The Feasibility of Launching and Detecting Jamming Attacks
The Feasibility of Launching and Detecting Jamming Attacks
Presented by
Neel Saraiya
10304581
Contents
• Introduction
• Jamming characteristics and Metrics
• Jamming attack models
• Statistics for detecting the jamming attacks
• Jamming detection with consistency check
• Conclusion
Introduction
Wireless networks:-
– Low cost
– Availability and Popularity
– Varieties of application
Threats:-
– Stealing information, corrupting data
Objective:-
– Providing security and trustworthiness
Attacks:-
– Radio interference
Jammers
• What?
– An entity who is purposefully trying to interfere with
the physical transmission and reception of wireless
communications.
• How? (2 styles)
– MAC-layer DoS
Bypass the MAC protocol, repeatedly send out packets
Introduces packet collision
– PHY-layer DoS
Jam transmission channel by emitting energy in the
frequency band corresponding to the channel
Jammers – Hardware
• Deceptive Jammer
• Random jammer
• Reactive jammer
Constant jammer
Basically it uses
•Waveform generator
•Normal wireless devices
Less effective
No energy conservation
Harder to detect
Consider example
Parameters
Distance
• Let dXB = dXA
• Fix dAB at 30 inches
Power
• PA = PB = P X = -4dBm
MAC
• Fix MAC threshold
• Adaptive MAC threshold
Cont’d
Experiment result
Experiment Observation
• Constant jammer:
– A constant jammer can completely block A from sending out
packets, if it is close enough to A.
– When A use BMAC, although A can send out some packets, most of
them are corrupted by the jammer. Thus, PDR is low.
• Deceptive jammer:
– A deceptive jammer continuously sends out packets, both A and B
are forced to receive packets no matter which MAC protocol there
use.
• Random jammer
– The longer a random jammer sleeps, the less impact it has on the
normal traffic.
– The PSR measured in BMAC and 1.1.1MAC scenarios don’t differ
much, because the on state of random jammer is not long enough
for the threshold to increase.
• Reactive jammer
– The sender is able to reliably send out its packet in all cases,
however, most of the packets are corrupted with the presence of a
jammer nearby.
– Even for short packets, the reactive jammer can effectively disrupt
network communication.
Statistics for detecting jamming attacks
• Signal strength
For first two experiments
consider
Sender Receiver
A B
Exp 1
Packets = 20
Rate=5.28kbps
Exp 2
Packets= Max traffic
Rate= 6.46kbps
For next four exp.
consider
Figure 3: Plot of the first two higher order crossings, D1 vs. D2, for different jammer
and communication scenarios.
Carrier Sensing Time
Cont’d
Packet Delivery Ratio
Packet Delivery Ratio
•The PDRs are low in the
presence of jammers
•PDR is effective in
discriminating jamming
from congested network
scenario.
• Experiment setup:
– The sender power: - 5dBm
– Data rate: 20packets/sec
Packets are 33 bytes
– Average PDR over 200 packets
– SS were sampled every 1msec for 200msec
– PDR bins: (0,40) (40,90)(90, 100)
– PDR threshold 65%
– 99% confidence bar
Location consistency check
• Goal:-Detect presence of radio interference attack
• Uses GPS or other localization techniques
• Idea:-
• Check the jamming status using PDR of
neighbors
• Keeps the records of PDR and location of
neighboring nodes
Location consistency check
Conclusion
Due to the shared nature of the wireless medium, it
is an easy feat for adversaries to perform a jamming-
style denial of service against wireless networks.
We presented four different jammer attack models.
We have studies the effectiveness of them by
constructing prototypes using the MICA2 Mote
platform and measured the PSR and PDR.
We showed that a single measurement statistic is not
enough to definitively conclude the presence of a
jammer.
Cont’d
We introduced the notion of consistency checking,
where the PDR is used to classify a poor link quality, and
then a consistency check is performed to determine
whether the poor link quality is due to jamming.