M.V. Sichem Amethyst (AMP)

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST
Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator
Investigation Report
M.T. SICHEM AMETHYST, IMO NO.: 9354571 AUXILIARY ENGINE FAILURE AT SEA 3 SEPTEMBER 2007
R-027-07/DISAM
This investigation report was written to improve safety and prevent new accidents. The report does not address the possible responsibility or liability caused by the accident. The investigation report should not be used for purposes other than the improvement of safety.
Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine Marine Casualty Investigation Branch Panama, Republic of Panama
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................3 USED ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................5 FOREWORD ..................................................................................................................6 1 EVENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS......................................................................7 1.1 Data, items, records ........................................................................................8 1.2 Damages and loss ..........................................................................................9 1.3 . Incident voyage..13 1.3.1 Voyage and its planning.13 1.3.2 Action after incidence13 1.3.3 Assistance rendered13 1.4 Relevant directions and rules guiding the operation..14 1.4.1 Rules and guidelines issued by the authorities...14 1.4.2 Company procedures..14 2. INCIDENT ANALYSIS..14 2.1 .. Immediate cause.14 2.2 Root cause..14 3. CONCLUSIONS.16 3.1 Sequence chain.....16 3.2 Contributing factor.16 4. RECOMMENDATIONS.17 REFERENCE....18
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SUMMARY
M.T.SICHEM AMETHYST, FAILURE OF AUXILIARY ENGINES AT SEA ON 3 SEPTEMBER 2007.
Panama flag chemical tanker M.T.Sichem Amethyst, IMO No. 9354571 was built in October, 2006. LOA - 114.99 m Breadth - 18.20 m Depth (moulded) - 9.65 m Summer DWT - 8816.74mt She loaded 1000mt Caustic Soda and 6877mt Lubricating Oil cargo from Livorno port, Italy to discharge at Dakar, Senegal. On her way to Dakar, the vessel was scheduled to bunker at Gibraltar. During her first leg of the voyage from Livorno to Gibraltar she was using on-board bunkers, which were supplied at Benin port in Senegal on 14 August 2007. During the voyage at sea on 3 September 2007 at 2230hrs, with balance Fuel Oil 52.8mt and Diesel Oil 60.0mt in position Latitude 36deg 47min N & Longitude 001deg 32min W and depth around 1600m, approximately 60nm South of Cartagena and 45nm North-East from the Almeira port of the Spanish Coast, the vessel reported technical difficulties in running of ships generators leading to auxiliary engine power, subsequently resulting in main engine immobilization and loss of propulsion. At the time of the above incident, the weather and sea were calm with light airs. Vessel was at a negligible drift rate in safe waters, 20 miles off the Spanish coast with source of power from emergency generator which came on load automatically after shutting off of auxiliary engines. Vessels Technical Superintendent, Designated Person Ashore and Marine Rescue Coordination Center, Almeira in Spain were contacted about the loss of propulsion power. Spanish Coast Guard dispatched a tug boat, which was stand-by in near vicinity of the vessel to render assistance, if required. In consultation and with the advice of the Technical Managers, the vessel was towed to Cartagena, Spain for repairs of the affected machineries, in particular the auxiliary and main engines. In the Cartagena Port, the vessel was attended for repairs by the class NKK Surveyor, Technical Superintendent, and Technician from the Manufacturers of the Auxiliary Engine, Yanmar. Damages to the auxiliary and main engines were evaluated, and the root cause was found to be in the use of inferior quality and contaminated fuel. Damaged parts of Main Engine and Auxiliary Engine were replaced extensively; also, suspected fuel oil was completely segregated. Diesel oil was put in service for use until supply of good quality fuel oil. All machineries re-started, checked, and performance monitored, which was found satisfactory.
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Vessel pumped out to shore facility the suspected fuel oil, and the new fuel oil was supplied at Gibraltar. Vessel resumed her voyage to discharge port, Dakar. All damaged parts of machineries and suspected fuel samples were sent for laboratory analysis to take preventive action and to stop reoccurrence of such incident.
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USED ABBREVIATIONS
AIS DPA FO, DO Hrs IMO LR/ NKK M/E, A/E MRCC MT/m/Ltr Nm P.O.B. PMA ROB SOLAS TAN
Automatic Identification System Designated Person Ashore Fuel Oil, Diesel Oil Ship Time in hour and minute International Maritime Organization Lloyds Register/ Nippon Kaiji Kyokai Classification Society Main Engine, Auxiliary Engine Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre Metric Tons/Meter/Liter Nautical Mile Pilot on Board Panama Maritime Authority Remaining on Board Safety of Life at Sea. Total Acid Number 5
FOREWORD
The Panama Maritime Authority Marine Accident Investigation Branch got information from the Technical Managers of the M/T SICHEM AMETHYST about the loss of power from main auxiliary engines, and subsequent loss of propulsion resulting in drifting of vessel at sea. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch contacted the Spanish Maritime Authorities, MRCC, Almeira, Ships Owner and Technical Manager/Operator about the ship. On 4.09.2007 the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the Panama Maritime Authority commissioned to investigate the casualty on M/T SICHEM AMETHYST. On 14 November 2007, Captain C.D.Mathur was appointed as Principal Investigator to carry out the investigation of the marine casualty of the subject vessel, and to submit the report to the Panama Maritime Authority. Investigating authorities acted in accordance to the IMO resolution A 849(20) with the Panama Maritime Authority being the leading party. Root cause analysis of the incident was conducted with the help of various organizations, viz-a-viz Classification Societies, namely NKK and LR, ITS Marine Testing Centre. Samples of suspected fuel and damaged machinery parts were sent for mass spectrometry, FTIR, and GCMS analysis On site inspection of the Auxiliary and Main Engines damaged parts was carried out by the manufacturers technicians, classification societys surveyors, and their reports were compiled and put up for recommendations to prevent reoccurrence. Statements, realistic data, and events of the accident from ship were collected. Photographs of damaged parts of the machinery were taken for record and recommendations of classification society and manufacturers of A/Es were circulated to the fleet of companys ship.
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1. EVENTS AND INVESTIGATION 1.1 Data, items, records

Date 3 Sep07 Time 22:30 22:35 22:30-40 23:49 Event A/E No.1 stopped. Stand-by A/E No.2 failed to start. Emergency generator automatically comes on load. Vessel was Not Under Command. AIS was updated. Ship's staff tried restarting A/Es, but was not successful. Technical Manager was informed of A/Es failure and ships staffs inability to re-start. Vessel contacted MRCC, Almeira on telephone. MRCC, Almeira requested for detailed information by fax. Information sent by fax to MRCC, Almeira Updates given to MRCC, Almeira on telephone. MRCC, Almeira informed about the arrival of a tug and same to be stand by until completion of repairs. Tug boat Remolcanosa Cinco, IMO No. 7625122, arrived and was stand by. Technical Managers informed that the standby tug will be used for towing the vessel to Cartagena. Vessel made fast from forward to tug boat using two tow wire from tug. Cabo de Gata traffic informed about vessel's arrival, and advised that vessel was not to enter Cartagena harbour before daybreak. Vessel was under tow towards port of Cartagena. Vessel arrived at the Cartagena Pilot station. Pilot informed boarding time at 10:00hrs. P.O.B. Port tug boatVB Glacial made fast aft for berthing the ship in port. Towing tug boatRemolcanosa cast off forward. Tug boat VB Glacial made fast forward. 1st line ashore, port tug boat Anibal assisting. Port Tug boats away. Vessel all fast 3+2 lines forward and aft at SUR F-E 024 berth. Yanmar technician on boarded vessel. Tried to start A/E No.1, but failed. Shore generator connected. A/Es spares were connected on board. Fleet Manager from Technical Managers office went on board. A/E No.1 fitted with new plunger and barrels, started.
4 Sep07
03:54 04:05 04:44 10:34 10:41 11:30 19:30 21:35
21:40 05 Sep07 08:00 10:12 10:33 10:45 10:50 11:42 11:53 11:54 20:00 21:30 06 Sep07 15:30 17:35 18:50 21:30
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07 Sep07
08:30 09:25 13:05 10:06 12:06 19:00
A/E No.1 was taken on load. Shore generator stopped. Class surveyor on board. Drop of out-bound Cartagena sea pilot. End of sea passage, Gibraltar. Vessel anchored at Gibraltar harbour for bunkering Departure from Gibraltar for Dakar, Senegal. Vessel resumed her voyage.
10 Sep07 11 Sep07
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1.2 DAMAGES and LOSS
AE #1 WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER
AE #2 WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER 9

ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER
ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT FUEL PUMP BARREL 10

ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT LINER
ME UNIT #3 DAMAGED / WORN OUT PISTON RINGS 11

FO PURIFIER SHAFT & HOUSING
FO PURIFIER BOWL & PLATES 12

1.3 INCIDENT VOYAGE

1.3.1 VOYAGE AND ITS PLANNING On 3 September 2007 during voyage to Dakar, ships Auxiliary Engines stopped and the emergency generator was activated automatically to supply restricted power. All efforts by ships staff proved futile to re-start the Auxiliary Engines; consequently, vessels main engine and propulsion came to a standstill. Vessel displayed signal of not being under command. Ships Technical Manager Designated Person Ashore was informed of the incident. MRCC, Almeira was contacted and the situation about the Auxiliary Engines failure was conveyed. The nearest port, Cartagena, sent out a tug boat to be standing by for any assistance, if required. As per advice of vessels operators, it was decided that the vessel would be towed to the port of refuge, Cartagena, in order to find out the cause of the problem and to carry out necessary repairs on Auxiliary Engine and Main Engine. Vessel was towed to the port of Cartagena and attended by the Technical Manager, Classification Society Surveyor, Manufacturer, Yanmars Technicians to evaluate damages to the Auxiliary Engine and Main Engine.
1.3.2 ACTION AFTER INCIDENT Vessel in port was supplied with shore power. Both A/Es and No.3 unit of M/E, which showed sign of abnormality and wear down were opened. A/Es and M/E fuel and feed pump barrel & plungers were withdrawn for renewal. Also fuel injectors of both A/Es were inspected, found to be worn out. All fuel injectors on both the A/Es were inspected and found to be worn out. A/Es fuel feed pumps gears inspected and were found to be worn out. ME unit #3 piston ring were also inspected and found to worn out. Fuel oil purifier seal rings were changed, as some were worn out. The worn out parts were landed and sent to makers for further analysis. After initial inspection makers intimated that the damage noticed is inconsistent with the damage caused due to off-specification fuel.
1.3.3 ASSISTANCE RENDERED

MRCC, Almeira sent out a tug boat from the port of Cartagena to be stand by near the vessel and provide assistance, if require. Stand by tug boat Remolcanosa towed vessel to port of refuge, Cartagena, for repairs of the Auxiliary Engines and Main Engine. Manufacturers (Yanmar) technician attended to the vessel and evaluated the damages and its root cause. 13
A detailed analysis report of suspected fuel oil and damaged parts of machinery from FOBAS, determined that contamination of fuel oil was the root cause of the incident.
1.4 RELEVANT DIRECTION AND RULES GUIDING THE OPERATION

Technical Managers/Operators SMS guidelines, procedures, and check lists in compliance with were followed. 1.4.1 RULES AND GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITIES IMO Resolution A.741(18) ISM-Code. The objective of the code is to comply with international standard on safety of life at sea, safe operation on board ships, and environmental protection. The code is based on general principles and objectives. The goals of the code are to ensure safety at sea, to prevent personnel injuries, loss of life, and to prevent damages to the environment and to property. The safety management system of technical managers/ operators follows the principles, objectives, and goals set forth by the code. ISM code
1.4.2 COMPANYS PROCEDURES The Companys procedures and guidelines laid down in SMS for various contingencies, e.g., heavy weather, cargo protection, cargo damage, structural damage, machinery failure, flooding of cargo holds, grounding, and abandoning ship were followed.
2. INCIDENT ANALYSIS
2.1 IMMEDIATE CAUSE
Since all the fuel pumps, barrels, plungers, and fuel system in general of both the Auxiliary Engines and that of unit #3 of the Main Engine, were showing signs of abnormal wear down. The reason was narrowed down to a common factor. It was highly unlikely to experience a complete failure of the full fuel system and associated auxiliaries at one time, unless there is a common cause. Prior to this incident, all the Auxiliary Engine & Main Engine parameters were found to be within normal limits. A strong indicator pointing towards usage of Nigerian fuel oil which was supplied to the vessel on 14 August 2007 at Benin port, Senegal, causing failure of the complete fuel system of the Auxiliary Engines on board the M/T SICHEM AMETHYST.
2.2 ROOT CAUSE

Off-specification fuel supplied to the vessel and same burned inside the combustion chambers of various engine machineries resulted in the damages to the Auxiliary Engine and # 3 unit of Main Engine. 14
As per Classification Societys surveyor and Auxiliary Engines manufacturer, Yanmar, technicians advised that it was concluded that such abnormal wear can only be caused due to contaminated and off-specification fuel oil in use. The FOBAS investigation report by Lloyds Register, Marine Consultancy Services, detected evidence for a range of components which would not normally be expected to be present in fuel oil, including various fatty acids. The detailed laboratory analysis of fuel sample clearly indicated that the FO was contaminated and have contravened or violated stipulation of MARPOL Annex VI, Regulation 18.1(a) (iii) and the International Marine Fuel Standard ISO 8217 Section 5.1 which states The fuel oil shall not include any added substances or chemical waste which jeopardize safety of ship or adversely affects the performance of the machinery. FOBAS also advises that use of such contamination fuel in diesel engines may result in operational problems, in particular to the fuel pumps and the injector nozzles, causing loss of power, possible fuel pump seizure, and in an extreme case, a total fuel system failure as experienced on the M/T SICHEM AMETHYST.
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3. CONCLUSION
3.1 SEQUENCE CHAIN
1. Vessel was on an emergency source of power due to A/Es failure. 2. Vessel was towed to port of refuge, Cartagena, and was berthed for investigation and repairs. 3. Shore power was supplied to the vessel. 4. Requisite shore assistance and attendance by Class, Technicians, and Fleet Manager. 5. Supply and renewal of damaged parts of the Auxiliary Engines & Main Engine, in consultation with Class & guidance from makers technician. 6. All machineries were started, checked, and performance confirmed which was found satisfactory prior vessels departure from Cartagena. Synopsis of repairs carried out in Cartagena. aa. Auxiliary Engine 1 & Auxiliary Engine 2 All 6 units fuel pumps plunger & barrel were renewed. All 6 units fuel injectors overhauled & nozzles were renewed. bb. Auxiliary Engines fuel feed pump gears were renewed. cc. Main Engine Unit #3 was overhauled & piston rings were renewed. All 6 units fuel injectors were overhauled & nozzles were renewed. dd. Fuel oil Purifier was fully overhauled and damaged seal rings were renewed. Suspect Fuel oil was completely segregated and it was decided same was not to be used. Informed charterers were to arrange landing of suspected fuel to shore facility. Vessel sailed to Gibraltar using diesel oil only. New fuel bunkers were received in Gibraltar. Vessel de-bunkered the suspect fuel oil. On voyage from Gibraltar to Dakar, the new Fuel oil received was used after testing and all parameters of the Auxiliary Engine and Main Engine monitored were found to be within limits. Fuel oil samples were forwarded to the FOBAS lab, Rotterdam for carrying out detailed analysis. Damaged parts were sent to makers for lab analysis. All the critical spares for the vessel which were used were re-furbished.
3.2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Sub-standard and off-specification fuel usage on ships machinery was the main contributory factor, causing loss of time, freight, manpower, bunkers, and additional supply of spares.
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS
Technical Manager/Operators of vessel must have procedures laid down in Safety Management System, to ensure that ships staff has laboratory analysis report of suspected fuel oil prior to use in Main and Auxiliary Engines with due consideration of time factor for test availability worldwide. The fuel is not to be used until the analysis reports are within the required specification. In pursuance of this, the analysis report must include TAN (Total Acid Numbers). In addition to normal FOBAS analysis, the fuel must be tested for Naphthenic and fatty acids. Naphthenic acids originate from the crude sources and they are troublesome to the level of 3.0mg KOH/g. Fatty acids are external contaminants and once an elevated acid number is detected, then an in-depth analysis such as FTIR/ GCMS must be conducted to determine the nature of the acid present. Presence of vanadium must be checked if the fuel oil is supplied at West African ports, because high level of vanadium in the fuel cannot be removed by purifier and the gummy deposits cause high wear down of machinery. Water content is also to be addressed in an analysis report because it causes sludge formation. Reputed laboratories should be used for specific analysis tests. Reputation of bunker supplier should be verified with laboratories worldwide and various charterers. The suspected fuel should be kept segregated and minimum quantity to be replenished. Ship staff should be briefed and trained for handling, care, and treatment of on board fuel.
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REFERENCES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Viswalabs report of the fuel oil supplied to vessel on 14 August 2007 at Benin, Senegal. Survey report of the NKK classification Society. FOBASs (LR) report of advanced analysis of suspected fuel. Intertek Sunbury Technology Centres statement witnessing fuel sample. Intertek Sunbury Technology Centres FTIR and GCMS analysis report with appendix.
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Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

1. EVENTS AND INVESTIGATION 1.1 Data, items, records

03:54 04:05 04:44 10:34 10:41 11:30 19:30 21:35

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

08:30 09:25 13:05 10:06 12:06 19:00

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

1.2 DAMAGES and LOSS

AE #1 WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER

AE #2 WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER 9

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT FUEL PUMP PLUNGER

ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT FUEL PUMP BARREL 10

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

ME #3 UNIT DAMAGED / WORN OUT LINER

ME UNIT #3 DAMAGED / WORN OUT PISTON RINGS 11

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

FO PURIFIER SHAFT & HOUSING

FO PURIFIER BOWL & PLATES 12

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

1.3 INCIDENT VOYAGE

1.3.3 ASSISTANCE RENDERED

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

1.4 RELEVANT DIRECTION AND RULES GUIDING THE OPERATION

2.2 ROOT CAUSE

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

3.2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

Auxiliary Engine Failure in M/V SICHEM AMETHYST

Capt. C.D.Mathur Accidents Investigator

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