IP Sec: Waleed Ejaz
IP Sec: Waleed Ejaz
Overview
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Security Scheme Design Issues: Perfect Forward Secrecy IP Concepts: NAT, Tunnel, Firewall, Proxy Servers IP Headers IPsec: Concepts, AH, ESP AH, ESP Version 3
Perfect Forward Secrecy Denial of Service Protection End Point Identifier Hiding Live Partner Reassurance
Attacker cannot decrypt a conversation even if he records the entire session and subsequently steals their long term secrets Use session keys not derivable from information stored at the node after session concludes Escrow-Foilage: Even if the long-term private keys have been escrowed, eavesdropper (passive) cannot decrypt
Rule: Do not keep state until the response comes back All state in cookies sent back to the requester Adds a round-trip delay
Hide the identities from eavesdroppers Anonymous DH and use the key to tell identities Passive eavesdropper cannot learn identities but active Man-in-the-Middle can learn one or both identities Authenticate Requester should divulge first
DH operations are expensive g, b, a are not changed often Keys should be based on a gab and an nonce Can't replay previous sessions
IP Concepts
Private Addresses Network Address Translation Tunnel Firewalls Proxy Servers IPv4 IPv6
Private Addresses
32-bit Address 4 Billion addresses max Subnetting Limit is much lower Shortage of IP address Private addresses Frequent ISP changes Private address Private Not usable on public Internet RFC 1918 lists such addresses for private use Prefix = 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16 Example: 10.207.37.234
NAT = Network Address Translation Like Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Outgoing Packets: Change <Private source address, Source Port> to <public address, new Port> Incoming Packets: Change <Public Destination Address, Dest Port> to <Private IP address, original Port #>
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Tunnel
Tunnel = Encaptulation Used whenever some feature is not supported in some part of the network, e.g., multicasting, mobile IP
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Firewall
Enforce rules on what internal hosts/applications can be accessed from outside and vice versa One point of entry. Easier to manage security. Discard based on IP+TCP header. Mainly port #. Firewall-Friendly applications: Use port 80.
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Proxy Server
Specialized server programs on bastion host Take user's request and forward them to real servers Take server's responses and forward them to users Enforce site security policy Refuse some requests. Also known as application-level gateways With special "Proxy client" programs, proxy servers are almost transparent
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IP Headers
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IPSec
Applies to all applications Routers/firewalls vendors can implement it (Can't implement SSL) Limited to IP Addresses Has no concept of application users
Limitations:
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Security Association
One way relationship between sender and receiver For two way, two associations are required Three SA identification parameters
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IPSec Concepts
IPsec Security Association: One-way Security Parameter Index: Allows receiver to retrieve info from security association database.
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IPSec
Secure IP: A series of proposals from IETF Separate Authentication and privacy Authentication Header (AH) ensures data integrity and data origin authentication Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) ensures confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, and antireplay service
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Authentication Header
Next Header = TCP=6, UDP=17, IP=4, AH=51 Designed by IPv6 fans Payload Length = Length of AH in 32-bit words 2 (for IPv4) =Length of AH in 64-bit words -1 (for IPv6) SPI = Identifies Security association (0=Local use, 1-255 reserved) Authentication data = Integrity Check Value
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AH ICV Computation
The AH ICV is computed over: IP header fields that are either immutable in transit or that are predictable in value upon arrival at the endpoint for the AH SA, e.g., source address (immutable), destination address with source routing (mutable but predictable) The AH header (Next Header, Payload Len, Reserved, SPI, Sequence Number, and the Authentication Data (which is set to zero for this computation), and explicit padding bytes (if any)) The upper level protocol data, which is assumed to be immutable in transit
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ESP Packet
Payload data: IP, TCP, UDP packet Pad Length in bytes Next Header: Type of payload (TCP, UDP, ) Authentication Data: Integrity Check Value over ESP packet
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Provides encryption and/or integrity Confidentiality=ESP, Integrity=AH or ESP, Confidentiality + Integrity=ESP, ESP+AH Null encryption algorithm No confidentiality IV and authentication data sizes available from SA database
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For example, used in Cisco PIX firewall, many remote access gateways
IPsec has been out for a few years, but wide deployment has been hindered by complexity
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AH Version3
RFC4302, December 2005 (V2 in RFC2402, November 1998, V1 in RFC1826, August 1995) Uniform algorithm for Security Parameter Index (SPI) for unicast and multicast Unicast: SPI alone, or SPI+protocol may be used to select SA Multicast: SPI+DA or SPI+DA+SA Extended 64-bit sequence numbers for high-speed communications Separate RFC for mandatory algorithms
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ESP Version3
RFC4303, December 2005 (V2 in RFC2406, November 1998, V1 in RFC1827, August 1995) Uniform algorithm for SPI for unicast and multicast Extended 64-bit sequence numbers Separate RFC for mandatory algorithms Combined Mode algorithms: Combined Confidentiality + Integrity algorithms in addition to separate confidentiality and integrity algorithms Can add extra bytes before padding for traffic flow confidentiality Can generate and discard dummy padding packets (Next header=59) Issue: No version number in the header. But older versions will reject new algorithms and options
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Summary
Design Issues: Perfect forward secrecy, Denial of Service Protection, End Point Identifier hiding, Live partner assurance NAT, Firewall, Proxy Servers, Tunnel (Encapsulation) Security Association and Security parameter index AH is for integrity ESP can be used for Confidentiality and/or integrity
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Questions!
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