Best Practices in Sis Documentation

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Best Practices in SIS

Documentation
Ed Marszal, President, Kenexis
Presenters

Ed Marszal

Gary Hawkins
Introduction

Safety Instrumented System Design per ISA S84* is


becoming a common practice
Poor documentation is being generated due to
safety case mentality
Current practices ignore audience of documents and
good practices for specifications in general

* ANSI /ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511-Mod)


FEED Phase SIS Documents
List of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF)
Grouping of Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF)
Group by equipment or process
Compressors
Reactors
Fired Heaters
P&ID representation of SIF
Logic description
cause and effect tables
Boolean logic diagrams
Narrative (plain English description of operation)
Testing procedures (with documentation of results)
Preliminary Design Steps

SIF List should be precursor to SIL selection


HAZOP/LOPA without knowledge of typical SIF leads
to errors
HAZOP is a final check on a good design, not a
design task
Typical SIF based on experience, standards, codes,
and judgment
Instrumented Protective Function Groups

Group instruments together that are functionally


related
Typically based around major equipment
Compressors
Fired Heaters
Reactors
Typically contains multiple SIF
Also can contain non-SIF instruments and logic
Typical Plant Groupings
IPF Grouping for Separator
H
PT A
PIC H
101A 101A D PIC
L
PV 101B L
101B
PT
101B

USC PT
Detail A
101 101D

H
PI
101C

PT
101C

V-101

PV
101A
LG LT USC
Detail A
101B 101B 101

LG LT
101A 101A
Advantages of IPF Grouping

Compact information with minimal duplication


Facilitates programming programmer shielded for
single instruments in multiple SIF
Facilitates design and I/O counting
Facilitates test plan development and testing
P&ID representation

Symbology for SIS, specifically tag naming in


inconsistent (I, X, UC, USC)
Use of S is technically correct, but leads to more
confusion (PSV is always a relief valve??)
Use of typicals to minimize clutter
Typical SIS I/O Details

Detail A - SIS Inputs

XT USC XI
XXX XXX XXX Indicator

XAHL Pre-Alarm
XXX

XAHHLL Trip Alarm


XXX

HS Bypass
XXX Switch

HA Bypass
XXX Alarm

XDA Deviation
XXX Alarm
Safety Requirements Specs

Specifications (emphasis on s)
Limit information to what is required for audience (SIL
not required on C&E or P&ID)
Use general requirements statements for common
features such as bypassing
Refer to other documents for non-critical information
Typical Bypass Note

1.1 Bypass / Override SIS Logic Solver

Each of the functional groups that are described in this Safety Requirements
Specification shall require a shutdown bypass function for maintenance and testing. The
bypass functionality described in this note shall not be used for normal operations. If a
bypass is required for normal operations such as start-up, a dedicated hard-wired
bypass facility shall be provided.

The SIS shall be configured so that bypasses are implemented using a two-step process
that includes activation of a unit-specific bypass enable switch and activation of an
input-specific BPCS bypass soft switch. Only when both of these items are activated
shall the input be bypassed. When an input is placed in bypass, the SIS logic solver
shall hold the input in the non-trip state, regardless of the status of the bypassed input.
Reference External Documents
Conclusions

Room for improvement in SIS documentation


practices
Consider the audience for the documents
Use good engineering practice
Minimize data duplication
Leads to shorter preparation time and fewer errors
Business Results Achieved

Decreased implementation time and cost


Compact documentation is easier to prepare and more
accurate
Use of standard modules instead of custom development
Minimal clarification and rework
Decreased ongoing maintenance effort and cost
Updates only occur in one document
Likelihood of inconsistent data in multiple documents
decreased
Safer processes
Lower probability of systematic errors in system resulting from
poor documentation
Summary

SIS design can be made safer and more cost


effective through documentation method
improvements
Specification preparation time can be reduced by as
much as 50%*
Please fill out comment cards and e-mail any feed
back you have to the authors
Questions?!?
Where To Get More Information

ISA Bookstore Safety Integrity Level Selection


Kenexis Web Site
HTTP://www.kenexis.com/resources
Emerson SIS Lifecycle Workbook
At Delta V SIS Booth during EGUE
Contact Emerson After EGUE

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