Access Control 2011
Access Control 2011
Access Control 2011
Access Control
Presented By: Jeff McEwen, CISSP. Security Architect, AAA NCNU Insurance Exchange
Domain Objective Domain 1: Access Control The objective of this domain is to understand:
Access control concepts and techniques Access control methodologies and implementation within centralized and decentralized environments Detective and corrective access controls Mechanisms for controlling system use Potential risks, vulnerabilities, and exposures
Domain Summary Domain 1: Access Control The information for this domain represents approximately 16% of the CISSP exam content.
Access Control Defined Domain 1: Access Control Access control is the heart of security
The ability to allow only authorized users, programs or
processes system or resource access The granting or denying, according to a particular security model, of certain permissions to access a resource An entire set of procedures performed by hardware, software and administrators, to monitor access, identify users requesting access, record access attempts, and grant or deny access based on pre-established rules. The collection of mechanisms for limiting, controlling, and monitoring system access to certain items of information, or to certain features based on a users identity and their membership in various predefined groups.
4
Access Control Concepts Domain 1: Access Control Security Policy - a high-level overall plan embracing general goals and acceptable actions for each system Accountability - systems that process sensitive information must assure individual accountability Assurance - systems must guarantee correct and accurate interpretation of security policy
What does AC hope to protect? Domain 1: Access Control Data - Unauthorized viewing, modification or copying System - Unauthorized use, modification or denial of service It should be noted that nearly every network operating system (NT, Unix, Vines, NetWare) is based on a secure physical infrastructure
Information Value Domain 1: Access Control Information is assumed to have a value that can be measured by quantity or quality The major reason to value information is the cost to develop and the value to its owners Valuation techniques - Use of policy or regulation, checklist, questionnaire, consensus, accounting data, statistical analysis
10
11
Control Types Domain 1: Access Control Preventative - deter problems before they occur Detective - investigate an act that has occurred Corrective - remedy acts that have occurred Deterrent - discourage an act from occurring Recovery - restore a resource from an act that has occurred
13
14
Access Control Types Domain 1: Access Control Management - policies, procedures, and accountability designed to control system use Technical - hardware and software controls used to automate protection of the system Operational - personnel procedures used to protect the system
15
Domain 1: Access Control Awareness training Background checks Separation of duties Split knowledge Policies Data classification Effective user registration Termination procedures Change control procedures
Guards Locks Mantraps ID badges CCTV, sensors, alarms Biometrics Fences - the higher the voltage the better Card-key and tokens Guard dogs
18
Access Control & privacy issues Domain 1: Access Control Expectation of privacy Policies Monitoring activity, Internet usage, email Login banners should detail expectations of privacy and state levels of monitoring
19
User Authentication
21
User Authentication
22
User Authentication
Authentication
24
Password Domain 1: Access Control Most common type of authentication in use something a user knows a string of characters that IDs a user Types
One-time passwords - system generated and changed after every use Passphrase a sequence of characters that is longer than a regular password and is transformed into a virtual password
25
Management
Transport paths that user uses to update password owner authentication generated by owner system owner authentication generated by system system administration to owner & system generated by system administrator
26
Password Issues
27
Easily broken
Inconvenient
30
Dont use:
common names, DOB, spouse, phone #, etc. word found in dictionaries password as a password systems defaults
31
Password management
Domain 1: Access Control Configure system to use string passwords Set password time and lengths limits Limit unsuccessful logins Limit concurrent connections Enabled auditing How policies for password resets and changes Use last login dates in banners
32
33
Tokens
34
35
Biometrics
Behavioral keystroke, signature pattern, signature dynamics Physical characteristics of a person to prove their identification
Fingerprint, Iris, retina, voice, face
36
Cant be loaned like a physical key or token and cant be forgotten like a password Good compromise between ease of use, template size, cost and accuracy Fingerprint contains enough inherent variability to enable unique identification even in very large (millions of records) databases Makes network login & authentication effortless
37
Biometric Disadvantages
Processing speed issues - Still relatively expensive per user Accuracy Subject to environmental changes User acceptability -- Some hesitancy for user acceptance
38
Tracking and surveillance - Ultimately, the ability to track a person's movement from hour to hour
Anonymity - Biometric links to databases could dissolve much of our anonymity when we travel and access services
Profiling - Compilation of transaction data about a particular person that creates a picture of that person's travels, preferences, affiliations or beliefs
39
2-factor authentication. To increase the level of security, many systems will require a user to provide 2 of the 3 types of authentication. ATM card + PIN Credit card + signature PIN + fingerprint 3-factor authentication -- For highest security Password + SecurID token + Fingerprint
40
41
(Reduced Sign-on)
Single sign-on
42
Provides multiple sessions limited to one computing platform Synchronization problems Security server SESAME Secure European System for Applications in a Multivendor Environment
Provides distributed access control using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography Project of ECMA Provides global access identity targets end system and provides mapping to local access
43
Authorization
46
47
schedule used for multilevel security each time slot a different access level used for rotating shifts, weekend operations, etc.
access is restricted unless granted
48
should have only the least privileges the object needs to perform its assigned task, and no more.
Separation of Duties
49
50
Formal Models
Varied types of Access Control Domain 1: Access Control Discretionary (DAC) vs Mandatory (MAC) Centralized vs Decentralized Formal models (detail in Sec Arch module):
Biba (Integrity) Take/Grant Clark/Wilson Bell/LaPadula (confidentiality)
52
Object label contains objects classification Subject label contains subjects clearance Rule-based - access granted based on resource rules Administratively directed - access granted by administrator
53
Complex decisions with multiple objects and subjects. Mathematical structure that defines greatest lower-bound and least upperbound values for a pair of elements
54
Competing definition
55
56
57
58
Domain 1: Access Control Based on a static infrastructure Defined and succinct policies These do not work in corporate systems which are extremely dynamic and constantly changing None of the previous models deals with:
Viruses / active content Trojan horses firewalls
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service) TACACS (Terminal Access Controller Access Control System) Active Directory
60
61
62
Control is based on policy - rules to enforce Mechanism - enforce policy Assurance - confidence in control to provide function
Hybrid - a combination of centralized and decentralized administration
63
DOD Influence
Orange Book Domain 1: Access Control DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, DoD 5200.28-STD, 1983 Provides the information needed to classify systems (A,B,C,D), defining the degree of trust that may be placed in them For stand-alone systems only Windows NT has a C2 utility, it does many things, including disabling networking
65
66
Problems with the Orange Book Domain 1: Access Control Based on an old model, Bell-LaPadula Stand alone, no way to network systems Systems take a long time (1-2 years) to certify
Any changes (hot fixes, service packs, patches) break the certification
Has not adapted to changes in clientserver and corporate computing Certification is expensive Mostly not used outside of the government sector
67
Red Book Domain 1: Access Control Used to extend the Orange Book to networks Actually two works:
Trusted Network Interpretation of the TCSEC (NCSC-TG-005) Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline: Guidance for Applying the Trusted Network Interpretation (NCSC-TG-011)
68
Techniques
70
ACL Types
Domain 1: Access Control Menus and shells Database views Physically constrained user interfaces restrict access by blocking direct access to function Capability tables - access to protected resources granted if accessor possesses authentication ticket
71
72
Mainframe Sample - 2
73
Mainframe Sample # 3
74
Permissions
R (read)
X (execute) W (write)
75
76
UNIX - recommendation
Domain 1: Access Control UNIX - Dont make a program run setuid to root if not needed. Rather, make file group-writable to some group and make the program run setgid to that group, rather than setuid to root Dont run insecure programs on the firewall or other trusted host
77
Windows Sample
78
Access Control Administration Domain 1: Access Control Centralized - one location is responsible for access control
Advantages Strict control and uniformity of access Composite access view easier Disadvantages central administration can be overloaded More difficult to associate entitlements with approvers
80
Access Control Administration Domain 1: Access Control Decentralized - resource owners are responsible for access control
Advantage Access is granted by person accountable (Approver) Disadvantages Access combination conflicts, Composite view of user access unavailable Lack of access consistency More difficult to respond to external regulators
81
Auditing and Monitoring Domain 1: Access Control Organizations use two basic methods to maintain operational assurance:
System audit - is a periodic event to evaluate security Monitoring - is an ongoing activity that checks user and systems
82
Auditing
83
Domain 1: Access Control Regular review of network and application user accounts against active employee termination lists to ensure that only active personnel have active accounts. Regular review of user entitlements by user managers and data/application owners to ensure that users only have access necessary to do their job
84
Monitoring Domain 1: Access Control IDS Logs Audit trails Network tools
Tivoli Spectrum OpenView
85
86
87
88
Intrusion Detection Systems Domain 1: Access Control IDS monitors system or network for attacks IDS engine has a library and set of signatures that identify an attack Adds defense in depth NIDS / HIDS Should be used in conjunction with a system scanner (CyberCop, ISS S3) for maximum security
89
inductively generated sequential patterns sequential rules describe behavior time-based inductive learning approach time-based induction machine (TIM) observes temporal process identifies patterns set of hypotheses input episodes user profile
TIM
Attempt to ID vulnerabilities and gain access to critical systems within organization ID and recommends corrective action for the systemic problems Assessments allow client to demonstrate the need for additional security resources
91
Banners Domain 1: Access Control Banners display at login or connection stating that the system is for the exclusive use of authorized users and that their activity may be monitored Not foolproof, but a good start, especially from a legal perspective Make sure that the banner does not reveal system information, i.e., OS, version, hardware, etc.
93
Access Control Software Domain 1: Access Control Software that automates information security functions on host computers
Features: use password protection log accesses user access controls data access controls flexible administration Examples: RACF, ACF2, TOP SECRET, Tivoli Access Manager, RSA Access Manager, Windows GINA/Active Directory
94
95
Kerberos Domain 1: Access Control Part of MITs Project Athena Currently in ver 5 Kerberos is an authentication protocol used for network wide authentication All software must be kerberized Tickets, authenticators, key distribution center (KDC) Divided into realms Kerberos is the three-headed dog that guards the entrance to Hades (this wont be on the test)
96
Kerberos roles Domain 1: Access Control KDC divided into Authentication Server & Ticket Granting Server (TGS) Authentication Server - authenticates the identities of entities on the network TGS - Generates unique session keys between two parties. Parties then use these session keys for message encryption
97
Kerberos authentication
Domain 1: Access Control
User must have an account on the KDC KDC must be a trusted server in a secured location Shares a DES key with each user When a user want to access a host or application, they request a ticket from the KDC User provides ticket and authenticator to the application, which processes them for validity and will then grant access. Requires synchronized time clocks Relies on UDP which is often blocked by many firewalls
98
100
Hardware/Software Media
Corrupt electronic media, stolen disk drives
102
Methods of Attack Domain 1: Access Control Methods to bypass access controls and gain unauthorized access to information
Brute force - persistent series of attacks, trying multiple approaches, in an attempt to break into a computer system Denial of service - overloading a system through an online connection to force it to shutdown Social Engineering - deception of system personnel in order to gain access Spoofing - masquerading an ID or data to gain access to data or a system
103
Dictionary
Crack John the Ripper
104
Protection
Must ensure that magnetic media must not have any remnance of previous data Also applies to buffers, cache and other memory allocation Required at TCSEC B2/B3/A1 level Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and SolidState Memory, Peter Gutmann
http://www.fish.com/security/secure_del.html
Documents recently declassified as to how 10-pass writes were recovered Objects must be declassified Magnetic media must be degaussed or have secure overwrites
106
108