Board of Optometry vs. Hon.

Colet
G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996 Facts: The Revised Optometry Law of 1995 was approved into law. The private respondents here filed with the RTC for a declaratory relief, among others, to protect their Constitutional rights because allegedly, said law would affect their operation and inflict serious and irreparable injury to their legal rights. They were not able to prove, however, their juridical personality. Thus, they also assert that such action is in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens suit, and therefore pray to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers public health (in the nature of a taxpayers suit). Issue: WON the private respondents have a legal interest in the controversy; and WON the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. Held: No.As a special civil action for declaratory relief, its requisites are: (1) the existence of a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first and fourth requisites are wanting. For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring the action. Thus, they cannot be deemed real parties in interest. They cannot also claim such legal personality under a taxpayers suit because, among others, they failed to allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit. And since an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, it cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under the law subject matter of this case.

Mariano v. COMELEC
242 SCRA 211

FACTS:A p e t i t i o n f o r p r o h i b i t i o n a n d d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f a g a i n s t R . A . N o . 7 8 5 4 , " A n A c t Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, "was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, T e r e s i t a T i b a y , C a m i l o S a n t o s , F r a n k i e C r u z , R i c a r d o P a s c u a l , T e r e s i t a Abang,Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba . O f t h e petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of I b a y o U s u s a n , T a g u i g , M e t r o M a n i l a . S u i n g a s t a x p a y e r s , t h e y a s s a i l a s un constitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854. ISSUE: Whether sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 are unconstitutional. RULING: The court finds no merit in the petition. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 clearly stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Hence, the territorial bounds need not b e m a d e i n m e t e s a n d b o u n d s w i t h t e c h n i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n a n d does not violates e c t i o n s 7 a n d 4 5 0 o f t h e L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e . A l s o , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co -equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute

should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. T h e c o n t e n t i o n o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f s e c t i o n 5 1 o f R . A . N o . 7 8 5 4 w a s n o t entertained by the court since it did not comply the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law which are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events which this Court has no jurisdiction and nor are they proper parties to raise this abstract issue. On the constitutionality of section 51 of R.A. 7854, which declares the addition of a n o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t i n M a k a t i , t h e c o u r t r e f e r s t o t h e c a s e o f T o b i a s v s . Abalos In said case, the court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was d o n e b y C o n g r e s s in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislatived i s t r i c t s a l l o t t e d t o e a c h l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t u n i t n a t i o n w i d e , w o u l d c r eate aninequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congres s w i l l b e denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. Even granting t h a t the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). There is also no merit in the contention of the title of the bill that it should expressly state the addition of a legislative district. The Constitution does not command th at the Atitle of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details so as not to impede legislation. Hence, the court ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs

FERNANDEZ VS TORRES 215 SCRA 489 Facts: Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene Caballero, Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek Certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE")and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."2. Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows:1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the performing artists be below 23years old. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof.3.The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by public agitation (as reflected in the print media) for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, in response to the growing number of documented reports and complaints from entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative working conditions ,harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing artists and entertainers abroad.4.Because a comprehensive prohibition of such deployment would visit

obviously adverse economic consequences upon the entertainment industry, the First National Tripartite Conference for the protection of Overseas Entertainers, attended by representatives from the Government and from the management and labor sectors of the entertainment community, was held last 18 November 1991. The Conference was convened to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete interdiction of overseas deployment of Philippine entertainers and performing artists. During this Conference, someof the problems facing Filipino entertainers (in particular, women entertainers) abroad were discussed openly: vulnerability to operations of organized crime syndicate abroad; subjection towhite slavery; harsh and substandard working conditions; vulnerability to sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies, and soforth.5.At the end of the Conference, the consens us among the management and labor representatives which emerged was that Government should adopt a policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of deployment abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would impose on the country's man power export program. The labor representative recommended that the minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to twenty-three (23) years. Petitioners alleged themselves to be "qualified performing artists, mostly singers and dancers, "of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years:(1) that Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is violative of the equal of the protection clause and the due process clause of the Constitution, andt he state policy on protection of labor because Item No. 1 is arbitrary, oppressive and discriminatory against performing artists of ages eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) who would otherwise be qualified for overseas employment; and(2) that Item No. 1 of the mentioned DOLE Circular was promulgated by public respondent DOLE Secretary and POEA Administrator without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: WON DOLE circular is unconstitutional Held: NO. In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. the Solicitor General urges that the Petition atbar does not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed prematurely. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. We note in the first place that Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof."The discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91."d. In the second place petitioners have failed to alleged or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 0191. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create are reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No.01-91 is "practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted to support this assertion. The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all applications for exemption from coverage

of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality. The second is that official dut yhas been or will be regularly performed. We consider, therefore, that petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of a judicial inquiry, the existence of actual case or controversy. This failure renders unnecessary consideration of the other requisites of constitutional litigation.
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretaty Facts:25 July 1987 EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development anduse of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine other wise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US$50,000,000. 00) 3 March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law. 30 March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato .9 April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA7942 took effect20 December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO96-40. 10 January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40.No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction(denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA 7942 [1], of DENR Administrative Order 96-40 [2], and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement entered in noon 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC(Philippines) , Inc..23 January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP isno longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral ResourcesCorporation.18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTA Ato Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since the question of validity of theFTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius. Issue/s: 1.WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquinos legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect after which. 2.WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to above stated laws is invalid Held: Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Since the petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of interest to the contract/agreement.1.NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectively date lies beyond the expiration of the Presidents legislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held such power. It does not run counter to EO 200 requiring laws to have 15days after publication requirement before its effectivity since EO200also provides unless it is otherwise provided, EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as shall take effect immediately. In addition, the 15day post-publication requirement was for the information of the public and does not in any way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.2.Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

DeFunis v. Odegaard 416 U.S. 312, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164(1974).

Facts: Petitioner DeFunis, a white applicant to the University of Washington law school, sued the Board of Regents of the University of Washington in state court after he was denied admission. DeFunis alleged that the law school discriminated against applicants of certain races and ethnicities, including whites, by admitting minority applicants with significantly lower undergraduate grades and LSAT scores. DeFunis maintained that hisrejection was predicated on racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted DeFunis injunctive relief and ordered the law school to admit him. When DeFunis was in his second year of law school, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the admissionspolicy was not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States granted DeFunis petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington pending final disposition of the case. The case came before the Supreme Court of the United States for a full hearing when DeFunis was in his final year of law school. Although the lawschool assured that it would allow DeFunis to graduate regardless of the Courts decision, both parties contended that mootness did not exist to block formal adjudication of the matter. Issue:Can a case be adjudicated when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking due to mootness, if adjudication of the suit would resolve animportant social issue? Held:No. When a federal courts determination of a legal issue is no longer necessary to compel the result originally sought, the case is moot and federal courts lack the power to hear it.T he constitutional basis of the mootness doctrine is found in Article III of the Constitution which requires the existence of a case or controversy. Thus, areal and live controversy must exist at every stage of review. The court held that when the original controversy has disappeared prior todevelopment of the suit, it is deemed moot and a trial must not proceed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That a matter deemed moot leaves an important social issue unresolved is of no consequence. Dissent (Douglas) Due to the social significance of the issue involved in this case, this matter should be adjudicated despite its apparent mootness. Dissent (Brennan)Because of the social significance of the issue involved in this case, failureto adjudicate this matter now will only result in a future duplication of the court effort.

Warth vs Seldin 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed2d. 343 Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfields Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended that Penfields zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiffs had standing. Issue. Have the Plaintiffs established that a case or controversy exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing? Held: A plaintiff must generally allege a specific case or controversy between herself and the defendant in order to have standing. Article III U.S. Constitution, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants actions, or that prospective relief will remove the injury. Case or controversy requirement.

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit.

CRAIG VS. BOREN 429 US 190December 20, 1976 Facts. Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action to the attention of US Supreme Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that anOklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of non-intoxicating 3.2%beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 yearsof age the equal protection of the laws. A three-judge District Court held that appellees statistical evidence regarding young males drunk-driving arrests and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads. Issue: Do Craig and Whitener have standing to sue? Held: The US Supreme Court held that the controversy has been mooted as to Craig. Whitener on the other hand has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Craig, at the time that the US Supreme Court had noted probable jurisdiction, has turned 21 years old hence the decision that the controversies ought by Craig has been mooted. Furthermore, the court also held that there be no prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of justertii (third party standing) can be furthered here, especially as the District. booths. In addition, such ownership will then be subsequently transferred tothe government under Built-Lease-Transfer agreement

Francisco Tatad, John Osmea and Rodolfo Biazon v. Jesus Garcia, Jr. (DOTC Sec.),EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995 Quiason, J. FACTS: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA, a major thoroughfare inMetropolitan Manila, which shall traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong and Makat.i. RA No. 6957 entitled An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation andMaintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes or B O T L a w p r o v i d e d f o r t w o s c h e m e s f o r t h e f i n a n c i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f go vernment projects through private initiative and investment: Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) or BuildTransfer (BT) Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) and the Te chnical Committee werecreated by the DOTC in relation to EDSA Light Rail Transit III project only the EDSA LRT Consortium (later called EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd.) m e t t h e requirements of PBAC DOTC requested presidential approval of the contract but then Exe. Sec. Drilon conveyedthat the Pres. could not sign the same. So DOTC and private respondents re-negotiated theagreement. The agreement provided inter alia that upon full or partial completion and viability thereof,private respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTCwhich shall operate the same. RA No. 7718 amended RA No. 6957; it expressly provides for BLT scheme and allows direct negotiation of BLT contracts ISSUE: W ON EDSA LRT Corp., Ltd., a foreign corporation can own EDSA LRT III, a public utility HELD: Yes. W hat private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, railstations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed tooperate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a publicutility. W hat constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Const.: No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines orto corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixtyper centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificateor authorization be exclusive character or for a longer period than fifty years. there is a distinction between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of thefacilities and equipment used to serve the public ownership- a r e l a t i o n i n l a w b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h a t h i n g p e r t a i n i n g t o o n e p e r s o n i s completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated places and themovement of the trains at pre-scheduled times right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately fro

m t h e ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as apublic utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. merely the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III o n c o m p l e t i o n d a t e o f t h e L R T p r o j e c t , E D S A L R T C o r p . L t d . w i l l i m m e d i a t e l y d e l i v e r po ssession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shalloperate the same as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC; technical maintenance consists of providing 1)repair and maintenance facilities for the depot and rail lines, services for routine clearing and security; and 2) producing and distributing maintenance manuals and drawings for theentire system EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd. shall also train DOTC personnel for familiarization with the operation,use, maintenance and repair of the rolling stock, power plant, substations, electrical, signaling, communications and all other equipment as supplied in the agreement.Since DOTC shall operate the EDSA LRT III, it shall assume all the obligations and liabilitiesof a common carrier .BOT scheme- contractor undertakes the construction and financing in infrastructure facility, and operates and maintains the same; contractor operates the facility for a fixedperiod during which it may recover its expenses and investment in the project plus a reasonable rate of return thereon; after the expiration of the agreed term, the contractortransfers the ownership and operation of the project to the government. BT scheme- contractor undertakes the construction and financing of the facility, but aftercompletion, the ownership and operation thereof are turned over to the government. Thegovernment, in turn, shall pay the contractor its total investment on the project in additionto a reasonable rate of return. If payment is to be effected through amortization paymentsby the government infrastructure agency or local government unit concerned, this shall bemade in accordance with a scheme proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract. BLT scheme which is challenged by petitioners is but a variation of the BT scheme lease contract where one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoymentor use of a thing for a certain price and for a period which may be definite or indefinite butnot longer than 99 years; no transfer of ownership at the end of the lease period lease-purchase agreement- parties stipulate that title to the leased premises shall betransferred to the lessee at the end of the lease period upon the payment of an agreed sum. the claim that the BLT scheme and direct negotiation of contracts are not contemplated bythe BOT Law has now been rendered moot and academic by RA No. 7718 Section 3 thereof authorizes all government infrastructure agencies, government-ownedand controlled corporations and local government units to enter into contract with any duly prequalified proponent for the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure or development facility through a BOT, BT, BLT, BOO( B u i l d - o w n - a n d - o p e r a t e ) , C A O ( C o n t r a c t - a d d o p e r a t e ) , D O T ( D e v e l o p - o p e r a t e - a n d - transfer), ROT (Rehabilitate-operate-andtransfer), and ROO (Rehabilitate-own-operate)

Kilosbayan vs Guingona
232 SCRA 110 Facts :Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction w i t h a p r a y e r f o r a T R O & preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the Contract of Lease between P C S O & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners ares u i n g i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s a n d a s taxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was executed and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount toa lack of authority by entering into the contract, because:1 . S e c t i o n 1 o f R A 1 1 6 9 ( P C S O C h a r t e r ) p r o h i b i t s t h e PCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with anyentity2 . R A 3 8 4 6 & j u r i s p r u d e n c e r e q u i r e C o n g r e s i o n a l franchise before a telecom system (public utility) can beestablished3 . A r t i c l e 1 2 o f S e c t i o n 1 1 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o h i b i t s companies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership fromoperating a public system4 . P G M G i s n o t a u t h o r i z e d b y i t s c h a r t e r o r b y R A 7 0 4 2 ( F o r e i g n I n v e s t m e n t A c t ) t o i n s t a l l a n o n l i n e L o t t o systema . T h e c o n t r a c t s h o w s t h a t P G M C i s t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t o r w h i l e i t i s a 7 5 % f o r e i g n - o w n e d company. RA 7042 puts all forms of gambling on the negative list Respondents answered the allegations by contending:1 . P G M C i s o n l y a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r . T h e r e i s n o shared franchise2 . P C S O w i l l n o t a o p e r a t e a p u b l i c s y s t e m a s a t e l e c o m system is an indispensable requirement of an online lottery system. Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow.3 . T h e r e a r e n o v i o l a t i o n s o f l a w s 4 . T h e i s s u e o f m o r a l i t y i s a p o l i t i c a l o n e a n d s h o u l d n o t b e resolved in a legal forum5 . P e t i t i o n e r s a r e w i t h o u t l e g a l s t a n d i n g , a s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Valmonte vs. PCSOa . T h e P C S O i s a c o r p o r a t e e n t i t y a n d c a n e n t e r into all kinds

of contracts to achieve objectives .Arguing that PCSO will operate a public utility,it is still e xempted under Section of Act 3846, w h e r e l e g i s l a t i v e f r a n c h i s e e s a r e n o t necessary for radio stations Issues:1 . W h e t h e r o r n o t p e t i t i o n e r s h a v e s t a n d i n g 2 . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c o n t r a c t i s l e g a l u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 o f RA1169 Held: Y e s , p e t i t i o n e r s h a v e s t a n d i n g . S t a n d i n g i s o n l y a procedural technicality that can be set aside depending o n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a n i s s u e . A s t a x p a y e r s a n d citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system, petitioners have standing. N o , t h e c o n t r a c t i s i l l e g a l . T h e C o u r t r u l e s i n t h e negative arguing that whatever is not unequivocally. lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest.In this case, no other government agency filed suit.4.wide impact or implementation; in this case, nationwide. KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. (G. R. No. 118910) FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially thesame as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public biddingof contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COACircular No. 85-55-A.Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. HELD :The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operationof the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actuallysue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they havefor bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Drilon vs Lim GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994 FACTS: Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.

ISSUES: The issues in this case are(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and (2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government HELD: The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. People VS. Vera
65 phil. 56

Held: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law isapplicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of thePreparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisersand assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.

Philippine Constitution Association vs Enriquez

235 SCRA 506

FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the GeneralAppropriations Act of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the NationalHousing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in

question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provisionblocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Bayan v. Zamora November 10, 2010G.R. No. 138570 FACTS: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was entered into by the Philippines and UnitedStates to regulate conditions of presence of US military personnels in the Philippines. TheSenate concurred with the VFA. Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congress questioned its validity. ISSUE: WON the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, orlegislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? NOTE: bayan muna. Etc. have no standing.a party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid but that he was sustained on is in immediate danger of sustaining some correct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. HELD: Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining anydirect injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. As taxpayers, they failed to show how theVFA will involve the exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Members of Congress standing cannot be upheld absent a clear showing of any direct injury to their personor to the institution to which they belong. Further, IBP has no standing