THE FORD PINTO CASE

The scandal and the trial

On August 10, 1978, a tragic automobile accident occurred on U.S.
Highway 33 near Goshen, Indiana. Sisters Judy and Lynn Ulrich
(ages 18 and 16, respectively) and their cousin Donna Ulrich (age
18) were struck from the rear in their 1973 Ford Pinto by a van. The
gas tank of the Pinto ruptrured, the car burst into flames and the
three teen-agers were burned to death.
Subsequently an Elkhart County grand jury returned a criminal homicide charge
against Ford, the first ever against an American corporation. During the following
20-week trial, Judge Harold R. Staffeld advised the jury that Ford should be
convicted of reckless homicide if it were shown that the company had engaged in
plain, conscious and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result (from its
actions) and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct. The key phrase around which the trial hinged, of course, is
acceptable standards. Did Ford knowingly and recklessly choose profit over
safety in the design and placement of the Pinto's gas tank? Elkhart County
prosecutor Michael A. Cosentino and chief Ford attorney James F. Neal battled
dramatically over this issue in a rural Indiana courthouse. Meanwhile, American
business anxiously awaited the verdict which could send warning ripples through
board rooms across the nation concerning corporate responsibility and product
liability.
The Pinto controversy
In 1977 the magazine Mother J ones broke a story by Mark Dowie, general
manager of Mother J ones business operations, accusing Ford of
knowingly putting on the road an unsafe car the Pinto in which
hundreds of people have needlessly suffered burn deaths and even more
have been scarred and disfigured due to burns. In his article Pinto
Madness Dowie charges that:
Fighting strong competition from VW for the lucrative small-car market,
the Ford Motor Company rushed the Pinto into production in much less
than the usual time.
Ford engineers discovered in pre-production crash tests that rear-end
collisions would rupture the Pinto's fuel system extremely easily. Because
assembly-line machinery was already tooled when engineers found this
defect, top Ford officials decided to manufacture the car anyway
exploding gas tank and all even though Ford owned the patent on a
much safer gas tank.
For more than eight years afterwards, Ford successfully lobbied,
with extraordinary vigor and some blatant lies, against a key
government safety standard that would have forced the company
to change the Pinto's fire-prone gas tank.
Ford knows that the Pinto is a firetrap, yet it has paid out millions to
settle damage suits out of court, and it is prepared to spend millions
more lobbying against safety standards. With a half million cars rolling
off the assembly lines each year, Pinto is the biggest-selling subcompact
in America, and the company's operating profit on the car is fantastic.
Finally, in 1977, new Pinto models have incorporated a few minor alterations necessary to meet
that federal standard Ford managed to hold off for eight years. Why did the company delay so
long making these minimal, inexpensive improvements?
Ford waited eight years because its internal cost-benefit
analysis, which places a dollar value on human life, said
it wasn't profitable to make the changes sooner.
By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would
not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as
high as 900. Burning Pintos have become such an embarrassment
to Ford that its advertising agency, J. Walter Thomson, dropped a
line from the ending of a radio spot that read Pinto leaves you
with that warm feeling.
The Ford's defense
Several weeks after Dowie's press conference, Ford issued a news
release, countering points made in the Mother J ones article.
Their statistical studies significantly conflicted with each other.

For example, Dowie states that more than 3000 people were burning to death yearly in auto
fires; he claims that, according to a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
consultant, although Ford makes 24% of the cars on American Roads, these cars account for
42% of the collision-ruptured fuel tanks.

Ford, on the other, uses statistics from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)
maintained by the government NHTSA to defend itself, claiming that in 1975 there were 848
deaths related to fire-associated passenger-car accidents and only 13 of these involved Pintos;
in 1976, Pintos accounted for only 22 out of 943. These statistics imply that Pintos were
involved in only 1.9% of such accidents, and Pintos constitute about 1.9% of the total
registered passenger cars. Furthermore, fewer than half of those Pintos cited in the FARS
study were struck in the rear. Ford concludes from this and other studies that the Pinto was
never an unsafe car and has not been involved in some 70 burn deaths annually as Mother
J ones claims.
Ford admits that early model Pintos did not meet rear-impact tests at 20 mph but denies that this
implies that they were unsafe compared to other cars of that type and era. In fact, its tests were
conducted, according to Ford, some with experimental rubber bladders to protect the gas tank,
in order to determine how best to have their future cars meet a 20 mph rear-collision standard
which Ford itself set as an internal performance goal. The government at that time had no such
standard. Ford also points out that in every model year Pinto met or surpassed the government's
own standards, and it simply is unreasonable and unfair to contend that a car is somehow unsafe
if it does not meet standards proposed for future years or embody the technological
improvements that are introduced in later model years.
New charges against Ford
Mother J ones, on the other hand, presents a different view of the situation. If Ford was so
concerned about rear-impact safety, why did it delay the federal government's attempts to impose
standards? Dowie gives the following answer:
The particular regulation involved here was Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
301. Ford picked portions of Standard 201 for strong opposition way back in 1968
when the Pinto was still in the blueprint stage. The intent of 301, and the 300 series
that folloed it, was to protect drivers and passengers after a crash occurs. Without
question the worst post-crash hazard is fire. Standard 301 originally proposed that
all cars should be able to withstand a fixed barrier impact of 20 mph (that is, running
into a wall at that speed) without losing fuel.
When the standard was proposed, Ford engineers pulled their crash-test results
out of their files. The front ends of most cars were no problem with minor
alterations they could stand the impact without losing fuel. We were already
working on the front end, Ford engineer Dick Kimble admitted. We knew we could
meet the test on the front end. But with the Pinto particularly, a 20 mph rear-end
standard meant redesihning the entire rear end of the car. With the Pinto scheduled
for production in August 1970, and with $200 million worth of tools in place,
adoption of this standard would have created a minor financial disaster. So
Standard 301 was targeted for delay, and with some assistance from its industry
associates, Ford succeeded beyond its wildest expectations: the standard was not
adopted until the 1977 model year.
Ford's tactics were successful, according to Dowie, not only due to their extremely clever
lobbying, which became the envy of lobbysts all over Washington, but also because of the
pro-industry stance of NHTSA itself.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the Pinto was as safe as other comparable cars with
regard to the positioning of its gas tank. Unlike the gas tank in the Capri which rode over the
rear axle, a saddle-type fuel tank on which Ford owned the patent, the Pinto tank was placed
just behind the rear bumper.
Dr. Leslie Ball, the retired safety chief for the NASA manned space program and a
founder of the International Society of Reliability Engineers: The release to production
of the Pinto was the most reprehensible decision in the history of American
engineering. Ball can name more than 40 European and Japanese models in the Pinto
price and weight range with safer gas-tank positioning.
Los Angeles auto safety expert Byron Bloch: It's a catastrophic blunder. Ford made an
extremely irresponsible decision when they placed such a weak tank in such a
ridiculous location in such a soft rear end. It's almost designed to blow up
premeditated.
The crucial point: a cynical cost-benefit analysis
Perhaps the most intriguing and controversial is the cost-benefit analysis study that Ford did
entitled Fatalities Associated with Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires, released by J. C.
Echlod, Director of Automotive Safety for Ford. This study apparently convinced Ford and was
intended to convince the federal government that a technical improvement costing $11 per car
which would have prevented gas tanks from rupturing so easily was not cost-effective for society.
The costs and benefits are broken down in the following way:
Benefits Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles
Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle
Total Benefit: 180 X ($200,000) + 180 X ($67,000) + 2,100 X ($700) = $49.5 million
Costs Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
Unit Cost: $11 per car, $11 per truck
Total Cost: 11,000,000 X ($11) + 1,500,000 X ($11) = $137 million
The most controversial aspect proved to be the way Ford's accountants determined the total cost
of a human life as about $200,000.
Component 1971 Costs
Future Productivity Losses
Direct $132,000
Indirect 41,300
Medical Costs
Hospital 700
Other 425
Property Damage 1,500
Insurance Administration 4,700
Legal and Court 3,000
Employer Losses 1,000
Victim's Pain and Suffering 10,000
Funeral 900
Assets (Lost Consumption) 5,000
Miscellaneous 200
TOTAL PER FATALITY $200,725
Mother J ones reports it could not find anybody who could explain how the $10,000 figure for
pain and sufferin had been arrived at.
Although Ford does not mention this point in its News Release defense, it might have replied that it
was the federal government, not Ford, that set the figure for a burn death. Ford simply carried out a
cost-benefit analysis based on that figure. Mother J ones, however, in addition to insinuating that
there was industry-agency (NHTSA) collusion, argues taht the $200,000 figure was arrived at under
intense pressure from the auto industry to use cost-benefit analysis in determining regulations.
Mother J ones also questions Ford's estimate of burn injuries: All independent experts
estimate that for each person who dies by an auto fire, many more are left with charred
hands, faces and limbs. The true ratio obviously throws the company's calculations
way off.
Finally, Mother J ones claims to have obtained confidential Ford documents which
Ford did not send to Washington, showing that crash fires could be largely prevented
by installing a rubber bladder inside the gas tank for only $5.08 per car, considerably
less than the $11 per car Ford originally claimed was required to improve crash-
worthiness.
Ford has paid millions of dollars in Pinto jury trials and out-of-court settlements,
especially the latter. Mother J ones quotes Al Schlechter in Ford's Washington office as
saying: We'll never go to a jury again. Not in a fire case. Juries are just too sentimental.
They see those charred remains and forget the evidence. No sir, we'll settle.
Instead of making the $11 improvement, installing the $5.08 bladder, or even giving the consumer
the right to choose the additional cost for added safety, Ford continued to delay the federal
government for eight years in establishing mandatory rear-impact standards. In the meantime
thousands of people were burning to death and tens of thousands more were being badly burned
and disfigured for life, tragedies many of which could have been prevented for only a slight cost
per vehicle. Furthermore, the delay also meant that millions of new unsafe vehicles went on the
road, vehicles that will be crashing, leaking fuel and incinerating people well into the 1980s.
Unfortunately, Dowie claims, the Pinto is not an isolated case of corporate malpractice in the auto
industry. Neither is Ford a lone sinner. There probably isn't a car on the road without a safety hazard
known to its manufacturer. Furthermore, cost-valuing human life is not used by Ford alone. Ford
was just the only company careless enough to let such an embarrassing calculation slip into public
records. The process of willfully trading lives for profits is built into corporate capitalism.
The trial and the verdict
On March 13, 1980, the Elkhart County jury found Ford not guilty of criminal homicide in the Ulrich
case. Ford attorney Neal summarized several points in his closing argument before the jury.
Ford could have stayed out of the small car market which would have been the easiest
way, since Ford would have made more profit by sticking to bigger cars. Instead Ford
built the Pinto to take on the imports, to save jobs for Americans and to make a profit
for its stockholders.
The Pinto met every fuel-system standard of any federal, state or local government,
and was comparable to other 1973 subcompacts.
The engineers who designed the car thought it was a good, safe car and bought it
for themselves and their families.
Ford did everything possible quickly to recall the Pinto after NHTSA ordered it to do so.
Finally, and more specifically to the case at hand, Highway 33 was a badly designed
highway, and the girls were fully stopped when a 4,000-pound van rammed into the
rear of their Pinto at at least 50 miles per hour. Given the same circumstances, Neal
stated, any car would have suffered the same consequences as the Ulrich's Pinto.
As reported in The New York Times and Time, the verdict brought a loud cheer from Ford's
Board of Directors and undoubtedly at least a sigh of relief from other corporations around
the nation.