QuanRiskAssessment v4

Chemical Process
Quantitative Risk
Assessment
April 6, 2015 (rev 4)

Hazardous Modelling Quantitative
Risk Final
Review Material Frequency
Consequence Source Hazard Effect Estimation Thoughts
Release Analysis
Concept Definitions
Hazard An intrinsic chemical, physical, societal, economic or political condition

that has the potential for causing damage to a risk receptor (people,
property or the environment).
A hazardous event (undesirable event) requires an initiating event or failure and then either
failure of or lack of safeguards to prevent the realisation of the hazardous event.
Examples of intrinsic hazards:

Toxicity and flammability H2S in sour natural gas
High pressure and temperature steam drum
Potential energy walking a tight rope
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Concept Definitions
Risk A measure of human injury, environmental damage or economic loss in

terms of both the frequency and the magnitude of the loss or injury.
Risk = Consequence x Frequency
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Concept Definitions
Ris
k
Intrinsic Undesirable
Hazards Event Consequences
Likelihood Likelihood of
of Event Consequences
Example
Storage Loss of life/ property,
Spill and Environmental
tank with
Fire damage,
flammable Damage to reputation
material of facility
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Concept Definitions
Ris
k
Causes of Event Consequences
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Concept Definitions Layers of Protection are used to

enhance the safe operation. Layers of
Ris Layers of Layers of
Protection Analysis (LOPA) is used to
determine if there are sufficient layers of
k Protection Protection protection for a predicted accident
scenario. Can the risk of this scenario
be tolerated?
Causes of Event Consequences
Causes are also known
as Initiating Events.
Preparedness,
Prevention Mitigation,
Land Use Planning,
Response,
Recovery
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Quantifying Risk
Risk A measure of human injury, environmental damage or economic loss in
terms of both the frequency and the magnitude of the loss or injury.
N
Riskh = Consequencei,h * Frequencyi,h
i=1
Rh Consequencei, of Frequencyi, of
Risk from an undesirable event, h consequence i from
undesirable event h
event, h
where i is each consequence
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Quantifying Risk
If more than one type of receptor can be impacted by an event, then the
total risk from an undesirable event can be calculated as:
K N
Riskh = Consequencei,h,k * Frequencyi,h,k
Rh k=1 i=1
Risk from an Consequencei, of Frequencyi, of
undesirable undesirable event, h consequence i, from
event, h event h
where k is each receptor (ie. people, equipment, the

environment, production)
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Types of Consequences
Locational Consequence Outdoor
Probability of IMMOVEABLE receptor that is maximally exposed.
the consequence, Pd
(death, damage) Pd,h(x) = Conditional probability of
of an event consequence (death, injury, building or
equipment damage) for event h at
distance x from the event location.
Event
Distance from Event, x
Location
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Probability of IMMOVEABLE receptor that is maximally exposed.
the consequence, Pd We can sum all the locational consequences at a set
(death, damage) location, to calculate the total risk = facility risk.
of an event The total risk includes the risk from all events that
can occur in the facility.
H
Total Risk = Rh
h=1
Event
Location
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IMMOVEABLE receptor that is maximally exposed.
Probability of
the consequence, Pd
Layers of Protection
(death, damage)
of an event
Individual Consequence
An ability to escape and an
indoor vs. outdoor exposure.
Event
Location
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Release Analysis
Aggregate Consequence Outdoor IMMOVEABLE receptor.

Cd,h = Pd,h r dA
Exposed
Probability of Geographical
the consequence, Pd Area
(death, damage)
of an event
r is the population density in dA
r is shown in yellow, and Pd,h is the grey line
Event dA Distance from Event, x

Location
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Aggregate Consequence Outdoor IMMOVEABLE receptor.

Layers of Protection
Probability of Societal Consequence An ability to escape,
the consequence, Pd indoor vs. outdoor exposure and fraction of time
(death, damage) the receptor at a location.
of an event
Event dA Distance from Event, x

Location
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Define the System

Overview of Risk Assessment
Risk
Hazard
1. Identify hazardous materials and process Analysis
conditions Identification
2. Identify hazardous events
3. Analyse the consequences and frequency of
events using:
i. Qualitative Risk Assessment Consequence Frequency
(Process Hazard Analysis using
Risk Matrix techniques) Analysis Analysis
- SLRA (screening level risk assessment)
- What-if
- HAZOP (Hazard & Operability study) Risk
- FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis)
Evaluation
Risk Assessment
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Define the System

Overview of Risk Assessment
Risk
Hazard
ii. Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment Analysis
- Fault trees/ Event trees/ Bow-tie
Identification
iii. Quantitative Risk Assessment

- Mathematical models for hazard effents Consequence Frequency
include explosion overpressure levels, Analysis Analysis
thermal radiation levels
- The consequences are determined from
the hazardous effects
Risk
Evaluation
Risk Assessment
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Release Analysis
Hazard effects can be caused by the release of hazardous

material
Hazardous materials are typically contained in storage or process vessels

(as a gas, liquid or solid).
Depending on the location of the vessel, release may occur from a fixed facility or
during transportation (truck, rail, ship, barge, pipeline) over land or water.
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Release of Solid Hazardous Material
The release is significant if the solid is:

An unstable material such as an explosive
Flammable or combustible solid (petroleum coke)
Toxic or carcinogenic (either in bulk or as dust)
Soluble in water and spill occurs over water (dissolves into the water)
Dust (which can cause clouds and impact respiration)
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Release of Liquids or Gases from Containment
Release from containment will result in:
an instantaneous release if there is a major failure
a semi-continuous release if a hole develops in a vessel
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Release of Liquids or Gases from Containment
Mass discharge of a liquid [kg/s] through a hole can be calculated:

m (kg / s) = Cd A r v(m / s)
Cd discharge coefficient (dimensionless 0.6)
A area of the hole (m2)
where liquid density (kg/m3)
P - Pa P - Liquid storage pressure (N/m2)
v(m / s) = 2 + gh
r Pa ambient pressure (N/m2)
g gravitational constant (9.81 m/s2)
h liquid height above the hole (m)
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Release Analysis
Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage Tank
Pressurised storage tanks containing liquefied gas are of

particular interest as their temperature is between the
materials boiling temperature at atmospheric pressure and
its critical temperature. A release will cause:
- A rapid flash-off of material.
- The formation of a two-phase jet which could create a liquid pool

around the tank. The pool will evaporate over time.
- Formation of small droplets which could form a cloud that is denser

and cooler than the surrounding air. This is a heavy gas cloud which
remains close to the ground and disperses slowly.
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Release Analysis
Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage Tank

Wind Outdoor Temperature > Normal Boiling Point of
Liquid
Rapid Flash-off and Cooling

Two-phase Dense Gas Plume
Large Liquid Droplets Evaporating Liquid Pool
Outdoor Temperature < Normal Boiling Point of Liquid 21

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Release Analysis
Consequences of Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage

Tank
Flammable Gas Release No Ignition = vapour cloud
Immediate ignition = jet fire
Delayed ignition = vapour cloud explosion
Flammable Liquid Release No ignition = toxic health issues

Immediate Ignition pool fire
Pool fire under or near a pressure vessel
can lead to a Boiling Liquid Expanding
Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
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Gas Discharge
A discharge will result in

P rcrit
sonic (choked) flow Pa where
g
g +1 g -1
OR rcrit =
2
P < rcrit
subsonic flow Pa
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Gas Discharge
m = Cd A ( P )y
Gas discharge rate can be calculated: ao
Subsonic Flows
1
2 (g -1)
ao sonic velocity of the gas (m/s)
2
2g Pa g
2

1 - Pa
g P
y = for a rcrit
g -1 P P

P Cd discharge coefficient (0.6)
A area of hole (m2)
R gas constant
Sonic (Choked) Flows T upstream temperature (K)
2
(g +1)
2(g -1)
Pa M gas molecular weight (kg/kmol)
y =g for rcrit
flow factor (dimensionless)
g -1 P
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Hazardous Events and Concerns

Event Type Event Mechanism Hazard Concern
Fires
Gas/Vapour - Jet fire, flash fire, fireball Thermal radiation, flame
Liquid - Pool fire, tank fire, running fire, spray fire, fireball impingement, combustion products,
Solids - Bulk fire, smouldering fire initiation of further fires
Explosions
Confined - Runaway reactions, combustion explosion, physical explosion, Blast pressure waves, missiles,
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) windage, thermal radiation,
Unconfined - Vapour cloud explosion combustion products
Gas Clouds
Heavy Gases - Jets Asphyxiation, toxicity, flammability,
Light Gases - Evaporation, volatilisation, boil-off range of concentrations.
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Modelling the Effects of a Hazardous Material Release
The type of material and containment conditions will govern source strength.
The type of hazard will determine hazard effect:

- Gas Clouds: concentration, C
- Fires: thermal radiation flux, I
- Explosions: overpressure, Po
The probability of effect, P, can be calculated at a receptor.
We will focus on effect modelling for combustion sources: fires

and explosions.
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Combustion Basics
Combustion is the rapid exothermic oxidation of an ignited fuel.

Combustion will always occur in the vapour phase liquids are
volatised and solids are decomposed into vapour.
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Essential Elements for Combustion

Fuel

Gases: acetylene, propane, carbon monoxide, hydrogen
Liquids: gasoline, acetone, ether, pentane
Solids: plastics, wood dust, fibres, metal particles
Oxidizer Ignition Source

Gases: oxygen, fluorine, chlorine Sparks, flames, static electricity, heat
Liquids: hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, perchloric acid
Solids: metal peroxides, ammonium nitrate
Examples: Wood, air, matches or

Gasoline, air, spark
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Essential Elements for Combustion

Fuel

Gases: acetylene, propane, carbon monoxide, hydrogen
Liquids: gasoline, acetone, ether, pentane
Solids: plastics, wood dust, fibres, metal particles
Oxidiser Ignition Source

Gases: oxygen, fluorine, chlorine Sparks, flames, static electricity, heat
Liquids: hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, perchloric acid
Solids: metal peroxides, ammonium nitrate
Methods for controlling combustion are focused on eliminating

ignition sources AND preventing flammable mixtures.
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Flammability
Ignition A flammable material may be ignited by the combination of a fuel and
oxidant in contact with an ignition source. OR, if a flammable gas is
sufficiently heated, the gas can ignite.
Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) Smallest energy input needed to start
combustion. Typical MIE of hydrocarbons is 0.25 mJ. To place this in
perspective, the static discharge from walking across a carpet is 22 mJ;
an automobile spark plug is 25 mJ!
Auto-Ignition Temperature The temperature threshold above which enough
energy is available to act as an ignition source.
Flash Point of a Liquid The lowest temperature at which a liquid gives off
sufficient vapour to form an ignitable mixture with air.
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Combustion Definitions
Explosion Rapid expansion of gases resulting in a rapidly moving pressure or
shock wave.
Physical Explosion Results from the sudden failure of a vessel containing
high-pressure non-reactive gas.
Confined Explosion Occurs within a vessel, a building, or a confined space.
Unconfined Explosion Occurs in the open. Typically the result of a flammable
gas release in a congested area.
Boiling-Liquid Expanding-Vapour Explosions Occurs if a vessel containing a
liquid above its atmospheric pressure boiling point suddenly ruptures.
Dust Explosion Results from the rapid combustion of fine solid particles
suspended in air.
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More Combustion Definitions

Shock Wave An abrupt pressure wave moving through a gas. In open air, a
shock wave is followed by a strong wind. The combination of a
shock wave and winds can result in a blast pressure wave.
Overpressure The pressure of an explosion above atmospheric pressure; more

specifically, the pressure on an object, resulting from the shock wave.
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Types of Fire and Explosion Hazards

Fires Explosions
Pool Fires Physical Explosions
- Contained (circular pools, channel fires)
- Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions
- Uncontained (catastrophic failure, steady release) (BLEVEs)
- Rapid phase transitions (eg, water into hot oil)
Tank Fires - Compressed gas cylinder failure
Jet Fires Combustion Explosions
- Vertical, tilted, horizontal discharge - Deflagrations: speed of reaction front< speed of sound
- Detonations: speed of reaction front> speed of sound
Fireballs - Confined explosions
Running Fires - Vapour cloud explosions
- Dust explosions
Line Fires
Flash Fires
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Fires vs. Explosion Hazards

Combustion
o Is an exothermic chemical reaction where energy is released following combination of a fuel
and an oxidant
o Occurs in the vapour phase liquids are volatilised, solids are decomposed to vapours
Fires AND explosions involve combustion physical explosions are an exception

The rate of energy release is the major difference between fires and combustion
Fires can cause explosions and explosions can cause fires
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The Effects
Major Fires Explosions

Toxic concentrations from Blast pressure levels
combustion emissions Thermal radiation
Thermal radiation Missile trajectory
Flame impingement Ground shock
Ignition temperature Crater
Explosions can cause a lung haemorrhage,

eardrum damage, whole body translation.
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Modelling Major Fires

The goal of models is to
o Assess the effects of thermal radiation on people, buildings and equipment use the
empirical radiation fraction method
o Estimate thermal radiation distribution around the fire
o Relate the intensity of thermal radiation to the damage this can be done using the PROBIT
technique or fixed-limit approach
Modelling methods
1. Determine the source term feeding the fire
2. Estimate the size of the fire as a function of time
3. Characterise the thermal radiation released from the combustion
4. Estimate thermal radiation levels at a receptor
5. Predict the consequence of the fire at a receptor 36
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Modelling Major Fires
Radiation Heat Transfer

Is = Incident Radiative Energy Flux at the Target
Empirical Radiative Fraction Method

Is = E F where E = f Q and F = (4S2)-1
atmospheric transmissivity
F point source shape factor (S is the distance from the centre of the flame to the receptor)
E total rate of energy from the radiation
f radiative fraction of total combustion energy released
Q rate of total combustion energy released 37
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Release Analysis
Pool Fires
Heat radiation
from flames
Storage Tank
Pool of flammable Liquid from
tank
Dyke
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Pool Fires
SIDE VIEW TOP VIEW
First Degree Burns
1% Fatalities Due
to Heat Radiation
100% Fatalities
Due to Heat
Radiation
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Modelling Pool Fires

The heat load on buildings and objects outside a
burning pool fire can be calculated using
models. A pool fire is assumed to be a solid
cylinder.
The radiation intensity is dependent on the
properties of the flammable liquid.
Heat load is also influenced by:
Xm
Distance from fire
Relative humidity of the air
Orientation of the object and the pool.
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Height of Pool Fire Flame Model

The height of a pool fire flame, hf, can be
calculated, assuming no wind:
0.61

hf = 42

hf
[kg/ (m2s] = mass burning flux
[m]
df [m] flame diameter
dpool [m] pool diameter, assume equivalent to dpike
g [m/s2] gravitational constant = 9.81
air [kg/m3] density of air
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Explosion Modelling
A simple model of an explosion can be determined using the TNT approach.
1. Estimate the energy of explosion :
Energy of Explosion = fuel mass (Mfuel, kg) x fuel heat of combustion (Efuel, kJ/kg)
2. Estimate explosion yield, :
This an empirical explosion efficiency ranging from 0.01 to 0.4
3. Estimate the TNT equivalent, WTNT (kg TNT), of the explosion :

WTNT =

where ETNT = 4465 kJ / kg TNT
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Explosion Modelling
The results from the TNT approach can then be used to
1. Predict the pressure profile vs distance for the explosion.
2. Assess the consequences of the explosion on human health or objects
PROBIT
Damage effect methods
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Classifying Hazards for Consequence Modelling

In general, hazard effects associated with releases can be classified in to the
following:
1. Thermal Radiation Radiation could affect a receptor positioned at some distance from a
fire (pool, jet, fireball).
2. Blast Pressure Wave A receptor could be affected by pressure waves initiated by an
explosion, vapour cloud explosion or boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
3. Missile Trajectory This could result from tub rocketing.
4. Gas Cloud Concentrations Being physically present in the cloud would be the
primary hazard.
5. Surface/ Groundwater Contaminant Concentrations Exposure to
contaminated drinking water or other food chain receptors could adversely effect health
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Consequence Models
These models are used to estimate the extent of potential damage caused by a
hazardous event. These consist of 3 parts:
1. Source Term The strength of source releases are estimated.
2. Hazard Levels or Effects Hazard level at receptor points can be estimated
for an accident.
Fire: A hazard model will estimate thermal radiation as a function of distance from the
source.
Explosion: A hazard model will estimate the extent of overpressure. NO concentrations of
chemical are estimated.
3. Consequences Potential damage is estimated. Consequence of interest will
be specific to each receptor type (humans, buildings, process equipment, glass).
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Source Term for Hazardous Material Events
Source models describe the physical and chemical processes occurring during the
release of a material. A release could be an outflow from a vessel, evaporation
from a liquid pool, etc.
The strength of a source is characterised by the amount of material released.
A release may be:

- instantaneous: source strength is total mass released m [units: kg]
- continuous: source strength is rate of mass released [units: kg/s]
The physical state of the material (solid, liquid, gas) together with the
containment pressure and temperature will govern source strength.
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Release from Containment

There are a number of possible release points from a chemical vessel.
Relief Valve
Crack Hole
Crack
Valve
Severed or
Ruptured Pipe
Pump seal
Pipe Connection Flange
Hole 47
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Release Analysis
Physical State of a Material Influences Type of Release

Vapour OR Two Phase
Gas / Vapour Leak Vapour/ Liquid Leak
Liquid OR Liquid Flashing into Vapour

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Source Models Describing a Material Release

Flow of Liquid through a hole
Flow of Liquid through a hole in a tank We are going to focus
Flow of Liquid through pipes on the source models
Liquids flashing through a hole highlighted in red.
Liquid evaporating from a pool
Flow of Gases through holes from vessels or pipes
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Release Analysis
Liquid Flow Through a Hole
Ambient Conditions
We can consider a tank that develops a
hole. Pressure of the liquid contained in the
tank is converted into kinetic energy as it
Liquid drains from the hole. Frictional forces of the
liquid draining through the hole convert
some of the kinetic energy to thermal
energy.
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where
Liquid Ambient Conditions
Pg = gauge pressure
P = Pg P = 1 atm u = average fluid
utank = 0 uambient = u velocity (m/s)
z = 0 A = leak area (m2) z = height
Ws = 0 Ws = shaft work
= liquid G = 9.81 m/s2
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Mass Flow of Liquid Through a Hole

Liquid
P = Pg
Qm = A Co 2 r g Pg
utank = 0
z = 0 Co is the discharge coefficient
For sharp-edged orifices, Re > 30,000 Co = 0.61
Ws = 0
For a well-rounded nozzle, Co = 1
= liquid For a short pipe section attached to the vessel: Co = 0.81
When the discharge coefficient is unknown: use Co = 1
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Release Analysis
Liquid Flow Through a Hole - Example

Consider a leak of benzene from 0.63 cm orifice-like hole in
Benzene a pipeline. If the pressure in the pipe is 100 psig, how much
Pressurised in a benzene would be spilled in 90 minutes? The density of
Pipeline benzene is 879 kg/m3.
Qm = A Co 2 r g Pg
Qm = (3.12 x 10-5 m 2 )(0.61) 2 (879 kg / m3 )(9.81 m / s 2 )(689 x 103 kg / m 2 s 2 )

Qm = 2.07 kg / s
Area of Hole Volume of Spill
Area = /4 D2
Area = (/4 * 0.0063)2
Volume = 2.07 kg/s * (90 min * 60 sec/min * 1/879 m 3/kg = 12.7 m3
Area = 3.12 x 10-5 m2
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Release Analysis
Liquid Flow Through a Hole In a Pressurized Tank
Ambient Conditions
Liquid Pressurised
in a Tank We can consider a tank that develops a hole.
Pressure of the liquid contained in the tank is
Utank = 0
converted into kinetic energy as it drains from the
= hole. Frictional forces of the liquid draining through
the hole convert some of the kinetic energy to
thermal energy.
= 0
= liquid
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Release Analysis
Liquid Flow Through a Hole In A TANK
where
Ambient Conditions
Liquid Pressurised
Gauge Pressure
in a Tank = 1
uambient = u
Average Instantaneous
Velocity of Fluid Flow
[length/time]
=
Utank = 0 = Height [length]
= 0 W = 0
= liquid
W Shaft Work [force*length]
Gravitational Constant
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Release Analysis
Liquid Flow Through a Hole In a Tank
Mass Flow of Liquid Through a Hole in a Tank
Liquid Pressurised gc Pg
in a Tank Qm = A Co r 2 + ghL
r
=
Utank = 0 Where Co is the discharge coefficient (0.61)
= 0 W = 0 Assume Pg on the liquid surface is constant, which is valid for

Vessels which are padded with an inert gas to prevent an internal
= liquid explosion, or if the tank is vented to the atmosphere
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Evaporation from a Pool

The rate of evaporation from a pool depends on:
- The liquids properties
- The subsoils properties
It is also key to note if the liquid is released into a

contained pool or not. For contained pools, the pool
height = volume spilled/cross sectional area of the
containment structure.
If the release is not contained then it is called a

freely spreading pool. US EPA Offsite Consequence
Analysis Guide recommends a pool depth of 1 cm.
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Non-boiling Liquids
The vapour above the pool is blown away by
prevailing winds as a result of vapour diffusion. The
amount of vapour removed through this process
depends on:
The partial vapour pressure of the liquid

The prevailing wind velocity
The area of the pool
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Mass Flow of Liquid Evaporating from a Pool
Psat
Qm = MW K A
RTl
Qm Evaporation rate (kg/s)

MW molecular weight (g/mol)
K mass transfer coefficient (cm/s)
[ie, if unknown use K = 0.83 (18.01/MW)0.333 cm/s,
which relates the mass transfer coefficient to that of
water]
A area of the pool (m2)
Psat saturation vapour pressure at Tl
R ideal gas constant (J/mol K)
Tl liquid temperature
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Burn from a Pool
Lets now assume that the liquid that drained

into the dyke is flammable and is ignited.
We can consider the burn rate of this flammable

liquid from the pool.
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Burn Rate of a Flammable Liquid from a Pool
Liquid Burn Rate from a Pool [m/s]

-6

1.27 x 10 DH comb
Yburn =
DH vap + BP Cp dT
T
Tl
Hcomb = Heat of combustion (kJ/kg)

hvap = Heat of vapourization (kJ/kg)
Cp = heat capacity (kJ/kg K)
TBP = normal boiling point of the liquid (K)
Tl = liquid temperature (K)
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Burn Rate of a Flammable Liquid from a Pool
Liquid Burn Rate from a Pool

-6

1.27 x 10 DH comb
Yburn =
DH vap + BP Cp dT
T
Tl
Mass Burn Rate

Qm (kg / s) = Yburn * A * rliquid
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Release Analysis
Generation of Toxic Combustion Products

Industrial fires can release toxic substances. Generation is
dependent on availability of combustion mixture and
oxygen supply.
Combustion temperature determines the products
generated more complete combustion occurs at higher
temperatures
Toxic combustion products include:
Component in Burned Material Combustion Product
Halogen HCl, HF, Cl2, COCl2
Nitrogen NOx, HCN, NH3
Sulphur SO2, H2S, COS
Cyanide HCN
Polychlorinated aromatics and biphenyls HCl, PCDD, PCDF, Cl2 63
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Release Analysis
Damages Caused by the Release of Toxic Combustion Products
Toxic combustion products can adversely effect many types of people (employees,
emergency responders, residents) and the environment (air, groundwater, soil).
Based on past accidental releases, inhalation of toxic combustion products occurs in

about 20% of cases. In about 25% of cases, evidence of environmental pollution
has been noted.
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Consequence Models
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Fundamentals of Transport and Dispersion
Hazardous material releases (from containment) can occur into/on:

1. Moving media (water, air)
Transport is dependent on speed of currents and turbulence level
2. Stationary media (soil)

- Release can be carried away by rain potential surface water contamination
- Release can slowly diffuse through the soil for potential groundwater contamination.
- Diffusion in the soil mediates movement into groundwater
The hazardous material is the contaminent

and the moving media is the carrying medium.
Spread of the release in the environment can occur by advection (transport over
large scale), turbulence (dispersion over small scale) or diffusion. Diffusion is
negligible compared to other routes.
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Fundamentals of Transport and Dispersion
Releases into Air

- Spread dependent on winds and turbulence
- Relative density to air is critical
- Contaminants can travel very large distances in a short time (km/h)
- Difficult to contain or mitigate after release
Releases on Water
- Spread dependent on current speeds
- Miscibility/ solubility and evaporation is important
- Spill will be confined to the width of a small river easy to estimate the spread of the release
- Spill likely not to reach sides of a large river
- Containment is possible after release
Releases on Soil
- Spread dependent on migration in soil
- Miscibility/ solubility and evaporation is important
- Contaminants travel VERY slowly [m/yr]
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Fundaments of Transport and Dispersion

Dispersion models must account for the density differences between the released
substance and the medium into which it is released
Oil spills on water
Heavy gas releases into the atmosphere
Dispersion by nature is directional - the released material will travel in the direction
of the flow of the carrying medium.
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Hazard Modelling - Atmospheric Dispersion
When modelling dispersion, a distinction should be made between

- Gases that are lighter than air, neutrally buoyant gases AND
- Gases that are heavier than air
By understanding hazardous material concentrations as a function of distance from

the release location is important for estimating whether an explosive gas cloud could
form or if injuries could be caused by elevated exposure to toxic gases.
Pollutant dispersion in the atmosphere results from the movement of air. The major
driver in air movement is heat flux.
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Fundaments of Transport and Dispersion

Releases into the atmosphere are the most challenging to control, especially when
there are frequent wind changes. Turbulent motions in the atmosphere can impose
additional fluctuations in the concentration profile at a receptor.
Accidental releases of gases is particularly difficult. These releases are often violent
and unsteady, resulting in rapid transient time variations of concentration levels at
a receptor.
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Concentration at a Receptor after an Unsteady Release

Exposure Duration at
Some Distance from the Release Location
Duration of Release
Instantaneous
Concentration
Average
Time From Release

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Atmospheric Dispersion Surface Heat Flux
Surface heat flux determines the stability of the atmosphere: stable, unstable or
neutral.
Positive Heat Flux - Heat absorbed by the ground due to radiation from the sun
- Air masses are heated by heat transfer from the ground
Negative Heat Flux - Heat from ground is lost to space

- Air masses are cooled at the surface by heat transfer to the ground
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Stable Atmospheric Conditions

Temperature
Free Atmosphere
Heat fluxes range
from -5 to -30 W/m2
Accumulation Layer
Occurs at night or
with snow cover
Wind Vertical movement
Profile Mixing is supressed
Turbulent Layer Height
Turbulence is
100 m caused by the wind
Ground
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Steady
Elevation Winds
Distance
from Source
Concentration
Zero or Near Zero

Ground Level Concentrations
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Fluctuating
Elevation Winds
Distance
from Source
Concentration
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Unstable Atmospheric Conditions
Free Atmosphere
Heat fluxes range
Entrainment Layer from 5 to
400 W/m2
Occurs during the

Wind Mixed day or with little
cloud cover
Profile Layer Mixing
Height Vertical movement
is enhanced
1500 m
Surface Layer Convective cell
activity
Ground
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Unstable Atmospheric Conditions
Elevation
Distance
from Source
Concentration
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Neutral Atmospheric Conditions

Temperature
Free Atmosphere
Occurs under
cloudy or windy
conditions
There is a well-
Wind mixed boundary
layer.
Profile Mixing
Turbulent Layer Height Vertical motions
are not
500 m suppressed.
Turbulence is
Ground caused by the
wind.
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Neutral Atmospheric Conditions
Elevation
Distance
from Source
Concentration
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Plume Concentration - Gaussian Distribution Assumption

C(x,y,z,H) average concentration (kg/m3)
G release rate (kg/s)
x, y, z dispersion coefficients
z (x downwind, y crosswind, z vertical)
U wind speed (m/s)
x H height above ground of the release
y
2 z-H
2 z+H
2
H C(x, y, z, H ) =
G
exp
-1
exp -1 + exp -1
y h 2ps ys zU 2
s y 2

s
z 2 s
z

where = +
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Atmospheric Dispersion - Calculating Plume Height

1. Determine the stability of the atmosphere (A, B, C, D, E, F)
Day Night
Surface Wind
Speed, U Incoming Solar Radiation Thinly Cloud
[m/sec] Overcast Coverage
Strong Moderate Slight
<2 A A-B B
2-3 A-B B C E F
3-5 B B-C C D E
5-6 C C-D D D D
>6 C D D D D
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2. Determine the Flux Parameter
Buoyancy Flux Ts - Ta Momentum Flux Ta
Parameter Fb = g us d
2
s Parameter Fm = us d
2 2
s
4T s s
4T
3. For Buoyant Plumes, determine the flux parameter

v 2/3
Unstable or neutral (A, B, C, D) Fb 55 m 4 / s 2 ; DTc = 0.00575 Ts s2/3

ds
v 2/3
Fb < 55 m 4 / s 2 ; DTc = 0.00297 Ts s2/3
ds
q / z Stability Class E - q = 0.02 K / m

DTc = 0.01958 Ts vs s where s = g and z
Ta Stability Class F - q = 0.035 K / m
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4. Establish whether the plume is buoyancy or momentum dominated
If Ts Ta Tc, then the plume is buoyancy dominated
If Ts Ta Tc, then the plume is buoyancy dominated
For these equations

Ta ambient temperature (K)
Ts stack temperature (K)
us stack exit velocity (m/s)
ds stack diameter (m)
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5. Calculate the final plume rise, h
Atmospheric Condition Unstable and Neutral Stable
Buoyancy Dominated Plume Fb < 55; x f = 119 Fb2/5 us

x* = distance at which atmospheric
Fb3/4
x f = 2.0715
turbulence starts to dominate air Dh = 21.425 s
entrainment into the plume; us
F
1/3
xf = distance from stack release to Fb 55; x f = 49 F 5/8
final plume rise (=3.5 x*)

b Dh = 2.6 b
Dh = 38.71
Fb3/5 us s
us
F
1/3
Momentum Dominated Plume vs
Dh = 3 ds Dh =1.5 m
us us s
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Hazard Modelling - Heavy Gas Dispersion

Heavy gases are heavy by virtue of having large molecular weight relative to
the surrounding atmosphere or by being cold.
These gases have the potential to travel far distances without dispersing to safe
levels.
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Heavy Gas Dispersion Release from Pressure-Liquefied Storage

Wind
If density of the gas is
higher than air, the plume
Rapid Flash-off and Cooling will spread radially
Two-phase Dense Gas Plume because of gravity. This
will result in a gas pool.
A heavy gas may collect in

low lying areas, such as
sewers, which could
hamper rescue operations.
Large Liquid Droplets Evaporating Liquid Pool
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When is a Heavy Gas a Heavy Gas?

A heavy gas may not exhibit the characteristics of typical heavy gas behaviour
under all conditions.
To establish if a release is behaving like a heavy gas, the release must first be
characterised as a continuous or instantaneous release.
U Rd Rd = release duration [seconds]

r= where
=
x
If r 2.5, then model as a continuous release

If r 0.6, then model as a instantaneous release
If 0.6 r 2.5, then try modelling both types and take the max concentration of the two
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When is a Heavy Gas a Heavy Gas?

Calculate the non-dimensional density difference:
r - rair
go = g o where o = initial gas density
r air
For a continuous release, if: where qo = volumetric release rate (m3 / s)

where
( ) qo
0.333
go qo Dc =
Dc U10
> 0.15
U10
For a instantaneous release:

( go Vo0.333 ) where Vo = release volume (m3 )
0.5
> 0.2 where

U10
Then, the release will exhibit heavy gas behaviour at the source. 88
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Calculating Heavy Gas Concentration (Cm) at Some Distance

Initial Concentration (volume fraction), Co
Given Concentration (volume fraction), Cm , at some downwind distance, x
Procedure for determining concentration:

1. Calculate Cm/ Co
2. Calculate the appropriate non-dimensional x-axis parameter, the chart at this x-axis value
3. Read the y-axis parameter value
4. Calculate the downwind distance, x
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Calculating Heavy Gas Concentration (Cm) at Some Distance, x
Continuous Release Instantaneous Release
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Summary of Hazard Models
A hazardous release can be released into moving (air, water) or stationary (soil)
media.
Atmospheric releases are of greatest concern due to the challenges in containing

the release. These releases can occur into a stable, unstable or neutral
atmosphere. The plume of the hazardous material release will differ for each.
Heavy gases released into the atmosphere are also of concern. Heavy gas
behaviour, however, confines dispersion. When estimating downwind
concentrations of heavy gas release, it is important to note if the release is
continuous or instantaneous.
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Consequence Models
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Modelling the Consequences of a Hazardous Material Release
Consequence severity or potential damage, can be calculated at receptor locations. Recall

that receptors can be differentiated between individual and societal consequences.
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES
Expressed in terms of a hazard or potential damage at a given receptor at a given
location in relation to the location of the undesirable event.
Human receptor consequence of hazard exposure = fatality, injury, etc.
Building receptor consequence of hazard exposure = destruction, glass breakage, etc.
SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES
Expressed as an aggregate of all the individual consequences for an event.
Add up all the individual receptors consequences (human, building, equipment) for total
exposed area.
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Modelling the EFFECT of a Hazardous Material Release
Receptors can be influenced by hazardous material through various transport media,

including atmospheric dispersion, groundwater contamination, soil erosion, etc.
Atmospheric transport is the most important in risk assessments.
Hazard effects for materials are:

CONCENTRATION (C) used for toxic and carcinogenic materials and materials
with systemic effects.
THERMAL RADIATION (I) used for flammable materials.
OVERPRESSURE (P0) used for determining blast wave consequences such as

deaths from lung haemorrhage or injuries from eardrum rupture.
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Hazardous Material Dose Curve and Response
The response induced by exposure to hazardous materials/conditions

(heat, pressure, radiation, impact, sound, chemicals) can be
characterised by a dose-response curve.
A dose-response curve for a SINGLE exposure can be described with the

probability unit (or PROBIT, Y).
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PROBIT Method for Estimating Consequence Level
PROBIT equations are available for a specific health consequences as a

function of exposure.
These equations were developed primarily using animal toxicity data. It

is important to acknowledge that when animal population are used for
toxicity testing, the population is typically genetically homogeneous
this is unlike human population exposed during a chemical accident.
This is a source of uncertainty when using PROBIT equations.
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We need to gather the following information to estimate consequence

level with the PROBIT method:
The quantity of material released

The hazard level at the receptors location
o Concentration (C) for a toxic cloud or plume
o Thermal Radiation Intensity (I) for a fire
o Overpressure (P0) for an explosion
The duration of the exposure of the receptor to the hazard

The route of exposure of the receptor to the hazard
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This method is suitable for:

Many types of chemical and release types (short or long term).
Estimating the variation of responses from different members of the population

(adults, children, seniors).
Determining consequence level for time varying concentrations and radiation

intensities.
Events where a number of different chemical releases have occurred.
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PROBITS for Various Hazardous Material Exposures
PROBIT can be calculated as
Y = k1 + k2 lnV
Where k1 and k2 are PROBIT parameters and V is the causative variable

that is representative of the magnitude of the exposure.
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PROBITS for Various Hazardous Material Exposures

Type of Injury/Damage Causative Variable k1 k2
(V)
FIRE Y = k1 + k2 lnV
Burn death from flash fire (te Ie)^( (4/3)/104) -14.9 2.56
Burn death from pool fire (t I)^( (4/3)/104) -14.9 2.56
EXPLOSION te effective time duration [s]
Death from lung haemorrhage P0 -77.1 6.91 Ie effective radiation intensity [W m-2]
Eardrum rupture P0 -15.6 1.93 t time duration of the pool fire [s]
Death from impact J -46.1 4.82 I radiation intensity from pool fire [W m-2]
Injuries from impact J -39.1 4.45
Injuries from flying fragments J -27.1 4.26 P0 overpressure [N m-2]
Structural Damage P0 -23.1 2.92
J impact [N s m-2]
TOXIC RELEASE
Carbon Monoxide death C1T -37.98 3.7 C concentration [ppm]
Chlorine death C2T -8.29 0.92
Nitrogen Dioxide death C2T -13.79 1.4
T time interval [min]
Sulphur Dioxide death C1T -15.67 1.0
Toluene death C2.5T -6.79 0.41
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PROBIT and Probability
The relationship between

probability and PROBIT
is shown in the plot.
PROBIT
Percentage
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The sigmoid curve can

be used to estimate
probability or PROBIT.
Alternatively, this
table can be used.
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PERCENTAGE
The sigmoid curve can

be used to estimate
probability or PROBIT.
Alternatively, this
table can be used.
PROBIT
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PERCENTAGE
If the PROBIT is known as
Y = 5.10, then the associated
percentage is 54.
OR
If the percentage is 12%, then

the PROBIT is 3.82.
PROBIT
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As an alternative to using the table to calculate percent probability, the

conversion can also be calculated with the following equation:
Y -5 Y - 5
P = 50 1 + erf
Y - 5 2
Where erf is the error function.
PROBIT equations assumes exposure to the accident occurred in a distribution of

adults, children and seniors. Variability in the response in different individuals is
accounted for in the error function.
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PROBIT and Probability Example 1
Determine the percentage of people that will die from burns caused by a
pool fire. The PROBIT value for this fire is 4.39.
Solution 1
Using the PROBIT table, the percentage is 27%.
Solution 2
Using the PROBIT equation, we can solve for P with Y=4.39. The error function can
be found using spreadsheets available in the literature.
Y -5 Y - 5
P = 50 1 + erf = 27.1
Y - 5 2
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Data has been reported on the effect of explosion overpressures on

eardrum ruptures in humans.
Percent Affected Peak Overpressure (N m-2)
1 16,500
10 19,300
50 43,500
90 84,300
Confirm the PROBIT variable for this exposure type.

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Solution
Convert the percentage to the PROBIT variable using the PROBIT table.
Percent Affected Peak Overpressure (N m-2) PROBIT
1 16,500 2.67
10 19,300 3.72
50 43,500 5.00
90 84,300 6.28
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Damage Effect Estimates
The damage caused by exposure to hazardous material release can be

estimated for various levels of overpressure or radiation intensity. These
damage effects are summarised in tables.
It is important to note, damage effect estimates are NOT suitable for

releases with rapid concentration fluctuations.
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Damage Effect Estimates Radiation Intensity

Radiation Intensity (kW m-2) Observed Damage Effect
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
25 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposures
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds; second degree burns after 20 seconds
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds; however, blistering of the
4
skin is likely (second degree burn) ; 0% lethality
1.6 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure
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Overpressure
Psig kPa
Observed Damage Effect
Damage Effect Estimates
0.02 0.14 Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency, 1015 Hz)
0.03
0.04
0.21
0.28
Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under
Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom, glass failure
Overpressure
0.1 0.69 Breakage of small windows under strain
0.15 1.03 Typical pressure for glass breakage
0.3 2.07 Safe distance (probability 0.95 of no serious damage below this value); projectile limit; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken
0.4 2.76 Limited minor structural damage
0.51.0 3.46.9 Large and small windows usually shatter; occasional damage to window frames
0.7 4.8 Minor damage to house structures
1 6.9 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
Corrugated asbestos shatters; corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling; wood panels (standard housing), fastenings fail,
12 6.913.8
panels blow in
1.3 9 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
2 13.8 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
23 13.820.7 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shatter
2.3 15.8 Lower limit of serious structural damage
2.5 17.2 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
3 20.7 Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial buildings suffer little damage; steel frame buildings distort and pull away from foundations
34 20.727.6 Frameless, self-framing steel panel buildings demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks
4 27.6 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptures
5 34.5 Wooden utility poles snap; tall hydraulic presses (40,000 lb) in buildings slightly damaged
57 34.548.2 Nearly complete destruction of houses
7 48.2 Loaded train wagons overturned
78 48.255.1 Brick panels, 812 in thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure
9 62 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
10 68.9 Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools (7000 lb) moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive
300 2068 Limit of crater lip
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Damage Effect Estimates - Example
One thousand kilograms of methane escapes from a storage vessel,

mixes with air and then explodes. The overpressure resulting from this
release is 25 kPa. What are the consequences of this accident?
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Damage Effect Estimates - Example
One thousand kilograms of methane escapes from a storage vessel,

mixes with air and then explodes. The overpressure resulting from this
release is 25 kPa. What are the consequences of this accident?
Solution
Using the table on Observed Damage Effects table an overpressure of
25 kPa will cause the steel panels of a building to be demolished.
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Risk Assessment requires QUANTITATIVE frequency analysis.
Quantifying risk enables estimation of:

How often an undesirable initiating event may occur.
The probability of a hazard outcome after the initiating event.
The probability of a consequence severity level after the hazard outcome

(i.e. fatalities, injuries, severity of economic loss).
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Historical data can be used to calculate the frequency of

initiating events, hazard outcomes and the severity of the
consequence.
Analysis Techniques
1. Frequency modelling techniques
2. Common-cause failure analysis
3. Human reliability analysis
4.
External events analysis
Used
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Data can be used to calculate the frequency of initiating

events, hazard outcomes and the severity of the
consequence.
Analysis Techniques
1. Frequency modelling techniques Used to estimate frequencies or
2. Common-cause failure analysis probabilities from basic data.
3. Human reliability analysis Typically used when detailed
historical data is not available.
4.
Used
i. EVENT TREES
ii. FAULT TREES
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consequence.
Analysis Techniques
1. Frequency modelling techniques Used to identify and analyse
2. Common-cause failure analysis failures common to multiple
3. Human reliability analysis components found in systems
4. External events analysis that can lead to a hazardous
event.
Used
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consequence.
Analysis Techniques
2. Common-cause failure analysis Used to provide quantitative
3. Human reliability analysis estimates of human error
4. External events analysis probabilities.
Used
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Data can be used to calculate the frequency of initiating events,

hazard outcomes and the severity of the consequence.
Analysis Techniques
2. Common-cause failure analysis
3. Human reliability analysis
4. External events analysis Used to identify and assess
external events (i.e. plane crash,
Used
terrorist activities, earthquakes)

to understand expected
frequency of occurrence and/or
consequence severity per
occurence. 119
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consequence.
Analysis Techniques
1. Frequency modelling techniques Used to estimate frequencies or
2. Common-cause failure analysis probabilities from basic data.
3. Human reliability analysis Typically used when detailed
historical data is not available.
4.
Used
i. EVENT TREES
ii. FAULT TREES
We will focus on event and fault trees as frequency modelling techniques.
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Fault Trees Event Trees Bow-Tie
Fault Trees
Fault trees are logic diagrams using and/or combinations.
They are a deductive method to identify how hazards culminate from
system failures.
The analysis starts with a well-defined accident and works backwards
towards the causes of the accident.
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Fault Trees Typical Steps

STEP 1 Start with a major accident of hazardous event (release of toxic/
flammable material, vessel failure). This is called a TOP EVENT.
STEP 2 Identify the necessary and sufficient causes for the top event to occur.
How can the top event happen?
What are the causes of this event?
STEP 3 Continue working backwards and follow the series of events that
would lead to the top event. Go backwards until a basic event
with a known frequency is reached (pump failure, human error).
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Fault Trees Simple Example

Car Flat Tire
(TOP EVENT)
Driving over Tire failure

debris on the
road
Defective Worn
Tire Tire
This is not an exhaustive list of failures.
Failures could also include software, human and environmental factors. 123
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Car Flat Tire
(TOP EVENT)
Driving over Tire failure INTERMEDIATE

debris on the EVENT
road
Defective Worn
Tire Tire
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Car Flat Tire
(TOP EVENT)
Driving over Tire failure

debris on the
road
BASIC Defective Worn

EVENTS Tire Tire
Lets now format this tree as a fault tree logic diagram.

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Fault Trees Simple Example, Logic Diagram

TOP EVENT Car Flat Tire
OR
Tire failure
Driving over OR
debris on
the road
Defective Worn
Tire Tire
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Fault Tree Logic Transfer Components

BASIC EVENT
AND GATE This is fault event with a known
Output event requires simultaneous frequency and needs no further
occurrence of all input events definition.
INTERMEDIATE EVENT
An event that results from the
OR GATE interaction of other events.
Output event requires the
occurrence of any individual input UNDEVELOPED EVENT
event.
An event that cannot be developed
further (lack of information), or for
INHIBIT EVENT which no further development is
Inhibit Output event will not occur if needed.
the input and the inhibit
EXTERNAL EVENT
Condition An event that is a boundary
condition occur
condition to the fault tree. 127
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Fault Trees BEFORE YOU START DRAWING THE TREE, Preliminary Steps
STEP 1 Precisely define the top event.

STEP 2 Define pre-cursor events.
What conditions will be present when the top event occurs?
STEP 3 Define unlikely events.
What events are unlikely to occur and are not being considered?
Wiring failures, lightning, tornadoes, hurricanes.
STEP 4 Define physical bounds of the process.
What components are considered in the fault tree?
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Fault Trees BEFORE YOU START DRAWING THE TREE, Preliminary Steps
STEP 5 Define the equipment configuration.

What valves are open or closed?
What are liquid levels in tanks?
Is there a normal operation state?
STEP 6 Define the level of resolution.
Will the analysis consider only a valve or is it necessary to
consider all valve components?
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Fault Trees DRAWING THE TREE

STEP 1 Draw the top event at the top of the page.
STEP 2 Determine the major events (intermediate, basic, undeveloped or
external events) that contribute to the top event.
STEP 3 Define these events using logic functions.
a. AND gate all events must occur in order for the top event to occur
b. OR gate any events can occur for the top event to occur
c. Unsure? If the events are not related with the OR or AND gate, the event
likely needs to be defined more precisely.
STEP 4 Repeat step 3 for all intermediate, undeveloped and external events.
Continue until all branches end with a basic cause.
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Fault Trees Chemical Reactor Shutdown Example

A chemical reactor is fitted with a high
pressure alarm to alert the operator in
the event of dangerous reactor pressures.
An reactor also has an automatic high-
pressure shutoff system.
The high pressure shutoff system also
closes the reactor feed line through a
solenoid valve.
The alarm and feed shutdown systems are
installed in parallel.
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Fault Trees Chemical Reactor Shutdown Example

Define the Problem
TOP EVENT = Damage to the reactor by overpressure
EXISTING CONDITION = Abnormal high process pressure
IRRELEVANT EVENTS = Failure of mixer, electrical failures, wiring
failures, tornadoes, hurricanes, electrical storms
PHYSICAL BOUNDS = Process flow diagram (on left)
EQUIPMENT CONFIG = Reactor feed flowing when solenoid valve
open
RESOLUTION = Equipment shown in process flow diagram
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TOP EVENT Reactor Overpressure

and Damage
1. Start by writing out the top event on

Note that you can only have the top of the page in the middle.
Reactor Overpressure, if
Reactor Pressure Increasing is
an intermediate or undefined
condition; the system passes
through pressure increasing to
overpressure
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AND A
High Pressure Emergency

Alarm Indicator Shutdown failure
Failure
2. The AND gate notes that two events must occur in

parallel. These two events are intermediate events.
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3. The OR gates
define one of two AND A
events can occur.
Alarm Indicator Failure Emergency Shutdown Failure
OR B OR C
Pressure Pressure Pressure Solenoid

Switch 1 Indicator Switch 2 Valve
Failure Light Failure Failure Failure
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4. Well give a
number to each of AND A
the basic causes &
basic events. Alarm Indicator Failure Emergency Shutdown Failure
OR B OR C
Pressure Pressure Pressure Solenoid

Switch 1 Indicator Switch 2 Valve
Failure Light Failure Failure Failure
1 2 3 4
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Chemical Reactor Shutdown Example Determining Minimal Cuts

After drawing a fault tree, we can determine minimum cut sets which are sets of
various unique event/condition combinations, without unnecessary additional
events/conditions which can give rise to the top event.
Each minimal cut set will be associated with a probability of occurring human
interaction is more likely to fail that hardware.
It is of interest to understand sets that are more likely to fail using failure probability.
Additional safety systems can then be installed at these points in the system.
Example: The combination of A and B and C can lead to the Top Event. However, A
and B alone can lead to the Top Event, and C is unnecesary
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1. Write drop the first logic gate below the top
event.
2. AND gates increase the number of events in

the cut set. Gate A has two inputs: B and C. The
AND gate is replaced by its two inputs.
AB C
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3. OR gates increase the number of sets. Gate B
has inputs from events 1 and 2. Gate B is replaced by
one input and another row is added with the second
input.
AB1 C
2 C
4. Gate C has inputs from basic events 3 and 4.
Replace gate C with its first input and additional rows
are added with the second input.
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4. Gate C has inputs from basic events 3 and 4.
Replace gate C with its first input and additional rows
are added with the second input. The second input
from gate C are matched with gate B.
AB1 C 3
2 C 3
1 4
2 4
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5. The top event can occur following one
of these cut sets:
Events 1 and 3
Events 2 and 3
Events 1 and 4
Events 2 and 4
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Quantifying the Probability of the Top Event

Process equipment failures occur following interactions of individual components in a
system. The type of component interaction dictates the probability of failure.
A component in a system, on average, will fail after a certain time. This is called the
average failure rate (, units: faults/time).
Using the failure rate of a component, we can determine its reliability and probability
of failure.
Failure Rate Probability Reliability
P(t) t
R(t) 1-P(t)
P(t) = f (t)dt
t=0
Time, t Time, t Time, t 142

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Failure Rate Reliability Probability
R(t) P(t)
t
1-P(t) P(t) = f (t)dt

t=0
Time, t Time, t Time, t
R(t) = exp(-m t) P(t) = 1- R(t)

P(t) =1 - exp(-m t)
143
Risk Final
Release Analysis
PFDavg Probability of failure on Demand, averaged over time
PFD at any given time, averaged

1 t=T
PFDavg = PFD(t)dt over a period of time
T t=0
Reliability, R(t), is the Probability of Success,

averaged over a specified period of time
144
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Failure data for typical Component Failure Rate, (faults/year) R(t) P(t)
process components can be

Control Valve 0.60 0.55 0.45
Flow Measurement
obtained from published Fluids
Solids
1.14
3.75
0.32
0.02
0.68
0.98
literature. Flow Switch 1.12 0.33 0.67
Hand Valve 0.13 0.88 0.12
Indicator Lamp 0.044 0.96 0.04
Level Measurement
Liquids 1.70 0.18 0.82
Solids 6.86 0.001 0.999
pH Meter 5.88 0.003 0.997
Pressure Measurement 1.41 0.24 0.76
Pressure Relief Valve 0.022 0.98 0.02
Pressure Switch 0.14 0.87 0.13
Solenoid Valve 0.42 0.66 0.34
Temperature Measurement
Thermocouple 0.52 0.59 0.41
Thermometer 0.027 0.97 0.03 145
Risk Final
Release Analysis

The failure probability and Component Failure Rate, (faults/year) R(t) P(t)
reliability of a component
Control Valve 0.60 0.55 0.45
Flow Measurement
can be calculated from its Fluids
Solids
1.14
3.75
0.32
0.02
0.68
0.98
known failure rate. Flow Switch 1.12 0.33 0.67
Hand Valve 0.13 0.88 0.12
Indicator Lamp 0.044 0.96 0.04
Level Measurement
Liquids 1.70 0.18 0.82
Solids 6.86 0.001 0.999
pH Meter 5.88 0.003 0.997
Pressure Measurement 1.41 0.24 0.76
Pressure Relief Valve 0.022 0.98 0.02
Pressure Switch 0.14 0.87 0.13
Solenoid Valve 0.42 0.66 0.34
Temperature Measurement
Thermocouple 0.52 0.59 0.41
Thermometer 0.027 0.97 0.03 146
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Weve discussed the failure probability of individual components. Failures in chemical
plants, result from the interaction of multiple components. We need to calculate the
overall failure probability and reliability of these component interactions (R = 1 P)
Components in Parallel - AND gates

Failure Probability P1 Reliability n
R1
P= P
n
P R =1 - (1 - R ) R
i P2 i=1
i
R2
n is the total number of components
i=1 n is the total number of components
Pi is the failure probability of each component Ri is the reliability of each component
Components in Series OR gates

Failure Probability
n
P1 Reliability R1
n
P =1 - (1 - P ) i
P R = Ri R
i=1 P2 i=1 R2 147
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Calculations for failure probability can be simplified for systems comprised of only two
components
n
P =1 - (1 - Pi )
i=1
Can be expanded to:

P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) P(A and B) = P(A) + P(B) P(A)*P(B)
or A A and B at the
A
& same time
B
B
148
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Two methods are available:
1. The failure probability of all basic, external and undeveloped events are written on
the fault tree diagram.
2. The minimum cut sets can be used. As only the basic events are being
evaluated in this case, the computed probabilities for all events will be larger than
the actual probability.
149
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Reactor Example Quantifying the Probability of the Top Event

Fault Tree Diagram Method
We must first compile the reliability
and failure probabilities of each basic
event from tables.
Component Reliability, R Failure Probability, P

Pressure Switch 1 0.87 0.13
Alarm Indicator 0.96 0.04
Pressure Switch 2 0.87 0.13
Solenoid Valve 0.66 0.34
Remember P = 1 - R System condition

Reactor Pressure Increasing
150
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Fault Tree Diagram Method AND gate A
2 R =1- P
P = Pi
i=1
P = 1 - 0.0702
P = (0.135) * (0.426) P = 0.93
OR gate B P = 0.0702
2
R = Ri OR gate C
i=1
R =(0.87)(0.66)=0.574
R = (0.87) * (0.96) P = 1-0.574 = 0.426
R = 0.835
P = 1 - R = 0.165
The total failure
probability is
0.0702.
P = 0.13 P = 0.04 P = 0.13 P = 0.34
R = 0.87 R = 0.96 R = 0.87 R = 0.66
151
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Direct Method
P(B) = P(1 or 2) = P(1) + P(2) - P(1) * P(2) = 0.13 + 0.04 - 0.13 * 0.04 = 0.1648
P(C) = P(3 or 4) = P(3) + P(4) - P(3) * P(4) = 0.13 + 0.34 - 0.13 * 0.34 = 0.4258
P(A) = P(B and C) = P(B) * P(C) = 0.1648 * 0.4258 = 0.0702
152
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Minimum Cut Set Method
Events 1 and 3 P(1 and 3) = (0.13)(0.13) = 0.0169

Events 2 and 3 P(2 and 3) = (0.04)(0.13) = 0.0052
Events 1 and 4 P(1 and 4) = (0.13)(0.34) = 0.0442
Events 2 and 4 P(2 and 4) = (0.04)(0.34) = 0.0136
TOTAL Failure Probability = 0.0799
Note that the failure probability calculated using
minimum cut sets is greater than using the
actual fault tree. 153
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Words of Caution with Fault Trees

Fault trees can be very large if the process is complicated. A real-world
system can include thousands of gates and intermediate events.
Care must be taken when estimating failure modes best to get advice
from experienced engineers when developing complicated fault trees. It is
important to remember that fault trees can differ between engineers.
Failures in fault trees are complete failures a failure will or will not failure,
there cannot be a partial failure.
154
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Moving from Control Measures to Consequences

We can move from thinking about the basic events that will lead to a top
event to the consequence that can follow the top event. This can be done
using Event Trees.
Fault Tree Analysis starts with a top event and then works backward to
identify various basic causes using and/or logic
Event Tree Analysis starts with an initiating event or cause and works
forward to identify possible various defined outcomes
155
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Event Trees
Failures and
Successes of Various
Initiating Various Defined
Event Intervening
Final
(Cause) Safety
Outcomes
- these Systems/Actio
ns - These will
have an have
- These have
associated associated
an average
frequency Probability on frequencies
Demand
When an accident occurs, safety systems can fail or succeed.

Event trees provide information on how a failure can occur.
156
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Event Trees Typical Steps

1. Identify an initiating event
2. Identify the safety functions designed to deal with the initiating event
3. Construct the event tree
4. Describe the resulting sequence of accident events.
The procedure can be used to determine probability of

certain event sequences. This can be use to decide if
improvement to the system should be made.
157
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Event Trees Chemical Reactor Example
What happens if
there is a loss of
coolant?
High Temperature
Alarm
158
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Safety operations following the loss of
coolant (the initiating event)
High temp alarm alerts operator
0.01 failures/demand
Operator acknowledges alarm
Operator restarts cooling system
Operator shuts down reactor
0.1 failures/demand
High Temperature
Alarm
159
Risk Final
Release Analysis

High temp alarm alerts operator
We can note
the probability Operator acknowledges alarm
of failure on 0.25 failures/demand
demand of
each safety Operator restarts cooling system
function 0.25 failures/demand
Operator shuts down reactor
0.1 failures/demand
High Temperature
Alarm
160
Risk Final
Release Analysis

High temp alarm alerts operator [B]
And assign an
ID to each Operator acknowledges alarm [C]
operation 0.25 failures/demand
Operator restarts cooling system [D]
Operator shuts down reactor [E]
0.1 failures/demand
High Temperature
Alarm
161
Risk Final
Release Analysis
1. Start by writing out the initiating

event on the left side of the page, in
the middle.
Loss of coolant
(initiating event)
162
Risk Final
Release Analysis
1. Start by writing out the initiating

event on the left side of the page.
2. Note the frequency of this event
(occurrences per year)
Loss of coolant
(initiating event)
1 occurrence/year
163
Risk Final
Release Analysis

ID B (High Temp Alarm Alerts Operator) 3. Well call the initiating event A and also note
0.01 failures/demand the occurrence per year.
4. Draw a line from the initiating event to the
first safety function (ID B) a straight line up
Success indicates the results for a success in the safety
of Safety function and a failure is represented by a line
A Function B drawn down.
1 5. We can assume the high temp alarm will fail

Failure to alert the operator 1% of the time when in
Loss of coolant demand OR 0.01 failure/demand.(This is a
(initiating event) of Safety probability of failure on demand)
Function B
1 occurrence/year
164
Risk Final
Release Analysis

Safety Function
7. Consider Safety Function B (operator alerted
ID B (High Temp Alarm Alerts Operator) by temperature safety alarm). There are 0.01
0.01 failures/demand failures/demand of this function.
Success 0.99
of Safety
Function B
A Success of Safety Function B
= (1- 0.01)* 1 occurrence/year
1 = 0.99 occurrence/year
Failure
Loss of coolant of Safety
(initiating event) Function B Failure of Safety Function B
1 occurrence/year = 0.01 * 1 occurrence/year
0.01 = 0.01 occurrence/year
165
Risk Final
Release Analysis
ID C (Operator Acknowledges Alarm)

ID B Success Success of Safety Function C

= (1-0.25 failures/demand)*0.01 occurrence/year
0.0075
= 0.0075 occurrence/year
Success
0.99 Failure
Failure of Safety Function C
0.0025 = 0.25 failures/demand *0.01 occurrence/year
A
1
Loss of coolant Failure
(initiating event) 0.01 8. If the safety function does not apply for the
1 occurrence/year scenario, the horizontal line continues through
the function.
166
Risk Final
Release Analysis
ID B ID C ID D (Cooling System Restarted)
Success of Safety Function D
0.7425 = (1- 0.25 failures/demand)* 0.99
0.0075 0.2475
Success Failure of Safety Function D
0.99 = 0.25 failures/demand* 0.99
Loss of A 0.0025
coolant
(initiating
event)
1
Failure Similar calculation for
1
occurrence/ remaining scenarios.
0.01
year
167
Risk Final
Release Analysis
ID B ID C ID D ID E (System Shutdown)
0.1 failures/demand
Continue
0.7425 Operation
0.0075 0.2227 Shutdown
Success 0.2475
0.99 0.02475
Runway
Runway
0.0025
A
1
Failure Runway
0.01
168
Risk Final
Release Analysis
ID B ID C ID D ID E (System Shutdown)
0.1 failures/demandSequence of Safety Function Failures
Continue A
0.7425 Operation
0.0075 0.2227 Shutdown AD
Success 0.2475
0.99 0.02475
Runway ADE
Runway AC
0.0025
A
1
Failure Runway AB
0.01
169
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Sequence of Safety Occurrences/year
Function Failures
Continue Operation A 0.7425
9. The initiating event is used to indicate
Shutdown AD 0.2227 by the first letter in the sequence (ie. A).
10. The sequence ABE indicates an the
Runway ADE 0.02475 initiating event A followed by failures in
safety functions B and E.
11. Using the data provided on the
Initiating Event frequency and the
Probability on Demand of Failure or
Runway AC 0.0025
Success for the safety functions, the
overall runway and shutdown
occurrences per year can be calculated.
Runway AB 0.01
170
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Sequence of Safety Occurrences/year
Function Failures
Continue Operation A 0.7425 Total Shutdown
Occurrences per year
Shutdown AD 0.2227
= 0.2227 occurrences/year
= Once every 4.5 years
Runway ADE 0.02475
Total Runway
Runway AC 0.0025 Occurrences per year
= 0.02475 + 0.0025 + 0.01
= 0.03725 occurrences/year
= Once every 26.8 years
Runway AB 0.01
171
Risk Final
Release Analysis

What is expected if there is an
accident due to a loss of coolant?
A system shutdown will occur one every

4.5 years.
A runway will occur one every 28.6
years.
High Temperature
Alarm
172
Risk Final
Release Analysis

What happens if there is an accident
due to a loss of coolant?
A system shutdown will occur one every

4.5 years.
A runway will occur one every 28.6
years.
A runway reaction once every 30 years is
considered to high! Installation of a high
temperature automatic reactor shutdown
High Temperature function can decrease this occurrence rate.
Alarm
173
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Summary of Event Trees

The objective is to identify important possible safety failures from an
initiating event that could have a bearing on risk assessment.
Primary purpose is to modify the system design to improve safety.
Real systems are complex which can result in large event trees.
The risk analyst MUST know the order and magnitude of the potential
event consequences in order to complete the event tree analysis.
The lack of certainty that a consequence will result from a selected failure
is the major disadvantage of event trees.
174
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Event Trees and Fault Trees
Initiating Fault Critical Event Occurrence 4

Tree Event Tree Consequences
Events Event 4
Working Backwards Working Forwards

Deduction Process Induction Process 175
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Event Trees and Fault Trees = BOW-TIE
Initiating Fault Critical Event Occurrence 4

Tree Event Tree Consequences
Events Event 4
Working Backwards Working Forwards

Deduction Process Induction Process 176
Risk Final
Release Analysis
System Definition
Define the system including controls and boundaries
RISK
ASSESSMENT
Risk Analysis (Qualitative or Quantitative)
Hazard Identification Risk Treatment
Consequence Analysis (Source, Hazard or Effect, Consequence) Add/ Modify Controls
Frequency Analysis
Risk Estimation/ Ranking
YES
Risk Acceptability Determination
Does risk need to be reduced?
NO
Carry on with Existing Activity or Plan Review

and Implement New Activity/ Controls Monitor Controlled Risks Implementation
177
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Risk = Consequence x Frequency

Rh = Ci,h * Fc,i,h
Rh
Risk from an Consequence i, h of Frequency C, i, h of
undesirable undesirable event, h consequence i, h from
event, h event h
N
Total Risk = Rh
h=1
178
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Location/ Individual Risk

The annual likelihood of a fatality due to a hazardous event at a location; in
other words, the likelihood that a person living near a hazardous facility
might die due to potential accidents
N in that
N facility
Risk (location or individual) = Rh = fh Pc,h Pp
h=1 h=1
where Ph is the probability of the effect, Pp is the probability of being present (Pp = 1)
Societal Risk
Total expected number of fatalities in a year due to hazardous events.
N N
Risk (societal) = Rh = fh Ch
h=1 h=1
where Ch is the consequence of the event involving one or more

probability-factored fatalities per hazardous event
179
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Calculating the Frequency of an Event
Frequency analysis can be performed using the following methods:

Historical records
Fault trees
Events trees
Common-cause event analysis
Human error analysis
External event analysis
The frequency of an event can be looked up in industry references, literature,

plant operating history, etc.
180
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Calculating the Probability of the Consequence of an Event
Consequence analysis can be performed using the following methods:

Fires thermal radiation models
Explosions overpressure models
Flammable gases dispersion models
Toxic gases dispersion models
Radiation, overpressure, and concentration effects can be related to the

probability of a consequence using PROBIT or damage correlations.
The probability of a consequence due to a hazard effect from an event can

usually be found in industry references or literature.
181
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Calculating the Probability of a Consequence of an Event using

Contours
For hazards from a fixed facility that are
0.01 not sensitive to meteorological
0.1 conditions or have any other directional
dependencies.
0.5
0.9
Decreasing Pe,h
Po
Po is the probability of the risk source

P is the probability at the risk receptor
182
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Calculating the Risk of an Event using Contours
For hazards from a fixed facility that are

0.01fh not sensitive to meteorological
0.1fh conditions or have any other directional
dependencies.
0.5fh
0.9fh
Risk (individual event) = fh Pe,h
Po
P Po is the probability of the risk source

P is the probability at the risk receptor
183
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Estimating TOTAL Risk of an Event at a Given Distance
To estimate the total risk associated with an event at some distance, x:
1. Identify the hazardous events

2. Estimate the frequency
3. Estimate how the probability of the consequence would vary with distance
4. Multiply the probability of the consequence with the frequency of the event
5. Sum the risk of each event to determine the total risk at a given distance
184
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Define the System
Hazard
Identification Hazard identification
answers the following:
What can go wrong? How? Why?
185
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Define the System

Risk
Hazard
Assessment
Identification Risk assessment further
answers :
What can go wrong? How? Why?
Consequence Frequency
How often can these go wrong?
Analysis Analysis
What are the consequences?
How likely are these
Risk consequences?
Estimation
What is the risk?
186
Risk Final
Release Analysis
Define the System

1. Identify hazardous materials and process
Risk
Hazard conditions
Assessment 2. Identify hazardous events
Identification 3. Analyse the consequences and frequency of
events using:
i. Qualitative Risk Assessment
(Hazard Identification tool coupled with
Consequence Frequency a risk matrix)
- SLRA (screening level risk assessment)
Analysis Analysis
- What-if
- HAZOP
- FMEA
Risk ii. Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment
Estimation - Fault trees/ Event trees/ Bow-tie
iii. Quantitative Risk Assessment
- Mathematical models (frequency and
consequence analysis)
Risk Acceptance 187
Risk Final
Release Analysis
End Products of Qualitative Hazard Analysis

1. List of intrinsic hazards
2. List of events that could go wrong:

- event scenarios
- existing safeguards
- possible additional safeguards
3. List of possible consequences (injuries, death, damages)
188
Risk Final
Release Analysis
End Products of Quantitative Hazard Analysis

Consequence Modelling
- Source Term Models the strength of the source release is estimated
- Hazard Effects Models calculate hazard level (heat flux, overpressure) as a function
of distance from the event location
- Consequence Determination Models relate hazard effect level to severity of
damage or injury
Consequence Metrics
- Location Consequences severity of damage at a point: probability of death,
building damage as function of distance
- Aggregate Consequences extent of damage in the whole area impacted by the
event: number of people killed, number of buildings impacted and extent of damage189

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Chemical Process

April 6, 2015 (rev 4)

Hazard An intrinsic chemical, physical, societal, economic or political condition

Examples of intrinsic hazards:

Risk A measure of human injury, environmental damage or economic loss in

Risk = Consequence x Frequency

Concept Definitions Layers of Protection are used to

where k is each receptor (ie. people, equipment, the

Aggregate Consequence Outdoor IMMOVEABLE receptor.

Event dA Distance from Event, x

Aggregate Consequence Outdoor IMMOVEABLE receptor.

Event dA Distance from Event, x

Define the System

Define the System

iii. Quantitative Risk Assessment

Hazard effects can be caused by the release of hazardous

Hazardous materials are typically contained in storage or process vessels

Release of Solid Hazardous Material

The release is significant if the solid is:

Release of Liquids or Gases from Containment

Release from containment will result in:

an instantaneous release if there is a major failure

a semi-continuous release if a hole develops in a vessel

Release of Liquids or Gases from Containment

Mass discharge of a liquid [kg/s] through a hole can be calculated:

Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage Tank

Pressurised storage tanks containing liquefied gas are of

- A rapid flash-off of material.

- The formation of a two-phase jet which could create a liquid pool

- Formation of small droplets which could form a cloud that is denser

Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage Tank

Rapid Flash-off and Cooling

Large Liquid Droplets Evaporating Liquid Pool

Outdoor Temperature < Normal Boiling Point of Liquid 21

Consequences of Liquid Release from a Pressurised Storage

Flammable Liquid Release No ignition = toxic health issues

A discharge will result in

Hazardous Events and Concerns

Modelling the Effects of a Hazardous Material Release

The type of hazard will determine hazard effect:

We will focus on effect modelling for combustion sources: fires

Combustion is the rapid exothermic oxidation of an ignited fuel.

Essential Elements for Combustion

Oxidizer Ignition Source

Examples: Wood, air, matches or

Essential Elements for Combustion

Oxidiser Ignition Source

Methods for controlling combustion are focused on eliminating

More Combustion Definitions

Overpressure The pressure of an explosion above atmospheric pressure; more

Types of Fire and Explosion Hazards

Fires vs. Explosion Hazards

Fires AND explosions involve combustion physical explosions are an exception

Major Fires Explosions

Explosions can cause a lung haemorrhage,

Modelling Major Fires

Modelling Major Fires

Radiation Heat Transfer