Demographic

Transformation

Rubina Waseem
Preston University
 Demography
Demographyis thestatistical studyof
humanpopulations.

It can be a very general science that can be

applied to any kind of dynamic living
population, i.e., one that changes over time or
space.

It encompasses the study of the size,

structure, and distribution of these
populations, and spatial and/or worldly
changes in them in response
tobirth,migration,aging, death etc.
 People born in the last few years are exposed to
life-chances and behavior norms that are very
different from those of a generation ago and
prevailing at the beginning of the twentieth
century.

It is pretty clear that, demographically speaking,

the world will be a very different place in another
25 years time.

The focus is on the scale and distribution of world

population growth, the transitions taking place in
life expectancy and fertility, the developments in
international migration, and the single most
important element of demographic restructuring,
namely population ageing.
 World Population Growth
The challenge presented by these
transformations can most readily be
illustrated by reference to total population
numbers.

The total population of the world is

estimated to have passed 6 billion during
1999, representing the latest stage in a
relatively short period of generally
increasing to absolute growth.
1. It was not until the beginning of the
nineteenth century that world population
attained its first billion (around 1804).

2. Then, while it took some 123 years to add a

second billion (1927),

3. The third took only another 33 years

4. Fourth only 14 years

5. Then Fifth 13 years

6. Sixth 12 years
 The pace of raise increased greatly as the
twentieth century proceeded.

World population growth averaged barely 0.5

percent a year during the first two decades, the
rate rose to around 1.0 percent a year during
the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

By the close of the century, however, there is

plenty of evidence that the rate of world
population growth has peaked and is now
slowing, though the absolute volume of increase
remains very high by long-term standards.
 This latest reduction in rate has been large
enough to offset the effect of the growing
population base, so that the size of the
annual increments has fallen somewhat in
recent years_ down to an estimated 78
million a year in the second half of the
1990s.

These latest trends are expected to

continue. According to the 1998-based
projections prepared by the UN in 1999, the
growth rate is likely to fall below 1.0 percent
during 2015-20.
 Because of the growing population base,
the annual increment seem destined to stay
above 70 million till around 2020, but are
then expected to more than halves by 2045-
50.

On this basis, world population would reach

8.9 billion by 2050, almost 3 billion larger
than now but with the majority of this
addition occurring in the first quarter of the
century and bringing up the 8-billion mark
in 2028.
 However, if there is one thing that demographers
have learnt over the last few decades, it is that
projections are never correct and indeed
sometimes prove to be wildly inaccurate.

This review of global trends suggests two major

challenges for the new millennium.

One is the very practical one of coping with the

expected continuation of large-scale growth for
the next few decades, further increasing the
pressures and problems experienced since 1960
as the world added its latest three billion people.
 The other is the challenge posed to people
involved in population studies as they try to
understand better the factors affecting
population trends and peoples behavior
and thereby establish more firmly the likely
future course of events.
 Differential Population
Change
The most important feature of the
unevenness of population growth across the
world is the unbalanced concentration of
growth in Less Developed Regions (LDRs).

Over the past half-century, these have

accounted for fully 89 percent of the worlds
3.4 billion extra people, with their
contribution rising steadily to reach 97
percent by 1995-2000.
 The UN projections suggest that between now and
2050 the LDRs will account for the whole of the
world population growth because the More
Developed Regions (MDRs) will experience overall
decrease.

The unevenness in growth rates is producing a

substantial shift in the distribution of population.

Whereas the MDRs accounted for almost one-third

of all people in 1950 (32.2 percent), the
proportion was down to one-fifth in 1998 (20.0
percent) and seems destined to fall to barely one-
right (13.0 percent) by 2050.
 This imbalance is seen clearly in the changes in
distribution between the major areas of the world
( Table 7.1 of your book)

At individual country level, China and India

continue to dominate world population, together
accounting for over one-third of world population.

The number of large-population countries is

growing, in 1950 only nine countries (on the basis
of 1998 boundaries) contained over 50 million
people, roughly the size of the UK at that time.
 One obvious feature of the recent past is
the rapid growth of countries with a
significant Muslim presence, with some of
the highest growth rates occurring in the
Arabian sub-continent and with the worlds
main zone of high population growth rates
being dominated by the wrap of Islamic
countries that stretches from Pakistan
westwards to Africas Atlantic coast.

This trend seems likely to become even

more marked over the next few decades.
The progress of the democratic
transition
For decades it has been customary to view
trends in population growth rates in terms of
the demographic transition model.

Definition
The demographic transition model seeks to
explain the transformation of countries from
having high birth and death rates to low birth
and death rates. In developed countries this
transition began in the eighteenth century and
continues today. Less developed countries
began the transition later and are still in the
midst of earlier stages of the model.
 The origins and nature of the demographic
transition model are outlined:
Stage 1: High Fluctuating
Birth Rate and Death rate are both high.
Population growth is slow and fluctuating.

Reasons

Birth Rate is high as a result of:

Lack of family planning
Need for workers in agriculture
Religious beliefs
Children as economic assets
Death Rate is high because of:

High levels of disease

Famine

Lack of clean water and sanitation

Lack of health care

War

Predators such as rats

Lack of education

Typical of Britain in the 18th century and the

Least Economically Developed Countries
(LEDC's) today.
 Stage II: Early Expanding
Birth Rate remains high. Death Rate is falling.
Population begins to rise steadily.

Reasons
Death Rate is falling as a result of:

Improved health care (e.g. Smallpox Vaccine)

Improved Hygiene (Water for drinking boiled)
Improved sanitation
Improved food production and storage
Improved transport for food
Decreased Infant Mortality Rates

Typical of Britain in 19th century; Bangladesh; Nigeria

 Stage III: Late Expanding
Birth Rate starts to fall. Death Rate continues to
fall. Population rising.

Reasons:

Family planning available

Lower Infant Mortality Rate
Increased mechanization reduces need for workers
Increased standard of living
Changing status of women

Typical of Britain in late 19th and early 20th

century; China; Brazil
Stage IV: Low Fluctuating

Birth Rate and Death Rate both low.

Population steady.

Typical of USA; Sweden; Japan; Britain

 Like all models, the demographic transition model
has its limitations. It failed to consider, or to
predict, several factors and events:

1. Birth rates in several MEDCs have fallen below

death rates (Germany, Sweden). This has
caused, for the first time, a population decline
which suggests that perhaps the model should
have a fifth stage added to it.

2. The model assumes that in time all countries

pass through the same four stages. It now
seems unlikely, however, that many LEDCs,
especially in Africa, will ever become
industrialised.
3. The model assumes that the fall in the
death rate in Stage 2 was the consequence
of industrialisation. Initially, the death rate
in many British cities rose, due to the
insanitary conditions which resulted from
rapid urban growth, and it only began to
fall after advances were made in medicine.

4. Countries that grew as a consequence of

migration from Europe (USA, Canada,
Australia) did not pass through the early
stages of the model.
 Morality and life
expectancy
During the past half-century enormous pace
have been made in reducing mortality and
increasing life expectancy.

Across the world, crude death rate (death

per 1000 people) have more than halved
over this period, dropped from 27.9 to 15.4.
 In terms of life expectancy, measure which
is not affected by age structure and
provides a direct indicator of life-chances, it
is found that even the MDRs are continuing
to experience gains, through the rate of
improvement appears to be slowing.

Between 1950-5 and 1970-5 life expectancy

there rose from 66.5 to 71.2 years for both
sexes combined- an increase of almost one
year during every four years of ancient
history.
 For the LDRs, the improvements in life
expectancy have been considerably more
marked.

Two main challenges faced by those countries

that currently have the lowest life expectancies.

One is relatively new, but already appears to

be having s significant effect on population
growth rates in many countries, notably in
Africa: the HIV/ AIDS wave, and the other is
infant and childhood mortality.
 Whereas in the MDRs almost four-fifths of
deaths in 1990-5 were accounted for by
people aged 60 and over, the proportion was
only two-fifths in the LDRs.

The contrast is even greater for 0-5 years old,

who make up under 2 percent of all deaths in
MDRs, 28 percent in the LDRs as a whole and
41 percent in Africa.

The main reason for this difference is in the

numbers of babies that fail to reach their first
birthday.
 Fertility and Family Size
Despite some uncertainties about the future
of mortality, it is primarily fertility behavior
that will determine future population
numbers for the world as a whole and most
of its major regions.

Even quite small changes in fertility rate

can produce major differences in population
size in the longer term.
 In case of future, the biggest issue concerns
whether the least developed countries,
especially in Africa, can continue the
reductions in fertility that appear to have
got underway over the last decade.

It is remarkable, how much Total Fertility

Rates (TFRs), which are broadly equivalent
to the average number of births per woman,
have fallen for most of the LDRs since mid-
century.
 International Migration
Migration is an increasingly important component
of population change.

In the century leading up to the First World War,

upwards of 55 million people moved from Europe to
the New World, most notably the USA which
gained 30 million between 1860 and 1920 alone.

Moreover, over that period migration played a

substantial role in relieving population pressures
during the long-drawn-out transition process in
Europe; for instance, with immigration reducing
Norways population growth by over a quarter
between 1860 and 1914.
 There are two reasons for the growing
prominence of migration in countries
population trends.

One concerns the reduction in natural

increase rates in the MDRs.

Here migration exchanges are now

constituting a larger proportion of their
rates of overall population growth than used
to be the case and are increasingly
determining whether their populations grow
or decline.
 The impacts of net migration on population
trends have now become quite significant, at
least as far as the MDRs are concerned.

At the broadest level there is expected to have

been a net flow of almost 10 million people from
the LDRs to the MDRs between 1995 and 2000.

The scale of population movement within these

broad regions is much grater and has been
growing, despite the fact that losing and gaining
areas may share similar demographic contexts.
 Within these changes, probably the single most
important feature of the last 15 years is the
increase in numbers of asylum-seekers and
refugees.

The average level was running higher in the

1990s than at any time since the first few years
after the Second World War.

Nevertheless, despite their political salience,

asylum-seekers and refugees make up only
around one-fifth of all people living outside their
country of citizenship and even fewer of those
residing in a country that is not their birthplace.
 A second rapidly growing group of
international migrants, but one that by
contrast is often referred to as invisible,
comprises professional, managerial and
technical personnel.

A third group comprises the relatively

unskilled labor that is prepared to work in
low-wage sectors like agriculture,
manufacturing and hotels and catering,
often on a temporary or clandestine basis.
 In addition to these three main types of
international movement, there are a others
including students, retirees and brides etc.

In some cases, the impact of these non-refugees

migrants on population distribution is relatively
small, as these people are temporary rather
than permanent settlers or because there are
flows in both directions between countries.

Fundamentally, the arrival of people of different

language, religion and especially skin colour
may be seen by some as threatening not only
the structure of local communities but the very
honor of the existing nation-states.
 Population Ageing
Current demographic trends are having a
profound effect on population composition.

Across most of the world, population ageing

is now the dominant trend, as people are
living longer and normally the more
important factor- falling fertility is reducing
the proportion of younger people.
 Already, many MDR countries have moved a
long way from the traditional age structure
and indeed are beginning to look distinctly
top heavy, but the biggest growth in
numbers of older people is now taking place
in the newly industrializing countries.

For the LDRs as a whole, coping with a

ageing population constitutes one of the
most serious challenges of the new
millennium.
 These trends constitute a big challenge for
MDR countries, where governments have
for some time been concerned about their
ability to fund pensions and care provision
through taxes imposed on a shrinking
proportion of working-age people.

Up till now, the most rapid ageing has taken

place in the newly industrialized countries
of East Asia, where very rapid economic
growth (at least until 1998) helped to ease
the burden.
 Conclusion
The worlds demographic complexion has clearly
undergone some major transformations in the
past half-century.

The past three decades have seen the fertility

transition spread quite rapidly across many LDRs
hand in hand with economic growth and family
planning programs.

Some things seem very certain and raise

extremely important issues, as world population is
very likely to rise by a further 3 billion in the next
half century.
 The number of old people is going to continue to
increase rapidly, imposing ever greater strains on
families and societies in both the MDRs and LDRs.

It is necessary to acknowledge the increasing

importance of migration as a component of
national population change alongside fertility and
mortality.

Demographics now constitute a major force for

global change and their combination of
transformation and uncertainty represents a
powerful challenge for the new millennium.