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Reasoning and Knowledge: Dr. Patrick Greenough

The document discusses skepticism about knowledge and certainty. It introduces epistemology as the study of knowledge, including its nature, types, sources, and limits. It outlines three types of skeptics - radical skeptics who believe knowledge is impossible, Cartesian skeptics who doubt provisionally to uncover the foundations of knowledge, and local skeptics who doubt certain areas of thought. It examines Descartes' arguments that we cannot distinguish reality from dreams or be certain we are not being deceived, and how these pose challenges to the possibility of knowledge. It analyzes the "master skeptical argument" that knowledge requires certainty but certainty is unattainable, therefore knowledge is unattainable.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
82 views44 pages

Reasoning and Knowledge: Dr. Patrick Greenough

The document discusses skepticism about knowledge and certainty. It introduces epistemology as the study of knowledge, including its nature, types, sources, and limits. It outlines three types of skeptics - radical skeptics who believe knowledge is impossible, Cartesian skeptics who doubt provisionally to uncover the foundations of knowledge, and local skeptics who doubt certain areas of thought. It examines Descartes' arguments that we cannot distinguish reality from dreams or be certain we are not being deceived, and how these pose challenges to the possibility of knowledge. It analyzes the "master skeptical argument" that knowledge requires certainty but certainty is unattainable, therefore knowledge is unattainable.

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jonathanlerner
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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PY1006 (2009-10)

REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE

LECTURE TWO:
KNOWLEDGE IS IMPOSSIBLE

9/02/2010

Dr. Patrick Greenough

1
1. What is Epistemology?

• The word ‘epistemology’ derives from the Greek


words ‘episteme’ (knowledge) and ‘logos’
(science, or understanding).

2
1. What is Epistemology?

• Epistemology is typically concerned with the:

(i) nature,
(i) types,
(iii) sources, and
(iv) limits of knowledge.

3
1. What is Epistemology?

• There are two basic epistemological questions:

The Definitional Question: What is knowledge?

The Sceptical Question: Do we know anything?

4
1. What is Epistemology?

The project of epistemology: To give a


satisfactory answer to the definitional question
which avoids the threat of scepticism.

5
1. What is Epistemology?

• Set the standards for knowledge too high and no


person can ever have knowledge.

• Set the standards too low and we will fail to


distinguish knowledge from, say, mere belief.

6
2. Claiming knowledge versus doubt.

• I claim to know lots of things:

That Waterloo took place in 1815.


That it is cold in South Georgia.
That I will die. That you will all die.
That my name is ‘Patrick’.
That cats are not foxes.
That I am experiencing a red sensation.
That I have toothache.
That 7+5 =12.

7
2. Claiming knowledge versus doubt.

• I might have cause to doubt some of my claims


to knowledge, but wouldn’t it just be plain silly to
doubt all my claims to knowledge?

• Descartes (the founder of modern epistemology,


1596 -1650 ) didn’t think so: it’s not only possible
but philosophically instructive to doubt whether
we have knowledge.

8
3. Three Sorts of Sceptic.

• What is a sceptic?

• Answer: someone who doubts that we have


knowledge …

• Three sorts of sceptic: Radical, Cartesian, and


Local.

9
3. Three Sorts of Sceptic.

• The Cartesian Sceptic merely doubts


provisionally.

• Why? In order to uncover the foundations and


structure of our knowledge:

we must make a ‘clean sweep … beginning


again from the very foundations’ (Descartes,
Meditation I, 1641).
10
3. Three Sorts of Sceptic.

• The Radical Sceptic says that no such rebuilding


can be done: Knowledge is unobtainable, period.

• There’s no way back once sceptical doubt is


begun …

11
3. Three Sorts of Sceptic.

• The Local Sceptic says that we only lack


knowledge in certain regions of thought.

12
4. Descartes: The Argument from Dreaming.

I see plainly that sleep and waking can never be


distinguished by any certain signs (Descartes,
Meditation I).

13
4. Descartes: The Argument from Dreaming.

(1) To know that I am sitting by the fire then I must be


able to distinguish wakefulness from dreaming.

(2) I cannot distinguish wakefulness from dreaming.

(3) Therefore, I cannot know that I am sitting by the fire –


I cannot have such knowledge.

14
4. Descartes: The Argument from Dreaming.

• The challenge generalises to all our


knowledge of the external world.

15
4. Descartes: The Argument from Dreaming.

Whether I am awake or asleep, two and


three add up to five, and a square has only
four sides; and it seems impossible for
such obvious truths to fall under a
suspicion of being false (Descartes,
Meditation I).

16
5. The Cartesian Argument from Deception.

But ‘suppose that there is an evil spirit, who is


supremely powerful and intelligent, and does his
utmost to deceive me’ (Descartes, Meditation I).

17
5. The Cartesian Argument from Deception.

18
6. The Modern Argument from Deception.

• Suppose one is hooked up to the Matrix: all of


one’s sensory inputs are thus controlled via a
vast computer.

• So, (most of) one’s experience of the world is


simply a simulation.

19
6. The Modern Argument from Deception.

20
7. The Master Sceptical Argument.

(1) Knowledge requires certainty

(2) Certainty is unobtainable

(3) Therefore, knowledge is unobtainable

21
7. The Master Sceptical Argument.

• If this argument is sound it will lead to


‘inextricable darkness’.

• It looks like we have two options: deny the


reasoning, or reject a premise. …

22
8. Three definitions: argument, soundness and validity.

Definition One: An argument consists of one or


more premises which (allegedly) support or
justify a conclusion.

23
8. Three definitions: argument, soundness and validity.

Definition Two: An argument is sound if and only


if:

(a) it is (deductively) valid and


(b) has true premises.

24
8. Three definitions: argument, soundness and validity.

Definition Three: An argument is (deductively)


valid if and only if whenever its premises are
true, its conclusion must be true.

That is, if and only if it is not possible for its


premises to be true and its conclusion false.

25
9. Certainty and assent.

Reason already convinces me that I must


withhold assent no less carefully from what is
not plainly certain and indubitable than from
what is obviously false (Descartes, Meditation I).

• So, lack of certainty entails that we should not


speak, judge, or form beliefs.
Result: ‘inextricable darkness’.

26
10. What is meant by ‘certainty’?

• Certainty has both an subjective and a objective


aspect.

• …

• …

27
10. Objective Certainty.

• Cartesian certainty amounts to indubitability.

• That is, a proposition is certain when it is


immune to doubt (in the sense that one has no
right or reason to doubt the proposition in
question).

28
10. Objective Certainty.

• The Master notion of certainty is: immunity to


error.

• One’s belief is immune from error when and only


when you have ruled out all possibility of being
mistaken.

29
10. Objective Certainty.

• …

• …

30
11. The Sceptical Template once again.

(1) Knowledge requires immunity to error.

(2) Immunity to error is unobtainable

(3) Therefore, knowledge is unobtainable

31
12. Certainty and Infallibilism.

• That knowledge requires certainty (as immunity


to error) is an expression of infallibilism.

• …

32
12. Certainty and Infallibilism.

[..] knowledge is an absolute concept. On one


interpretation, this means that the justification or
evidence one must have in order to know a
proposition p must be sufficient to eliminate all
the alternatives to p (where an alternative to a
proposition p is a proposition incompatible with
p). That is, one’s justification or evidence for p
must be sufficient for one to know that every
alternative to p is false (Cohen, 1992).

33
12. Certainty and Infallibilism.

• …

• …

34
13. Example: there is milk in the fridge.

• Suppose you claim to know that you have milk in


your fridge.

• The sceptic asks: how can you know this for you
have not ruled out the possibility that your flat-
mate has replaced your milk with a milk
substitute, or that you locked the cat in the fridge
without knowing it and the cat has drunk all the
milk.
35
13. Example: there is milk in the fridge.

Let ‘p’ abbreviate the proposition: there is milk


in the fridge.

36
13. Example: There is milk in the fridge.

• Alternatives to p (i.e. the not-p possibilities):

(i) The carton has leaked …


(ii) I bought soya milk without realising it.
(iii) My flat-mate has drunk the milk.
(iv) The builders have drunk the milk.
(v) Everything in my flat has been stolen.
(vi) The cat hides in the fridge and drinks the milk.

37
13. Example: There is milk in the fridge.

(vii) The milk fairies have stolen the milk.


(viii) I am dreaming that I bought the milk.
(ix) I am in the Matrix – everything is an illusion …
(x) I am being deceived by a malign demon.

38
14. The Sceptical challenge: thumbnail version.

• The thumbnail sceptical challenge is:

If you can’t rule out all the alternatives to p


then
you can’t know that p

39
15. Important Qualification.

Note: …

• …

40
16. The Incoherence of Fallibilism.

• Just ask yourself: …

Upshot: knowledge is impossible: radical


scepticism is vindicated.

• …

41
16. The Incoherence of Fallibilism.

[…] knowledge requires absolute certainty: I


know something if and only if there is no
possibility, however remote, that I am wrong. On
this view, there is a kind of incoherence in
combining a claim to know that p with an
admission that one might nevertheless be in
error (Michael Williams Unnatural Doubts, 1996,
p. 48).

42
16. The Incoherence of Fallibilism.

• …

• …

43
17. To sum up.

• We have found that:

(i) Scepticism comes in different forms.


(ii) There are different arguments for scepticism.
(iii) The strongest argument comes from
Infallibilism: if you can’t rule out all the not-p
possibilities then you can’t know that p.
(iv) Fallibilism sounds incoherent. So, scepticism
is valid: we don’t know anything!
44

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