Ethics (Or Moral Philosophy)
Ethics (Or Moral Philosophy)
Ethics (Or Moral Philosophy)
1. Moral Realism:
Moral Realism (or Moral Objectivism) holds that there are
objective moral values, so that evaluative statements are
essentially factual claims, which are either true or false, and
that their truth or falsity are independent of our beliefs,
feelings or other attitudes towards the things being
evaluated. It is a cognitivist view in that it holds that ethical
sentences express valid propositions and are therefore truth-
apt.
There are two main variants:
a. Ethical Naturalism
This doctrine holds that there are objective moral properties
of which we have empirical knowledge, but that these
properties are reducible to entirely non-ethical properties. It
assumes cognitivism (the view that ethical sentences express
propositions and can therefore be true or false), and that
the meanings of these ethical sentences can be expressed as
natural properties without the use of ethical terms.
b. Ethical Non-Naturalism
This doctrine (whose major apologist is G. E. Moore)
holds that ethical statements express propositions (in that
sense it is also cognitivist) that cannot be reduced to non-
ethical statements (e.g. "goodness" is indefinable in that it
cannot be defined in any other terms). Moore claimed that a
naturalistic fallacy is committed by any attempt to prove a
claim about ethics by appealing to a definition in terms of
one or more natural properties (e.g. "good" cannot be
defined in terms of "pleasant", "more evolved", "desired",
etc).
Ethical Intuitionism is a variant of Ethical Non-
Naturalism which claims that we sometimes have
intuitive awareness of moral properties or of moral
truths.
2. Moral Anti-Realism:
Moral Anti-Realism holds that there are no objective
moral values, and comes in one of three forms,
depending on whether ethical statements are
believed to be subjective claims (Ethical
Subjectivism), not genuine claims at all (Non-
Cognitivism) or mistaken objective claims (Moral
Nihilism or Moral Skepticism).
1. Ethical Subjectivism, which holds that there
are no objective moral properties and that moral
statements are made true or false by the
attitudes and/or conventions of the observers, or
that any ethical sentence merely implies an
attitude, opinion, personal preference or feeling
held by someone.
There are several different variants:
Simple Subjectivism: the view that ethical statements reflect
sentiments, personal preferences and feelings rather than objective
facts.
Individualist subjectivism: the view (originally put forward by
Protagoras) that there are as many distinct scales of good and evil as
there are individuals in the world (effectively a form of Egoism).
Moral Relativism (or Ethical Relativism): the view that for a thing to
be morally right is for it to be approved of by society, leading to the
conclusion that different things are right for people in different
societies and different periods in history.
Ideal Observer Theory: the view that what is right is determined by
the attitudes that a hypothetical ideal observer (a being who is
perfectly rational, imaginative and informed) would have.
Non-Cognitivism, which holds that ethical sentences are
neither true nor false because they do not express
genuine propositions, thus implying that moral knowledge
is impossible. Again there are different versions:
Emotivism: the view, defended by A.J. Ayer and C. L.
Stevenson (1908 - 1979) among others, that ethical
sentences serve merely to express emotions, and ethical
judgments are primarily expressions of one's own attitude,
although to some extent they are also imperatives meant
to change the attitudes and actions of other listeners.
Prescriptivism (or Universal Prescriptivism): the view,
propounded by R.M. Hare (1919 - 2002), that moral
statements function as imperatives which are
universalizable (i.e. applicable to everyone in similar
circumstances) e.g. "Killing is wrong" really means "Do not
kill!"
Expressivism: the view that the primary function of moral
sentences is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to
express an evaluative attitude toward an object of
evaluation. Therefore, because the function of moral
language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have
any truth conditions.
Quasi-Realism: the view, developed from Expressivism
and defended by Simon Blackburn (1944 - ), that
ethical statements behave linguistically like factual
claims, and can be appropriately called "true" or "false"
even though there are no ethical facts for them to
correspond to. Blackburn argues that ethics cannot be
entirely realist, for this would not allow for
phenomena such as the gradual development of ethical
positions over time or in differing cultural traditions.
Projectivism: the view that qualities can be attributed
to (or "projected" on) an object as if those qualities
actually belong to it. Projectivism in Ethics (originally
proposed by David Hume and more recently
championed by Simon Blackburn) is associated by many
with Moral Relativism, and is considered controversial,
even though it was philosophical orthodoxy throughout
much of the 20th Century.
Moral Fictionalism: the view that moral statements
should not be taken to be literally true, but merely a
useful fiction. This has led to charges of individuals
claiming to hold attitudes that they do not really have,
and therefore are in some way insincere.
Moral Nihilism, which holds that ethical claims are
generally false. It holds that there are no objective values
(that nothing is morally good, bad, wrong, right, etc.)
because there are no moral truths (e.g. a moral nihilist
would say that murder is not wrong, but neither is it
right).
Error Theory is a form of Moral Nihilism which combines
Cognitivism (the belief that moral language consists of
truth-apt statements) with Moral Nihilism (the belief that
there are no moral facts).
Moral Skepticism, which holds that no one has any
moral knowledge (or the stronger claim that no
one can have any moral knowledge). It is
particularly opposed to Moral Realism (see above)
and perhaps its most famous proponent is
Friedrich Nietzsche.
An alternative division of meta-ethical views is between:
Moral Absolutism:
The ethical belief that there are absolute standards against which moral
questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right or wrong,
regardless of the context of the act.
Moral Universalism:
The meta-ethical position that there is a universal ethics which applies
to all people, regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality,
sexuality or other distinguishing feature, and all the time.
Moral Relativism:
The position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect objective
and/or universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social,
cultural, historical or personal circumstances.
a.2.3. Applied Ethics
Applied Ethics is a discipline of philosophy that attempts
to apply ethical theory to real-life situations.
Strict, principle-based ethical approaches often result in
solutions to specific problems that are not universally
acceptable or impossible to implement.
Applied Ethics is much more ready to include the insights
of psychology, sociology and other relevant areas of
knowledge in its deliberations. It is used in determining
public policy.
The following would be questions of Applied Ethics: