People vs.

LOL-LO and SARAW Facts: The defendants were charged of the crime of piracy for pirating two Dutch boats as well as raping two of the women. Defendants contend that the provisions of the penal code dealing with piracy are no longer in force. Issue: W/N the provisions of the penal code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Decision: Yes. By virtue of the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the US. It is but a logical construction that wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which lie may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. Note: This case is an exception to the exception WHO vs. Aquino Facts: Respondent judge issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of the petitioner, an official of the WHO. Despite intervention of the Solicitor General and the DFA that Mr. Verstuyft is covered with diplomatic immunity, the judge refused to withdraw the search warrant. Issue: W/N the action of the judge is a violation of RA 75 and thus an abuse of discretion. Decision: Yes. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of government as, in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction." US vs. Ah Chong Facts: Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by some one trying to open the door, and called out twice. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Issue: W/N Ah Chong should be acquitted because of mistake of fact.

Decision: Under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negate a particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence, and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to commit. The circumstances proved that in Ah Chongs mind, he was being attacked, regardless of the circumstances outside him. Would the facts been as he though them to be, there would have been no crime. Mistake of fact indicates good faith. Good faith negates intent. Without intent, there is no crime. Note: 1. 2. 3. 4. Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because the intention was to kill another, does not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility (People vs. Gona). In mistake of fact, the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful. There is no crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact (US vs. Bautista) When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense. (People vs. Fernando)

URBANO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 157 SCRA 1 Facts: Urbano was charged for the crime of homicide for the death of Marcelo Javier. A fight ensued between the two when Urbano learned that Javier opened the floodgates thereby causing his palay to be flooded. Marcelo was only hit in the palm and while the wound was healing, the victim continued working. After 22 days, he died from tetanus. Issue: W/N the hacking incident can be considered a proximate cause of Marcelos death. Decision: No. Proximate cause it the case, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. The hacking incident could not have been the cause of the victims death since the tetanus appeared only on the 22nd day after the hacking incident. It is possible that the victim may have been inflicted with a mild tetanus but since Javier died only two or three days from the onset, it is logical to assume that there may be other causes other than the hacking incident. It is a rule that in criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. Since there may be other efficient causes of the death, the accused should be acquitted. (iii) When felony committed not proximate cause: (3) Intervening active force, which is distinct and absolutely foreign to felonious act of accused

(i) Resulting injury is due to intentional act of victim (ii) Death attributable to fever prevalent in locality In People v. Oanis and Callanta, the accused Chief of Police and the constabulary soldier were sent out to arrest a certain Balagtas, supposedly a notorious bandit. There was an order to kill Balagtas if he would resist. The accused arrived at the house of a dancer who was supposedly the girlfriend of Balagtas. When they were there, they saw a certain person who resembled Balagtas in all his bodily appearance sleeping on a bamboo bed but facing the other direction. The accused, without going around the house, started firing at the man. They found out later on that the man was not really Balagtas. They tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of having acted in fulfillment of a duty. The second requisite is absent because they acted with negligence. There was nothing that prevented them from looking around the house and looking at the face of the fellow who was sleeping. There could not be any danger on their life and limb. Hence, they were held guilty of the crime of murder because the fellow was killed when he was sleeping and totally defenseless. However, the Supreme Court granted them the benefit of incomplete justification of fulfillment of duty and the penalty was reduced by one or two degrees. Do not confuse fulfillment of a duty with self-defense. PEOPLE vs. APEGO Keyword: Paranoid sister, couple coming from Nasugbu, husband stabbed at the vital organ by the sister with fan knife and TIN CANS. Issue: W/N the defendant can plead complete self-defense. Decision: When a sleeping woman is awakened at night by some one touching her or grasping her arm, and she, believing that some person is attempting to abuse her asks who the intruder is and receives no reply, attacks the said person with a pocketknife, and the nature of the wound shows that she was either standing up or sitting up at the time, it is concluded that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, there was not sufficient provocation to justify her in using a deadly weapon; although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person did not insist or repeat any act which could be considered as an attempt against her honor. The accused exceeded her right of self-defense since there was really no need of wounding the victim. There was no reasonable cause for striking a blow in the center of the body where the vital parts are located. Thus, in the commission of the crime, there was present the circumstance of incomplete exemption from responsibility since the second requisite is missing. KILLING OF PARAMOUR NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO ATTEMPT TO RAPE ACCUSED WHO MAINTAINED ILLICIT RELATION WITH VICTIM FOR SOME TIME PEOPLE vs. RENEGADO Keywords: Insane security guard. type test questionnaires. Slave-driver teacher who asked the guard to

Decision: No. For purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it becomes necessary to restate certain basic principles in criminal law, viz. that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; that a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom intelligence, and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which even the actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. In the eyes of the law, insanity exist when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rest upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstances and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence. Applying these principles, defense fails.

Issue: W/N the defendant can be acquitted with the argument that he should be exempted from criminal liability on account of insanity.