Digital Signatures & Authentication Protocols

Chapter 13 Digital Signatures & Authentication Protocols
Fourth Edition by William Stallings
Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (modified by Prof. M. Singhal, U of Kentucky)

1
Digital Signatures
have looked at message authentication
but does not address issues of lack of trust
digital signatures provide the ability to:

verify author, date & time of signature authenticate message contents be verified by third parties to resolve disputes
Digital Signature Properties

must depend on the message signed must use information unique to sender
to prevent both forgery and denial
must be relatively easy to produce must be relatively easy to recognize & verify be computationally infeasible to forge
with new message for existing digital signature with fraudulent digital signature for given message
be practical save digital signature in storage

3
Direct Digital Signatures

involve only sender & receiver assumed receiver has senders public-key digital signature made by sender signing entire message or hash with private-key can encrypt using receivers public-key important that sign first then encrypt message & signature security depends on senders private-key
4
Arbitrated Digital Signatures

involves use of arbiter A
validates any signed message then dated and sent to recipient
requires suitable level of trust in arbiter can be implemented with either private or public-key algorithms arbiter may or may not be able to see message
5
Authentication Protocols
used to convince parties of each others identity and to exchange session keys may be one-way or mutual key issues are
confidentiality to protect session keys timeliness to prevent replay attacks
published protocols are often found to have flaws and need to be modified
6
Replay Attacks
where a valid signed message is copied and later resent
simple replay repetition that can be logged repetition that cannot be detected backward replay without modification
countermeasures include
use of sequence numbers (generally impractical) timestamps (needs synchronized clocks) challenge/response (using unique nonce)
7
Using Symmetric Encryption

as discussed previously, we can use a two-level hierarchy of keys usually with a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC)
each party shares own master key with KDC KDC generates session keys used for connections between parties master keys used to distribute these to them
8
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
original third-party key distribution protocol for session between A B mediated by KDC protocol overview is:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1 2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ] 3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA] 4. B -> A: EKs[N2] 5. A -> B: EKs[f(N2)]
9
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
used to securely distribute a new session key for communications between A & B but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old session key has been compromised
then message 3 can be resent convincing B that is communicating with A
modifications to address this require:

timestamps (Denning 81) using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)
10
Using Public-Key Encryption

have a range of approaches based on the use of public-key encryption need to ensure have correct public keys for other parties using a central Authentication Server (AS) various protocols exist using timestamps or nonces
11
Denning AS Protocol
Denning 81 presented the following:
1. A -> AS: IDA || IDB 2. AS -> A: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T] 3. A -> B: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T] || EPUb[EPRas[Ks||T]]
note session key is chosen by A, hence AS need not be trusted to protect it timestamps prevent replay but require synchronized clocks
12
One-Way Authentication
required when sender & receiver are not in communications at same time (e.g., email) have header in clear so can be delivered by email system may want contents of body protected & sender authenticated
13
Using Symmetric Encryption

can refine use of KDC but cant have final exchange of nonces:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1 2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ] 3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA] || EKs[M]
does not protect against replays

could rely on timestamp in message, though email delays make this problematic
14
Public-Key Approaches
have seen some public-key approaches if confidentiality is major concern, can use:
A->B: EPUb[Ks] || EKs[M] has encrypted session key, encrypted message
if authentication needed, use a digital signature with a digital certificate:

A->B: M || EPRa[H(M)] || EPRas[T||IDA||PUa] with message, signature, certificate
15
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

US Govt approved signature scheme designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's published as FIPS-186 in 1991 revised in 1993, 1996 & then 2000 uses the SHA hash algorithm DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm FIPS 186-2 (2000) includes alternative RSA & elliptic curve signature variants
16
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

creates a 320 bit signature with 512-1024 bit security smaller and faster than RSA a digital signature scheme only security depends on difficulty of computing discrete logarithms variant of ElGamal & Schnorr schemes
17
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
18
DSA Key Generation

have shared global public key values (p,q,g):
choose q, a 160 bit choose a large prime p = 2L
where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64 and q is a prime factor of (p-1)
choose g = h(p-1)/q
where h<p-1, h(p-1)/q (mod p) > 1
users choose private & compute public key:

choose x<q compute y = gx (mod p)
19
DSA Signature Creation

to sign a message M the sender:
generates a random signature key k, k<q k must be random, be destroyed after use, and never be reused
then compute signature pair:

r = (gk(mod p))(mod q) s = (k-1.H(M)+ x.r)(mod q)
sends signature (r,s) with message M

20
DSA Signature Verification

having received M & signature (r,s)
to verify a signature, recipient computes:

w = u1= u2= v = s-1(mod q) (H(M).w)(mod q) (r.w)(mod q) (gu1.yu2(mod p)) (mod q)
if v=r then signature is verified

see book web site for details of proof why
21
Summary
have discussed:
digital signatures authentication protocols (mutual & one-way) digital signature algorithm and standard
22

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Chapter 13 Digital Signatures & Authentication Protocols

Fourth Edition by William Stallings

Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (modified by Prof. M. Singhal, U of Kentucky)

digital signatures provide the ability to:

Digital Signature Properties

be practical save digital signature in storage

Direct Digital Signatures

Arbitrated Digital Signatures

Using Symmetric Encryption

modifications to address this require:

Using Public-Key Encryption

Using Symmetric Encryption

does not protect against replays

if authentication needed, use a digital signature with a digital certificate:

Digital Signature Standard (DSS)

Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

DSA Key Generation

users choose private & compute public key:

DSA Signature Creation

then compute signature pair:

sends signature (r,s) with message M

DSA Signature Verification

to verify a signature, recipient computes:

if v=r then signature is verified

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