FAULT & EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

BY NITESH M. DONGARE

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

DEFINITION
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most important logic and probabilistic techniques used in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and system reliability assessment. Fault Trees are deductive method for identifying ways in which hazards can lead to accident. The approach starts with a well defined accident ,or top event, and works backwards towards the various scenarios that can cause the accident.

STEPS IN CARRYING OUT A FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

1.

Identify the objective for the FTA.

2.
3. 4. 5. *

Define the top event of the FT.

Define the scope of the FTA. Define the resolution of the FTA. Define ground rules for the FTA. The first five steps involve the problem formulation for an FTA.

6.
7. 8.

Construct the FT.

Evaluate the FT. Interpret and present the results.

The remaining steps involve the actual construction of the FT, the evaluation of the FT, and the interpretation of the FT results.

SYMBOL REPRESENTATIONS
Circle it means that basic failure Diamond it means that basic fault

Rectangle it means that resultant event

Double diamond represents an event

House represents the basic event

FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION`

Consider the following block diagram. Let I/P and O/P be the input And output terminals. There are two sub-systems A and B that are connected in series.

X1
INPUT X2 SUB - SYSTEM (A)

X3 OUTPUT X4 SUB - SYSTEM (B)

For this the fault tree analysis diagram shown in next slide

F (S)

Top event

OR

F (A)

F (B)

intermediate event

AND

AND

F( X 1)

F( X 2)

F( X 3)

F( X 4)

Basic event

CONTINUE..
Here F(x1) , F(x2) , F(x3), F(x4) Are Events Fail F (A) = SUB SYSTEM (A) FAILS F(B) = SUB SYSTEM (B) FAILS

THEN F(A) = F(X1) AND F(X2)

AND F(B) = F(X3) AND F(X4) FINALLY THE FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM F(S) = F(A) OR F(B)

CALCULATION OF RELIABILITY FROM FAULT TREE

CONSIDER THE EARLIER BLOCK DIAGRAM
The probability of failure of sub system (A) is indicated as shown in below, P(A) = P (X 1 and X 2) P(A) = P( X1) * P( X 2) Similarly for sub system (B) P(B) = P( X 3 and X 4) P(B) = P( X 3) * P( X 4) FAILURE OCCURS WHEN SUB SYSTEM (A) or (B) FAIL.., F (S) = P(A) or P(B) THEN F(S) = P(A) + P(B) ( P(A) * P(B) ) IF THE RELIABILITY OF THE ELEMENTS ARE GIVEN BY R1,R2,R3,R4 THEN P( Xi ) = 1 Ri RELIABILITY OF SYSTEM R(S) = 1 - F(S)

1.

For an emergency operation theatre in a hospital, the power is obtained from the main city supply through a transformer connected in series. To ensure an uninterrupted supply, an auxiliary generator is also used with a suitable switchover. The probability of failure of the city supply is 0.01 and the transformer reliability is 0.996. the auxiliary power generator has a reliability factor of 0.99. draw the block diagram for the system. Construct the fault tree and, based on this, calculate the reliability of the system.
mains transformer Operation theatre

generator

BLOCK DIAGRAM

INPUT

X1

X2

OUTPUT X3

Fault tree for problem

F (S)

AND

OR

A
Main fails

B Transformer fails

Generator fails

SOLUTION
FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM F (S) = ( P ( X1 ) or P(X 2) ) and P( X 3 ) P ( X 1) = 0.01 P ( X 2) = 1 0.996 = 0.004 P ( X 3) = 1 0.99 = 0.001 F (S) = ( P (X 1) + P (X 2 ) ( P (X1 ) * P(X2) ) ) * ( P (X 3 ) ) = ( 0.01 + 0.004 ( 0.01 * 0.004) ) * (0.001) F(S) = 0.0001396 FOR RELIABILITY R(S) = 1- F(S) = 1- 0.0001396 R(S) = 0.99986

USES
Use of FTA to understand of the logic leading to the top event. Use of FTA to prioritize the contributors leading to the top event. Use of FTA as a proactive tool to prevent the top event. Use of FTA to monitor the performance of the system.

Use of FTA to minimize and optimize resources.

Use of FTA to assist in designing a system. Use of FTA as a diagnostic tool to identify and correct causes of the top event.

ADVANTAGES
Begins with top event. Use to determine the minimal cut sets.

DISADVANTAGES

Complicated process.
Require considerable amount of time to complete.

EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

DEFINITION
Event trees begin with an initiating event & work towards the final result. This method provides information on how a failure can occur & the probability of occurrence.

STEPS INVOLVED IN AN ETA

1. Identify an initiating event of interest. 2. Identify the safety functions designed

to deal with the initiating event.

3. Construct the event tree.

4. Describe the resulting accident event sequences

EXAMPLE
Oxidation reactor high temp. Alarm alerts operator at temp T1. Operator reestablish cooling water flow to the oxidation reactor. Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temp. T2. ( T2 > T1) These safety functions are listed in the order in which they are intended to occur.

Reactor Feed

Cooling Coils

Cooling Water Out

Cooling Water In

Reactor TIC
Temperature Controller

Alarm at T > TA

TIA
Thermocouple High Temperature Alarm

Figure 11-8 Reactor with high temperature alarm and temperature controller.

Step 1 - Identify the initiating event

system or equipment failure human error process upset

[Example] Loss of Cooling Water to an Oxidation Reactor

Step 2 - Identify the Safety Functions Designed to Deal with the Initiating Event
Safety system that automatically respond to the initiating event.

Alarms that alert the operator when the initiating event occurs and operator actions designed to be performed in response to alarms or required by procedures.

Barriers or Containment methods that are intended to limit the effects of the initiating event.

Step 3: Construct the Event Tree

a. Enter the initiating event and safety functions.
Oxidation reactor high temperature alarm alerts operator at temperature T1 Operator reestablishes cooling water flow to oxidation reactor Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temperature T2

SAFETY FUNCTION

INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water to oxidation reactor

FIRST STEP IN CONSTRUCTING EVENT TREE

Step 3: Construct the Event Tree

b. Evaluate the safety functions SAFETY FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor high temperature alarm alerts operator at temperature T1 Operator reestablishes cooling water flow to oxidation reactor Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temperature T2

INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water to oxidation reactor

Succes s

Failure

REPRESENTATION OF THE FIRST SAFETY FUNCTION

Step 3: Construct the Event Tree

b. Evaluate the safety functions SAFETY FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor high temperature alarm alerts operator at temperature T1 Operator reestablishes cooling water flow to oxidation reactor Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temperature T2

INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water to oxidation reactor

Succes s If the safety function does not affect the course of the accident, the accident path proceeds with no branch pt to the next safety function.

Failure

REPRESENTATION OF THE SECOND SAFETY FUNCTION

Step 3: b. Evaluate safety functions.

SAFETY FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor high temperature alarm alerts operator at temperature T1 Operator reestablishes cooling water flow to oxidation reactor Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temperature T2

INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water to oxidation reactor

Succes s

Completed !

Failure

COMPLETED EVENT TREE

Step 4: Describe the Accident Sequence

Oxidation reactor high temperature SAFETY alarm alerts FUNCTION operator at temperature T1
B

Operator reestablishes cooling water flow to oxidation reactor

C

Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at temperature T2

A Safe condition, return to normal operation

AC Safe condition, process shutdown INITIATING EVENT: Loss of cooling water to oxidation reactor A ACD Unsafe condition, runaway reaction, operator aware of problem AB Unstable condition, process shutdown ABD Unsafe condition, runaway reaction, operator unaware of problem

Succes s

Failure

ACCIDENT SEQUENCES

High Temp Operator Alarm Alerts Notices Safety Function: Operator High Temp

Operator Re-starts Cooling

Operator Shuts Down Reactor

Result

Identifier: Failures/Demand:

B 0.01

C 0.25

D 0.25

E 0.1

0.99 A 1 Initiating Event: Loss of Cooling 1 Occurrence/yr. 0.01 0.002 5 0.007 5 0.247 5

0.00187 5

0.000625

Shutdown = 0.2227 + 0.001688 + 0.005625 = 0.2250 occurrences/yr. Runaway = 0.02475 + 0.0001875 + 0.0000625 = 0.02500 occurrences/yr.

A 0.7425 AD 0.2227 ADE 0.02475 AB 0.00562 5 ABD 0.00168 8 ABDE 0.0001875 ABC 0.00187 5 ABCD 0.000562 5 ABCDE 0.0000625

Continue Operation Shut Down Runaway Continue Operation Shut Down Runaway Continue Operation

Shut Down
Runaway

Figure 11-9 Event tree for a loss of coolant accident for the reactor of Figure 11-8.

Safety Function
0.01 Failures/Demand

Initiating Event 0.5 Occurrences/yr.

Success of Safety Function (1-0.01)*0.5 = 0.495 Occurrence/yr.

Failure of Safety Function 0.01*0.5 = 0.005 Occurrence/yr.

Figure 11-10 The computational sequence across a safety function in an event tree.

High Temp Operator Alarm Alerts Notices Safety Function: Operator High Temp

Operator Re-starts Cooling

Operator Operator Shuts Down Shuts Down Reactor

Result

Identifier: Failures/Demand:

B 0.01

C 0.25

D 0.25

E 0.01

F 0.1
Continue Operation Shut Down

0.99 0.2475

A 1

Initiating Event: Loss of Cooling 1 Occurrence/yr.

0.01

0.00750
0.001875

0.0025 0.000625

A 0.7425 AD 0.2450 ADE 0.002228 ADEF 0.002475 0.0002475 AB 0.005625 ABD 0.001856 ABDE 0.00001688 ABDEF 0.00001875 0.00000187 5 ABC 0.001875 ABCD 0.0006187 ABCDE 0.00000563 ABCDEF 0.00000675 0.00000062 5

Shut Down
Runaway Continue Operation Shut Down Shut Down Runaway Continue Operation Shut Down Shut Down Runaway

Shutdown = 0.2450 + 0.001856 + 0.00001688 + 0.0006187 = 0.2475 occurrences/yr. Runaway = 0.0002475 + 0.000001875 + 0.000000625 = 0.0002500 occurrences/yr. Figure 11-11 Event tree for the reactor of Figure 11-8. This includes a high temperature shutdown

ADVANTAGES
Structured, rigorous, and methodical approach.

Can be effectively performed on varying levels of design detail.

Permits probability assessment.

DISADVANTAGES
An ETA can only have one initiating event, therefore multiple ETAs will be required to evaluate the consequence of multiple initiating events.

Partial successes/failures are not distinguishable.

Requires an analyst with some training and practical experience.