Honeypots
Honeypots
Honeypots
B.VIJAYKUMAR
2451-15-735-301
Introduction
•They are the highly flexible security tool with different applications
for security. They don't fix a single problem. Instead they have
multiple uses, such as prevention, detection, or information
gathering
• Goals
Should look as real as possible!
Should be monitored to see if its being used to launch a
massive attack on other systems
Should include files that are of interest to the hacker
Classification
By level of interaction
• High
• Low
By Implementation
• Virtual
• Physical
By purpose
• Production
• Research
Interaction
Low interaction Honeypots
• They have limited interaction, they normally work by emulating
services and operating systems
• They simulate only services that cannot be exploited to get complete
access to the honeypot
• Attacker activity is limited to the level of emulation by the honeypot
• Examples of low-interaction honeypots include Specter, Honeyd,
and KFsensor
Interaction
High interaction Honeypots
• They are usually complex solutions as they involve real operating
systems and applications
• Nothing is emulated, the attackers are given the real thing
• A high-interaction honeypot can be compromised completely,
allowing an adversary to gain full access to the system and use it to
launch further network attacks
• Examples of high-interaction honeypots include Symantec Decoy
Server and Honeynets
Implementation
• Physical
• Real machines
• Own IP Addresses
• Often high-interactive
• Virtual
• Simulated by other machines that:
– Respond to the traffic sent to the honeypots
– May simulate a lot of (different) virtual honeypots at the
same time
Production
• Production honeypots are easy to use, capture only limited
information, and are used primarily by companies or corporations
• Prevention
• To keep the bad elements out
• There are no effective mechanisms
• Deception, Deterrence, Decoys do NOT work against
automated attacks: worms, auto-rooters, mass-rooters
• Detection
• Detecting the burglar when he breaks in
• Response
• Can easily be pulled offline
Research
• Can only track and capture activity that directly interacts with
them
• All security technologies have risk
• Building, configuring, deploying and maintaining a high-
interaction honeypot is time consuming
• Difficult to analyze a compromised honeypot
• High interaction honeypot introduces a high level of risk
• Low interaction honeypots are easily detectable by skilled
attackers
Conclusion
• Not a solution!
• Can collect in depth data which no other technology can
• Different from others – its value lies in being attacked, probed
or compromised
• Extremely useful in observing hacker movements and preparing
the systems for future attacks
References
1. Spitzner, L. 2002. Honeypots: Tracking Hackers. 1st ed. Boston,
MA, USA: Addison Wesley.
2.Mokube, I. & Adams M., 2007. Honeypots: Concepts,
Approaches, and Challenges. ACMSE 2007, March 23-24, 2007,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA, pp.321-325
3.Aaron Lanoy and Gordon W. Romney, Senior Member,IEEE
[2006] A Virtual Honey Net as a Teaching Resource .
4.G. Romney, et al., "A Teaching Prototype for Educating IT
Security Engineers in Emerging Environments," Presented at
the IEEE ITHET 2004 Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, June 2,
2004. Published in IEEE Xplore.
Thank you
Questions??