of field monitoring
in emergency response.
11. List three levels of medical response.

56
FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS /cont.
Learning objectives
13. Explain importance of triage.
14. Understand reasons for public concerns.
15. Describe particularities of radioactive waste coming from
nuclear emergency.
16. Explain importance of mitigating the non-radiological
consequences.
17. Understand the need for adjusting protective actions and
implementing recovery operations.

57
Managing emergency response operations
• Operator
− Full authority for response actions on-site (mitigating)
− Has to be able to transition from normal operations to emergency
response without impairing safe and secure operation of the facility itself
− Notifies off-site authorities, providing sufficient information
• Off-site authorities
− Command and control over implementation of public protective actions
• Decision-making process to be
− Well coordinated on and off-site
− Documented
− Well understood by all response organizations

58
Identifying, notifying and activating
• There should be clear and effective way for key response

organizations to be alerted 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and
to activate appropriate personnel and resources
• Emergency class
− The simplest and the shortest message the operator can send off-site to
trigger an adequate level of emergency response
− Timing requirement:
− Prompt enough to enable response organizations to perform their required
functions effectively
− Notification has to extend to neighbouring countries in which emergency
response actions may be warranted
− Countries within emergency planning zones and distances

59
Emergency classification
• Operator
− To have an easy to use classification procedure
− To promptly identify emergency conditions and
− To determine and declare the emergency class
• Upon declaration of an emergency class
− The operator and each response organization should take, without
further assessment, their assigned actions for that emergency class
− These actions are pre-planned and coordinated
− The meaning of emergency class needs to be consistent for the
operator and the off-site response organizations

60
The IAEA recommended classification system
Class Description
General Emergencies at facilities in emergency preparedness category I
emergency or II for an emergency that warrants taking precautionary urgent
protective actions, urgent protective actions and other response
actions on the site and off the site.
Site area Emergencies at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that
emergency warrants taking protective actions and other response actions on
the site and in the vicinity of the site.
Facility Emergencies at facilities in category I, II or III for an emergency
emergency that warrants taking protective actions and other response
actions at the facility and on the site but does not warrant taking
protective actions off the site.
Alert Emergencies at facilities in category I, II or III for an event that
warrants taking actions to assess and to mitigate the
consequences at the facility.
Other nuclear Emergencies in category IV that warrant taking protective actions
or radiological and other response actions at any location.
emergency
61
Taking mitigatory action
Mitigatory actions for a nuclear emergency refer to immediate actions

to be taken on-site:
• To prevent severe damage to fuel in the reactor core or spent fuel
pool, preventing a large release of radioactive material
• To reduce the size of any release following damage to fuel
• To delay a large release of radioactive material following damage to
fuel to allow protective actions to be taken

62
NPP states during an emergency
During a nuclear emergency the plant can fall within following states
• Design basis accident (DBA)
• Design extension conditions (DEC)
• Operator has to be capable to manage DBA and DEC
− There have to be procedures and guidelines in place
− Emergency operating procedures – EOP
− Severe management guidelines – SAMG
− Personnel has to be trained to cope with such conditions and mitigate
the emergency.

63
Taking protective actions and
other response actions
• Public protective actions

− Urgent protective actions
− Referred to as ‘precautionary urgent protective actions’ when taken on the
basis of plant conditions, before or shortly after a release
− Early protective actions
• Other response actions (which are not protective)
− Provision of public information
− Medical care
− Psychological support and similar

64
Urgent vs. Early protective actions
• Urgent protective actions

− To be taken promptly (within hours) to be effective
− Require prompt decision-making
− Are used over a relatively short period of time (days/weeks)
• Early protective actions

− Can be implemented within days to weeks and they will still be effective
− They can be long lasting

65
Urgent vs. Early protective actions /cont.
Major urgent protective actions: Urgent and early:

• Iodine thyroid blocking (ITB) • Closing off the area
• Evacuation • Preventing
inadvertent ingestion
• Sheltering
• Personal decontamination
Major early protective action:

• Restrictions on food, milk and
drinking water and on
• Relocation commodities
• Medical treatment

66
Protective actions implementation
Two possibilities:
1. Before or shortly after the release based on EALs (upon
declaration of a general emergency) within emergency planning
zones and distances
2. After the release based on OILs following performance of
monitoring and sampling
• Effective urgent protective actions - there is an urgency and time
constrain!
• Arrangements must be made in the preparedness stage
− To effectively and safely take urgent protective actions
− Factors such as availability of transport and effectiveness of shelters
and other local characteristics and infrastructure must be considered

67
Iodine thyroid blocking (ITB)
• Radioactive iodine can be released in

large amounts
• Radioactive iodine accumulates in the
thyroid gland
• Important health risk
− Increase chance of
thyroid cancer
• Young children and foetuses most
vulnerable
• Protection
− Take stable (non-radioactive) iodine
Iodine thyroid blocking
before exposure to block the thyroid
from accumulating radioactive iodine
68
Implementing ITB
• Pills to be taken before or shortly after intake, i.e. within 2 hours

• Clear instructions to be given to population
− When, what dosages
• ITB prevents intake from inhalation or ingestion
− Inhalation = short term, geographically limited
− Ingestion = long term, affecting larger population
• ITB not for long term protection
• ITB is for protecting of thyroid against radioactive iodine ONLY!
− Other protective actions are warranted in parallel (evacuation, food,
drink restrictions)

69
Preparing for ITB
• For severe accidents

− ITB more than few 100 km from the accident may be warranted
− Enough time to distribute pills that far and to effectively implement
• Pre-distribution necessary in the vicinity of the facility (i.e. within
PAZ and UPZ) in order ITB to be effectively implemented
− To be stored in homes, schools, workplaces, hospitals and other special
facilities
• ITB mechanism implementation to be well explained to the public at
the preparedness stage
− To support effective implementation of ITB
− To prevent unwarranted actions taken by the public
− To reduce fear

70
Evacuation
• Prompt evacuation (taken before or

shortly after a release) most
effective public protective action
− If carried out safely
− Prevents exposure from all pathways
• Evacuations are common, they occur
quite frequently in conventional
emergencies

71
Evacuation after release may still be effective
• It protects against ground shine (important source of exposure)

• Evacuation at speeds greater than walking speed (~ 5 km/h),
even during release, is more effective than sheltering
• If evacuating during or after a release
 Monitor evacuees for contamination and as necessary
decontaminate
• Challenges
− Large number of people and vehicles to monitor /decontaminate
− Effective traffic control plans
− Equipment capabilities
− Preventing bottlenecks during evacuation
• If evacuation is not possible right away
 shelter until safe evacuation + ITB
72
Sheltering
• People to stay indoors with windows and doors closed and

ventilation turned off
− Reducing exposure mainly from radioactive plume (inhalation and cloud
shine pathways) and from ground contamination
• Sheltering in place
− People to go inside, shut the windows and doors
• Sheltering in large buildings
− Called substantial shelter, away from closed windows with outside
ventilation shut off

73
Sheltering – Simple to implement, but …
• TIME - People cannot be kept inside for longer periods

− Sheltering is a short term measure
− Few days at most
− Only if evacuation is not possible
• SUPPLIES - People do not keep extensive supplies of food
− If more than a day, authorities need to take care of food, water,
sanitation, power, medical support, etc.
− Vital to keep people informed and to respond to their concerns
• EFFECTIVENESS
− Large building sheltering can prevent lethal doses
− Gradual air exchange between inside and outside
− To be combined with ITB

74
Relocation
• Relocation means removal of people to avoid longer term exposure

• Based on results from monitoring using OILs
− Relocation due to hotspots
− Relocation due to essential food and water being too much
contaminated to be allowed for consumption with no replacement
• Relocation is non-urgent
− A week to a month to be implemented and still to be effective
− Time is available to address personal needs
− Providing for household pets
− Gathering important possessions
− Securing property
− Providing for farm animals
− Providing for evacuees’ needs as well

75
Closing off an area
• Areas where evacuation and relocation were implemented need

to be closed for the public!
• Authorities must have complete control over closed areas
• Closing off to be publicly announced
• Closed areas to be clearly and physically marked (e.g. roadblocks)
• Control points to be set up

− Secure exiting and entering the closed off area including entry
point for emergency services
− Contamination control to be performed when exiting

76
Prevention of inadvertent ingestion
• Deposited radioactive material can be a significant source of

exposure
• Activities leading to an inadvertent ingestion:
• Eating, drinking and smoking with contaminated hands
• Children playing on the ground
• Working in the garden, sweeping the yard
• Other outdoor activities either for work or recreation
• Following actions can prevent and/or reduce inadvertent ingestion:
• Avoid unnecessary outdoor activities
• Keep your hands away from your mouth (do not smoke, eat and drink)
• Decontaminate as soon as possible if contamination is suspected (wash
hands and face, shower, change clothes)

77
Personal decontamination
• People can get contaminated if they

don’t leave potentially affected areas
before release
• Radioactive material deposits on
clothes and skin
• Initial decontamination:
− To remove outer clothes and wash hands and face or shower

− Handling of clothes properly not to contaminate the premises
− Discarding in well-marked plastic bags
− Showering with mild soap, no harsh scrubbing

78
Restrictions on food, milk and drinking water
and on other commodities
• Protection against ingestion of contaminated food, milk and drinking

water
− Restrictions applied to:
− The source - the food chain and water supply system
− Consumption - use and distribution of food, milk and drinking water
− Rainwater and local produce concern within hours of a release
− Milk within about two days, but urgent decisions are essential to prevent
contamination of milk from grazing animals
• Protection against the use of contaminated non-food commodities
• Controls in place have to be communicated for reassuring the public
− Certification can be an option

79
Instructions and warnings to affected
population
• Two aspects to be considered:

− Informing public periodically at the
preparedness stage
− Giving warnings and instructions of actions
to take during an emergency

80
Informing public periodically at preparedness
stage
• Scope of the information to be provided:

− The nature of hazard
− How people will be warned or notified
− On actions to be taken
− Emergency arrangements in place
• Disseminated as
− Brochures
− Leaflets
− Calendars
− Television or radio information programs
• Effectiveness of public information arrangements is subject to
periodic assessment

81
Warning and giving instructions during an
emergency
• Affected public must be warned promptly

− Provide them instructions on protective actions to take
• Warning options may include:
− Fixed sirens
− Centrally activated radios within homes
− Loudspeakers operated from police or fire fighting vehicles
− Door-to-door notification
• Even if no actions required, public still needs to be informed:
− To reduce their concern
− To prevent them taking unwarranted actions
(note that public communication in general is addressed separately)

82
Protecting emergency workers
• Personnel from the facility

− Employees who are directly
employed or through a
contractor
• Response organizations staff,
such as fire fighters, police
officers, medical personnel,
drivers and crews of
evacuation vehicles
• They are all emergency
workers and they need to be
protected adequately

83
Protecting emergency workers /cont.
• The first step – identify and designate emergency workers at the

preparedness stage
− Will help ensuring they are adequately protected when needed
(commensurate with their duties)
• Possibility some emergency workers may not have been seen as
such earlier but may be required during an actual emergency
− Register and integrate them within the response organization
− Identify responsible organization for their protection
• Participation of emergency workers in emergency drills and

exercises needs to be encouraged on regular basis

84
High doses on a voluntarily basis
• Most response actions to be carried out within dose limits for

occupational exposure
• Critical actions (life saving, prevention of development of
catastrophic conditions, averting large collective doses) may lead to
incurring higher doses (subject to pre-set guidance values)
− They are to be taken on a voluntarily basis
− Subject to informed consent
• To keep the doses of emergency workers as low as reasonable
achievable
− Managing and controlling the doses
− Records must be kept

85
Work in contaminated areas
• Must be planned in advance

• Besides external gamma radiation and
inhalation, skin contamination major
source of dose on-site
− Inhalation and skin contamination can
be prevented implementing adequate
protective actions (i.e. using
appropriate personal protective
equipment)

86
Helpers in an emergency
• Members of the public who willingly and voluntarily help

in response
− They are aware they may be exposed to radiation
• Regularly seen during natural disasters but it cannot be

excluded for them to volunteer to help in nuclear
emergency too
• Register and integrate them within the response
organization
• Identify responsible organization for their protection

87
Facility status and emergency radiation
monitoring
• Starts with the emergency

classification
• Detailed plant status
− By using plant's emergency
procedures and accident
management procedures
• Robust instrumentation that
withstands, for example:
− High radiation
− Humidity
− High temperature
− Extended measuring range

88
Protective actions based emergency radiation
monitoring
• Monitoring data
− Basis for additional protective actions (based on OILs)
− Assess actions taken, adjust them
− Assess hazards
• Measurements
− Ambient dose rate and dose
− Airborne radionuclide concentration
− Environmental deposition
− Food, water, and environmental contamination
− Individual dose
− Object-surface contamination measurements.
− Measurements of airborne aerosols and gases to provide warning
of unknown releases
89
Emergency radiation monitoring
• Monitoring purpose:
− To assess hazards
− To assess actions taken and to identify a need to adjust them
− To identify further actions to be taken
• Decisions for protective actions based on OILs
• Measurements may include:
− Ambient dose rate and dose
− Airborne radionuclide concentration
− Environmental deposition
− Food, water, and environmental contamination
− Individual dose
− Surface contamination measurements

90
Managing medical response
• Medical response is necessary element of response

• Based on methods used for handling other types of accidents
− Taking into account
− Health effects of radiation
− Contamination issues
• Medical response need to consider:
− Needs on-site: medical care for workers
− Needs off-site: medical care for workers and the affected population

91
Three levels of medical response
1. First aid on spot

2. Initial medical examination, treatment in a general hospital
3. Complete examination, treatment in a specialized medical centre
According to
• Degree of complexity
• Necessary resources for assistance
• Severity of consequences

92
Management of patients
• In case of high doses (deterministic effects)

 Specialized medical hospital for complete medical
examination, treatments, and assessment of the dose
• In case of large number of exposed persons
 Triage of persons
TRIAGE = To sort patients into classes on the basis of their condition to

expedite clinical care and maximize use of available medical services
• Contaminated patients may require decontamination

− But decontamination should not precede the provision of
critical medical care!

93
Dealing with contaminated patients
• Conventional protection is enough when handling contaminated

patients
• Care needs to be given not to spread contamination
− e.g. use plastic cover in the vehicle in which the patient is transported
• Medical staff may be required to wear personal protective clothing
(PPE) such as overalls, masks, plastic gloves, overshoes
• In some cases, medical staff may need:
− To wear personal dosimeters
− To be monitored for contamination

94
Public communications during an emergency
• Public communication during an emergency is one of the important

activities
• Public is very sensitive about any nuclear
− All nuclear emergencies are perceived as dangerous
 immense amount of media, public and political attention
• Authorities to provide official information as soon as possible
− Even though not much information may be known at the time

95
Public concerns
• During emergencies public is always concerned

− Nuclear emergencies raise even greater concerns then conventional
ones, ionizing radiation is almost completely unknown to general public
− Messages from the authorities may be confusing and too complicated
(e.g. containing technical data and information)
− There are "experts" appearing in the media with their own explanations
and detailed technical information
• There will be enquires from:

− Individuals
− Media
− Non governmental organizations and other interested parties

96
Unwarranted actions by the public
• Actions not justified by the radiation hazard and not warranted

− May do more harm than good!
− Can occur even if there is no release
− People take such actions on their own in belief they protect themselves
and others
• Examples of such unwarranted actions include:
− Shadow evacuations
− Unsubstantiated abortions
− Not accepting products, officially cleared, from affected areas
− Unwarranted closing school, embassies and other public buildings
− Unwarranted medical examinations, etc.

97
Managing radioactive waste
• Radioactive waste is normal side product

− Ranges from spent nuclear fuel of NPPs (high level waste) to
contaminated personal protective equipment (low level waste)
• Major recovery and decontamination activities may be warranted in
a nuclear emergency resulting in a large volumes of radioactive
waste being produced
− Can easily overwhelm national capabilities for its management
• Adequate preparedness to address waste management following
the emergency is necessary

98
Mitigating non-radiological consequences
• Psychosocial, economic and other non-radiological consequences

often outweigh radiological health effects
• Difficult to mitigate - primary related to perceived risk
• Emergency plans should
− Recognize their significance and
− Make provisions to reduce detrimental effects
• Measures to be considered
− Informing affected population accurately and promptly
− Accident’s progression
− Risks involved
− Protective actions being taken
− Keeping sheltered, evacuated, or relocated people informed of the
expected time to return to normal
99
Terminating the emergency
• Emergency stops, no on-going uncontrolled releases and no further

ones are expected, facility is under control
 Decision makers need to consider when and under what
conditions to terminate the emergency situation and to:
 Transition to long term recovery operations (i.e. existing exposure
situation or
 Return to planned exposure situation
• It may be impossible to prepare a detailed plan in advance for
recovery
− An outline of a plan or a strategy to be prepared
− Identifies the differences in authority, management and coordination
between the emergency and recovery responsibilities

100
INFRASTRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
Learning objectives
1. Explain importance of assigning authorities, roles and
responsibilities.
2. Understands staffing of response organizations.
3. Describe coordination of emergency response.
4. Describe the system of plans and procedures.
5. Describe facilities and equipment.
6. Explain the importance of training and exercises.
7. Explain what quality management in preparedness is in
practice.
101
INFRASTRUCTURAL ELEMENTS
Functional elements vs. Infrastructural elements
What functions need What infrastructure needs to be put

to be performed in place in support to perform
those functions
• Plans
• Procedures
• Facilities
• Equipment
• Training
• Exercises
• Quality management
102
Authority
• Authorities, roles and responsibilities should be

− Allocated
− Documented in national and local plans
• Conflicting roles and responsibilities need to be resolved
• Workable concept of operations ASAP
• Authority and responsibilities assigned within a clearly defined and
unified command and control system

103
Organization
• The same basic response organization for all emergencies

− Rapid integration, co-ordination and expansion of the response
− Covering nuclear and conventional emergencies (‘all-hazards’
approach)
• Emergency command and control system (ECS) with five
components:
− Command, Planning, Operation, Logistics, Finance/administration
• Small-scale emergencies  Only emergency commander may
perform all components
• Large-scale emergencies  Each component runs separately
• Command transfer:
 operator /first responders  Local official  National official

Coordination of emergency response
• EPR coordination mechanisms must be

− Established for any type of emergency
− Effective and practical
− Formalized
− Within organization, between individuals and departments
− At each level
− Between organizations and jurisdictional levels.
• Especially for large-scale operations

− With extensive resources required
• Coordination agreements
− Between facility and off-site authorities
− Notification protocols
− Communication mechanisms
− Off-site assistance ...

Plans and procedures
• All response organizations to have plans and procedures

− Radiation emergency response is not daily work
− People don’t know by heart exactly what has to be done
− Effective system of procedures with outlines, checklists and reminders
• Challenge is large number of organizations
− Need for coordination of plans and
− Concept of operations
• Updating is important
− Ensuring changes reflect in all documents
− Ensuring all organizations work from the last version
− Operational procedures revised annually
− National plans on a few years cycle (e.g. after bigger national exercises)
− Middle plans fall somewhere in between
− Emergency preparedness committees are needed to ensure these
Emergency response facilities and locations
• Emergency teams, decision making bodies, support teams, etc.,

need facilities or locations to be stationed with communication,
equipment, supplies:
− Simple regular offices turned into emergency centres
− Dedicated and equipped emergency centres
• Facilities located within potentially contaminated zone

− Premises for emergency personnel to be protected from external
radiation and airborne contamination
− Protection against other external hazards may be needed
• Emergency locations, e.g. field monitoring base, medical triage base

• Reception centre for evacuees registration and contamination
management

Emergency response facilities for NPPs
Primary:
• Control room
• Technical Support Centre (TSC)
• Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
• Operations Support Centre (OSC)
Others include: public information centre, reception centre

for evacuees, emergency centres, etc.

108
Emergency tools, equipment and supplies
• All response organizations should maintain suitable tools,

equipment and supplies
• Lists may vary considerably and may include:
− Regular office equipment and supplies (computers, printers, scanners),
− Special applications for dose calculations, source term estimation …
− Internal network and intranet,
− GIS applications to map emergency data,
− Monitoring equipment (measurement instruments, stations, vehicle kits,
− Decontamination equipment,
− Personal protective equipment,
− Supplies for evacuees (e.g. water, food, beds and blankets),
− Emergency vehicles,
− Communication equipment (phones, radios, faxes)
Communications
• A number of organizations involved

 Good communication systems are needed
− Dedicated
− Reliable
− Robust
− Simple to use
− With redundant back-ups and regular tests
• Common communication systems fail due to overloads
− Both landlines and cellular systems
• Provide key players robust and reliable communication
− Protected or direct lines
− Satellite telephones have limitations with sensitivity
− Microwave links are effective alternative where applicable
− All main communication systems to be tested and contact numbers
updated periodically
110
Training, drills and exercises
• Essential part of effective emergency preparedness program

• Training and exercises for facility to be held several times a year
• Substantial financial and human resources for off-site organizations
• Training and exercise program for off-site organizations to take into
account
− The role of each
− Its critical needs for responding
− Value of the training and exercises
e.g. police forces may only need specific radiological training
• Systematic approach to training (SAT) is needed

111
Quality management programme
• Response organizations to establish comprehensive quality

management program
− Availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication
systems and facilities
− Inventories, resupply, tests and calibrations
− Maintenance, review and updating of emergency plans, procedures and
other arrangements
− Incorporation of lessons learned from research, operating experience
and emergency drills and exercises
• Sufficient resources be available to regularly test all the above
• Testing to be carried out systematically with a continuous program
• Lessons learned to be fed back to the preparedness process
• Internal and external audits
112
THE ROLE OF IAEA IN A NUCLEAR OR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Learning objectives
1. Describe the role of the IAEA related to emergency
preparedness and response.
2. Describe the IAEA/IEC main functions.
3. Explain the obligations under the Early Notification and
Assistance Conventions.
4. Explain the mechanism of notification under the Early
Notification Convention.
5. List relevant IAEA safety standards on emergency
preparedness and response.
113
THE ROLE OF IAEA in EPR
• Statutory responsibilities
complemented with functions
assigned under:
− Early Notification and Assistance
Conventions
− IAEA Safety Standards in EPR
− IAEA Policy-making organs’ decisions

114
Roles of IAEA in emergency response
• Notification and official exchange of information

• Provision of advice and assistance
• Provision of assessment and prognosis
• Provision of public information
• Coordination of inter-agency response

115
Roles of IAEA in emergency preparedness
• Developing EPR related safety standards, technical guidance and

practical tools and providing for their implementation
• Assisting MS in establishing, enhancing their EPR and capacity
building
• Providing peer review services, e.g. EPREV
• Maintaining IAEA’s in-house and inter-agency preparedness

116
Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)
• Within Department of Nuclear

Safety and Security, IAEA
• Reporting directly to
Deputy Director General
• Custodian of IAEA‘s Incident and
Emergency System (IES)
• Global focal point for EPR
• World‘s centre for coordination of
provision of international
assistance

117
Early Notification Convention
• State Parties to notify and provide information regarding

emergencies with trans-boundary consequences which are of
radiological safety significance for other States
− Directly or through the IAEA
• State Parties to assign national warning point and competent
authorities for notification and information exchange purposes
• IAEA maintains a list of these contact points and uses diverse
means to promptly notify other states and international
organizations and for official information exchange
− USIE (Unified System for Incidents and Emergencies) being one

118
Assistance Convention
• States to request for international assistance, in writing

− Facsimile, email, USIE
• Upon receiving the request, IEC
− Conducts initial assessment
− Contacts other MS for offering requested assistance
− Co-ordinates the provision of assistance
• Response Assistance Network (RANET)
− Global network to facilitate assistance provision timely and effectively

119
IAEA Safety Standards in EPR
Hierarchy of the IAEA standards

• Safety Fundamentals
− Objectives, concepts, principles -
basis for requirements
• Safety Requirements
− Requirements on what is to be done
to ensure protection of people and
environment
• Safety Guides
− Recommendations and guidance on
how to meet requirements

120
IAEA Safety Standards in EPR /cont.
• GSR- Part 7
− Establishes requirements for adequate level of EPR for all facilities
and activities
− Uses ‘shall’ statements
− Sets common goal, concepts and approaches in EPR
• GS-G-2.1
− To assist Member States in implementation of selected safety
requirements in EPR
• GSG-2
− Provides the criteria for implementing protective actions and other
response

121
EPR Series publications
• Based on EPR safety standards

• To assist the application of IAEA
Safety Standards in EPR
• More operational documents
− Describe good practices
− Give practical solutions, detailed
methods
− Informational in nature
− Include numerous examples and
templates of actual documents

122
www.IAEA.org
• Get the latest information

on the IAEA website
www.iec.iaea.org

The views expressed in this document do
not necessarily reflect the views of the
European Commission.

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BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE

Emergency preparedness and response

Version 1.0, November 2015

This material was prepared by the IAEA and co-funded by the

Electricity is essential today

• Different types of power plants

 We still need to be prepared, to the extent practicable, to

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

When one is prepared enough?

• Preparing for emergencies should be adequate to enable effective

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Scope of the Module and terms used

• EPR = Emergency Preparedness and Response

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

On-site & Off-site

• On-site = Area within the security perimeter, fence or other

• Off-site = Area beyond that under control of the facility

 Our topic is EPR of local, regional and national response

 Aspects of coping with the accidents within NPP is also

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Road book for this Module

• Basic Concepts - Facts and phenomena for better understanding

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• Brought about by change in

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Particularities of nuclear accidents

• Consequences to population and environment

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• Understanding of ionizing radiation and nuclear technology is

 Thus, good cooperation and coordinating mechanism are

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Primary emergency response goals

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Additional response goals

• Rendering first aid

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Emergency preparedness makes sure that

Always ready - to mitigate consequences!

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Preparedness in a nut shell

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Preparedness in a nut shell /cont.

• Communication & Equipment

• Training, testing, exercising

 Everything must be set on all levels for all involved

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• For evaluating radiological consequences on human health

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

Deterministic and stochastic effects

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• When doses are to exceed those at which radiation induced health

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• Nuclear emergency can produce two types of releases:

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• Usually main concern as it may result to exposures of population

Basic Professional Training Course; Module XVI

• Deposition can be increased by precipitation (rain)