BECG.l-12 Internal - External .CG Mechanisms
BECG.l-12 Internal - External .CG Mechanisms
BECG.l-12 Internal - External .CG Mechanisms
Contents
This deals with:1. Internal CG Mechanism
2.
External CG Mechanism
Regulators Gate Keepers Institutional Investors Corporate Raiders
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1. Internal CG Mechanism
(i)
Board of Directors: The primary function of the Board is to take responsibility for the performance of the company, to promote its interests on behalf of shareholders, to whom it is accountable. Board overseas the performance of the co., its CEO and top managers. It monitors corporate performance with reference to goals, objectives and targets. The Board provides strategic guidance to the co. It studies the future trends so that the co. has necessary funds for future growth and development. The Board has to maintain good relations with the stake-holders and run the company on ethical grounds. Its important roles include: Strategic role; Policy Making role; and monitoring and supervisory role. The designing and structure of the Board shall be suitable to the co. for its efficient functioning.
2. External CG Mechanism
(i)
(ii)
Regulators: The external CG mechanism shall ensure that the co. shall comply with all relevant laws, regulations and codes. It also includes that the Board and executive management shall comply with the rules and regulations of all Regulators such as SEBI, RBI, IRDA, and also strictly comply with the provisions of the Companies Act etc. Gate-Keepers: In the wake of a series of corporate governance disasters in the US and Europe viz. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat and Satyam Computers recently - one question has not yet been addressed. A number of gatekeeping professions - auditors, attorneys
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IIs such as large Pension Funds, Insurance Cos., Mutual Funds, Unit Trusts and other FIs have become the largest shareholders in many countries, having significant shareholdings in the companies in which they invest. This has resulted in growing influence of IIs in their investee Cos. and they are now increasingly interested in CG, as good CG increases corporate efficiency leading to good returns to IIs and other shareholders. The tools of governance include one-to-one meetings, voting, focus lists, and rating systems. The evidence as to whether good corporate governance impacts on corporate performance is rather mixed but, looking at it another way, good governance can help to ensure that companies do not fail. Also, a company with good corporate governance is more likely to attract external capital flows than one without.
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Raiders:
(i) Corporate Raider is a person or co. that is offering or executing a hostile takeover by buying shares directly from shareholders. If a firm makes an offer to shareholders to acquire a publicly-traded company after the board of directors refuses, or if it bypasses the board completely, one refers to the acquiring firm as a corporate raider. Often, the corporate raider does not actually intend to take over the target co., but is simply trying to force the board of directors to repurchase shares at a premium to their market value. A corporate raider that accumulates more than 5% of a company's outstanding shares must register with the SEBI. It is also known simply as a raider.
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Under the current Takeover Code, with the acquisition of 15% or more of the voting rights of the target company, open offer for additional 20% shares is mandatory. This restricts the acquirer to make large investments in the co., where controlling the company is not an objective, limiting the acquirer to below 15% so as to avoid an open offer. This is especially a big hindrance in private equity deals wherein private equity intends to acquire more than 15% without any intention of running the companies. An option may be considered wherein this limit could be raised to 25% which will ease fund raising for India Inc. Also, this limit of 15% does not converge with the limits followed globally by countries such as Hong Kong (35%), UK (30%), Malaysia (33%), and Singapore (30%). However, in India, there are many listed cos. where promoter shareholding is less than 40%. Hence, even if the limits are raised, adequate protection should be provided in the case of cos. with low promoter shareholdings. *End*