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Reasoning and Knowledge: Lecture Eight: Humean Scepticism and The Problem of Induction

Humean skepticism argues that inductive reasoning is groundless. It presents a circular argument: (1) the only way to know that similar causes produce similar effects is through induction, but (2) induction relies on the assumption that nature is uniform (the future will resemble the past), and there is no non-circular justification for this assumption. Therefore, according to Hume, inductive reasoning cannot be rationally justified.

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76 views

Reasoning and Knowledge: Lecture Eight: Humean Scepticism and The Problem of Induction

Humean skepticism argues that inductive reasoning is groundless. It presents a circular argument: (1) the only way to know that similar causes produce similar effects is through induction, but (2) induction relies on the assumption that nature is uniform (the future will resemble the past), and there is no non-circular justification for this assumption. Therefore, according to Hume, inductive reasoning cannot be rationally justified.

Uploaded by

jonathanlerner
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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PY1006 (2009-10)

REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE

LECTURE EIGHT:

Humean Scepticism
and the Problem of Induction

25/02/10
(Student version)
Dr. Patrick Greenough

1
1. Overview.

• Last time we looked at the distinction


between two sorts of knowledge (a priori
versus a posteriori).

• And we questioned whether we can be


said to have any a priori knowledge.

2
1. Overview.

• Today, we will look at one type of a


posteriori knowledge, namely knowledge
by induction.

3
1. Overview.

The Definitional Question: What is


induction?

The Local Sceptical Question: Do we


have any knowledge via induction?

4
2. Induction: The Thumbnail View.

Rough definition: induction is reasoning


from observed cases to unobserved
cases.

5
2. Induction: The Thumbnail View.

(1) All the fertilised chicken eggs we have


observed so far hatch after 5-6 weeks.

(2) Therefore, all fertilised chicken eggs


hatch after 5-6 weeks.

6
2. Induction: The Thumbnail View.

Another example …

7
2. Induction: The Thumbnail View.

• Some atypical examples:

(1) John has cancer.


(2) Therefore, everybody has cancer.

(1) This fire burns.


(2) Therefore, all fire burns.

8
3. Induction: The Key Features.

(i) It is a method of acquiring a posteriori


knowledge (of contingent truths).

(ii) It involves inferences (hence inductive


knowledge is not direct/immediate, but
involves a ‘movement of the mind’).

9
3. Induction: The Key Features.

(iii) It typically involves reasoning from a set


of observed facts to claims about what
has not been observed (such as future
events, unseen past events, events on
the other side of the solar system, events
round the corner, and so on).

10
3. Induction: The Key Features.

(iv) So, induction is how we gain knowledge


about the future (as well as the past and
the present).

11
3. Induction: The Key Features.

(v) Induction is ampliative: the conclusion of


an inductive argument always contains
more than is contained in the premises.

(The conclusion of an inductive


argument is stronger than the premises.)

12
3. Induction: The Key Features.

(vi) Inductive arguments can be good or bad.

• Good inductive arguments take us from


knowledge of the premises to new
knowledge.
• A bad inductive argument will not yield
any new knowledge.

13
4. Induction: Two sorts.

Induction to a generalisation …

14
4. Induction: Two sorts.

Induction to a particular claim …

15
4. Induction: Two sorts.

• Inductive to a particular is derivative …

16
4. Induction: Two sorts.

• …

• …

17
5. Deductive arguments.

Rough definition: Deductive arguments


are arguments where the conclusion is
alleged to follow as a matter of logic from
the premises.

18
5. Deductive arguments.

(1) Patrick and Mr Messy are idiots.

(2) Therefore, Patrick is an idiot.

Valid or invalid?

19
5. Deductive arguments.

(1) All cats can purr.

(2) Barney is a cat.

(3) Therefore Barney can purr.

Valid or invalid?
20
5. Deductive arguments.

(1) All chickens are evil.

(2) Barney is not evil.

(3) Therefore, Barney is not a chicken.

Valid or invalid?
21
5. Deductive arguments.

Thumbnail definition: An argument is


deductively valid if and only if:

it is not possible for its premises to be


true and its conclusion false.

22
5. Deductive arguments.

Equivalent definition: An argument is


deductively valid if and only if:

whenever the premises are true then the


conclusion must be true.

23
5. Deductive arguments.

• The conclusion of a deductively valid


argument is contained in the premises.

24
5. Deductive arguments.

(1) Patrick is an idiot.

(2) So, Mr Welsomer and Patrick are idiots.

Valid or invalid?

25
5. Deductive arguments.

(1) All US presidents start wars.

(2) Obama has started a war.

(3) So, Obama is a US president.

Valid or invalid?
26
5. Deductive arguments.

• …

27
5. Deductive arguments.

• NOTE: all inductive arguments (whether


good or bad) are not deductively valid.

• Why? Because the conclusion of an


inductive argument always contains
more than is contained in the premises.

28
6. Key features of deductive arguments.

(i) Deductive arguments can be valid or


invalid.

(ii) If valid, the conclusion is contained in the


premises: they are not ampliative.

29
6. Key features of deductive arguments.

(iii) Deductive arguments can nonetheless


yield new knowledge as we don’t
typically know all the logical
consequences of what we know.

(iv) Inductive arguments are not deductively


valid (because induction is ampliative).

30
7. Humean Scepticism.

It implies no contradiction that the course of


nature may change, and that an object, seemingly
like those we have experienced, may be attended
with different or contrary effects [...] We have said
that all arguments concerning existence are
founded on the relation of cause and effect; that
our knowledge of this relation is derived entirely
from experience; and that all our experimental
conclusions proceed upon the supposition that
the future will be conformable to the past.

31
7. Humean Scepticism.

To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last


supposition by probable arguments, or
arguments regarding existence must evidently
be going round in a circle, and taking that for
granted which is the very point in question
(Hume’s Enquiry, Section IV, Part Two).

32
7. Humean Scepticism.

From causes which appear similar we expect


similar effects. That is the sum of our
experimental conclusions [...] But you must
confess that the inference [from like cause to
like effect] is not intuitive; neither is it
demonstrative: of what nature is it then? To
say that it is experimental, is begging the
question. For all inferences from experience
suppose, as their foundation, that the future
will resemble the past [...]

33
7. Humean Scepticism.

If there be any suspicion that the course of


nature may change, and that the past be no
rule for the future, all experience becomes
useless, and can give rise to no inference or
conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any
arguments from experience can prove this
resemblance of the past to the future; since all
these arguments are founded on the
supposition of that resemblance (Hume’s
Enquiry, Section IV, Part Two).
34
7. Humean Scepticism.

(1) Hume’s fork: all knowledge is either based on


experience or is discoverable by
demonstration
(2) Our knowledge of cause and effect is based on
experience
(3) In particular, knowledge that similar causes
produce similar effects is grounded in
experience
(4) So, knowledge that the future will resemble the
past can only be gained through experience.

35
7. Humean Scepticism.

(5) But all inferential experiential knowledge


presupposes that the future will resemble the
past.

(6) Thus, the principle that nature is uniform (that


the future will resemble the past) is
groundless: any justification for this principle is
circular.

36
7. Humean Scepticism.

In a nutshell: it’s only rational to reason


from the observed to the unobserved if
one has good evidence that similar
causes produce similar effects (nature is
uniform).

37
7. Humean Scepticism.

BUT: the only way we can know that


similar causes produce similar effects is
by using induction (i.e. reasoning from
the observed to the unobserved).

Conclusion: inductive reasoning is


groundless—because any justification for
it is circular.
38
7. Humean Scepticism.

• In effect, Hume is showing that we have a


vicious circle, as shown by the two following
arguments:

(1) Nature is uniform.


(2) Therefore, induction is justified/rational.

(1) Induction is justified/rational.


(2) Therefore, nature is uniform.

39
7. Humean Scepticism.

• These arguments are VERY BAD


because in both cases in order to have
evidence for the premises one already
presupposes that you have evidence for
the conclusion.

40
7. Humean Scepticism.

Upshot: even if we have some immediate


a posteriori knowledge there is no
inductive knowledge: thus, no knowledge
of the world gained via inference.

• …

41
8. Question-begging arguments.

Definition: An argument is question-


begging if and only if to have evidence
for its premises already presupposes that
you have evidence for the conclusion.

42
8. Question-begging arguments.

• So, question-begging arguments are not


persuasive—they are not rationally
compelling, they cannot advance you to
new knowledge.

43
8. Question-begging arguments.

• Why exactly? Because one cannot


persuade someone that the conclusion is
true on the basis of the truth of the
premises because the premises can only
be justified if one already has justification
for the conclusion.

44
8. Question-begging arguments.

• Here is a famous example of a question-


begging argument, namely the proof of
the existence of an external world given
by G. E. Moore:

45
8. Question-begging arguments.

(1) I have two hands

(2) If I have two hands then there is an


external world

(3) Therefore, there is an external world

46
10. Do you want to read more?

• Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy, chapter 6.

• Hume, D. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,


chapter 4

• Alan Chalmers: What is this thing Called Science,


chapter 2

• David Papineau: "Induction and its problems", in


Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, Grayling (ed).

47

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