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Con tents
The Conquest of Sicily I.

10th July to 17th August, 1943.

... Page
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Preparatory Measures...............

II. The Assault... ...... .. :........ III. The Enem~y's Stand at Catania...
Reduction of the Island ... ..... Diary of the Sicilian Campaign.. Tables Showing Scale of Effort.. . ... Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean ........... Tables Showing Effort from Malta... ................ Air Operations in the Aegean......... IV.

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Development-of Enemy Bombs and Offensive Weapons........

Medical Receiving Stations in the Western Desert............. Rescue by Night.................................. Flying Control: Part II............ ... ... ... Air Transport............... . .......... A Difficult Rescue................ ... ... ......... From the 540s ................. ..................... Acknowledgment............. ................ 10th July to 17th August Maps: The Sicilian Campaign Italian Targets Attacked Ist July to 17th August
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The R.A.F. Mediterranean' Review is Secret (= American Secret). It is intended for the information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approved by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within those limits it has as wide a circulation as possible. No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O., H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone outside the Services. All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruction of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. of a copy should immediately Any unauthorised person obtainin ssession forward it in a clo ed J ope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Foreword
A
s announced in the Foreword-of the The last number of the Review, its name changes with this issue from the R.A.F. Middle East Review to the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review. transition from a predominant Middle East viewpoint to the wider horizon demanded by a Mediterranean production must of necessity be gradual, and this number inevitably contains, apart from the historical narrative, articles more of Middle East than Mediterranean interest. No apology be need be offered for that, however, for whereas Middle East may

regarded more-or-less as a pensioned warrior mainly employed on guard duty, it is true to say that the Mediterranean giant is"equipped in great part with the former's weapons and experience. The Mediterranean aspect, therefore, will be more fully developed in the next number, and for that reason the commencement of the Invasion of Italy, which really falls within the quarter under review, has been left over until Number 5. Additional to that reason is the fact that the Sicilian campaign, which may be regarded as a model combination of effort between the three Services, land, sea and air, has been considered here in its entirety.

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The Conquest Of Sicily

ioth JULY TO
17th

AUGUST,

1943

As the Tunisian campaign drew to its end in the first half of May, 1943, plans were formulated for the invasion of Sicily, a main bulwark of the southern defences, of Hitler's European "Fortress". Essential prerequisites of the invasion included the reduction of Pantelleria and the less important islands of Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa; these were all in Allied hands by 13th June, as the result of a sustained aerial offensive, supplemented by naval bombardment. Details of the Allied air attacks were given in the previous number of the "Review", but it may be re-iterated here that against Pantelleria over 5,650 effective sorties were flown by Allied bombers and fighter-bombers, in the course of which approximately 6,500 tons of bombs were dropped, Against Lampedusa only 30 air attacks were needed in which about 5 0o of the bomb tonnage expended on Pantelleria was dropped. Meanwhile, a strategic bombing programme had been carried out with the object of interfering with the enemy's "build-up" in the Central Mediterranean area in general and Sicily in particular. From the middle of May to the end of June constant attacks were delivered against the enemy's airfields in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, the enemy's ports and submarine bases in the same areas, the communications across the Messina Straits and industrial targets, particularlyat Naples and Bari. In addition, the bombing attacks from the United Kingdom against targets in Northern Italy were supplemented by a few large-scale raids on Leghorn and Spezia from North-west Africa. In the six weeks period mentioned Allied bombers and fighter-bombers of the North-west African Air Forces and Middle East Command (including Malta) flew 2,292 effective sorties against the enemy's Central Mediterranean airfields and 2,638 against his ports, bases and lines of communication. These totals are exclusive of the effort against Pantelleria and Lampedusa. The following account of the Allied air operations,1st July to 17th August, carried out in connection with the Sicilian invasion, is divided into four sections:I. PreparatoryMeasures. II. The Assault. III The Enemy's Stand at Catania IV. The Reduction of the Island.

I.

PREPARATORY

MEASURES

Preliminary Bombing Programme The successful invasion of Sicily implied major commitments for the Allied air forces before, during and after the actual landings. Mention has already been made in the preface .above of the scale of bomber effort developed

from mid-May to the end of June against the enemy's airfields, bases and lines of communication; for the week immediately prior to the Sicilian landings the Air Plan provided for an even greater effort against enemy airfields. By "zero hour" it was hoped that the sustained

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attacks on the airfields, coupled with the casualties inflicted on the enemy's intercepting fighters, would have greatly reduced the enemy's first line strength in the Sicilian theatre of war, especially in fighter aircraft. In addition, the enemy's ports and lines of communication were to be attacked when necessary, in accordance with the intelligence provided by air reconnaissance. Meanwhile, Home-based bombers were to continue their offensive against Northern Italian industrial targets, which, apart from the material damage caused, was certain to have an effect on the morale of the Italian people, which was already at low ebb. Malta Prepares For Malta the wheel had turned full circle: from being a besieged fortress in 1942 it was now destined to become a major base for offensive operations. As early as January, 1943, work had begun on the task of improving the island's airfields. Existing airfields were extended and.extra landing strips were prepared. Thus, by the end of June Malta could maintain and operate nearly 30 fighter squadrons. In addition, during that month U.S. Army Engineers constructed a landing strip at Gozo from which a further three squadrons could operate. The airfield on Pantelleria was also put into order and was soon able to accommodate several American long-range fighter squadrons. Meanwhile, the provisioning of Malta went on apace and adequate stores, supplies and spares necessary for the operation and maintenance of the powerful air striking force were speedily accumulated. Improvements were also made in the existing R.D.F. and fighter control facilities. In particular, a new Fighter Control Room was hewn out of the rock, an enlarged Filter Room was established, and additional R.D.F. stations were set up. For the battle period, also, a combined War Room was prepared with the object of providing an hour by hour picture of ground, naval and air operations. Close at hand, also, were the Army Support Centre and the Naval Cobperation Operations Room. Thus, full care was taken that during the period of the coming battle control would be immediate and as faultless as humanly possible. On the eve of the Sicilian invasion nearly 40 squadrons were concentrated on Malta and the satellites Gozo and Pantelleria. The Island was ready to pay off old scores. Main Features of the Air Plan No radical change was necessary in the existing organisation and system of command in the Mediterranean theatre. Under the direction of the Air Commander-inChief, Mediterranean, the Commandin

North-west African Air Forces remained in command of the North-west African Allied air forces. The operational formations, the North-west African Strategic, Tactical and Coastal Air Forces were to remain unchanged in their basic organisation and functions, although it was envisaged that some redistribution of units might be necessary from time to time. The provision of two subordinate Air Commanders by the A.O.C. Tactical Air Force for air task forces operating in Sicily is considered later. The Middle East air forces not already under the operational control of the North-west African Air Forces (excluding, that is, No. 205 Group controlled by the Strategic Air Force and the Desert Air Force which was an integral part of the Tactical Air Force) were to remain under the existing system of command. The forces operating from the North African mainland comprised the Ninth U.S. Air Force (including the two R.A.F. heavy bomber squadrons under its operational control) and the A.H.Q. Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean and No. 201 (Naval Cooperation) squadrons. Malta, as already mentioned, accommodated a large fighter force derived from the North-west African Tactical Air Force in additipn to the "garrison squadrons." The A.O.C.-in-Chief, Middle East, was responsible for the administration of the air forces operating from the Middle East and Malta and the Commanding General, North-west African Air Forces had a similar responsibility in respect of all other air forces operating in the Mediterranean theatre concerned with the Sicilian invasion. In the initial stage of the campaign, also, H.Q., R.A.F., Middle East was to hold itself in readiness to assist in the maintenance of air forces based in Sicily. After due consideration it was decided that the assault on Sicily should be launched against the south-eastern corner of the island and eight simultaneous pre-dawn landings were planned to take place on the beaches from Licata to east of Avola. The British assaults were to be made on the eastern seaboard and the American landings on the south-east shore. The immediate aim of the assault troops was the capture of the airfields and ports in south-eastern Sicily and the development of an assault on the key position of Catania. Subsequently, advances were to be made on Palermo and Messina. By restricting the landing to the south-eastern corner of the island and ignoring the western shore tactical surprise was more likely and the dispersion of the air effort in covering assaults in the Palermo area was avoided. In spite of the concentration of fighter squddrons on Malta and the satellite aerodromes, forward airfields from which our short-range fighters could effectively operate over the battle area in the initial stages were still not over-plentiful; in particular, fighters based in northern Tunisia could operate effectively over the most

D ECAS

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westerly of the assaults only and could not assist landings east of Licata. As airfields were occupied in Sicily, however, it was planned for fighter squadrons from Malta to move in and their places on the island were to be taken by fighter-bomber squadrons, withdrawn, in the first instance, from Pantelleria. When room was available for the fighter-bombers in Sicily the landing grounds vacated by them in Malta were to be allotted to light bombers. These, in turn were to be established in Sicily when airfields became available. A scheme was drawn up for an eastern air task force to support the Eighth Army and attached units and a western air task force to assist the U.S. Seventh Army. Until the eastern air task force was established in Sicily the greater part as already indicated was to be based in Malta; these squadrons were to be under the command of the A.O.C. Malta until they were transferred to Sicily, when the A.O.C. of the eastern air task force was to assume command. The American squadrons allotted to support the U.S. Seventh Army were to be derived mainly from Tunisia and accordingly came under the command of the A.O.C. of the western air task force forthwith. Both air task forces were to be under the control of A.O.C. North-west African Tactical Air Force. The speedy establishment of the two air task forces in Sicily was of vital importance in order to provide continuous close support to our advancing land forces. - The Allied medium and heavy bomber squadrons of the North-west African Air Forces (including No. 205 Group's Wellingtons) were to continue to operate from the North-west African mainland and the U.S. and R.A.F. heavy bombers under the control of the Ninth U.S. Air Force were to function from Cyrenaica, as formerly. The sailing of east and west-bound convoys to Sicily implied increased shipping protection commitments. Fighter protection and anti-submarine patrols were to be provided under the existing organisations. That is to say, convoys passing westwards through the Eastern Mediterranean were to receive protection from squadrons operating under A.H.Q. Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, and east-bound convoys in the Central Mediterranean were to be protected by the North-west African Coastal Air Force. Wherever possible, the Sicily convoys were to be routed close to the North African coast and fighter squadrons engaged on shipping protection were to move up with their respective convoys, as far as practicable, in order to economise the fighter effort. On the day prior to the landings the invasion craft converging on Malta were to be protected by fighters from the island to an extent of a circle of 50 nautical miles 'radius from Valetta. During and immediately after the Sicilian landings, before anti-aircraft defences could be established ashore, the fullest fighter protection was to be provided over the beaches. During the

hours of darkness, moreover, arrangements were made for night-fighters based in Malta and Tunisia to give the maximum protection to ships unloading at the beaches and to captured ports. As soon as C.G.I. could be installed on selected occupied airfields in Sicily, also, certain nightfighter squadrons were to be established there. Reconnaissance The Air Plan made provision for a constant watch to be kept on the enemy's strength and movements. For the initial period, arrangements were made for a detachment of the North-west African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing to operate from Malta in order to assist the work of No. 248 Wing. Other photographic reconnaissance units were to continue to function from North Africa. Tactical reconnaissance requirements in the eastern area of the Sicilian battlefield were to be met by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., operating from Malta; a similar commitment in respect of the western area was the responsibility of an American observation squadron based in Tunisia. The RBle of Air Transport On the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign units of the Troop Carrier Command commenced training for the carrying out of a large-scale paratroop mission which was to precede the landing of our sea-borne troops. During the pre-invasion period, also, American, British and French air transport units were available for the urgent transportation of personnel and freight. In addition, when the battle was joined the U.S. Transport Command was to undertake the evacuation of wounded as well as normal transport commitments. Relative Air Strengths The Allied air forces in the Mediterranean area were infinitely stronger than those of the Axis. For all operations connected with the Sicilian invasion it was estimated that a front-line strength of approximately 4,000 aircraft was available. This figure excludes the large American glider force. R.A.F. squadrons provided the majority of the single and twin-engined offensive and defensive fighters and coastal aircraft while the bomber and air transport forces were composed principally of American units. With regard to the night bomber force, however, it should be noted that this consisted mainly of R.A.F. Wellingtons, Liberators and Halifaxes. On the eve of the Sicilian invasion the German and Italian air forces had a total of 1,800 to 1,900 aircraft, excluding transport types, based in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and southern France. The enemy's fighters were based mainly in Sicily, Southern Italy and Sardinia. In Sicily and Italy (south of 41o north) it was estimated that the G.A.F. had approximately 260 sinleengined fighters and" fi te

Italians 200 single-engined fighters; in Sardinia, there were about 130 German single-engined fighters and fighter-bombers and 100 Italian fighters. The balance of the Italian single-engined force-approximately 230 aircraft-was located in central and northern Italy. The German twin-engined fighter force, which comprised some 75 aircraft, was based half in Sicily (including Italy south of 41 north) and half in Italy (north of 41 north). Night-fighter JU.88s appeared to be based entirely in central Italy. Apart from 50 JU.88 bombers in Sicily, the German long-range bomber force was based principally in Italy (north of 40 north), with an additional strong force in southern France; bomber reconnaissance JU.88s were also based mainly in the two last mentioned areas. Italian bomber reconnaissance and torpedo bomber aircraft were located in central Italy, with detachments in Sardinia and Sicily. In addition, in Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese there were approximately 265 German and 180 Italian aircraft; in particular, the German total included about 130 bombers, dive-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. The serviceability of enemy aircraft in the Mediterranean area in general was estimated to average 50%; in the battle area, however, the average serviceability was undoubtedly less. The Opposing Land Forces It was naturally impossible to gauge with accuracy the strength of the enemy's land forces prior to the invasion, but by the end of the first week's fighting it transpired that the forces ready to repel our attack were approximately as follows:-there were five Italian field divisions, two German field divisions, and five Italian coastal divisions. The coastal divisions were made up mainly of older men or men of low physical category and included a high proportion of Sicilians; in addition, their almost total immobility and the simple nature of the defence works rendered them unfitted to the task of opposing our assault troops. The Italian field divisions were men of better calibre and more adequately equipped. The German divisions were the reformed Herman Goering Division and an armoured formation which had been given the name of the 15th Panzer Division, "liquidated" in Tunisia. These two divisions were well equipped and included about 200 tanks; it became obvious that they would provide the hard core of resistance. After considering all available evidence at the end of the campaign it was estimated that at the beginning of hostilities the Italian field forces, coastal defence and anti-aircraft artillery units comprised in round figures 216,000 men. In addition, there were probably about 28,000 Italian second-line troops composed of depot units, carabinieri, and local militia, and a further 50,000 in labour corps. German forces at the beginning of the Sicilian campaign, includin anti-aircraft and t s ci

sectors, were estimated to comprise about 60,000 men. The Allied invasion forces were made up of a re-organised Eighth Army, which now included Canadian units, and the Seventh U.S. Army. Most of the Allied troops were veterans of the North African campaign, and backed by sea and air superiority they were confident from the start of making the first breach in the defences of Occupied Europe. Pre-Invasion Blitz on Sicilian Airfields During the first nine days of July, in accordance with the preliminary bombing plan mentioned on page 5, the Allied air forces carried out intensive attacks on the enemy's airfields in Sicily. During this pre-invasion period the North-west African Air Forces carried out 394 heavy, 1,255 medium and 377 light bomber effective sorties against Sicilian landing grounds. In addition, Cyrenaican-based Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force flew 126 effective sorties against these objectives and Malta-based Spitfire-bombers also made a few attacks. The majority of the enemy's fighters in Sicily was now based in the east, with Gerbini airfield and its many satellites as the principal base. Accordingly, the greater part of the bomber effort was directed against landing grounds in the Gerbini area. From 4th to 9th July, inclusive, aircraft under the operational control of* H.Q. North-west African Air Forces flew 294 heavy and 560 medium bomber sorties against the Gerbini landing grounds and U.S. Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force flew 79 sorties. Some indication of the havoc wrought at Gerbini is shown by the North-west African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing's report on the damage inflicted by 100 U.S. Fortresses on 5th July. Of the 54 aircraft present on the main airfield during the raid all but four were destroyed and at two satellite landing grounds a total of fourteen aircraft, mainly single-engined fighters, were destroyed. Widespread damage was caused, also, on several other Gerbini satellites. On the 5th, moreover, enemy fighters were induced to join battle. Approximately 100 enemy aircraft attacked a formation of 27 U.S. Fortresses and as a result of a long running fight 35 of the enemy were claimed as destroyed for the loss of two American bombers. Two further formations of heavy bombers, which attacked the same objectives about 20 minutes later, met no enemy opposition, and an escorted formation of U.S. Mitchells, which renewed the attack an hour afterwards, was also left unmolested. It was evident that the enemy's fighter force was in no condition to challenge every Allied raid, but attacked spasmodically only, in an endeavour to conserve strength for the critical days ahead. In addition to the blitz on the Gerbini group of landing grounds, the following bomb loads were dropped on the other principal eastern airBiscari 335'6 tons: Comiso 300 tons (ini 1 tons dropped by U.S. Liberators): Ca-

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tania 139"4 tons. The majority of these attacks were carried out by N.A.A.F. medium bombers U.S. Mitchells and Marauders operating by day ,and Wellingtons by night. The western Sicilian landing grounds also received attention, but the Allied attacks in this quarter were not so intense as these landing grounds were now of secondary importance. Sciacca was attacked nine times by N.A.A.F. aircraft, in the course of which 130.7 tons of bombs were dropped. Many of the raids took place at night, and, in particular, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores played a full part in this activity. Other western airfields attacked included those at Trapani/Milo and Bo Rizzo, against which 96 light and 45 medium and twelve light bomber effective sorties were flown, respectively. The Allied air forces' attacks on the Sicilian airfields during the first nine days of July rendered many of them unserviceable and about a half of the enemy's aircraft formerly based there were either forced to withdraw to South Italy or moved to newly constructed landing grounds. In particular, on the eve of the Allied landings the main Gerbini airfield, seven of its satellites, and Comiso airfield were rendered unserviceable ; in the west, also, as the result of the heavy attacks in June Bocca di Falco airfield appeared to be unserviceable and Castelvetrano was all but abandoned. In addition to the great number of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground in the course of the pre-invasion blitz on the Sicilian airfields, bombers operating under the control of the Northwest African Air Forces claimed the destruction of 56 enemy fighters in combat for the loss of seven aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire and enemy. air action and eight missing; escorting fighters accounted for another 45 enemy aircraft destroyed at the cost of seven shot down and five missing, and Malta-based Spitfires acting as top cover to the N.A.A.F. bombers also accounted for an appreciable number of enemy fighters. U.S. Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force encountered little enemy air opposition in the course of their attacks on Gerbini and Comiso airfields and destroyed only one enemy fighter in combat without loss. Attacks on Bases and Communications As indicated in the preceding paragraphs the main activity of the Allied air forces prior to the Sicilian invasion was directed against the enemy's airfields. Attacks on his bases and lines of communication were consequently on a reduced scale. In all, from 2nd to 9th July, inclusive, aircraft controlled by the North-west African Air Forces flew 194 bomber and fighter-bomber sorties against enemy ports bases and shipping and 698 against his positions and lines of communication; fighters meanwhile carried out 88 sorties on ground attacks and 68 on anti-shipping missions, in addition to their normal commitments of bom-

ber escort, offensive sweeps, shipping protection, and reconnaissance tasks. The bomber attacks included 75 Wellington sorties against Palermo and 26 more against the important position at Catania and an attack by 21 U.S. Mitchells on targets in the Caltagirone area on the day before the invasion. The fighter-bomber effort was directed chiefly against the harbours of Porto Empedocle and Marsala, but there were also successful U S. Warhawk attacks on radar stations at Cape Passero, Palazzo, Catania and Syracuse. Shipping Protection The protection of the convoys en route to Sicily involved increased commitments for the Northwest African Coastal Air Force (which was considerably enlarged particularly by the addition of more Beaufighter squadrons) in the Central Mediterranean, and the Middle East squadrons controlled by Air Headquarters, Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean and No. 201 Group (reinforced by two long-range fighter squadrons loaned from North-west Africa and one from Malta) in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the fighter protection of our east-bound convoys during the first nine days of July squadrons of the Coastal Air Force flew a total of 1,426 sorties, including the record number of 574 sorties on the 8th and 9th. In addition, 541 fighter sorties were flown on local defence. Naval cooperation aircraft, meanwhile, carried out 258 sorties on anti-submarine protection and submarine hunts. Over our west-bound convoys the fighter squadrons controlled by Air Headquarters, Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean flew 1,421 sorties and carried out 257 sorties on local defence. Coastal aircraft of No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, meanwhile, flew 314 sorties on anti-submarine close cover, area patrols and submarine hunts. As the great armada converged on Malta during the morning of 9th July fighter protection was provided from the island. About two-thirds of the available fighter force was employed continuously on shipping protection, carrying out 413 sorties. The only opposition of note to the massing of our invasion fleet was the attack on Bizerta on the night 6/7th July. Sixty-five enemy bombers dropped light explosive and incendiary bombs in an attempt to damage shipping in the harbour, but the harm done was negligible. One JU.88 was destroyed by night fighters and three more were shot down by our anti-aircraft fire. It was clear that the Allied air forces' intensive attacks on the enemy's airfields had prevented the concentration of an effective air striking force and the combined naval and air force control of the Mediterranean sea-ways dissuaded the enemy from employing submarines on any appreciable . scale.

. ... .

ASSAULT
The Assault from the Air The invasion of Sicily began shortly before midnight 9/10th July, when British and American airborne units landed on the peninsulas north and south of Syracuse and on the coastal plain between Gela and Licata. The principal tasks of these troops were to harass the coastal defence forces, destroy the enemy's lines of communication to the coast and preserve those which would be of use to the Allied armies scheduled to land on the morrow. Glider troops, drawn from the British 1st Airborne Division, operated in the Syracuse area and paratroops of the American 82nd Airborne Division were dropped in the Gela - Licata locality. Aircraft of the North-west African Troop Carrier Command carried out 109 C.47 (Dakota), 21 Albemarle and seven Halifax sorties in towing the gliders and 226 C.47 sorties conveying the parachute troops. The strong headwinds encountered forced a number of gliders into the sea short of the target area but, on the whole, considering the difficulty of carrying out such a hazardous undertaking at night, the missions were satisfactorily completed. Many of the set tasks were performed by the airborne troops and the way was paved for the landings from the sea. Protection for the aerial armada was provided by R.A.F. night fighters and, in addition, cannon Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron preceded the transport fleet across the Sicilian coast in order to eliminate searchlights. It was evident that the enemy had been taken by surprise and only slight anti-aircraft fire was encountered. The operations of the Troop Carrier Command in connection with, the subsequent attacks of Allied airborne troops are dealt with chronologically. Bombing on the Night 9/10th July On the night of the airborne assaults bombing attacks were delivered in order to soften resistence generally to our shock troops; as cover to the glider operations; to create a diversion while our airborne troops formed up for the attack, and to prevent enemy reserves being rushed up to the threatened areas. The attacks in the western area were carried out by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers and U.S. medium bombers under the operational control of the North-west African Air Forces. A total of 22 S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores attacked targets at Niscemi, Butera, Ponte Olivo airfield, and eastwards as far as Canicatti, causing many fires, and 25 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons effectively bombed the airfields at Sci~~acEs d~ilp inthewest. Meanwhile, 24 U.S. Mitchells made attacks over a wide area, concentrating mainly on the Piazza area in attacks on Armerina-Caltagirone-Biscari enemy reserves but extended their range to Sciacca in the west and Floridia in the east. Later that night a large force of No. 205 Group Wellingtons (including North-west African Strategic Air Force Wellingtons now under its operational control) attacked targets in the Syracuse area, in order to create a diversion while British airborne troops formed up to assault the town, made a diversionary attack on Catania, and bombed enemy reserve formations. The scale of effort of these important attacks was as follows:- 55 aircraft attacked targets in the Syracuse isthmus, dropping all bombs in the specified areas, and nine successfully attacked the Syracuse' seaplane base; nineteen Wellingtons bombed Catania, scoring hits on the town and the docks, while dummy paratroops were dropped to create confusion; nineteen bombers attacked the enemy's reserves at Canicatti, Caltanissetta, Caltagirone and Palazzolo Acreide; and six more aircraft carried out other specific attacks. The General Officer Commanding 1st Airborne Division later informed the A.O.C. No. 205 Group that although his troops "were not in a position to take immediate advantage of the bombing, Syracuse was easily captured during the following evening largely as a result of it". In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, immediately prior to the landings mentioned in the following paragraphs, eleven R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based Liberators and Halifaxes bombed Avola, Noto and San Paolo, in order to weaken resistance to the Eighth Army's initial attacks. The Landings At 04.00 hours 10th July, British, Canadian and American forces carried out landings all round the south-east coast of Sicily north of Syracuse to west of Licata, supported by Allied naval and air forces. Nearly 2,800 vessels of different sizes took part in this extensive amphibious operation, ranging from the largest battleship to the smallest landing craft, and the sea forces participating included units of the Royal Indian, Netherlands, Polish and Greek Navies in addition to the Anglo-American forces. The adverse winds which had already interfered with our airborne assaults, together with a slight swell, caused delays in the arrivals of some of the smaller vessels, but,' in the main, the landings were executed according to plan. British and Canadian' troops of the Eighth Army landed on three specified beaches between Pozzalo and Cape Murro di Porco, and the American Seventh Army landed at two beaches along the Gulf of Gela. The Eighth Army had as its immediate objective the capture of Pachino land-

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Paratroops emplaning in full operational kit.

ing ground and Syracuse, to be followed by an advance up the east coast to Catania and Messina; the Seventh Army's tasks were first to secure Licata and Gela and then to press on to Caltanissetta, in order to cut the roads leading to the invasion areas. At this initial stage contact was made only with the ill-trained demoralised Italian coastal troops, who offered little resistance. Bridgeheads were quickly established on all beaches and supplies and reinforcements poured in. By 13.30 hours the entire Pachino peninsula was occupied and repairs to the ploughed-up landing ground were under way. By the early evening forward troops of the Eighth Army had crossed the bay of Syracuse and by 21.00 hours the town had fallen intact. The Italians had had no time-or inclination-to carry out demolitions and the majority of the civil population, moreover, proved friendly and willing to cooperate. To the west, the U.S. Seventh Army also made good progress. Licata was speedily captured and an adIvanc was made On Vtt ra.

DAASSIFIED E

Fl
an appreciable number of sorties in protecting landings and unloading at the most westerly point, but, in general, the patrolling of the beaches was the responsibility of the R.A.F. Spitfire squadrons based on Malta and U.S. fighters operating from the satellites Gozo and Pantelleria. As the fighters based on Malta and its satellite airfields were not numerous enough to provide constant patrols for each of the five landings throughout the sixteen hours of daylight the following programme was adhered to:(1) Throughout the hours of daylight fighter cover was given to at least two of the beaches concerned. (2) All landing areas were provided with continuous fighter patrols for the first two hours of daylight; from 10.30 to 12.30 hours; from 16.00 to 17.30 hours, and for the last one and a half hours of daylight. These periods were correctly anticipated as the most likely times for enemy attacks.

(3) A reserve Spitfire Wing was held in readiness to reinforce patrols which required assistance. In the event, these fighters were not called upon for the task and some were employed in escorting U.S. medium bombers in the attacks mentioned in the following sub-section. During the first day of the landings fighters based on Malta and the satellite islands flew a total of 1,092 sorties on beach patrol. The cover provided proved extremely successful. The Allied Navies were prepared for a loss of 300 ships during the day prior to and the actual day of the landings; in the event, up to nightfall of 10th July twelve ships only were successfully attacked from the air. Most of the enemy attacks were delivered against shipping lying off Licata and Gela, where the American troops were being protected by U.S. fighter squadrons. Many of the American ships in the area lay as far as six miles off the beaches and the fighters patrolling over the shipping were thus unable to afford full protection to the beaches and small craft plying between the ships and the shore. Another

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Amphibious craft coming ashore.

fact which militated against 100% fighter protection in all areas was the fact that Naval anti-aircraft guns so frequently engaged our fighter patrols that squadrons were eventually obliged to fly as high as 10,000 to 14,000 feet instead of 5,000 to 8,000, as ordered. During the day of the initial landings Allied fighters based on Malta and the satellite airfields destroyed two JU.88s, one HE.111, and nine enemy fighters, and probably destroyed or damaged fourteen more aircraft; Allied losses through enemy action were eleven Spitfires shot down and missing. No. 324 Group's U.S. Warhawks, operating from North-west Africa, in their patrols over the most westerly point of the landings accounted for another JU.88. Air Attacks While the landings on 10th July were in progress the Allied bombers and fighter-bombers continued their attacks on the enemy's Sicilian airfields, positions and lines of communication. The Gerbini satellites, the enemy's main Sicilian landing grounds, received the heaviest attack, a total of 51 U.S. Fortresses operating against satellites numbers four and five and 28 against number nine. In each case the targets were reported to be well covered with bomb bursts. The enemy's western airfields at Sciacca and Milo (Trapani), meanwhile, were effectively bombed by 71 U.iS. Mitchells. The attacks on enemy targets at Palazzola Acreide were continued by 36 U.S. Mitchells, which encountered no opposition either in the air or from the ground. Further north 24 U.S. Fortresses and 28 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators bombed the marshalling yards at Catania, in order to hinder the reinforcement of. the enemy's main strong points. Explosions followed by huge fires were caused and smoke from the latter was visible for 80 miles on the heavy bombers' return journey. During the day, also, North-west African U.S. A.36s carried out intensive attacks on the enemy's communications and positions. The A. 36, a dive-bomber derived from the P.51 (Mustang) by the addition of bomb racks and dive brakes, had made its appearance in the African theatre of war in June. Although particularly adapted for dive-bombing it was also employed

130

View of the landing from the air.

as a glider-bomber for attacks in broken country; it remained, however, fundamentally a fighter, and the usual formation was the fighter defensive formation of twelve aircraft line abreast. When the assigned targets were well described great success was achieved by the A.36s. It is worth noting that at this stage it carried a greater bomb-load than any other fighter-bomber in use, excluding the P.38 (Lightning). On the 10th the A.36s carried out a total of 169 sorties in bombing and straffing attacks in the Agrigento, Barrafranca, CaJtanissetta, Grwmmichele, and Vallelunga areas. The targets attacked included road junctions, bridges, railways, trains, gun positions and transport vehicles. These attacks greatly assisted the Seventh Army's advance and hindered the movement of Axis troops from the north-west of the island to the invasion area. In addition to the above-mentioned attacks U.S. Lightnings successfully straffed an R.D.F. station in south-west Sicily. Meanwhile, 21 U.S. Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force effectively attacked the Italian airfield at Vibo Valentia, causing numerous fires and scoring direct hits on hangars.
Vdift

The enemy's air opposition to the Allied attacking aircraft. on the 10th was slight, and of the enemy fighters which attempted interception seventeen were shot down. Allied losses were three U.S. Mitchells and two A.36s shot down or missing and a number of other aircraft damthese aged, including eighteen U.S. Mitchells; casualties were believed to be caused entirely by the intense flak encountered. Air Activity Night 10/11th July That night, 10/11th July, U.S. Mitchells, Bostons and Baltimores from North-west Africa operated over the western and central areas of the island: the main target was Milo airfield, but Sciacca, Trapani and the enemy's central lines of communications, particularly at Caltanisseta, also received attention. In, all, 79 U.S. Mitchell and 58 light bomber effective sorties were flown on these attacks. In addition, fourteen Wellingtons attacked the Gerbini landing ground over a period of three to four hours, 205 opposition. No. negligible encountering Group's effort on this night was limited owing to the fact that heavy attacks on Augusta and Catania planned to support further airborne

landings were cancelled due to the postponement of these missions, and the scale of the attack on Gerbini was limited by an accident on a runway. By the evening of 10th July a G.C.I. station had been disembarked and was put into operation during the night. This and G.C.I. stations operating in L.S.Ts (Landing Ships Tanks) proved invaluable in extending the range of the Malta control now that enemy night bombers were beginning to operate against our shipping lying off the south-east coast of Sicily. During the night Malta-based Beaufighters destroyed two JU.88s and one Cant. Z.1007 and probably destroyed a JU.88 in the Augusta and Syracuse areas; intruder Mosquitoes also probably destroyed a JU.88 south-east of Castelvetrano. Bridgeheads Firmly Established On the 11th, with bridgeheads firmly established, our land forces made further advances in the coastal area. Progress was made northwards and westwards from Syracuse along the roads leading to Catania and Caltagirone, respectively, while to the south Avola and Noto fell and the escarpment to the west was occupied. Further south Rosolini, Spaccaforno and Pozzallo were

0 MaIFIED
M

captured and an advance was begun towards Modica and Ragusa. To the west of this area American troops advanced to within two miles of Vittoria, effected some penetration in the Gela area, and accupied the high ground east, north and west of Licata. The resistance offered to all these advances was still feeble. Throughout the day the maxifhum air support was afforded from the North African mainland and Malta. The North-west African heavy bomber effort, carried out by 83 U.S. Fortresses, was again directed against the marshalling yards at Catania. Explosions and huge fires were caused, the smoke from which could be seen for 140 miles on the return journey, and many hits were registered on the warehouses, repair buldings and oil storage installations. The attacks on the Gerbini landing ground were continued by 47 U.S. Marauders and the western airfields at Milo and Sciacca were bombed by 27 U.S. Marauders and 36 U.S. Mitchells, respectively. Nearly 100 U.S. Lightnings were despatched on offensive sweeps and to bomb targets of opportunity in Central Sicily, and an even greater number of A.36s attacked transport columns, trains and airfields, destroying or dam-

Note the open doors in the bows from which vehicles are driven out.
15

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aging 248 vehicles, two locomotives and several grounded aircraft, particularly in the region of San Caterina,Caltanissetta and Porto Empedocle. Fighter escort for the bomber and fighter-bomber formations was provided by a total of 117 aircraft from North-west Africa, and 22 Spitfire sorties from Malta acted as escort to bombers attacking Gerbini. The Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberator attacks were again concentrated against the enemy's air bases in the toe of Italy. Sixty-eight effective sorties were flown against the airfields at Vibo Valentia and Reggio di Calabria and widespread damage to airfield facilities and grounded aircraft was reported. Considerable air opposition was encountered and two enemy fighters were destroyed without loss to the Liberators. Meanwhile, Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks continued their beach patrols, flying 872 sorties. A mixed bag of 28 enemy aircraft were shot down, five probably destroyed and sixteen damaged for the loss of one Spitfire and one Warhawk. During the day, also, 58 Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted by Spitfires, went into action, bombing and straffing enemy transport vehicles on the road between Augusta and Catania.

our forward units in the Gela area. The mission was less successful than its predecessor and out of 144 C.47s despatched 23 failed to return. Difficulty was experienced in following the course through lanes of safe transit which had to be determined in accordance with the operations of the Allied sea and land forces. The unarmed transport aircraft encountered intense flak and were attacked by enemy aircraft; one squadron, in particular, ran foul of anti-aircraft fire from our Naval vessels which were being bombed by enemy aircraft from a high altitude. Capture of Augusta On 12th July Ponte Olivo landing ground to the north-west of Gela was captured; elements of the' Seventh and Eighth Armies made contact in the Ragusa area; the advance westwards from Syracuse went beyond Palazzolo Acreide; and Naval units entered Augusta harbour, which had previously been subjected to bombardment from the sea. The town itself was occupied in the early hours of the 13th, after a Commando raid on the 4 inch coastal defence battery, and port installations were found to be almost intact.
T.,ack onf vehiclpe nreventPd the convevance of

Our main air attacks on Sicily during the night 11/12th July were delivered against air and supply bases in the west of the island. Fortyeight U.S. Mitchells effectively bombed Bo Rizzo airfield ard 30 Wellingtons attacked targets at Trapani, Marsala, and Mazzara de Vallo, causing fires and explosions. The Wellington attacks preceded a naval bombardment scheduled to commence at 01.00 hours and great care had to be taken to be off the target before this began and to keep clear of the Navy's formidable anti-aircraft fire. A further Wellington force of 26 aircraft bombed and machine-gunned hangars and grounded aircraft at Porto Corvino Ravello airfield, near Salerno, at which enemy bombers were based. From Cyrenaica pressure was maintained during the night against the enemy's air bases across the Messina Straits, twelve Liberators and Halifaxes successfully attacking Reggio di Calabria airfield. Malta-based Mosquitoes continued their intruder patrols over the enemy's air bases in northeastern Sicily and southern Italy, shooting down an unidentified aircraft over Crotone. Nignt fighters were also active, shooting down two JU.88s and an HE.111 which were operating against our shipping off the landing beaches. Our land forces were also on the move during the night; in particular, Seventh Army troops occupied the important airfield at Comiso, where repairs were begun immediately by moonlight. The Second Paratrbop Assault On the night of the 11/12th, also, the Troop Carrier Command carried out a further paratroop mission, which aimed at dropping troops of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in front of

the infantry during this period and our troops had to march and fight in extremely hot weather. Heavy air attacks were made during the day on the Messina communications in order to hinder the enemy's reinforcement programme. The North-west African heavy bombers carried out 79 U.S. Fortress sorties against the Messina railway bridges and 72 Cyrenaican-based U.S. Liberators attacked the ferry slips and railway yards at San Giovanni and Reggio di Calabria. In the following days these attacks on the enemy's main supply line were intensified. Gerbini airfield and its satellites received their daily attack, delivered by 36 U.S. Mitchells, and Agrigento and Canicatti were bombed by 27 and 31 U.S. Marauders, respectively. In addition, nearly 1,000 sorties were flown by North-west African-based fighters and fighter-bombers on sweeps and straffing missions against the enemy's rear lines of communications in southern and central Sicily, particularly in the vicinity of Caltanissetta, Enna and Casteltermini. The main air effort from Malta was still directed to the provision of fighter cover for the landing beaches and shipping in the occupied harbours. Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks carried out 897 sorties on these duties and succeeded in shooting down 24 enemy aircraft, probably destroying nine. and damaging a further 21 for the loss of eight Spitfires and one Warhawk. Escorted Kittyhawkbombers, meanwhile, continued their attacks on gun positions and other targets on the SyracuseAugusta road. Good Nights Hunting During the night 12/13th July the Allied air forces kept up their 24 hour bombing programme.

>AVE

ion,1j

Results of bombing at Augusta.

Forty-six U.S. Mitchells attacked Termini docks, with light bombers acting as "path-finders", in order to hinder the enemy's reinforcement and 45 Wellingtons dropped 75 tons of bombs on enemy concentrations at Caltanissettaand Enna; a lesser Wellington effort was directed against the Gerbini landing grounds and light bombers carried out limited attacks on Sciacca landing ground and communications south-east of Palermo. In addition, Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombers attacked the enemy's air bases at Reggio di Calabria and Vibo Valentia in the toe of Italy. The high-light of the night's air activity, however, was the success achieved by Malta-based Beaufighters and Mosquitoes. Operating in clear moonlight the night-fighters had an excellent night's hunting, shooting down five JU.88s, three HE.ills, two Cant. Z.1007s and one DO.217 without loss to themselves. Further Airborne Missions The same night, 12/13th July, two Albemarles dropped a small detachment of the British 1st Airborne Division detailed to attack and harass certain enemy lines of communication and rear areas in north-east Sicily; one Albemarle was lost in the course of this mission. 'A similar mission was attempted on the following night but the pre-arranged ground aids were not visible and the aircraft were obliged to return to base with their task unaccomplished. Establishment of the Air Task Forces in Sicily The success achieved by our land forces in occupying enemy landing grounds and the assistance afforded by the R.A.F. Servicing Commandoes allowed the transference of squadrons to Sicily to commence on 13th July. On that day No. 244 Wing Spitfires (less No. 417 Squadr6n which urin the ft h' fol

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next three days six mo"ir efi A.F. Spitfire squadrons were installed at Comiso and six U.S. fighter squadrons moved in to Licata and Ponte Olivo. Thereafter, the transference of Tactical Air Force squadrons to Sicily in accordance with the Air Plan occurred at regular intervals, and full air support to our advancing land forces was continued without a break. Reduced Enemy Air Resistance The 13th July proved to be the last day on which the enemy put up any effective air resistance in Sicily. His vital coastal radar posts had been lost on invasion day and other key installations were constantly attacked by fighter-bombers from North-west Africa; he now had recourse to spotty coverage only. Fighter control was complicated further by the elimination of established airfields and the occupation of new landing grounds. Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks continued their patrols of the beaches and harbours, carrying out 732 sorties. As the result of numerous combats 24 enemy aircraft were shot down, three probably destroyed and 25 damaged for the loss of one Spitfire. JU.87 dive-bombers again showed their vulnerability to fighter attack ; No. 234 Squadron intercepted twelve unescorted dive-bombers and shot down five of them and damaged the remainder. Malta-based Kittyhawks were also active during the day, carrying out 54 sorties against the enemy's communications between San Michele and Grammichele and at Curlentini and Lentini. Targets attacked from North-west Africa on the 13th included a total of 76 U.S. Fortress sorties against Catania and Milo/Trapani airfields, 23 U.S. Marauder sorties against Carcitelia landing ground, and 108 escorted U.S. Mitchell sorties against enemy positions and communications at Enna. Fighter-bombers, meanwhile, bombed and straffed targets in the Castelvetrano, Termini, Corleone, Caltanissetta and San Caterina areas, where a total of 118 transport vehicles were claimed as destroyed, and six locomotives and 45 railway carriages and trucks were destroyed at Leonforte. As a result of bombing the Gerbini and Catania landing grounds (the latter also having been subjected to bombardment from the sea) were now untenable and the enemy's dwindling air activity was further limited by successful attacks on his air bases at Vibo Valentia and Crotone, in the toe and heel of Italy, by a total of 73 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators. In addition, the trickle of supplies reaching the enemy's Sicilian forces was reduced by a successful shipping strike carried out by Coastal Air Force Beaufighters north-north-east of Palermo, which resulted in the sinking of a merchant vessel and the setting on fire of two escorting destroyers.

Paratroop Mission in the Plain of Catania During the night 13/14th troops of the First British Paratroop Brigade were dropped over the plain of Cataniain order to secure the key bridge at Primosole over the Gornalunga river. One hundred and five C.47s, seven Halifaxes; and 23 Albacores were employed with nineteen gliders in tow, some of which transported Jeeps and sixpounder guns. The parachutists seized the bridge, removed the demolition charges placed there by the enemy, and held their positions till 09.00 hours on the following day when they had to withdraw owing to lack of ammunition. The venture proved a costly one as ten C.47s, one Halifax and three Albacores were lost, but the paratroop mission performed an extremely valuable piece of work. Meanwhile, our air attacks were continued against enemy positions and concentrations, particularly at Enna, by U.S. Mitchells and light bombers and the Wellington force flew over 70 effective sorties in attacks on the marshalling yards at Messina and Palermo. Malta-based Beaufighters and Mosquitoes took their nightly toll of enemy bombers, shooting down five aircraft. The Advance Continued On 14th July patrols of the Eighth Army were in contact with enemy rearguards in the area Chiaramonte-Monterosso. A German counter-attack had a flash-in-the-pan success in the early morning when enemy troops reached the seaplane base at Augusta, but by noon the position had been restored. The German troops which had originally been in western Sicily had now moved eastwards and were concentrated in the northeastern part of the island. On the Seventh Army's front, our troops captured Biscari airfield, Mazzarino and Canicatti. During the day Malta-basedSpitfires made their last considerable effort on beach patrols. The enemy's air resistance by day was now practically negligible; only 40 enemy aircraft were reported airborne and of these the Spitfires shot down four and probably destroyed two more without incurring any loss. Close support was also provided by 34 escorted Kittyhawk-bombers which operated against targets in the Caltagirone ard Lentini areas, where considerable resistance was being offered to our land forces; and 24 U.S. Warhawk-bombers made their first appearance in the Sicilian campaign in bombing enemy transport vehicles near Lentini. Attacks delivered from the North African mainland were chiefly concentrated on Messina, U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders of the Northwest African Air Forces flying a total of 179 sorties and Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators 73 sorties. Large fires and explosions were caused in the vicinity, of the marshalling yards and harbour and a big oil storage tank was blown up. These attacks were followed up that night by

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ten Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bomber sortie As a result of the combined attacks the ferry service now appeared to be in disuse. The key base of Enna, in the centre of the island, was again heavily attacked by 60 U.S. medium bombers, and U.S. fighter-bombers, operating at full intensity, attacked targets of opportunity all over the battlefield, and hindered the intake of supplies into North-east Sicily by attacks on Milazzo docks and barges at Scaletta, south of Messina. The continuous bombing of enemy transport and positions was continued during the night by Bostons and Baltimores; in particular, enemy vehicles on the road south of Villarosa to Enna were successfully attacked from 4,000 to 1,000 feet; Lercara town was bombed, and traffic on the main road to the west was .also attacked. In addition 48 U.S. Mitchells bombed the enemy's important base at Palermo and targets in that area generally. Malta-based Mosquitoes and Beaufighters again had an extremely successful night, shooting down twelve enemy aircraft, including nine JU.88s. The Wellington attacks in the Naples area during the night, which heralded the renewal of the offensive against Italian targets, are considered in the next column. Ground Situation on 15th July On 15th July our land forces re-captured the important Primosole bridge and by the evening we held the general line Primosole-Scordia-Grammichele-Mazzarino-Riesi-Canicatti-Favara-Palma. The whole of the Hyblean plateau, where determined troops might well have fought a delaying action, was now in our hands, and the Eighth Army was beginning to debouch on to the plain of Catania. The German forces had now been reinforced to some extent by parachutists acting in a ground r61e and it was clear that strong opposition could be expected. Enemy Air Resistance Broken in Sicily The enemy's air resistance in Sicily had now been broken. Spitfires, which flew 171 sorties on offensive patrols over the Catania and Gerbini areas on the 15th, did not encounter a single enemy aircraft, and few were seen by fighters escorting our bombers and fighter-bombers. Throughout the day U.S. fighter-bombers continued their attacks on enemy transport and positions, concentrating particularly on hindering the movement of troops across Central Sicily to the threatened areas in the east and south, attacking positions and transport vehicles in the area around Mt. Etna, and enemy vehicles west of Catania. Weight was also given to the attacks in the Catania sector by U.S. Mitchell attacks on the town of Paterno. Meanwhile, the reinforcing of Northwest Sicily was hindered by the bombing of Termini railway station by U.S. A.36s and the straffing of truck convoys in the same area. 19

'ttacks on Enemy Shipping During the first week of the Sicilian campaign the Coastal Air Force scored successes against enemy shipping in Central Mediterranean waters on almost every day. The week's "bag" comprised two merchant ships (of unspecified tonnage) and one 4,000 ton tanker sunk, two merchant ships totalling 12,000 tons probably sunk, and seven vessels damaged (including two transport ships of 9,000 and 12,000 tons, respectively, and a destroyer). The above-mentioned results include successes scored off Sardinia and Corsica in addition to attacks against the main stream of sea traffic off Sicily and the Italian western seaboard. Air Offensive Against Southern Italy While the air attacks were continued at intensity against Sicilian targets the decision was taken to strike increasingly heavy blows against the enemy's rail communications and supply and air bases in Southern Italy in order to prevent the reinforcement of the island and the building up of air resistance. The renewal of the air offensive against the Italian mainland was initiated on the night 14/15th July by No. 205 Group's Wellingtons. The two Neapolitan airfields at Capodichino and Pomigliano were attacked by fifteen and sixteen aircraft, respectively, and many fires caused among buildings and grounded aircraft. A greater effort was directed against Naples docks, where 44 Wellingtons caused considerable destruction in the area west of the harbour, in spite of the enemy's attempt to obscure the target with a smoke screen. A feature of the attack on Capodichino was the dropping of 330,000 leaflets. On the next day, 15th July, the Naples marshalling yards received a shattering blow from 79 U.S. Fortresses, which dropped 212 tons of 1,000 and 500 lb. bombs on their target. Photographs taken after the raid revealed that severe damage was inflicted and much rolling stock was destroyed. In the central part of the yards sixteen trains were hit and practically all the tracks in Other this area were damaged and blocked. damage included the setting on fire of two oil tanks and damage to buildings in the vicinity of the oil refinery. During the same day, Ninth U.S. Air Force 'Liberators carried out 68 effective sorties against -the enemy's important air base at Foggia. The following night, 15/16th July, the Wellington force flew a total of 62 effective sorties against the docks and marshalling yards at Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni, across the Straits of Messina, and the airfields at Reggio, Vibo Valentia and Crotone. In addition 2,308,000 leaflets were dropped in the areas attacked. The attack on Crotone airfield was supplemented, also, by attacks delivered by seven Cyrenaicanbased R.A.F. heavy bombers. On the 16th the attacks across the Messina

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ALASNAME OF PLACE UNDERLINED INDICATES EXISTENCE OF AIRFIELD OR LANDING GROUND.

resses which caused widespread devastation at San Giovanni, particularly in the railway yards and barracks area. One hundred and seventeen U.S. Mitchells and Marauders, meanwhile, concentrated on the airfield at Vibo Valentia. Photographs taken after the attack showed that of 78 aircraft present on the airfield, 50 were destroyed and two damaged. During the night the Wellington force was entrusted with the dropping of the joint Churchill-Roosevelt warning to the Italian people, informing them of the uselessness of continued resistance; 1,720,000 of these leaflets were distributed over Rome and Naples and other towns in Southern Italy. In addition, a total of 59 Wellingtons continued the attacks on the Naples marshalling yards and Capodichino airfield. The following day, 17th July, was a fateful one for Naples. In the morning 71 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators attacked the marshalling yards, and succeeded in placing a heavy concentration of bombs in the target area, causing huge fires and explosions. Two Liberators were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire and considerable air opposition was encountered. The morning attack was followed up in the afternoon by 111 U.S. Fortresses, 108 U.S. Marauders and 72 U.S. Mitchells from North-west Africa. Five hundred and forty-eight tons of bombs were rained on the marshalling yards, shell and torpedo factory, repair and textile plants, and on the Royal Arsenal, where tremendous explosions were caused. Huge fires were started and after the third attack a pall of heavy smoke spreading across the town obscured many parts of the target area. Although intense and heavy flak was encountered only six U.S. Marauders were lost. Enemy fighter opposition during these later attacks was on an extremely limited scale. The intensive effort against Naples on 17th July had a great effect in dislocating the enemy's supply system; an even more far-reaching result was the shattering blow delivered to the sinking Italian morale. Further air attacks on Italian targets are considered on page 22. Fall of Caltagirone and Porto Empedocle While the bombing of the Italian supply and air bases was in progress, our land forces, backed by full air support, were securing fresh objec. tives in every sector, of the Sicilian battlefield. On 16th July, elements of the Eighth Army began to infiltrate across the river Gornalunga and threatened the Gerbini landing grounds. The Germans attempted a counter-attack against our positions at the Primosole bridge, but this proved unsuccessful. Further west, Canadian troops took Caltagirone and pushed along the road in the direction of Piazza Armerina. The following day the Eighth Army extended its Primosole bridgehead north of the river against desperate German resistance, and continued to infiltrate armoured units across the Gornalunga. 21

macca pt n To the west, the ana and Piazza Armerina. All of the enemy's effective forces-that is the German units-were now north of the line Primosole bridge-PiazzaArmerina-San Caterina. The Italians were fighting more half-heartedly than ever and the whole weight of the main defence fell upon the stronger of the Axis brethren. Serra On the Seventh Army's front Pietraperzia, di Falco, Agrigento and Porto Empedocle fell into our hands and a firm line was established north of these points. During the two days under immediate review16th-and 17th July-Spitfires flew 235 sorties on offensive sweeps over the Gerbini and Catania areas in support of the Eighth Army's advance; six enemy aircraft were shot down and two probably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire. Beaufighters and Mosquitoes during the nights 16/17th and 17/18th on interception patrols in eastern Sicily shot down a total of sixteen enemy aircraft without loss to themselves. Fighter-bombers, meanwhile, flew a total of 148 sorties on attacks on Sicilian targets. In particular, the Leonforte marshalling yards, north of Enna, and road convoys at Randazzo, the important supply base and road junction north of Mt. Etna, were bombed by U.S. Lightnings; Kittyhawk-bombers attacked vehicles on the road near Paterno; U.S. Warhawk-bombers attacked the radar station on Ustica island, which provided early warning of raids in the north; and numerous U.S. A.36s attacked targets of opportunity in all sectors, bombing and straffing tanks, trucks, trains, railway stations, and shipping in Termini harbour. Already the air plan for reducing Catania by the systematic bombing of the lines of approach in addition to attacks on the position itself was being implemented. Thus the bomber effort against battlefield targets from the night 15/16th to the night 17/18th July, inclusive, included an attack on the night 15/16th by 46 U.S. Mitchells, aided by Boston flare-droppers, on Randazzo; the bombing of Vulguarnera, north of Piazza Armerina, on the Canadians' front, by 24 U.S. Mitchells on the 16th; an attack on the enemy's Catania positions on the night 16/17th by four Bostons and 30 U.S. Mitchells; an attack on Paterno, west of Catania, by 24 U.S. Mitchells on the 17th; and the bombing of enemy positions west of Catania by 42 U.S. Mitchells and four Bostons, which also acted as illuminators, on the night 17/18th. The Advance in Central Sicily On the Eighth Army's front heavy fighting was continued north of Primosole bridge on the 18th. Our troops continued to operate north of the Gornalunga, however, and by the evening two brigades had crossed the river Simeto. Further west, Raddusa had fallen into our hands. On the following day, 19th July, some.-progress was made .in the area six miles south-west of Catania,

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and ac e a, supported by tanks, aimed at Primosole blidge was beaten off. In addition, the 51st Infantry Division in the face of determined, opposition established two bridgeheads across the Dittaino river three miles south-west and four miles north-west of Gerbini. To the3 west, in spite of considerable resistance an advance was made to within fourteen miles of Enna. On the Seventh Army's front Caltanissetta,Caterina and Aragona were captured on the 18th. The following day an advance was made in the area north-north-west of Caterina,and Mussomeli was reached further west; in the coastal sector the American 82nd Airborne Division reached the area north-west of Montallegro. In the course of the two days, 18th and 19th July, Allied fighters flew a total of 428 sorties on offensive patrols; two ME.109s and two ME. 110s were destroyed and one ME.110 was probably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire; all the interceptions took place in the Catania,Etna, and Riposto areas. In addition, on the morning of the 19th, Spitfires escorting a convoy of three troopships and three destroyers into Augusta prevented four R.E.2001 bombers, escorted by six other RE.2001s, from damaging the vessels and shot six of the enemy aircraft down. Ground straffing and fighter-bomber attacks were carried out by a total of 224 Allied aircraft. The biggest effort was made by U.S. A.36s. On the 18th attacks were concentrated on Adrano, across the Simeto river, on the road leading south-east to Catania; in the Caterina area, in order to aid the attacking troops of the Seventh Army; and on the supply base at Termini, south-east of Palermo. The following day successful attacks were made on trains being loaded at Fondaco. U.S. Warhawks also did good work in bombing railway yards at Alcamo and Castelvetrano, western Sicily, and in attacking warehouses, petrol storage, and trains in the same areas; The main medium bomber effort in Sicily, meanwhile, was directed against the enemy's positions at Catania on the night 18/19th, when attacks were made by 25 U.S. Mitchells, aided by Boston flare-droppers, and on Randazzo, on the 18th and 19th, when 17 American medium bombers bombed the railway and road bridges in order to hinder the enemy's reinforcement of the' Catania sector generally. Air Offensive on Italy Continued Meanwhile, the air offensive against the Axis supply and air bases in Southern Italy was continued at high intensity, On the night 17/18th a total of 62 Wellingtons were detailed to attack the enemy's air bases at Monte Corvino and Pomigliano, in the Salerno and Naples areas respectively,: Cloud and ground haze made identification, of the" targets difficult but bursts in each case were observed across the landing grounds and large fires were started. In addition, 1,401,000 leaflets were dropped in the . target areas.

During the night, also, nine R.A.F. Cyrenaicanbased heavy bombers continued the bombing of Sdn Giovanni across the Messina Straits. In the early hours of the 19th four Wellingtons dropped 864,000 special leaflets entitled "Citizens of Rome," which pointed out in no uncertain fashion the uselessness of Italian resistance and the disaster awaiting the Italian people as a result of their collaboration with the Germans. The Attack on Rome After full consideration of all likely repercussions-military, political and religious-consequent on an air bombardment of Italy's capital, it was decided that the time was now opportune for this long-awaited attack to be made. Crews were carefully briefed for definite military targets only in order that the minimum damage should be done to a city unique for its religious and historical associations, and the popu.lation had been previously warned that an attack was imminent. The blow was delivered on the morning of 19th July by a force of 158 U.S. Fortresses of the North-west African Strategic Air Force and 112 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators. In the afternoon, also, 216 U.S. Mitchells and 105 U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, all of the North-west African Air Force, attacked the Ciampino airfield, south of the city. Although our aircraft were traced to the Rome area by radar and the attack was expected hourly the enemy air opposition was negligible. Not a single American aircraft failed to return from the morning mission and two bombers only were lost in the afternoon attack on Ciampino. Excellent photographic coverage by the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing revealed that all targets were attacked successfully. The Lorenzo railway yards, engine houses and locomotive shops were devastated and large sheds in the main freight dep6t and much track and rolling stock were severely damaged. The Tobonelli steel plant, a large chemical plant, the tram garage and the passenger car depot were all hard hit and damage was inflicted on industrial buildings to the south-west of the target. At the Littorio railway yards about 80 hits were scored along the entire length of the marshalling yards and sidings, including" 50 direct hits on rolling stock and tracks. In addition, the locomotive dep6t and workshops were badly damaged. The Ciampino north airfield was rendered temporarily unserviceable and apart from 24 grounded aircraft destroyed or damaged hits were scored on ammunition dumps, administrative buildings, hangars and barracks. At the south airfield similar damage was done to airfield facilities and at least fourteen aircraft were observed damaged or burnt out. In the city of Rome itself no damage was caused except to a few buildings in the immediate vicinity of the Lorenzo railway yards. Apart from the tremendous blow inflicted on ' communications and air strength the

Lorenzo marshalling yards, Rome, under attack on 19th July, 1943.

23

Assessment of damage at Ciampino North airfield, Rome.

Ammunition dump : two out of three storage sheds damaged, 2. Three buildings damaged and one big shed partly destroyed. 3. Two shed type buildings, one gutted and one 4. d amaged the upper storeys o 4. A direct hit has damaged the upper storeys of the Administrative block. 5. Blast damage to West Hangar. 6. Blast damage to roof of Central Hangar. 7. Roofing stripped and structure damaged of East Hangar. 8. Three direct hits on two-day spre A 2 I 1. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. Barracks severely damaged by two possible direct hits and huts partially destroyed. Three sheds destroyed by fire. One shed destroyed by fire. Crater blocking road; direct hit on light railway; four trucks still burning. still way our trucs Twenty aircraft damaged or burnt out. Small dumps of stores burnt out. There are nearly 600 large, medium or small ters on landing and dispersal areas, not i luding those made by fragmentation bombs.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Repair sheds damaged by fire and 4-5 direct hits. Six-day hangar damaged. Sheds and buildings damaged by two near misses. Two shed type hangars damaged by eight bombs on and between them ; one large aircraft blown in two by direct hit. Small shed damaged. Presumed Recreation Hall damaged by direct hit. Presumed kitchen and Mess Hall damaged by 2-3 near misses. Five other small buildings damaged

7. 8.

Six-day hangar damaged by one or two direct hits. Twelve damaged or destroyed aircraft on landing field or dispersal area. Nearly 200 craters on landing ground or dispersal areas, not including those made by fragmentation

a~~9~aoED

effect on Italian morale was incalculable. The war had been brought to the very heart of Italy and from this time the desire of the people to be unfettered from the cracking German war machine became more and more manifest., Liquidation of Enemy's Sicilian Air Bases Of the few Sicilian airfields still in the enemy's

hands on 19th July all but two-Trapani/Milo and Bocca di Falco, in the north-west of the island-were unserviceable. The only active aircraft were eleven single-engined fighters at Bocca di Falco. Two days later the enemy's air activity from Sicilian bases, which during the campaign had never been particularly active, was definitely dead.

IrI. THE ENEMY'S STAND AT CATANIA

The Occupation of Western Sicily During the fourth week in July the Seventh Army made spectacular progress which resulted in the occupation of the entire western part of Sicily. An advance westwards from Agrigento reached Castelvetrano on 21st July and the western ports of Marsala and Trapani fell like ripe fruit on the 23rd and 24th, respectively. An advance to the north, meanwhile, from positions in Central Sicily resulted in the occupation of Enna on 20th July and Palermo was reached by nightfall on the 22nd. The important base of Enna, in particular, had been attacked by a total of 212 medium, 30 light and 107 fighter-bombers from 10th to 16th July, inclusive, Actually, the Air Plan had envisaged the fall of Catania before Palermo, but the delay in cutting the Central Sicilian roads enabled the enemy to reinforce the Catania sector from the northwest.

and A.36s on the Partinico railway yards and the roads to the north: Meanwhile, U.S. A.36s bombed and straffed troops, vehicles and artillery positions in the Petraliaarea. During the 25th and 26th the American troops re-grouped for a further thrust eastwards. They repulsed an enemy attack eight miles north-west of Nicosia and on the northern coast reached a point eight mileswest of an Stefano In order to soften resistance to this coastal push from the night 19/20th to 26th July light bombers made two night attacks and U.S. A.36s, operating each day, bombed and straffed communications and supply dumps in the San Stefano area and to the east and south-east. By the end of July the Seventh Army had advanced southwards to. Nicosia and eastwards beyond San Stefano. Fierce Fighting on Eighth Army's Front S atania fie f g c d
South of Catania fierce fighting continued

but

The troops opposing the Seventh Army were entirely Italians. These, now convinced beyond all doubt of certain defeat on the battlefield and the further devastation of their homeland, and realising at long last that they were mere pawns in the Nazi game, were only too eager pawns in the Nazi game, were only too eagerto pass into captivity for the rest of the war,
or

in spite of the strongly defended positions held by the enemy in this sector heavy casualties were inflicted on his forces. The Herman Goering division was now holding on while the 15th Armoured Division came eastwards to form up on its right flank. Even heavier fighting, however, took place on avier fighting, however took place on Ev en
t h e c e n t r a l

esthe iii act tei ormslp qieti normal peacetime activities Apart from the hopelessness of the military position Italian morale received another jolt, by the overthrow of Mussolini on, the 25th and the resultant uncertainty which followed the collapse of the Fascist regime, Owing to the nature of the Seventh Army's advance and the absence of enemy air opposition air support on a large scale was not necessary. Some of the most successful attacks in western Sicily during the four days of spectacular advance were made on targets of opportunity by 44 U.S. Warhawks, including 28 carrying bombs, on 20th July. The railway yards at Partinico were attacked and the track was bombed from Alcamo almost to Trapani; in addition, attacks were made on gun positions south of Gastellamare, on ammunition dumps west of Vitta and a radar station on the southern tip of Stagnone island, On this and the following day, successful attacks were also made by a total of 32 U.S. Warhawks

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Canadians made steady headway in the face of determined opposition. On the 21st and 22nd our troops engaged strong elements of the 15th Armoured Division south-west of Agira and in the region of Leonforte. The Germans here were fighting back grimly in order to keep .open the road running eastwards and in the hope of reinforcing the north-eastern stronghold with Italians. Assoro, south-east of Leonforte, fell to the Canadians' assault on 22nd and on the fo'lowing day Leonforte was captured. The enemy's 15th Armoured Division was now forced to withdraw eastwards along the roads through Petralia,Nicosia, Troina and north and east of Leonforte and Nicosia, under cover of heavy artillery fire and flak, to join up with the Herman Goering Division. The German'units suffered heavy casualties on this and the succeeding days at the hands of our land and air forces. Nicosia, ten miles north-east of Leonforte, was captured on the 24th, and in the face of strong

enemy opposition the Canadians, aided by Kittyhawk bomber attacks, pushed on towards Agira which was still in Axis hands. The following day our troops fought their way astride the Agira road but during the evening were forced to withdraw. During the 26th and 27th, however, the,Canadians continued to maintain pressure in the Agira sector, supported by the air attacks on the Regalbuto area mentioned in the following sub-section, and reached positions overlooking Agira on three sides. On the 29th the town was captured. Further south a British force improved its positions on the Dittaino river before Catenanuova, aided by Kittyhawk bomber attacks, and occupied the town on the same day as Agira fell. Air Attacks in the Battle Area Full air support was afforded by our air forces during the period of the stranglehold on the Catania area mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The air plan aimed at the isolation of the main Catania position by the systematic bombing and straffing of every line of reinforcement and approach. The ring formed by Misterbianco, Paterno, Adrano, Regalbuto, Troina, Cesaro, Bronte, Randazzo, Fiumefreddo, Riposto and Acireale were kept under constant attack and the connecting roads were also constantly straffed. Meanwhile, attacks were continued on Catania itself. From the night 19/20th July to the end of the month aircraft under the control of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force flew a total of 84 medium, 705 light and 1,170 fighter-bomber sorties against the targets mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The fighter-bomber attacks on the harbours at Catania, Riposto and Acireale are not included in the above total but are considered in the later sub-section, "Attacks on Sicilian Harbours". The Allied fighters, meanwhile, flew nearly 1,000 sorties on offensive patrols on all sectors of the battlefield but no conclusive engagements with enemy aircraft were reported. The most consistent effort was directed against Randazzo, the important road junction which connected the Axis positions in the north with those on the east coast. During the twelve days under review attacks were made by, 43 medium, 46 light and 178 fighter-bombers on the town, bridges and roads in the vicinity. Perhaps the most successful raid of the series was that carried out by 36 U.IS. Warhawks on 22nd July, when 40 enemy vehicles were claimed as destroyed and 25 damaged. Of almost equal consistency were the attacks delivered on the Troina area by twelve medium, 97 light and 135 fighter-bombers; the bombers concentrated on the town and main road junction, and the fighter-bombers (including 76 U.S. A.36s) attacked targets on the Troina-Randazzo road.

those made on Regalbuto, aof Agira, on the 26th and 27th while the Canadians were making their thrust in the Agira sector. On the 26th R.A.F. and U.S. light bombers flew a total of 212 sorties in attacks on Regalbuto and these were supplemented by 22 Kittyhawk-bomber sorties; considerable damage was done to the town and roads in the vicinity. On the following day the attacks were renewed by 82 more light bombers, These attacks, followed by 82 light bombers and eleven fighter-bomber sorties on Centuripe, further east, on 28th and 31st July materially helped our thrust eastwards from Agira. Catania itself, during the twelve days under consideration, was attacked by a total of 150 U.S. A.36s, U.S. Warhawks, and Kittyhawks; these attacks do not include the bombing of the harbour. Particular attention was paid to the marshalling yards and railway bridges in order to hinder the transportation of supplies and troop movements. Among the other strategic strong points guarding the approaches to the enemy's north-eastern area of resistance, Misterbianco, Adrano, Paterno and Cesaro received the main weight of the air attacks. The attacks on Riposto, on the coast to the north of Catania, are more properly regarded as part of the plan to limit the reinforcing and supplying of the Catania position and are considered later. Allied Forces Re-group for Final Attack The Allied forces, now re-grouping for the final assault, had a formidable task in front of them. In the southern Catania sector the enemy held strongly defended positions which had been improved by wiring and digging and the whole of the Germans' right flank was in difficult mountainous country, easily defended and giving no scope for mobile tank warfare. There were three main roads only in North-eastern Sicily along which large-scale Allied attacks could be developed:- that circling Mt. Etna, the Catania-Messina coast road; and the northern coastal road. The beginning of the end was in sight, but the way was still hard and .hazardous. Attacks on Sicilian Harbours While the air attacks on battlefield targets were in progress constant air attacks were delivered on the few remaining harbours in northeast Sicily still in Axis hands. Such craft as escaped our sea forces, which were operating at times even in the Messina Straits, were often caught in the enemy's Sicilian reinforcing ports, and the damage inflicted on harbour facilities further limited the scanty supplies reaching the enemy's hard-pressed army. The previous heavy air attacks on the Messina ferry terminal and those across the Straits
.

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27

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U S. Mflchells of the N A TA F. on low level bombtng of Sicilian roads.

DEBOlD

had ended the train ferry service, and the enemy had recourse mainly to the employment of small craft such as "F"-boats, Siebel ferries and barges in his attempt to pass supplies across to Messina. During the last twelve days in July 59 U.S. Warhawks and A.36s attacked Messina harbour: the A.36 attacks resulted in damage to a cruiser and two destroyers, and the Warhawks scored near misses on a 400 foot transport and two patrol boats, in addition to the bombing of two barges, two ferries and a steamer with unobserved results. Riposto harbour, to the north of the Catania position, was attacked by a total of 111 U.S. Warhawks and Kittyhawks. Considerable damage was inflicted on the docks and jetties and direct hits were scored on barges and small freighters. Acireale, further south, was also attacked on one occasion by eleven U.S. Warhawks which caused damaged to the harbour facilities. The heaviest attacks, however, were made against Milazzo, at this stage the enemy's busiest harbour. From 24th to 31st July, inclusive, 38 medium, 160 light, and 211 fighter-bombers made attacks on the harbour and 48 fighter-bombers attacked the marshalling yards, the main bridges and roads in the vicinity. Apart from the medium bomber attacks, carried out by U.S. Mitchells, aided by flare-dropping Bostons, the effort was made by day. The bomber attacks resulted in widespread damage to the harbour installations and near misses on a tanker and several small vessels. The fighter-bomber attacks, delivered almost entirely by U.S. A.36s and U.S. Warhawks, resulted in direct hits being scored on two 1,000 ton vessels, a 500 ton vessel, a "large ship" of unreported size and two freighters, in addition to numerous near misses on other shipping in the harbour and damage to the quays and docks. Attacks on Enemy Shipping at Sea During the last week in July, also, aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces flew 106 effective bomber and fighter sorties against enemy shipping at sea. Of the twelve attacks delivered the most successful were those made by Coastal Air Force Beaufighters. A 2,000 ton merchant vessel was sunk and a schooner probably sunk west of Naples on 24th July, and a barge was left ablaze; a 1,500 ton merchant vessel was sunk off the Sardinian coast on the 26th; and on the 29th a merchant vessel of 8,000 tons was probably sunk and a destroyer and an M.T.B. were set on fire north of Licosa Point, the southern extremity of the Gulf of Salerno. Destruction of Air Transport In addition to the attacks on the enemy's seaborne supplies and Sicilian harbours successful blows were also struck at the enemy's air transport force. In particular, on 25th July 33 Spit29

the airfires of No. 322 Wing, operating "f field at Lentini, south of Catania, shot down 21 JU.52s and four escorting ME.109s off Milazzo. Attacks on Italian Communications Continued Simultaneously with the air attacks on the enemy's shipping at sea, air transport and Sicilian harbours, the offensive against Italian bases and communications was maintained at high intensity. Photographic coverage revealed that as a result of the shattering blow to Naples on 17th July, mentioned on page 21, rail traffic through the Naples marshalling yards was still completely stopped. Traffic could by-pass the city, however, through the junctions at Cancello and Caserta. Accordingly heavy attacks were now made on the railway junctions at Salerno, Battipaglia, and Foggia to prevent supplies reaching Southern Italy and Sicily. Concerted attacks were made on all three junctions on 22nd July, when 71 U.S. Fortresses attacked Foggia, 52 U.S. Mitchells attacked Salerno and 48 more U.S. Mitchells bombed Battipaglia. In addition, 39 Wellingtons had previously attacked Salerno on the night 21st/22nd July and 66 more Wellington sorties were flown against this target on the nights 22nd/23rd and 23rd/24th. At Salerno all rail traffic through the junction was stopped and great damage was done to rolling stock. All main lines were destroyed at Battipaglia, and rail traffic through Foggia was also definitely stopped owing to the cutting of the main lines. Rail traffic to Southern Italy was consequently bottle-necked pending repairs. to the three junctions attacked. Additional attacks on southern Italian communications were made by 35 Wellingtons on the night 23rd/24th, when the San Giovanni docks were bombed; by a total of 48 U.S. Mitchells on 24th and 26th July when the marshalling yards at Paola were attacked; and by eleven R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based heavy bombers on the night 20th/21st July when the Reggio di Oalabria railway yards were bombed. In the north, also, a heavy blow was struck at the Bologna marshalling yards by 51 U.S. Fortresses on 24th July. At least seventeen tracks were put out of commission and much devastation was caused to rolling stock by the blowing up of an ammunition train in the north forwarding sidings. Locomotive depots and stores were hit, the through lines east to west were cut in several places, the main line northwards was blocked, and the northern loop line was damaged. The subsequent attacks on Italian bases and communications during the last fortnight of the Sicilian campaign are considered on page 34. Intensive Bombing of Italian Airfields The air attacks, meanwhile, on the series of airfields in Italy were continued unabated.

four main classes according to their locality:airfields in the foot of Italy, in the Naples area, in the Rome area, and those to the north of Rome. In the toe of Italy Vibo Valentia airfield was attacked by eight Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombers on the night 19/20th July and on the following day 71 escorted U.S. Mitchells and Marauders renewed the attack with loads of 20 lb. fragmentation bombs. Crotone, to the northeast, was attacked by 26 Wellingtons on the night 20th/21st and by 72 U.S. Mitchells on the 23rd. Meanwhile, our reconnaissance aircraft reported increasingly large concentrations of single-engined aircraft at Leverano airfield in the heel of Italy. This airfield was accordingly bombed by 69 U.S. Fortresses on 23rd July, when 828 x 500 lb. bombs were dropped plumb on the target. The bombers were attacked by a force of enemy fighters, twelve of which were destroyed without loss incurred by the Fortresses. The airfield was rendered unserviceable and our reconnaissance aircraft on the following day reported that of 38 ME.109s around the perimeter at least eighteen were damaged or burnt out and the remainder must have been damaged owing to their proximity to bomb craters. Grottaglie airfield, also in the heel of Italy, was attacked by 46 U.S. Fortresses on 30th July; apart from the destruction of grounded aircraft the two main hangars were completely gutted. Further north, in the instep of Italy, the landing ground at Scalea had come into use as a single-engined fighter base. This airfield was effectively bombed by 36 escorted U.S. Mitchells on the 27th. The vulnerability of the enemy's landing grounds in the foot of Italy induced him to transfer more and more aircraft further north and during the last week of July there was a noticeable reluctance to replace destroyed and damaged fighters, particularly in the Italian "heel." Attacks on the enemy's airfields in the Naples area included that on Aquino, north-north-west of Naples, on which JU.52s, JU.88s, ME.llOs and single-engined fighters had been seen by reconnaissance aircraft; the important Neapolitan air base at Capodichino, which was used particularly by JU.52s and ME.110/210s; Capua airfield, a JU.52 base; and Monte Corvino airfield, on which single-engined fighters and ME.llOs were based. In all, attacks were delivered by seventeen heavy bombers and 395 medium bombers (including 216 Wellingtons). Some indication of the destruction caused during these raids is given by the evidence of photographic reconnaissance. At Aquino airfield, for example, attacked by 65 Wellingtons on the night 19/20th July considerable damage was done to hangars and administrative buildings, about 100 craters were apparent on the landing area and 36 aircraft were damaged or burnt out on the ground. At Monte Corvino airfield, attacked by 72 U.S. Mitchells on the following afternoon 6 rfuil

aircraft were damaged or destroyed, including thirteen ME.llOs and six large aircraft. In the Rome area, Pratica di Mare airfield, to the south of the city, was attacked on two occasions by a total of 69 Wellingtons and U.S. Mitchells and the airfield at Viterbo, north of Rome, was bombed by 54 U.S. Fortresses on 29th July. In particular, the American medium bombers destroyed or damaged 25 grounded aircraft at Pratica di Mare and the heavy bombbers caused heavy damage to all three hangars at Viterbo and 36 medium and large aircraft were burnt out and six others seriously damaged. To the north of Rome, half way to Pisa, the important air base at Grosetto was attacked by 70 U.S. Fortresses on 21st July: cloud cover prevented an accurate estimate of the damage inflicted but it was evident that at least one ME. 323 and four medium bombers were destroyed on the ground and barracks, repair shops, administrative buildings and a hangar received many direct hits. The intensive air attacks oi the Italian airfields mentioned above, and the subsequent bombing indicated on page 40, further reduced the enemy's declining air resistance and paved the way for the subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland. Negligible Enemy Air Effort The enemy's air effort during the last week in July continued to be on a small scale and, apart from a daylight raid on Palermo and some divebombing at Enna, Agrigento and Sciacca, was made mainly at night. On the night 24/25th July JU.88s attacked Augusta and Syracuse; Beaufighters succeeded in shooting two of the raiders down. On the same night 25 JU. 88s and HE.111s made the first attack on Malta since the beginning of the campaign. Six JU.88s were destroyed-three by Beaufighters and Mosquitoes and three by antiaircraft fire. The enemy's fighter opposition to our intensive air attacks on Italian targets remained negligible. Early Attacks on Evacuation Shipping During the last week in July there were signs of a limited evacuation by sea, particularly from the Catania,Messina, Milazzo and Orlando areas. The merchant vessels, barges, freighters, Siebel ferries, and other small craft employed by the enemy were attacked with considerable success by a total of 226 U.S. A.36s, U.S. Warhawks and Kittyhawks. When the evacuation was in full swing in August the fighter-bomber effort against evacuation shipping was intensified. These later attacks are considered on page 39. Fall of Catania During the first few days of the fourth week of the campaign, Catania, the enemy's main

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A' typical bombing attack on a'Sicilia-n airfield

right up the runway.

31

centre of resistance, showed -signs of becoming untenable. The fall of Catenanuova on 29th July and the capture of Regalbuto four days later threw the enemy back on the road PaternoAdrano-Cesaro-San Fratello while providing our troops with excellent lateral communications. The thrust from Centuripe and Regalbuto towards Adrano now threatened the entire Catania position. On 3rd August preparations for the withdrawal of the Herman Goering Division were reported and two days later, together with Misterbianco to the west of the town, the position was in our hands. Our land forces entered Catania at dawn on 5th August without any enemy opposition, the Commanding Officer of the IEighth Army advanced troops having received a notice typed in English to the effect that "the authorities and functionaries of the city... were awaiting orders". Our troops were met by a seething mob of citizens who expressed delight at the departure of the Germans and begged for food. The intensive air attacks on all approaches to Catania mentioned on page 27 had been con-

tinued in the early days of August and had virtually isolated the position. During the first four days in August, in fact, attacks on targets in the Troina-Randazzo-Paternotriangle exceeded the 250 mark for medium bomber sorties and nearly 400 for light and fighter-bombers, respectively. In particular, heavy attacks were delivered on Adrano in support of the thrust from Regalbuto. Our advance in this area is considered in the following section, IV-"Reduction of the Island". From the beginning of the Sicilian campaign to the fall of Catania the Seventh U.S. Army captured 91,600 prisoners; during the same period the Eighth Army, which had come up against the main resistance, took 28,000 prisoners. Eighth Army casualties (including Canadians) killed, wounded and missing were 9,353 and the Seventh Army's casualties totalled 7,700. With the fall of Catania the enemy's forces were obliged to withdraw to their final bridgehead. The end was now in sight.

Bologna marshalling yards under attack, 24th July, 1943.

'M SbMSTIEO

iEo

British troops entering Catania.

Attack by U.S. Fortresses on Foggia railway communications in progress, 22nd July, 1943.
33.

IV. REDUCTION OF THE ISLAND

Capture of Troina While the enemy was evacuating the Catania position the Seventh Army advanced steadily eastwards along several parallel roads and captured Troina on 6th August. During the first six days in August our air attacks on Troina comprised twelve medium and 130 fighter-bomber sorties in addition to straffing attacks. This air support greatly assisted the Seventh Army's advance. Troina and roads in the vicinity had been predominantly a fighter-bomber target, 265 sorties being made by fighter-bombers from 18th July to the time of its fall as compared with twelve by medium and 97 by light bombers. Fall of Adrano Meanwhile, in the central sector of the Eighth Army's front our troops had captured Paterno and threatened Belpasso. On the 6th further pressure in the central sector resulted in the capture of Biancavilla and by the afternoon our land forces had reached the outskirts of Adrano. The town finally fell in the evening after a determined resistance. As our thrust against Adrano drew ever nearer the air offensive against this most important strong-point was intensified. From 1st to 6th August 129 medium, 223 light and 24 fighterbomber sorties were flown in attacks on the town, troop and gun concentrations, ammunition dumps and. roads in the vicinity as compared with 58 medium, 142 light and 82 fighter-bomber sorties during the last fortnight in July. With the fall of Adrano the German scheme to establish a firm line south of Mount Etna was impossible to fulfil, and a withdrawal in the coastal sector north of Catania became necessary to conform with the right flank which was being pushed back towards Bronte. The enemy's line now ran south-east from the foothills of Mount Etna through Nicolosi to a point on the coast between Catania and Acireale, while to the north-west the line ran through Bronte and Cesaro to San FratelTo. On both the Seventh and Eighth Army fronts, however, the enemy was making full use of mining and demolitions which rendered our advance in the difficult country of north-east Sicily slow and hazardous. Above all, it must be freely admitted that the German units were fighting with the grimmest determination. Air Attacks on Tactical Targets In addition to the air attacks on Adrano and Troina intensive attacks were made during the first six days in August on other tactical targets ii the battlefield and rear areas. Seven attacks were made on north-east Sicilian roads in the course of which nearly 153 tons of bombs were dropped: this total, however, included some attacks in the Troina area, already mentioned, and some in the Messina area which are considered in the following sub-section. One hundred and forty tons of bombs were dropped on targets of opportunity in north-east Sicily including such targets as enemy transport vehicles and encampments. Specific gun positions received a load of nearly 30 tons and the enemy's positions at Bronte, Paterno, Centuripe (on 3rd August only) Randazzo, St. Maria, Francavilla, Cesaro and others points of resistance were subjected to attacks involving the expenditure of a total bomb load of 343 tons. Attacks on Messina, Cape Peloro and Milazzo While the air attacks against battlefield targets were being carried out at full intensity during the first week in August, attacks were renewed on a large scale against the harbour, marshalling yards, bridges, roads and troops at Messina and towards the end of the week against the beaches extending westwards to Cape Peloro. The attacks had a dual aim:-to prevent last-minute supplies reaching the enemy's hardpressed forces and to strike at his main evacuation point. From 1st to 7/8th August,; inclusive, attacks were delivered by a total of 121 U.S. Fortresses, 269 Wellingtons and 225 R.A.F. and U.S. fighterbombers. The heavy bombers concentrated on the town of Messina itself (hitting amongst other objectives the gas works and commercial buildings) and on the cross-roads and highway bridges. The Wellingtons struck first at the marshalling yards and later at targets on the evacuation beach between Messina and Cape Peloro. The main fighter-bomber effort was directed against shipping in the harbour; supplies piled on the docks were destroyed and an appreciable number of small craft were sunk or damaged. Meanwhile, over 200 U.S. Warhawks and Kittyhawks supplemented our Naval operations in the Messina Straits by attacks on small craft already described as "evacuation shipping"; in particular, several Siebel ferries and barges were sunk or set on fire and near misses were scored on numerous other small vessels. Air attacks were also continued on Milazzo. Against the harbour itself attacks were delivered by a total of 24 medium, 23 light and 91 fighter-bombers and additional attacks on the town, marshalling yards and nearby camps were carried out by 34 fighter-bombers. Attacks on Italian Bases and Communications As part- of the plan -to force the enemy to abandon his Sicilian bridgehead attacks were continued on Naples and vital rail communications in Southern Italy. During the first week in August Naples was attacked twice by U.S. Fortresses and on three nights by Wellingtons.

DECU S ED

The American heavy bomber attacks were made on the 1st and 4th of, the month. On the 1st 23 aircraft operated against the docks and 47 concentrated their attacks on the nearby air base at Capodichino. In all, 181 tons of bombs were dropped and both targets were reported to be well covered by bomb bursts. In particular, photographs revealed that at least 29 grounded aircraft were destroyed or damaged at Capodichino. On the second occasion 77 U.S. Fortresses attacked the docks and submarine base, again reporting a good covering of the target. A feature of the Fortress attacks on Naples was the increased enemy fighter opposition. On 1st August the bombers were attacked by approximately 25 German fighters and their escort, consisting of 50 U.S. Lightnings, was engaged by about 35 Italian fighters; seven enemy fighters were destroyed for the loss of one Fortress. During the attack on the 4th the Fortresses claimed the destruction of one ME.109, one MC. 202 and one FW.190 and the probable destruction of eleven other aircraft; two Fortresses were shot down and 49 others were damaged by heavy accurate flak. The Wellington attacks on Naples were aimed at the marshalling yards against which a total of 170 effective sorties were flown; two aircraft only failed to return from these missions. On several occasions some of the aircraft operating acted as "path-finders" and in every raid fires were started which were often accompanied by explosions. These attacks greatly hindered the enemy's attempts to put the marshalling yards in commission again after the heavy July attacks. A feature of the attacks was the dropping of 180,000 "Mothers of Italy" and 1,200,000 "Italiana Soldati" leaflets on the night 6/7th August. Further south railway targets at Battipaglia, Marina Catanzaro and Paola were heavily attacked. By night a total of 147 Wellingtons bombed all three targets and day attacks were made by 135 U.S. medium bombers on Marina Catanzaro and Paola. Particularly heavy damage was inflicted on the railway yards and bridges at Marina iatanzaro, against which 137 effective sorties were flown. From Cyrenaica R.A.F. heavy bombers flew 27 effective sorties against the marshalling yards and railway bridges at Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni in the toe of Italy. The Liberator effort of the Ninth U.S. Force, meanwhile, was directed against the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania: this attack is described elsewhere in the Review. Enemy Air Attacks on Palermo During the first week of August the enemy attempted to hinder our recommissioning of Palermo harbour as a supply-base. In the early hours of the 1st, 25 JU.88s and DO.217s made a successful attack, rendering the best dock temporarily unserviceable;. in addi-

tion, rations and petrol suppli er destroyed, an ammunition train- was blpwn aund a diesel vessel was sunk. The second raid, however, Carried out on the 4th, achieved little success. In the first raid seven enemy aircraft, and in the second four, were destroyed. The Advance Continues On the Eighth Army front our troops followed up the enemy's retreating troops in the coastal sector: Aci Castello fell into our hands on the 7th August and Acireale on the following day. Meanwhile, to the west our seizure of Adrano was exploited for operations northwards, and a decisive threat to the enemy was developed along the Adrano-Bronte-Randazzo road on the heels of the air blitz mentioned below. Bronte was captured on the 8th and on the next day our troops were already several miles on the road to Randazzo, the last road junction connecting the Axis positions in the north with those on the east coast. As our troops approached Randazzo the position was attacked from the air with ever-increasing intensity. On the 7th Randazzo town and its approaches were attacked by 104 U.S. Mitchells, 142 U.;S. Bostons and R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores; intense heavy flak was encountered; two U.S. Mitchells failed to return and many aircraft were damaged. At the same time a small R.A.F. Boston force straddled Maletto, seven miles to the south-west, with bombs. Meanwhile, U.S. A.36s and Warhawks continued to carry out straffing attacks in close support of our land forces and other R.A.F. and U.S. fighterbombers helped them in this activity when returning from bombing Messina. Sea and Air Landings behind Enemy Lines The Seventh Army was also advancing. Before dawn on 8th August units made sea and air landings behind the enemy's lines south-west of Cape Orlando on the north coast and, by establishing themselves on high ground overlooking the coast, now harassed the enemy lines retreating before the advance of the main Seventh Army. The latter had captured San Fratello and Sant' Agata in the coastal sector on the 8th and forces advancing from Troina occupied Cesaro by the evening of the same day. The next morning the latter troops advanced along the Cesaro-Randazzo road and made contact with elements of the Eighth Army moving along the parallel road Bronte - Randazzo. The Seventh Army's advance was materially helped on the 7th by U.S. A.36s and Warhawkbomber sorties on the Agata railway tunnel, gun positions, and road junction to the north-west of the town. On the same day, also, heavy damage was done to artillery emplacements and casualties were inflicted on troops by an U.S. A.36 attack east of Fratello. Further south other A.36s softened resistance to the advance on Cesaro by attacks on roads and enemy transport vehicles. 35

Second Le During troops made another surprise landing east of Cape Orlando. By the following evening contact was established with the land forces at Naso. Air attacks in support of the Seventh Army's advance along the northern coast road were particularly heavy against Patti, to the east of Naso. From 8th to 12th August a total of ten medium, twelve light, and 126 fighter-bomber sorties were flown in attacks on gun positions, the cross roads, a bridge, railway junction, a suspected headquarters and the town itself. The medium and light bomber sorties mentioned above were all flown on 11th and 12th August and during those two days, also, U.S. A.36 attacks were particularly devastating. Further east, from 8th to 12th August, a total of twelve medium, twelve light and 41 fighter-bombers attacked the town of Barcellona and roads and railway in the vicinity. The Allied line now-ran from Naso to within two miles of Randazzo, round Mount Etna and north-eastwards to Riposto, on the east coast. It was clear that the reduction of the island would now be accomplished in a few days. Enemy Resistance Broken A two-pronged attack, meanwhile, had been developed against the key position of Randazzo, units of the Eighth Army approaching the town from Bronte and units of the Seventh Army from Cesaro. The enemy resisted both of the assaults with the utmost obstinacy, but the strain of battle and our intensive air attacks coupled with the absence of reinforcements and air support forced him to give ground and Randazzo was occupied on 13th August. The peak air effort against Randazzo on 7th August, mentioned on page 35, was never approached again, but the attacks were continued at high intensity. From 8th August to the time of its fall U.S. Mitchells flew a total of 190 effective sorties against the positions, and the Allied light bombers and fighter-bombers flew 86 and 44 sorties respectively. Except for a few S.A.A.F. Boston sorties on the night 9/10th August all the attacks were delivered by day and proved most successful, In all, from the beginning of the Sicilian campaign to the final reduction of Randazzo 561 medium, 324 light and 321 fighter-bomber effective sorties were flown against this position. During July the town and roads in. the vicinity were treated primarily as a fighter-bomber target, but in the first fortnight of August, when resistance stiffened in this area, more weight was given to the air attacks by medium and light bombers, which flew nearly 700 effective sorties. Amongst other attacks in the vicinity of Randazzo may be mentioned the attacks by 36 U.S. 'Warhawks on Francavilla, to the north-west, on the 12th which resulted in hits on the road junction and a bridge, thus helping to cut the enemy's retreat northwards,

vance along the East Coast Simultaneously with the attack on Randazzo, Eighth Army troops in the east coast sector, although hindered by mines and demolitions, succeeded in reaching Gioeni and Riposto by the 12th and were advancing beyond Fiumefreddo on the following day. The main bombing support at this stage for the advance along the east coast road was provided on 11th August by 36 U.S. Mitcell sorties in attacks on the railway and road near Fiumefreddo nd 36 R.A.F. Baltimore and U.S. Boston sorties on troop and vehicle concentrations in the same area. Further south on the 12th 23 U.S. Bostons attacked the town of Nunziata. In addition, the rear areas at Scaletta and Gesso were successfully attacked by Allied light and medium bombers. Second Attack on Rome On 13th August, following the dropping of warning leaflets on the city during the previous night by Wellingtons, heavy and medium bombers of the Strategic Air Force revisited the Italian capital. Once again marshalling yards were the main objectives attacked in order to ensure the paralysis of rail communications in Southern and Central Italy. In all, effective sorties were flown by 91 U.S. Fortresses, 66 U.S. Mitchells and 202.U.S. Marauders, which dropped a bomb-load of approximately 500 tons. Escort was provided by 145 U.S. Lightnings. Photographs revealed that the following damage was inflicted in the course of this large-scale raid. At the Lorenzo marshalling yards a large crater was made in the centre of the tracks on the Naples line and much rolling stock was damaged and burnt out. On the eastern perimeter many repair shops and industrial buildings were hit and the sidings were put temporarily out of use. Heavy damage, also, was again inflicted on the Tabonelli manufacturing plant. Damage at the Littorio yards included the blocking of the through lines, the destruction of rolling stock in the reception sidings, and hits on railway buildings and repair shops. At the Rome Littorio airfield, the buildings hit included the airframe and engine repair shops, five hangars and the administrative buildings; fresh craters were made in the eastern part of the landing area and grounded aircraft were destroyed and damaged. Damage to non-industrial and historic buildings was again negligible. Four formations of our bombers were engaged by approximately 75 enemy fighters, but few were aggressive in their attacks, concentrating on the medium bombers and leaving the heavies alone. The American bombers claimed the destruction of two enemy fighters and three "probables" and the escorting U.S. Lightnings reported the shooting down of three more and two "probabies". Two U.S. Marauders failed to return from this mission.

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The other attacks on Italian communications during the last stage of the campaign in Sicily are mentioned below. The Last Phase As a result of the fall of Randazzo on 13th August the enemy was left with only one lateral communication road, that running from Taormina through Francavillaand Novara to the north coast west of Barcellona. Some attempt was now made to hold the road while the tempo of the enemy's evacuation was quickened. On the 15th, however, the enemy withdrew after a token resistance and our troops entered Taormina, Castiglione, Novara and Mazzarra. In the coastal sector the enemy's retreat was accelerated by the threat of an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Scaletta. On the same day elements of the Seventh Army, profiting by the speedy retreat in the north and helped by their third leapfrog landing on the previous night, reached Spadaforo, twelve miles west of Messina. On the evening of 16th August advanced elements of the Seventh Army entered Messina and in the early morning of the following day forward units of the Eighth Army, moving up from Scaletta, also reached the town. An extraordinary feature of the last days of the enemy's withdrawal was the screening of the crack German units by second-class Italian coastal regiments so that the Germans could make good their escape. Organised resistance ceased on 17th August and Sicily was in Allied hands. It was estimated that enemy casualties, killed and wounded, amounted to approximately 32,000 men, of whom 25,000 were Germans. At least 132,000 prisoners were taken (including 125,000 Italians) and many Sicilian troops had donned civilian clothes and returned to their homes. During the last four days of the 'Sicilian campaign practically the entire air effort, as indicated below, was directed against the enemy's evacuation beaches on either side of the Messina Straits and communication targets in Southern Italy. Milazzo was attacked by fighter-bombers, however, until its occupation on the 15th and a total bomb load of 90 tons was dropped on the few remaining roads in Sicily in enemy hands and on targets of opportunity generally. The "Milk Run" to Messina Mention was made on page 34 of the bombing of Messina and attacks on evacuation shipping in the first week of August. During the last ten days of the campaign the attacks on the enemy's Sicilian evacuation beaches and shipping were continued at high intensity. In all, attacks were delivered by 21 heavy, 404 medium, 20 light and 278 fighter-bombers. The heavy bomber sorties were all flown on the 9th when the cross-roads at Messina were bombed; poor visibility, however, prevented the

complete observation of the results achieved. Apart from 35 U.S. Mitchell sorties flown on the 16th August against harbour installations at Messina and troop concentrations at Cape Pelora, all the medium bomber attacks were carried out at night by Wellingtons. Night after night the R.A.F. medium bombers continued to pound the evacuation beaches from south of Messina to west of Cape Pelora and these nightly trips inevitably became known as the "milk run". Innumerable fires among transport vehicles on the roads and beaches and in the villages and camps were started and the widespread havoc and confusion caused greatly hampered the enemy's night evacuation moves. In addition, the Wellingtons dropped considerable numbers of leaflets in the target area. During the last few days of the evacuation the Wellington attacks were switched to the beaches These attacks are across the Messina Straits. considered in the following sub-section. The fighter-bomber attacks in the Messina area, apart from the attacks on evacuation shipping considered later, were carried out mainly by U.S. Warhawks and Kittyhawks and included the bombing and straffing of the railway, bridges, supply dumps, storage buildings and harbour facilities. In particular, from 15th to 17th August, inclusive, the fighter-bombers flew a total of 222 sorties against these targets. Attacks on Italian Communications and Beaches Meanwhile, heavy air attacks were continued against Italian rail and road communication and the reception beaches across the Messina Straits. During the last ten days of the campaign, apart from the devasting attack' on the Rome marshalling yards on 13th August, already considered, the main attacks specifically aimed at railway yards were delivered against those at Terni, north of Rome, Lamezia, in the foot of Italy, Viterbo, north-north-west of Rome, Battipaglia, south-east of Salerno, Sapri in the foot of Italy, and San Giovanni on the Italian side of the Messina Straits. Terni railways yards and industrial area were attacked by 72 U.S. Fortresses on llth August and considerable destruction of rail traffic and damage to jute and wool mills, steel works and barracks was caused. The marshalling yards at Lamezia were most successfully attacked on the nights 13/14th and 14/15th by a total of 42 Wellingtons, which left the whole target area ablaze. On the following two nights the Wellingtons struck further north at the Viterbo marshalling yards, carrying out 76 effective sorties; on each occasion mist rendered the target difficult to locate but the area was well covered with bombs. The attack on Battipaglia marshalling yards was delivered by 36 U.S. Marauders on 17th August and the target area was reported to be "completely blanketted". The marshalling yards at Sapri were effectively bombed on the 15th by 24 U.S. Marauders; many of the 245 coaches present were believed to be

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Photograph taken a few hours after the attack on Istres Le Tube airfield, 17th August, 1943. (1) Roofs of four large hangars slightly damaged. (2) Roofs of two :large workshops slightly damaged. (3) Roofs of barracks damaged. (4) Roof of large hangar damaged. (5) Shed to north-east of workshops damaged by fire. (6) Extensive area covered by fragmentation bomb craters.

destroyed and two oil fires were started with smoke rising to 5,000 feet. Meanwhile, Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombers carried out three night attacks on the railway siding at San Giovanni, flying 39 effective sorties. The most striking attacks on bridges were those delivered against the important railway and road bridges across the Angitola river, which flows into the Gulf of Eufemia. From 7th to 17th August day attacks on these bridges and targets in the area generally were made by a total of 319 U.S. medium bombers. When temporary bridges were constructed to take the place of those destroyed attacks were continued against these also by U.S. and R.A.F. medium bombers operating by day and night, respectively. Traffic across the Angitola river was seriously impeded by these determined attacks and at times was brought to a standstill. An intense air effort, meanwhile, was directed against the many landing points on the western seaboard to which the enemy's small evacution craft made their perilous trip. By day the beaches and harbours were attacked continuously by Allied fighter-bombers and where necessary weight was given to the attacks by U.S. medium and R.A.F., S.A.A.F. and U.S. light bomber sorties. During the last few nights of the campaign, also, the Wellingtons switched their attacks from the Messina-Cape Pelora beaches to landing points across the Straits. Some idea of the day effort may be given by considering the attacks on Palmi. From 9th to 14th a total of 71 effective U.S. Warhawk-bomber sorties were flown against this landing point and barges and warehouses were bombed and straffed. On the 14th 47 U.S. Mitchells and twelve R.A.F. Baltimores dontinued the attacks somewhat inland, concentrating particularly on the road junction to the north-west of the town in order to harass and hinder troop movements. Similar attacks, meanwhile, were going on against landing craft, supply dumps, warehouses and roads at Pizzo, Reggio di Calabria,Scilla, Nicastro, and numerous other points in the foot of Italy. Amongst the attacks delivered specifically against roads, vehicles, bridges and railway communications, as distinct from beaches, may be mentioned 88 U.S. A.36 sorties against "targets of opportunity" in the Gioia Tauro area on the 13th, 14th and 15th; the bombing of roads and vehicles at Piedimonte, north of Naples, by 21 U.S. medium and twelve U.S. Bostons on the 13th; and attacks by 42 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks aimed at supply dumps and railway communications on the Italian south-east and south-west coasts on the 14th. The fighter-bomber effort directed solely against "evacuation shipping" is considered later. The night effort against the Italian beaches was carried out by the Wellington force which switched its effort against the Messina beaches

e Straits on the night 13/14th On that night 23 aircraft found the beaches from San Giovanni to Palmi clearly identifiable in the moonlight and accurate bombing was reported. Twenty-three more Wellingtons concentrated on the beaches in the Pizzo area, further north, dropping bombs around Marina di Valentia harbour and village and on vehicles three miles north-east of Pizzo. The following night the same beaches were attacked; sixteen Wellingtons attacked the San Giovanni to Palmi beaches, 34 bombed the beaches, roads and towns of Palmi, Bagnara and Scilla and nineteen bombed barges at Pizzo and villages to the south. On the night 15/16th 40 Wellingtons successfully attacked the landing points, barges and marshalling yards at Paola, Scalea, Sapri and Cetraro. The following night 40 Wellingtons attacked the beaches from Palmi to Maratea, with railway communications as secondary targets. The weather and visibility were excellent and specific objectives could be selected for attack; eighteen fires were caused over the whole area, including four in the Pizzo marshalling yards. On the night 17/18th attacks on barges, railway communications and bridges were made in the Cape Suvero-Briatico area by 47 Wellingtons and good visibility again greatly aided the selection of targets. Meanwhile, intruder Mosquitoes from Malta carried out night bombing attacks on enemy ports, bases and lines of communications in South and Central Italy, flying 27 effective sorties from 8th to 17th August, inclusive. The Wellington Effort During the closing phase of the :Sicilian campaign No. 205 Group's effort had been steppedup to the maximum intensity so that the beaten enemy was subjected to unslackening round-theclock air attacks. In addition to the magnificent bombing record an interesting feature of the Wellingtons' activity was the dropping of great quantities of "nickels" (leaflets) over a tremendous stretch of enemy territory from Messina in Sicily to Modena, Northern Italy. Owing to the hazardous nature of the medium bombers' attacks, and, in particular, the danger from concentrated flak casualties were inevitable, but considering the scale of the attacks and the damage inflicted these were comparatively slight. Attacks on Evacuation Shipping In addition to the fighter-bomber effort against the enemy's principal evacuation points intensive, attacks were delivered against the enemy's evacuation shipping in transit and off the beaches. From 8th to 17th August, inclusive, a total of 1,170 effective sorties were flown in this activity, almost entirely by Kittyhawks and U,S. Warhawks. In particula, oveh hal f the' hbve
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The majority of the attacks was made on vessels in the Messina Straits, but an appreciable number were carried out on craft along the south-west Italian seaboard. It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the damage and casualties inflicted on the enemy's evacuation craft in the course of these attacks: in many cases results were not fully observed and the harm caused by near misses varied according. to circumstance. The peak effort was reached on 16th August, when twelve light and 191 fighter-bomber effective sorties were flown against shipping crossing the Messina Straits and nineteen fighterbomber sorties against craft off the Italian south-west coast. The following typical reports indicate the nature of the attacks and results achieved. The light bomber sorties mentioned were flown by twelve Baltimores against two 7,000 ton vessels off Messina; the brief report on the bombing stated, "No direct hits but one near miss". The reports of Kittyhawk-bombers "All bombs fell within included the following:30 yards of Siebel ferry; vessel stopped". "Two large 200 foot barges attacked on Palmi beach; direct hit on each". "Direct hits scored on two 100 foot barges, both were destroyed." The following are typical of the U.S. Warhawks' reports:- "Nine near misses scored on two merchant vessels in Messina Straits". "One hit and one near miss scored on large Siebel ferry with troops aboard. Another Siebel ferry boxed by four misses. Four bombs dropped astern barge, which seemed to. stop". "Three near misses on "Two hits seen "F"-boat, believed damaged". among barges; large clouds of smoke only results observed". Headquarters North-west African Air Forces' conservative estimate of casualties inflicted on enemy shipping in the Straits of Messina and off the western Italian seaboard from 8th to 17th August, inclusive, was as follows:- four landing craft, three barges, one Siebel ferry and one "E"-boat sunk; five landing craft, two barges and one "E"-boat probably sunk; and eight barges, seven Siebel ferries, five landing craft, three merchant vessels, two. "E"-boats, two "F"-boats and one tug damaged. Partial Success of Enemy's Evacuation In spite of the rigorous Naval and air action against the enemy's evacuation points and shipping, and the bombing of the enemy's southern Italian rail and road communications, the Germans had considerable success in withdrawing personnel and equipment to the Italian mainland. This was due to many factors. The evacuation was not a last-minute rush job but had been methodically carried out during the last days of July and on a larger scale from 8th August onward. The narrowness of the Messina Straits and the heavy concentration of enemy anti-aircraft and coastal guns made our Naval and air and the ap.aings operations hazarsjclad

proach of our armies to the final Sicilian bridgehead was rendered difficult by the obstacles of the terrain and expert mining and demolitions. Not an inconsiderable factor, also, was the good morale and discipline of the German units concerned. On the other hand, the Germans' ruthless disregard for the safety of those Italian formations which had continued to help them in the struggle fanned into flame the fires of resentment long smouldering against an overbearing and now hated "ally". Offensive Against Enemy Air Bases During the last eleven days of the campaign a heavy offensive was again launched on some of the enemy's key airfields. On the 7th, 8th and 12th August U.S. Mitchells flew a total of 116 effective sorties in attacks on Crotone airfield, at this stage the enemy's most important air base in the toe of Italy. Barracks and the runways were hit and at least twelve grounded fighters were reported as destroyed or damaged. Further north the single-engined fighter base at Grazzanise (near Naples) was attacked on 12th August by 48 U.S. Marauders. An analysis of photographs showed that twelve aircraft were put out of action on the ground and of the landing area only a strip in the centre and to the south-east remained free of bomb craters. A feature of the attack was the opposition put up by 24 to 30 enemy fighters which took off from Capua airfield and made their attacks prior to the bomb run. Some "air to air" bombing was unsuccessfully attempted and seven of the attacking aircraft were destroyed, On the 16th came Foggia's turn for another full-scale attack; this time the blow was delivered from Cyrenaica by 85 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators. The whole surface of the landing ground at San Nicola was well covered with bursts and at Tortorellaoil fires were started and bursts were observed in the dispersal areas. Enemy fighters, estimated at 75 to 100 strong, attacked the Liberators which claimed to have destroyed 45 aircraft (including 29 M.E.109s) and probably destroyed seven others. Eight of the heavy bombers failed to return. First Attacks on Airfields in Southern France The following day, 17th August, U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force made their first attack on the enemy's main South of France airfields, where long-range bombers and torpedobombers were based. In addition, the airfields were packed with transport aircraft and gliders as this area was a base for paratroop formations. One hundred and forty-four sorties were flown against the Istres airfields (comprising 92 sorties against Le Tube airfield and 52 against the Les Patis and Group I airfields) and 38 sorties against the nearby Salon airfield. Strike photographs showed that a total of at least 94 air-

craft were destroyed on the ground and about 28 others damaged. Reconnaissance photographs taken after the attacks revealed that all the hangars in the north group of landing grounds at Istres were damaged and two hangars and fourteen large workshops in the south group were severely damaged and administrative buildings were hit at Salon. At both the Istres and Salon airfields the landing areas were well covered with craters caused by fragmentation bombs. Enemy Air Attacks During the last week of the campaign enemy air attacks on our Central Mediterranean shipping were on an increased scale and four of our merchant ships were damaged. Bizerta was raided on four nights, including a large-scale attack on the night 17/18th when 75 long-range bombers operated over the port. Beaufighters of the Coastal Air Force intercepted the bombers and destroyed two JU.88s and one H.E.111. On the following night the attack was renewed by over 60 bombers; on this occasion the Beaufighters shot down two HE.1ls and damaged another. The long-range bombers which made the attack on Bizerta were apparently based at airfields in the South of France. Accordingly, as mentioned in the preceding sub-section, attacks' were delivered on the landing grounds concerned at Istres and Salon. Protection of Shipping and Harbours Reference has already been made on page 9 to the intensive air effort directed to the protection of Allied convoys and harbours in the nine days immediately before the invasion of Sicily. During the campaign itself the effort required for carrying out these tasks was still on a necessarily high scale. From 10th July to 17th August, inclusive, fighter aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces flew a total of 6,572 sorties on the protection of shipping in the Central Mediterranean and Middle East fighters during the same period flew 2,613 sorties over convoys in the Eastern Mediterranean. This air cover ensured practically complete immunity from enemy air attacks on our shipping in transit. Full fighter defence was also provided for our harbours and land lines of communication. The enemy's effort against the Middle East harbours continued to be negligible, but, as already mentioned, attacks were periodically made on the Central Mediterranean harbours in Allied hands. Some of the high lights of the North-west African and Malta-based night-fighters' activity in countering the threat of the enemy's long-range bombers have already beep indicated. The submarine menace was most effectively kept in check, the Allied Naval co-operation aircraft helping and supplementing the work of our sea forces. From 10th July to 17th August the 41

Middle East Naval co-operartioi squadrons (including Malta) flew a total of 1,421 sorties on close cover anti-submarine protection and area patrols and those of the Coastal Air Force carried out 1,238 sorties on these activities. Maltabased Wellingtons damaged two submarines at night east of Catania in the middle of July and by day two Hurricanes of No. 336 (Hellenic) Squadron scored strikes on a surfaced submarine off Sidi Barrani. In Central Mediterranean waters aircraft of the Coastal Air Force during the first half of August sank one submarine and probably sank another. A number of other submarines were attacked during the period under review but as is most often the case in submarine attacks definite results were not observed. The lack of success attending the enemy's U-boat warfare during this period is shown by the fact that only seven merchant ships of an appreciable size were sunk in the whole of the Mediterranean during the months of July and August by submarine action. The air/sea rescue effort is indicated in the table on page 53. In previous issues of the Review accounts have been given of the Middle East's activity in this interesting and most valuable work and the Coastal Air Force's air/sea rescue effort will be considered in a subsequent number. Air Reconnaissance The success of our air attacks in the Central Mediterranean theatre of war could not have been achieved without the necessary "spade work" of the reconnaissance squadrons based in North-west Africa and Malta. Tactical reconnaissance Spitfires and strategic reconnaissance U.S. Mustangs, photographic reconnaissance aircraft and sea reconnaissance Wellingtons, Baltimores and Marauders all played a vital part in spot-lighting every aspect of enemy activity. Tables indicating the scale of the reconnaissance effort are given on page 45. Comparative Aircraft Casualties In the course of the operations 1st July to 17th August, inclusive, the Allied air forces destroyed over 740 enemy aircraft in combat. The total Allied losses through enemy action, in spite of an immeasurably greater effort, were roughly 50% of the enemy total. In addition, the havoc caused by our air attacks on the enemy's Sicilian airfields is indicated by -the fact that enemy aircraft of operational types left abandoned in varying degrees of unserviceability .exceeded the 1,100 mark. A breakdown by types showed that German casualties amounted to 57% of this total. The most prevalent types found abandoned were ME.109s (280 aircraft), MC.202s (100), ]C.200s (85), JU.88s (80), FW. 190s (70), and S.79s (44). The types abandoned also pointed to the increased use of the ME.210 and a lesser employment of the ME.110; 29 of the Sun and only fourteen of the lati

S\ter. The limited use of the HE.129 "tank buster", pointing to its ineffectiveness, was illustrated by the fact that only one specimen was found in the whole of the island, and the decline of the JU.87 dive-bomber, the scourge of the skies in the early German campaigns, was shown by the paltry figure of eight only left abandoned. The Air Factor The Sicilian campaign was in many respects a model one-a strongly held island was completely occupied in the space of five and a half weeks, due to the successful combined operations of sea, land and air forces. The pattern of the Allied air activity in connection with the Sicilian campaign may be summarised as follows:(1) The reduction of enemy air resistance prior to the assault by the methodical bombardment of his airfields. (2) The limiting of supplies reaching the enemy's land and air forces by constant attacks on his supply lines and shipping.

(3) (4) (5)

(6)

(7) (8)

The protection of our shipping before, during and after the assault. The transportation of airborne assault troops. A concentrated effort against the enemy's lines of comunication to prevent the speedy transfer of reinforcements to threatened areas. The isolation of centres of enemy resistance by tactical bombing and straffing before the advance of our land forces. The effort against the enemy's evacuation movements. The switching of the strategic bombing effort to the enemy's next series of airfields, bases, and supply lines in preparation for the subsequent advance into Italy.

A well-thought-out plan had been ably executed: the battle could now be carried still further into Hitler's Europe.

e sina wharves at conclusion of the campaign.

Minw

I~*Lo

DIARY OF THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

Page Preparatory Measures, etc. 5 Reduction of Pantelleria and smaller islands. against SStrategic bombing programme the enemy's Central Mediterranean "build up" mid May to end of June, 1943. 6 Preparation of Malta as offensive base. SMain features of Air Plan. 7 Air reconnaissance arrangements. , Role of air transport. SRelative air strengths. 8 The opposing land forces. , Pre-invasion blitz on Sicilian airfields. 9 Reduced effort against enemy bases and communications. Pre-invasion shipping protection. I. II. 10 The Assault Page Air attacks continued against Enna, Catania and Palermo night 13/14th July. ,Eighth Army patrols in contact with enemy rear guards in Chiaramonte-Monterosoarea 14th July. counter-attack in Augusta area ,German repulsed 14th July. ,German forces complete move from western Sicily to south-east of the island 14th July. 19 Air attacks on Enna continued 14th and night 14/15th July. ,Air attacks on Palermo 14/15th July. of Malta-based Mosquitoes and ,Success Beaufighters night 14/15th July. ,Eighth Army recapture Primosole bridge 15th July. Allied armies' line on evening of 15th July ran:- Primosole - Scordia - Grammichele - Mazzarino - Riese - Canicatti .-- Favora - Palma. ,Enemy air resistance in Sicily broken 15th July. Fighter-bomber attacks continued on enemy's central Sicilian communications and Catania position 15th July. , .A.A.F. successes against enemy shipping during first week of Sicilian campaign. ,Air offensive against Southern Italian rail communications and supply and air bases night 14/15th July to 17th July, inclusive. 21 Elements of Eighth Army infiltrate across the river Gornalunga 16th July. against Eighth German counter-attack Army's positions at Primosole bridge fails 16th July. capture Caltagirone 16th July. ,Canadians Canadians occupy Rammacca and Piazza Armerina 17th July. ,Seventh Army capture Pietraperzia, Serra di Falco, Agrigento and Porto Empedocle 17th July. ,Spitfire sweeps over Gerbini and Catania area 16th and 17th July. and Mosquitoes shoot down ,Beaufighters sixteen enemy aircraft over eastern Sicily on the nights 16/17th and 17/18th July. .Air attacks on Randazzo, Paterno, Valguarneraand Catania16th to night 17/18th July, inclusive. SAir attacks on air bases in Naples and Salerno areas 17/18th July. Capture of Raddusa 18th July. 22 Air attacks on Adrano 18th July. ,Seventh Army capture Caltanissetta,Caterina and Aragona 18th July. counter-attack against Primosole ,German bridge position beaten off 19th July. ,Eighth Army establish bridgeheads across the Dittaino river 19th July- - : 18

The airborne assaults night 9/10th July. ,Bombing on the night 9/10th July. The landings 10th July. 12 Beach fighter patrols 10th July. 13 Air attacks on enemy's Sicilian airfields, positions and lines of communications, 10th and night 10/llth July. 15 The Eighth and Seventh Armys' initial advance. Allied air activity on 11th and night 11/12th July. Seventh Army capture Comiso airfield night 11/12th July. Second paratroop assault night 11/12th July. Naval units enter Augusta 12th July. Air attacks on Messina communications, 12th July. Air attacks on enemy communications and positions in southern and central Sicily 12th July. Malta-based . aircraft successes against enemy air forces over the beaches 12th July. 17 Air effort against Termini docks and concentrations at Enna and Caltanissettanight 12/13th July. Success of Malta-based Mosquitoes and Beaufighters night 12/13th July. Third airborne mission night 12/13th July. ,Early establishment of Task Air Forces in Sicily. 18 Reduced enemy air resistance in Sicily 13th July. Success of Malta-based fighters on beach patrols 13th July. Air attacks on Catania and Milo/Trapani airfields and enemy positions, etc. at Enna 13th July. Beaufighters' success against enemy shipping off Palermo 13th July. SFourth paratroop mission night 13th July.

Page 22 American airborne troops reach area northwest of Montallegro. Spitfire patrols 18th and 19th July over battle area. ,, Intensive U.S. A.36 attacks on battlefield targets 18th and 19th July. Air attacks on Randazzo 18th and 19th July. 26 First air attack on Rome 19th July. SEnemy's Sicilian airfields virtually liquidated by 19th July. II. The Enemy's Stand at Catania

I~

Northern advance of Seventh Army resulted in capture of Enna on 20th July. . Summary of air effort against Enna. SWestern advance of Seventh Army reached Castelvetrano on 21st July. ,Seventh Army reach Palermo 22nd July. Canadians capture Assoro 22nd July. 29 Heavy/air attacks on railway junctions at Foggia, Salerno and Battipaglia22nd July. 26 Seventh Army's westward drive resulted in capture of Marsala on 23rd and Trapani on 24th July. Canadians capture Leonforte 23rd July. 29 Heavy air attack on Bologna marshalling yards. ,, Spitfires destroy 21 JU.52s south of Catania 25th July. 27 Canadians capture Agira 29th July. Eighth Army capture Catenanuova 29th July. Fullest air support which aimed at isolation of the Catania position night 19/20th to 31st July. 29 Heavy air attacks on Italian airfields night 19/20th July to 30th July. 27 Air attacks on enemy's Sicilian harbours 19th to 31st July. 29- Successful air attacks on enemy shipping during last week in July. 30 Air attacks on limited evacuation shipping during last week in July. Enemy evacuates Catania 5th August. 32 Air attacks on Troina-Randazzo-Paterno triangle 1st to 4th August. 26 IV. 34 Reduction of the Island

Seventh Army capture Troina 6th August. ,Air effort against Troina. , Eighth Army occupy Adrano 6th August. ,Air effort against Adrano. Enemy's line on 6th August ran south-east from foothills of Mount Etna through Nicolosi to the coast between Catania and Acireae; to the north-west from Mount Etna the line ran through Bronte and Cesaro to San Fratello. eCapelo rop Air attacks on Messina, Milaozq during firstWeek in August j

Page 34 Heavy air attacks on Italian bases and communications during" first week in August. 35 Eighth Army in east coast sector capture Aci Castello on 7th and Acireale on 8th August. Eighth Army advance along Adrano-Bronte-Randazzo road. Heavy air attack on Randazzo 7th August. Eighth Army capture Bronte 8th August. Units of Seventh Army's leapfrog landing . behind enemy's lines south-west of Cape Orlando before dawn on 8th August. ,Main forces of Seventh Army capture San Fratello, Sant' Agata on north coast and advancing from Troina occupy Cesaro on 8th August. 36 Units of Seventh Army make another surprise landing east of Cape Orlando on night 11/12th August. ., Air attacks on Patti and Barcellona 8th to 12th August. Allied line on 12th August ran from Naso to within two miles of Randazzo, round Mount Etna and north-eastwards to Riposto on the east coast. Eighth Army troops in east coast sector capture Gioine and Gesso on 12th August. STwo-pronged attack on Randazzo by units of Eighth Army approaching from Bronte and units of Seventh Army from Cesaro led to fall of the position on 13th August. Air effort against Randazzo. Second air attack on Rome. 37 Third leapfrog landing by Seventh Army troops on north coast night 14/15th August. Fall of Taormina, Castiglione, Novara and Mazzara 15th August. Commando landing in the Scaletta area on night 15/16th August. .On the evening of 16th August advanced elements of Seventh Army reached Messina. On 17th August forward units of Eighth , Army entered Messina. Air effort against the Sicilian evacuation beaches during the last ten days of the campaign. Air effort against the Italian reception , beaches and lines of communication during the last ten days of the campaign. 39 Air attacks on enemy's evacuation craft during last ten days of the campaign. 40 Air offensive against enemy's air bases in Italy during last eleven days of campaign. ,, Attacks on airfields in south of France 17th August. 41 Air protection of shipping and harbours during the campaign. ,, Importance of air reconnaissance during the campaign. , Pattern of Allied air activity during the campaign.

4,-k

RECONNAISSANCE BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (3/4 July
-

28 August, 1943)

Tactical and Strategical

Ke

ey N.A.A.F. and MALTA

MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

Tac/R.

Strat/R.

TOTALS

3/4 -17

July....................167 -47 1/8-3Juy370 Jl.......................

264

431
47

1281 ... -67 1488 75 352 -85

1651 67 1750 75 582 85

171 -3

31 July/i Aug

14 Aug. ........

...........

262

14/15

28 Aug...................

....

180

GRAND TOTALS.................979

838,6 274

4364
.274

Mediterranean Submarine (area and ,close cover searches)

FORNIGHTLY PERIODS

Anti-shipping

TOTALS

3/4

-17

July...................191 37

509 514 509 10 487 383 11 372 393 17 426

700 551 838 497 582 383 568 443

17/18

31 July.....................329

31 July/i Aug.

14 Aug...................199

14/15

28 Aug......................175

GRAND TOTALS..................894 75

1794 1799 -

2688 1874

45

F.R

ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED BOMBER AND MINELAYING AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH=WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (3/4 July -I

28 August, 1943)

Key

:K

MALTA N.A.A.A.F. MIDDLE EAST

PORTS, BASES and LINES OF COMMUNICATION (including minelaying) FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

0 -

AIRFIELDS and LANDING GROUNDS

-IIL

ENEMY CAMPS and POSITIONS FORTNIGHTLY TOTALS

0 H 0 H

I,

.0

S 0

0 H

514 459

748

541 3

1813 462

521 454

1817 1 390

3 3

2731 457

292

1348

2403 3

6947 922

277 /18
31 July ...

456

174

394 25

1301 173

256 28

983

17 4

1256 32

2007
1

3178 1

5735 206

145

436 I

876

23

1543 39

2878 296

47

259

1989

1117

2040

5146

8283 296

31 July/1 Aug. -

14 Aug......

250

340 14/15 28 Aug ............ 294

1542 5

88

1009 20

2979 319

396 101

550 102

47 1

985

1642

5171 422

1567 GRAND TOTALS .. 1148

~

3622 12

295 3

3487 87

8971 1250

1220 583

3166

390

4796 591
_ Ir i, I

3373 1
I

2616

6380 1112369

86136 1846

Il

--

II -

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (3/4th July 28th August, 1943) Key: S.A.A.F. and MALTA MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

3/4 -

17 July ...

31 July

Aug. -

14 Aug.

28 Aug .

........
i .-

RECONNAISSANCE NORTH-WEST

OF THE

MEDITERRANEAN

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT

OF

THE

AFRICAN AIR FORCES,

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July

28 August, 1943)

KeyKy:)MIDDLE : N.A.A.F. andMALTA EAST

Submarine FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping (area and close cover) TOTALS

191

509. 514

700 551

3/4

17 July

................
37

329 17/18 31 July..... 10

509 487 11

838

497,

199 31 July/1 Aug. 14 August ............

11

383
3732 (

582
383

175 14/15 -

393

568

28 Aug............

17

426

11

443

894 GRAND TOTALS ......

1794

2688

75

1799

1874

SORTIES FLOWN BY AIRCRAFT IN

ON

PROTECTION

OF FRIENDLY

SHIPPING

THE MEDITERRANEAN

(3/4 July

28 August, 1943)

By aircraft

of the N.A.A.F.

and MALTA

......

:...................

10,767

By aircraft

of the MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

4,382 4,382

ti

4I

EFFECTIVE SORTIES-;AGAINST ,SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN
(
,,,i
-

THE MEDITERRANEAN

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED

AIR
l

FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

Attacks on Shipping
a k onS b ri e

(3/4

July

28

A ugust,

1943)

K ey

Aittacks on Submarines
At

{J

NUMBERS OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES

FORTNIGHTLY
PERIODS

HEAVY

MEDIUM

LIGHT

F/BOMBER

TOTALS

N.A.A.F.
and

N.A..F. Middle

ad

East

and ad

Middle

N.A.A.F.
and and

East

Middle East

N.A.A.F
and an

Middle

N.A.A.F
and ad

Middle

East

East

Malta

Malta

Malta

Malta

Malta

91 3/4 17 July ...................

-

2
-

117
-

208
10

2
1

210
11

3
3
-

1 3 1
-

154
.

1.3

157 6

20
1

177 7

17/18

31 July .....................

2 31 July/i August 14 August......

102
3

5 2 i

104

10
2

114

11

13

19 14/15 28 August ..

67

86

14

100

......

115
4y

20
-;;

2
2

440
3

24
2 1

555
27

46
4 1)

601
31

GRAND TOTALS ...............

2

~4*
-. 4'

P.

RESULTS OF ATTACKS (BY EFFECTIVE SO] BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE (3/4 July 38 August, 1943)

iR

S AT SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA Key: Shipping

Submarines

RESULTS OF ATTACKS FROM N.AFRICA/LEVANT/MALTA

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

n
o

3/4 -

17 July ...

17/18 -

31 July

31 July/1 Aug. -

14 Aug.

14/15 -

28 Aug.

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING (BY TYPES OF VESSEL) AND SUBMARINES

AT

SEA

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (3/4 July 28 August, 1943) ey N.A.A.F. and MALTA y MIDDLE EAST

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN

L) AIR FORCES,

bUR BY R.A.F. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

COMMAND ANI

MALTA

(3/4 July -

28 August, 1943)

SKey: jN.A.A.F.
TYPE OF VESSEL Sunk

and MALTA MIDDLE EAST

IProbably Sunk
-

Damaged

Results Unknown

TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS

Merchant

Vessels...............
--

24
1 7

33 6
1

60 14
1

Tankers

1
1
-

Trawlers........

............

1
1

2
1

Coasters and Freighters

9
1 -

.16

1 5 15

"F"-Boats .

Siebel Ferries

and

T.L.C..........

9.

16

36

65

Barges and Tugs ...............

26

12

40
1

53
--

131
1

Schooners and Sailing Vessels

...

1 2
9

24
19 6

12 9
19 2

14 40 47
8

Miscellaneous and Unidentified ...

NAVAL

VESSELS

Battleships
-

Cruisers

1
1

1 1 1

Destroyers.

...........

Submarines
-

Minelayers and M.T.Bs

....

.......

2
2

"E"-Boats

2
1

Escort Vessels, etc..............

2
2

10 2

TOTALS.

-n'a DUi

41

29
Aft

amw7 N, zp nu

IE

Em am_

I
JD
1

127
45

176

373

17

70

11

tU

AIR/SEA

RESCUE

OPERATIONS

IN

THE

MEDITERRANEAN

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED

AIRCRAFT

OF THE

NORTH-WEST

AFRICAN

AIR FORCES,

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA (3/4 July 28 August, 1943)

Total number of personnel rescued during this period:I.

143.
-I ---

and N.A.A.F.

MALTA

Ke:MIDDLE EAST
I

Number
FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS
-----------------------

of

Sorties
--------. ; ---

Effective location of aircrew or wreckage

--------------------------

Bomber
~-ea;s~ ------------

Fighter
~----

TOTALS
! ~clo--~er~l ( l~c~

Rescues (1 or more persons)

-------- --- ------~~..

Wreckage,

empty dinghy, etc.

--I--------

TOTALS
IIC-i-~~

230

287 23

6*

17
3

3/4

17 July ...
;3 "% IL "ifi:L r ii

d78

187

31 July

247 78

58

22 8

...

17
107

154

11

21

31 July/i Aug. -

14 A ug.
22

59

5
II:-

226

324

37
j"

14/15 -

28 August 2
I-

22

4
bl~kP~ L U~

1~1
L...I

~~

-~r~cmp-. II~ C3 ZI~I~^

~hl~

~ ~

-~Wl~

~---

i~l~

~/

~--~.--~~Y ~
l

1_S 1--------.

262

750

1012

44
-

97

GRAND TOTALS
141
I I -

41
-

182
--

4*
--

20

* Includes co-operation with H.S.L. in aircraft on search.

certain cases.

In

addition certain of these

rescues were effected

by Naval vessels directed to scene

by

RECONNAISSANCE

BY R.A.F.

GARRISON

AIRCRAFT 1943)

BASED ON MALTA

(3/4 July -

28 August,

LAND AND HARBOUR

FORTNIGHTLY

PERIODS

LAND

HARBOUR

TOTALS

3/4 -

17 July ..

...................

..

49

59

108

17/18 -

31 July...

..

..........

".......45

56

101

31 July/i

Aug.

--

14 Aug. .............

43

53

96

14/15

28 Aug.......

..........

...

44

42

86

GRAND

TOTALS..............181

210

391

In

addition to the above, 93 sorties were flown on Special Tasks.

EASTERN

AND CENTRAL

MEDITERRANEAN

Submarine FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping

(area TOTALS

and close cover searches)

3/4

17 July.........................48

17

65

17/18 -

31 July..............

.......

39

96

135

31 July/i

Aug. -

14 Aug.

............

23

83

106

14/15

28

Aug......................

28

74

102

GRAND

TOTALS

408

ra

ATTACKS ON LAND

TARGETS

BY R.A.F. BOMBER AND (3/4 July -

MINE-LAYING

AIRCRAFT

GARRISONING

MALTA

28 August, 1943)

PORTS, BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (including Mine-laying) FORTNIGHTLY

AIRFIELDS and LANDING GROUNDS

ENEMY CAMPS and POSITIONS FORTm

NIGHTLY TOTALS

PERIODS

,c

4,

.6~
I--I 1------9 -

w
Il---II-

~H

H 0
--i -

-I-

NO 0

3/4-17 17/18 .31 14/15 July/l -

July............... 31 Aug. 28 Aug. July. -

; --

14

...
14 Aug......................

......-

14
25 26

14

29
29

___________ . ___________ - I -

29
-

...-

29
_____________________

GRAND
-'-1:-:~ --,r

TOTALS.......

72

OPERATIONS OVER LAND

AND

SEA

BY R.A.F.

FIGHTER AND (3/4 July -

FIGHTER-BOMBER

GARRISON

AIRCRAFT BASED

ON MALTA

PIT,
28 August, 1943)
I:.~ ;~c ~~ s

Local-Defence
L-' ~

Ground

FORTIGHTLY PERIODS

i:~-~l"~.j

(including Niht Fighters and cover, to retng offensive Recce.)

attackS & T/E

Ground 'AttackF/Bomber

Offensive

Oei
Recce.

(including
Cannon)

Land and Sea

Intruder Patrol

Bomber

Bomber and Recce. Escort

AntiShipping

Shipping

TOTALS

Protection

3~i~ -

3/4 -17July... 17/18 31 July Aug.-14

.............. ........ ... ......

..

90 213 181

45 19 15 5

712 193 35 10

53 32 14 27

481 21 -

1 9 o 1

180 65 80 97

1562 566 358 360

14 25 26

Lo-LII_-ll;.rli..i-1

31J
-"a i I-i 1--;-,--;-.-;

uly/1

August
... ...

14/15-28

August

194

GRAND

TOTALS

...

...

678

84

65

950

126

502

19

422

2846

EFFECTIVE SORTIES AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. GARRISON

AT SEA IN

THE EASTERN AND ON MALTA

AIRCRAFIT BASED

(3/4 July -

28 August, 1943) :Attacks on Submarines

Attacks

on Shipping

For results of attacks on enemy shipping and submarines see TABLE on page 57.

DR

I5

RESULTS

OF ATTACKS (BY EFFECTIVE SORTIES) AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES

AT SEA IN THE

EASTERN

AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. GARRISON AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA (3/4 July
--

28 August,

1943)

Ke

IKy

Attacks on Submarines Attacks on Shipping

RESULTS OF ATTACKS
FORTNIGHTLY Effective_________.

PERIODS

Sorties

Sn or Beached Probably Sunk Damaged Results Unknown TOTALS

23/4
-

-2

17 July.... ...

9 17/18
-

-2

8
1

10
3

31 July ...
5

10 31. July/i Aug. -14 Aug.

1
-

5
-

17
-

14/15

.28 August..

--

26 GRAND TOTALS

1 6

-,2 -,

10

9 1,3

20

Q
!AR/SSA
CORFu

~'LEM

NOS

CEVAPE CAAL

*XWALK
EURIPOCHANNEL

00

CEflLOIAAKEm~h

IO

%
C//J*AHENUS

DVzNC~iTAAZUAD0
QEA.

ANkO

SAMO
ITWS KAPJA

4WOS

KYTI1NOS 9

4n
O

SYRDS

MKONOS NAQ
4 AMORLOS TA TiIERA
APIE SAP 'ShRJNAA

ON

lA

N
IINz

EIPHOS

PAO
NTIPARO0S d'4

KALE

AaMEOS
Q

K~o 17 ?

O PHOL WEs

zv lowAL pwl

ANTIKYTHERA

Air Operations In The Aegean

JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER,

_ ___I_
I

1943

COMPARED WITH MORE portentous events further west, the operations carried out this year by the Middle East Command in the Aegean and Ionian Seas seem relatively insignificant. Yet, when the reason for them is understood, they have an important bearing on the war in the Mediterranean area as a whole. As the enemy lost the initiative after the VIIIth Army's advance from Alamein in October, 1942, retention of some foothold on the northern side of the Mediterranean became increasingly necessary to him if he were to keep the back-door to Nazi Europe - Greece and the Balkans - shut. German strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean was accordingly based on a strong "outer ring" of defence consisting of Crete, Scarpanto and Rhodes. Retention of these strategically vital islands, with their air and sea bases, denied us the possibility of single-engined fighter cover over the Aegean and thus rendered a landing on the mainland behind them impracticable. Behind this "outer ring", in order to keep the lines of communication open, the enemy maintained a number of smaller island outposts in the Aegean. Garrison duty was, until the collapse of Italy, largely in the hands of the Italians. Nevertheless, by September, 1943, the Germans had some 35,000 troops in Crete, 7,000 in Rhodes and 4 - 5,000 scattered around the other islands and were strong enough to seize complete control within a few days after Italy had signed the Armistice. This, however, is anticipating events, but it is necessary to indicate the importance placed by Germany on the Aegean situation and the preparations that had been made to meet trouble in that quarter. Even towards the end of 1942 the increase in shipping around Greece, bringing extra stocks of food, fuel and ammunition from Italy, showed that action by us was anticipated. The ships used were mainly small - seldom more than three or four thousand tons - and for plying between Greece and the island outposts the enemy still had a large fleet of caiques, schooners, trawlers and barges. First Patrols by Marauders Our policy was to cause the maximum dislocation of this sea-borne traffic as a preliminary to possible future offensive activity against the "outer ring." Plans were accordingly laid by

No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group. By the end of 1942, as the tide of war had receded from Egypt, many of the Group's units had been transferred to Malta, where they could operate more easily against Axis convoys bound for North-west Africa. Since our own convoys, however, had to be protected, certain units or detachments - reconnaissance, twin-engined fighters and torpedobombers continued to be based in Egypt. Among them was a recently arrived Marauder squadron and these aircraft flew the first few tentative offensive reconnaissance patrols in the Aegean. A single Marauder, armed with a torpedo, made the actual debut three days after Christmas, but bad weather forced it to return before any sightings were made. The next patrol was on the last day of the year, when two Marauders saw a few small craft south of Antikythera Island. No attacks materialised, however, until New Year's Day. Two Marauders, on an offensive sweep, made a machine-gun attack on a stationary three-masted sailing vessel west of Lesbos, with unobserved results, and later scored hits on a trawler or drifter of 3/400 tons further to the south. Altogether during January Marauders flew 31 sorties - 29 in the Aegean and two in the Ionian Sea. Twenty sightings were made, normally of small craft. Seven torpedo attacks followed, but only one vessel - of 750 tons - was claimed as sunk. iines were also laid on three occasions by Marauders and Wellingtons in the Euripo Channel, between Euboea and the mainland. Enemy Counter-Measures The effect of these attacks went beyond the damage done to actual shipping. The possibility of attack at any moment and in any quarter forced the enemy to give his ships more protection, both by air and surface craft, and the threat to the island outposts themselves necessitated additional defensive fighter effort. No. 201 Group continued its activity throughout February, and by now various sections of the Aegean area had been selected and numbered for future reference when briefing armed reconnaissances. Suitable prey, however, was still hard to find. In sixteen sorties Marauders made five sightings, but in no case was the vessel large enough to warrant a torpedo.

*"2*

p --

More substantial results came from a daylight attack on the harbour at Melos Island by six bomber and three torpedo Marauders on 21st February. Two vessels of-1,500 tons each were hit by torpedoes, one sinking and the other being left ablaze. Other activity in February consisted of further mine-laying in the Euripo Channel and the taking of many valuable photographs. At the end of February the Marauder squadron was transferred to North-west Africa, so was no longer available for strikes in the Aegean. In March, although striking forces of Beaufighters were at readiness, no suitable targets were found by reconnaissance. Successful Beaufighter Strikes In April, in spite of the increasing number of friendly convoys moving through the Eastern Mediterranean - 122 convoys were given protection as against 94 during March - offensive activity was resumed in the Aegean and along the west coast of Greece.

The transfer of the Marauders was balanced by the arrival of an extra Beaufighter squadron. These aircraft and, occasionally, Baltimores operated by day, and torpedo Wellingtons joined in the hunt by night. The Wellingtons and the Baltimores were unlucky, but the Beaufighters carried out cannon and machine-gun attacks on five occasions. On the 24th they set a 120 tons schooner on fire; on the 26th one caique was seen to go down and another was left on fire and sinking; and next day a 125 tons caique was left smoking and abandoned by its crew. These successes, however, were insignificant compared with the records of May and June. In May there was again an increase in the number of convoys that had to be given protection - a total of 133 - but as many aircraft as possible were spared for harassing the enemy in the Aegean. Under the threat of invasion, the enemy naturally strove to reinforce and supply his garrisons at all vulnerable points and, consequently, sea traffic increased by leaps and bounds all round Greece.

CAIQUES

200 TONS

LARGE MERCHANT VESSEL Note prominent derricks and several hatches

500FT-9,000

TONS

GERMAN "F"

BOAT 156 FT-SPEED 8 KNOTS Note parallel sides, downwards slope of topsides and wheelhouse aft

SMALL MERCHANT VESSEL Note"reduced number of hatches

61 -

LINER-TROOP TRANSPORT 450 FT-7,000 Note full superstructure and large number of boats carried Taking full advantage of this, No. 201 Group's aircraft put up 183 sorties on offensive sweeps. The Wellingtons were unable to find suitable targets for torpedoes, but the Beaufighters and Baltimores made up for this by their successes. Of the steam ships sighted, five were attacked. One 800 tons merchant vessel was sunk; another of the same size was left with its deck cargo of hay on fire; a small steamer of 150 tons was sunk and another of 250 damaged with cannon shells; and finally a mine-sweeper was hit and set alight. Of the smaller fry, 50 sailing vessels totalling 4,500 tons were attacked and hit with cannon or machine-gun fire; fourteen totalling 1,120 tons were sunk and 36 totalling 3,385 tons were damaged. During these operations Beaufighters also shot down seven enemy aircraft that attempted to

TONS

interfere with them and damaged another. Two Beaufighters were lost and a third was damaged and had to land in Turkey. Two Attacks on Submarines Other operations in May included two attacks on submarines by aircraft returning from Aegean patrols and an attack on the seaplane base at the west coast of Greece between Preveza, Corfu and Cephalonia. The first submarine attack occurred on the 7th when one was sighted on the surface by three Baltimores. The submarine immediately crashdived and only one Baltimore was able to bomb, dropping two x 250 pounders from 200 feet, which overshot by 50 yards as the periscope was submerging. On the 25th an Italian submarine was seen by two returning Beaufighters. Cannon hits

4n

NAVAL AUXILIARY

iED

200FT-800

TONS

DESTROYER

350 FT-1,900 Note, older types often have two or three funnels

TONS

were scored before it could submerge and a second attack was made while it was at periscope depth. An oil patch observed next day in approximately the same position suggests that damage may have been done to oil tanks or pipes. The first attack on the Preveza seaplane base was planned for the 16th after photographic reconnaissance had shown that normally some fifteeen seaplanes were moored there or drawn up on the beach. Six Beaufighters were briefed, but were foiled by thick clouds. Nine days later, however, another six Beaufighters were more fortunate and found fourteen seaplanes and flying boats waiting for them. Their cannon fire destroyed a Cant.501 and two Cant.506s, set on fire and probably destroyed another Cant.506, and badly damaged five more. A fuel dump on shore was also hit and set alight. On the night of the

26/27th a Wellington, briefed to attack the seaplane base, was unable to locate, so dropped six x 100 lb. bombs on the slipways, with unobserved results. The Levkas Canal Blocked In June activity around Greece was again considerable - 144 sorties being flown - although successes were not up to the May standard, The Wellingtons at night once more drew a blank, but by day Beaufighters and Baltimores sank sixteen sailing vessels totalling 1,840 tons, probably sank two and claimed a further 29; damaged. They made seven attacks on larger vessels, but had only one definite result - although this was a good one. On the 27th four Beaufighters caught a passenger-type vessel of 3,800 tons passing through the Levkas Canal, dividing the island of

COASTER 200-250FT-1,000 Note derricks and hatches, and bridge amidships or just forward of engine room

TONS i

nDECLAS-+ r
U+t-l +,+t+ 1

ra~6 Eta~

TONS 500 FT-1,000 LARGE TANKER or hatches, prominent catwalk and ventilation boxes Note, usually engines aft; no derricks Levkas from the west coast of Greece. They scored two direct hits amidships with 250 lb. bombs as well as a number of near misses and also straffed the. vessel with cannon fire. Smoke was seen to be rising from it as they left and subsequent reconnaissance showed it aground and listing 45 degrees to port, blocking the northern entrance to the canal. One Beaufighter struck the ship's aerial with its port bomb-rack and took nine feet of the wire back to base. The first assignment in July - on the 1st was to try to do more damage to the helpless vessel. Two Beaufighters were briefed and aimed four bombs at the target. They straddled it with two of them, while the others fell 25 - 30 yards short. Later in the day four more Beaufighters carried out another offensive sweep over the canal, their objective being a number of dredgers that were working there. All the aircraft attacked the largest dredger, of 250 - 300 tons, two bombs scoring very near misses and two overshooting by about ten yards. This dredger and a smaller one of some 125 tons were also straffed with cannon and machine-gun fire. One Beaufighter failed to return and another, hit by A.A. fire, made a belly-landing at base. On the nights of 13/14th and 14/15th July three Wellingtons made further attempts to finish the vessel off. On the first occasion each dropped eleven x 250 lb. bombs, but results were unobserved. One crew reported coloured lights seen along the coast - possibly the work of patriotsas being a useful navigational aid. On the following night one of the Wellingtons dropped its bombs from only 50 feet and explo-

ITALIAN "'E" BOAT Note u

FT-SPEED 42 KNOTS s amidships

A tug leaving Preveza harbour attacked by Beaufighters, 22nd August, 1943. A coaster of 1/2,000 tons attacked by cannon fire, 22nd August, 1943.

A merchant vessel of 1/2,000 tons under attack by Beaufighters south of Preveza.

A minelayer or patrol vessel under attack in Syros (Kyklades) harbour.

sions were seen in the target area, although the vessel was obscured by smoke. The other two aircraft bombed from 4,500 - 5,000 feet, with unknown results. At the end of the month salvage work appeared to have ceased - and the canal remained blocked. Wellingtons Find Targets In general in July Wellingtons, Baltimores and Beaufighters continued the aggressive policy in the Aegean, although commitments in connection with friendly convoys made it impossible to keep up the scale of the two previous months. In all, 86 sorties were put up on offensive reconnaissance. In this month the Wellingtons came into their own at last. Apart from the Levkas Canal operations described above, they found suitable targets on three other occasions. On the night of 24/25th four Wellingtons sighted a single vessel on a northerly course east of the island of Nisero, between Cos and Rhodes. One aircraft dropped its torpedoes and a second attack was made with bombs, both with unknown results. At Alimnia anchorage, just off Rhodes, two merchant vessels of 1,000 and 2,000 tons were also attacked and near misses scored. On the following night two Wellingtons, on a sweep in the Rhodes - Leros area, bombed a merchant vessel, escorted by three destroyers. The first stick of five bombs was aimed at the merchant vessel, with unobserved results, and the second stick of six scored near misses across the stern of one of the destroyers. On the 28/29th three Wellingtons made a return visit to Alimnia harbour, where shipping had been attacked the previous day by four Beaufighters. Two merchant vessels, of 3,000 and 2,500 tons, were present, and two of the Beaufighters had scored direct hits with four bombs on the- smaller vessel, leaving it listing and emitting smoke and flames, while the other two scored cannon and machine-gun strikes on the larger vessel. The first Wellington lit up the two ships with flares and then dropped six x 500 lb. bombs from 4,500 feet, causing a column of smoke to issue from the port side of the larger vessel. The other two aircraft each dropped eleven x 250 Ib. bombs from 1,200 feet, straddling the targets. SThe most successful Beaufighter strikes, apart from the attack on Alimnia mentioned above, were against the lesser craft, A Titano-type vessel was left listing to port and shrouded in smoke on the 27th; on the 29th four near misses were scored on a 250 tons schooner, which was also raked with cannon and machine-gun fire; and next day two Beaufighters, returning from a sweep in the Alimnia area-where they had seen the 2,500 tons vessel, attacked on the 28th, lying almost completely submerged in the anchorage-caught a 500 tons tug-type vessel and set it alight with cannon and machine-gun fire. In addition, during the month seven sailing vessels totalling 705 tons were claimed as sunk, one of 67

250 tons probably sunk, and fourteen totalling 1,100 tons damaged. Apart from the shipping strikes in the Aegean and off the west coast of Greece, No. 201 Group's aircraft also turned their attention to a number of land targets. These included a train hidden in a clump of trees (one of the Beaufighters returned to base festooned with fir branches); a bridge carrying a railway track; A.A. and machine-gun posts; cars and trucks; and Kalamata airfield in the south of Greece. For the special operation carried out by A.H.Q., A.D.E.M., over Crete on 23rd July, No. 201 Group provided eight Baltimores and seven Beaufighters, of which six Baltimores failed to return to base. Trouble with Bombs Towards the end of July began the first of a series of claims of bombs failing to explode that grew into something of an epidemic in August. On the first occasion Beaufighters claimed a direct hit with a 250 lb. bomb on the bows of a 110 tons schooner anchored in Kyllene, on the west coast of Greece opposite the island of Zante. The bomb apparently did not explode, although others were seen to burst on the shore. Reports of other failures of both 250 and 500 pounders were brought back by Beaufighters aid Wellingtons on 5th, 7th, 11th, 11/12th, 14/15th and 15th August. These reports were investigated by the Armament Section of H.Q., R.A.F., M.E., and the failures were attributed mainly to the fact that in most cases direct hits had not been made on the ships attacked and that bombs had not exploded on hitting the sea owing to the low height from which they were dropped; or if they did strike the target, they had not had time to stabilise and consequently glanced off. The trouble practically ceased after the middle of the month. In spite of these bomb troubles, Beaufighters and Wellingtons had a comparatively satisfactory month, flying, with occasional Baltimores, a total of 202 sorties. Wellingtons found only a few targets worthy of torpedoes, the most successful attack taking place on the night of the 12/13th. One aircraft of two engaged on an anti-shipping sweep aimed a torpedo at a 2,000 tons merchant vessel west-south-west of Melos Island. A hit was scored on the port side, causing a cloud of steam and smoke. Beaufighters on the 5th scored numerous cannon hits on a 300 tons trawler anchored by the quayside at Preveza; near misses with bombs and hits with cannon on a corvette-type vessel near Githion, in the Gulf of Laconia, on the 8th; completely destroyed an 80 tons caique in Paros Bay on the 12th with a bomb that burst five yards away; bombed the landing ground and harbour at Kalamata on the 15th; claimed a bomb hit on the stern of a 500 tons coaster in Vonitsa Bay, Preveza, on the 18th; and on the 30th scored near r isses with bombs and strikes with cannon on a 2,500 tons merchant vessel off Levkas.

*a

*B'i-

i~i~

".

During the Preveza attack on the 5th, one Beaufighter's fuselage struck the forward mast of the trawler and snapped off several feet. The aircraft made base safely, but others were not so fortunate in the later part of the month. On the 19th a Beaufighter, believed hit by A.A., crashlanded near Missolonghi, on the west coast of Greece; two were missing from sweeps on the 22nd; one was shot down next day by intense A.A. fire during an attack on Zante harbour; on the 28th another, with engine trouble, came down in the sea off Cyprus, the crew being rescued; and, finally, in the Levkas attack on the 30th one Beaufighter was caught by A.A. fire and crashed in the sea.

o Occupy Aegean Islands In September came an elaboration of our aggressive policy in the Aegean. After the seizing of control at Rhodes by the Germans following the Allied Armistice with Italy, it was decided to occupy the Aegean islands of Castelrosso, Cos,. Leros and Samos. Cos, with its landing ground, and Leros, with its harbour, could then be used as bases on which to build up a force capable of seriously threatening communications with Rhodes and other German-held outpost and, eventuall, as possible springboards for more am tually, as possible springboards for more ambitious undertakings. Castelrosso would be a useful intermediate supply base and Samos a valuable

This

an attack on two M/Vs

... Direct hits were scored from low level in face of strong anti-aircraftfire.
advanced outpost. The three services were to cooperate in these operations. In the early part of the month R.A.F. activity in the Aegean and Ionian Seas continued normally. On the 2nd one of four Beaufighters, attacking shipping anchored off Cos, struck the mast of a caique and crashed into the sea. Four other Beaufighters on the same day caused explosions and fires among a group of 30 M.T., which they found parked on a road near Preveza, and also scored a bomb hit amidships on a 1,500 tons merchant vessel outside the harbour there. On the 7th three Baltimores seriously damaged an 80 tons caique with bombs and machineguln . fire off Naxos Island. On the 11th a single Baltimore, on reconnaissance for shipping off Crete, claimed one hit and two near misses on a 300 tons vessel unloading its cargo off Gavdos Island, leaving it on fire and down at the stern. Later on the same day, in connection with the invasion of Cos and Leros, a short series of diversionary bombing attacks began against Rhodes airfields. Shortly after dusk five Beaufighters visited Maritza airfield, but owing to the darkness no enemy aircraft could be seen and the Beaufighters had to be content with bombing and machine-gunning the hangars. Shortly afterwards four Wellingtons attacked Calato airfield, starting':many fires in the dispersal area. Next day a more shatteriing a1 k on the two airfields took place. Forty-three .T.S.A.F. Liberators were briefed, of which five -returned early.

69

fires, burbd si lf Twenty-three bombed Mart W s 1 covered by bursts. Fires were started ith persal area and about six aircraft were reckoned to have been destroyed on the ground. In all, the Liberators dropped 340 x 500 lb. bombs between 10.16 and 10.25 hours. On the 13th the first British troops landed in Cos. The operations that took place between then and 3rd October are, however, outside the scope of this article and will be dealt with in the next issue of the Mediterranean Review. The Period in Retrospect Roughly nine months had now passed since the beginning of our operations in the Aegean and Ionian Sea areas. What had been accomplished? Was the effort worth while? On examination, it becomes clear from the record of those nine months that the effort was worth while. This is proved by the number and

tonnage of ships sunk and damaged alone-163 ships with a tonnage of approximately 53,580 tons. But the value of the operations went beyond mere figures, taking in such subsidiary factors that the enemy had to maintain a large defensive air force in the Aegean, and, eventually, to augment it in face of the threat of our landings; that outlying garrisons had to be reinforced by troops that would have been useful in the main theatres of activity; and that a continuous state of tension was caused among the Germans forming the garrisons. The importance placed by Germany on our unwelcome intrusions is shown by the energetic measures taken to seize Italian-held islands when Italy signed the Armistice and when, a few day later, it was learned that our troops were in Cos and Leros. At the end of September Germany's "outer ring" still stood intact. Nine months' effort by No. 201 Group's aircraft had not, however, made the position of the garrisons manning it any more enviable - and offensive operations in the Aegean still continued.

. iiliii :iiiiiiii ; i :iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii *.'":::::i::"::ii.uiii)iii.i/:>. l: iit : i:iiii ii iiiiilii:

:::::: ::::-::: :.:i:::::::::_::::iiiiiiii::i " ::::: iiiliiriiliiiiijiijiiiiliiiil ...

Siiiiiiiiiiiilili~ililiiiijiiiiiiiiii

i ::: ' $iiiiiiiiiiir~i :::

::::::::::::::::::::

' i:::::::: i'''

:. -::.

.............. s:.:: : i : . .: ' .. .:::

::::::::::::::::::::: :?iliiii}iii ii ::: '" '" :::::::::::: :::::: ::::: i :::::: : ::
:: , : i::: i " [

..... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::

:i::::::::i~i::::::::::.

::.

::::::: ::::: ::i:::::::::::::

GERMAN SIEBEL FERRYiiiiiiiiiii ::,iiiiliis i5z54iii FTl.

GERMAN "E" BOAT SPEED 36 KNOTS 90-1i 1O FT Note straight sides, square stern and torpedo tubes forward.

GERMAN SIEDEL FERRY 75x54 FT.

Note twin pontoons joined by flat platform, with central deckhouse

70

PARTICULARS OF SHIPPING SUNK OR DAMAGED IN THE AEGEAN BY R.A.F. AIRCRAFT 1 Jan. 30 Sept., 1943
-I I

Shipping at Sea ey: Key:Shipping in Harbour

-II -

TYPE OF VESSEL
I

Sunk or Beached

Probably Sunk
i

Damaged
~I

TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS, etc. M .Vs. ... .... ... ... ... 11 3

"F"-Boats and Barges ...

2 59 75 1 2 1 1

Schooners and Trawler

..

..

...

Coasters

.....

...

Tugs

...

...

...

...

o...

...

.. o

...

...

NAVAL VESSELS. Destroyers ... .................. 1 1 ... ... ... 1

M .T.Bs

...

...

...

...

"E"-Boats ...

...

..

..

..

......

...
1

1 1 3 75 88

Escort Vessels (unspecified)

.........

GRAND TOTALS

11 '15

42 69

Approximative Tonnage Combined Totals

Sunk

...

...

...

...

...

.....

...

3385 1185 16800 3050

4570

Probably Sunk

........

19850

Damaged

...

...

..

..

...

...

..

110 11040 38305 158275

29160

GRAND TOTALS

53580

il~bAIR
TRVDLA

OPERATIONS

AGAINST SARDINA

_D

LAAUSANIA

SHO

DOWN.N/RDJUY

MITCHELLS~3

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Q-

6ATUAI

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30HJULY.

ENOMYAIRCRAFT

DESETEBR

ATAKA2FED3DSETME1 ATAKRAA TK S ENWE ST AATIONS AIRFIELD~L N

WAHAWS

SW 'GTHRb

OVE
3RD JULY

2NL/AN

SM. OPS

RECORDS.

H.Q,

k7

Air

Against Sardinia And Corsica

perans
JULY TO OCTOBER, 1943
ed the enemy to remove his long-range bomber force, which had been amassed for attacks on our ports at Bone, Djidjelli and Oran, to safer bases in Southern Italy. The attacks on Sardinia from February to June, inclusive, seriously impeded the provisioning of the island, dislocated to some extent the railway communications, and greatly reduced the enemy's air strength. The following account covers our air effort during the closing stages of the enemy's occupation of both Sardinia and Corsica, from 3rd July to 4th October. Reduced Bomber Effort The heaviest bombing of Sardinian targets during the period under review occurred on 3rd July, when concerted attacks were made on some of the enemy's main airfields. These attacks, however, should be considered as the finale of the May and June effort and constituted the last big "crack" at Sardinian airfields before the more pressing commitments of the Sicilian campaign and subsequent invasion of Italy demanded the almost exclusive attention of the Allied and enemy air forces alike. On the 3rd, U.S. Fortresses flew 38 sorties against Chilivani airfield; U.S. Mitchells flew 68 and 36 sorties against the airfields at Milis and Alghero, respectively; and 25 U.S. Marauders attacked Capoterra airfield. The estimate of the damage caused was not so precise as for previous attacks because haze prevented the taking of photographs suitable for interpretation. Results were unobserved in the Chilivani raid but considerable damage appeared to be inflicted on the other three airfields attacked and strike photographs taken over Milis showed that of 43 aircraft present on the ground two medium bombers and four single-engined aircraft were destroyed. A Mitchell and a Marauder failed to return from these missions, but on the asset side Mitchells reported the shooting down of five enemy fighters over Alghero. Two nights later came Villacidro airfield's turn for a visit from seven Wellingtons and the attack was renewed the next night, 5/6th July, by eighteen more R.A.F. medium bombers; on each occasion the target seemed to be well covered by bomb bursts.

A GLANCE AT the map is enough to indicate the strategic value of Sardinia to the enemy in the Mediterranean. From the air aspect, in particular, it provided good bases for the operation of torpedo-bombers against our Central Mediterranean shipping and for aircraft engaged in protecting enemy shipping en route to Tunisia. After the loss of Tunisia, Sardinian airfields were used as the bases from which long-range bombers attacked our North-west African ports. In addition to the island's strategic position its lead and zinc industries provided the major part of the Italian output of those essential minerals. From February onwards, the attacks by the North-west African Air Forces on Sardinian ports, bases and airfields were continuous and on an ever-increasing scale until July, when events obliged the enemy to concentrate his main Central Mediterranean air forces in Sicily and Italy - and later on the Italian mainland exclusively - leaving a depleted garrison force only in Sardinia. Some idea of the scale of the North-west African Air Forces' bombing effort against the main Sardinian ports during the first half of 1943 is given by the following high-lights of the air activity against the port of Cagliari. Forty-six U.S. Fortresses attacked the port on 28th February; 24 U.S. Fortresses on 31st March; and 107 U.S. Mitchells on 13th May, followed up by 22 Wellingtons during the night. The attacks on the 13th and the night 13/14th May practically neutralised Cagliari as a port. Meanwhile, the harbours at Terranova, La Maddalena, Carloforte, Golfo Aranci, Alghero, Porto Scuso, and Porto Torres also felt the weight of Allied bombs, The bombing of Sardinian airfields was particularly intensive during April and the week following the completion of the Tunisian campaign, 15th to 21st May. During April, for example, 130 tons of bombs were dropped on Decimomannu airfield and during the week 15th to 21st May the airfield received a bomb load of nearly 90 tons. Similarly, the Elmas, Monserrato, Milis, Venafiorita (Olbia), and Alghero airfields were all heavily attacked. In particular, the May attacks on the Sardinian airfields forc-

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The enemy's Sariiin. ai~t&fdtce,"hwver, en considerably reduced. Our air kiai& y reconnaissance of the principal airfields at the beginning of July indicated that the German Air Force on the island numbered about 155 to 170 aircraft of operational types and the Italian aircraft 125 to 140, excluding a few Army co-operation and coastal aircraft; the above totals included approximately 150 ME.109s and FW.190s and about 120 MC.202s, 200s and RE.2001s. At the end of the following week, on the eve of the Sicilian invasion, air reconnaissance revealed a further reduction in air strength; in particular, the combined total of German and Italian fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft had fallen to about 230. By the end of the next week (16th July) it was clear that the fighter strength had been still further reduced; as there had been no Allied air attacks on the Sardinian landing grounds during that period, and aircraft had not been moved to new unknown landing grounds, it was certain that fighters had been removed from the island. From 16th July to the end of the Sicilian campaign, 17th August, the enemy's Sardinian air strength remained practically stable: the total number of operational aircraft (excluding a few Italian CA.311/313 Army Co-operation and CZ.501, 506 and RS.14 coastal aircraft) averaged about 190, of which 65 were ME.109s and FW.190s and 100 MC.202s, 200s and RE.2001s. It followed that heavy bomber attacks on the enemy's Sardinian airfields were not necessary and the fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber attacks, mentioned in the following section, were sufficient to keep down the strength of the Sardinian defensive fighters. Similarly, heavy attacks on the Sardinian ports could be dispensed with as our air reconnaissance made it clear that the enemy was employing only La Maddalena harbour, in the northern tip of the island, on a considerable scale and the wide dispersal area of the roads there presented an unsatisfactory target. The Wellington attacks on the barracks and railway station at Cagliari on the nights 30th June/ist July and 1st/2nd July, when 71 effective sorties were carried out, and the bombing of Olbia marshalling yards and military stores by 36 Wellingtons on the following night represented the finishing touches to the previous series of attacks before the entire Wellington effort was required against Sicily and Italy. The Warhawks Take Over In the latter part of July fighter sweeps over Sardinia by U.S. Warhawks of the Strategic Air Force became increasingly frequent and on several occasions the enemy's fighter opposition was on a greater scale than that encountered on missions over Sicily and Italy during the same period. On 22nd July, for example, 48 U.S. Warhawks straffed gun emplacements and the railway station at La Maddalena, south of Cagliari, set

some large factories on fire south of Villasor and straffed schooners and road transport at other points. Twenty-five to thirty enemy aircraft were encountered of which seventeen were reported destroyed: two Warhawks failed to return. Four days later a force of 48 U.S. Warhawks again swept over Sardinia and of the ten MC.202s and two ME.109s encountered over the Cagliari area, one German and four Italian fighters were destroyed without loss. On the 28th a similar force continued their activity over the island and destroyed two MC.202s and probably' destroyed another; one Warhawk was shot down by flak, but the pilot baled out, The following day 52 Warhawks swept over southern Sardinia without incident. On 30th July the Warhawks of the 325th Fighter Group scored really sensational victories over the enemy's intercepting fighters. The story deserves to be told in some detail. Twenty Warhawks of the 317th Squadron took off at 08.00 hours and flew up the west side of Sardinia and then across the coast to due west of Sassari. As they turned to fly southwards over western Sardinia they were attacked near Sassari, about 20 miles to the north of a point fixed for a rendezvous with Warhawks of the 319th Squadron which were to arrive from the east. The attack was made at 09.35 hours by 25 to 30 ME.109s which were reinforced by nearly 20 more fighters, including some MC.202s, as the battle went on. The enemy first attacked from the north-west at the same height as the Warhawks were flying-9,000 feet. Almost immediately four ME.109s were seen to crash and in the next few minutes several more were shot down. As a result of a 20 to 30 minutes running fight 21 ME.109s were destroyed and three ME.109s and two MC.202s probably destroyed for the loss of one American fighter: The latter was believed to have accounted for four of the enemy before going down. The enemy pilots were courageous but undoubtedly "green", as their tactics and evasive action were poor in the extreme. It is possible that the enemy formation was made up of students from a training unit: at any rate, it was a veritable "slaughter of the innocents". When the U.S. Warhawks made their next offensive sweep over Sardinia on 2nd August not a single fighter was airborne to meet them. The same tale was true of several other sweeps during the month. Of the August offensive sweeps which resulted in combats with enemy fighters two of the most successful were carried out on the 7th and 28th, respectively. On the former occasion the Warhawks shot down two ME.109s without incurring any loss and on the latter enemy fighter casualties anounted to six ME.109s destroyed and four probably destroyed for the loss of one Warhawk which crash-landed in Tunisia. For the first week in September, as indicated in the next section, the U.S. Warhawks concentrated on bombing and straffing attacks; during

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the next week several offensive fighter sweeps were carried out, but enemy fighters, which were now almost entirely confined to the central and northern landing grounds, refused to rise to the bait. Enemy air resistance over Sardinia was to all intents and purposes extinct. Fighter-bomber and "Cannon Mitchell" Attacks On a number of occasions the U.S. Warhawk sweeps over Sardinia were carried out with the primary object of delivering fighter-bomber attacks. On 20th July, for example, seventeen escorted Warhawk-bombers successfully attacked dispersed aircraft on Decimomannu airfield and, in addition, shot down five of the twelve enemy fighters which intercepted them at the cost of one aircraft missing. The most successful of the fighter-bomber attacks in the following month was that delivered by 44 U.S. Warhawk-bombers on a factory and smelting plant at Fluminimaggiore on the 28th ; a by-product of the raid was the shooting down of six ME.109s without loss to the Warhawks. During August, also, occurred the first "cannon Mitchell" (B.25 G) attack in the Mediterranean theatre of war. The attack in question was made on 5th August by four U.S. Mitchells, equipped with 75 mm. guns, on the large electric power switching station near Guspini. Three power lines entered the station and it was believed that these lines provided power for a large area in south-west Sardinia. The Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, approached the target "on the deck", pulling up to 300 feet at a selected point about 4,500 yards north of the target; the building could not be identified, however, until the Mitchells were within 2,000 feet of it and fire was opened at this range. Nine rounds of high explosive shells were fired and direct hits were scored on the target; a ball of fire and flashes like lightning were seen to come out of the building and flashes and sparks ran along the power lines. In early September the U.S. Warhawk-bombers turned their attention to Pabillonis landing ground, north of Villacidro, which accommodated a number of single-engined aircraft. In. all, on 5th, 7th and 8th September a total of 112 U.S. Warhawk-bombers dropped 672 x 20 lbs fragmentation bombs on the dispersal area and runways with good results. Fighter-bomber attacks, meanwhile, were made on industrial and other targets, and Wellingtons extended their leaflet dropping activity to the Sardinian east coast and over Cagliari and Sassari. On 1st September a small force of U.S. Warhawk-bombers scored direct hits with 500 lb. G.P. bombs on the Iglesias zinc plant. Two days later thirteen U.S. Warhawk-bombers attacked the radar installations at Pula and Cape Carbonara; one and a half tons of bombs were dropped at Pula, scoring five near misses, and slightly more at Cape Carbonara, where four

direct hits were claimed on what was believed to be a Freya surrounded by a blast wall. On the 5th the attacks on the Pula installations were renewed by four U.S. Mitchells (B.25 Gs), escorted by 36 U.S. Warhawks, which dropped a small number of 30 lb. bombs and fired sixteen rounds of 75 mm. shells. The attack was delivered from a height of approximately 200 feet and cannon fire was opened at 5,000 yards continuing to the target, where the bombs were dropped at minimum altitude. Direct hits were scored with the bombs but the result of the shelling was unobserved. Attacks on Enemy Shipping While the attacks on land targets in Sardinia mentioned in the above section were in progress, sea reconnaissance Wellingtons, Baltimores and Marauders kept up a continuous watch for enemy shipping off the Sardinian and Corsican coasts and according to the information collected air and sea forces were briefed to deliver attacks. The most successful shipping strikes off Sardinia in July were made on the 26th. Shortly before noon three Beaufighters of No. 415 (U.S.) Squadron on armed reconnaissance along the east coasts of Sardinia and Corsica sighted and attacked seven barges covered with canvas awnings; as a result of cannon strikes one barge was left with smoke rising from it and another with its cargo on fire. A few minutes later four torpedo and four anti-flak Beaufighters of No. 144 Squadron on "rover strikes" in the same area destroyed a couple of ME.323 transport aircraft at the cost of one Beaufighter shot down by escorting enemy fighters. The torpedo-Beaufighters carrying on with their patrol then sighted and attacked an enemy convoy; one merchant vessel of 1,500 tons was blown up. One of the most successful air attacks in Sardinian waters during August was that delivered by U.S. Strategic Air Force Warhawks on the 5th, when returning from escorting the "cannon Mitchell" (B.25 G) attack on Guspini switching station. A surfaced enemy submarine was sighted off the south-west tip of Sardinia and two Warhawks went in to attack; hits were scored on the conning tower causing a big explosion which was followed by flames and smoke visible at 5,000 feet. The submarine listed 20 degrees to starboard and went down by the bows with the stern pointing upwards. A third Warhawk then made an attack and the submarine disappeared, leaving a streak of yellow-green foam and oil. The submarine was chalked up as a "probable". The :September attacks on enemy shipping engaged in the evacuation of Corsica are mentioned later. The Evacuation of Sardinia The first definite signs that the enemy was getting ready to evacuate Sardinia were provided by the 3rd Photographic Group's coverage of the

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Sardinian airfields on 25th August. It was clear that the landing grounds at Elmas, Monserrato and Capoterra in the south had been rendered unserviceable and the reduced fighter force was then almost entirely concentrated in the north of the island. Later, after the capitulation of Italy, steps were taken to make all airfields and landing grounds unserviceable or ready for speedy demolition. Immediately prior to the evacuation of the island, also, the Germans destroyed such aircraft as could not be flown out; in particular, air photographs taken on 19th September revealed 47 additional destroyed aircraft on Olbia/Venafiorita airfield, including 40 believed to be Italian fighters. Later evidence suggested that these aircraft were destroyed when Italian pilots refused to fly them to Corsica Photographic coverage of the Sardinian ports in September also pointed to an imminent evacuation. During the first week of the month far less merchant shipping was reported to be entering La Maddalena and during the week ending 17th September an increased traffic in "F"-boats and Siebel ferries heralded the evacuation of the island, Corsica being used as a steppihg stone to the Italian mainland. During the week ending 25th September the German evacuation of Sardinia was completed and Allied troops and officials were landed. Of the three Italian infantry divisions on the island only one elected to co-operate with the Germans after the announcement of the Armistice and was evacuated first to Corsica and then to Italy. Attacks on the Corsica Evacuation Route In the latter part of September when it became evident that Corsica, also, was in process of being abandoned, the Strategic Air Force struck heavy blows at the enemy's evacuation route from Corsica to the Italian mainland. In particular, the Corsican port of Bastia, the port of departure for enemy troops (including those previously in Sardinia), and the reception port of Leghorn, Northern Italy, were heavily attacked. On the 21st, the newly-arrived U.S. Liberators made their first attacks from North-west Africa; 32 of the heavy bombers dropped 95 tons on Leghorn, hitting several of the small craft plying the evacuation route and damaging harbour installations, and 20 more dropped a bomb load of 55 tons on Bastia harbour, scoring hits on several vessels. The attack on Bastia was continued during the

night by 75 Wellingtons, which dropped 125 tons of bombs starting fires visible for 70 miles on the return journey. In the last days of September a further attack was made on Bastia by 36 U.:S. Mitchells, which attacked the airfield, and 80 Wellingtons bombed Leghorn harbour. On the 4th of the following month 35 U.S. Mitchells made the last attack on Bastia, dropping 53 tons of bombs on shipping and harbour installations. Meanwhile, attacks were carried out on the enemy's evacuation craft in transit from Corsica to the mainland. In this connection the activity of U.S. "cannon Mitchells" (B.25 Gs), attached to the Coastal Air Force for shipping strikes, was particularly interesting. The method of attack was for four of these aircraft to approach the vessel selected for attack simultaneously. Cannon attacks were made at a height of 100 feet at about 5,000 yards closing in to 1,500 or 1,000 yards before a sharp break-away. Each aircraft also carried two 500 lb. bombs for skip bombing lightly defended vessels. During the week ending 24th September, in particular, the Mitchells flew fourteen sorties firing thirty-six 75 mm. shells at shipping targets between northern Corsica and Elba and scored hits on a destroyer and many small craft. At the same time Coastal Air Force Beaufighters and Marauders attended to the enemy's transport aircraft playing their part in the evacuation. Thus on 24th September, in particular, Beaufighters of No. 242 Group shot down a total of nineteen JU.52s at various points between Corsica and the Italian mainland. The Allies Take Possession While the Germans were defending their final bridgehead around Bastia in the early days of October the Italian forces on Corsica,in the main, co-operated with the local patriots and resisted the German attempt to disarm them. Meanwhile, French reinforcements from North-west Africa were landed to increase the pressure on the withdrawing German forces. On 4th October Bastia was captured while the final evacuation took place from Marmi di Luri, twelve miles north of the city. The four main island bulwarks - Pantelleria, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica - were now in Allied hands.

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THE ESSENTIAL TASK of protecting the bases from which air forces work, driven home so terribly in Europe in the early stages of the war, led to the formation of the Royal Air Force Regiment. In the critical days after Dunkirk the R.A.F. formed its own Station Defence Force to assist the Army to defend the airfields of Britain, then gravely threatened. This force, composed though it was of excelllent material with a good leavening of ex-Army Officers and N.C.Os, was necessarily a make-shift expedient. It had neither the up-to-date training nor the equipment needed to meet the expected attack by the German Army. It was an alleviation of the situation, but Army garrisons still had to be maintained on important airfields.

The Regiment Formed In order to release troops for the Field Army, however, the R.A.F. took over the whole responsibility for local defence of its airfields in Britain, and in February, 1942, the Station Defence Force was expanded into the R.A.F. Regiment. The R.A.F. still acted as agent of the Army and only within the radius of its airfields. The local Military Commander was still in supreme control. The newly-formed Regiment was supplemented by the machine-gunners of the A.A. flights, which had long been established on R.A.F. Stations. The Army gave generously of experienced officers and N.C.Os, of training facilities and of equipment. The Regiment was constituted, h6wever, as an integral part of the R.A.F., so that its offi-

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cli t rlW~rei would fit harmoniously into the general life of the station. Its units were given Air Force names and its personnel carried Air Force ranks. In Britain the functions of the R.A.F. Regiment were, and still are, chiefly to garrison static airfields against ground or low-flying attack. The units are trained in mobile defence, not on the old lines of a pill-box scheme. In these days of man-power shortage, it is impossible to strengthen them sufficiently to make the defence of every airfield their sole charge. The station personnel, officers and men of the Air Force, engaged in the many ground tasks, are also trained and armed to defend their own airfield in time of need. The Regiment works alongside them, as the hard core of the defence, and administratively it is organised in common with all other Air Force units on a station basis. Misemployed in the Middle East In the Middle East the R.A.F. Regiment was rather slow in getting into its stride. From the end-of October, 1941, to the beginning of 1942 there were approximately 5,000 ground gunners in the command, who formed a useful nucleus. During February and March, 1942, drafts from the United Kingdom brought the strength up to approximately 8,000 men. Little training, however, could be carried out, as the gunners were normally used as static guards by night and misemployed - even in such capacities as mess or latrine orderlies - by day. Better progress was made after September, when a Middle East Order formed the 8,000 odd gunners into 226 flights. The establishment for each flight was one P/O or F/O and 360 N.C.Os and airmen. The gunners were armed with rifles, light machine-guns and Sten guns. This formation into flights enabled mis-employment to be stamped out and organized training to begin. One of the facts brought out by the formation of the gunners into flights was an acute shortage of officers - a deficiency of 65 per cent. An R.A.F. Regimental O.C.T.U. was, therefore, formed at Amman in October, and the officer shortage gradually lessened. Conditios are Different When he Regiment was founded in the Middle East its personnel were scattered over an immense territory, on airfields in such widely separated places as the Western Desert, Iraq and the Sudan. To weld them into an unified force with a regimental pride was a. task indeed in such circumstances; moreover, the officers in command had to suffer all the growing troubles of lack of equipment, shortage of officers, and so on. These difficulties were all met, and though they have by no means yet been entirely overcome, the R.A.F. Regiment in the Mediterranean area has been turned already into something much more than a generic name for a number of scattered units. As in Britain, the Army was generous in its help, providing first-class officers and N.C.Os to conduct training, and the highest standards were set for the training of the men. In the Middle East, where conditions were different from those in England, the functions of the R.A.F. Regiment varied considerably. Airfields in this theatre for the most part were not static bases. They moved with the speed of an expeditionary force. In the Middle East and North Africa, therefore, the Regiment has regarded as its duty the performance of every possible service on the ground in the protection of the mobile squadrons of the R.A.F. The primary aim the Regiment set itself was to speed up the advance of the air forces by giving their ground convoys protection on the move, and by going ahead of them to clear landing grounds of the enemy. To these functions they later added that of clearing runways of land mines. It was found that complete clearance of the mines was impossible for the sappers, who were compelled always to be moving on; special units of the R.A.F. Regiment were, therefore, trained in this essential task. The October Advance The manoeuvres in which flights were trained were put into operation in the Western Desert autumn offensive of 1942. They advanced over the desert with the squadron convoys to protect them en route. As they approached to 'within some twenty miles of the target airfield, the trucks of the Regiment moved on ahead. A short distance from their destination the men left their vehicles, deployed, and went forward as infantry to secure the landing ground. Once they had secured the landing grounds on the advance, the flights of the Regiment threw protective screens around them. Other small parties went on ahead to assist in the location of new landing grounds or, sometimes, in their rapid construction. More than once, notably at Daba and Fuka, they found themselves opposed by strong pockets of the enemy, of whom they successfully disposed, taking their first prisoners, some 350, mostly Germans. The battles they fought were small engagements, but none the less intense, ard the Regiment suffered casualties at Mersa Matruh and elsewhere. The Regiment also won its first award, which is referred to in the following message from the Under Secretary of ,State for Air to No. 1459700 A.C.1. Bullen:"I would like to congratulate you on the award of the Military Medal for your gallantry in action in November, 1942, and again in December, 1942. I have seen the citation and your achievements are in accord with the finest traditions of the R.A.F. Regiment which have been so well laid in the comparatively short time which the Regiment has been in existence. You are the first man of the Regiment to receive an award for gallantry and this registers a landmark of which you and your fellow members of

R.A.F. Regiment recruits undergo stiff training. A lesson in tough tactics.

Live ammunition is used in exercises. Sighting one of the Regiment's double purpose guns.

the Regiment can justifiably be proud. All god/ luck to you and your fellow members of the Regiment in the coming months." The desert flights of the R.A.F. Regiment marched with the VIIIth Army throughout the advance to Tunis. They contributed greatly, even in those early days of their formation, to the speed with which the squadrons of the Allied air forces were able to move forward over the desert, and thus to keep always within range of the retreating enemy. Units of the Regiment also took part in the 1st Army's operations from the other side of North Africa. In the landing one of the Regiment's transports was torpedoed, so the baptism of fire came early. In the first few days of the campaign the A.A. flights had several successes to their credit and suffered casualties themselves. Generally speaking, their role was the same as it was with the VIIIth Army. When not actively engaged in protecting the landing grounds, squadron personnel were often sent up to the line with the 1st Army to gain battle experience. Preparing for a New Role In the desert campaign, the R.A.F. Regiment was equipped and trained principally as a mobile infantry force. With the cessation of hostilities in North Africa in May, 1943, it was foreseen that another role would be required of the Regiment in Sicily and elsewhere. A Middle East Order formed the flights into squadrons-the establishment being one S/Ldr. and one F/Lt. on headquarters and six flights to a squadron - and training and equipping of selected squadrons was begun for the formation of special Field Squadrons and A.A. Squadrons, for mobile and static defence duties. The Field Squadrons provide a mobile striking force against possible paratroop landings and their role requires that, in addition to normal infantry weapons, they are equipped with reconnaissance cars and anti-tank guns. The establishment of a Field Squadron is : three Rifle Flights, one Armoured Flight (six armoured cars) and one Support Flight (four two-pdr. or six-pdr. guns). The role of the A.A. Squadrons is to give static defence against low-flying attack. Each squadron consists of three flights, each armed with eight 20 mm. Hispano cannons. Both types of squadron go through an intensive training up to commando standard, the battle drill being conducted with ball ammunition. The Invasion of Sicily When the Sicilian campaign opened on 11th July, the Regiment was soon in the picture. One A.A. squadron was among the first troops to land and the balance followed in the second wave.

A Altogether, -nine squadi'ons took part in the campaign; three sailed from the Middle East and ten came specially from the United Kingdom, four of which were held as reserves in North Africa. Even before they landed, some of the squadrons came under fire when the ships bringing them over were attacked off Sicily. Two squadrons lost most of their M.T., stores and equipment when a transport went down in Syracuse harbour. In the early days, however, more casualties were caused by malarial mosquitoes than by enemy action. Although the Regiment's role was entirely A.A. defence, its personnel had the distinction of being the first British troops on Catania airfield. Squadrons saw their most concentrated action on 11th August during heavy bombing attacks on Lentini, San Francesco, Scordia and Agnone landing grounds. One squadron defending Lentini lost six men killed by direct hits on their posts and three seriously injured, who died later. In another squadron four men were killed and three injured. Several personnel who kept their guns going under extremely difficult circumstances were recommended for awards. Altogether, in the Sicilian campaign the Regiment had two officers wounded, thirty-one other ranks killed, twelve missing and fifteen wounded. Operations in the Aegean From Sicily, when the time came, squadrons moved into Italy with the rest of the invasion force, and are still doing good work there. Another of the Regiment's commitments was in connection with the operations in the Aegean Sea. Six squadrons were detailed and one of them that went to Cos was the first R.A.F. Regiment unit to be transported into action complete with its weapons by air. Pride of Regiment It is obvious from this brief account that the R.A.F. Regiment in the Mediterranean area has made great strides in the last year. At the end of September, 1943, total strength in the Mediterranean was approximately 10,800 men. The Regiment is an integral part of the R.A.F., and though it is organized and trained primarily as a fighting force for the defence of airfields against attack, it must be ready and willing to turn its hand to any task that will assist the R.A.F. to maintain its operational efficiency. The exigencies of war may make a variety of demands on the Regiment; these demands will be freely met, provided that the primary role of the unit is not thereby interfered with. In a word, the Regiment is developing into a well-trained, disciplined body of men, and a very noticeable pride of regiment is showing itself.

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THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT of the U.S.A.F. heavy bombers in the Middle East was a raid on the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti,near Bucharest. This operation, known as "Halpro," was carried out in June, 1942, by thirteen Liberators of Colonel Halverson's detachment. Unorthodox tactics were used. No attempt was made at concentrated bombing, but aircraft were briefed to fly at great height and bomb individually through breaks in the cloud or when they were estimated to be over the target. The damage inflicted by these methods was not thought to be extensive and five of the Liberators forced-landed in Turkey on the way home. Over a year passed before the next attempt was made to smash this vital target. Some idea as to how vital it is to the Axis may be understood when it is known that the Rumanian oilfields

produce some 5,200,000 tons of crude oil a yearapproximately a third of the total output from all sources in enemy-occupied Europe. Of this total the six main Ploesti refineries produce about four million tons. In addition to the refining and cracking plants, Ploesti houses Rumania's only paraffin wax plant and considerable facilities for the production of lubricating oils. Thus, serious damage to Ploesti would deal a devastating blow to the Axis war machine. The Attack Carefully Planned Every effort was, therefore, made to ensure that the second attack was as successful as possible. Plans began to be laid as far back as April, 1943. Among the factors that had to be taken into consideration were the number of aircraft that could be available in view of other

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operational commitments; the type of attack most likely to succeed; the forecasting of most suitable weather conditions; the extent of possible air and ground opposition in the target area; and the provision of the best reconnaissance aircraft for assessing the damage after the attack. As regards the aircraft available, there were already two U.S.A.F. Bombardment Groups, Nos. 98 and 376, flying Liberators, in Cyrenaica in the early summer. For the operation three more Liberator Groups-Nos, 44, 93 and 389-flew out from the United Kingdom. Between them they represented a formidable maximum striking force of some two hundred aircraft. It was decided that the type of attack most certain of success was from as low a level as possible, a hundred feet being the minimum, using 1,000 and 500 lb. H.E. bombs, fused from 45 seconds to six hours delay, and four lb. British and 100 lb. American incendiaries. The attack was to be as concentrated as possible-a complete reversal of the tactics employed in the previous year. It was estimated that to achieve the effect of one concentrated low-level attack twenty highlevel attacks would be necessary. The weather, according to the meteorologists' was likely to be most propitious in late July or early August, and the attempt was finally scheduled for 1st August. Enemy opposition was reckoned by Intelligence to comprise 80-100 fighters, 60-100 balloons, strong A.A. defences and smoke screens. For subsequent reconnaissance, two long-range Mosquitoes were made available. In addition, for assessing the damage, an American authority on the effects of explosives on oil installations, who had a close knowledge of the Ploesti refineries, came over specially from Washington. Training the Aircrews An intensive training course was prepared for the air crews. A motion film demonstrating methods of low-level attack was flown over from England for the crews to study. Models of the main Ploesti plants were made and photographed for use as target maps. Various types of bombs were experimented with arid, of course, all crews carried out as much low-level approach and bombing practice as possible. One of the most stressed points in the briefing was that aircraft should arrive simultaneously over the target area, in order not to lose the value of surprise and to reduce the possibility of effective counter-measures being taken by the defenders. Crews were ordered to withdraw after the attack at low-level until the aircraft were clear of the ground defences. It was reckoned that the aircraft would be airborne for approximately twelve or thirteen hours in order to cover the two thousand odd miles to Ploesti and back. Groups of aircraft were each given a special objective to deal with in the target area, both at Ploesti itself and at Campina, fifteen miles to the

north-west, and at Brai, four miles to the south where certain of the refineries were situated. The Raid Carried Out Between 04.00 and 04.30 hours on 1st August a force of 177 Liberators took off, made up of 37 aircraft of the 44th Bombardment Group, 37 of the 93rd, 46 of the 98th, 28 of the 376th and 29 of the 389th. The weather on the way out was on the whole favourable, although over mountain areas in Albania and Yugo-Slavia there was a considerable amount of cloud or haze, with scattered showers, which at times made visibility poor. While flying over Yugo-Slavia and parts of Rumania, crews observed people waving, signalling "V"s with torches and flashing mirrors; this use of mirrors had been reported a few weeks earlier during a raid on airfields nearAthens. Out of the 177 aircraft briefed, 127 are thought to have reached the target area. Unfortunately, the cloudy conditions encountered caused some cf the Liberator formations to split up. As a result, a few aircraft arrived half an hour before the main force, thus lessening the shock of complete surprise and stirring up something of a hornet's nest. A smoke screen was put into operation, but was ineffective; balloons were rushed up, but not more than about fifteen; light A.A. and machine gun fire was intense and heavy A.A. was used in low cross fire; and ME. 109s and 110s, FW. 190s, JU. 88s and even some unidentified and obsolete biplanes engaged the attacking force. The Mission Completed In spite of these counter-measures, the Liberators dropped 197 X 1,000 lb. H.E., 292 X 500 lb. H.E., 202 S.B.C. 4 lb. incendiaries and 107 X 100 lb. incendiaries, from heights varying from 100 to 700 feet. Those that came back reported a successful attack, the 'estimated result of which, after the reconnaissance Mosquitoes had returned, is given below. The five bombardment groups involved met with varying fortunes. The 37 aircraft of the 44th Group all reached the target and deposited 64,640 lbs. of bombs from 120-250 feet. In addition to the A.A. fire, they were tackled by fighters, of which they claimed thirteen destroyed and one damaged. Of the 37 from the 93rd Group, five returned with technical trouble and the other 32 dropped 113,300 Ibs. of bombs from 150-300 feet. Some eight enemy aircraft were encountered, four making attacks near Bucharest. One ME. 109 and one FW. 190 were claimed as destroyed. Of the 46 aircraft from the 98th Group, five had to return early to base. Those that reached the target dropped 55,640 lbs. from an altitude of from 200-250 feet. They were more heavily attacked by enemy aircraft than any other group, and out of a total of approximately 5Q._engaged, il 'i:: they-claimed 33 shot down.\

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All except two of the 28 aircraft from the 376th Group reached Ploesti, dropping 62,000 lbs. of H.E. bombs and ten clusters of incendiaries from 125 feet. A few ME. 109s and F.W. 190s were seen, but they were not keen to attack the Liberators and one ME.109 was claimed to be destroyed. Nineteen out of 29 from the 389th Group dropped 67,000 lbs. of bombs on targets, at Campina from 200-700 feet. They claimed two enemy aircraft destroyed. The final assessment gave 54 Liberators lost, including eight that landed in Turkey, twenty over the target, two in the sea and twenty-four unaccounted for. Five more were written-off landing in friendly territory. Between them, the Liberators claimed 51 enemy aircraft destroyed and one damaged. Adventures of an H.S.L. Crew One of the eight aircraft regarded as landing in Turkey actually landed in the sea just off the Turkish coast near Manavgat in the Gulf of Antalya, north-west of Cyprus. The crew were spotted on the shore by an Air/Sea rescue Wellington on 2nd August and a high-speed launch was despatched. The officer in charge of the launch, on learning that the Americans were injured, went ashore with four men to assist them. The five members of the H.S.L. crew were interned by the Turkish authorities along with the Americans, and the launch was ordered to leave the shore. The corporal in charge, on reaching base, reported what had happened. On official representation being made, the five members of the crew were released and an H.S.L. was allowed to pick. them up from Mersin a few days later. The Damage Assessed To augment the preliminary estimates and photographs of damage brought back by the attacking force, a Mosquito was briefed to carry

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" AottB gBl| !C|f|alplltthie similar 'reconnasance was made on the 19th. On the first occasion the Mosquito did the 2,000 mile return trip in six and a half hours; on the second occasion in three quarters of an hour less.

A study by experts of all the available reports produced the following estimate of damage done:In general, although a certain amount of speculation is necessary, a high degree of shortterm damage and a promising degree of longterm damage was caused. Over 40% of the cracking capacity put out of action for at least 4 - 6 months. The original refining capacity of 24,275 tons of crude oil per day probably reduced by 10,360 tons. The most heavily damaged refineries were reckoned to be the Creditul Minier at Brazi, the Steaua Romana at Campina, and the Colombia Aquila and the Astra Romana at Ploesti itself. Damage was also done to the Orion and Concordia Vega refineries. In addition, Rumania's only paraffin wax plant would be immobilised for. a long period and the lubricating oil supply position at least temporarily jeopardised. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, in a congratulatory message, described the attack as "a big job magnificently done." A Rumanian Cabinet Minister remarked that "it was as if the bombers were postmen each with a letter for its particular address to which it was duly delivered." The German radio quoted a Bulgarian paper as saying that the American government had had to offer the aircrews 10,000 ,dollars, medals and leave to induce them to take part in the raid, and that as so many aircraft did not return to base, the government would be saved a lot of money.... It may certainly be said that the operation compensated amply for the disappointment of the first attack on the Ploesti refineries and that one more heavy blow was added ,to the many being dealt against Nazi Europe.

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In The Wilderness
THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE was originally supplied, neatly bound in book form with photographs facing the typescript, as an appendix to the Operations Record Book of No. 29 Wireless Unit for June, 1943. It is reproduced in this number of the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review as an account of the, life and work typical of many isolated but essential units of the R.A.F., and is of special interest to those engaged in more active theatres, unaware of the monotonous routine unselfishly and patiently borne by personnel less fortunate. The story is the visit by the Commanding Officer to the six Observer Outposts in north Sinai under his control; it is reproduced, with but slight essential modifications, as written by him. The Start to Post FB. We leave our Headquarters at 17.30 hours after dinner, and at 19.45 hours we are passing through Beersheba. The first post, FB, is now only seven miles along the road to Bir Asluj. The party consists of the C.O., a Corporal, who is the unit topographical expert, and an L.A.C. who combines the duties of travelling canteen manager and cameraman. This is a pay and mail run, but apart from the pay our most valuable cargo is the canteen, which includes two crates of beer that we are taking to the members of our tribe who thirst in the wilderness. It is dusk when we reach Post FB. We are bringing both pay and letters and parcels from home and are therefore welcome visitors. The post personnel are paid, and our Corporal goes off to inspect the observer site and check the post lay out; the L.A.C. is taking a bulk order for canteen supplies from the senior wireless operator and the C.O. sits talking with the Post Commander, discussing hurricane lamps, primus stoves, how to treat scorpion bites, the new reporting procedure, the.relative qualities of charpoys and table tops for sleeping purposes and a variety of other topics. The Post Commander gives the C.O. his written report on the Post activity for the preceding week. He is complimented on the condition of his Post which is particularly clean and well organised. It is getting late. Two of the Ground Observers sit playing draughts. We have a cup of tea and then turn in. The next morning the Post guard wakes us soon after five o'clock. The duty wireless operator must be on watch by five minutes to six and we wish to make an early start in order to travel in the cool hours of the day. As we leave for Bir Asluj, the duty observer is reporting a Sunderland. This is a regular plot, and one that is looked for daily. Bir Asluj, 20 miles further on, is a staging point for military traffic travelling between Egypt and Palestine. Here is the D.I.D. from which all the post rations and petrol are drawn. By rationing locally and not from Base, fresh supplies of meat and vegetables and even ice can be issued daily to all posts. At Post FC. Post FC is on a hill overlooking this encampment. The Post is provided with transport and the Post Commander is responsible for looking after the airmen at Post FB. He sends them rations and water daily and brings each man in turn to Bir Asluj to have a shower or to see one of the occasional cinema shows down at the Staging Post. As we climb up the hill in bottom gear, we see the observer with his binoculars trained to the heavens. Perhaps he wishes to impress us by an assiduous performance of duty. In present deployment, the Posts form a secondary screen supplementing existing cover on the coast, in the Canal Area, and along the Gulf of Suez. Air traffic follows the coast line and aircraft are very rarely observed in the" other parts of Sinai. It says much for these airmen that they should cheerfully and conscientiously remain at their observation posts during the hours of daylight looking around at a sky that remains disappointingly empty. "They also serve who only watch and wait." At Post FC, we find the Sergeant i/c Ground Observers. The routine visits of the senior N.C.Os, either the Sergeant i/c Ground Observers or the involve Sergeant Wireless-Operator-Mechanic, much more detail than the C.O's inspection. Each senior N.C.O. works to a planned programme and the following are a few of the duties which he carries out: examines all paybooks and verifies that their safe custody is ensured; checks conditions and custody of arms; arranges for respirators to be tested and worn for ten minutes by all personnel; carries out aircraft recognition tests for all personnel; checks post copy of unit standing orders to ensure that the amendments have been entered and signed; examines Post comforts, football, gramophone and records, draughts, books, chess, etc. But those are only six of the duties; the full catechism for the visiting Sergeant with his assisting Corporals and airmen combines forty-two separate detailed instructions! The visiting Ser-

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Post FD at Auja Auja, which is a frontier post of the Palestine Government, was a former Byzantine town. There are the ruins of a chufch and a monastery and, of more recent origin, the disused buildings of a Turkish hospital of the last war. The observer personnel are accommodated in some permanent buildings, and as we approach along the road, which sweeps round to the. frontier barrier, the duty observer, high up on the ruins on the hill, overlooking the Police Post, notes our arrival. We are too far away to see him lift the receiver of his field telephone but there is no doubt that already he will have warned the Post Commander that the C.O. is coming. With two or three minutes warning of our arrival, there is time to put the kettle on, or, perhaps, what is more urgent, there will be time to carry out some very hurried straightening up before we pull up at the door. Thus does an efficient warning system work ! At this Post a sub-control is operated. Three large rooms in the police outbuildings are occupied, one is for sleeping quarters, another is the signals room and the third is used as, a W/T equipment store. W/T communication with Ismailia Filters, to which the unit report, is exceptionally good from here, and a twenty four hour watch is maintained. The unit airman wireless mechanic is stationed here and can quickly proceed from this convenient sub-headquarters to carry out repairs. The unit signals Sergeant and the Corporal wireless operator, whom we met on Post FC, remain down here, staying for alternate weeks and are responsible for- the general technical supervision of the screen. The absence of plots in this area has been referred to before and it seems particularly unfortunate, when an excellent frequency for W/T communication has been allotted, that there should be so little traffic. The set in use at this post is a ground station pattern and is very useful for continuous operating. It would be very cumbersome in a 180 lb. tent but in present circumstances where there is ample room it is ideal. The Post Commander of FD is responsible for obtaining water, rations and petrol from Asluj for his own post and the remaining three, sited at intervals of twenty to twenty five miles along the road running south from Auja down to the Gulf of Aqaba. On to Post FG. We leave the tarmac Sinai road and follow the track down to Post FG; this is rutted, with occasional- patches so bad that the Dodge, bouncing on its hard springs, lifts us six inches from our seats. Any speed above 20 miles per hour is sheer purgatory. Then, following the old Turkish railway track we arrive eighteen miles from Auja at El Qusei-

personnel, including Wireless Operators and M.T. Drivers, a report being given to the C.O. of the results obtained by each airman. Knowledge of aircraft recognition can only be tested by using standard test papers, silhouettes, photographs, etc. Ground Observers with two or three years overseas experience, posted in from other wireless units, where they have undergone real active service conditions, and have observed many types of both hostile and allied aircraft, comment on the high standard of recognition of our original ground observers who are,, of course, very much less experienced. The morse test which follows is not only given to Wireless Operators but to Ground Observers. At present, four practice buzzers have been issued to the six Posts. Although progress is not very rapid, there are a few who can boast their eight words a minute and one Corporal Ground Observer, with civilian experience, has reached the dizzy height of fifteen words per minute. Each Post has been issued with a copy of A.P. 1762 "Electrical and Radio Notes for Wireless Operators." This is provided to assist the Wireless Operators in improving their technical knowledge. Operators on an Observer Post are at a disadvantage as compared with those employed on a main station, where the advice and assistance of N.C.Os is constantly available to help them improve their trade proficiency. The unit operators, however, receive oral tests from the visiting Wireless Operator N.C.Os and the SerThis is to geant Wireless Operator Mechanic. make sure that they are reading and can understand the text book issued to them. The Corporal Wireless Operator touring the Posts with the Sergeant i/c Ground Observers is now making a 50 hour test inspection of an "Alco" petrol electric generating set. Until recently, the unit was using very low capacity accumulators (twelve volt fifteen a.p.h.) and all Posts were handling a great deal of W/T traffic. The maintenance of these generators then conBreakdowns stituted a very difficult problem. were frequently occurring primarily due to the excessive running, which necessitated constant re-charging. As he overhauls the generator, the Corporal explains to the Senior Wireless Operator what he is ,doing, advises him on the maintenance and refers him to the operating instructions contained in the unit standing orders. The aim of all Post training is to reduce the maintenance required from Headquarters to a minimum. Preparation is being made for the day when it may be impossible for help to be sent out from Base immediately a Post is "off the air." When the Ground Observers can tap out an emergency W/T message and the Wireless Operators can diagnose and deal with simple faults in their equipment,; thisambitfon ill ave ieeaclhieve Leaving that hive of industry, Post FC,, we drive on to Auja.

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The first Post, FB.

Observer on duty at Post PC.

Aircraft recognition training.

Observer on ruins at Post FD, Auja.

ma. This is another frontier post. The surroundings are not quite so arid as the country we have passed through. There is a spring and a small grove of eucalyptus and palm trees. We have been warned not to use this water and the trailer Bowser, which we use for the Posts in this area, is filled at Auja. After signing our names at the frontier we take the left hand fork, the road to Kuntilla, and one mile further we come to the site of Post FG. Even in the wilderness it is possible to create order if only on a small scale. The neat planning of this little camp seems to cry a brave defiance against the rude chaos of the rugged surroundings. The Post Commander advances from the tent door. He stands between two small cairns adorned with bunches of camel thorn. For a moment we think that these are two gate posts, and the line of stones on each side is a garden wall. Instinctively' we look through the gate along the short path, expecting to see the door of a suburban villa bearing the legend: "The Cedars. " It is after one o'clock and getting very hot. Perhaps the heat accounts for our hallucinations. At any rate, we feel our early rising has justified a siesta. With the Post Commander's permission we occupy three of the neatly made up beds and doze contentedly until half past three. Post FG is at the foot of a hill named El Jeisi, rising to 444 metres. The observation point is on top of the hill, some ten minutes rough going from the camp. We telephone to the duty observer telling him that we are coming up to see him. It is quite a stiff climb and we are much too short of breath to do anything except observe our surroundings when we reach the summit. It is really an excellent observer site, the view to the south extending nearly 30 miles. There are higher hills to the north, east and west but these are so far away that, in this generally somewhat hazy atmosphere, aircraft would not in any case be discernible at such a distance. The observer seems pathetically glad to see us. This is not very surprising since the poor devil must feel very detached from human intercourse all alone on this barren peak. This observer, one of our crack recognition experts, has seen neither an aircraft nor even a bird in eighteen days. Instructions were sent out from Unit Headquarters to these three southern Posts to keep a record of the details and time of passing of all transport proceeding along the road. The unit will be able to furnish information therefore in the event of vehicles being delayed or breaking down along this route. Halfway down the hill we see the camp iing before us. The three 180 lb. tents are joined together with their flaps fastened up. The one tent thus form-

ed is sited so that the prevailing breeze in the valley will blow right through. The tents are not dug in; drills and dynamite would be required for parts of this ground which is granite hard. The normal scale of iissue of tents for each Post is two. By collecting those which were issued for Post FD, and not' required by them, and supplying two extra from Base, four Posts in the isolated sites now have quite spacious accommodation. In the foreground is the latrine surrounded by a screen. This is of the deep trench variety and in our view the most satisfactory for these conditions. The Medical Officer, R.A.F., Ramleh, whom we consulted, advised us that the alternative variety, the bucket latrine, should only be employed if proper incineration facilities are available. The complete freedom from gastrointestinal complaints in the unit may, perhaps, be taken to indicate that the sanitary arrangements have so far been satisfactory. To the right we can see the G.M.C. truck newly arrived from Post FD. It must be getting near five o'clock, for the ration truck always arrives about this time. Food is a matter of interest for all mankind but to the airman on an observer post it is the supreme factor in life. We have already said that the Posts are supplied daily with fresh rations, and each holds an up-to-date scale of ration entitlement. Each Post Commander therefore is able to verify that a full issue is made for the personnel of his post. All the Posts report that their rations are excellent. Indeed, airmen returning to Headquarters after being on a Post for some weeks complain bitterly of the quality of rations at Base, making invidious comparisons between the efficiency of the commissariat organised on their Post and that at the Unit Headquarters. The main explanation, of course, is the very generous supplementary allowance which the D.I.D. makes in rationing small numbers. Furthermore, on the majority of Posts additional rations are bought from local sources if supplies are available. In a few moments the transport will have arrived from Post FH to collect the supplies for Posts EH and FJ. At seven o'clock the truck from post FJ will be waiting at Post FH to pick up their supplies when the Post FH transport returns. In this manner the rations are shuttled down the line. The truck from Post FH has arrived and the water camels are being filled. These containers are not very satisfactory for carrying water in vehicles over rough country. Although they are fastened in the lorries and sandbags placed between them they quickly wear thin at the edges and are difficult to repair. No rationing of water has been attempted. So long as adequate supplies ,can be obtainec5he posts are *;. h,,*B generously supliea m t E'atue of \thi, ,'** .a Rn
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Morse training for ground observers.

Observer on duty at Post FG.

ED

The C.O. arrives at Post PG.

Panoramic view of Post PG.

DCLAfI

however, they are expected to maintain a scrupulous standard of cleanliness, not only personally but of the Post equipment as well. During the routine visits all utensils, tables, clothing, etc. are examined to ensure that they are being kept thoroughly clean. The trailer Bowser is not designed for travelling long distances over these roads. The C.O. was shown a Bowser of similar type completely wrecked in two months after servicing the posts of a wireless unit deployed in this area. It is in an effort to preserve the vehicle that the water is distributed in water camels, the Bowser only doing the short trip to Auja to collect water and returning to Post FG where it is based. No millionaire ever boasted so enthusiastically of his French chef as does the Post Commander with an efficient cook. Because of the importance of well-cooked and appetizing meals, all Post Commanders are advised to employ as cook any airman who has a natural "flair" for the job. To follow a regular roster of the personnel usually results in moderate meals from average cooks and extremely bad meals from unwilling cooks. From the Post Commander's eulogy, it is apparent that the airman in question is undoubtedly an unrecognised "cordon bleu." We are invited to inspect the "Mayfair Grill." This is a deep depression painfully hollowed out with picks and shovels, enclosed on three sides by sand-bagged walls, the whole covered with sheets of corrugated iron weighted down with stones. There is a curtain of sacking at the doorway. We enter. The blast of hot air that greets us is appalling. A petrol stove splutters furiously in the corner. We are too polite to say so, but to us it is nothing less than a miniature hell and we make our exit as rapidly as possible. Soon, however, we are sitting down to a succulent joint, nicely browned potatoes and exOur host is compliquisitely cooked cabbage. mented on the excellent results of his cook's sweated labour. Corporal asks the secret of the particularly piquant sauce which is served with the sweet. It is clear that this enquiry is a gross solecism, for we are told that such information may only be passed to one of the fraternity. We stayed the night at Post FG.... After dinner we discussed the prowess of professional footballers and the quality of various brews of beer. The latter aroused considerable local patriotism evoking a wealth of nostalgic reminiscence until finally it was time to go to bed. Earlier in the evening, a message from Post FJ to Base was intercepted reporting the visit of the Wireless Unit Liaison Officers from Headquarters, Middle East, and from Air Headquarters, Eastern Mediterranean. The C.O. was informed that both these officers would be at El Arish on the following night, if he desired to see them. To visit the remaining two posts and go on to El Arish in one day meant very early rising.

Canteens and P.S.I. The next morning the guard called us at quarter to four, and after a hurried cup of tea we made straight for Post FJ. Off we went in the cool morning air along the 59 mile stretch of desert track, through wild and hilly scenery until we arrived at Kuntilla. Here, at Post FJ, as a preliminary to all other activity, we had a shave. The unit standing orders make rather point of this, insisting that all personnel be shaved by half past seven. It was then well after seven o'clock. While we perform our ablutions the Post cook is preparing the eggs which we handed in. Major C.S. Jarvis in his book "Yesterday and Today in Sinai" states that Kuntilla is the ideal spot for a sanatorium or hotel. Personally, we think that the amenities of the neighbourhood are somewhat limited. But the atmosphere is certainly bracing and we eat our fried eggs with good appetite. A pay clerk accompanies the C.O. on the pay parade, his principal duty being to deal with allotments and remittances. A large number of airmen save by having deductions of their pay credited to a Post Office Savings Account. The majority, however, are saving by increasing their allotments or by sending remittances to their parents or families in U.K., to be put away for them there. The remittances in some weeks have amounted to as much as 60 out of a pay roll of 300. A unit P.S.I. was begun in September, 1942. An initial grant of 30 was received and very quickly, by means of all types of profit-making activities, whist drives, housey-housey, etc., and by opening a canteen, a considerable sum was accumulated. When the unit went into operation a sufficient amount of money had been obtained to provide stock for the canteen at Headquarters and the travelling canteens which tour the posts each fortnight. Every commodity which can be bought from N.A.A.F.I. is sold: e.g. tinned pies, pipes, collar studs, beer, jellies, hair cream, soap, chocolate, etc., etc. The canteen is operated on a strict accounting basis. The balance sheet, which is prepared each month and forwarded to Air Headquarters, is circulated round the unit, to be seen by all personnel. The present monthly turnover amounts to between 200 and 300. Special efforts have been made for the efficient conduct of the travelling canteens. A stock list showing all items, with separate columns for the purchases of each Post, is given to the airman in charge. This is drawn up in such a way that, at the conclusion of the journey, the quantity and value of stock to be returned can be rapidly calculated. The airman signs a receipt before his departure for the amount of stock which he is taking out. Such discrepancies which have arisen

The Mayfair Grill.

Observer

site at Posit PH.

have been the total receipts from a oye of Posts i journey may amount to 50. The profits from the canteen are utilised for the purchase of sports gear and the other expenditure involved by unit welfare. The unit was already well provided with gramophones, playing cards and other in-door games before the inception of the P.S.I. In the last three months the following items have accounted for the bulk of the money expended:- footballs; baseball equipment; books; gramophone records; complete cricket equipment; supplementary rationing to celebrate R.A.F. Jubilee; Unit sports day prizes; M.T. charges; swimming parties. All personnel take a very great interest in the P.S.I. since the results of its administration are much more obvious on a small unit than they are on a large station. Feeling develops very strongly if it is considered that one section of the unit has benefited more than another by some P.S.I. scheme. Every effort is made, therefore, to obtain widely representative opinion before any P.S.I. plans are adopted or purchases made. All the Post Commanders are encouraged to forward P.S.I. suggestions in their reports. Now that the Posts are adequately provided with comforts, it is proposed to adopt the suggestion of the Wireless Unit Liaison Officer, Air Headquarters, Eastern Mediterranean. In future, a note will be made of the purchases by individual Posts and goods equivalent to a 10% discount on that amount will be given to the Post on the next routine run. At Kuntilla On top of the Fort at Kuntilla is the duty observer. His view extends for many miles around. All he can see is the barren plain and the distant hills. Occasionally a military truck will pass in a cloud of dust or a camel train go slowly by. When the Posts were deployed, all the personnel in the present screen were warned that they might be on their Posts for a considerable time without spotting a single aircraft. From some sites it was certain that no aircraft would be seen at all unless they were hostile, or friendly planes far off course or investigating. Vigilance was therefore especially important. The principles of wireless unit reporting have been thoroughly ingrained and the whole scheme of reporting, as a vital part of the air defence organisation, is understood by all of these observers. They understand the operation of the warning system and the relative roles of civilian report centres, wireless units and R.D.F. -They are familiar with the functions of a Filter Roommany of them having been detached for duty at

Filter table-and the complete processes which lead, via the Operations Room, to actual interception. An Unpleasant Spot Leaving Kuntilla, we return north along the track we followed in the early morning. Post FH is almost mid-way between Post FG and Post FJ. It is a grim isolated spot and the site has gained an unsavoury reputation for the remarkable size, variety and number of scorpions and snakes that abound. The arrival of the mail is a very cheerful occasion. Letters from home prove a most effective panacea for the discomforts of the surroundings. Every effort is made to effect a rapid distribution of mail and no vehicle leaves Headquarters for any Post without taking what letters and parcels there may be. These are shuttled along the line to the Posts concerned. The maximum delay is fourteen days and it is usually very much less. There is no delay in the despatch of outgoing mail. This is sent daily on the ration vehicle for censoring by the ever obliging Camp Commandant at No. 1 R.S.P. Asluj. The observer on duty at Post FH is probably one of the best ground observers in the unit. He is a former ACH/GD, who has been employed in a Watch Office. His knowledge of aircraft recognition is extremely good and he remustered to Ground Observer in the rank of Leading Aircraftsman with the greatest ease. Having no aircraft to observe, he sits drawing them. The skill with which he produces recognisable sketches of different types is quite remarkable. All these Ground Observers were previously employed on a very busy screen, but they realise that one plot in three months in an area such as this may very well have much greater significance than the plotting of 70-80 aircraft daily, as was customary on their coastal sites. Time presses. The C.O. has sent a message to El Arish via the unit control at Ismailia, stating that he will be there at 19.00 hours. After a light tiffin we set off again along the desert track.
* * *

Our tour of the Posts is complete. We have seen them out on their lonely encampments in the desert; the duty observers in solitary isolation at their observation points. So far as we can judge they are doing their job conscientiously and in some cases with surprising enthusiasm. At Ismailia, we shall learn what Filters think of them.

First Air Att Wiener N eustadt

ON 13TH AUGUST aircraft from Cyrenaica dropped bombs on Greater Germany for the first time since the beginning of the war. The target was the Messerschmidt assembly works at Wiener Neustadt, south of Vienna, and Liberators of five Bombardment Groups of the Ninth U.S.A.F. were briefed. This event marked another step forward in the war against Germany. It was no random attack, but part of the general bombing scheme, linking up with attacks on similar fighter manufacturing works in other districts of Germany. Thus, on 17th August British-based U.S.A.F. Fortresses bombed the Messerschmidt plant at Regensburg in Bavariaand carried on across the Alps to land in North Africa; on 9th October other Fortresses from Britain visited the Focke-Wulf assembly works at Marienburg in East Prussia, almost on the Polish frontier. The aircraft of the Luftwaffe, having already lost control of the skies, were now being hounded even before they could take to the air. These crushing blows aimed at the centres of Germany's fighter aircraft production were, in turn, all part of the wider bombing pattern speading inexorably over Nazi-controlled Europe. By now Germany has realized that nowhere can German war industry in Greater Germany itself, in Norway, in Rumania or anywhere else - carry on its work unmolested. From Britain or the Mediterranean the heavy bombers can reach out to every corner. Preparing for the Attack The attack on Wiener Neustadt was planned to take place shortly after the heavy daylight attack on the Ploesti oil refineries near Bucharest. Three extra Bombardment Groups had flown out to the Middle East for that operation and were retained for the Wiener Neustadt raid. Contrasted tactics were employed in the two operations. At Ploesti the aircraft went in at very low level - between 100 and 700 feet - and At the attack was as concentrated as possible. Wiener Neustadt the bombing was done from 17,500 to 22,500 feet, and extreme concentration was not attempted. American 500 lb. and 1,000 lb. H.E. bombs and clusters of incendiaries were used. A total of 101 aircraft were despatched - 26 of the 44th Bombardment Group, 20 of the 93rd, 5 of the 98th, 27 of the 376th and 23 of the 389th. These were the same groups that had attacked Ploesti. The intention was that two-thirds of the effort should be directed against the Steyr-Daimler component factory and the remaining one-third against the final fighter airframe assembly plant. The Attack Carried Out The weather was an important factor and owing to unsuitable conditions the operation had to be postponed once. On the 13th the weather, although it did not prevent the attack from taking place, affected its success adversely. En route 10/10th cloud was encountered and the target itself was covered by 4/10th cumulus. Consequently, owing to this and to engine trouble only 61 of the Liberators reached Wiener Neustadt. Twenty aircraft of the 44th Group got through and dropped 90,000 lbs. of bombs from 22,000 to 22,500 feet; the target was. well covered with bursts and many fires and explosions were noted. Fourteen of the 93rd Group's aircraft dropped 50,900 lbs. from 20,000 to 21,000 feet; hits were observed on the assembly plant and repair shops, None of the 98th Group's aircraft made the target; one developed mechanical trouble and the other four were forced by the weather to turn back 100 miles south of their destination. Nine aircraft of the 376th Group, dropping 36,000 lbs. of bombs from 17,500 to 19,000 feet, saw direct hits on buildings, followed by fires and explosions, one rising to 10,000 feet. Good results were also reported by the eighteen aircraft of the 389th Group that reached the target, where they dropped 74,000 lbs. of bombs from 17,800 feet. Losses were extremely light, only one aircraft failing to return and being last seen losing altitude and heading towards Switzerland. Such A.A. fire that was encountered was said to be inaccurate. Enemy fighters were few and far between and one FW. 190 and one ME. 109 were shot down. Results of the Attack Photographic evidence showed that results of the attack were fairly good. All the main buildings in each target were hit at least once. In the Steyr-Daimler factory four hits were made on the large workshop in the south-east corner and one on the boiler-house. Each of the three machine-shops on the south side received at least one hit and the machine-shop on the north side tav s'qs, which also two hits as well: .nin 1

1'g;i-

DE j.I

probably damaged several adjac 1 fire developed in the extreme south of the target area, possibly among stores. In the final assembly plant there were at least one or two direct hits on each of the four assembly shops and one on the repair shop. One hangar was set on fire and the hutted camp in the south-east received eight hits. Many bombs burst among parked aircraft on the factory airfield and some twenty were believed to have been written off.

In addition, numerous bursts were seen on the Henschel and Sohn factory, (reported variously as producing locomotives, tanks or aircraft components) that lies between the two main targets, and there were also bursts on the factory railway sidings and four hits on the main railway line to, Vienna. Wienier Neustadt was to experience other attacks, but these lie outside the period covered by this issue "of the Mediterranean Review, and will be considered later.

Wiener Nei~stadt under attack, 13th August, 1943.

*LASSWIEB

Details of damage at Wiener Neustadt.

1.

Alrfrcarme

works

West Wing, damage to Damage Shop to centre.

5. Blast
station.

damage to Gunnery

Synchronisation

31,000 sq. ft., roof, and to offices. to roof of vaulted shop in

the east has two direct hits, and blast damage over 16,000 sq. ft. A shed and stores damaged. Hits on tarmac and taxi track. 8. Aircraft Assembly Shop
-

(Approximately

1 3/4 acres, with 8 gun A.A. position on roof). Two hits in centre. Two large holes and blast damage over more than half the area. Craters on tarmac and blast damage to small building. 8. Compass Swinging Base. Hit on edge, air-

Similar to Item 6. Aircraft Assembly Shop (2) - More than one third destroyed, with roof damage over whole area. Escaped oil and debris on ground behind. 7. Large L-shaped stores building (88,000 sq. ft.) Destroyed over 4,500 sq. ft. by direct hit, with blast damage over more than half roof area. 8. Unidentified building. Damage from blast. 9.' Two sheds destroyed by fire. 10. Flight hangar and one aircraft destroyed by fire. 11. Small building damaged.

craft damaged. 4. raters on landing are.

101

4 (C~oftinu t onagj1QjL

Det~t~Y I

(Continued from page 101) 12. Aircraft destroyed on tarmac. 18. R.R. damaged, but still in service. 14. Damage to huts in Labour camp, south-east of works. 15. Damage to south-west corner of Labour camp. 16. Thirty hits on Labour camp towards east end. 17. Sixteen hits in area between R.R. and road. 18. Henschel and Sohn Werke (Heavy Engineering). Damage to long stores building by direct hit and two near misses. 19. Severe damage over one third of total area
to workshop (110 x 385 ft.).

Aircraft - damaged or destroyed, one medium and at leasLaiwk Hll. A

Steyr-Daimler-Puch A.G. (Engineering) 20. Two sheds damaged by blast. 21. Machine and Assembly Shops (four and three quarter acres). Two or more direct hits in centre and blast damage to roof. 22. Long shop at item 21, covering 22,500 sq. ft. Three quarters of roof damaged by blast. 23. Hit in courtyard, and blast damage. 24. Power Station damaged by blast. 25. Machine and Assembly Shop (over three acres). Direct hit near centre causing hole 4,500 sq. ft. Extensive damage to roof. 26. Machine and Assembly Shop (four and three quarter acres). One shed gutted; slight damage to roof area. 27. Workshop (over two acres). Hole in roof approximately 4,200 sq. ft. and other damage e-quarters of roof area. llI Ib pW

53f

ER **LTaao!i

Development Of Enemy Bombs And Offensive Weapons

___~
No. 1 RADIO CONTROLLED BOMBS THE MOST IMPORTANT innovation in recent German bombing technique has been the introduction of radio controlled bombs. The Germans have produced these new weapons as a result of their relative lack of success in ordinary forms. of bombing and torpedo attacks and by reason of the casualties sustained by their aircraft using these methods. The basic idea of the radio controlled bomb is to enable the attacking aircraft to remain outside the range of effective A.A. fire, and still obtain the necessary accuracy. Since the chief target of these attacks is shipping, the additional advantage of the ability to counter any avoiding action vessels may take, is of great value. Up to the present two different types of radio controlled bomb have been encountered, namely the P.C.1400 F.X. armour-piercing type of slightly over 3,000 lb. which is used mainly against large warships, and the H.S.293 jet propelled glider bomb, believed to weigh 1,760 lb. and intended primarily forattacks on merchant shipping. A considerable amount of information about these weapons and their operation has now been obtained from P/W sources, eye-witness reports, examination of fragments of the bombs themselves and from inspection of wrecked specimens of the parent aircraft abandoned on captured Italian landing grounds. This has enabled the following details to be given and provisional drawings to be made. The P.C. 1400 F.X. The P.C.1400 F.X. is a normal 3,000 lb. armourpiercing bom6, adapted for radio control. The modifications, consist of the attachment of four wide fins to the body of the bomb at the centre of gravity and the provision of a new lengthened tail cone housing the batteries, radio receiver and control unit. At the rear of the tail cone is a rectangular tail drum mounted on four wide struts of aerofoil section which incorporate the moveable surfaces directing the flight of the bomb. A tracer tube or electric lamp is fitted in the tail to enable the bomb aimer to follow its fall and The overall apply the necessary corrections. length of the bomb is 11', and the span of the fins 5' and that of the tail drum approximately 4'. The DO.217 K-2 is the only aircraft at present in service which is known to have been used to 103 carry these bombs, being specially modified by increasing the span from 62' 5" to 80' 6" to enable the load to be carried to the necessary height, and having also a redesigned nose to give a better streanilined form combined with improved visibility for pilot and observer. Two large external faired racks are fitted, one under each wing between the fuselage and engine nacelles, although often only one bomb is carried, in which case a 200 gallon jettisonable fuel tank may be fitted on the opposite side to the bomb. The bomb aimer's equipment consists essentially of a normal Lotfe 7D level bomb sight which can, however, be tilted fore and aft slightly, and a control box and transmitter unit. The controls are quite simple, merely giving left or right and fore and aft deflection. The operational procedure with this weapon is After the target has been found as follows:(some machines may be equipped with A.S.V. for this purpose) the aircraft climbs oi 15,000 25,000 ft., this height being necessary in brder.to obtain the full penetrative effect of the bomb and to give the bomb aimer time to apply lhe required corrections during its fall. The radio control system is then switched on, aim taken through the sight and the bomb released in the usual way. As soon as it has left the aircraft, the pilot throttles back to enable the bomb aimer, who tilts his sight if required, to keep the bomb in view. Tables carried define the precise amount of deceleration necessary ' After the bomb has fallen freely fo' 2' seconds or more, according to the height of rlase, the bomb aimer may begin to control it, keeping, the trace or light in the tail directly over'the target the whole time. The limits of control are said to be approximately 500 yards fore and aft and 350 yards laterally, and 80% direct hits are claimed to have been made with this bomb in practice, although this figure is hardly likely to be obtained under operational conditions. The H.S.293 The H.S.293 differs considerably from a normal bomb, resembling closely a small aircraft in actual fact. The span is about 11' and the length 10'. The airframe is constructed almost entirely of light alloy, the nose, however, consisting of a normal 1,100 lb. thin case bomb, which probably forms a rigid attachment point for the wings. The batteries, radio receiver and control

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Provisional drawing of HS 293 in flight

unit are mounted in the fuselage behind the explosive portion, and the fuselage terminates in a tail unit similar to that of an ordinary aircraft except that no moveable rudder is fitted, control being carried out by elevator and ailerons only. Below the fuselage is mounted a streamlined nacelle housing the jet propulsion unit with its fuel tanks. A 100 watt electric lamp is carried in the tail to enable the observer to follow the bomb's course without difficulty. The H.S. 293 has so far been used by DO 217 E-5s with the normal wing span of 62' 5", and HE. 177s are also reported to have been in action for the first time carrying these bombs. Two bombs may be carried on the DO.217, one under each wing 12' 8" inboard of the wing tips on large faired racks, or as in the case of the P.C.1400 F.X. a jettisonable fuel tank may replace one of the bombs. The control apparatus both on the aircraft and on the bomb is the same as that used with the P.C.1400 F.X., with only slight modifications, but the method of attack with this weapon differs considerably. The aircraft usually flies parallel to the course of the ship to be attacked, either in the same direction or on a reciprocal course and at a distance of 3- 5 miles, i.e. beyond effective A.A. range, and at a height of 2,000 ft. to 6,000 ft., varying according to the distance from the ship, which may be measured accurately by the use of A.S.V. No bomb sight is used, the bomb being released by judgment only. It first falls freely for a second or two before the jet propulsion unit starts up and propels it forward, so that it forges ahead of the parent aircraft. The bomb aimer now turns it towards the target and keeps it heading steadily on its course. The power jet is exhausted after about six seconds, at the end of which period the bomb has reached a speed of 350 - 400 m.p.h. It now commences to glide at an angle of 15 - 20 and the observer counters any evasive action the ship may take. If the bomb is seen to be overshooting it can be made to dive on to the ship, while if it is falling short, the glide can be flattened to some extent. A short delay fuse is fitted to make the bomb burst inside the ship, but in some cases the bombs have passed right through and exploded on the far side, or have failed to detonate at all. Owing to the short period during which the transmitter is working, and the fact that the receiver is fitted with separate explosive charges to ensure self-destruction even in the event of the bomb itself failing to go off, the Germans believe it will be very difficult for us to discover the frequencies used and jam them. The individual operation of the various controls on the bomb is effected by means of very selective vibratory relays, and it is likely that two different carrier wave frequencies may be employed, on which can be superimposed several low frequency modulations, which through the relays select the required controls. Further developments in radio controlled bombs must be expected and, in addition to those already mentioned two other versions are reported to exist, namely the H.S.294, which is believed to be similar to the H.S.293 but larger, being about 15' in span and 17' long, and the H.S.293 "H", said to be intended for attacks on hea

105

DECLASS

Hs._293
SCALE: A2 IN, =I FT.

DE

bomber formations, as it can be exploded at any desired point in its flight. Counter Measures and Tactics Apart from radio counter measures, which are the subject of research at present, the best methods of defence against radio controlled bombs would appear to be the provision of adequate fighter cover at all times when attacks are imminent. If this is not available the parent aircraft should be engaged with heavy A.A. before and after release of the bomb and, in the case of

the H.S.293, light A.A. fire should be brought to bear on the bomb itself during its approach. Violent evasive action should also be taken by the ship, and the use of searchlights directed at the parent aircraft to dazzle and confuse the bomb aimer might be seriously considered. These weapons have not so far been identified in attacks on land targets, probably owing to the danger of fighter opposition and the wish to preserve the secrets of construction, but it is possible that they will be used against important land targets in the future.

U tlll~nE

ON 9th MAY, 1943, a Middle East Administration Order was issued to the effect that Nos. 21, 22, 24 and 25 Medical Receiving Stations were to be known henceforth as R.A.F. Mobile Field Hospitals. This date marked the end of an outstanding chapter in the history of the R.A.F. Medical Service. The Medical Receiving Stations have long been familiar to many R.A.F. operational units throughout the various phases of the Middle East campaigns. Their original conception before the War was to serve as Clearing Stations to a chain of operational units in the field, and transport their casualties to railheads in the rear. But as the campaign in the Middle East unfolded itself, they soon developed into something quite beyond the original ideas of their creators, and became fully equipped hospitals, mobile to keep pace with swiftest moving R.A.F. ground units, able to cope with any type of casualty, and prepared for every emergency. They served functions specific to the R.A.F. Medical Service, unattainable by any Army Medical unit in the field. Not only did they provide aircrew casualties with the means of being restored to health in the atmosphere of their own Medical Service-no mean factor in dealing with patients keyed-up to operational fervour, often highly strung, and restless to get back to their squadrons--hut they were also the means o i of returning essentai mmnbers of

to their units in the shortest possible time. Thus, they were often able to effect a saving of many weeks or even months, which would have otherwise been lost, had these R.A.F. patients been transported through a chain of Army units from Casualty Clearing Stations to Base Hospitals in the Canal Zone or the Levant. Numerous cases were inevitably transferred from the Medical Receiving Stations back to base. But these were cases involving prolonged convalescence, e.g. severe fractures, burns, chronic diseases, or cases where rehabilitation was required. Such cases invariably do better far removed from the forward areas. But in all these instances, the time factor no longer exists. Their period of non-effectiveness will often run into many months, and the one factor to be considered is the patient's ultimate restoration to some degree of active service. The most striking tribute that can be paid to the work of the M.R.Ss lies in the high percentage of patients returned direct to their units, after a minimum period of non-effectiveness. The following account deals separately with the progress, life and vicissitudes of the four Medical Receiving Stations in chronological sequence. No. 21 Medical Receiving Station Pride of place must be accorded to No. 21 M.R.S., self-styled "The Old Firm-Western De-

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sert, 1940-41-42-43" on its signboard. Formed originally at Helwan on 8th April, 1940, with "sufficient equipment for six hospital beds, and 20 stretchers," the unit received its number on 15th May, 1940. Two months were spent in assembling equipment, acquiring transport, and training personnel. It first began to function on 17th June, within a week of Italy's entry into the War, and pitched its camp at Fuka, a location that often recurs in the history of all the Medical Receiving Stations. The First Phase : June, 1940 - January, 1941 No. 21 M.R.S. remained at Fuka for seven months until 12th January, 1941, when the speed of General Wavell's advance necessitated its move forward into Cyrenaica. During these months of fruitful activity, the unit passed through many initial difficulties and gained a wealth of desert experience. Conditions, however, were far from ideal. The Operating Theatre was dug in at first barely four feet below the surface, with a flooring of old wood and duckboards, and its walls built up of petrol tins and sandbags. The Sterilising Room was built in with 'sandbags, and roofed over with old sleepers. Fuka was, unfortunately, rarely free from sandstorms at any time of the year, and in the months of June, July, and August, conditions were at their most trying. The sand blew eastwards from the escarpment at Fuka Satellite landing ground, and enveloped the M.R.S. in a whirling canopy that settled on everything within reach. Sandstorms raged for hours on end, sometimes continuing incessantly for two or three days. The heat was intense, with that searing quality so peculiar to the Khamseen, the burning wind that blows with gale force across the desert. Visibility was often nil, rarely more than a few feet at a time. After each gale, the sand lay piled up across the entrances, and covered instruments, drugs, patients and staff alike. Rarely indeed, can major surgery have been performed under less promising conditions. By the end of July, further equipment had arrived, and accommodation now consisted of sixteen beds, eight surgical and eight medical. In August a large increase in personnel took place, two additional officers and 45 airmen arriving at the M.R.IS. on posting from the U.K. With them, a notable expansion of activity followed, 61 cases being admitted during the month, of whom less than 20% had to be evacuated to base hospitals. The Air Evacuation of casualties had already begun to function successfully. Seriously wounded patients were loaded on to a Bombay, and flown from Fuka Satellite landing ground with the minimum of disturbance to base at Heliopolis. The activities of the M.R.S. grew so rapidly that early in September a new site had to be found, lying immediately south of the DabaMatruh road, near the point where it meets the road to Fuka station. This site, in view of past. experiences, was carefully chosen andiprepared.

A small army of native labourers were employed to excavate the site, to dig in wards, operating theatre and reception room well below the ground surface, so that nothing could be seen above, to lay down concrete floors and approaches, to instal adequate ventilation, and protection against sandstorms. The new site served admirably. Despite the intense heat, it was found to be remarkably cool. The surroundings were cleaner and more free from dust. In its new home, the unit was able to settle down to four months of useful activity till its onward move in January, 1941. It is axiomatic that a hospital throws open its doors to all comers. The call of suffering, from time immemorial, has known no distinction of colour or creed. Very early in its history, No. 21 M.R.S. was able to record that its patients "now include members of all three services." Hardly had it begun to function, before its first Italian prisoner-of-war was admitted. Army units in the vicinity regularly sent their patients to its Wards and Sick-Parades, and Egyptian Army units availed themselves equally of its facilities. Indians patients were accorded skilled surgical assistance, and later seen safely to their own hospital at Daba. In October there occurred a striking incident which demonstrated the service that No. 21 M.R.S. was already performing, and its response to the wider calls of humanity. On the night of 13/14th October, a train filled with native refugees, fleeing to Alexandria from Graziani's invading forces, was bombed by Italian aircraft. Not only was the train crowded with natives, but with them were also their wives and children, their livestock and other possessions, and, while halted at Fuka station, it provided an easy target. Immediately on receipt of the news, a rescue party from 21 M.R.S. Sproceeded to their assistance. A scene of indesscribable carnage presented itself. Determination of the correct number of casualties was rendered difficult, as the carcases of dead animals were heaped with dead and severely injured natives. At least five people had been killed outright, and the work of extricating the wounded was greatly hampered by the fact that enemy aircraft were continually circling low in the vicinity, and no light could be used. Over thirty victims, including many women and children, received treatment at 21 M.R.S. that night. At least two had multiple compound fractures, on which life-saving operations were performed immediately. Both were given Blood Transfusions obtained from voluntary donors among the R.A.F. personnel on the unit. Despite their serious injuries, they both stood a favourable chance of survival when transferred to a civilian hospital. The work of 21 M.R.S., on behalf of the native victims, elicited not only a tribute from the A.O.C.-in-C., but also a letter of gratitude from the Egyptian Ministry of Public Health, Cairo, expressing :through the Under S eretary of State, "apirsci tion for the prompt n nd skil l iassistancen rendered to uaI

the Bedouin refugees on the night of 13/14th October." In October, the number of admissions rose to 202, and the operations performed to 57. An interesting development was the formation at 21 M.R.S. of a mobile Surgical Team, complete with crash kit and full surgical equipment, for transport by air to the scene of any accident. In November, 1940, the facilities available at 21 M.R.S. were extended by the construction of a Resuscitation Ward for the early treatment of shock in severely injured patients. This lay between the Reception Ward and the Operating Theatre, and was built of concrete floor and walls.. Three teams of four nursing orderlies each, selected for their skill and keenness, were specially trained in giving intravenous transfusions, and were always available in the Resuscitation Ward. These methods were soon. firmly established, and became generally adopted as the routine treatment of severely injured cases. During the bitter cold of the winter months, when blinding sandstorms and high winds alternated with heavy rainstorms and drenching showers, the unit enlarged its site, erected permanent buildings for the accommodation of personnel, and still further extended its equipment. All the Wards, as well as Operating Theatre, Laboratory, X-Ray Room, and Resucitation Ward were now dug-in at a depth of eight feet below the surface, and well-built with concreted floors. No. 21 M.R.S. Moves into Cyrenaica The enemy air attacks became more and more insistent with the long winter nights. Emboldened by their forward sweep over the frontier, and their advance as far as Sidi Barrani, 56 miles inside Egyptian territory on 16th September, Marshal Graziani's air force made many raids on our landing grounds east of Mersa Matruh. Early in December, however, the pendulum swung back with a vengeance. On thee night of 8/9th December, General Wavell launched his offensive, and within a week our Army swept into Cyrenaica on the heels of an Italian army in full retreat. The elation of victory soon communicate d itself to the M.R.S. Italian prisoners-of-war filter d ed in for treatment, and rumours rapidly spreac of an impending forward move. By 10th Januar the main party of 21 M.R.S. had been trans ferred to Solla.. with full surgyical enui . ment, ambulances and tenders, and on the 11th the Operating Theatre dealt with several air-raid casualties. The houses of Sollum, however, proved unsuitable as a locale for the M.R.S. Heavy traffic lumbered by on the main road, trailing clouds of dust, and the whole area, already fouled by Italian troops and prisoners, soon became a large Army supply dump, and a vulnerable military objective. A move was therefore made 1 to the top of the of Sollum. Here, .s

ditions, amid severe gales and sandstorms, the M.R R.S. gradually established itself. To the rigours of the weather were added other tribulaTents were blown down, transport needed tions. overha I, rations were short, the water-supply brackish Sand unsuitable, and the soil varied between e extremes of too-soft sand and too-hard Within two weeks, however, the M.R.S. rock. was ag" ain on the move, and by 25th January occupiedI a Rest-House some 15 miles east of occupied Tobruk. Here the accommodation was far more promisir ig, and soon .the unit was comfortably settled and in full operation. Again, however, the sign al to move forward was received, and an advance party proceeded on 12th February to Benghazzi, where a prospective site with excellent facilitiess was found in the headquarters of an Italian bbank. These hopes, unfortunately, did not material ise, for on 15th February the forward move w as cancelled, and the advance party had to retur n to Tobruk. A few days later, a signal arrived authorising the unit's return to Helwan to refit. On 1st March, camp at Tobruk was struck, and by the 3rd, the whole unit had returned to its base at Helwan. D u r n g the five and a half months from Septem ber, 1940, to February, 1941, several days of whic ch had been spent in transit and organisati on, No. 21 M.R.S. admitted a total of 828 cas es, of whom well over 60% were R.A.F. personn el. The remainder consisted of Army units, I]ndian troops, Egyptian troops and civilians. T he average daily bed state was seventeen, and the number of operations performed was 239. Eight d eaths were recorded, of whom three were native Arabs, and two Italian prisoners-of-war, with se' vere multiple injuries. Over 42% of the R.A.F. cases were discharged to their units, but this fig ure would have been improved upon considerabl y had not mass discharges to base hospital s been necessitated by the unit's moves. cond Phase: April, 1941 - January, 1942 EARL! Y IN APRIL 1941, a small Advance Party of 21 M .R.S. moved again to its old site at Fuka, fully eq uipped to work as a surgical unit. The work ex:panded rapidly, especially on the medical side, wi hich soon tended to outstrip the surgical work pe rformed; an experience which became the rule in jfuture campaigns. Further personnel and extra e quipment were added, and by mid-June the uni t was functioning efficiently as a complete fiield hospital. Owing to the large numbers of Army personnel arriving for treatment, an R.A.M.C. Field Ambulance was sent to Fuka, and took over most. of the out-patient work. 'Army cases, however, still continued to be admitted to 21 M.R.S. for surgical treatment. For the quarter ending June, 1941, of a total of 816 admissions, over 60% were R.A.F. personnel, and the remaining 40% Army and other units. The average daily ad now'increased by over 100% from e 36.

Bench for Microscopy and inner compartment for Serological work

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During

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move forward began in November, 1941, the work at the unit was well maintained. An average of over 203 admissions per month was recorded, of whom R.A.F. personnel constituted 83%. The daily Bed State continued to average over 30, and the number of operations 50 per month. The main incidents during this period alternated between frequent air-raids and severe sandstorms. One event of note was the celebration of the Unit's first anniversary by a Dinner held on 26th September, and the taking of a Cine News-Reel of the Unit at work. On 12th October, Fuka station was severely bombed by seven JU. 88s, which dived low over 21 M.R.S. in making their approach runs. A petrol and ammunition train was hit, and a series of explosions continued throughout the night. The main water-point was damaged, and an acute water shortage resulted. On 25th October further heavy raids occurred on Fuka station, with the explosion of a main petrol dump. Of four cases of severe burns subsequently admitted to 21 M.R.S. three were employees of the Egyptian State Railways, one of whom died early the next morning. The Second Move Into Cyrenaica News came through at the end of October that a forward move was imminent, and on 1st November, an advance party of 21 M.R.S. proceeded to L.G. 215, its new site in the centre of several forward landing grounds, situated in the open desert, about 50 miles due south of Sidi Barrani. No. 22 M.R.S. arrived at Fuka on November 4th to taxe over the site. As its convoy halted on the main road, the arrival was hailed by a party of four JU.88s, which dived out of the low cloud, and dropped several bombs in the immediate vicinity. An hour later, the greeting was again renewed by flares and further salvoes of bombs. Only one casuality resulted, however. By 6th November, the site had been handed over, all the patients transferred, and No. 21 M.R.S. was away in full convoy. Next day saw the unit with all its tents erected on the new site, and fully operational. Its stay, however, was of brief duration. In less than a fortnight, orders came through for a further move forward. On 18th November, General Auchinleck launched his "Crusader" Offensive, which at first achieved a dramatic success. Within two months, Benghasi was once again in our hands, and the enemy driven back to El Agheila. On November 21st, No. 21 M.R.S. moved to a new site near Fort Maddalena, six miles east of the Frontier wire, and about 40 miles due south of SoZlum. It was fully operative almost immediately and on the third day no fewer than 27 patients were admitted. These were exciting days. Enemy raids were Irequent, ani air battles took place in full view of the camp. Valuable stores were salvaged from the s o e Ip 3 abandoned e
.

expression to an opinion that "the Germans are respecting the Red Cross in this campaign. British wounded recaptured by our troops and brought to 21 M.R.S., stated that their treatment at German hands was excellent. Also certain Army Medical Units who fell into enemy hands stated that they received consideration from their captors." These were destined, however, to be isolated incidents. A notable event during this period was the evacuation of 81 casualties by air from 21 M.R.S. during the last week of November, practically all Army cases. Few severe battle casualties were dealt with during the month, and even more striking still was the small number of R.A.F. personnel reporting sick, and the trivial nature of their injuries. During the month of November, consequent upon the frequent moves and the increasing tempo of operations, the number of admissions fell to 157 (60% R.A.F., 40% Army.) The average daily Bed State fell from 34 at Fuka to eleven at L.G. 110, and fifteen at L.G. 122. The total number of operations for the month was 34. Forward to El Adem, and Back to Base Early in December, orders were received for a new move to a site near Tobruk. By 11th December, all tents and equipment had been packed, and the remaining patients evacuated by air in a Bombay to Heliopolis. The unit reached its new site at El Duda on the 12th, eight miles east of El Adem, and was operating within a few hours. Normal activity was resumed, although the number of admissions declined. Many of the casualties consisted of injuries resulting from the handling of grenades, and wandering into minefields. Christmas, 1942, was celebrated in a heavy rainstorm, but salvaged Italian soup, Roast Pork, Tinned Beer, and Christmas Pudding on the menu lent a seasonable atmosphere. The year ended amid a downpour of rain, with bitter cold gales blowing dontinuously. Early in the new year, the order came again to return to base. On 14th January, after a five days' ordeal, buffetted by severe sandstorms and delayed by persistent breakdowns of transport, the convoy finally crawled into Helwan. The early months of 1942 saw the creation of R.A.F. Hospital, Egypt. A newly-built hospital at Abbassia was re-adapted and fully equipped for the reception of R.A.F. aircrew casualties requiring base hospital treatment. For the launching of this new enterprise, the skill and experience of 21 M.R.S. proved invaluable. To the Quartermaster of the unit was allotted the responsible task of initiating the Hospital and arranging for its equipment and medical stores; a large number of Nursing Orderlies and airmen from 21 M.R.S. were also posted to the new Hospital. No. 21 M.R.S. at Daba During the four following months, the remainof 21 M.R.S. at. Helwan was engaged in re-

newing its equipment and reorganising its changed personnel. Among noteworthy items of new equipment were three Army-type Hospital marquees, which could be expanded by the addition of extra central-sections, and enlarged to accommodate as many as thirty patients in a single ward. On 17th May, 1942, the unit left its base in a convoy of 24 vehicles and three trailers, nearly all of uniform type to facilitate maintenance, and arrived next day at its new site near Daba. A very useful period was spent at Daba. The unit was favourably impressed with its new equipment, and relieved to exchange the monotony of four months at base for the exhilaration of full activity in the Western Desert. The work expanded rapidly during June, when 263 admissions were recorded. During this month, the percentages of R.A.F. and Army admissions were reversed, for of this total, only 41% were R.A.F. personnel, the remainder consisting of Army and allied units. These figures are accounted for by the absence of fully-equipped Army units in this area, although the situation was partly relieved by the arrival of an Army Field Ambulance towards the end of June. The M.R.S. still continued, however, to perform major surgical duties for Army personnel. Throughout June, the average daily Bed State was 21, and the number of operations performed totalled 73. Many of these were surgical emergencies, the result of enemy action during the anxious days of the withdrawal. The Move to Amriya On 24th June, large numbers of R.A.F. units passed through the Daba area, retreating after the fall of Tobruk. A movement of 21 M.R.S. to the rear was thus anticipated, and a partial packup begun. The portable crash kit and transfusion apparatus were taken on several occasions to the scenes of bombing, and used with good effect. A train smash near Daba occurred on the night of 26th June, and eight seriously injured cases brought to 21 M.R.S. for operation. Both 22 and 24 M.R.S. had already withdrawn well to the rear, and No. 21 alone remained to serve the forward fighter units. As the scene of fighting drew nearer to the M.R.S., cases had to be evacuated quickly, and the admissions consisted almost solely of surgical emergencies. On 29th June, the order came to move at once to Amriya, but the actual departure had to be delayed for two hours, while an urgent operation was performed for removal of a bomb fragment from the abdomen. Amriya, however, was reached safely late that night, and the convoy drawn up off the road. A new site was selected near L.G.90 the next day, about 12 miles south of Amriya, and 21 M.R.S. continued throughout the following four months to serve the forward fighter wings. During this static period, a vast expansion took place of all the R.A.F. units in the vicinity. New fighter and bomber wings arrived, and the M.R.S.

found itself coping with a large increase in its number of patients. During the four months, an average of 482 cases per month were admitted, of whom 79% were R.A.F. personnel. Of these over 50% were returned to their units directly, or through No. 22 M.R.S., which served as the R.A.F. holding unit. Cold statistics, however, convey but little idea of the manifold activities of 21 M.R.S. during these critical months. Every effort was made to prevent R.A.F. casualties, especially aircrews and ground personnel, from being evacuated In through Army lines of communication. a period of intensive preparation for the final onslaught every man counted. Of the R.A.F. casualties who. were unavoidably evacuated to Army hospitals, the majority were afterwards exceedingly difficult to trace. Several weeks and even months elapsed before they were eventually able to return to their units, and then, almost without exception, only after having first been evacuated to base. Here No. 22 M.R.S., stationed at Wadi Natrun as a holding unit, rendered incalculable service. Thither were sent most of the cases of Malaria and Infective Hepatitis, which at one time constituted more than 25% of the total admissions. These required longer treatment than could be given in a forty-bedded unit, but could be saved from the maelstrom of evacuation to Army hospitals at base. Medical admissions, of great variety and considerable clinical interest, continued to predominate over surgical, and, as noted always during a static period, the relative incidence of operational wounds fell among the latter group. Yet the work of the unit increased so enormously that an average of no fewer than 104 operations was performed each month, 37% of a major character. The relative proximity of all three M.R.iSs to each other, and to Air H.Q., Western Desert, proved of great value. Periodic conferences were held, problems were discussed, ideas exchanged, and a helpful spirit of close working co-operation evolved. Frequent meetings were also held for unit Medical Officers attached to R.A.F. Squadrons, at which matters of clinical interest were discussed, and demonstrations given of Blood Transfusion technique and M.R.S. equipment. A new departure was also undertaken by each of the M.R.Ss, in their constitution as sub-depots for the distribution of medical stores to any R.A.F. unit in transit through the Western Desert. The Advance to Tripoli Early in November came the news of the VIIIth Army's break through at El Alamein, and the wholesale German and Italian retreat. After a rapid pack-up, No. 21 M.R.S. moved forward to Daba on 6th November and thereafter moved speedily with the advanced fighter units, keeping in close communication with the Air Transport Centre, in order to maintain full air evacuation facilities for its patients. Mersa Matruh, Sollum, Gambut, Gazala, Martuba and

<~a.V ii

:i'

Barce were passed through and by 1st December the unit was installed in the Italian Colonial Hospital at Benghasi. The Rear Section remained here attached to 22 M.R.S. to form an enlarged holding unit, while the Advance Party sped onwards, keeping pace the whole time with the forward fighter wings. By the end of the year, 21 M.R.S. had covered no fewer than 1,200 miles, halting at innumerable posts en route, treating sick and wounded with unremitting care, and arranging their evacuation by air from the various landing grounds nearby. It had originally been intended to leap-frog the M.R.Ss in the event of an advance. The rapidity of the pursuit, however, soon led to the abandonment of the original plans. No. 21 M.R.S. had. by now become an almost integral part of the advanced fighter wings, and was far ahead of Nos. 22 and 24 M.R.S' in the rear. The speed of the chase spurred it on. Morale was high, and with it also a keenness to be in the very forefront of the R.A.F. advance to Tripoli. The airmen took a pride in the speed with which operational tentage could be dismantled, re-erected on its new site, and rendered fully functioning again. Non-medical personnel took a lively interest in the work of the unit, and were often seen rendering useful help in the wards, during their off-duty hours. Appreciative messages on the work achieved were received from, among others, the Principal Medical Officer and the D.M.S. of the South African Forces. But the satisfaction of having kept pace with the advanced fighter wings without any loss of efficiency brought its own reward. It was learnt from experience that the M.R.S. could move forward more quickly in sections, than in one whole party. Usually on arrival at any location, the majority of admissions were of a surgical nature, such as mine casualties or wounds from enemy action. After a few days, however, medical cases were again in the ascendant. Thus, on receipt of a movement order, the Surgical Unit would strike off at once, and leave at early dawn for the new location, usually 100 miles in advance. The Medical Section and rear party would then evacuate all the remaining patients, including surgical cases, by air transport to base, and follow on in 24 hours' time. Thus, by the time the rear party were leaving the old site, the forward party were already receiving sick or wounded cases at their new location. The advance party of 21 M.R.S. consisted of the Operating Theatre and Resuscation Room, one Surgical Ward and full X-Ray equipment, with the C.O. Surgeon, Anaesthetist, and 22 personnel in attendance, conveyed in six vehicles, including two ambulances. The chain of R.A.F. Air Evacuation Centres worked well in the forward areas, casualties being ferried back to base by No. 1 Australian Air Ambulance Unit (flying D.H. 86s) or by Bombays or Lodestars. No f r t pt~atients noi s as were thus evacuated during

the static, 214 during the mobile period) from No. 21 M.R.S. alone. The end of 1942 found 21 M.R.S. operating at Marble Arch. By 11th January, it had moved beyond Sirte to Hamraiet, and on 23rd January the unit celebrated the fall of Tripoli at Darragh, 40 miles south-west of Misurata. The unit remained here until 13th February, when it moved steadily forward past Tripoli, El Assa and Zuara, to reach Medenine, close to the Mareth Line, on 21st February, 1943. During the month of February, the unit operated only 20 beds in the forward areas, owing to the fall in the number of admissions, and left a rear party behind at Tripoli, to assist in the opening up of No. 24 M.R.S. as a holding unit. Medenine was welcomed as the first pleasant site since leaving Helwan ten months previously. The unit was not, however, destined to remain there for long. The site proved to be too near the front line. Considerable aircraft activity greeted the unit on its arrival, including groundstraffing of an adjacent landing ground, and low swoops by ME.109s over the camp. The groundstraffing continued by day and night. Artillery duels and bombing were heard incessantly, and even the Air Ambulances were reluctant to venture thus far forward. On 2nd March, the order came to withdraw to a site 25 miles to the rear, as a German counter attack was expected. Next day found the unit fully operational at Neffetia, and here it remained almost three weeks. The number of admissions during March rose" to nearly three times that of the previous month, and the two wards of twenty beds were fully extended. Out of 197 admissions, no fewer than 59% were surgical, and of these nearly 80% were battle injuries. Several of the admissions were cases of severe multiple wounds from enemy bombing raids, which continued at Neffetia scarcely less than at Medenine. As a result of enemy fighter-bomber attacks on Neffetia landing grounds on 6th March, 15 casualties were admitted, of whom 11 were A.A. gunners. Nine A.A. gunners were also admitted the next day. For ten successive nights, the enemy air activity continued. On the night of 15th March, bombs were dropped all around the M.R.S., the nearest stick being 200 yards away. Next evening, an intense artillery barrage, continuing from dusk till dawn, signified the start of the VIIIth Army's offensive against the Mareth Line. A severe thunderstorm broke during the following night, with heavy downpour of rain, and part of the surgical ward was blown down. Vehicles had to be brought at 03.30 hours to be moored against the tents. Meanwhile, the VIIIth Army's offensive had been crowned with success, and on 22nd to forward March the unit again moved Medenine, near to its former site. Here a strip of ground 900 yards long was laid out as a, runaway for visiting Air Ambulances, which were thus enabled to land alongside the M.R.S. itself. of having several different M

types of stretchers were demonstrated, as patients with severe fractures had to be loaded on to the special Lodestar cradle stretcher from the standard type, and unloaded again to the standard type of stretcher on arrival at base, an anomaly which has since been rectified. On 25th March, the unit was visited by the Director-General of the R.A.F. Medical Service, Air Marshal Sir Harold Whittingham, accompanied by the P.M.O., R.A.F., M.E. The next move forward took place on 5th-April, when the unit advanced to Gabes. A continuous heavy artillery barrage announced the VIIIth Army's' offensive at Wadi Akarit, and soon the Axis forces were again in full retreat. By 11th April, No. 21 M.R.S. had reached Fauconnerie, where contact was made with American troops. Three days later, the unit moved to Kerker, and on 21st April reached its ultimate point in the Tunisian campaign, at Sidi Hani, a pleasant site lying between Kairouan and Msaken. Here it remained for a full month, dealing mostly with medical cases, mainly of Malaria and Dysentery. At Sidi Hani on 15th May, one week after the fall of Tunis, notification was received that No. 21 Medical Receiving Station had ceased to exist, and No. 21 Mobile Field Hospital was born. Thus the "Old Firm" continued its existence under a new name. For exactly three years it had operated continuously in the field, with the exception of two breaks at base. From its experiences have been learned the Medical and Surgical problems of a Mobile Air Force in the field, serving under a variety of geographical, climatic and operational conditions. From modest beginnings, as a unit with "sufficient equipment for six hospital beds, and twenty stretchers to be held in reserve," it had now grown into a Field Hospital of fifty beds, with fifty stretchers in reserve. Its personnel had increased from fourteen to 80, its vehicle strength from six to 27. Within four hours of arrival at a new site, all its departments were fully operational, and any surgical procedure, any examination, Radiological, Microscopic, or Biochemical, could be carried out. During the three years of its existence, No. 21 M.R.S. had admitted upwards of 6,000, patients, exclusive of large numbers of cases who attended its out-patient clinics.
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on

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Suez

on 23rd August.

After several weeks spent in assembling equipment and training personnel, it left Helwan on 28th October, 1940, for service in the Sudan campaign. Here, covering vast distances and operating hundreds of miles away from its base, conditions were vastly different from those confronting 21 M.R.S. in the Western Desert. The East African Campaign The Italian Colonial armies, flushed with their occupation of the frontier posts of Kassala and Gallabat on 4th July, 1940, had settled down to .prepare for a frontal advance northwards into the Sudan. They found themselves initially in a strong position. British Somaliland had been invaded early in August, and by the end of the month was wholly in Italian hands. They thus controlled the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and a large part of the Western shore of our sole route to Egypt. Italian units soon began to mass in force along the frontier, but were skilfully held at bay for two months during October and November, 1940, by lively patrol skirmishes and artillery duels. By January, 1941, however, disaster had overtaken the Italian armies in Libya, and all hopes of further reinforcements for their vast Empire in East Africa had vanished. The strategic plan of the Allies to oust the Italians was already gathering momentum, and British reinforcements were moving southwards from Port Sudan. On 18th January the attack commenced: Kassala fell the next day, and by 2nd February both Agordat and Barentu were in our hands. Long weeks of intensive mountain fighting followed, until the fall of Keren on 26th March led to the capitulation of the whole of Eritrea. No. 22 M.R.S. in the Sudan After halts -at various landing grounds in the Sudan, notably Wadi-Gazouza, near Erkowit, during November, and at Gordon's Tree, near Khartoum, until the end of February, No. 22 M.R.S. passed through Kassala on 5th March, 1941, and arrived at Agordat on the following day. They remained here seven weeks, during. the first three of which operations were proceeding at Keren, about thirty miles away. At Agordat No. 22 M.R.S. were attached to No. 3 C.C.S., whose operating team had been moved further forward during the battle for Keren. The unit was located in the Italian military hospital, and the personnel housed in double-ridge tents in a wadi bed. Convoys of casualties arrived daily by road, and the medical staff of 22 M.R.S. was kept working at full pressure. Accommodation was available for over 200 cases, and a large number of hospital beds and considerable medical supplies had been left behind by the Italians. In the brief period from the 5th to 29th of March, no fewer than 771 British wounded and 119 Italians, a total of 890 cases, passed through No. 3 C.C.S. The majowvreatadmttd but ievacuated t ver,

No. 22 Medical Receiving Station The fact has often been commented on that each of the four R.A.F. Medical Receiving Stations operating in the Middle East, despite numerous interchanges of personnel, locale, mobility and function, possessed a character essentially its own. Although No. 22 M.R.S. received its title on the same day as No. 21, the history of this unit is in striking contrast to that of the "Old Firm." Formed on 15th May, 1940, at the R.A.F. Medical Training Establishment at Halton, Bucks, it embarked for the Middle East

41t

Mobile Field Laboratory at No. 25 M.R.S., near El Djem, May, 1943

Reception tent at No. 25 M.R.S., El Djem, May, 1943

Main bench showing filter pump and auxiliary water tank

Reception tent at No. 21 M.R.S., Ben Gardane, May, 1943

t6

to Tessenei, an eight-hour journey by road, as instructions had been received for the C.C.S. to be kept as empty as possible for contingencies. During the seven weeks' stay at Agordat, over 300 admissions were recorded, involving 60 major and 40 minor surgical operations. The XRay apparatus proved of considerable value and was employed in 70 eases. All the wards were well equipped, and were staffed by personnel from No. 3 C.C.S., assisted by six Nursing Orderlies from 22 M.R.S. The administrative work was carried out by No. 3 C.C.S., although the surgical work was performed entirely by the staff of 22 M.R.S., which functioned only as a small Operating Section, and possessed less than half the complement of staff and equipment normally carried by an M.R.S. The work performed in Eritrea, however, was interesting and extremely valuable, but during the whole of the campaign, very few R.A.F. casualities were treated, fully 90% of admissions being from Army units. The Second Phase: November, 1941 - July, 1942 In April, the unit moved to Egypt, where it remained non-operational at Helwan for the next six months. Most of its personnel were transferred to other units, and the whole of its transport and equipment were overhauled. On the eve of the British offensive in November, 1941, however, it became fully operational once more. Its personnel were increased to full establishment from 24 to 74, its vehicles from eight to 20, and all its equipment brought up to scale for service in the field. On 3rd November No. 22 M.R.S. left Helwan and arrived at Fuka, where it settled down on the site previously occupied by 21 M.R.S., and took over its remaining sixteen patients. Forward Into Cyrenaica The stay at Fuka lasted for six weeks' until 14th December, when the M.R.S. moved forward into Cyrenaica. Sidi Rezegh was passed on 17th December, and Tmimi reached on the 21st. Here the unit halted for ten days at an Italian blockhouse, and by 30th December was again on the move. During the 42 days of November and December, 1941, on which the unit operated, a total of 135 admissions were recorded, and 32 major operations performed. New Year's Eve, 1941, was spent in a deserted farmhouse five miles east of Barce, and by 14th January, Agedabia had been reached, where the Italian school was taken over as a hospital, and served its purpose admirably. At this location,, No. 22 M.R.S. was the most forward R.A.F. unit in Libya. The surrounding, area had been heavily mined, and many severe casualties were admitted. Within a week, however, confused and conflicting reports were received from Army sources of the approach of enemy armoured columns. Withdrawal at Speed On 21st January, the main party of No. 22 M.R.S. left for Benghasi, but a surgical team 117

rem a to operate on twelve rious casualties urgently requiring treatment. This party moved from Agedabia on the next day with 20 patients, one hour before enemy forces occupied the town. All the patients travelled well and were transferred to a Field Hospital at Benghasi in a satisfactory condition. As all communications with Air Headquarters, Libya, had been cut off owing to the rapid withdrawal necessitated by Rommel's advance, it was decided to return to Tmimi, which was reached on 24th January. Within a few days, orders were received to move still further back to Gazala, where the unit arrived on 29th January. At Gazala, however, No. 22 M.R.S. was permitted a breathing-space only. By 4th February, it arrived at Gambut, and by 8th February at Maaten Bagush. Rommel's advance had meanwhile spent itself, and the new line was consolidated south of Gazala. Although its transport was now sadly in need of overhaul, No. 21 M.R.S. received instructions to move forward again to Gambut, and by 19th February it had reached there safely and was fully operative. The Static Period: February June, 1942

The next four months were spent at Gambut and much useful work accomplished. No. 22 M.R.S. was situated well in the forward area, within six miles of fourteen R.A.F. squadrons, and many other units. It also served large numbers of Army personnel in the vicinity, being the only medical unit of its kind between Bardia and Tobruk, a radius of 35 miles. Enemy air activity was on a reduced scale, and the major disturbances were heavy rainstorms, which for a while paralysed all transport movements. Throughout the months of March, April and May, the work continued to increase steadily. It is worthy of note that flying and battle casualties formed but a negligible proportion of the total cases admitted. On 26th May, following news of a heavy armoured battle in the Bir Haarea, immediate steps kim-Tobruk-El Adem were taken to evacuate all cases, and render the full bed strength available for casualties. At the same time, the unit was placed on a highly mobile basis, ready to move at short notice. Eleven Army cases, severely injured by fire from enemy armoured patrols, were admitted into the wards on 27th May. Back to Helwan On 14th June, following the fall of Bir Hakim, orders came to move once more, and by 15th June, L.G. 75, 30 miles south of Sidi Barrani, was reached. On 24th June, No. 22 M.R.S. withdrew to Maaten Bagush, and four days later arrived at Amriya, where it encamped in the vicinity of 21 M.R.S. Early in July, instructions were received to proceed to base for refit, and by 5th July the unit had again reached Helwan. From 3rd November, 1941, until 5th July, 1942, the unit had been operating continuously for eight months in the Western Desert. During 'v

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this period the total admissions numbered 973, of whom 63% were R.A.F. personnel. The total number of surgical operations performed was 231, of which 142 were of a major character. The Third Phase: The "Holding" M.R.S. 'October, 1942 - May, 1943 With the German lines at El Alamein, and the prospect of an intensive winter campaign ahead, No. 22 M.R.S. was completely, re-formed and reequipped to serve as a "Holding" Unit. The intention was to utilise it well in the rear of Nos. 21 and 24 M.R.S. for the reception of any of their cases requiring a moderately long period of hos'pitalisation, but not of sufficient gravity to necessitate invaliding to Base. It was thus hoped to conserve essential man-power in the operational units of the R.A.F. Many weeks of noneffectiveness could thus be avoided in numerous medical cases such as Acute Gastro-Enteritis, Infective Hepatitis, non-specific Dysenteries, and B.T. Malaria. In the surgical wards, also, ample scope would be found for the treatment of wounds, minor burns, sprains, simple fractures, desert sores, and numerous types of sepsis. Statistics afford eloquent testimony of the results achieved. In October, of 218 admissions, 78% were returned direct to their units. In November, of 244 R.A.F. admissions, the figure was 77%, while in December with 442 admissions, it rose to no fewer than 87%. Of the October admissions, fully 50% were transferred from Nos. 21 and 24 M.R.S, SOn 4th October, 1942, No. 22 M.R.S. was established in the vicinity of Rear A.H.Q., Western Desert, at Wadi Natrun, on an 80 bed basis, soon afterwards increased to 100 beds. The organisation was well-planned in the form of four wardunits of 20 beds each, accommodated in a large extending hospital marquee, sixty feet long, with four centre sections. It was found practicable later to extend the marquee to six central sections, and thus accommodate thirty patients under one roof. On 5th November, No. 22 M.R.S. moved to Amriya, 40 miles northwards, just east of the Cairo-Alexandria road, in the wake of the advancing R.A.F. units, where it remained for two weeks. A further move was then made to El Adem, 423 miles westwards, and completed, after sundry transport mishaps, in three days. On 25th November, an advance party of 'the unit was in occupation of the Italian Colonial Hospital at Benghasi, while its rear party was at Tmimi Roadhouse. During the next three months, No. 22 M.R.S. functioned in conjunction with the rear party of 21 M.R.S. as a holding hospital at Benghasi. The combined bed state of 125 rose rapidly to 350, and the hospital rendered magnificent service in the treatment of numerous casualties from the forward areas, and as a clearing station for cases to be transported by hospital ship. During the month of December alone, 455 of the latter e ro h

M.R.S. Into Hospital A valuable precedent was created by the arrival at 22 M.R.S. during December of seven hospital sisters of the P.M.R.A.F.N.S. from Cairo. Their splendid pioneer work soon had its effect, and on 8th March, 1943, R.A.F. Hospital, Cyrenaica, fully equipped and complete in every detail, came into existence. Another innovation, arising partly out of the severity and frequency of enemy air raids over Benghasi, was the creation of a Convalescent Camp at Apollonia. Hither were sent cases who were not yet fit to return to their units, but requiring treatment or convalescence in a more peaceful atmosphere than existed at Benghasi. Within two months, the camp was reconstituted as No. 1 Middle East Rest Centre. The early days at Benghasi were full of incident. The town had been almost completely destroyed by two and a half years of ceaseless bombing, and appeared a mass of ruins. Ships, docks and wharehouses lay battered in the harbour area, and a petrol tanker, blazing away in the port, enveloped the town in a pall of smoke. On arrival at the Colonial Hospital, eighteen British prisoners, including an R.C. padre, were freed from captivity. Many of the Hospital buildings bore marks of Italian occupation. Walls, floors and ceilings were so infested that in one instance a Crusader tank was employed in effecting demolitions. Difficulties were also encountered with the Italian nuns and priests, who were at first decidedly non co-operative. Many Italian and German prisoners-of-war were found being treated under their care, and on four occasions were encountered loose in the compound at night, fully armed, and supplied with food and clothing by the nuns. Action followed by the Military Authority, which left the M.R.S. in exclusive occupation of a clearly-demarcated Service area. Enemy air raids were continuous from dusk to early dawn throughout the month of December, for which, for a time, the burning tanker in the harbour provided an excellent guide. As the defences improved, the A.A. barrage became of great intensity. Five bombs fell in the hospital area,, leaving huge craters, and completely demolishing the house of the Mother Superior. Two of the nuns were buried in the debris, and had to be dug out. No casualties were sustained, however, and the R.A.F. Nursing Sisters set an example of cool courage, which had a steadying influence among the patients. Mobile Once More No. 22 M.R.S. ceased to function as a static hospital at Benghasi on 5th March, 1943, when an advance party of 60 beds left to reform as a field unit in 'the Misurata area. The main party followed on 28th March, and was soon actively functioning at Gardabia, and during the month d 131 admissions, of whom 75% I e i ha back to their units. During

hands.

Nr' a rl- 4 31 . I
May, the numbers fell to 99, of whom nearly all were returned fit for duty. No. 22 M.R.S. was operating near Misurata, serving No. 205 Bomber Group and other R.A.F. units in that area, when, on 9th May, its title was changed to No. 22 Mobile Field Hospital, and a short while after, with 205 Group, it moved northwards into the Kairouan area of Tunisia, near the site which No. 21 M.R.S. had formerly occupied.
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No. 24 Medical Receiving Station One and a half years after the constitution of Nos. 21 and 22 M.R.S., No. 24 M.R.S. was formed at the Medical Training Establishment, Harrogate, on 3rd November, 1941. The complete unit, consisting of six officers and 55 airmen, embarked for the Middle East on 10th November, and reached Suez on 11th January, 1942. After proceeding to Helwan, the unit was non-operative for five months, owing to delays in the arrival of its stores and equipment. Many of its personnel were meanwhile detached to other units. On 13th June, 1942, 24 M.R.S. was finally enabled to move off in convoy, and stayed the night at Amriya. The following day Fuka was reached, but the old site of Nos. 21 and 22 M.R.S. was found unsuitable for occupation, being completey sanded in, and infested after a long period of dissuse. A new site was therefore chosen nearby, and on 20th June the unit was fully functioning. The news of Rommel's offensive in Libya, however, became increasingly grave, and after six days the unit was given orders to withdraw. On 26th June, No. 24 M.R.S. left Fuka for Wadi Natrun, where it worked on a skeleton basis at a site one mile south-east of the Road House, until 17th July. At these two locations, over a period of 21 operational days, the unit admitted a total of 125 cases, and gained a useful experience of desert conditions and rapid mobility. On 17th July, the unit moved to Burg-el-Arab, the Advanced Air H.Q. of R.A.F., Western Desert, where it functioned for nearly four months. During this vital period, it accomplished a heavy amount of operational work with conspicuous efficiency. Over 638 cases were admitted as patients, and 160 operations performed, while in addition, over 1,700 cases attended as out-patients, nearly 60% from Army units. 24 M.R.S. Moves Forward With the advance of the VIIIth Army into Cyrenaica, No. 24 M.R.S. was moved forward to Maaten Bagush on 9th November, and to Gerawla on 10th November, where it was assigned to serve the rear force of R.A.F. units, when the leapfrogging plan was superseded, and thus fell back behind its colleagues. It remained at Gerawla for ten days, during which 58 patients were admitted. The remains of a German Field Hospital were found near Mersa Matruh, and four large Ward Marquees were salvaged. These possessed several advantages over ours, in the absence of

guyropes, the small number of tent-pegs required, (only 20 as against 60 in our standard patterns), the excellent lighting and ventilation by means of mica windows on sliding frames, ease of erection, and the better wearing qualities of heavier material. These Marquees were subsequently put into service, and found satisfactory, proving completely rainproof in the heaviest shower. Ample accommodation was afforded within for 24 patients. On 23rd November, No. 24 M.R.S. moved forward again, and arrived at Gambut the following day, where the unit remained operational for the next two months. During December, over 260 admissions were recorded, of whom fully 78% were R.A.F. personnel. The number of operations was 66, and over 300 cases were treated as Out-Patients. Evacuation of R.A.F. personnel who were expected to be fit for duty within six to eight weeks, was arranged by air to No. 22 M.R.S. the "holding" unit at the Colonial Hospital, Benghasi, while others were sent by air to base. Army cases were evacuated through the C.C.S. at Tobruk. Occasional delays in the working of the Air Evacuation Scheme were experienced away from the forward areas. On 21st January, the unit moved forward again, reaching Benghasi on the 24th. Instructions were received here to proceed to Rear A.H.Q., W.D., at 30 miles west of Buerat. On arrival, the unit was notified that it was to serve as the future "holding" M.R.S., and occupy the Italian Military Hospital at Tripoli. The full convoy reached Tripoli on 28th January, five days after the capture of the town, and encamped on the Bir Setta race-course. They speedily settled down to the task of preparing and equipping the hospital. A Base Hospital at Tripoli From the end of January, 1943, No. 24 M.R.S. ceased to function as a Mobile Field Unit, and became a static hospital. A great deal of preliminary work had to be done before the hospital could be ready for the reception of casualties. The buildings were in a filthy condition, damaged by previous bombing attacks, and stripped of all doors, windows, and fittings by indiscriminate looting on the part of natives. Many deficiencies were found in the site; the main buildings were old converted military barracks, with drainage, latrine and washing facilities totally inadequate for a hospital. The central hospital block, however, was well built, and certain of the annexes were of modern design. Within a few days, the expansion of 24 M.R.S. from a 40-bed to a 200-bed unit was well advanced, and large quantities of equipment already on their way. During the active period of February, 292 admissions were recorded, over 55% of them being surgical cases. The following month witnessed a still further expansion of the Hospital, 341 cases being admitted, with an average daily Bed State of 155. The X-Ray, Laboratory, and Dental departments were well installed, and rendered useful service.

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An important advance was marked during April by the arrival of six R.A.F. Nursing Sisters, whose services had been needed for same time. They were joined by two more Nursing Sisters in May, and further additions were made to both the medical staff and personnel The value, of 24 M.R.S. as a holding unit at a forward base was of increasing assistance to large numbers of R.A.F. units in the area, and cases could now be retained and successfully treated over a considerable period. By 15th May, when its name was changed to No. 24 Mobile Field Hospital, the word "mobile" had become a relative term only. For the unit was now installed in a 240-bedded hospital, with plans projected for a further steady increase to 300, and ultimately to 400 beds.

icles were safely on the main road. Marble Arch was duly reached next day, and by 29th December the unit was functioning again on a site two miles east of Nofilia landing ground. The ten days spent at Agedabia proved a very useful period of activity. Over sixty cases were admitted, and eleven operations performed. More than half the patients were returned to their units, and the remainder transferred by Air Ambulance. At Nofilia, the unit soon settled down to work again. On the last day of the year, five South African natives were brought in, injured by a land mine. Contact was made with three New Zealand Field Ambulances in the area, and a joint celebration organised to greet the New Year. Gales with the New Year 1943 arrived, however, with the worst gales experienced by the unit since it set out for the Western Desert. The storm blew continuously for three days with terrific force, and all air communication was cut off. In eleven days stay at Nofilia, the unit admitted 44 cases, and perOn 11th January, the formed 14 operations. M.R.S. moved to a landing ground at Gzina near Sirte, where it remained for four weeks, and a variation in the menu of desert rations was afforded by a number of gazelle and turkeybustards shot in the vicinity. Eighty-three admissions were made during the time spent in this area, and 24 operations performed, and on 20th January a light section was moved forward to Hamraiet east. On 9th February another move forward was decreed. Bir Dufan was reached on 11th February, and here No. 25 M.R.IS. remained until 5th March. Numerous cases, some very severely injured, were admitted during this period, the Bed State often reaching 35. Evacuations were organised by air to 24 M.R.S., now operating as a hospital at Tripoli. Their embarkation was greatly facilitated by the marking-out of a small landing ground on the unit site, and the D.H. 86s of No. 1 Australian Air Ambulance Unit Squadron were thus enabled to complete their landing, loading of patients, and take off within less than half-an-hour. During the three weeks spent at Bir Dufan, 98 patients were admitted, and 16 operations performed. The majority of R.A.F. patients were discharged either directly, or via. No. 24 M.R.S., back to their units. On 5th March, 1943, the unit moved again, and arrived next day at its new site, three miles north west of El Assa village, west of the Ben Gardane track. No. 25 M.R.S. remained here until 4th April, and spent an active four weeks. For a while it acted as a holding unit, receiving casualties from No. 21 M.R.S. and two VIIIth Army C.C.Ss. Its admissions totalled 125, and included cases of R.A.F., S.A.A.F., and U.S.A.A.F. personnel. The equipment was ample,. and allowed of easy expansion to admit 150 cases if necessary. The M.R.S. left El Assa on 4th April and remained for ten days at Medenine, on the site of 21

No. 25 Medical Receiving Station Though easily the youngest of the four Medical Receiving Stations in the Middle East, No. 25 M.R.S. very soon attuned itself to operational conditions, and by the end of the Tunisian campaign had already become a vigorous and enterprising unit. Formed at No. 2 P. D. C., Wilmslow, on 15th August, 1942, over nine months later than No. 24 M.R.S., it embarked for the Middle East on 28th August, and arrived at Port Tewfik on 8th November. Helwan was reached the next day, and during the following four weeks the supply of equipment and training of personnel proceeded space. Operations were by then in full swing in. the Western Desert, and the speed of Rommel's retreat brooked of little delay. No time was available to await the arrival of the unit's medical stores from the U.K. On 6th December, the convoy left Helwan, and arrived at Tmimi roadhouse on the 9th, where the unit functioned until 16th December, when it moved off again, reaching Benghasi on the 17th, and Agedabia the following day. At Agedabia, No. 25 M.R.S. pitched its camp 11 miles south of the town, on the coastal side of the main road. Numerous cases were admitted at once, with a large proportion of Infective Hepatitis among them. Several had been sent from a Group of the U.S.A.A.F. stationed at Balindah, 25 miles away across the desert. Then for six days a sand storm with alternate gales and rain blew continuously, bringing with it loads of dust and sand from the desert tracks away to the south. The unit spent its first Christmas fairly pleasantly, however, despite these adverse conditions. On Boxing Day a message was dropped from a Lysander, instructing the unit to proceed to Marble Arch by 28th December. The whole of the day following, therefore, the M.R.S. struggled to extricate itself out of the mud, with its personnel exerting almost superhuman efforts. A diminutive "Jeep", lent by the 57th U.S. Pursuit Group, rendered heroic servce in towing a large Fordson six-wheeler ambulance out of the quagmire. Two anxious hours elapsed before all the bogged veh-

Entrance to No. 24 M.R.S. at Military Hospital, Tripoli,

May, 1943

Main

bauilding of

No.

24

M.R.S. at Tripoli

surgical ward of No. 24

M.R.S., at Tripoli

A ward of No. 22 M.R.S. at

Colonial Hospital, Benghasi.

December, 1942

'A4

M.R.S., where 81 patients ere admitted. Four days were then spent at Triaga near Sfax, and on 20th April the unit 'reached a site two miles along the La Hancha - El Azheg road, below its intersection with the main road from Sfax to El Djem. It remained here for six weeks as a semi-holding unit, to cover the light bomber wings in the Sfax - EF Djem area. During this period over 200 admissions were recorded, and 50 major operations performed. The majority of the cases were medical, but a large number of severe casualties from road accidents were admitted, accounting for three deaths. One very severe case of Haemorrhagic Smallpox occurred, with fatal results. In a German Hospital The camp at La Hancha was pleasantly situated amid olive groves, and sea-bathing was within easy reach. A light section of No. 25 M.R.S. moved to Carthage, near Tunis, on 13th May, to take charge of a German Field Hospital, The housed in a converted Convent School. building was finely situated on a hill overlooking the beautiful Bay of Tunis and the ruins of ancient Carthage. The hospital contained over 450 German wounded under the. care of their own

medical officers, with a British Army guard. The sanitation was hopelessly inadequate, the wards badly overcrowded, and sepsis rife among grossly-wounded patients in close proximity. Supervision was exercised over the transfer of these German wounded to prisoner-of-war camps, and to prevent destruction of captured enemy equipment, which included R.A.F. medical equipment captured by them at Tobruk. The advance party remained at Carthage until the end of May, by which time some 230 patients were still awaiting transfer. Instructions were received for a further move southwards to the Ben Gardane area at the end of May, and by early June, the move had been completed. And here, at La Hancha, we leave No. 25 Medical Receiving Station with its name changed tb No. 25 Mobile Field Hospital.

Thus ends this record of the four R.A.F. Medical Receiving Stations in the Middle East during their evolution and development into Mobile Field Hospitals. The full story of their achievements and the magnificent work they accomplished will be told when the history of the R.A.F. Medical Service is written..

Rescue By Night
DURING THE AFTERNOON of 5th June, 1943, a report was received by the Air/Sea Rescue Flight that a Beaufighter flying from Malta to the Delta area was believed to be down in the sea; the position given was 300 Benina 15 miles, and was later amended to "more likely to be in the neighbourhood of 200 miles". A Wellington was despatched to search along this track. The weather was none too good, with rainstorms, low cloud and a very rough sea, making searching for a small dinghy very difficult. Added to this was the fact that the aircraft was flying more or less into a setting sun. Despite these difficulties a good look-out was kept and after about a 100 miles flying, the rear gunner reported a Verey light on the port quarter, this being some 45 minutes before estimated time of sighting. The aircraft altered course and flew in the direction of the smoke of the cartridge, which remained visible in the air, and located a dinghy containing three men. A rescue kit was dropped and and information signalled to Base. H.S.L. 159 from Benghazi was immediately H.S.L.159 from Benhazi was immediately ordered out to the position, and a second Wellington laid on to relieve, the first, which was still circling the dinghy, at 19.00 hours. This relief was duly carried out and the relieving Wellington continued to circle the dinghy until 21.00 hours, by which time it had become it h blk, ad s| there was no sign of the H.S.L., which had been delayed owing to high seas, it was decided to return to Base. Having plotted the dinghy's position, course was set for Base and after flying for about ten minutes, a light was seen on the water. Upon closer investigation, this proved to be the H.S.L. and she was signalled "Are you O.K. ? " The reply being "Yes," she was signalled "Follow us and watch for lights," and course was reset back to the dinghy. Before the aircraft arrived at the position, double red cartridges were seen being fired by the dinghy, and as the aircraft passed overhead, the survivors flashed a torch which enabled the aircraft to drop a flame float close by. The aircraft then dropped two other flame floats to form a triangle with the dinghy in the centre and at the same time commenced to fire Verey cartridges so that the launch could see the aircraft's position. The Wellington circled for over an hour, replacing the flame floats as they went out, firing Verey cartridges, and switching on the aircraft landing lamps to indicate the position to the launch, which arrived at approximately 23.00 hours. This is the first combined air and sea rescue on record achieved by night in the Mediterranean, and is an. c nt example of team work carried it une veryjifficult conditions. i

I,

DEiUESilED

PART I.

1942-1943.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF Flying Control in the Middle East, from its inception until our retreat to El Alamein, was described in the last number of the R.A.F. Middle East Review. This second part of the article deals with subsequent expansion and the introduction of Area control. Central Flying Control During the summer of 1942 the ground position in the Western Desert remained static, but night after night strong forces of heavy and medium bombers crossed the Delta from their bases in the Canal Zone or Palestine to attack the harbours at Benghazi, Tobruk, Mersa Matruh, Sollum and Bardia, Crete, or the enemy's forward landing grounds at Fuka and Daba. It was inevitable that many of the aircraft returned lame and some 123

service was urgently needed to assist them to make safe landings at base or at more conveniently situated landing grounds. The answer to this problem was the establishment of the Central Flying Control in the Fighter Operations Room at Air Headquarters, Egypt. The Flying Control Officers watched the plots of returning bombers guard creeping across the operations table watches were maintained on as many as eight operational frequencies - and as intercepted bearings related to their respective plots, "owners" were given the latest information of their aircraft. A night seldom passed without at least one or two returning bombers needing definite assistance, and on the instructions of the Central Flying Control airfields were illuminated, pyrotechnics fieed; and .searchlight homing brought

into action.
DE

DEBLM lED
MSIRED

From the sublime:-

(Control Tower at Civil Air Port in the Middle East)

Regional Flying Controls The situation changed completely when the VIIth Army advanced across Cyrenaica in the autumn and winter of }942. Static fighter defences were set up to protect supply bases in the rear and the convoys passing along the coast. Air Headquarters, Egypt, became Air Defences, Eastern Mediterranean, and it was impossible to maintain an adequate aircraft safety organisation from the Central Flying Control in Cairo. That had done its job and done it well under the circumstances already described. It was now necessary to meet the changed conditions, and so was born the idea of establishing a series of Regional Flying Controls along the coast, located in the operations rooms at the Fighter Group Headquarters at Haifa, A.H.Q., A.D.E.M. Benina and, later, Tripoli. The responsibilities of the Regional Flying Controls fell under four headings :(i) Direct control by W/T or other means of . is aircraft in distress (ii) The co-ordination of Air/Sea Rescue and Desert Rescue action. (iii) The tracing of aircraft reported missing or overdue on the same lines as the Air Ministry department, A.S. 4. (iv) The establishment of an information bureau where all information concerning the safety of aircraft was kept available, and from whence all warnings of a navigational nature were notified to interested flying units. The Regional Flying Control at Benina was particularly successful in bomber liaison, being situated close to and in an ideal position to assist the Ninth United States Bomber Command, and letters of appreciation for services rendered were received from them. The close liaison and interchange of information maintained between the Movements Liaison sections in the Filter Rooms and the Regional Flying Control was the secret of the organisation's smooth working. The R.D.F. assed immediately from the

C!

6 ,tB

if

-:To

the ingenious

(Control Office on desert landing ground, constructed of old petrol tits)

Standard design for Control Towers on base airfields.

:k

, r' t

, " :

s r s y r .

9g

"

'. y

MoakEtt

tu

The Airfield Controller, from the runway Control Van, gives a Hurricane of the R.E.A.F. permission to take off
Filter Rooms to the Flying Controls, and HF/DF bearings intercepted by the latter's W/T watches were passed to the Movements Liaison Officer. thereby assisting identification of his plots. The most important development during the period, however, was the organisation for tracing overdue aircraft. Hitherto each flying unit had been responsible for the initiation of requestnews signals when aircraft failed to arrive, and no organisation existed to carry searches to their conclusion or to maintain a record of the numbers of aircraft adrift. Now it became the duty of flying units to inform the appropriate Regional Flying Control of aircraft overdue. In the first two months over 500 aircraft were so reported, and subsequent analysis proved that out of this number only about two per cent were in any form of trouble. Of the rest, pilots had failed to book in, incorrect signals had been originated, aircraft had made non-scheduled stops; in fact, a general state of slovenly disregard on the part of all concerned for the movement of aircraft regulations was discovered. A vigorous drive to improve conditions started, and up to the time of writing has met with some success, but by no means enough; there is still an average of some 150 aircraft unnecessarily reported overdue each month. More information than hitherto also became available upon which the Air/Sea Rescue Squadron could work, and close liason was kept by the Regional Flying Controls with civil and military units to assist in searches for, and the rescue of, crews forced down over land. In time, however, it' became obvious that a dual control problem was arising in the field of air/sea rescue, Operationally, air/sea rescue was the responsibility of No.201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, but more and more of the work of co-ordination of the necessary information was undertaken by the Regional Flying Controls under A.H.Q., To obtain the maximum value from A.D.E.M. the organisation and at the same time save manpower it was decided to put the whole on a Middle East basis, and fuse the Regional Flying Controls and the Air/Sea Rescue organisation. The Regional Flying Control was therefore moved from A.H.Q., A.D.E.M., to H.Q., No. 201 (N.C.) Group, and a plan implemented to locate the various Regional Flying Controls in the most suitable geographical positions, all under the direct control of H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. A control was formed at No. 25 Fighter Sector in Cyprus; the Control at Haifa moved to Ramleh; Sub-Controls were formed on the airfields at Mersa Matruh and El Adem; the Control at Benina re-

127

'"1

ryaE

mained, and the Control at Tripoli was moved to Castel Benito. Thus was built an aircraft safety organisation with executive powers in air/sea rescue, extending from Cyprus to the Tunisian border. Immediately prior to the invasion of Sicily, the Regional Flying Control at Malta was added to the chain. Increase in Ferry Controls Alongside the development of the Regional Flying Controls came the big increase in the number of Ferry Controls and Staging Posts along the Ferry and Reinforcement routes, with subsequent increased need for this specialised form of Flying Control. As operations moved westwards, Staging Posts were opened at El Adem, Marble Arch, Castel Benito, and onwards to Biskra, El Aouina, Maison Blanche, Rabat Sale, etc. Local Airfield Control personnel were provided to handle the ever increasing flow of transport and reinforcements arriving from Great Britain and the United States, and safety facilities were created from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, from Italy to the Sudan and South Arabia. The School of Flying Control This vast expansion stretched the supply of trained Flying Control personnel to the limit. Bomber Command was absorbing all the output of the School of Flying Control in England, and the need for personnel in the Mediterranean area became acute. To overcome the difficulty and

meet the demand, a School of Flying Control was inaugurated in Cairo, where officers and airmen could be trained as Flying Control Officers and N.C.O. Airfield Controllers. A comprehensive syllabus was drawn up including Local Control of operational and non-operational aircraft; Regional Control; Navigation; Meteorology and Signals; with lectures by specialists on such varied subjects as the performance of different types of aircraft, accidents investigation and methods of controlled approach. The ISchool is now well established. Personnel selected for training spend up to three months in preliminary training on airfields before taking the Course, which is followed by a further period under instruction before they are finally posted. As this article goes to press, O.T.Us are opening in Egypt and the Levant and Flying Control Officers, some from Middle East resources and some fresh from the United Kingdom, are taking up their duties of assisting the crews and training them in Flying Control procedure. The aim of Flying Control is to render the maximum possible assistance to pilots, not only when in On their side pilots trouble, but at all times. can assist Flying Control to carry out this important work by rigidly adhering to the instructions laid down, and by remembering that these instructions have been issued solely for the safety and assistance of the crews who fly aircraft. Those on the ground are the servants of those who fly, but only by complete understanding and co-operation can they achieve success in their tasks.

I _

R.A.F. MIDDLE EAST REVIEW No. 2. Supplies of the above number are now exhausted. Requests are being received for them, however, and it would be appreciated if Units possessing
copies which they no longer require would return them to H.Q., M.A.A.F.

(S.C.O.R.U.)

, .-

THE NUMBER 216 is a famous one in R.A.F. history in the Middle East. The connection goes back to June, 1919, when No. 216 Squadron arrived in Egypt. At the outbreak of the present war, the squadron was still here and was the only heavy night-bomber unit in the Middle East. Its Valencias were even then, however, employed largely on transport work. Now it is purely a transport squadron and comes under No. 216 Group. This Group, which bears the same number as the old squadron, was formed on 21st May, 1942, to control the aircraft reinforcement routes in the Middle East. On 9th September it was re-formed with enlarged scope as No. 216 Air Transport and Ferry Group, controlling the transport squadrons in the command as well as the ferry routes. Thus what had happened in effect was that where there had formerly been one bomber squadron that did transport work in its spare time there was now a Group controlling five transport squadrons flying over a million miles a month and an organization comprising eight ferry routes, over which delivery pilots were flying more than a million and a half miles every month. Importance of the Group's Work What makes the Group's work so vital is the vastness of the territory that it has to cover. In

Africa itself the Group's aircraft have to operate from the West Coast to Egypt, and from Egypt to Algeria; beyond Africa they operate across Arabia to India. Especially during the long period when the Mediterranean was virtually shut to our shipping, the responsibilities resting on the flying organization, and the strain thrown on it, were enormous. The strain was made greater all along by the chronic shortage of load-carrying aircraft. From the beginning of the war the value of air transport had been recognized by the enemy both in the European and African campaigns. We had lagged behind. Where the enemy had employed hundreds^ of load-carriers, we had only tens available. The fact that in April, 1942, our fighters shot them down like grouse on the 12th does not alter the fact that the enemy had some 300 transport aircraft available for the final stages of the North African campaign. We had to start almost from scratch, the only purely . transport aircraft available being those belonging to the commercial air lines. On the ferry side of the organization such problems did not, of course, exist.. The work before and since No. 216 Group came into being - had just gone on steadily, week in, week out they 1

rio d .r heire the Group's work has been valuable is in the co-ordination of effort, cutting out waste and overlapping. In the following paragraphs some idea is given of the two sides of the Group's work and of the problems that had to be met before the fusion into one organization became possible. Before the Group Took Over As already mentioned, on the outbreak of war any odd jobs in the way of transport had of necessity to be undertaken by No. 216 Squadron's Valencias. They carried stores and personnel to and from the Western Desert and between Egypt and Iraq. One journey was made in October, 1939, to take General Wavell and his staff for the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement. In October, squadron crews went to England to collect the Bombays that were soon to become one of the most familiar features of the Middle East - the old faithfuls, a few of which were still in service in 1943. The first Bombay transport flight was made on 6th November, 1939, when one flew to Matruh to bring back some Staff Officers to Cairo. This month also saw the inauguration of a weekly mail service between Egypt .and Iraq, run by No. 216 Squadron. By the end of the year, however, air transport in the command can scarcely be said to have begun. Until Italy entered the arena in June, 1940, No: 216 Squadron pursued the even tenor of its way, doing useful even if not exhilarating work. In the light of later developments, the most significant trips were those made by Bombays in helping units to move. On 11th May, for instance, the Squadron Operations Record Book states: "One Bombay to Amman and Port Said moving No. '14 Squadron attachment"; on 18th May: "Four Bombays to Amman to assist 2nd Echelon to move to Port Said". These were pointers to the days in 1942 and 1943 when whole fighter wings were to be flown in behind the enemy's lines and maintained exclusively by air transport, and when the ground personnel and equipment of the whole Tactical Fighter Force were to be flown over to Italy. A Temporary Return to Bombing With Italy in the war and menacing the frontier from Cyrenaica, No. 216 Squadron reverted partly to its original function of bombing. This was due to the fact that, apart from a few Blenheims, there were no other aircraft on hand to do the job. Nevertheless, in addition to bombing the Italians, the squadron's Bombays and Valencias found time for such occupations as bringing stretcher cases back to the rear, taking guard reliefs to desert frontier posts, conveying stores and rations, an S ing in the move of squadrons
to Aden a a

land forces in attacking military concentrations at Sidi Barrani.But from the autumn of 1940 onwards the essential work was transport -of stores, spares, wounded and what are classed as "very important personages", including Mr. Eden, who was flown from Cairo to Lydda. In October a Bombay went as far afield as Nigeria and back. Evacuation from Greece and Crete The trouble in Greece gave the squadron more exciting work in the transport line. On 1st November a Bombay took No. 30 Squadron ground crew to Heraklion, in Crete, and thence on to Eleusis, near Athens. This was the first British aircraft to land 6n Greek soil after the Italian declaration of war, and was the first of a series of over a hundred flights, transporting war material to Greece and Crete - all completed without casualties or engine failures. These flights were supplemented by others made by two Sunderland squadrons, which normally carried out sea patrols. In April and May, 1941, came the evacuation from Greece and Crete, in which a memorable part was played by No. 216 Squadron, No. 267 Squadron, which had been formed late in the previous summer for communication work, the Sunderlands, and by the flying boats of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, which were called in to help. The Bombays concentrated mainly on air crews; the other aircraft brought away passengers of all kinds, both service and civilian. The Sunderlands began by evacuating 48 passengers from Yugo-Slavia on 16th April; they followed this by evacuating some 700 personnel from Greece - including a record number of 83 in one aircraft and 90 from Crete. The B.O.A.C's share consisted of thirteen return trips between Alexandria and Suda Bay, the first on 22nd April and the last on 5th May. A total of 469 passengers were taken off, including the Greek Royal Family. The Lodestars of No. 267 Squadron evacuated nearly a hundred passengers between 24th and 28th April, including 44 from Heraklion in the face of continuous air activity over the airfield. No. 216 Squadron's Bombays, in addition to picking up aircrews and other personnel, took reinforcements of men and materials to Cyprus in May, as a precautionary measure. Transport for Iraq and Syria In March, four Bombays of No. 216 Squadron had been detached to Khartoum to cope with the transport of equipment, stores, ferry pilots and crews necessary for the West African reinforcement route. On 30th April, 1941, this detachment was re-formed as No. 117 BomberTransport Squadron and began operating on 1st May. A notable fight was made on 4th June when one of the squadron's Bombays flew to Gura to convey the Duke of Aosta and his Staff to captivity after his surrender in Abyssinia. Meanwhile, in early May, trouble had broken tin Iraq. No. 216 Squadron's first task was

In Octo some bom example, a Bon

SI
to send five Valencias and three Bombays to Lydda on 4th May, thence to transport troops and ammunition to Iraq. Between the 6th and the 21st Valencias and Bombays carried out similar operations in support of the Army and also evacuated personnel from Habbaniya. On 24th May a special operation took place, in which a Bombay flew thirteen sappers from Egypt to Habbaniya, whence they were taken by Valencias into Syria, with which we were nonminally at peace, but across which the enemy was operating into Iraq. Once in Syria the sappers blew up an important bridge on the MosulAleppo railway and got away without casualties in spite of being machine-gunned from an armoured vehicle. In June, just before the Syrian campaign opened, Bombays of No. 216 Squadron dropped propaganda leaflets over towns in Syria by night. During the campaign itself the squadron carried up all kinds of war materials and brought back wounded. The Period Before "Crusader" Transport work went on as usual between the end of the Syrian campaign in July and the beginning of "Crusader" in November, 1941, and the opportunity was taken to make a number of changes and developments, the chief of which were as follows:- A daily fiewspaper and mail service to the desert was inaugurated by No. 267 Squadron in September. In October the B.O.A.C. formed, at the request of the R.A.F,, a communicating service between Heliopolis and the Western Desert to assist both Nos. 216 and 267 Squadrons. Also in October No. 117 Squadron was re-equipped with D.C.IIs, and at the end of the month the Squadron left Khartoum for Bilbeis, in preparation for operations in connection with "Crusader". In November - and this paved the way for the creation of No. 216 Group - the Aircraft Movements Branch was formed at H.Q., R.A.F., M.E., with the object of co-ordinating the work both of the transport squadrons and the air reinforcements organizations under one control. These had previously been respectively under Air Staff and the C.M.S.O. branch. Immediately .before "Crusader" a special task fell to No. 216 !Squadron. On the night of 16/17th November five Bombays were briefed to drop 60 parachute troops to sabotage enemy air-, fields in the Tmimi and Gazala areas. Mainly due to bad weather, the attempt was not a success and one of the Bombays was lost. It is unnecessary to give a detailed picture of the activities of the transport squadrons during "Crusader". All that need be said is that they did a fine job of work. Throughout the campaign a regular desert transport service was maintained; help was given to No. 1 Air Ambulance Unit in evacuating casualties; and many urgent calls for petrol and other essential supplies were answered. The first appeal came on '20th November, when twelve tons of 37 mm.

ammunition, asked for at 12.30 hours 'was deli-' vered in Bombays at an advanced landing ground four hours later. Nos. 216 and 117 Squadrons were largely concerned with special tasks while No. 267 Squadron- and the B.O.A.C. dealt with the more routine runs. The B.O.A.C. worked in close co-operation with the R.A.F. and followed up the advancing VIIIth Rarely was their terminal landing Army. ground more than a score or so of miles away from the battle area. When the western terminus was at Tmimi, for instance, it was only 30 miles south-east of Derna, which was still in enemy hands. Towards the end of the advance, the B.O.A.C., together with No. 267 Squadron, was engaged in rushing petrol to our forward forces south of Benghazi who were running short. In December No. 117 Squadron, in addition to carrying 97,500 Ibs. of freight and 380 passengers, borrowed a Lodestar from the B.O.A.C. and flew the Air Mission, bound for Russia, as far as Teheran. Activity after "Crusader"

Ai w
'

During the withdrawal to Gazala in January and February, 1942, and the subsequent lull, the transport squadrons carried on steadily. Apart from the routine runs, flights were made much further afield. In February No. 117 Squadron flew General Alexander to Delhi, on his way to take over the Burma Command, and made two other trips to India, taking 3,200 lbs. of equipment to a squadron recently transfered there. In March five D.H.86s were allotted to No. 117 Squadron and its D.C.IIs were transfered to India. Some of "A" Flight pilots ferried the aircraft there and other pilots delivered a number of other D.C.IIs. In May the Squadron received some Lodestars and began a period of intensive training. Also in May a Lodestar of No. 267 Squadron took the Duke of Gloucester on his Middle East tour of Cyrenaica, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq. At the end of February it had been decided that the B.O.A.C's Western Desert work was finished for the time being and its aircraft reverted to their normal civilian routes. Early in May, however, the B.O.A.C's Lodestars shared with No. 267 Squadron's Lodestars in the CairoMalta service, which had begun in March. Between them they operated six services a week until the end of June when the Axis advance overran the Gambut and other landing grounds that were being used. Before the service was suspended the B.O.A.C. had made 33 trips, carrying over 200 passengers and much mail and freight. For several months, when Malta was cut off by intense enemy air attack, air transport was almost its only link with the outside world. On an average, two weekly services were maintained and the aircraft sometimes took grae rsks in taking off heavily over-loaded.

Fo.

216 Ferry Group, although the transport squadrons were not directly affected until this Group became the Air Transport and Ferry Group in the following September. The Withdrawal to El Alamein Throughout the crisis of June-September, 1942, the transport squadrons made an all-out effort in the desert. Urgently needed stores and equipment were moved from place to place and many wounded brought back to safety. On the night of 9/10th June one of No. 216 Squadron's Bombays was given the special task of dropping supplies for the besieged garrison at Bir Hakeim, after two Hurricane-bombers had done so the previous night. No, 117 Squadron found time for two delivery flights to India, and in July and August flew over a thousand passengers and many thousand pounds of mail and freight to and from Malta in D.C.IIIs. Other D.C.IIIs of No. 267 Squadron also made journeys between Egypt and Malta, one of their passengers being Lord Gort, the Governor of the island. Work was made easier by the issue in August of some 40 Lockheed aircraft to the transport squadrons and by the formation in July of No. 173 Squadron, with a mixed bag of aircraft, mainly for communication work in the Delta area. So far the transport aircraft had come off remarkably light in casualties. On 24th July, however, the Bombays of No. 216 Squadron had their first loss when two were shot up on a temporary landing ground about six miles behind the front line. Early in August, again, another Bombay was caught in the air by enemy fighters and destroyed. The casualties included General Gott, who was to have taken over the command of the VIIIth Army. Three Special Operations Between July and September No. 216. Squadron was involved in three special operations. The first, on 9/10th July, was a strike by-Albacores against a convoy running from Crete to Tobruk. To be within effective range of the convoy the Albacores had to refuel at an unoccupied landing ground 150 miles behind the enemy lines. This plan entailed a ground party to protect the bombers against air attack while refuelling and to defend the landing ground for a limited period against possible enemy raiding parties. No. 216 Squadron's job was to carry both the ground party and its equipment and the fuel and other necessities for the Albacores. Six Bombays took part and the whole operation went off almost without a hitch and without a casualty. The fact that the Albacores could not claim a definite sinking does not detract from the competence and daring of the operation. The second operation, in early August, was one in which the R.A.F. assisted one of the Long Range Desert Group's thrusts deep behind the enemy's lines. No. 216 Squadron's task was to replenish four L.R.D.G. parties on their way back

to our own lines. To do this one of the squadron pilots reconnoitred the area south of Mersa Matruh, some 150 miles behind the battle area, to find a suitable landing ground. Our former L.G. 64 was chosen and on the night of 4/5th August three Bombays were briefed to deliver 800 gallons of petrol and rations for 160 men. They were also to bring back certain L.R.D.G. personnel. In spite of difficulties in locating the prepared flare path, two of the Bombays safely delivered the goods, and returned with 42 passengers, including the crew of a crashed Wellington and some escapees from Tobruk. The third operation, in September, was a more anitious combined-services affair, aimed mainly at disrupting enemy supplies by sabotage at Tobruk and Benghazi; a diversionary raid was to be made at Barce and a temporary base was to be established at Jalo Oasis by a force operating from Kufra. No. 216 Squadron was called upon to transport the necessary supplies to Kufra and to stand by there with six Bombays. Five of the squadron's Hudsons were also detailed to drop dummy parachutists over Siwa Oasis with the object of causing alarm among the Italian garrison there and possibly making the Germans rush reinforcements from the Matruh-Tobruk area. This task was duly carried out by the Hudsons, although the exact result could not be gauged. The only one of the Bombays at Kufra to be employed was briefed to fly to a landing ground near Jarabub to evacuate Wounded L.R.D.G. personnel. In spite of a flight of 400 miles over featureless desert, the landing ground was located and the wounded flown back safely to Kufra. There was trouble a few days later, however, when the enemy made a surprise air attack on Kufra. Although there were no casualties to personnel, three Bombays were written off on the ground. On the credit side was a "probable" HE.111, which a member of one of the air crews fired at with a Bren gun. This operation did not achieve the hoped-for results. Nevertheless, with the others, it shows the varied activities expected of the transport squadrons-activities that added spice to normal and more mundane duties. No. 216 Group in its Final Form On 9th September, 1942, No. 216 Group took on its final form as an Air Transport and Ferry Group. It immediately began its preparations for the October offensive, including the planning by the Group Signals of special wireless channels for the advanced transport centres. When the VIIIth Army advanced, the transport squadrons were ready and better organized than they had ever been before. The widest possible use was made of them during our advance, and once again the B.O.A.C. was called upon to play an active part by carrying men and materials to and from the desert. Throughout the campaign fuel, ammunition, water and supplies of all kinds - including such comparative luxuries as current

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newspapers - were flown wherever they were needed, casualties were brought back and, in addition, a number of special assignments were undertaken. The first assignment of the transport squadrons was on the first night of the offensive and was similar to that carried out over Siwa Oasis in the previous month. On the night of 23/24th October, in co-ordination with a Naval simulated landing, four Hudsons of No. 216 Squadron dropped 32 dummy, self-destroying parachutists in the Fuka area. The object, as in September, was to cause confusion among the local enemy troops, thereby diverting attention from the main operations taking place at El Alamein. Fighter Wings Moved by Air The next operations exploited the full tactical possibilities of air transport in wartime and hark back to the occasions in May, 1940, when Bornbays helped units to move from place to place in the command. Now the ground crews and equipment of complete 'fighter wings were carried forward en masse to confound the enemy by operating fighters where he would never expect them to be, and providing air cover for our most forward troops. On the first occasion on 11th November No. 239 (Kittyhawk) Wing had been moved forward by surface transport to the south -of the retreating enemy columns. It was supplied by air with ammunition, water and equipment until the S. & T. Column could catch up. The next day a landing ground some 120 miles south-west of Maddalena was reconnoitred and supplies of fuel, water and rations were laid down by transport aircraft, ready for a move of No. 243 (Hurricane) Wing. On the 13th nine Hudsons flew ground personnel of No. 243 Wing to the landing ground where they made everything ready for their Hurricanes to operate against the retreating enemy in the Jedabya-Agheila district. The squadrons were maintained by air until the 16th when they were withdrawn by transport aircraft. Other more ambitious "wing lifts" followed, involving the whole available transport force. On 18th December No. 239 Wing was moved from Belandah to Marble Arch and was operating its aircraft on the same day by 13.30 hours. No. 216 Group had to make four "sorties" at full strength, to carry a total weight of approximately 160 tons of personnel, equipment and supplies, including 35,000 gallons of petrol and oil. This feat was followed up on 17th January with a lift of No. 239 Wing from Hamraiet to a landing ground about twelve miles from Sedada, specially prepared by an R.E. aerodrome party. Of the 25 D.C.IIIs, 22 Hudsons and eight Bombays employed, the only loss was one Bombay, which was written off when a tyre burst. Two more lifts carried the wing forward to Castel Benito by 24th January, only one day after the enemy had evacuated Tripoli. For

some of these operations No. 216 Group had the help of the American transport squadrons, which approximately doubled the load-carrying capacity. From now on American help began to make all the difference to air transport work in the Mediterranean area. Other Special Operations In addition to these "wing lifts" there were other interesting and well executed special tasks. Daily between 19th and 26th November transport aircraft supplied ammunition, water, rations and diesel oil to an armoured force operating near Msus; between 28th November and 1st December all available aircraft, except No. 267 Squadron, were engaged in carrying 250 lb. bombs to the forward landing grounds, the heaviest load in one day being 52 tons. The reason for No. 267 Squadron's absence on this occasion was that it was busy with an operation that consisted in flying some 250 men, with tools and equipment, from Egypt to Malta in thirteen Hudsons and three D.C.IIIs. This operation was repeated between 2nd and 5th December and again between 7th and 8th December. On 11th December came an operation in which two Hudsons led a force of eleven Hurricanes to Malta and thence via an overland route across Tunisia to Algiers. The Hudsons returned with Hurricane pilots and other passagers. In a repeat performance, one Hudson and one Hurricane were lost. The Ferry Side of the Work Before rounding off the story of No. 216 Group in the first nine months of 1943, it must be remembered that during the time that the transport squadrons were engaged in the desert campaigns, the ferry side of the Group's work had continued uninterruptedly. By 1943 it bore little resemblance to the ill-equipped organization that had in 1940, with a few primitive and inadequatelystaffed ilanding grounds, practically no signals facilities and no flying control or other flying aids, blazed the West African reinforcement route that had been pioneered four years earlier by Imperial Airways. On the pilot alone in the earlier part of the war rested almost all the responsibility of getting his aircraft to Egypt. Yet the first convoy of one Blenheim and six Hudsons that. came through in October, 1940, was the beginning of a stream that was to swell in two years to a thousand aircraft a month, flying over routes totalling over 11,000 miles. Where formerly each journey was something of an adventure into the unknown, by 1943 fewer than .65 per cent of the aircraft ferried failed to reach their ultimate destination. In the early days the landing grounds and the ferry crews were looked after by the African Reinforcement Route Control. On 15th December, 1941, however, ,the:'A.R.R.C. crews were absorbed .in the Aircraft :Deliv t ugh'*' * * .?* -jtflh

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lengthening and the flow of aircraft increasing. Up to 1942, however, each section of the reinforcement routes ran its own show, under the general direction of H.Q., Middle East. There was little or no co-ordination of effort. In May, therefore, No. 216 Group was created to operate all the ferry routes and to control the A.D.U., which by then had some 300 pilots on its strength, Everything was tightened up to ensure that the aircraft flowed as easily and speedily as possible from the erection centres to the immediate battle areas, to the storage units or to the India Command. Directly under the Group came the Ferry Controls, in turn responsible for the staging posts on the air routes-the Takoradi Route, the Northern Trans-African Route, the Southern Trans-African Route, the Nile Valley Route, the Port Sudan Route, the North Arabian Route, the South Arabian Route and the Western Desert Route. The A.D.U. was later split into two sections to deal more conveniently with local commitments and by 1943 was employing some 450 pilots and aircrew British and men from the Colonies and Dominions, Poles, Yugoslavs and French. Developments in 1943

were also formed, bringing the total number up to six. Preparing to Invade Sicily The month of June saw the Group's transport and ferry organizations working to full capacity. The transport squadrons flew nearly 7;000 hours (about 1,700 more hours than in May); carried over 9,000 passengers (about 2,500 more than in May); and delivered over 700 tons of freight and mail (about 100 more tons than in May). The increase in flying hours was largely due to the ease of maintaining the new Dakotas, and all the routine trips ran a hundred per cent to schedule. Attention was also paid to the casualty-clearing side of the transport work and some 50 aircraft were adapted to augment, when necessary, No. 1 Air Ambulance Unit. Everything was now set for the next phase of the Mediterranean campaign - the invasion of Sicily. In preparation for this, Advanced H.Q., No. 216 Group, was formed at Tunis on 1st July. The aircraft at its disposal comprised ten D.C.IIIs and twenty Hudsons of No. 117 Squadron, based at Castel Benito (Tripoli), ten D.C.IIIs of No. 267 Squadron, based at El Aouina _(Tunis), and four extra Dakotas attached from No. 216 Squadron. To supplement this force, it was arranged that immediately the United States Troop Carrier Command H.Q. at Kairouan had fulfilled its airborne-landing commitments, its aircraft would come under the operational control of Advanced H.Q., No. 216 Group, for transport purposes. The aircraft that were thus made available-approximately 320 C.47s and C.53s-were predominantly U.S.A.F. and to facilitate co-operation a number of U.S.T.C.C. officers were located with Advanced H.Q. Also under the control of Advanced H.Q. were No. 1 Air Ambulance Unit and a flight of six Sunderlands detached from No. 230 Squadron (Mombasa) and based at Bizerta, for communication work between Malta and North-west Africa. Immediately before the invasion, No. 216 Group carried out one of its large-scale "lifts" when its aircraft carried the ground personnel and equipment of two fighter squadrons engaged in convoy protection from the Delta to Cyrenaica. Another type of operation, which No. 216 Group had carried out several times in the past, took place on the night of 11th July. Four Dakotas of No. 267 Squadron were briefed to drop dummy paracutists and incendiary flares over Marsala, on the west coast of Sicily. One of the aircraft crashed a few minutes after take-off, but the others completed their mission, which resulted in the enemy temporarily diverting some of his forces that had been proceeding south. Work During the Invasion On 13th Group and echelon of comprising July fifteen Dakotas-ten of No. 216 five U.S.A.F.-carried the servicing the 31st Fighter Giroup squadrons, 75 personnel and 1,700 lbs. of equip-

By the beginning of 1943, the two complementary sides of No. 216 Group were in full swing. At any given moment there were some 200-250 aircraft, including transports, flying on the Group routes. More and better aircraft - particularly Douglas Dakotas - were to hand for the transport squadrons and new staging posts had been successively set up at intervals roughly 100 miles behind the front line, to cut down to a minimum the time necessary to get the freshly-delivered aircraft into action. In January No. 249 Wing was formed to absorb the advanced elements of the transport squadrons that had previously been under the control of a curiously disembodied unit that had never been established; on 27th January a staging post was opened at Castel Benito, the main Tripoli airfield, only four days after the fall of the town. In February a weekly air service to Karachi was inaugurated. In March - the month in which the new Transport Command was formed in England - the Group pulled'off another successful operation, in which on the 27th 1,500 reinforcements for the VIIIth Army, with 15,000 lbs. of urgent equipment, were flown up to Castel Benito. In April the new route, United Kingdom - MoroccoMiddle East, was opened, and the first two Air Despatch and Reception Units were formed to facilitate the handling of freight and mail and the movement of passengers by air. In May the last of the old Bombays were withdrawn from service to the delight of the maintenance crews and the transport squadrons were now almost entirely equipped with Dakotas. In June a daily service was running from Egypt to Casablanca and the B.O.A.C. began its service from the United Kingdom through to Russia. Four additional A.D.R.Us

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ment, from Gozo to Licata. These were the first transport aircraft to land in Sicily and were the beginning of a stream of aircraft that flew personnel, equipment, stores and M.T. from Northwest Africa, Malta and Pantelleria into the invaded island. On the 19th, at the request of the 15th Army. Group, No. 216 Group began a regular service to Sicily that was gradually extended, linking up Tunis-Cassibile-Palermo-Malta. Throughout the Sicilian campaign this service was maintained, and in addition the Group was called upon to fulfil such tasks as the transportation of Fighter Control staffs from Malta and Tunisia; complete headquarters consisting of over a hundred personnel and 40,000 lbs. of baggage and equipment; Jeeps, motor-cycles and trailers, and such random demands as fifteen tons of boots and stockings for the 7th Army. The number of casualties carried out of the island rose from 2,462 in July to 4,422 in August. Valuable work was done in Sicily by the three mobile A.D.R.Us-Nos. 24, 25 and .26- that were sent there. They operated under extremely difficult circumstances, improvising continually, and were largely responsible for the smooth running of transport matters in the island. The Group's achievements in Sicily are best shown by the figures themselves. Between 13th July and 18th August 2,689 passengers were flown into Sicily and 1,054 flown out; 785 tons of freight were carried either in or out; and, with No., 1 Air Ambulance Unit, 6,538 casualties were flown to safety either in North-west Africa or Malta or from forward landing grounds to the evacuation bases in the rear of the fighting. In spite of the added commitments of the campaign, the only curtailment of the normal routine services was that the Ras el Mar-Casablancaleg of the daily Cairo-Casablancarun was reduced to alternate days. In the Group's work as a whole, records continued to be made in July and August in both the transport and ferry sides. In July the transport squadrons carried 12,558 passengers and 1,289 with the help of tons of freight; in August No. 28 S.A.A.F. Squadron, which had been formed towards the end of July and added to the Group's strength - 14,463 passengers and 3,395 tons of freight. The ferry pilots also improved on the June figures and delivered 1,412 aircraft in July and 1,241 in August to North-west Africa, the Middle East, India, Iraq and South and West Africa. The Assault on Italy There is no doubt, however, that the climax of No. 216 Group's work in the Mediterranean area was reached during the assault on Italy in Sep-

tember. In the initial stages of the campaign, the ground personnel and equipment of the whole of the Tactical Fighter Force and of a considerable part of the Bomber Force were lifted into Italy by aircraft under the Group's operational control. The importance of these mammoth "lifts" is obvious when it is realized that, owing to the distances involved, no single-engined shore-based fighters would have been available to support the Allied armies during the critical early period except by this method. In addition to its work in Italy in September, the Group also lent a hand in the Aegean operations. In August a detachment of eight No. 216 Squadron Dakotas had been sent to Ramat David in Palestinein connection with paratroop training. When the occupation of Cos took place on 13th September, six Dakotas dropped 120 paratroops at selected points on the island. Altogether, up to the end of September, Dakotas flew 680 Army personnel to Cos with vehicles, equipment and stores weighing 171,598 lbs., as well as R.A.F. Regiment and other air force personnel and their equipment. September figures showed an improvement even on those of' the two previous months and the transport squadrons set up a new record. A total of 17,374 passengers and 3,907 tons of freight were carried on the Group routes, the aircraft in doing this covering a total of 1,390,562 miles. Three Years of Progress As this article briefly indicates, great strides have been made in the development of transport and ferry work in the Mediterranean area since the beginning of the war. The ferry side was obviously essential all the time, as we strove to build up an air force capable of attaining air superiority - and at last succeeded. The value of the transport side was not so quickly recognized except by people with vision, but the record of the transport squadrons alone is sufficient proof of their value. Even when they were inadequately equipped, they had an important share in all the Mediterranean campaigns - in the Desert, in Greece and Crete, in Iraq and Syria, in the retreat to Alamein and in the victorious advance to Tripolitaniaand Tunisia. By that time, with the invaluable help of U.S.A.F. aircraft, they had showed the possibilities of mass air "lifts", a development that was to be exploited still further in the Sicilian and Italian invasions. Much air has flowed past the transport aircraft's wings since those days when, even before Italy was in the war, No. 216 Squadron assisted R.A.F. units to move from place to place.

47
;

Ipp-iyi

A Difficult Rescue
AT APPROXIMATELY 03.00 hours on 10th. July, 1943, the ten members of the crew of a Liberator of the 93rd U.S.A.F. Bombardment Group, having completely lost themselves after an invasion-eve attack on Sicily, decided to bale out, as the aircraft had reached the limit of endurance and a forced landing was impossible in the darkness. Unfortunately, they were over one of the most inaccessible spots in the Libyan desert, some 200 miles south of Nofilia, in the Gulf of Sirte. The area consists mainly of hard, black volcanic lava, strewn with boulders, the only recognizable features being various rock formations. This barren and inhospitable region became known to the lost airmen and their rescuers as "The Coal". The story of this rescue - which took the air force and army units concerned over ten days, during which aircraft flew 120 flying hours, the land party covered 1,350 miles and the total area searched was 15,500 square miles - is a good example of army and air force team work and of joint triumph over difficulties. The Search Begins Having made up their minds to bale out, the Americans sent out a W/T message to that effect. Bearings were taken on the distressed aircraft by the H.F. D/F stations at Benina, El Adem, Misurata, Berka, Marble Arch, Heliopolis, Cairo West and Malta. From these it was decided by No. 212 Group Flying Control and the Air/ Sea Rescue Flight that the best position to start a search was 27.48 N., 18.27 E. At 08.25 hours the search began with an Air/ Sea Rescue Flight Wellington airborne, for this position. After eight hours flying the pilot returned to base, having completed a square search of 900 square miles without result. Two Liberators of the IXth Bomber Command also made an unavailing seach around this position. On the evening of the 10th a conference was held between the Air/Sea Rescue Flight and the IXth Bomber Command and an extensive search was planned, using three Liberators, a Wellington and a Blenheim. The area to be cover.ed was to the west of the one already searched and extended 150 miles north and south and 65 miles east and west. On the 11th the Welllington and the Blenheim were unsuccessful, but two of the Liberators reported five survivors in position 27.10 N., 18.00 E., and two survivors in position 26.50 N., 17.50 E. Supplies were dropped for both parties. A Land Party Organized Meanwhile, a land rescue attempt had also been organize 93u r ( M sisted of a light car patrol of No. 9 Motor Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force. The British officer in charge received his orders at 11.00 hours on the 10th, stocked five eight-cwt. vans and a fifteen-cwt. wireless truck, and with a party of sixteen men left Benghazi at 13.30 hours to report to the Civil Affairs Officer at Jedabya, who was to provide maps and route reports of the area. The party arrived at 17.30 hours to find that the Civil Affairs Officer was at Benghazi. On being shown maps of the area around Marada, some 90 miles south of Agheila, the S.D.F. Bimbashi realized at once that he could not do the journey with his present vehicles since they could not carry sufficient water as well as the necessary petrol. He arranged, therefore, for a three-ton lorry and 1,200 gallons of petrol to join the party at Agheila at dawn on the 11th. On telephoning the D.A.Q.M.G., No. 93 SubArea, he was ordered to proceed immediately and leave one van to collect maps and route reports when the Civil Affairs Officer returned. The Bimbashi, however, did not feel inclined to venture into the desert south of Agheila without making sure of maps, so remained at Jedabya until the Civil Affairs Officer returned at 19.30 hours. He did not have the necessary maps, and after telephoning the D.A.Q.M.G. it was arranged that next day maps should be dropped by air for the party at Marada. It was suggested that, owing to the difficult nature of the country, a sun compass should be provided, but the D.A.Q.M.G. said that he did not consider one was necessary since they did not have sun compasses ten years ago. The patrol left Jedabya at 21.15 hours for Agheila and at 01.00 hours on the 11th reached Maaten Bescer, the Agheila water point, where it remained for the rest of the night. Soon after dawn it was joined by the three-ton lorry, and on arrival at Marada at 14.00 hours it was found that the R.A.F. had already dropped the maps. There was also a message saying that five survivors had been located in position 27.10 N., 18.00 E. The Bimbashi decided to proceed at dawn on the 12th south-west to Abu Naim and from there try to reach the survivors. The patrol was fortunate in finding a number of 2-gallon water and petrol cans at Marada as its own containers were leaking badly. Difficulties to be Faced

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From all reports it became evident that a most complex operation faced both the air and land units concerned. In the first place, much flying time was taken up in reaching the position and,

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secondly, "The Coal" in which the survivors were located consisted, as already mentioned, of rough, black volcanic rock, providing extremely difficult going for the land party and an equally difficult landing ground for aircraft. For these reasons a Bisley carried out two sorties on the 12th to re-locate the survivors and also to reconnoitre the area. Although unsuccessful in finding the survivors, the pilot brought back much useful information, which later helped to speed up the rescue. The S.D.F. patrol on the 12th, having reached a point 22 miles west of Marada, had to turn back owing to a broken piston on the petrol lorry, without which it was impossible to proceed. They were delayed at Marada throughout the 13th, awaiting the arrival of two more three-ton lorries for which they had signalled, and certain M.T. spares which the R.A.F. was to drop. The American airmen had not been re-located: since the 11th, and another extensive search was

organized by the Air/Sea Rescue Flight and the IXth Bomber Command for the 13th. Two Wellingtons and three Liberators carried out separate searches, one of the Wellingtons spotting four survivors in position 27.04 N., 17.56 E.. and dropping further supplies. These men were the same as had been previously reported as five, a support for their parachutes fixed to provide shelter having been mistaken for an injured survivor. There was still no trace of the other o members of the crew. The two men seen on the 11th were, however, re-located by Liberators on the 14th in position 27.20 N., 18.00 F., and ,the group of four again. seen by an Air/Sea Rescue Blenheim, who gave the position as much further north-27.24 N., 17.50 E. Supplies were dropped for both parties. The Blenheim also dropped the springs and other spares for the S.D.F. patrol and marked maps
-

giving all known information -about' the missing

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137

Part of the Army land 'party ready to enter the "Coal"

This glimpse of the convoy travelling over the "Coal" gives a good idea of the desolate nature of the terrain.

Making tracks for the trucks to get through the "Coal".

The S.D.F. patrol cooling off.

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estimated position, but the going was rough and rocky, with frequent patches of soft sand. All the vans boiled continuously and there were further breakdowns. These troubles persisted on the 15th and one of the three-ton lorries ran its big end. In the evening the Bimbashi signalled his battalion H.Q., suggesting that another patrol be sent out as he could not get the airmen back in the remaining vehicles without considerable delay. As a result, a patrol of the Indian Long Range Squadron, based at Derna, was despatched. Preparing a Landing Strip Up to the 15th July the exact positions of the survivors had not been clearly established. All personnel who had seen the Americans agreed, however, that they could re-locate, since they all said that there were various rock formations in "The Coal" that they could recognise. On the 15th, therefore, a crew for a Wellington was formed containing somebody who had been on each of the previously successful flights. Between them they found all the survivors, the two parties turning out to be only eight miles apart. More supplies were dropped and a reconnaissance was made to find a landing strip for use as near "The Coal" as possible. Information about the preparation of this emergency landing ground was passed next day to the S.D.F. patrol, which was still struggling forward, along a mountainous and rocky track, broken by large sand dunes, and as it was still mined from the time of the Wavell campaign great care had to be taken. The hard-worked vehicles, which were too light for the ground they were traversing, continued to give trouble and the battery leads finally broke up in the W/T truck. On the 17th the going improved and better progress was made, although during the heat of the day the vans boiled ceaselessly. At 16.30 hours the patrol spotted an Air/Sea Rescue Flight Wellington, and after its attention had been attracted by verey lights the aircraft dropped smoke generators and marking strips as well as full instructions for making the landing ground. At 17.30 hours the patrol reached the spot chosen for the landing ground and an hour later was joined by the I.L.R.S. party, which had made better time, having taken only two days and six hours from Benghazi. By 20.00 hours the combined parties completed the landing ground in position 27.30 N., 18.45 E. and had informed battalion H.Q. by signal. The First Aircraft Lands At 09.00 hours on the 18th an Air/Sea Rescue Wellington appeared and, guided by a smoke generator, landed safely on the prepared strip. .2 Two and a half hours later the C.O. of the Rescue ' Flight arrived in a Magister. A conference was; held at which it was decided that the I.L.R.S. : officer should go up in the Magister and reconnoitre the best route into the volcanic rock area.

This was done and both parties left the landing ground at 14.30 hours. At 15.00 hours the Magister flew over the patrols, but some twenty minutes later the airscrew fell off and the aircraft had to make a forcedlanding. The crew was unhurt, but the position was so inaccessible that salvage of the aircraft was impossible. The accident was seen by the Rescue Flight's M.O., who was with the land party, and rescue was soon effected, the crew being sent back to the landing ground, 25 miles away, in one of the S.D.F. vans. Next morning both patrols broke camp. The going was appalling among the black volcanic lava and the I.L.R.S., being better equipped with vehicles, drew ahead of the SD.F., which had to stop continuously to remove boulders in order to get the vans through. At 13.45 hours the S.D.F. caught up with the I.L.R.S. patrol, which was resting in a native village. The S.D.F. drivers, having been at the wheel for seven hours, had to be rested, and the I.L.R.S. once more pushed on at 14.00 hours. Shortly afterwards a Wellington flew over and when the S.D.F. Bimbashi wrote on the sand that the I.L.R.S. was ahead, the aircraft followed to assist in directing the search. The Survivors Reached The search was at last successful. The Wellington guided the I.L.R.S. patrol first to the two Americans and then, eight miles away, to the other four. Two of the airmen were injured, but the others were well although weak and rather shaken after their ordeal. The two surviving officers reported that there were four other airmen somewhere in "The Coal". The First Pilot and the Flight Engineer, they said, had started to walk north-but had no water with them and their parachutes had been found rolled up under a tree; the remaining two airmen had at first been with one of the rescued parties but, being slightly injured, had dropped out when their comrades began to walk northwards. None of the missing men, however, had been seen by the searching aircraft. It was decided that it would be better to get the survivors to safety before making any decision regarding further air searches for the lost airmen. On the morning of the 20th the S.D.F., which on the previous evening had caught up with the I.L.R.S., left camp with the six survivors, the injured men riding in a borrowed I.L.R.S. truck. The other two trucks of the I.L.R.S. stayed to continue the search. They contacted a native village, but could get no news of the missing men and consequently made their way back in the, evening to the landing ground, which the S.D.F. with the survivors had reached earlier. That night a message was received telling the . patrols to remain at the landing ground for further orders, although by then the S.D.F. had water left for only two and a half days.

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The A.S.R. Flight Magister, used during the search, being refuelled from a Wellington.

Another view of the Magister being refuelled, with one of the Army cars in the background.

The American survivors being shown their position in the "Coal" on a map.

The

rescued airmen safely back at Berka.

DECLA
140

First thing next morning two Air/Sea Rescue Flight Wellingtons flew the six rescued airmen back to base at Berka. A conference was then called to decide whether any further action was likely to be fruitful. No. 212 Group Flying Control, No. 93 Sub-Area, the 93rd Bombardment Group and the Air/Sea Rescue Flight were all represented, and it was finally agreed that further searching would be useless and that the missing men were to be considered lost. The landing ground was, therefore, evacuated by all personnel. The S.D.F. patrol left at 13.45 hours on the 21st and limped into the Company camp at Benghazi at 16.00 hours on the 27th, after suffering almost every known type of breakdown. The I.L.R.S. patrol received orders when at Zella, 150 miles south of Nofilia, on the 22nd to proceed by forced-march to Qassassin, in the Suez Canal Zone. It reached Benghazi, at 18.00 hours on the 24th, rested and carried out repairs for the next 24 hours, and made Suez by 16.00 hours on the 28th, embarking for India next day. As already mentioned, the Air/Sea Rescue Flight's aircraft had flown 120 flying hours,

searching a total area, excluding areas covered two or three times, of 15,500 square miles. Owing to heavy commitments at that time in connection with the invasion of Sicily, the Flight was short of aircraft at base, but the small maintenance organisation left behind completed six engine changes in eight days on the aircraft, employed in this rescue. An American Tribute The following message was received by No. 212 Group Flying Control from Brigadier General U.G. Ent, the C.O. of the IXth Bomber Command, U.S.A.F.:-"This Command wishes to express its appreciation for the untiring efforts expended by Flying Control personnel in the recent rescue of six American airmen of the 93rd Bombardment Group, who were stranded in the desert. The problem of rescue in this case was unusually difficult and only by the intelligent planning and prompt action of your organization and other units involved was the rescue made
possible".

An extract from the Operations Record Book of No. 209 Squadron was given in "From the 540s" in 'Number 3 of the Review. On the following page is an interesting diagram showing the distances from base of the Squadron's Detachments.

141

THE ADJUTANT
GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCES
SHOWN
SHOWN

THUS:- ----

ACTUAL DISTANCES FLOWN

THUS:

A DIAGRAM, SHOWING OVER OF EUROPE THE DISTANCES MENTS RUN BY Na2O9 SQUADRON SINCEIsiJANUARY 1943. BASE H-ASBEEN TRANSPLANTED TO LONDON, THE DAR.K LINES REPRESENT DISTANCES BY THE ROUTES NORMALLY FOLLOWED BY THE AIRCRAFT; THE DOTTED LINES REPRESENT DISTANCES AS THE CROW FLEES.

LIST OF ADVANCED BASES

OAR ES- SALAAM PAMANZI

DIEGO SiUAREZ

"-APPROXIMATE SCALE (5,vtsh4 Sth'tute Mies)

05S0300 200
300

PORT VICTORIA, SEYCHELLES TOMBEAU BAY, MALURTIUS TULEAR ST LUCIA BAY DURBAN

400

500600

700

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MOMBASA-DUBAN 111 PAMANZL -

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MOMBASA-SL.LUCIA BAY.. 1510 -W/A PAMANZIL 1800BO MOMBASA-LANGEBAAN, SALDHANA BAY - 2125 /A PAMANZI, DURBAN, CAPETOWN------2925 MOMBASA-MAURITIUS..

1425 0

5 6

MOMBASA-SEYCIELLES. MOMBASA-PAMANZL..

950' 626

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MOMBASA-DIEGO SUAREZ. 758 MOMASA DAR-ES-SALMAM. 165 MOMBASATULEAR 1180

ACCOUNTS OF OPERATIONS in Sicily contained in the Operations Record Books of this quarter could have filled the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review alone, but following the previous policy the selection of extracts has been kept as diverse as possible, covering past as well as current events. Further sidelights on Sicilian adventures will be included in future numbers. No. 1. A Canadian Squadron in Sicily (From No. 417 Squadron, R.C.A.F.) Malta. 15th July. Ordered at 1130 hours to embark on barges in Valetta harbour at 1700 hours. In view of previous instructions, and inspections under way, this was very difficult, but the Squadron began loading on to the barge at 1703 hours. Rear party of 20 airmen and Engineer Officer left to finish inspections. Landing barge very fine double decker, accommodating all our 20 vehicles and 165 men quite easily. Left Valetta harbour and anchored off Valetta until

2300 hours. Convoy of ten barges and two corvettes sailed under full moon, calm sea. Sicily. 16th July. Were off Sicilian coast at 0400 hours; heavy air raid on Pachino, with impressive barrage. Lay off until raid was over, then drove .right up on to rocky beach at 0600 hours. F/O E. and F/Lt. S. first ashore. Transport came through water and up on beach without a hitch. Proceeded immediately to Pachino aerodrome three miles away, arriving at 0700 hours. Wing decided to move ahead to a field the Engineers had hacked out of an almond grove, so we moved on as advance squadron to Cassibile. Secured a fine dispersal in a big almond grove, with camp lines in a vineyard just behind. Had camp set up and flights ready to receive aircraft at 1800 hours. Aircraft landed at Pachino on last patrol and pilots stayed there for night. Heavy raid from 0005 to 0130 hours on ships at George Beach, Syracuse and Augusta. No Jprmns fl Qagii*i4,mlm

deal of shrapnel from

sleep two to a pup-tent, or four officers to a 180 1 tent in the desert. Pup-tents much more convenient to erect and carry. Have no mess tents, all having been left behind in Africa, but stretched a truck tarpaulin over the long table from Sousse Court House and set up a pilots' mess. Cassibile L.G. 17th July. Aircraft arrived at 0730 hours. Bit of sniping in area still, two men being killed at Pachino. Impossible to dig slit trenches as only a foot of soil above the lava stone, so are building small blast walls around Very fine country, with an the pup-tents. abundance of almonds, lemons, grapes, melons, tomatoes and good red wine. Oranges and walnuts not quite ripe. The district we are in is a broad plain with mountains to the south-west and north-west. Three hours raid between 2330 and 0230, no casualties. 18th July. Very hot, but airmen have discovered a deep well in an old farmyard with ice cold water, so have a constant bath parade. Sea much too oily for swimming. Natives very friendly and will trade anything for cigarettes. Rations very much better than in the desert-scarcely see bully beef. Have a new mascot, a young kid, which wandered into camp and attached herself like a puppy to P/O P. All other mascots were left behind in Africa. F/O G. has started a small poultry farm with seven hens and two turkeys. Raid from 0100 to 0200, one Gerry shot down just west of the aerodrome, one petrol ship in Syracuse in flames. 19th July. Visited by P.M.O. who complimented the Squadron on camp site, said it was best ordered and cleanest in the Wing. Squadron also had much the lowest sickness rate of any of the squadrons, a tribute to the keenness of our M.O. and sanitary squad. Each day the pilots off duty take a truck and travel round the country, visiting the Canadian Army and collecting green produce. Quite a number of the Canadian sailors in the ships off George Beach are frequent visitors of the Squadron. First raidless night since arrival. 20th July. Royal Engineers have now completed the aerodrome and made a very fine job of it. In the Desert it was found quicker and safer to construct a new aerodrome rather than de-louse the German ones, and so special companies of the Engineers were formed to specialize in this work; they are certainly very efficient. Heaviest raid to date started at 0300 hours. No casualties in our Squadron. 21st July. Air Evacuation centre set up in field and Squadron M.Os and orderlies worked on clearing casualties. As no cigarettes provided, the Squadron turned their daily ration over to our M.O. for distribution. Little progress being made against Catania,but Americans and Canadians advancing steadily. Another heavy two hour raid. 24th July. W/Cdr. D.S., D.S.O., D.F.C., now Wing Cdr. flying, led the Squadron on four

eps today and then complimented the pilots on being the best disciplined Squadron in the air of the five in the Wing; high praise indeed as 244 Wing is the crack wing of the Desert Air Force. All pilots agree that the tremendous change in Squadron airmanship and discipline is entirely due to S/Ldr. T. A very great change in the attitude of the Wing and Group to the Squadron; instead of being regarded as the junior squadron, left behind and doing the uninteresting shows, we are now the advance squadron and the C.O. sees that the pilots get the maximum flying in the best shows. No. 2. At Last! (From N9. 459 Squadron, R.A.A.F.) June, 1943. Hudson "T" was airborne at 1220 hours to co-operate with Naval vessels in a hunt for a U-boat which, had previously torpedoed a tender in the Haifa area. The Naval vessels were not met in the position given so the pilot climbed to 8,000 feet to take advantage of 4/10th cloud cover and commenced an independent patrol. At 1347 hours a submarine was sighted on the surface about four miles away on a course of 3300 at eight knots. The aircraft immediately dived and delivered an attack with four D.Cs up the track, one D.C. making a direct hit, two near misses and one 40 to 50 feet ahead. The submarine immediately circled hard to port;- members of the crew who had been caught sunbathing on the deck dived overboard, and less than five minutes later the U-boat sank stern first, the bow projecting sharply out of the water. Later, 21 survivors, all German, were picked up. Unfortunately for the aircraft the D.C. which made a direct hit caused a tremendous explosion which threw the Hudson 400 feet into the air, and severely bent and damaged the mainplanes, fuselage and tailplane. In view of this, the aircraft remained on the scene only long enough to take photographs, and then returned to "XYZ", where an excellent landing was made although the aircraft was so damaged that it was consequently placed in category two. The U-boat was assessed as a definite "kill" thus giving the Squadron its first, but long sought-after, submarine. The comment of the S.A.S.O. at No. 201 (N.C.) Group, was "a classical attack emphasising the value of surprise brought about by good hunting methods in a well camouflaged aircraft and followed by immediate action resulting in a certain kill". The Navy sent a signal "Many thanks". The Pilot was only on his third operation with the Squadron when he made his kill and he deserves every credit for this excellent attack, and his handling of a subsequently damaged aircraft. He later received an immediate award of the D.F.M. No. 3. The Right Spirit. (From No. 2 (M.E.) Fuel Transport Coy.) Lete. Near Benghazi. 21st July. On completion of deliveries on this date the unit had re-

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O[CLASS
corded deliveries of aviation fuel exceeding one million gallons. The total mileage .for all unit M.T. vehicles was 147,285. All vehicles were serviceable and there was a clear bill with regard to accidents. 31st July. During the month a great deal of consideration was given to the question of food. The stoves installed in the cookhouse lorry caused considerable trouble, and the lack of fresh meat was a great handicap to the cooks. The "eternal bully" quotation was much in evidence, but the men accepted the position in a very cheerful manner. All Sawyer stoves were converted to oilfed and field kitchens were built. These proved to be of great assistance and lessened the risk of fire. Morale was good, and was helped by the events in Sicily and Russia. The men are very proud of the work they are doing, and their meetings with the Americans in the course of their duties has proved intensely valuable in creating a better understanding between the U.S.A.F. and the R.A.F. here. The Officers have encouraged U.S.A.F. Officers to visit this unit and whilst this cannot be developed to any great degree, it is felt that what has already been achieved by individual invitaton has had an effect which will spread. Liaison between our unit and the U.S.A.F. units is given a high degree of importance. During the month no effort was spared to improve accommodation and recreational facilities in the camp. An exceptionally good and fairly well-stocked canteen now operates, and a piano has been hired. A violin has also been purchased through Welfare, and both instruments are being used to good advantage. Sickness was at a very low percentage and health was good. No. 4. Taxi, Sir ? (From No. 284 Squadron) Cassibile. 4.8.43. Weather good. Aerodrome O.K. At 1020 hours Sgt. L., W/O P., and F/Sgt. B. were sent off to meet escort and proceed three miles east of Catania. Here they picked up F/O K. (R.C.A.F.) of No. 72 Squadron, alive but badly wounded in the leg. Could not take off again in area so taxied to better conditions near Augusta, and took off. At 1240 hours, ten minutes after landing, Sgt. L. took off again in another Walrus with Sgt. B. and F/Sgt. P., to position 400 yards east of Catania. They picked up Sgt. W. (R.A.F.) in position without opposition, and were on homeward journey when re-vectored to position five miles further north, one mile off-shore, and here found and picked up P/O B., alive. With the extra weight they were unable to take off, so after two attemps proceeded to taxi. However, it was found that a hole had been made in the port float which proceeded to fill so three men were sent on to the starboard wing. As aircraft continued to take water, Sgt. L. decided to beach, which was done successfully six miles south of

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F/Lt. H. flew to Malta to collect cigarettes and soap for the boys. State of aircraft, two serviceable, two u/s. No. 5. A Change of Luck. (From No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron) 18.7.43. Another sweep of the same area as yesterday by twelve aircraft proved uneventful. In the afternoon the ground party received word to move again at one hour's notice and at 1700 hours they left Syracuse to move forward, arriving at Lentini at approximately 2100 hours where the night was spent under the transport. The ground party spent the day in settling in and preparing a camp site. Meanwhile, the pilots in Malta put up an excellent show. Four of our aircraft on convoy patrol five miles north-west Augusta ran into a number of Reggiane 2001 bombers attempting to attack the convoy. We went in full of joy, to send no fewer than six of them into the sea. F/O J. got three of them and F/O K. and Sgt. S. each got one and shared half another. This was the best break the Squadron has had since coming overseas. Perhaps our luck, which has been pretty poor so far, may be changed. 25.7.43. The best day in the history of the Squadron! At least thirteen enemy aircraft destroyed, one probable, and one damaged; twelve of them in one scrap when, led by W/Cdr. G., we ran into a crowd of JU.52s, escorted by ME.109s, attempting to land on the shore in the Gulf of Milazzo., The other aircraft destroyed was a ME.109 claimed by Sgt. S. on patrol in the same area during the evening. The Squadron was flying on the "deck" when the JU.52s were sighted and soon got among them. Several went up in a mass of flame, probably petrol transports. W/Cdr. G. got two of the JU.52s, F/O K. two, Sgt. B. two, F/Lt. B. one and a half, F/O J. a half, Sgt. P. one and F/O B. and P/O M. shared one. After dealing with the transports we got mixed up with the ME.109s of which F/O J. destroyed two and F/O K. chased one into Italy before his ammunition ran out and he had to leave it smoking badly very low in a narrow gully. He claimed it as a probable. Incidentally it got a shot into his wing before he first saw it. One of the JU.52s which F/Lt. B. destroyed blew up right in front of him so that his cockpit was filled with smoke, and when he got back he found a length of parachute cord in his radiator. The whole affair was a tremendous lift up to the Squadron, particularly in view of the six Italian aircraft destroyed on the 19th. The only black spot was that F/O M. failed to return. No. 6. For Services Rendered. (From No. 216 Squadron) April, 1943. El Djem turned out to have a grass landing ground and this is the first time since 1919, when the Squadron first came to Egypt, that our aircraft have operated from a grass aerodrome.

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Towards the end of the month crews began to be detailed back to base and Dakotas made their appearance, firstly for training purposes and later on replaced the Bombays. In recognition of our services in evacuating wounded under difficult conditions, we received a letter of appreciation from Colonel P. F., 2 N.Z. Division in which he said : "Would you please convey to Group Captain O'M., to No. 1 R.A.A.F. Air Ambulance Unit, and to the other air units involved the gratitude of the New Zealand Division for their help and co-operation during the recent fighting. The total of 420 cases evacuated by air from a position in close proximity to the enemy, and virtually behind his lines, would appear to be the largest undertaking of its kind so far in this theatre of war. By cutting out a journey of 160 miles over rough desert tracks it must have saved many lives and spared our wounded a great deal of suffering and so contributed to their early recovery. The work of the pilots in landing all types of planes on an improvised airfield under extremely bad weather conditions was most praiseworthy. May I also express my gratitude to you for the immediate response to all requests for assistance with supplies of blood and other stores, which contributed greatly to the solving of our difficulties." No. 7. Uncomfortable Moments. (From No. 249 Squadron) Pachino. 4.8.43. A captured ME.109 piloted by a 72 Squadron pilot was airborne only for a short time before the gunners in and around the A/D, not having been warned previously and unable no doubt to distinguish British marking, opened fire. An exciting few minutes followed, ground personnel running for cover, the 109 taking evasive action, a Spitfire taking off, circling the

drome waggling wings, signalling ack-ack to cease fire. Finally the 109 came in making an excellent one wheel landing; luckily the pilot escaped unscathed. Pachino. 12.8.43. News was received from Ops. that F/Lt. G. had baled out near Lentini and was safe with 244 Wing. He returned to the Squadron in a Whitley bomber on the 20th. After the first attack, his section had broken and he had become separated from it but not before he had seen a Spitfire going down in flames at about 12,000 feet and two other Spitfires in his section still breaking. On his way to Sicily, a FW.190 had attacked him from below and astern, severely damaging his aircraft. Most of the controls were shot away, the tail unit damaged, the port and starboard mainplanes holed, parts of the elevator were missing, the port flap hanging in pieces, the radio was dead, and only the engine appeared untouched. The machine was almost beyond control. At first he decided to try a forced-landing to save the engine. When he realised the futility of this he undid his straps and prepared to bale out. The hood refused to jettison, and he found it impossible to re-fasten his straps. After climbing from 3,000 ft. to 5,000 ft. and making for Lentini he eventually forced off the hood, after several attempts, whilst holding the stick between his knees. The hood struck the tail unit, rolling the aircraft on its back and his feet caught under the instrument panel. He hung suspended for a time until managing to kick more himself free; he felt for the rip cord delay; the parachute had slipped round his body. He; dropped about 1,500 feet before he could pull the cord when the parachute opened immediately. He now found it necessary to control the 'chute to avoid high tension cables and eventually landed in a cactus grove, luckily in an open space! During the descent he saw his own aircraft crash in a vineyard and burst into flames.

CORRECTIONS
1. Attention has been called to the fact that in the historical account

of R.A.F. operations in No. 3 of the R.A.F. Middle East Review, the activity of the Western Desert Air Force was described in a manner implying that it was still acting independently, whereas it was, w.e.f. 23rd February, 1943, operationally controlled by the North-west African Tactical Air Force and

from then on operated, of course, as an integral part of that Force. 2. A printer's error occurred in the same issue. On page 50, line 16, the bomb load, which was made up-primarily of 20 lb. fragmentation bombs, shoul rpad : to, no't 39-t: m 3

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ACKNOWLEDGHENT
is due to the Officers Commanding
THE R.A.F. REG IMENT

No. 216 GROUP

AIR STAFF INTELLIGENCE H.Q., R.A.F., MI.E.

P.0..

BRANCH H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

AIRCRAFT 'SAFETY. ORGANISATION H.Q., RAE.,

MLE.

NORTHWEST AFRICAN PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE WING R.A,F. MIDDLE EAST PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRIETATION UNIT

MIDDLE EAST COMMNAND PUBLIC RELATIONS

PHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT 294 SQUADRON

For their kind permission and co-operation in the production of material for this number of

THlE RI.A.F. MYED1TERRIANEAN

and also to those

REVIEW

Officers.

who supplied

articles or materials or photographs

rl

PBODUJCED BY AIR STAFF (OPERATIONS RECORDS)

HEADQUARTERS,

ROYAL

AIR FORCE,

MIDDLE EAST

148