fm34 130

FM 34-130
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE BATTLEFIELD
I ****?
II
US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000
I I
!
FINAL DRAFT
JULY 1993
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Intelligence Preparation on the Battlefield
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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)

The purpose of this manual is to describe the fundamentals of Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield (IPB). It describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and
its role in driving the staff's planning for contingency or combat operations. It
prescribes the procedures followed in performing IPB and illustrates the application of
IPB in various
situations.
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Information Warfare
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OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED None
*FM 34-130
FIELD MANUAL 34-130 Headquarters

Department of the Army
Washington, DC,
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
Table of Contents
Page
,.
PREFACE.............................~.......................iii
PREFACE ill
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................... l-l

What is IPB?..................................l- 1
Who Conducts IPB?.............................l- 5
Doctrine versus TTP ........................... l-6
What IPB Accomplishes.........................l- 7
IPB and the Intelligence Estimate.............l- 7
IPB and the Decision Making Process...........l- 8
IPB and the Targeting Process.................l-13
IPB and the Collection Management Process.....l-14
IPB and the Command and Staff
Execution of Battle.........................l-17
How IPB Relates to Everything Else............l-17
CHAPTER 2. CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD ..................................... 2-l
Define the Battlefield Environment............2- 3
Describe the Battlefield's Effects............2-12
Evaluate the Threat ........................... 2-56
Determine Threat Courses of Action............2-7 2
. Abbreviated IPB...............................2-9 6
CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD ..................................... 3-l
Scenario One - Conventional Offense...........3- 1
Scenario Two - Conventional Defense...........3-4 3
Scenario Three - Counterinsurgency............3-5 5
Scenario Four - Noncombatant Evacuation.......3-7 7
This publication supersedes FM 34-130, 23 May 1989.
i
t
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 4. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR

SPECIAL STAFF AWD SUPPORT UNITS.................4- 1 iy
Air Defense ................ ..~.................4- 1
Artillery .. ..-................................4- 4
Aviation .................................... ..4- 6
Counterintelligence & Counter-Reconnaissance..4- 9
Electronic Warfare............................4-11
Engineer......................................4-14 I
Intelligence ................................ ..4-18
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC).......4-2 1
Signal........................................4-2 3
Special Operations............................4-2 5 ._'
Rear Area and Combat Service Support..........4-2 7
3
CHAPTER 5. TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND STRATEGIC
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD.....S-1
Define the Battlefield Environment............5-1
Describe the Battlefield's Effects............5-3 i
Evaluate the Threat...........................5-6
Determine Threat Courses of Action............5-8
r
CHAPTER 6. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR...................6- 1
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief...6- 1
Support to CounterDrug Operations.............6- 5
Peacekeeping Operations.......................6- 8
Shows of Force................................6-14
Attacks and Raids ........................... ..6-18
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations...........6-19
Peace Enforcement.............................6-2 3
Support for Insurgencies and
Counterinsurgencies.............;...........6-2 5
Support to Domestic Civil Authorities.........6-2 8
ii
*FM 34-130
APPENDIX A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD,
WARGAMING, AND INTELLIGENCE.SYNCHRONIZATION.....A- 1
General Rules ................................. A-2
Prepare for Wargaming.........................A- 3
Conduct the Wargame...........................A- 4
Record the Results of Wargaming...............A- 6
Conduct the Targeting Conference..............A- 9
Compare Friendly Courses of Action............A- 9
Synchronize Intelligence......................A-10
Execute the Battle............................A-12
An Example Application....:...................A-14
Summary ....................................... A-19
APPENDIX B. GUIDELINES FOR INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD.....................................~- 1
Define the Battlefield Environment............B- 2
Describe the Battlefield's Effects............B- 3
Evaluate the Threat...........................B-16
Determine Threat Courses of Action............B-2 6
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Glossary-1
REFERENCES.........................................References-l
iii
FM 34-130
Preface
The purpose of this manual is to describe the fundamentals
of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). It
describes IPB, its use in directing the intelligence effort, and
its role in driving the staff's planning for contingency or
combat operations. It prescribes the procedures followed in
performing IPB and illustrates the application of IPB in various
situations.
This manual is intended to serve.as a guide for the use of
IPB by units of all types, at all echelons, across the entire
spectrum of conflict, and during the conduct of any mission, It
does not contain all the data required to conduct IPB, such as
specific information on threat doctrine or equipment
capabilities. Rather, it is intended as a guide to applying the
fundamentals of the IPB process to any situation which a unit
might face.
No part of this document should be construed as limiting
commanders' freedom of action or committing commanders to a
fixed or particular course of action (COA). Nor should it be
construed to imply that all IPB products must be prepared by all
commands in all situations. Commanders should apply the
doctrine and information presented in this manual in any manner
appropriate to their particular situation and mission.
This manual is intended for Army commanders and staffs at
all echelons. It applies equally to the Active Army (AC), Army
Reserve, and Army National Guard (ARNG). It is also intended to
be of use to commanders and staffs of joint and combined
commands; Marine and Naval forces; units of the Air Force; and
the military forces of allied countries.
The proponent of this publication is the United States Army
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Send comments and recommendations for improvement on DA
Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
directly to Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.
This manual does not implement any international
standardization agreements.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns
and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
V
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence preparation of the-battlefield (IPB) is the

best process we have for understanding the battlefield and the
options it presents to friendly and thrEeat forces.
::::::::::::::::::
;;;:;t:;;;:;;;;:;; What is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield? mfi
IPB is a ~systematic, continuous process of analyzing the
threat and environment in a specific geographic area. It is
designed to support staff estimates and military decision
making. Applying the IPB process helps the commander
selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical
points in time and space on the battlefield by--
o determining the threat's likely courses of action.
o describing the environment your unit is operating within
and the effects of the environment on your unit.
IPB is a continuous process which consists of four functions
which you perform each time you conduct IPB:
o Define the battlefield environment.
o Describe the battlefield's effects.
o Evaluate the threat.
o Determine threat courses of action.
The IPB process is continuous. You conduct IPB prior to and
during the command's initial planning for an operation, but you
also continue to perform IPB during the conduct of the
operation. Each function in the process is performed
continuously to ensure that the products of IPB remain complete
and valid, providing support to the commander and direction to
the intelligence system through to completion of the current
mission and into preparation for the next.
l-1
FM 34-130
A brief overview of each function is presented below. For a

more thorough discussion see chapter two.
Define the Battlefield Environment
In step one of the IPB process the GZ/SZ"identifies

characteristics of the battlefield which will influence
friendly and ,threat operations, establishes the limits of
the area of interest, and identifies 'gaps in current
intelligence holdings. This focuses the command's initial _
intelligence collection efforts and the remaining steps of
the IPB process.
The G2/S2 establishes the limits of the area of interest
(AI) to focus analytical and intelligence collection efforts
on the geographic areas of significance to the command's
mission. He bases the AI's limits on the amount of time
estimated to complete the command's mission and the location
and nature of the characteristics of the battlefield which
will influence the operation. If the command has not been
assigned an area of operations, the G2/S2 coordinates with
the G3/S3 to develop a joint recommendation on its limits
for the commander's approval. Similarly, the G2/S2 confers
with the G3jS3 on recommendations for the command's battle
space during development of friendly courses of action.
To focus the remainder of the IPB process, the G2/S2
identifies characteristics of the battlefield which require
in-depth evaluation of their effects on friendly and threat
operations, such as terrain, weather, logistical
infrastructure, and demographics. Generally, these are
analyzed in more detail for areas within the'command's area
of operations and battle space than for other areas in the
area of interest.
In addition to focusing the IPB effort, defining the
significant characteristics of the battlefield environment
aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings
and the specific intelligence required to fill them.
Similarly, the G2/S2 identifies gaps in the command's
knowledge of the threat and the current threat situation.
l-2
FM 34-130
Once approved by the commander, the specific intelligence

required to fill gaps in the command's knowledge of the
battlefield environment and threat situation become the
command's initial intelligence requirements.
Describe the Battlefield's Effects
Step two evaluates the effects of the environment with which

both sides must contend. The G2/S2 identifies the
limitations and opportunities the environment offers on the
potential operations of friendly and threat forces. Until
courses of action are developed in later steps of the IPB
process, this evaluation focuses on the general capabilities
of each force.
This assessment of the environment always includes an
examination of terrain and weather but may also include
discussions of the characteristics of geography and
infrastructure and their effects on the friendly and threat
operations. Characteristics of geography include general
characteristics of the terrain and weather as well as such
factors as politics, civilian press, local population
demographics, etc. An area's infrastructure consists of the
facilities, equipment and framework needed for the
functioning of systems, cities or regions. Products
developed in this step might include, but are not limited
to,--
0 Population status overlay.
o Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of
terrain.
o Weather analysis matrix.
o Integrated products such as modified combined obstacle
overlays.
Regardless of the subject or means of presentation, the
G2/S2 ensures that these products focus on the effects of
the battlefield environment.
Evaluate the Threat:
In step three the G2/S2 and his staff analyze the command's
intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally
organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar
circumstances. When facing a well-known threat, the G2/S2
can rely on his historical databases and well developed
l-3
FM 34-130
threat models. When operating against a new or less
well-known threat, he may need to develop his intelligence
databases and threat models concurrently.
The G2/S2's evaluation is portrayed in a threat model that
includes doctrinal templates which depict how the threat
operates when unconstrained by the effects of the
battlefield environment. Although th~ey usually emphasize
graphic depictions (doctrinal templates), threat models
sometimes emphasize matrices or simple narratives.
..
Determine Threat Courses of Action:
Step four integrates the results of the previous steps into

a meaningful conclusion. Given what the threat normally
prefers to do, and the effects of the specific environment
in which he is operating now, what are his likely objectives
and the courses of action available to him? In step four
the G2/S2 develops enemy course of action models that depict
the threat's available courses of action. He also prepares
event templates and matrices that focus intelligence
collection on identifying which course of action the threat
will execute.
The enemy course of action models developed in step four are
the products that the staff will use Wportray the threat
in the decision making and targeting processes. The G2/S2
cannot produce these models, effectively predicting the
threat COAs, unless he has--
Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the
time-duration of the operation; identified the physical
limits of the A0 and AI; and identified every
characteristic of the battlefield environment that might
affect the operation (step 1).
Identified the opportunities and constraints the
battlefield environment offers to threat and friendly
forces (step 2).
Thoroughly considered what the threat is capable of and
what he prefers to do in like situations if
unconstrained by the battlefield environment (step 3).
In short, the enemy course of action models which drive the
decision making process are valid only if the G2/S2
establishes a good foundation during the first three steps
of the IPB process.
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FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::: ...................................................................................................................
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Who Conducts IPB .7 iiiiillilllliiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~m~~~~~~~~~
.............................................................................................................
Everyone in the US Army conducts some form of IPB. For
example:
o A rifleman in an infantry fire team considers the possible
actions of the enemy soldier he is about to engage. He
also considers how the local terrain and weather affect
both himself and his adversary.
o An armor company commander considers the possible actions
of the'enemy battalion that he-is about to engage. He
also considers how terrain affects the enemy's courses of
action and the accomplishment of his own mission. _
Both of these examples illustrate an informal application of
IPB; that is, describe the effects of the battlefield and
determine the threat's courses of action. It is the application
of battlefield common sense. At this level it requires little
formal education beyond realistic field training exercises
against a savvy enemy.
As the size of the unit increases, the level of detail
required in the IPB effort increases significantly. An armor
company commander's informal IPB produces little more than an
appreciation of what the threat is most likely to do during
their engagement. A division staff's IPB can produce--
o Detailed terrain analysis products.
0 Climatic summaries.
o Detailed studies of the threat, his equipment, and his
doctrine.
o A comprehensive set of enemy course of action models
depicting a broad range of possible threat COAs.
Any unit large enough to have a staff (Sl, 52, 53, and 54)
develops at least some of the formal IPB products described in
this manual. The G2lS.2 has staff responsibility for the
command's IPB--that IPB which directly supports the decision
making process. The G2/S2, however, is not the only one who
conducts or needs to understand and use IPB.
Every commander and everv member of the staff needs to
understand and aoolv IPB during the staff nlannina vrocess. IPB
identifies the facts and assumptions about the battlefield and
the threat that allow effective staff planning. IPB forms the
basis for defining the courses of action available to the
friendly command and drives the wargaming process that selects
and refines them.
1-5
E
FM 34-130
The G2/S2 is responsible for facilitating the unit IPB L
effort, but he and his staff cannot provide all the IPB the unit
requires. Every commander and staff officer needs to think
through the effects the environment has on both threat and
friendly operations.
Furthermore, every staff officer should prepare detailed IPB
products tailored for his own functional area. For example:
0 A division electronic warfare officer will expand and
refine the division all-source production section's IPB II)
products to include electronic preparation of the
battlefield.
i
0 The engineer liaison for a brigade staff refines and
customizes the S2!s enemy course of action models to show
threat options for the employment of obstacles or
breaching equipment. i
0 The counterintelligence analysis section refines the all-

source production section's IPB products to focus on the
threat's intelligence system and its collection
capabilities.
0 A division air defense artillery officer uses the
all-source production section's IPB products as the basis
T
for developing enemy air course of action models and .,_
:,s
supporting event templates and matrices. J
0 Staff officers in the support operations section refine
the all-source production section's IPB products to focus
on the logistics support mission and prepare IPB products
for their specific functional areas.
0 The chemical staff officer refines the all-source 1
production section's enemy course of action models to show
the enemy's options for employing NBC weapons. This
allows refinement of the NBC reconnaissance support plan r
and enhances contamination avoidance tactics and
techniques.
;
The bottom line is that every soldier conducts IPB. Every i
soldier thinks through an informal IPB procedure, but commanders
and staff officers undertake a more formal process.
.. . .. ... ... .. . .. w
:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Doctrine versus Tactics, Techniques, and pr,-+-edures .:iiiifii;iii;ii
...........
:.. . . . . . . .
The doctrinal principles of IPB are sound and can be applied
to all situations at all levels. The tactics, techniques, W
and procedures (TTP) of applying IPB may vary according to
the mission, enemy! terrain, troops and time available
(METT-T) situation.
1-6
FM 34-130
The doctrinal principles of IPB always call for:
0 evaluating the battlefield's effects on friendly and
threat operations;
0 determining the threat's possible courses of action and
arranging them in order of probability of adoption;
0 identifying assets the threat needs to make each course
of action successful (high value targets) and where they
can be expected to appear on the battlefield (target
area,s of interest); and,
0 identifying the activities, or lack of, and the
locations where they will occur that will identify which
course -of action the threat has adopted.
The decision to use a sketch instead of an overlay to depict
the battlefield's effects or the threat's available courses
of action is a matter of TTP. Such decisions can only be
made within the context of a given situation. Similarly,
the amount of detail that goes into each step of the IPB
process, the techniques for depicting areas of RESTRICTED
terrain, and other such decisions are also driven by factors
of METT-T and local policies and procedures.
:::::::::::::::::: . . . . . . . . .
iiiiiliiliiiiliill What IpB Accomplishes iiiiil!iifiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
IPB identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield

environment and the threat. This enables staff planning and the
development of friendly COAs.
IPB provides the basis for intelligence direction and
synchronization that supports the command's chosen course of
action.
IPB contributes to complete staff synchronization and the
successful completion of several other staff processes, which
are described below.
::::::::::::::::::::::::
iliiiiiiiiiiiltiliiiilii IPB and the Intelligence Estimate Ifii.;ifil!i!ff!!!liititt;ltffl;fiilfff!
In order to facilitate staff planning, the G2/S2 prepares

the intelligence estimate before the remainder of the staff
complete their own estimates if at all possible. The
intelligence estimate forms the basis for the facts and
assumptions of the decision making process, driving the other
staff estimates and the remaining steps in the decision making
l-7
FM 34-130
process. The products of IPB are the basis of the intelligence
estimate. In fact, if the G2/S2 lacks the time required to
prepare a written estimate he can usually substitute graphics
that depict the results of his IPB evaluations and analysis. -
Paraaravh & of the intelligence estimate restates the command's

mission. w
ParaaraDh 2, the Area of Operations, is derived from step 2 of
the IPB process/describe the battlefield's effects. The
most important sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2 are the i
"effects on enemy COAs" and "effects on own COAs." These
sections describe the battlefield's impact on operations.
w
Paraaravh 3, Enemy Situation, is derived from step 3 of the IPB .-
process, evaluate the threat. This is primarily a
discussion of what is known about the threat (facts) and the
W
results of analysis of those facts (assumptions).
Paraaravh 4, Enemy Capabilities, is derived from step 4 of the
IPB process, determine threat COAs. This is a listing and I
discussion of the COAs available to the threat. These COAs
should exactly correspond with the enemy course of action
models developed in step four of the IPB process. r
ParaCXaDh 5, Conclusions, is~ derived from the evaluations made
during the IPB process. Here you summarize the effects of
the battlefield .environment on friendly and enemy courses of i
action, list the set of probable threat courses of action
(in order of probability of adoption), and list the threat's
exploitable vulnerabilities. I
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,...
jiJIiHIJilJiillll IPB and the Decision Making Process i;j;ilHilJ!li!Jijli!l^
Commanders and staffs use the decisionmaking process to
select a course of action and develop an operations plan,
operations order, or fragmentary orders that implement it. The i
results and products of IPB, conveyed in the intelligence
estimate, are essential elements of the decision making
process. Accordingly, the major IPB effort occurs before and m
during the first step of the decision making process.
The decision making process is a dynamic and continuous
process. The staff continues to estimate the situation as the w
operation progresses, adapting the command's course of action to
unforeseen changes in the situation. The IPB which supports the
decision making process must also remain dynamic, constantly
integrating new information into the initial set of facts and
assumptions.
l-8
FM 34-130
The relationship of the IPB process to each step in the

decision making process is discussed below.
Mission Analysis:
In this step IPB products enable the commander to assess

facts about the battlefield and make assumptions about how
CoHimand and Staff Actions Operational
,--
5 graphics to
OPORO 99-a
--m-
3
>;o8j
Analyze OPORD,
Mission COAs OPLAN,
Develop
Analysis
Analysis COAs
(Wargame) or lll>(BJ
and FRAGO
Decision
>(OBJ
^
A
ft ft ftl
XXX
>
5 4-
Partner Refined, prioritized Collection
Throat Threat COAs and Plan
COAs Draft Event Template
Intelligence
Synchronization
=LLH+4|I
Figure l-l. The S2 or 62 c support the tactical decision-

making process with specific products.
l-9
FM 34-130
friendly and threat forces will interact on the battlefield.
The description of the battlefield's effects identifies
constraints on potential friendly courses of action and may
reveal impl~ied missions. It also identifies opportunities
the battlefield environment presents, such as avenues of
approach, engagement areas, zones of entry, etc., which the
staff integrates into potential friendly courses of action w
and their staff estimates.
Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities identified during
evaluation of:the threat allow the commander and staff to
make assumptions about the relative capabilities of the
friendly command. Threat evaluation also provides the r
detailed information on the threat's current dispositions, -
recent activities, equipment and organizational capabilities
the staff need to complete their own staff estimates and
planning. i
Enemy course of action models developed in step four of the

IPB process, assumptions about threat courses of action,
provide a basis for the formulation of potential friendly
courses of action and complete the intelligence estimate.
The IPB process identifies any critical gaps in the
command's knowledge of the battlefield environment or threat
z
situation. As part of his initial planning guidance the
commander uses these gaps to as a guide to establish his I
initial intelligence requirements.
Develop Courses of Action:
The staff develops friendly COAs based on the facts and

assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis.
Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development
ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the
opportunities the environment and threat situation offer and
is valid in terms of what they will allow.
w
Analyze and Compare Courses of Action: I
During the wargaming session the staff 1'fights'8 the set of

threat courses of action, developed in step four of the IPB
process, against each .potential friendly COA. Targeting
l-10
FM 34-130
conferences follow or accompany the wargaming session to
refine selected high value targets (HVTs) from the enemy
course of action models into high payoff targets (HPTs) that
support the friendly COA. (See Figure 2-l)
Based on the results of wargaming, for each potential
friendly course of action the staff--
o Construct's decision support template (DST) and its
associated synchronization matrix.
o Identifv suvvortina intelligence reauirements.
t
BLUE RED
COR/XO
tt
SO/EWO
(Leads the We/gaming effort)
ttALO
tt
ENGR
t
t t
S2
Armed with SfT

Templates and
S3 other enemy
COA's & event
ADA template
imed with
isndly COA
nd their wits
t Asst/S3
or
A**VS2
Recorder
(Records DST & Synch Matrix)

He represents
the Thinking
Enemy"
-. _ - . _.
tlgure i-z. wargammg.
o Refine the enemy course of action models and event

templates.and matrices, focusing on the intelligence
required to execute the friendly course of action.
o Arrange the threat courses of action in order of
probability of adoption. There may be a different order
of probability for each potential friendly course of
action.
o Identify the most dangerous threat course of action.
l-11
r
1
FM 34-130
o Refine the friendly course of action, to include I
identifying the need for branches and sequels.
o Determine the probability of success of the friendly
course of action.
The results of wargaming each potential friendly course of
I
action against the set of enemy course of action models
allows the staff to make a recommendation on the best
friendly course of action. The G2/S2's recommendation
includes an evaluation of the intelligence system's ability I
to provide the intelligence needed to, support each course of
action.
J
Appendix A of this manual discusses the relationship between -
IPB and wargaming in more detail.
Following staff recommendations, the commander decides upon

a COA and issues implementing orders. He also approves the
list of intelligence requirements associated with that COA,
developed during wargaming, and identifies the most
important as PIR. The command's collection manager uses
the results of IPB to develop and implement a collection
plan that will satisfy these requirements (see below).
Execution:
As intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on

the battlefield environment or the threat's course of
action, a continuous IPB process identifies new intelligence
requirements. As the battle progresses, IPB is used to I
continuously evaluate the situation facing the command,
driving new iterations of the decision making process and
the directing step of the intelligence cycle. I
For a complete discussion of the decision making process see

FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff. ;
l-12
FM 34-130
..................
:::::::::::::::::: IpBandtheTargetingprocessiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
:::::::::::::::::: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ii.:::::::
As part of course of action analysis and comparison, or
immediately after, the staff generally starts the targeting
process with a targeting conference. The targeting process
results in targeting guidance that supports the command's course
of action. The relationship of the IPB process to each step in
the targeting-~ process
~. -. -..- is
-~ discussed below.
_._~__._.__
CATEGORY HP+ WHEN HOW ~ RESTRICTIONS

,. N m m Coordinale BfIack wilh EW
1 cc, 48.48 I
2 W I,%7 A N DNE MRL older Itian tiinutes. _
3 (MANUEVER) 25.28 A S Lest volley RAAhis/ADAM

-.
4 (ADA) 5a P s2 or G2 SEAD program 1206cQA
5 (ENGR) 85 P N ci?uruermobili1y program o/o
6 (RISTA) 103.105 EW
7 (RECON) 111,112 P N
Accuracy 0 IO 200 meters: TDA
8 (NUKE/CHEMICAL) I D required
9 (POL) A D
----,.--. .
10 (AMMO) A II
11 (MAINTAINANCE) P N NOI HVT nor HPT

_._. ~_ .-
12 (LJm P N Nor HVT nor HPT
13 (LOC) I lp 1 N and 03 INot HVT nor HPT-No FASCAhi
Numbers refer 10 large1 spreadsheets (FM B-20-10).

This is only a type snack guidance matrix. Actual malrices are developed by
the 63 or 53 and the FSE eon lhe basis ol the laclical silualion.
LEGEND:
1 * Immediate N = Neutralize
P Planned S Suppress
A * As acquired D = Destroy
Figure l-3. _ IPB supporlo devolopmenl of lho Mrck guidance malrlx.
1-13
FM 34-130
Using the list of high value targets that form part of each
enemy course of action model, developed in step four of the
IPB process, the staff determine which targets should be
acquired and engaged as part of the friendly course of
action. The resulting list of high payoff targets generates
additional refinement of the event templates and matrices
during the targeting process as the staff wargames the
command's selected COA ~to ensure the RPT are acquired during
execution of the friendly course of action.
The command's collection manager uses the refined templates

and matrices to develop SIR and plan intelligence collection
to detect and track high payoff targets.
IPB structures the analysis that enables the G2/S2 to advise

the commander and fire support officer on the execution of
the fire support plan.
For a complete discussion of the targeting process see
FM 6-20-10, The Taraetina Process.
. . . . . . . . .
iiiiii;jiii;E#;E IPB and the Collection Management Process il~~B~l~iiiii;;iiiiiiiiijiiiiiiiifi
Collection management synchronizes the activities of
organizations and systems to provide intelligence the commander
needs to accomplish his course of action and targeting efforts.
IPB helps the commander identify his intelligence requirements
and provides the focus and direction needed to satisfy them.
The commander bases his initial intelligence requirements on

the critical gaps identified during IPB in the mission analysis
step of the decision making process. Refined and updated
requirements result from staff wargaming and selection of a
particular friendly course of action.
l-14
.
FM 34-130
During staff wargaming the G2/S2 uses the enemy course of
action models developed in step fcur of the IPB process to
portray the enemy. The remainder of the staff '*fightsl' each
potential ~friendly CGA and note where and when in its execution
decisions are required to make the COA successful. They also
determine the specific intelligence required'to support each
decision and record it onto the list of proposed intelligence
requirements. When the commander selects a particular friendly
course of action he also approves and prioritizes the supporting
intelligence requirements.
DPs = Decision
Criteria
CTrigger).
DST TAI = Where we intend

to attack the
enemy.
H+4
DP #7
I
TW H+4
BOS
Synch Decision Criieria MRR CATK
-f--g-g
Matrix (Enemy Action) (Tk Co)
2-9 CAV. Collects

Intelligence .,~ ,.., .,., .,., ~,~ .,
w
z
o
8
s <
Attack Helos
to TAI 7 at
Maneuver
H+5
Q
z
UJ
Fire Support H+S DPICM to
E TAI 7
&Ew 2
Jam MRR c
Figure 1-4. The DST and SOS Synchronization Matrix.
1-15
FM 34-130
IPB supports further development of requirements by
identifying the activity which will satisfy each requirement and
where and when the activity is expected to occur.' The event
template identifies the named areas of interest where.the
activity will occur. The event matrix describes the indicators
associated with the activity. Both the event template and event
matrix depict the times during which the activity is expected to
occur. The details these tools provide are the basis of an
effective' intelligence collection plan.
IPB products also contribute to the development of staff
synchronization tools such as the decision support template
(DST) and battlefield operating system (BOS) synchronization
matrix (see Figure 2-3). The collection manager uses these
additional tools to .ensure that the collection plan stays
c
synchronized with the command's operations. The resulting
intelligence synchronization matrix depicts the collection
strategies which support the command's course of action (see
Figure 2-4).
S2 processing WHEN decision maker
time. needs the intelligence.
H 1
2- CAV
HUMINT
COLLECTION
IUINT STHATEGY
&
DEADLINES
SIGINT
'Estimated WHEN collected

WHO will collect WHEN collector
the information. collection information MUST be
must START
time. to S2/C2.
collecting.
#^.._ _b.-_a.I-.M:<->r lliiriv

FlQlm 1-5. , 0 ,llte,,,gence 3y,,l;llrIIILaLI~I In-u U.
Intelligence synchronization is much more than simply

ensuring that collection systems of various sorts are operating
24 hours a day. The G2/S2 must direct the intelligence system,
receive the information it produces, process it and then produce
and disseminate intelligence of value to the commander in time
to support his decisions. The coordination of this entire cycle
is intelligence synchronization.
FM 34-2, Collection Management and Svnchronization Planninq
discusses intelligence.synchronization and the collection
management process in detail.
1-16
FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::: ...................
;~:;z::;;;;;;z;;: IPB and the Command and Staff, Execution of Battle iii:jjiiii;ziiii
IPB provides the G2/S2 the tools he needs to quickly
evaluate incoming information and intelligence as it relates to
the.command's synchronization matrix and DST. This supports the
commander's decisions during course of action execution and
helps him to quickly confirm or deny the assumptions used during
course of action development.
During battle, the commander and staff track the DST and the
synchronization matrix against incoming reports. As the staff
nears each decision point they look to the G2/S2 for the
intelligence that supports that decision.
Sometimes the battle will progress in a direction
unanticipated during the initial IPB and wargaming. The enemy
is following his own plans and time lines; those determined
during staff wargaming are only estimates. Therefore, staffs
should ensure they use IPB, wargaming, and intelligence
synchronization as dynamic tools rather than as one-time
events. As the operation unfolds and the enemy's intentions
become more clear reinitiate the IPB and decision making
processes as needed.
This requires key members of the staff to "huddle" or
conduct "mini-wargaming." During these sessions, the G2/S2
reviews and modifies the initial IPB. The battle staff then
wargames the best friendly response or preemptive action based
on the updated set of IPB predictions. New decisions and COAs
lead to updating and refining the collection plan, intelligence
synchronization, and new decision support tools.
. . . . . .
How IPB Relates to Everything Else
IPB is an essential element of the intelligence cycle. The
products developed during IPB are so critical to this cycle and
the staff planning effort that it is a distinct function. There
are six intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) tasks
described in FM 34-1, the Army's intelligence principles
manual. They are to develop-
o IPB products.
o Situation development products.
o Indications and warnings (I&W) products.
o Target development and target acquisition products.
o Battle damage assessment (BDA) products.
o Force protection products.
1-17
FM 34-130
These IEW functions are accomplished within the intelligence I
system of systems (ISOS) to operate in this cycle and respond to
the commander's intelligence needs. The ISOS is the flexible
architecture of procedures, organizations and equipment that I
collect, process, store and disseminate intelligence. The G21.52
uses IPB products to process volumes of information provided by
the ISOS and the intelligence Cycle.
IPB products also enable staffs to exploit the modern
technology of the ISOS by~focusing collection systems that now
provide near-real-time information in sufficient accuracy to 3
conduct direct targeting. IPB not only enables a staff to put
steel on target, but helps prioritize and maximize the effects
of targeting. IPB plays a critical role in the decision.making
process. Finally, the commander leads the IPB effort. The .-
entire staff executes the IPB process.
The military intelligence (MI) unit commander is not
responsible for the supported command's IPB. However, the MI
unit commander will use the IPB process to support his own
unique planning requirements. Some of these involve employment
of the ISOS assets under his control.
1-18
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 2
CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield consists of four

steps which you perform each time you conduct IPB:
0 Define the battlefield environment.
0 Describe the battlefield's effects.
0 Evaluate the threat.
0 Determine threat courses of action.
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiiiiliiiiiiiiiii How To -&,ndu& IPB iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ::.:: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Each step of the IPB process consists of several principal

judgment decisions and evaluations which together form the basic
"how to" of IPB. These are presented in outline form below:
Define the battlefield environment
0 Identify significant characteristics of the environment.

0 Identify the limits of the command's area of operations
and battle space.
0 Establish the limits of the area of interest.
0 Identify the amount of detail required and feasible within
the time available for IPB.
0 Evaluate existing data bases and identify intelligence
gaps.
0 Collect the material and intelligence required to conduct
the remainder of IPB.
1 Describe the battlefield's effects 1
0 Analyze the battlefield environment

- terrain analysis
- weather analysis
- analysis of other characteristics of the battlefield
0 Describe the battlefield's effects on threat and friendly
capabilities and broad courses of action.
2-l
FM 34-130
Evaluate the threat I
0 Update or create threat models: I

Convert threat doctrine or patterns of operation to
graphics (doctrinal templates);
Describe in words the threat's tactics and options.
Identify high value targets.
,-
0 Identify threat capabilities.
Determine threat courses of action
0 Identify the threat's likely objectives and desired end

state.
0 Identify the full set of courses of action available to
the threat.
0 Evaluate and prioritize each course of action. r
0 Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time
allows.
0 Identify initial collection requirements.
The principles and steps of the intelligence preparation of

the battlefield process remain constant regardless of the type of I
mission, unit, staff section or echelon conducting IPB. The
application of the principles, however, varies with each specific
situation. The situation template prepared by an air defense
battery, for example, is very different from the one prepared by ti
an electronic warfare section or a counter-intelligence analysis
section.
Similarly, a given unit or staff section does not always
prepare all IPB products in every situation. Determining which
products to prepare and identifying their relative priority
depends on the factors of METT-T and command guidance. Chapters Y
three through six give examples of IPB applied in specific
situations, illustrating modification of the basic process to
particular needs. The remainder of this chapter describes each
step of the IPB process in detail.
2-2
FM 34-130
.. .. .. .. .. *. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Define the Battlefield Environment iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiililiiiiiriiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~

;;is;iiiiiiiiiliiiii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ::::::.:: . . . . . . . . . . . . . :::::::::::::.::::..::
.
1 What is it? 1
Definition:
Identifying for further analysis specific features of the
environment or activities within it, and the physical
space.-where they exist, that may influence available
courses of action or the commander's decisions.
Two Short Examales:
During planning for a humanitarian assistance operation
the J2 identifies the activity of local armed factions as
a feature influencing available courses of action and his
commander's decisions. The J2 expands the area of
interest to encompass the area within the neighboring
country where these groups have established safe havens.
He examines the data bases and determines that they do not
contain the information he needs to estimate the different
courses of action each faction might adopt. He identifies
for collection information about the areas where they are
located and their past operations to complete his data
bases. ,Realizing that the information will probably
arrive too late to support initial planning, the J2
discusses with the commander reasonable assumptions for
use during planning. As the intelligence arrives, he
confirms his initial assumptions and incorporates the new
information into his ongoing IPB process.
During planning for a mounted attack the S2 identifies the
enemy's divisional attack helicopters as a major threat to
accomplishment of the brigade's mission. The 52 expands
the brigade's area of interest to encompass the reported
location of the enemy's attack helicopter battalion and
the zone where it will probably establish forward
operating bases and forward area arming and refueling
sites. He reviews his intelligence holdings to determine
the types of intelligence he will need about the terrain,
weather, and enemy helicopter operations to identify
potential helicopter locations and courses of action. He
builds an initial R & S plan to provide the intelligence
he needs to complete his IPB. As the reports come in, he
uses them to update or validate the results of his initial
2-3
FM 34-130
Define the battlefield environment (cant)

So what? (cant)
IPB. If necessary, he reinitiates the IPB process to

account for intelligence that denies assumptions made
i
during the IPB and decision making process.
Desired End Effect:
Focus the.IPB effort on the areas and characteristics of
the battlefield which will influence the command's
mission. Acquire the intelligence needed to complete the, I
IPB process in the degree of detail required to support -
the decision making process.
1 So what? 1
Success Results in:

Saving time and effort by focusing only on those areas and
c
features which will influence courses of action and
command decisions.
Conseauences of Failure:
Failure to focus on only the relevant characteristics
leads to wasted time and effort collecting and evaluating
intelligence on features of the battlefield environment
that will not influence success of the command's mission.
I
On the other hand, failure to identify all the relevant
characteristics may lead to the command's, surprise and
unpreparedness when some overlooked feature of the
battlefield exerts an influence onsuccess of the r
command's mission.
I
1 How to do it: 1
0 Identify significant characteristics of the environment. I
0 Identify the limits of the command's area of operations

and battle space.
2-4
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
0 Establish the limits of the area of interest.

0 Identify the amount of detail~required and feasible within
the time available for IPB.
0 Evaluate existing data bases and ~identify intelligence
gaps.,:
0 Collect the material and intelligence required to conduct
the remainder of IPB.
IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT CHAFWZTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Characteristics of the battlefield environment that will
influence the commander's decisions or affect the courses
of action available to your own force or the threat are of
soecial siqnificance in the IPB process.
GAPS (N KNOWLEDGE
UNCERTAINTIES'
I I
Figure 2-l. The common understanding of the battlefield.
2-5
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Identify significant characteristics of the environment I
During a humanitarian assistance operation, for example,

the location and activities of civilian relief (I
organizations might be a significant characteristic of the
battlefield. During support to counterdrug operations,
significant characteristics might include the production
of narcotics or the~trading of weapons. During war
characteristics such as the location and activities of
enemy reserves, reinforcements, and long range fire
support assets are typical significant characteristics. -
At some levels of command they might also include
characteristics such as economic trade activity between a
neutral country and our enemy.
When identifying significant characteristics of the
battlefield, consider threat forces and all other aspects i
of the environment that may have an effect on
accomplishment of the unit's mission. Depending on the
situation these might include-- ,., d
m
0 Geography, terrain, and weather of the area.
0 Population demographics (ethnic groups, religious
groups, age distribution, income groups, etc.)
0 Political or socio-economic factors, including the
role of clans, tribes, gangs, etc.
0 Infrastructures, such as transportation or
telecommunications.
0 Rules of engagement or legal restrictions such as
International treaties or agreements.
0 Threat forces and their capabilities, in general i
terms. Consider para-military forces. as well.
Initially, examine each characteristic only in general I
terms to identify those of significance to the command and
its mission.. Further evaluation of the effects of each
characteristic takes place during later steps of the IPB .,i
process. For example, at this step the evaluation of i
threat forces is limited to an identification of forces
that have the ability to influence the command's mission
based on their location, mobility, general capabilities, I
weapons ranges, etc. During later steps of the IPB
process you will actually evaluate each threat force's
specific capabilities and probable courses of action.
c
2-6 i
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Identify significant characteristics of the environment
Identifying the significant characteristics of the

battlefield environment helps establish the geographical
limits of the area of interest and directs analytical
efforts ,in steps two and three of the IPB process. It
also helps identify gaps in the common understanding of
the battlefield, serving as a, guide to the type of
intelligence and informationrequired to complete the IPB
process.
IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMAND'S AREA OF OPERATIONS AND
BATTLE SPACE
The area of operations (AO) is the geographical area where
the commander is assigned the responsibility and authority
to conduct military operations. A thorough knowledge of
the characteristics of this area leads to its effective
use. Generally, because this is the area where the
command will conduct its operations, the evaluation of the
battlefield's effects is more thorough and detailed within
the A0 than it is within the area of interest. Identify
the limits of the A0 in order to provide the focus you
need. The limits of the area of operations are normally
the boundaries specified in the operations order or
contingency plan from higher headquarters that define the
command's mission.
The limits of the command's battle space are determined by
the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire targets and
physically dominate the threat. The command's
capabilities in this regard include the target acquisition
and long range assets of supporting and higher commands as
well as its own organic systems. A command's battle space
generally includes all or most of the area of operations
as well as areas outside of the AO. The evaluation of the
area within the command's battle space may be as detailed
as the evaluation of the area of operations if the
commander's guidance or intent requires the command to
request, conduct, plan, or synchronize operations there.
This is true even if the operations are to be conducted by
some other command. In other cases the command's battle
space may receive the same treatment as its area of
interest.
2-J
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Establish the limits of the area of interest
FLOT PL RED
OPERATfONS
AntA :
OF

FLOT
I
PL RED
Figure 2-2. Battlefield areas.
ESTABLISH THE LIMITS OF THE AREA OF INTEREST

The area of interest is the geographical area from which û
information and intelligence are required to permit
planning or successful conduct of the command's
operation. Because the commander and staff need time to
process information and to plan and synchronize
operations, the command's area of interest is generally
larger than its area of operations and battle space. The
limits of the area of interest include each of the
characteristics of the battlefield environment you
identified as exerting an influence on available courses
of action or command decisions.
.
2-8
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Establish the limits of the area of interest (cant)
Base the limits of the AI on the ability of the threat to

project power or move forces into the area of operations.
Also consider the geographical locations of other
activities or characteristics of ,the environment which
might influence courses of action or the commander's
decis~ions. Consider also any anticipated future mission
or "be prepared" and "on order" missions identified during
mission analysis and determine their effect on the limits
of the AI. Finally, consider changes in the command's
battle space as a result of maneuver.
-Considerations:
You might divide the AI into several components, such as a

ground AI, an air AI, or a political AI. Such a division
accommodates the types of information relevant in each
area.of interest as well as their usually different
geographical limits. The air AI, for example, is usually
much larger than the ground AI. Within this extensive
area, however, only activity related to the projection of
air power is of interest. Although you might develop and
consider the various areas of interest separately, at some
point you must consider them as an integrated whole to
insure that you present the commander with a complete,
integrated description of the battlefield.
For the air AI include a consideration of altitude. When
conducting air defense related IPB, the AI should extend
upwards to the maximum service ceiling of the threat's
aircraft. When conducting aviation related IPB, the AI
should extend to the maximum service ceiling of the
friendly aircraft or the maximum effective altitude of
threat air defense systems, whichever is greater.
One of the primary considerations in establishing the
limits of the AI is time. Base the time limit not only on
the threat's mobility, both ground and air, but also on
the amount of time needed to accomplish the friendly
mission. For example, if a command estimates that it will
take two days to complete an operation, the AI must
encompass all forces or activities that could influence
accomplishment of the command's mission within two days.
2-9
FM 34-130
1
How to do it (cant)
Establish the limits of the area of interest (cant)
For missions that are of relatively short duration, such

as the evacuation of non-combatants or raids, the AI
usually includes only immediate, direct threats to mission
accomplishment and may be relatively small. A helicopter
raid on a battlefield where we enjoy air superiority might I
have an AIthat includes only the air defense systems
within range of the engagement area and the air routes to
and from. Some long-term missions, such as nation
building, will result in an extensive area of interest -
that considers many political and economic factors as well
as the more conventional military factors.
r
Since the limits of the AI are based on threats to mission
accomplishment rather than strictly terrain
considerations, they might cross into neutral countries. d
For example, if political developments in a neutral
country might influence the accomplishment of the unit's
mission, include that country within the area of
interest. Likewise, if the population of a neutral
country provides a base of support for forces opposing the
command's operations, include it within the AI.
IDENTIFY THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL REQUIRED AND FEASIBLE WITHIN THE
TIME AVAILABLE
The time available for completion of the IPB process may
not permit the luxury of conducting each step in detail.
Overcoming time limitations requires a focus on the parts
of IPB that are most important to the commander in
planning and executing his mission. Identifying the
amount of detail required avoids time wasted on developing
more detail than necessary in each step of the process. I
For example,, the situation may not require an analysis of
all threat forces within the AI. Perhaps only selected I
areas within the command's A0 require detailed analysis
due to the assigned mission or other factors of "mission,
enemy, troops, terrain and time available." Some
geographical areas or threat forces within the A0 may
require only a summary type evaluation of their effects or
capabilities.
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Identify the amount of detail required and feasible
within the time available (cant)
Identify the amount of detail required on each area of the

battlefield or each threat force to support planning by
consulting with the commander and the remainder of the
staff. Prioritize your efforts to produce the amount of
detail required within the available time. Backwards plan
the IPB process and determine how much time you can
reasonably devote to each step to meet the commander's,
time lines. See scenario 3 in chapter 3 for an example:
EVALUATE EXISTING DATA BASES AND IDENTIFY INTELLIGENCE GAPS
Not all the intelligence and information required to
evaluate the effects of each characteristic of the
battlefield and each threat force will be in the current
data base. Identifying the gaps early allows you to
initiate action to collect the intelligence required to
fill them.
Identify and prioritize the gaps in the current holdings,
using the commander's initial intelligence requirements
and intent to set the priorities. You should also
identify any gaps which can not be filled within the time
allowed for IPB. Discuss with the commander and the
remainder of the staff the gaps you do not expect to be
filled and formulate reasonable assumptions to fill them.
COLLECT THE REQUIRED INTELLIGENCE AND MATERIALS
Initiate collection or requests for intelligence to fill
intelligence gaps to the level of detail required to
conduct IPB. Include collection against all identified
significant characteristics of the battlefield, not just
threat forces, in priority order.
Continuously update the IPB products as you receive
additional intelligence. Inform the commander if you
confirm assumptions made during the initial mission
analysis and IPB process. If any assumptions are denied,
re-examine the evaluations and decisions on which they
were based.
Ideally, intelligence operations enable you to develop the
perception of the battlefield and the threat to
2-11
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Collect the required intelligence and materials (cant) I
completely match the actual situation on the battlefield.

In reality intelligence will never eliminate all of the i
unknownaspects or uncertainties which concern a commander
and his staff. Be prepared to fill gaps with reasonable
assumptions. I
Describe the Battlefield's Effects i
What is it?
I
Definition:
3
The determination of how the battlefield environment
affects both threat and friendly operations.
A Short Example:
"General Eisenhower, after the Pas de Calais area, the I
best available landing sites are along the coast of
Normandy. Our best chances of a favorable combination of
moon light, tides, and weather is in late May and early i
June."
An 52 tells his commander, "Sir, terrain and weather best
accommodate offensive operations in the western part of
the region. The best avenue of approach ,is number 3, but
avenues 1 and 4 are also good. Avenue of approach 2 is
unsuitable since it requires use of terrain within the
neutral province. The region's best defensive terrain is
along PL TOM, but suitable terrain is also available near
PL JONELL and PL GARY."
Desired End Effect:
Identify how the battlefield environment influences the I
operations and courses of action of threat and friendly
forces.
2-12
FM 34-130
Describe the Battlefield's Effects (cant)

So what?
So what?
Success Results in:

(1) Allowing the commander to quickly choose and exploit the
terrain (and associated weather, politics, economics,
etc.) that best supports the friendly mission;
or
knowingly pick the second or third best terrain for
operations supported by a deception in the first best
terrain.
(2) Identifying the set of threat courses of action available
within a given geographic area.
Consequences of Failure:
(1) The commander will fail to exploit the opportunities that
the environment provides.
(2) The threat will find and exploit opportunities in a manner
the command did not anticipate.
How to do it:
Evaluate and integrate the various factors of the battlefield

environment that affect both friendly and threat operations.
Begin the evaluation with an analysis of the existing and
projected conditions of the battlefield environment then
determine their effects on friendly and threat operations and
broad courses of action. The specific steps are--
0 Analyze the battlefield environment:
- terrain analysis;
- weather analysis;
- analysis of other characteristics of the battlefield.
0 Describe the battlefield's effects on threat and friendly
capabilities and broad courses of action.
.
2-13
i
\
FM 34-130
Describe the battlefield's effects (cant)

How to do it (cant)
Analyze the battlefield environment
ANALYZE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The degree of detail in the analysis will vary depending
on the area of the battlefield environment you are
evaluating. Generally the evaluation of the area of
operations is more detailed than the area of interest.
Additionally, the focus will vary throughout each area.
For example, rear areas within the area of operations may
require a different focus than areas near the main battle-
area.
Also bear in mind that the battlefield is not I
homogeneous. Certain areas, or sub-sectors, will affect
various types of operations to varying degrees. During
the evaluation identify areas that favor each type of i
operation. Include the traditional operations (defense,
offense, etc.) as well as the operations associated with
any METT-T specific factors (counterterrorism, peace
enforcement, etc.). *
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
I
The best'terrain analysis is based on a
reconnaissance of the A0 and AI. Identify gaps in
knowledge of the terrain which a map analysis cannot W
satisfy. Use the gaps you identify as a guide for
reconnaissance planning. Because of time constraints
focus reconnaissance on the areas of most importance
to the commander and his mission. For example, when I
conducting terrain analysis for a signal unit you
might focus on identifying locations from which the
unit's assets can best support the force commander W
while also identifying the best locations for the
threat's EW assets that might target friendly Signal
systems.
-
Similarly, a counterintelligence analysis section
might focus on locations that best support employment
of threat intelligence collection systems and W
locations that best protect friendly elements from
their collection activities. See chapter 4 for
additional considerations in tailoring terrain i
analysis.
2-14
W
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Analyze the battlefield environment (cant)
Terrain analysis (cant)
The engineer (terrain) detachment that supports

divisions, corps, and echelons above corps usually
conducts the major portion of the terrain analysis,
combining~extensive database information with the
r:esults of reconnaissance. The engineers work closely
with the USAF weather detachment or staff weather
officer to ensure that their terrain analysis
incorporates the effects of current and projected-
weather phenomena.
The engineer (terrain) detachment has access to
special terrain data bases compiled by the Defense
Mapping Agency, allowing automated support of the
terrain analysis process. TERRABASE, if available,
also offers automated terrain analysis capabilities.
While unequalled in conducting pre-hostility and
pre-deployment terrain analysis, you should supplement
these data bases with reconnaissance of the terrain in
question whenever feasible.
If engineer terrain support is unavailable, evaluate
the,terrain through a map analysis supplemented by
reconnaissance. The Defense Mapping Agency produces
specialized maps, overlays and databases to aid in map
based evaluations. Specialized Defense Mapping Agency
products address such factors as--
0 cross country mobility;
0 transportation systems (road and bridge
information);
0 vegetation type and distribution;
0 surface drainage and configuration;
0 surface materials (soils);
0 ground water;
0 obstacles.
Ensure that the terrain analysis includes the effects
of weather on the military aspects of the terrain.
Consider the existing situation as well as conditions
forecasted to occur during mission execution.
Also consider that terrain analysis is a continuing
process. Changes in the battlefield environment may
.
2-15
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
change the evaluations of its effects that result from

terrain analysis. For example,
If built-up areas are reduced to rubble or lines
of.~communication are destroyed by battle, you must
re-evaluate the mobility characteristics of the
area of operations.
Similarly, if weather conditions change you must
re-evaluate the terrain's effect on military
operations. Terrain analysis must always consider
the effects of weather.
Express the results of evaluating the terrain's
effects by identifying areas of the battlefield that
favor, disfavor, or do not affect each broad course of
action. Examples of conclusions about the terrain
that help you make evaluations of the terrain's
effects are identification of the places best suited
for use as--
0 engagement areas,
0 battle positions,
0 infiltration lanes
0 avenues of approach, and
0 specific system or asset locations.
You reach conclusions about the effects of terrain
through the following sub-steps.
(1) Analyze the military aspects of the terrain.
(2) Evaluate the terrain's effects on military
operations.
Each of these sub-steps is discussed below.
(1) Analyze the military aspects of the terrain.
Terrain analysis consists of an evaluation of the
military aspects of the battlefield's terrain to
determine its effects on military operations. The
military aspects of terrain are:
.
2-16
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Analyze the military aspects of terrain
0 observation and fields of fire,

0 concealment and coverI
0 obstacles,
0 key terrain, and
0 avenues of approach
Consider all of these factors when analyzing _~
terrain, but always focus on the ones of most
relevance to the specific situation at hand and
the needs of the commander. Evaluate them in any
order that best supports your analysis.
Remember that the terrain analysis is not the end
product of the IPB process. Rather, it is the
means to determine which friendly COAs can best
exploit the opportunities the terrain provides and
how the terrain effects the threat's available
courses of action.
Observation and Fields of Fire:
Observation is the ability to see the threat
either visually or through the use of
surveillance devices.~ Factors that limit or
deny observation include concealment and
cover.
A field of fire is the area that a weapon or
group of weapons may effectively cover with
fire from a given position. Terrain that
offers cover limits fields of fire.
Terrain that offers good observation and
fields of fire generally favors defensive
courses of action.
The evaluation of observation and fields of
fire allows you to:
0 identify potential engagement areas, or
"fire sacks" and "kill zones,"
2-17
FM 34-130
Describe the battlefield's effects (cork)

How to do it (cant)
Observation and fields of fire (cant)
0, identify defensible terrain and specific

system orequipment positions, and W
0 identify where maneuvering forces are most

vulnerable to observation and fires.
Evaluate observation from the perspective of -
electronic and optical line-of-sight systems
as well as unaided visual observation. I
Consider systems such as weapon sights, laser
range finders, radars, radios, and jammers.
W
While ground based systems usually require
horizontal line-of-sight, airborne systems use
oblique and vertical line-of-sight. The same
is true of air defense systems. w
An evaluation of oblique line-of-sight aids in

planning ADA system locations, selecting I
landing and drop zones, planning helicopter
forward area arming and refueling position
locations, identifying areas vulnerable to
aerial intelligence collection systems, and i
selecting low-level flight routes and aerial
battle positions.
Evaluate fields of fire for all flat
trajectory and indirect fire weapons the unit
owns--
An ideal field of fire for flat trajectory
weapons is an open area in which the
threat can be seen and on which he has no
protection from fire from those weapons,
out to the weapon's maximum effective
range. Although observation is essential I
to effective control of fire, the best
observation does not guarantee the best
field of fire; you must also consider the
availability of cover. s
2-18 r
FM 34-130 P
/
Figure 2-S. Oblique LOS (ground).
MASKED AREA
Figure 24. Oblique LOS (air).
Figure 2-5. Vertical LOS.

2-19
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Observation and fields of fire (cant)
For indirect fire weapons consider only

the nature of the terrain in the target
.,: area and the amount of protection it
provides from those weapons.
Combine the analysis of each factor limiting
observation and fields of fire into a single
product. .This is usually an overlay with
areas of poor observation and fields of fire W
marked by parallel diagonal lines or cross
hatching. It identifies the areas where a
unit is vulnerable to observation by
intelligence collection systems or engagement
by threat forces. Use products such as this
to help you identify potential engagement
areas and evaluate avenues of approach. I
To complete the analysis identify areas that

offer positions overwatching areas of
vulnerability. This helps you to identify
defensible terrain, potential battle
positions, and possible locations for
intelligence collectors.
If time and resources permit prepare terrain
factor overlays to aid in evaluating
observation and fields of fire. Consider the
following:
0 vegetation or building height; I
0 canopy or roof closure;

0 vegetation or building density;
0 relief features, including micro-relief
features such as defiles (elevation
tinting techniques are helpful);
2-20
..-
W
FM 34-130
\\\-/
7
Figure 2-6. Example of a horizontal line-of-sight template.
0 friendly and threat target acquisition and

sensor capabilities;
0 specific lines of sight.
Another technique which aids an evaluation of
observation and fields of fire is to conduct
or request line-of-sight studies. Some
commands, such as signal units, MI units, and
ADA units, have a great need for line-of-sight
analysis.
. 2-21
L
=\
FM 34-130
-:
Describe the battlefield's effects (cant) !
How to do it (cant)
Terrain analysis (COnt) -1
observation and fields of fire (cant)
Line-of-sight studies aid in site selection

for specific systems requiring direct line of
sight. Normally, you request or conduct
line-of-sight studies after the evaluation of
the terrain's effects on observation have
identified areas for likely employment of I
these systems.
Concealment and Cover: u
Concealment is protection from observation.

It can be provided by areas of woods, I
underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated
vegetation, etc.
Cover is protection from the effects of direct
and indirect fires. It can be provided by
ditches, caves, river banks, folds in the
ground, shell craters, buildings, walls,
embankments, etc.
The evaluation of concealment and cover aids
in identifying defensible teyrain, possible i
approach routes, assembly areas, and
deployment and dispersal areas. Evaluate
concealment and cover in the same manner as -j
for observation and fields of fire. Combine
the analysis of each factor into a single
product such as an overlay cross-hatched to I
depict areas that offer concealment and
cover. You can usually use the products
developed during the evaluation of observation
and fields of fire as a start point. Use the i
results of the evaluation to:
0 identify and evaluate avenues of approach
0 identify defensible terrain and potential
battle positions
0 identify potential asse,mbly and dispersal
. areas.
2-22
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Terrain analysis (Cont)
Concealment and cover (cant)
Concealment and cover are desirable for both

the attack and the defense:
0 If an attacking force can move forward
under concealment the chances of achieving
surprise are greater. If a force can-move
protected from the threat's fire the
attack will be more effective. Concealed
and covered approach routes are
particularly important to reconnaissance
units, dismounted infantry, and insurgent
or terrorist forces.
0 Defending forces seek to defend in an area
which offers both concealment and cover
but does not provide covered approaches
for the threat.
Rear area units seek deployment areas and
movement routes that are concealed from threat
intelligence collection systems and provide
cover from deep attack systems, including
level I, II, and III rear area threats. Cover
and concealment are desirable during force
movements by any means. Units always seek to
maximize:
0 the cover and concealment of their own
forces, and
0 their observation and fields of fire into
potential threat positions or threat
avenues of approach.
Obstacles:
Obstacles are any natural or man-made terrain
features that stop, impede, or divert military
movement.
2-23
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Obstacles (cant)
Some examples of obstacles to ground mobility

are buildings, steep slopes; rivers, lakes,
forests, deserts, swamps, ju.ngles, cities,
minefields, trenches, and military wire I
obstacles,
Obstacles to air mobility include features
that exceed the aircraft's service ceiling, iii
restrict nap-of-the-earth flight or that force
the aircraft to employ a particular flight
profile. Examples are tall (greater than 75
feet) trees, towers, buildings, rapidly rising
terrain features, mountains, and smoke or
other obscurants. I
An evaluation of obstacles leads to the

identification of mobility corridors. This in
turn helps identify defensible terrain and r
avenues of approach. To evaluate obstacles:
0 ,Identify pertinent obstacles in the AI,
0 Determine the effect of each obstacle on
the mobility of the evaluated force, and
0 Combine the effects of individual
obstacles into an integrated product.
If DMA products are unavailable, and time and
resources permit, prepare terrain factor
overlays to aid in evaluating obstacles. Some I
of the factors to consider are:
0 Vegetation (tree spacing and trunk
diameter);
0 Surface drainage (stream width, depth,
velocity, bank slope and height);
2-24
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Obstacles (cant)
,. 0 Surface materia,ls (soil types and

conditions that affect mobility);
0 Surface configuration (slopes that affect
mobility)
0 Obstacles (natural and man made, consider
obstacles to flight as well as ground
mobility);
0 Transportation systems (bridge
classifications and road characteristics
such as curve radius, slopes, width, etc.)
0 Effects of actual or projected weather
such as heavy precipitation or snow cover.
Combine the several factor overlays into a
single product known as the.combined obstacle
overlay. The combined obstacle overlay
integrates the evaluations of the various
factors into a single product that depicts the
battlefield's effects on mobility (see Figure
2-7).
2-25
TREE SPACING
SLOPE
,...n
SOIL CHARACTERISTICS
COMBINED OBSTACLES
Figure 2-7. Combine all evaluated factors to produce an integrated product.
X. A
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Terrain analysis (cant) m
Obstacles (cant)
i
A,technique often used to,display the
cumulative evaluation of obstacles is a
.,.graphic product that depicts areas of terrain i
classified as UNRESTRI,CTED, RESTRICTED, and
SEVERELY RESTRICTED in terms of their .effects
on mobility. IPB defines these three d
classifications as:
0 UNRESTRICTED indicates terrain free of any
restriction to movement. Nothing needs to I
be done to enhance mobility.
UNRESTRICTED terrain for armored or i
mechanized forces is typically flat to
moderately sloping terrain with scattered
or widely spaced obstacles such as trees 5
or rocks. UNRESTRICTED terrain allows
wide maneuver by the forces under
consideration and unlimited travel
supported by well developed road networks. i
0 RESTRICTED terrain hinders movement to 1

some degree. Little effort is needed to I
.enhance mobility but units may have
difficulty maintaining preferred speeds,
moving in combat formations, or I
transitioning from one formation to
another. RESTRICTED terrain slows
movement by requiring zig-zagging or
frequent detours. J
RESTRICTED terrain for armored or
mechanized forces typically consists of I
moderate to steep slopes, moderate to
densely spaced obstacles such as trees,
rocks, or buildings. Swamps or rugged
terrain are examples of RESTRICTED terrain
for dismounted infantry forces.
Logistical or rear area movement may be
supported by poorly developed road i
systems. \
2-26 i
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Obstacles (cant)
A common and useful technique is to depict

RESTRICTED terrain on overlays and
sketches by marking the areas with
diagonal lines.
0 SEVERELY RESTRICTED terrain severely-
hinders or slows movement in combat
formations unless some effort is made to
enhance mobility. This could take the
form of committing engineer assets to
improving mobility or of deviating from
doctrinal tactics, such as moving in
columns instead of line formations or at
speeds much lower than those preferred.
SEVERELY RESTRICTED terrain for armored
and mechanized forces is typically
characterized by steep slopes and large or
densely spaced obstacles with little or no
supporting roads. A common technique is
to depict this type of SEVERELY RESTRICTED
terrain on overlays and sketches by
marking the areas with crosshatched
diagonal lines.
Other types of SEVERELY RESTRICTED terrain
include minefields, unfordable rivers that
exceed vehicle-launched bridge length, and
road or railroad embankments, as just a
few examples. Depict these types of
SEVERELY RESTRICTED terrain using the
symbology contained in FM 101-5-1,
Operational Terms and Symbols. If
standard symbology does not exist, such as
in the case of unfordable rivers, depict
them using wide solid lines, ad hoc
symbology, or crosshatching as
appropriate. Ensure that all non-standard
symbols are explained in the graphic's
legend.
2-27
FM 34-130
J
Describethe battlefield's effects (cant)
How to do it (cant)
Obstacles (cant)
Terrain mobility classifications are not

absolute but reflect the relative effect of
terrain on the maneuver of combat formations.
They are based on the ability of a force to
maneuver in combat formations, usually linear,
or to transition from one type formation to -
another, as opposed to simply moving through a
piece of terrain.
Identifying an area as SEVERELY RESTRICTED
terrain, for example, does not imply that
movement through that area is impossible, only
that it is impractical. Units moving in
column formations along roads generally have
little trouble traversing SEVERELY RESTRICTED
terrain.
Additional Considerations:
0 Obstacles perpendicular to an axis of
attack favor the defender by slowing the
attacker, forcing him into concentrations
while crossing or negotiating obstacles,
and holding the attacker for longer
periods under the fires of the defender.
0 Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance
may give the attacker flank protection but
they may also interfere with his lateral
movement, employment of reserve forces,
and coordination between adjacent units.
0 To be effective the defender must cover
obstacles by observation and fire.
However, even undefended obstacles may
canalize an attacker into concentrations
which are easier to detect and attack.
0 Terrain considered SEVERELY RESTRICTED for
one unit may pose no obstruction to the
mobility of another unit. For example, a
2-28
FM 34-130

How to do it (cant)
Analyze the military aspects of~terrain
Obstacles (cant)
dismounted infantry unit could easily

negotiate a hilly, forested area that a
mounted infantry unit might consider
SEVERELY RESTRICTED. Similarly an attack
helicopter unit may consider an area
containing several tall towers and many
high tension wires as SEVERELY RESTRICTED
terrain while the same terrain would pose
little or no obstacle to high performance
aircraft operating at higher altitudes.
0 When evaluating the terrain's effects on
more than one type force, such as
dismounted infantry and armor, you may
have to prepare separate combined obstacle
overlays. Each one should focus on the
mobility of a particular type force. As
an alternative, if the situation or
available time require you to accept the
clutter, you can mark dismounted infantry
infiltration lanes on an overlay that
depicts the terrain's effects on the
mobility of mounted forces.
0 Consider the cumulative effects of
individual obstacles in the final
evaluation. For example, by themselves a
gentle slope or moderately dense woods may
present little obstacle to mounted
movement. Taken together, however, the
combination may be restrictive.
0 Ensure that you account for the weather's
effects on factors which affect mobility.
For example, heavy rains swell streams and
decrease the load bearing characteristics
of most soil types. Some soil types,
however, actually improve when wet. See
FM 34-81-1 for details and Appendix B of
this manual for rules of thumb.
2-29
.
1
FM 34-130
Describe the battlefield's effects (cant) I

How to do it (cant)
Terrain analysis (COnt) r
Obstacles (cant)
i
0 When considering threat courses of action
in relation to the terrain's effects on
mobility keep the .lessons of history in i
mind. There are many examples of a force
achieving surprise by negotiating,
supposedly 9Vimpassable@8 terrain. The '- i
classification of terrain into various
obstacle types reflects only its relative
impact on force mobility. The
classifications are not absolute. i
Kev Terrain:
r
Key terrain is any locality or area the
seizure, retention, or control of which
affords a marked advantage to either i
combatant.
An example of key terrain is a bridge over an
unfordable river which gives access to the I
opposite shore without requiring an assault
crossing. Another example is a level clearing
in rough terrain which is the only accessible ii
landing field for airmobile operations.
Key terrain is often selected for use as
m
battle positions or objectives.
Evaluate key terrain by assessing the impact
of its seizure by either force upon the I
results of battle. Techniques that aid this
evaluation are:
0 Evaluate the other four aspects of
military terrain first and integrate the
results into the evaluation of key
terrain. For example, if you identify
only one valid avenue of approach to the
command's objective, then the choke points
on that avenue will probably become key
terrain (compared to a situation where
. several avenues of .approach are
available).
2-30
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Key terrain (cant)
0 Time permitting, 'conduct l*mini-wargamingll

to visualize possible outcomes of battle.
See appendix A for a discussion on how to
accomplish this.
A common technique is to depict key terrain on
overlays and sketches with a large "K" within-
-a circle or curve that encloses and follows
the contours of the designated terrain. On
transparent overlays use a color that stands
out, such as purple.
In the offense, key terrain features are
usually forward of friendly dispositions and
are often assigned as objectives. Terrain
features in adjacent sectors may be key
terrain if their control is necessary for the
continuation of the attack or the
accomplishment of the mission. If the mission
is to destroy threat forces, key terrain may
'include areas whose seizure helps ensure the
required destruction. Terrain which gives the
threat effective observation along an axis of
friendly advance may be key terrain if the
threat must be denied its possession or
control.
In the defense, key terrain ,is usually within
the area of operations and within or behind
the selected defensive area. Some examples of
such key terrain are:
0 Terrain which gives good observation over
avenues of approach to and into the
defensive position.
0 Terrain which permits the defender to
cover an obstacle by fire.
2-31
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Key terrain (cant)
0 Important road junctions or communications

centers which affect the use of reserves,
sustainment, or lines of communications.
..
0 Key terrain varies with the level of
c o m m a n d . For example, to an army or
theater commander a large city may afford
marked advantages as a communications
center. To a division commander the high
ground which dominates the city may be key
terrain while the city itself may be an
obstacle.
0 Terrain which permits or denies maneuver
may be key terrain. Tactical use of
terrain is often directed at increasing
the capability for applying combat power
and at the same time forcing the threat
into areas which result In reduction of
his ability to apply his combat power.
Terrain which permits this may also be key
terrain.
0 Major obstacles are rarely key terrain
features. The high ground dominating a
river rather than the river itself is
usually the key terrain feature for the
tactical commander (since holding the high
ground allows full use of the river's
obstacle value). An exception is an
obstacle such as a built-up area which is
assigned as an objective.
0 Key terrain is decisive terrain if it has
an extraordinary impact on the mission.
Decisive terrain is rare and will not be
present in every situation. To designate
;
,-a
2-32
.
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Key terrain (cant)
terrain as decisive is to recognize that the

success of the mission depends on seizing or
retaining it. The commander designates
decisive terrain to communicate its importance
in his concept of operation to his staff and
subordinate commanders.
Avenues of Anuroach:
An avenue of approach is an air or ground
route of an attacking force of a given size
leading to its objective or to key terrain in
its path.
The identification of avenues of approach is
important because all COAs which involve
maneuver depend upon available avenues of
approach.
During offensive operations, the evaluation of
avenues of approach leads to a recommendation
on the best avenues of approach to the
command's objective and identification of
avenues available to the threat for withdrawal
or the movement of reserves.
During the defense, identify avenues of

approach that support the threat's offensive
capabilities and avenues that support the
movement and commitment of friendly reserves.
To develop avenues of approach use the reSUltS
of evaluating obstacles to--
0 Identify mobility corridors;
0 Categorize mobility corridors;
0 Group mobility corridors to form avenues
of approach;
2-33
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Avenues of approach (cant)
0 Evaluate avenues of approach;

0 Prioritize avenues of approach.
'- o Identifv Mobilitv Corridors:
Mobility corridors are areas where a force-
will be canalized due to terrain
constrictions. They allow military forces
to capitalize on the principles of mass
and speed.
Evaluate the combined obstacle overlay to
identify mobility corridors wide enough to
permit maneuver in tactical formations.
If friendly and threat forces require
mobility corridors of different widths,
perhaps due to organizational or equipment
differences, you may have to conduct two
separate evaluations. Identification of
mobility corridors requires some knowledge
of friendly and threat organizations for
combat and preferred tactics. See
Appendix B for some rules of thumb on
threat forces.
The best mobility corridors use
terrain that provides enough
UNRESTRICTED
space for a force to move in its preferred
doctrinal formations while avoiding major
obstacles. Mobility corridors usually
follow the direction of roads and trails.
You may have to evaluate factors other
than obstacles and mobility when
identifying mobility corridors. Mobility
corridors, like obstacles, are a function
of the type and mobility of the force
being evaluated. For example, mechanized
and armor units generally require large
open areas in which to move. Dismounted
2-34
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
infantry, and most insurgents and

terrorists, are less restricted by the
presence of obstacles or hindering terrain
and prefer areas that provide cover and
concealment.
Similarly, the mobility corridor.usedby a
jet aircraft with a minimum operating
altitude of 1,000 feet is quite different
from that considered by a helicopter with
a maximum service ceiling of 12,000 feet.
Depict mobility corridors and zones of
entry (see below) on overlays and sketches
using simple, easily recognized symbols.
See Chapter 3 for examples. If using
colored graphics, use red when focusing on
threat mobility or blue when the attention
is on friendly force mobility. Ensure
that any nonstandard symbols are explained
in the graphic's legend.
o Cateqorize Mobilitv Corridors:
Once you have identified mobility
corridors, categorize them by the size or
type of force they will accommodate. You
may prioritize them.in order of likely use
if warranted. For example, because
military units generally require
logistical sustainment a mobility corridor
through UNRESTRICTED terrain supported by
a road network is generally more desirable
than one through RESTRICTED terrain or one
unsupported by a road network.
Normally, identify mobility corridors for
forces two echelons below the friendly
command. This varies with each situation.
Where the terrain is restrictive, allowing
only relatively small mobility corridors,
you may need to evaluate mobility
. corridors several echelons below the
friendly command.
2-35
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
"o~Grouv Mobilitv Corr~idors to form Avenues of

Bporoach:
.. Group mobility corridors together to form
avenues of approach. An avenue of
approach must provide ease of movement and
enough width for dispersion of,a force -
large enough to significantly affect the
outcome of an operation.
Normally, identify avenues of approach for
a force one echelon below the friendly
command. Unlike mobility corridors,
avenues of approach may include areas of
SEVERELY RESTRICTED terrain since they
show only the general area through which a
force can move.
LEGEND:
ffi) = NO-GO
Figure 2-8. Group mobility corridors to form avenues Of approach.
.
2-36
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Depict avenues of approach using arrows

that encompass the mobility corridors
which constitute the avenue. Use the same
considerations for color selection that
apply to mobility corridors.
o Evaluate Avenues of Avvroach:
An evaluation of avenues of approach
identifies those which best support
maneuver capabilities. Most engineer
detachments do not have the expertise on
threat or friendly tactical doctrine
required to conduct this step alone. It
should be performed by the G2/S2 or his
analysts, with assistance from the G3/S3
as required. Evaluate them for
suitability in terms of:
0 access to key terrain and adjacent
avenues;
0 degree of canalization and ease of
movement;
0 use of cover and concealment (force
protection from both fires and
intelligence collection);
0 use of observation and fields of fire;
0 sustainability (LOC support);
0 directness to the objective.
The results of evaluating mobility
corridors and avenues of approach is
usually depicted on the combined obstacle
overlay. This may vary with the
situation.
2-37
I
FM 34-130 I

I
How to do it (cant)
Analyze the military aspects of terrain I
o Prioritize Avenues of Avvroach:

Prioritize the avenues of approach based
on how well each supports maneuver. rr
As always, the final product should focus ~_
on the results of the evaluation rather .- I
than the factors of the analysis.
l
0 Do not confuse avenues of approach with
direction of attack or axis of advance,
which, to achieve surprise, may not follow
avenues of approach (see glossary).
0 Mobility corridors and avenues of approach I
are based on the maneuver requirements of
tactical formations. They will not by
themselves identify likely infiltration
lanes or routes likely to be used by
reconnaissance assets. you must consider
other factors, such as the availability of
concealment and cover, .to identify likely Hi
infiltration lanes or reconnaissance unit
routes.
I
0 Avenues of approach are based solely on
assigned or likely objectives, the effects
of the battlefield environment, and force
mobility considerations. The ability of
an opposing force to interfere with the
friendly use of an avenue of approach does
not influence the evaluation at this point I
in the IPB process. Threat actions will
be wargamed during step four of the IPB
process, Determine Threat Courses of
Action, and during staff wargaming.
2-38
r
FM 34-130
1
How to do it (cant)
0 When evaluating avenues of approach for

units with amphibious, airborne, or
airmobile capabilities you must also
consider suitable zones of entry, such as
airfields, landing zones or beachhead
sites. See Appendix B for rules of,thumb
in identifying zones of entry.
0 The type unit under consideration is a
major factor in identifying mobility
corridors and avenues of approach. In
built-up areas, for example, a mechanized
unit might prefer areas of wide streets
and parks for movement. In the same area,
dismounted infantry might prefer an area
of closely built structures that allow
them to move under cover via holes knocked
through walls between buildings.
Similarly, helicopters look for areas that
allow access to cover and concealment by
nap-of-the-earth flight techniques while
high performance aircraft generally avoid
obstacles and use direct approaches.
This is more than a function of mobility.
For example, mechanized and armor units
generally require open areas in which to
move. This certainly enhances mobility
but the improved observation of open areas
also facilitates command and control over
maneuvering sub-elements. Similarly,
reconnaissance units generally prefer
areas that allow them to conduct their
mission without detection, favoring areas
that offer concealment even if it requires
some sacrifice of mobility.
0 Air avenues of approach permit the

employment of penetrating aerial sensors,
attack aircraft and airmobile forces. Air
2-39
FM 34-130
c
How to do it (cant) i
Terrain analysis (COnt)
I
avenues of approach are generally as
direct as possible inorder to minimize
risk to the aircraft and maximize the
. aircraft's payload. i
However, terrain can influence the choice

of particular routes. Terrain corridors -
are usually desirable because they afford
some defilade protection from ADA systems
outside the corridor. Corridors, and
other linear terrain features such as I
roads or rivers, also provide aids to
navigation at high speeds. Concealment
from ground observation or radar I
acquisition is also important to low
flying aircraft, particularly
helicopters. All other things being
equal, aircraft will generally use the
most direct approach to the target area.
In the target area, many attack profiles

depend on low level flight. It is here
that terrain analysis is most useful in ,-
identifying aircraft avenues of approach. 1
In addition to the terrain factors
considered above, evaluate air avenues of
approach by considering obstacles to
flight. See Chapter 4 for example
considerations.
(2) Evaluate the terrain's effects on military i
opqrations.
A common fault is to discuss the military aspects r
of terrain in great detail without addressing whv
they are important. To avoid this common fault
you must relate the analysis to the terrain's
effects on the broad courses of action available
to threat and friendly forces.
2-40
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Evaluate the terrain's effects on military
operations (cant)
Evaluate the terrain's effects on offensive and

,defensive courses of action by identifying the
areas along each avenue of approach best suited
.,~ for use as potentialy-
0 engagement areas and ambush sites: using the
results of evaluating cover and concealmant
identify areas where maneuvering forces are
vulnerable to fires. Consider weapon ranges,
missile flight times and the likely speed of
maneuvering forces. If your command is
attacking these are areas where it will be
vulnerable to threat fires. If your command
is defending these are potential engagement
areas.
0 battle positions: identify covered and
concealed positions that offer observation and
fields of fire into potential engagement
areas. If your command is defending they are
potential defensive positions. If your
command is attacking they provide a start
point for determining possible threat courses
of action. They might also be used by
friendly attacking forces to block enemy
counterattacks.
0 immediate or intermediate objectives: identify
any areas or terrain features that dominate
the avenues of approach or assigned objective
areas. These will usually correspond to areas
already identified as key terrain.
As time permits or the situation requires also
identify potential--
0 assembly and dispersal areas
0 observation posts;
0 artillery firing positions;
0 air defense system positions
2-41
i
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Evaluate the terrain's effects on military r
operations (cant)
i
0 intelligence and target acquisition system
positions;
o Forward area arming and refueling positions;
I
o'- landing or drop zones;
0 infiltration lanes;
0 etc.
I
See chapter four for additional considerations.
The terrain rarely favors one type of operation m
throughout the width and breadth of the battlefield.
Within a given area certain sub-sectors will affect
various operations to varying degrees. Based on the
m
location and nature of potential engagement areas,
battle positions, etc., determine which areas of the
battlefield favor each broad course of action.
Disseminate the results of terrain analysis in the
analysis of the AO, the intelligence estimate, and in -
graphic products that will aid the staff in the m
completion of their own estimates and plans. A common
and effective technique is the use of a modified
combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).
r
To construct a MC00 start with the combined obstacle
overlay and consider adding--
0 Cross countrv mobilitv classifications. Mark
areas of RESTRICTED and SEVERELY RESTRICTED cross
country mobility with easily distinguishable
symbology.
0 Avenues of aooroach and mobilitv corridors.
Tailor these to the type force under 5
consideration, basing them on factors other than
mobility as required. Categorize them by the size
force they accommodate and rank them in priority
order if justified. While it is possible to put
2-42
i
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Evaluate the terrain's effects on military
operations (cant)
J
both ground and air mobility corridors and avenues

of approach on the same overlay, clarity may
require separate overlays. Consider both friendly
.,~ and threat avenues.
0 Counter-mobilitv obstacle svstems planned for
future emplacement by friendly units or suspected
.within enemy positions.
0 Defensible terrain. Evaluate terrain along each
avenue of approach to identify potential battle
positions or possible defensive sectors for
subordinate units.
0 Enoaoement areas. Combine the results of
evaluating defensible terrain with the results of
evaluating observation and fields of fire to
identify potential engagement areas.
0 Kev terrain. Identify any areas or terrain
'features which dominate the avenues of approach or
objective areas. These will usually correspond to
terrain already identified as potential battle
positions or intermediate,objectives.
Distribute terrain analysis products as widely as
possible. Make the specific terrain factor overlays
available to other units and staff sections for their
own planning use. They will refine them to meet their
own needs. For example, the counterintelligence
analysis section will use the results of evaluating
the terrain's effects on observation to aid in
evaluating the threat's intelligence collection
capabilities.
2-43
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
For more information on terrain analysis see:

FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis, and
FM 5-170, Engineer Reconnaisshnce.
For terrain analysis techniques and considerations in
various climates and terrain types see:
FM 9q-3, Desert Operations;
FM 90-5, Jungle Operations;
FM 90-6, Mountain Operations;
FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized
Terrain;
FM 90-11, Cold Weather Operations.
WEATHER ANALYSIS
Terrain and weather analyses are inseparable. YOU
should have already included the weather's effects on
terrain during terrain analysis. In this sub-step
weather analysis evaluates the weather's direct
effects on operations.
If time and resources permit, you can obtain
climatology based overlays for planning purposes from
the USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center.
Once deployed, the supporting USAF Weather Team can
prepare similar but less detailed overlays depending
on the availability of data.
USAF weather teams at division, corps, and echelons
above corps (EAC) work together with engineer teams
during much of the analysis process. The weather team
analyzes the weather's direct effects and its effects
on terrain and integrates climatic, forecast, and
current weather data with terrain analysis.
Evaluate the effects of each military aspect of
weather. However, just as in terrain analysis, focus
on the aspects that have the most bearing on the
situation y-our command faces. Begin the evaluation of
each aspect with the local climatology, but always
fine-tune the evaluation with the most current
forecast available.
2-44
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Weather analysis (cant)
The sub-steps you use to accomplish weather analysis

are--
(1) ,Analyze the military aspects of weather.
(2) Evaluate the weather's effects on military
operations.
Each of these steps is discusses below.
(1) Analyze the military aspects of weather.
The military aspects of weather are:
Visibilitv:
Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and
retrograde operations. In the offense, it
conceals the concentration of maneuver forces,
thus enhancing the possibility of achieving
surprise. LOW visibility hinders the defense
because cohesion and control become difficult
to maintain, reconnaissance and surveillance
are impeded, and target acquisition is less
accurate.
When evaluating visibility, consider the
effects of all aspects of the weather. For
example, temperature conditions can have
either an adverse or beneficial effect on the
use of modern thermal sights. Cloud cover can
negate the illumination provided by the moon.
Precipitation and other obscurants can also
have varying effects.
A major factor in evaluating visibility is the
amount of available light. Consider the phase
of the moon as well as the times associated
with--
0 Beginning morning nautical twilight
(BMNT-see glossary);
2-45
FM 34-130 il)
i
How to do it (cant) r
Analyze the military aspects of weather
I
Visibility (cant)
0 Sun rise; I
0 Suns set;
'- 0 End'evening nautical twilight (EENT-see
glossary);
0 .~ Moon rise; and, r
0 Moon set.
6
Winds:
Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the
;
combat effectiveness of a force downwind as
the result of blowing dust, smoke, sand, or
precipitation. The upwind force usually has
better visibility. NBC operations usually i
favor the upwind force.
Strong winds and wind turbulence limit I
airborne, air assault, and aviation
operations. Evaluation of weather in support
of these operations requires information on
the wind at the surface as well as at varying I
altitudes. High winds near the ground
increase turbulence and may inhibit maneuver.
High winds at greater altitudes can improve or I
reduce fuel consumption.
Wind generated blowing sand, dust, rain or
snow can reduce the effectiveness of radars
and communication systems. Strong winds can
also hamper the efficiency of directional
antenna systems by inducing antenna wobble. I
Precioitation:
Precipitations affects soil trafficability,
visibility, and the functioning of many
electro-optical systems. Heavy precipitation
.
2-46
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Analyze. the battlefield environment (cant)
Analyze the military aspects of weather
Precipitation (cant)
can reduce the quality of supplies in

storage. Heavy snow",cover can reduce the
efficiency of many communication systems as
well as degrading, the effects of many
munitions and degrading air operations.
Cloud Cover:
Cloud cover affects ground operations by
limiting illumination and the solar heating of
targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many
target acquisition systems, the use of
infrared-guided artillery, and general
aviation operations.
Heavy cloud cover often canalizes aircraft
within air avenues of approach and during the
final approach to the target. Partial cloud
cover can cause glare, a condition attacking
aircraft might use to conceal their approach
to the target. Some types of clouds reduce
the effectiveness of radars.
Temperature and Humidity:
Extremes of temperature and humidity reduce
personnel and equipment capabilities, and may
require the use of special personnel shelters
or equipment. Air density decreases as
temperature and humidity increase, which may
necessitate a reduction of aircraft payloads.
Temperature 'crossovers," when target and
background temperatures are nearly equal,
degrade the use of thermal target acquisition
systems. The length of crossover time is
dependent on air temperature as well as cloud
cover and other factors.
2-47
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Evaluate the weather's effects on military
operations
(2) Evaluate the weather's effects on military

operations.
Weather has ~both direct and indirect effects on
military operations. Examples of indirect effects
are--
0 temperature inversions might cause some battle
positions to be more at risk to the effects of
chemical warfare than others due to their
altitude.
0 local conditions of visibility, such as fog,
might make some potential engagement areas
more attractive than others.
0 Hot, dry weather might force a unit to
consider water sources as key terrain.
All of these conditions would significantly affect

the selection of defensive positions even though
their effects are indirect. An effective
technique for evaluating and depicting the
weather's indirect effects is to modify the
terrain analysis products to depict the effects of
weather considerations.
Remember to revise the effects of weather upon
terrain analysis as the weather changes from the
originally evaluated conditions.
You must also evaluate the weather's direct
effects on personnel, equipment, and operations.
Begin by establishing the critical values of the
military aspects of weather that affect the
effectiveness of:
0 personnel;
0 specific types of equipment; and,
0 types of military operations.
2-48
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Evaluate the weather's effects on military
operations (cant)
An example would be setting critical values for

'visibility's effects on airborne operations as:
visibility of 1 kp or less as an unfavorable
condition;
7 visibility of l-5 km as a marginal condition.
A forecast of 2 km visibility can then be quickly
evaluated as making the conditions for airborne
operations marginal.
See Appendix B for other examples and rules of
thumb in establishing critical values. An example
of critical values arranged into matrix format is
shown in chapter three at figure 3-1-13.
Once you have set the critical values, use them as
gauges to evaluate the effects of local weather on
the operations and courses of action available to
both friendly and threat forces.
An example might be an S2 reporting to his
commander, "Sir, weather practically rules out the
use of air assault operations because temperature
and humidity have reduced the lift capability of
the enemy's helicopters by 70%."
Weather effects are harder to depict graphically
and may have to be portrayed in a matrix. Figure
2-9 is an example of one type of matrix that
depicts the results of the evaluation of the
weather's effects on military operations. See
Chapter 3 for other examples.
2-49
FM 34-130
=
I FORECAST TIME PERIOD (1992)
MISSION AREA OR USE 6 Oct | 7 Oct | B Oct j 9 Oct |
6 12 18 24 6 12 18 24 6 12 18 24 6 12 18 24
Mobility (ground)
Direct Fire Target Acquisition
Airmobile Operations
(Landing Lanes)
NBC
W//Y//A
33:
:AVORABLE (No shading-Green) UNFAVORABLE (I:-Red) MARGINAL (m -Yellow)
Figure 2-9. Determine the weathers effects on military operations.

Regardless of the means of presentation, ensure
you focus on the effects of weather on military
operations rather than the factors that make up _.,~ .,~, -
the analysis.
For example, you might express the effects of
visibility and precipitation on the mobility of a
force in terms of movement rates or the amount of
time the force will be exposed in an engagement
area. These types of evaluations are more readily
usable by the commander than statements such as
"...three inches of rain over the next 24-48
hours..."
For more information:
0 Commands that are not supported by a USAF weather
team should refer to FM 34-81-1, Battlefield
Weather Effects, for "how to" information on
determining the weather's effects on military
operations.
0 Commands that are supported by USAF weather teams
should refer also to FM 34-Sl/AFM 105-4.
2-50
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Analysis of other characteristics of the
battlefield
ANALYSIS OF OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLEFIELD

"Other Characteristics*' include all aspects of the
battlefield environment that affect friendly or threat
COAs not already incorporated into the,terrain and
weather analysis.
An example might be an S2 reporting to his commander,
"Sir, religious considerations will make cordon and
search operations on Wednesdays extremely difficult to
execute - the local population will be praying at the
same time we're trying to conduct the search."
In another example, during riot control assistance to
civil authorities the influence of gangs or other
unofficial political elements becomes very important.
Use the same two step process to determine the effects
of other characteristics of the battlefield--
(l).Analyze the other characteristics of the
battlefield.
(2) Evaluate the effects of other characteristics of
the battlefield on military operations.
Each of these sub-steps is discussed below.
(1) Analyze the other characteristics of the
battlefield.
Tvnical Characteristics: Because these aspects
vary greatly with each circumstance a
comprehensive list cannot be provided here.
However, depending on the situation, these
characteristics might include:
0 Logistics infrastructure, such as--
Land use patterns.
Sources of potable water.
Bulk fuel storage and transport systems.
2-51
i
FM 34-130
Describe the battlefield's effects (cant) I
How to do it (cant)
battlefield (cant) r
Canals and waterways, with associated I

control facilities such as locks.
-' Communication systems,6
i
Transportation means and systems,
including road and rail networks, 1
..
transloading facilities, and airfields.
Natural resources.
Industries and technologies.
i Power production facilities.
Chemical and nuclear facilities.
i
Population demographics, such as--
Living conditions.
Cultural distinctions.
Religious beliefs. I
Political grievances.
Political affiliation.
Education levels.
Economics.
J
Politics; local, regional and international I
(government systems, treaties, agreements, and
legal restrictions; includes unofficial
systems such as gangs, etc).
(2) Evaluate the effects of other characteristics of
the battlefield on military operations. I
As with terrain and weather, the evaluation of the
other characteristics of the battlefield is not
complete until you express it in terms of their 1
effects on friendly and threat courses of action.
In some situations, the "other characteristicsV1 of
the battlefield are of more concern than terrain
and weather. An historical example illustrates
this well:
2-52
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
battlefield (cant)
All US Army activities during and preceding

Operation JUST CAUSE were bound by the
Carter-Torrijos treaty. Certain provisions of
this treaty categorized land within the old
canal zone into five different categories.
The rights and responsibilities of the United
States and the Republic of Panama varied
widely depending upon the legal designation of
the terrain.
During the show of force operations that led
to JUST CAUSE the legal status of each piece
of land influenced the COAs of US forces and
Panamanian Defense Forces far more than the
tactical significance of the terrain and
weather.
To further illustrate this point, the
perception of "seizing the moral highground"
also influenced the actions of both sides in
Panama far more than the mere terrain and
weather.
These other characteristics of the battlefield are
particularly important at'the operational and
strategic levels, but also play a major role at
the tactical level in hostilities short of war.
Chapter 5 gives examples of "other
characteristics" as they might affect operations
at different levels of war.
Although you will usually be forced to discuss the
eff~ects of other characteristics of the
battlefield in text products or a matrix always
attempt to use graphics. Examples of graphic
depictions include an overlay showing areas most
vulnerable to insurgent operations, based on
demographics; or an overlay identifying high value
targets in the logistics infrastructure, in either
the threat or friendly rear area.
2-53
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Describe the battlefield's effects on threat
and friendly capabilities and broad courses
of action
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS ON THREAT AND FRIENDLY

CAPABILITIES AND BROAD COURSES OF ACTION
Combine the evaluation of the effects of terrain, weather,
and the other characteristics of the battlefield into one
integrated product. Do not focus on the factors that lead
to your conclusions. Instead, focus on the total
environment's .effects on courses of action available to '-
both friendly-and threat forces.
Some examples of techniques for accomplishing this are:
0 Prior to the development of friendly COAs:
Provide the evaluated and prioritized set of
avenues of approach to the 53 so he can develop
COAs by designating an axis of advance, direction
of attack, or zone of attack for each subordinate
unit (offense).
Provide the sets of defensible terrain along
threat avenues of approach to the 53 so he can
develop strongpoints, battle positions, or sectors
for each subordinate unit (defense and
retrograde).
Identify the periods when weather conditions will
optimize the use of friendly sighting and target
acquisition systems so the 53 canmake
recommendations on the timing of operations.
0 After the development of friendly COAs emphasize
concluding sentences such as "...of the courses of
action available, COA 2 makes second best use of the
opportunities the battlefield environment offers for
the following reasons..."
You must address the battlefield's effects on threat as
well as friendly courses of action. A good technique for
accomplishing this is to completely place yourself in the
perspective of the threat's 52 and 53 who must recommend a
set of courses of action to their commander.
2-54
.
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
of action (cant)
Ensure that you evaluate the-effects of battlefield

environment on threat courses of action considering the
specific threat your command is facing. Some examples to
consider are--
,.
0 Threat vehicles may have -different values than the
friendly vehicles you are used to in terms of
mobility, optical systems, etc.
0 The threat may have an organic capability that
undermatches or overmatches your unit. If the threat
is attacking without dismounted infantry, don't waste
time identifying infiltration lanes. Likewise, a
threat unit with exceptional bridging capabilities
will be less affected by river obstacles.
0 Bear in mind that weather will affect threat equipment
differently than U.S. equipment. An AK-47 is more
resistant to moisture than an M-16, for example.
Likewise, fog will affect U.S. thermal sights less
than it will affect vehicles with optical sights only.
0 Remember that "other characteristics" may sometimes
influence threat actions much more than terrain or
weather considerations. Remember to account for the
cultural bias the threat operates within. They will
evaluate the same legal, political, economic, and
demographic aspects in a completely different manner
than U.S. personnel would.
The bottom line is to evaluate the battlefield completely
from the perspective of the threat. Remember to express
this evaluation in terms of courses of action, not
detailed descriptions of the analytical factors that led
to the conclusions.
Focus the commander on concluding statements such as,
"Sir, the battlefield environment best supports insurgent
attacks on U.S. and host nation forces near Daleytown.
The next best place for their operations is Elkinsville."
Be prepared to back these conclusions with the detailed
analysis prepared in the previous steps.
2-55
FM 34-130 :
Describe the battlefield% effects (cant) I
How to do it (cant)
of action (cant) i
Communicate the final conclusions-from the description of i

the battlefield environment in written reports such as the
analysis of the area of operations or:the intelligence
estimate. Distribute the graphic products developed I
during the analysis and evaluation as needed to support
the remainder of the staff and other commands in their own
IPB and planning efforts.
i
Evaluate the Threat I
6
What is it? 1
i
Definition:
The determination of threat force capabilities and the i
doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques, and standard
operating procedures threat forces prefer to employ.
i
A Short Examole:
While planning a contingency show of force operation a J2
directs the Joint Intelligence Center to study the i
decisions on record of the targeted country's dictator.
As a result of this research the intelligence center
produces a model of how the dictator makes decisions, with I
special emphasis on his tendencies ~during political
crises.
Meanwhile, the S2 of the brigade which will conduct the 3
operation does his own evaluation of the threat. He
evaluates his contingency area order of battle files and
determines that the two threat brigades within the target i
area are equipped, organized, and well trained enough to
be capable of offensive as well as defensive operations
against the friendly brigade. He prepares threat models m
depicting the threat's normal offensive and defensive,
operations in built-up areas (the setting for the show of
force operation).
i
2-56 I
FM 34-130
Evaluate the threat (cant)
What is it? (cant)
Desired End Effect:

Know the enemy. Develop threat models which accurately
portray how threat forces normally execute operations and
how they have reacted to similar situations in the past.
Know what the threat is capable,.of given the current
situation.
The 'threat model should include:
o standard graphic control measures, such as 'boundaries,
etc;
o a description of typical tasks for subordinate units;
o an evaluation of how well the threat force is trained
on the task;
o employment considerations; and
o a discussion of typical contingencies, sequels,
failure options, and wildcard variations.
o an evaluation of the threat's strengths, weaknesses,
and vulnerabilities, including an evaluation of
typical BVTs;
1 So What? )
Success Results in:

Threat COAs developed in the next step of IPB reflect what
the threat is and is not capable of and trained to do in
similar situations.
The staff will lack the intelligence needed for planning.
The threat 'will surprise the friendly force with
capabilities that the S2 failed to account for.
At the other extreme, the friendly staff may waste time
and effort planning against threat capabilities that do
not exist.
2-57
FM 34-130
I Evaluate the threat (cant)

How to do it 1
1 How to Do it: 1
0 Update~or tireate threat models.

Convert ,threat doctrine or patterns of operation to
graphics (doctrinal templates);
- Describe in words the threat's tactics and options.
Identify high value targets.,'
0 Identify threat capabilities.
Each of these steps is discussed below.
- Movement begins as early as 1.5 hours after order.
- Mwement along previously rehearsed routes.
- Supported by well-planned and coordinated FS.
- Lead elements and supporting defenses fii friendlv forces with fires
- Main body seeks flank&of frieidty forces.
Failure Options:
- Hasty defense.
\ ,I - Fix friendly forces for counterattack by reserve of higher HQ.
Figure 2-l 0. A complete threat model consists of a template, a description

of tactics, and identification of HVTs.
UPDATE OR CREATE THREAT MODELS
Threat models depict how threat forces prefer to conduct
operations under ideal conditions. They are based on the
threat's normal'or "doctrina18* organization, equipment,
doctrine and TTP. Threat models result from a detailed
study of the threat force. Ideally, you construct threat
2-58
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Update or create threat models (cant)'
models prior to deployment. Even after deployment,

however, continue to evaluate the threat and update the
threat models as required.
Threatmodels consist of three ,parts:
0 doctrinal templates;
0 a description of preferred tactics and options; and,
0 -an identification of type high value targets.
An effective technique for recording threat'modelsis~ to

use the target spread sheet format (see Figure Z-10).
Each part of the threat model is discussed in detail
below.
-
Platoons E&E on
preplanned routes
3
*k A( J Approximately 10 to 20v
?::?S5:S& .->:-:$:-;.-:-: guerillas open fire on
iyJ^Lead" vehicle' is*
:;g;>:;>destroyed by
^S$:cmd-detonated
x&z^frig^fSffiear vehicle
>:^K::>>X>:?^<x destroyed
reinforcing
HN/US troops
....*Im*I.
Antipersonnel mines and booby traps have been established on the
0 natural survivability positions to kill HN/US troops seeking cover.
Figure 2-11. Doctrinal templates depict the enemys normal or preferred tactics.
2-59
FM 34-130 c
How to do it (cant)
Update or create threat models (cant)
Doctrinal templates
Doctrinal Temolates:
Doctrinal templates illustrate the deployment pattern I
and disposition preferred by the threat's normal
tactics when not constrained by the effects of the
battlefield environment. They are usually scaled I
graphic depictions of threat dispositions for a
particular type of standard operation, such as a
battalion movement to contact, an insurgent ambu'sh, or
a terrorist kidnapping. Figure 2-11 shows one such d
doctrinal template.
Construct doctrinal templates through an analysis of r
the intelligence data base and an evaluation of the
threat's past operations. Determine how the threat
normally organizes for combat and how he deploys and i
employs his units and the various battlefield
operating system (BOS) assets. Look for patterns in
task organization of forces, timing, distances,
relative locations, groupings, or use of the terrain I
or weather. Focus on major elements as well as
individual high value targets.
Even unconventional operations lend themselves to
graphic depiction. For example, an evaluation of the
database might indicate that when.robbing banks the
i
threat always sends four guerrillas inside with at
least two remaining outside. The four who move inside
the bank usually take up positions at distinct
locations within the bank. This type of information i
can easily be converted into a graphic representation,
although not necessarily to a standard map scale.
I
Doctrinal templates can ~also portray the threat's
normal organization for combat, typical supporting
elements available from higher commands, frontages,
depths, boundaries, engagement areas, objective I
depths, and other, control measures. Whenever
possible, convert these patterns into graphic
representations such as overlays or sketches.
2-60
i
1
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Doctrinal templates (cant)
Doctrinal templates are tailored to the needs of the

unit or staff section creating them. For example, a
division G2 creates a template that differs in scope
from that constructed by a battalion 52; the template
constructed by an electronic warfare section differs
drastically from that constructed by an air defense
unit. An air defense doctrinal template, for example,
would include a description of normal strike package
compositi~on, altitudes, time spacing between groups dP~
aircraft; etc.
Some doctrinal templates consider the threat unit or
force as a whole, while others focus on a single
battlefield operating system such as intelligence or
fire support.
Descriotion of Tactics and Ovtions:
The threat model includes a description of the
threat's preferred tactics. It addresses the
operations of the major units or elements portrayed on
the template and the activities of the different
battlefield operating systems. It also contains a
listing or description of the options available to the
threat should the operation fail (branches), or
subsequent operations if it succeeds (sequels).
Even if the threat's preferred tactics can be depicted
graphically, the threat model includes a description.
This allows the template to become more than a
"snapshot in time" of the operation being depicted.
It aids in mentally wargaming the operation over its
duration during the development of threat courses of
action and situation templates.
Like the template itself, you develop the description
of the threat's tactics and options from an evaluation
of his doctrine and past or current operations.
Include a description of the branches and sequels
normally available to or preferred by the threat
should the depicted operation succeed or fail. For
example, the threat might prefer to follow successful
2-61
I
FM 34-130 I
Evaluate the threat (cant) r

How to do it (cant)
Description of tactics and options (cant)
attacks with pursuit. Should an attack begin to fail

his preferred branches might include committing I
reserves, reinforcement, or shifting the main effort.
Should the attack fail, his preferred sequel might be
a hasty defense.
If the database reveals any decision criteria that
cause the threat to prefer one option over another,
include that in the description. This information - i
will aid in wargaming threat and friendly courses of
action, targeting, and deception planning.
I
Techniques:
0 Time event charts describe how the threat normally
I
conducts an operation. For example, while it is
difficult to depict a large scale air operation
graphically, the time relationship between the
various echelons and their normal composition can I
easily be described in a time event chart,
narrative, or matrix format.
i
0 Marginal notations on the graphic template are an
effective technique, especially when the notes are
tagged to key events or positions on the
template. For example, marginal notes might I
describe the insurgent's normal reactions to
friendly reinforcements during their conduct of an
ambush (see Figure 2-11). I
0 A BOS synchronization matrix depicts the threat's

1*SOP8v in matrix form. See Chapter 3 for some i
examples.
Hioh Value .Tarcrets: :i
I
Assets that the threat commander requires for the
successful completion of the mission depicted and
described on the template are high value targets
W'T) .
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FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
High value targets (cant)
Identify WJT from an evaluation of the database, the

doctrinal template, its supporting narrative, and the
use of tactical judgement. Develop the initial list
of HW by mentally wargaming: and thinking through the
operation under consideration.
,.
For example, while mentally wargaming an enemy air
attack against friendly targets supported by a well
prepared air defense system, it is logical to assume
that the enemy will need a substantial air defense
suppression package as part of the strike force. In
such a case, threat aircraft commonly used in such a
role become high value targets.
Identify assets which are key to executing the primary
operation. Also identify any assets which are key to
satisfying decision criteria or initial adoption of
the branches and sequels listed in the description and
option statements.
After identifying the set of HVT, rank order them with
regard to their relative worth to the threat's
operation and record them as part of the threat
model.
As you identify key assets, group them into one of the
13 categories used to develop target sets. These 13
categories are--
0 Command, control and communications;
0 Fire support (includes target acquisition assets,
ammunition, aircraft, fire direction control,
etc.);
0 Man,euver;
0 Air defense (includes radars, processing centers
and headquarters);
0 Engineer;
0 NBC (includes support elements and weapons);
0 REC (radio electronic combat or EW assets);
0 Bulk fuels (storage and refueling assets);
0 Ammunition storage sites and distribution points;
0 Maintenance and repair units (includes collection
points and mobile repair facilities);
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FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Update or create threat models (cant).
0 LOC (lines of communication-- roads, bridges,

railheads, transloading iacilfties, airfields,
choke points, etc.).
In a pinch, you can annotate the identified HVTs in
the margins of the doctrinal.template. When fully
developed, high value target evaluations take the form
of target relative value matrices (see Figure 2-12):
Target value matrices give a measure of the relative-
worth of targets, the rationale behind an attack on
each type of target, and the resulting effects on the
operation. See FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process, for
a complete discussion.
..~_~~-~~~~~- -.
I
D Command centers
i , coordinate move and
commitment of reserves.
S D L
Central FS centers nearby.
R E I
U L M TARGET SET
P A I
T Y T LOC allow rapid move of
reserves and continued
resuppty.
FS
MANEUVER Reserve units critical to
uccess of defense.
ADA
ENGINEER
R1STA FS masses fires to assist
defense and commitment
REC of reserves.
NUKE/CHEMICAL
CLASS 111 POL Acquire deep targets to
disrupt friendly attack.
CLASS V AMMO
CLASS IX MAINT
Stockpiles vulnerable,
UFT
important for continued
LOC anti-armor and FS fires.
Figure 2-12. A complete threat model iqentifres HV 1 s.
2-64
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
As always, tailor IPB to your needs by concentrating

on potential HVT important to your command or mission
area. For example, an ADA unit's evaluation of HVT
might concentrate on distinguishing between the
relative HVT worth of one type of aircraft over
another. A counterintelligence analysis section might
focus on the relative HVT worth of one type of
intelligence collector or 'discipline over another.
Additionql Considerations
0 You use all of the available intelligence sources to
update~and refine threat models. The most useful are
the Order of Battle (OB) files. Order of Battle files
contain the details which allow you to reach
conclusions about the threat's operations,
capabilities and weaknesses. The OS factors that
structure the OB files are:
0 Composition;
0 Disposition;
0 Strength;
0 Tactics or modus operandi (including habitual
operating areas for unconventional warfare forces,
gangs, insurgencies, etc.);
Training status;
Logistics;
Effectiveness;
Electronic technical data;
Miscellaneous data (personalities, pseudonyms,
etc.).
0 Create an order of battle file for each threat unit
you are. concerned with. Comparing the doctrinal norm .
with the files on each unit will indicate that most
vary from the standard. Types of equipment as well as
organization, training status, etc., may differ. As
much as possible, the threat models should portray the
unit you are evaluating, not just the doctrinal norm.
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FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
0 As time permits, continuously update the OB files as

you develop intelligence during the processing phase
of the intelligence cycle. Do not wait until staff
planning begins to conduct.the analysis. A common
technique is to maintain a set,of threat models under
the "tactics" or "modus operandi" tab of each OB file.
0 Consider the various order ,of battle factors and their
relationship when conducting the evaluation and
updating the threat models. For example, how'do ._
direct. fire weapon ranges and the threat's preferred
size and location of engagement areas and battle
positions relate? If he increases his direct fire
weapons system range will he move his engagement areas
further from his battle positions, or make the
engagement areas larger? If he improves the range of
his artillery systems will he employ them further to
his own rear, or use the extra range to engage deeper
targets? If his air defense capability improves will
he reduce the number of ADA assets in each unit?
0 The OB factors are not independent of each other; they
are closely related - consider them as a whole. For
example, changes in training status, command
personality, strength, or any other of the OB factors
may affect the tactics of a unit at a given time.
0 The OB factors form a framework for evaluation of any
force, not just those that are strictly military. For
example, when considering composition during a
counterdrug operation you might include an analysis of
extended family ties of suspected'traffickers. In
evaluating an insurgent force, you would include an
analysis of the insurgent political structure and its
relationship to the military elements.
0 Tailor evaluation of the OB factors to your unit
needs. For example, an aviation unit's evaluation of
composition would focus more heavily on those units
that contained air defense assets. Its evaluation of
equipment would focus on the vulnerabilities of likely
threat targets as well as the technical
characteristics of the threat's air defense systems.
,
2 - 6 6
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
0 Consider not only the threat's physical capability,

based on organization and equipment strength, but also
his normal modus operandi,. tactical doctrine, and
state of training. This requires an understanding of
the art and science of war aswell as current
knowledge of the threat. Ensure that you update the
historical data bases with current observations
whenever possible. For ex,ample, in scenario three of
chapter three of this manual, the S2 uses three
reports of recent insurgent ambushes to create a
threat model depicting an insurgent ambush (see Figure
3-3-12).
0 A useful technique in understanding how threat forces

conduct operations is to first gain an understanding
for how your own force conducts them. Then compare
and contrast the threat's normal approach to the same
operations. The OB factors form the framework for
this evaluation. Another useful framework is the
battlefield operating systems (BOS-see glossary).
0 For a full discussion of the analytical techniques
used in constructing threat models see FMs 34-3, 34-7,
34-40(S) and 34-60.
IDENTIFY THREAT CAPABILITIES
Threat capabilities are the broad courses of action, and
supporting operations, which the threat can take to
influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
They take the form of statements such as--
0 "The enemy has the capability to attack with up to 8
divisions supported by 170 daily sorties of fixed wing
aircraft."
0 "The enemy can establish a prepared defense by
14 May."
0 "The enemy has the ability to insert up to 2
battalions of infantry in a single lift operation."
0 "The drug smugglers have the capability to detect the
radars used at our observation posts."
.
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m
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Identify threat capabilities (cant)
0 "The threat can conduct up to three separate smuggling

operations simultaneously."
0 "The protesters can effectively block traffic at no
more than 7 different intersections."
There are generally four tactical courses of action open
to military forces in conventional operations:
0 attack;
0 defend;
0 reinforce; and,
0 conduct a retrograde.
Each of these broad courses of action can be divided into
a variety of more specific courses of action. For
example, an attack may be an envelopment, a penetration,
or other variations of an attack. A retrograde movement
may be a delaying action, a withdrawal, or a retirement
(see glossary).
1
Other capabilities include support to broad courses of
action or specific types of operations. Examples of these
types of capabilities are-- r
0 Use of NBC weapons;
0 Use of supporting air assets; i
0 Intelligence collection;
0 Electronic warfare;
0 Engineering operations;
0 Air assault or airborne operations; 1
0 Amphibious assaults;
0 Riverine operations;
0 Psychological operations; i
0 Decepti.on operations;
0 etc.
At other levels of war and during operations other than
war you will consider other types of operations and broad
courses of action. In any case, start with the full set
of threat models and consider the threat's ability to
conduct each operation based on the current situation.
2 - 6 8
FM 34-130
HOW to do it (cant)
Most situations will not present the threat with the ideal
conditions envisioned by his doctrine and TTP. He will
usually be under-strength in terms of personnel or
equipment. He may be short of logistical support. He may
not enjoy air superiority. His troops may be
inexperienced or poorly trained. As a result, the
threat's actual capabilities usually will not mirror the
ideal/capabilities represented by the complete set of
threat models. For example,--
0 The threat's doctrine may call for penetration att&ks
whenever possible. Your evaluation of his current
strength, however, may indicate that the threat lacks
the force ratio he normally considers adequate for a
penetration attack.
0 A terrorist group's normal tactics may call for the
use of car bombs or similar devices to tie down
emergency services while they conduct raids in other
parts of town. Your evaluation of the threat's
current logistics status, however, might indicate a
critical shortage of explosive materials.
Additional considerations
0 Use all available intelligence sources in the
evaluation of the threat's current situation. FOCUS
on the effects each incident or fact has on threat
capabilities rather than simply enumerate details.
2-69
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
I
0 Use the OB files for the particular threat force you
are evaluating. Most forces differ from the ideal
portrayed in threat doctrine or tables of organization 7
and equipment. They may be equipped or organized d
differ,ently, train for special.missions, or have a
particular record of combat experiences that give them
a u.nique set, of capabilities. r
0 In addition to identifying actual threat capabilities,
the evaluation may identify additional threat '-~ r
strengths or vulnerabilities caused by the current
situation. Ensure you incorporate them into the
threat models, the intelligence estimate, and the
threat courses of action you develop in the next step i
of the IPB process.
0 Consider the threat's ability to operate in darkness I
or adverse weather. This is more than the technical
capability of selected items of threat equipment. For
example, the threat's tank fleet may be equipped with
the latest in night vision devices but the supporting i
infantry and other arms may not be.
0 Also consider training levels. A force that i
frequently trains in night combat may have a better
capability for such operations than a better equipped
force that seldom trains at night. A force that has
never trained in large scale troop movements may have
a limited capability to conduct large offensive
maneuvers.
i
0 Consider the time element when evaluating
capabilities. For example, the threat's forces may be
currently dispersed to the point where he is not i
capable of offensive action. Given time, however, he
can mas.s his forces. Similarly, the threat's current
logistical stockage may permit offensive operations i
for only a limited amount of time before his
stockpiles are exhausted.
r
2-70
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
0 When time or some other~factor is a critical element

in a threat capability ensure that you state it
explicitly. For example,--
"The enemy has the capability to attack to seize
objectives no deeper than 'the line
SOCHATON-MESSVILLE due to insufficient fuel
reserves. 'I
"The enemy has the capability to attack after
repositioriing major elements of the IV Army. -
Current dispositions preclude an attack before
9 July."
"The insurgents will have the manpower they need
to conduct offensive action once the harvest is
completed."
Do not limit the threat models and evaluation of capabilities
to the strictly military forces of the threat. Student
rioters during a NE0 operation, for example, are a threat to
the friendly mission. Evaluate them using all the techniques
described in this section.
Like all other parts of the IPB process, tailor the evaluation
to your particular needs. A counterintelligence analysis
section, for example, focuses on the threat's intelligence
collection capabilities, and level I and II threats. Signal
units focus on the ability of the threat to disrupt friendly
communications.
Disseminate the results of evaluating the,threat as widely as
possible. This allows other staff sections and units to
include them in their own IPB process. For example, the
doctrinal templates produced by a division will be refined bye
subordinate battalions to include a greater degree of detail.
Templates produced by a G2 or 52 section will be modified by
other staff sections, possibly to highlight specific
battlefield operating systems in more detail, such as air
defense assets.
2-71
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
In addition to distributing threat models, disseminate the

results of evaluating the threat's capabilities, strengths and
vulnerabilities. The traditional means of disseminating the
evaluation is the intelligence estimate, but always use the
means best suited to the situation. The graphics that make up
the threat model might best be delivered by courier. You can
also deliver other parts of the evaluation by voice
communications or over automated systems.
For a full discussion of the analytical techniques used in-
evaluating the' threat see--
0 FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis;
0 FM 34-7, IEW Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations;
0 FM 34-40(S), Electronic Warfare Operations (U);
0 FM 34-60, Counterintelligence.
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Definition:
The identification and development 'of likely threat
courses of action that will influence accomplishment of
the friendly mission.
A Short ExamDle:
A Boer S2 tells his commander, "Sir, the enemy platoon
leader's likely
. objective is to retain control of the only
crossing point suitable for wheeled traffic over the
Silliaasvogel River. He can defend the crossing, known as
Duffer's Drift, with his 50 soldiers in any one of the
following ways:
(1) "He can leave it undefended until tomorrow (being
inexperienced and thinking that we'will not arrive
until the next day);
2-72
FM 34-130
Determine threat courses of action (COnt)
What is it? (cant)
(2) "He can dig his platoon into a small enclosure just on
the other side of the drift. A variant of this COA
would be for him to establish a trenchline astride the
main road;
(3) "He can occupy and fortify the Xraal village that
overlooks the drift;
(4) "He can occupy the river bed itself with only a small
outpost in the Kraal village. This goes against every
canon in British doctrine, however, we must consider.
this COA because it is so dangerous to the
accomplishment of our mission.
"Sir, I think the platoon leader will adopt one of these
COAs, in order of probability as I gave them. We need to
conduct reconnaissance of the riverbed and the Kraal in
order to find out which of these COAs he has chosen."
(Note: The Defence of Duffer's Drift, by MG Sir Ernest
Swinton, is a classic vignette illustrating the proper use
of tactics, IPB, and the practical application of
doctrine)
Desired End Effect:
Replicate the set of COAs that the threat commander and
staff are considering.
Identify all COAs that will influence the friendly
command's mission.
Identify those areas and activities that when observed
will discern which COA the threat commander has chosen.
The staff uses the resulting threat courses of action, along

with other facts and assumptions about the battlefield
environment, to drive the wargaming process and develop
friendly courses of action.
2-73
FM 34-130
Determine threat courses of action (cant)
So what? (cant)
Success Results in: i
The friendly commander and staff will avoid being

surprised with an unanticipated threat action. i
You will be able to quickly narrow:the set of possible

threat courses of action to the one he has chosen.
a
You will~fail to identify which of the possible courses- of
action then threat has chosen, leading to surprise of the
friendly command.
c
How to Do it:
0 Identify the threat's likely objectives and.desired end

state.
1
0 Identify the full set of courses of action available to
the threat.
0 Evaluate and prioritize each course of action. i
0 Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time

allows. i
0 Identify initial collection requirements

Each of these steps is discussed below.
IDENTIFY THE THREAT'S LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND DESIRED END STATE
Start with the threat command at least one level above
your own and identify likely objectives and the,desired
end state. As you identify the likely objectives at each m
level of command, repeat the process for the next
subordinate level, working down to two levels below your
own command. Ensure that each levels objective will
accomplish the likely objectives and desired end state of ti
its parent commands.
2-74
~,~
FM 34-130
i
How to do it (cant)
Identify the threat's likely objectives and
desired end state
0 The situation may require you to start at more than
one level above your command, particularly in
operations other than war. "
0 Only in rare cases will you have the intelligence you
need to state the threat's objectives and intended end
state as facts. You will usually state them ,as
assumptions. As with all assumptions, ensure that-you
discuss them with the commander and the remainder of
the staff. Ensure that you identify assumptions as
such.
0 Especially during operations other than war it is
important that you consider more than the conventional
objectives of terrain or friendly forces. This is
also true at higher levels of command where the
threat's political and economic objectives have a
direct influence on his courses of action.
0 Terrain related objectives (intermediate and final)
often focus on key terrain features. Force related
objectives usually focus on reserve forces.
0 Even during defensive operations the threat will have
objectives, such as retain control of a piece of
terrain, defeat or delay a friendly force, etc. YOU
must also identify likely counterattack objectives
such as terrain features or friendly reserve forces.
0 It is possible that the threat's intent and objectives
may not interfere with the accomplishment of the
friendly mission. This is more likely during
operati'ons other than war.
IDENTIFY THE FULL SET OF COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE
THREAT
To ensure that you consider the full set of courses of
action available to the enemy you must at least consider--
0 The courses of action the threat's doctrine believes
appropriate to the current situation and the likely
2-75
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant) m
Identify the full set of courses of action
available to the threat (cant)
objectives you have identified. This requires an in

depth understanding of the.threat*s decision making
process as well as an appreciation for how he i
perceives the current situation.
0 The threat courses of action which could significantly /
influence your command's mission, even if the threat's
doctrine considers them infeasible or @*sub-optimum"
under current conditions. Consider any indirect or-. i
"wildcard" courses of action that the threat is
capable of executing.
0 The threat courses of action indicated by recent m
activities and events. To avoid surprise from an
unanticipated course of action consider all possible
explanations for the threat's activity in terms of 1
possible courses of action.
Consider each sub-set of courses of action independently
to avoid forming biases that restrict the analysis and
evaluation. Once you have evaluated each sub-set
separately, combine them to eliminate redundancy and minor
variations. Compare the consolidated list to threat i
capabilities you identified in step three of the IPB
process and eliminate any courses of action which the
threat is incapable of executing. r
Based on the evaluation of the threat's capabilities (step
three of the IPB process) select threat models that will
accomplish the threat's likely objectives. Examine how ti
the effects of the battlefield (from step two of the IPB
process) influence their application as courses of action
(see Figure 2-13). You will usually find that terrain,
weather, and other characteristics of the battlefield
environment "offer" a limited set of COAs, encouraging
some while discouraging others. r
Start with the general courses of action open to the

threat, such as deliberate attack, hasty attack, defend,
and delay. Further define each general COA as a set of
specific courses of action by integrating the threat
2-76
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
models from step three of the IPB process with the

description of the battlefield's effects from step two.
Factors to consider include--
0 The threat's intent or desired end state.
0 Likely attack or counterattack objectives.
0 Effects of the battlefield.environment on operations
and broad courses of action.
0 Threat vulnerabilities or shortages in equipment or
personnel.
0 Current dispositions.
0 Location of main and supporting efforts.
0 Threat.perception of friendly forces.
0 Threat efforts to present an ambiguous situation or
achieve surprise.
Refine each broad course of action statement into a set of
specific courses of action. For example, a general course
of action such as "hasty attack I1 might be further defined
as a set of specific courses of action such as "with main
effort in the east....in the west . . ..against the adjacent
unit."
Criteria for Courses of Action
Each threat course of action you identify should meet
five criteria: suitability, feasibility,
acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with
doctrine.
Suitability:
A threat course of action must have the potential
for accomplishing the threat's likely objective or
desired end state. If the course of action is
successfully executed will it accomplish the
threat's objectives?
Feasibility:
Consider the time and space required to execute
the course of action. Are they available?
.
2-77
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Criteria for courses of action (cant)
i
Consider the resources required to execute the

course of action. Does the threat have the
physical means required to make it a success?
Occasionally force ratios or other factors might
,. indicate that the threat lacks the means to
accomplish his likely objectives. Before
discounting the threat completely, consider al&
actions he might take to create the conditions
needed for success. For example, he might conduct
economy of force operations in some sectors in
order to generate sufficient combat power for I
offensive operations in others. His lack of
resources might force him to violate his own
doctrine in order to accomplish his objective.
What seemingly radical measures can he take to
create the conditions for success? Avoid
surprise.
Acceptability:
Consider the amount of risk involved. Will threat
forces accept the amount of risk entailed in
adopting the course of action? Can they afford
the expenditure of resources for an uncertain
chance at success? This is obviously a subjective I
judgment based on knowledge of the threat and his
doctrine. In some instances, the threat might
undertake otherwise unfavorable courses of action, 3
particularly if they are the only means to
accomplishing his objective.
Uniquen.ess:
Each threat course of action must be significantly
different from the others. Otherwise, consider it i
as a variation rather than a distinct course of
action. Factors to consider in determining if a
course of action is "significantly" different are: II
o Its effect on the friendly mission;
o Use of reserves or second echelon; r
i
2-78
li
FM 34-130
Determine threat courses of action (COnt)
HOW to do it (cant)
Criteria for courses of action (cant)
0 Location of main effort;

o Scheme of maneuver;
o Task organization.
This is obviously a subjective judgement based on
: your experience and training.
Consistency with Doctrine:
Each threat course of action must be consistent
with the threat's doctrine. Base the evaluation
of consistency on the threat's written doctrine
and observations of his past application of
doctrine, as revealed in the intelligence
database. Do not, however, overlook threat
efforts to achieve surprise by deviating from
known doctrine or using l@wildcardl' courses of
action.
Additional Considerations
0 Account for the effect of friendly dispositions, or
the threat's perception of friendly dispositions, when
determining the COAs the threat believes are
available. A technique for accomplishing this is to
conduct "reverse IPB." In other words, replicate the
process that the threat is employing to discern
friendly COAs.
0 Focus on those courses of action that will affect
accomplishment of your command's mission. This
obviously includes those threat COA that will
interfere with the command's mission. If there are
indications that the threat might adopt a COA that
favors accomplishment of your command's mission,
include it as well. This prepares the commander to
take advantage of opportunities that might arise. For
example,
2-79
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
if the friendly command's mission is to attack to

destroy the threat, threat courses of action that
would interfere with the friendly mission are:
defend, including counterattacks; reinforce; and,
withdraw.
If your command's mission is to attack to seize a
terrain objective, threat courses of action that
could interfere with the mission are: def,end,.
including counterattacks; and, reinforce. Threat
withdrawal would favor accomplishment of the
friendly mission and would also be included in the
set of probable courses of action if there were
indications the threat might actually withdraw.
0 It is possible for the threat to have objectives and
choose courses of action which will not interfere with
success of your command's mission.
0 Identify the full set of courses of action available
to the threat. History repeatedly demonstrates that
those who predict only one COA are often surprised by
the enemy.
0 Do not overlook the less likely but still viable
courses of action. Do not risk surprise by failing to
take the time to consider all feasible courses of
action. Identify alternative methods by which the
threat can achieve his objective or desired
end-state. Consider the following possibilities that
might lead to "wildcard" courses of action:
Superior understanding of "other characteristics
of the battlefield" (politics in particular),
Ignorance of the military arts and sciences,
Immature decision-making,
Uncertainty as to friendly disposition or intent,
Unexpected objectives or desired end-states,
Desperation,
Bureaucratic inefficiency, and
Audacity.
2-80
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Onthe other hand, avoid developing a "ful18' set of

COAs by including bogus options.
0 For a,complete discussion of methods used to construct
courses of faction (friendly or threat) refer to
FM, lOl-5, Command and Control for Commanders and
Staffs.
EVALUATE AND PRIORITIZE EACH COURSE OF ACTION
The resulting set of courses of action depicts the full
set of options available to the threat. Remember that the
threat COAs you identify are assumptions about the threat,
not facts. Because of this you cannot predict with
complete accuracy which of the COAs the threat will
employ.
However, the commander and his staff still need to develop
a plan that is optimized to one of the courses of action,
while still allowing for contingency options if the threat
chooses another COA. Therefore, you must evaluate each
COA and prioritize it according to how likely you estimate
it is that the threat will adopt that option. Establish
an initial priority list to allow the staff to plan for
friendly courses of action. Once the commander selects a
friendly course of action, you may need to reorder the
list of threat courses of action. Consider especially any
changes in the threat's perception of friendly forces.
To prioritize each course of action:
0 Analyze each COA to identify its strengths and
weaknesses, centers of gravity, and decisive points.
0 Evaluate how well each COA meets the criteria of
suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and
consistency with doctrine (see above).
0 Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the
battlefield environment. How does the battlefield
encourage or discourage selection of each COA?
.
2-81
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant) m
Evaluate and prioritize each course of action (cant)
I
0 Compare each COA to the others and determine if the
threat is more likely to prefer one over the others.
Most forces will choose the COA that offers the
greatest advantages while minimizing risk. d
0 Consider the possibility that the threat may choose
the second or third "best" COA while attempting a
deception operation portraying acceptance of the
l'best" COA.
i
0 Analyze the threat's recent activity to determine if
there are indications that one COA is already being
adopted. Does his current disposition favor one COA
over others?
Use judgment to rank the threat's courses of action in
their likely order of adoption. Modify the list as needed
to account for changes in the current situation. For
example, the ~initial priority order of threat courses of
action does not account for the friendly course of action,
since one has not yet been selected. Friendly
dispositions may change as the command moves to adopt its
own COA. How will that change the likelihood of each
threat COA? Given time, you could develop several 1
different versions of the prioritized list of threat
courses of action: a different order for each potential
friendly course of action. Alternatively, after the ai
commander has selected the friendly course of action,
reprioritize the initial list of threat courses of action
to reflect changed friendly dispositions and activities.
i
DEVELOP EACH COURSE OF ACTION IN THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL TIME
ALLOWS
i
Once you have identified the complete set of threat COAs
develop each course of action into as much detail as the
situation requires and time available allows. Base the
order in which you develop each COA on its probability of i
adoption and the commander's guidance. To ensure
completeness, each course of action must answer five
questions: G
o What - the type of operation, such as attack, defend,
etc.
.
2-82
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Develop each course of action in the amount of
detail time allows (cant)
o When - the time the action will begin. You usually

state this in terms of the earliest time that the
threat can adopt the course of action under
consideration.
o Where - the sectors, zones, axis of attack, avenues of
approach and objectives that make up the course of
action.
o HOW - the method by which the threat will employ hiss
assets, such as dispositions, location of main effdrt
and the scheme of maneuver.
o Why - the objective or end-state the threat intends to
accomplish.
Consider threat forces available to at least one level of
command above your own when developing each course of
action. For example, a battalion S2 would consider the
courses of action available to threat regiments and
brigades. This helps to ensure that you account for
possible reinforcing forces and the higher command's own
objectives and intent.
Time permitting, the final product should consist of a
comprehensive, detailed set of threat courses of action.
Work to a degree of resolution at two levels of command
below your own. For example, a brigade S2 would depict
the missions and actions of threat battalions and
companies in the threat courses of action he develops.
Each developed threat course of action has three parts:
0 a situation template,
0 a description of the course of action, and
0 a listing of high value targets.
Situation Temalate:
Situation templates are graphic depictions of expected
threat dispositions should he adopt a particular
course of action. They usually depict the most
critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the
G2 and G3. However, you might prepare several
2-83
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Develop each course of action in the.amount of
Situation template (cant)
templates representing different "snapshots in time"

starting with the threat's initial array of forces.
These are useful in depicting points where the threat
might adopt branches or sequels to the main course of
action, places where the threat is especially
vulnerable, or other key-points in the battle such as
initial contact with friendly forces. Y,ou ,use
situation templates to support staff wargaming and
develop event templates.
To construct a situation template, begin with the
threat model representing the operation under
consideration. Overlay the doctrinal template on the
products that depict the battlefield environment's
effects on operations. Typically, the product of
choice is the modified combined obstacle overlay, but
this may vary with the situation.
&
ENEMYSOP
FOR FIGHTING
(Doctrinal template)
ENVIRONMENT
(Weather, terrain,
population, etc.)
i---L
ENEMY COAs
(Situation templates)
Figure 2-13. Consider the effects of the env-r nment on the enemys
doctrine to develop enemy &~As.
2-84
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Using your judgment and knowledge of the threat's

preferred tactics and doctrine as depicted in the
threat model, adjust the dispositions portrayed on the
doctrinal template to account 'for the battlefield
environment's effects. Obviously, there will be many
options available. Attempt to view the situation from
the point of view of the threat commander when
selecting from among them.
Check.the situation template to ensure that you have
accounted for all of the threat's major assets, and
that none have been inadvertently duplicated.
Ensure that the template reflects the main effort
identified for this course of action. Compare the
depicted dispositions to the threat's known doctrine;
check for consistency. Consider the threat's desire
to present an ambiguous situation and achieve
surprise.
Include as much detail on the situation template as
the time and situation warrant. For example, if the
threat is defending, identify the likely engagement
areas, reinforcing obstacle systems, and counterattack
objectives that form part of his defensive course of
action.
Next, using the description of preferred tactics that
accompanies the doctrinal template as a guide, think
through the course of action's scheme of maneuver.
Attempt to visualize how the threat will transition
from his current positions to those depicted on the
template.
Mentally wargame the schema of maneuver from the
positions depicted on the template through to the
course of action's success or failure. Evaluate time
and space factors to develop time phase lines
depi,cting threat movement. Draw time phase lines on
the template to depict the expected progress of
attacking forces, the movement of reserves or
counterattacking forces, and the movement of forces in
the deep and rear battle areas.
2-85
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Base time-phase lines on the threat's doctrinal rates

of movement, with some modification. Evaluate actual
movement r~ates, as revealed in the database, with
written doctrine. Consider the effects of the
battlefield environment on mobility. If contact with
friendly forces is expected, mentally wargame the
effects this will have on the threat's speed as well.
.~
When-placing time phase lines consider only the time
it will take to adopt movement formations, time to
conduct movement to the selected location, and time
for the unit to close after arrival. This assumes
.xx
c-
r-. \ .,. [MS
c- <J3
c-
a
c-
c-
AP
c- <5
-
Figure 2-l 4. Situation templates depict enemy COA.
.
2 - 8 6
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
that time consuming planning, issuance of orders,

reconnaissance, and logistical preparations may occur
during movement.
During staff wargaming of the situation templates
against potential friendly.courses of action, update
time phase lines to consider when threat movement will
be triggered or how they might be influenced ,by
friendly actions.
Prepare as many graphics as necessary to depict the
course of action in enough detail to support staff
wargaming and collection planning. For example, a
course of action may begin as a movement to contact,
transition to a hasty attack, followed by pursuit
operations that include a river crossing. Each of
these phases may require a separate template.
Tailor the situation templates to your needs by
focusing on the factors that are important to the
commander or mission area. For example, the situation
might focus only on the threat's reconnaissance assets
when determining and developing threat courses of
action. The situation templates you produce might
show only the location and movement routes of these
assets, their likely employment areas, and their
likely areas of interest. An aviation unit, for
example, might develop situation templates that depict
details such as specific radar and weapon locations
and their range fans or areas of coverage.
At higher echelons the situation templates will
usually;focus on culminating points and installations
or activities associated with centers of gravity
rather than specific military units.
Some situation templates are better presented in a
matrix format. Figure 2-15, for example, illustrates
a situation template in matrix form that depicts one
threat course of action for an air strike against
friendly targets. The time line indicates spacing
between the various groups as well as the time each
group is expected within each NAI.
2-87
FM 34-130
insert figure 2-15

new illustration
based on B-5 from fm 44-53
Sometimes, situation templates are replaced by other

products, such as a key facilities and targets
overlay. Use whatever technique best graphically
illustrates the threat's courses of action.
Course of Action Description and Ootions:
This is a description of the activities of the forces
depicted on the situation template. It can range from
a narrative description to a detailed "synchronization
matrix" depicting the activities of each unit and
battlefield operating system in detail. It should
address the earliest time the course of action can be
executed, time lines and phases associated with the
COA, and decisions the threat commander will make
during execution of the COA and after. You use the
course of action description to support staff
wargaming and to develop the event template and
supporting indicators.
Start with the description of preferred tactics that
accompanies the doctrinal template. As you mentally
wargame the situation template note when and where you
expect the threat to take certain actions or make
.
2-88
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Course of action description and options (cant)
certain decisions. Record each event into the

description of the course of action. Where possible,
tie each event or activity to time-phase lines or
other 'specific geographical areas on the situation
template. this will help you later when constructing
the event template.
As the threat force approaches decision oroption,
points., record each decision and its time line into-
the CGA description. The description you develop
forms the basis for the development of threat branches
or sequels, should they be necessary to support
friendly planning. Also record any decision criteria
that are associated with each decision point.
Develop the description of the course of action into
as much detail as time and the situation require. Use
whatever tools or techniques best satisfy your needs.
For example, you might use a time event chart or a
simple narrative description. Given enough time, you
might develop an elaborate matrix. See Chapter 3 for
examples.
Regardless of the form initially chosen, the course of
action statement will be refined to greater detail
during the staff wargaming of potential friendly
courses of action.
Hiah Value Taraets:
As you prepare and mentally wargame the situation
template note how and where the threat might employ
the high value targets listed on the doctrinal
template. The relative worth of each HVT target will
vary with the specific situation under consideration,
perhaps even several times during the COA you are
developing.
Using judgment, refine and modify the list of HVT from
the doctrinal template to reflect changes in their
relative worth over the course of the COA under
2-89
34-130
Determine threat courses of action,(cont)
r
How to do it (cant)
consideration. If the relative worth of an HVT varies

by phase of the operation, ensure you make the
appropriate notations. Transfer the updated list to
the situation template. You will use the list to
su,pport staff wargaming and the targeting process.
Note on the situation template any areas where high
value targets must appear or be employed to make the
operation successful. These are potential target
areas of interest and engagement areas. Cross
reference each potential NAI with the description of
the course of action that accompanies the template.
Additional Considerations
0 When considering an attacking threat, less detailed
resolution is required. For example, depending on the
situation, a friendly defending battalion might need
only to work to a level of detail of threat
companies. Considering the possible variations in the
threat's course of action based on the details of
employment of the individual platoons adds a
tremendous amount of effort to the process; perhaps
more than the results will justify.
0 When considering a defending threat, a greater level
of detail might be required. For example, an
attacking battalion might concern itself with
individual anti-tank or crew served weapons
positions. A greater level of detail in resolution is
generally required during hostilities short of war as
well.
0 After developing each course of action in detail you
may need to reprioritize the order of likely
adoption. For example, as you develop a particular
course of action you may discover that a particular
sect.ion of terrain offers only a limited number of
suitable defensive positions or concealed avenues of
approach. This may cause a change in the relative
priority of courses of action using that section of
terrain.
2-90
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
0 The level of command and type of operation has a

direct bearing on the level of detail that goes into
each situation template. For example,---
At tactical levels situation templates sometimes
depict individual vehicles in threat
dispositions. NAIs are often "pin-point"
locations such as road junctions or small unit
battle positions.
At operational levels situation templates might
focus on large reserve formations, major staging
bases and lines of communication. NAIs are often
large dispersal areas, reserve assembly areas, or
logistical support areas.
At strategic levels situation templates might
focus on the shift of large forces from one
theater to another as well as political and
economic developments. NAIs can sometimes
encompass large regions.
IDENTIFY INITIAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
After identifying the set of potential threat courses of
action the initial challenge is to determine which one he
will actually adopt. Initial collection requirements are
designed to help you answer the challenge.
The art of identifying initial collection requirements
revolves around predicting specific areas and activities,
which when observed, will reveal which course of action
the threat has chosen. The areas where you expect key
events to o.ccur are called named areas of interest, or
NAIs. The activities which reveal the selected course of
action are called indicators.
The Event TemDlate
The differences between the NAIs, indicators, and
time-phase lines associated with each course of action
2-91
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Identify initial collection requirements (cant)
Event template (cant)
form the basis of the event template (see

Figure 2-16). The event template is a guide for
collection and R&S planning. It depicts where to
collect the information that will indicate which COA
the threat has adopted.
Evaluate each course of action to identify its
associated NAIs. Mentally wargame execution of the
course of action and note places where activity must
occur.~if that COA is adopted. Pay particular
attention to times and places where the threat's high
value targets are employed or enter areas where they
can be easily acquired and engaged. These areas will
evolve into NAIs in support of targeting. Also
consider places you expect the threat to take certain
actions or make certain decisions, such as the
adoption of a branch plan or execution of a
counterattack.
An NAI can be a specific point, a route, or an area.
They can match obvious natural terrain features or
arbitrary features, such as time phase lines or
engagement areas. Make them large enough to encompass
the activity which serves as the indicator of the
threat's course of action.
Compare and contrast the NAIs and indicators
associated with each COA against the others and
identify their differences. Concentrate on the
differences that will provide the most reliable
indications of adoption of each unique course of
action. Mark the selected NAIs on the event template.
The initial event template focuses only on identifying
which of the predicted courses of action the threat
has adopted. Later, you will update and further
refine the event template and its supporting matrix to
support friendly decisions identified during staff
wargaming.
.
2-92
FM 34-130
SIT TEMPUTE 1
CJ> c_^
SIT TEMPLATE
O o
SIT TEMPLATE
V
cO/ CONSOLIDATED
SIT TEMPLATE
AD
JLNAI 1 fm
f'WAI A /
JAT7 X
v
EVENT TEMPLATE
/ \Hh\
1
^,
Figure 2-l 6. Compare enemy COAe to produce the event template.
2-93
FM 34-130
INDICATORS INDICATORS INDICATORS

THAT WOULD THAT WOULD THAT WOULD WOULD HELP
HELP CONFIRM HELP CONFIRM HELP CONFIRM CONFIRM OTHER
NAI COA1 COA2 C0A3 COAsOFCONCER
1 Air assault forces
2 Air assault forces -
3 Air assault forces Air assault forces
4 Infiltration of tight Inf
5 Light Inf attack NAI 5
Light Inf attack NAI 6

6
7 Light Inf attack NAI 7 Light Inf attack NAI 7

9 Poised to attack Poised to attack TD attacks
10 Poised to attack Poised to attack H Poised to attack TD attacks

abreast
11 Shifts N
12 1 or 2 Bdes attack W
13 1 or 2 Bdes attack S
Figure 2-17. The event martix suppotts the event template.
The Event Matrix

The event matrix supports the event template by
providing details on the type of activity expected in
each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active,
and its relationship to other events on the
battlefield.- Its primary use is in planning
intelligence collection, however, it serves as an aid
to situation development as well (see Figure 2-17).
Examine the events associated with each NAI on the
event template and restate them in the form of
indicators. Enter the indicators into the event
matrix along with the times they are likely to occur.
Use the time-phase lines from the situation template
or the description of the COA to establish the
2-94
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
Identify initial collection requirements (cant)
Event matrix (cant)
expected times in the event matrix. If there is a

"latest-time-information-of-value" time line, based on
the expected flow of events, record it into the event
matrix as a guide for the collection manager.
Refine the event matrix during staff wargaming and the
targeting process.
0 Differences between courses of action are usually
reflected in different NAIs but might also consist
of~different time-phase lines or indicators
associated with a particular NAI.
0 Consider the effects of threat deception attempts
on the reliability of each event as an indicator.
0 NAI for counter-air operations are more similar to
those used in targeting. Their focus is on
locations where threat aircraft are likely to
appear when using particular air avenues of
approach, likely forward support bases, and
forward rearming and refueling points. Generally,
ADA units will cover these NAI with their own
target acquisition assets.
0 During staff wargaming you will help establish a
decision support template that incorporates NAIs
supporting decisions by the commander and the
tracking of high payoff targets. The additional
NAI are developed from potential NAIs identified
on the-situation templates and the results of
decisions made during wargaming of friendly
courses of action.
Threat course of action models drive the wargaming of
potential friendly courses of action. They aid in the
construction of the command's decision support template
and other synchronization tools the staff uses during
mission execution. Disseminate the threat course of
action models as widely as possible. They are the most
.
2-95
:
FM 34-130
How to do it (cant)
useful products in allowing other commands and staff

sections to develop their own more detailed or specialized
threat course of action models.
The event template and matrix, once complete, form the
basis for planning collection strategies, synchronizing
intelligence with friendly operations, and preparation of
the collection plan. In some cases, you might disseminate
the event template in the form of a collection graphic to
support intelligence planning and collection by other
units.
The Abbreviated IPB Process
Many of the steps involved in IPB are time intensive. This is

especially true at the tactical echelons where automated support
for terrain analysis and other functions is not available.
Unfortunately, these echelons generally have less time available
for the IPB process.
Some effective techniques for abbreviating the IPB process
are:
WORK AHEAD
The best solution is to complete asmuch ahead of time as
possible. Establish a series of base products,
particularly those that deal with the battlefield
environment's effects on operations. Keep them updated by
periodic review instead of waiting until receipt of a new
mission.
Keep the databases on the threat as up to date as
possible. As you develop intelligence that indicates
changes or evolution in threat doctrine, change the threat
models to match.
If faced with a number of contingency missions, conduct
periodic reviews to ensure that the base IPB products,
such as descriptions of the battlefield environment and
the threat, are updated at regular intervals.
2-96
FM 34-130
The abbreviated IPB process (cant)
Work ahead (cant)
Become familiar with the support available to you from the

intelligence system of systems. Xnow how to get what you
need when you need it. Think through methods to get
support before, during, and after deployment.
FOCUS ON ESSENTIALS
Consider the general factors of METT-T when starting the
IPB effort, particularly that Of time. Backward plan the
IPB effort. Determine how much time you can devote to
each step of the IPB process. Ensure that thetime liner
allows you to properly support the decision-making
process.
Decide which products you will develop and to what degree
of detail. Focus on the products most important to your
mission. Rather than fully developing one threat course
of action at the expense of all others, identify the full
range of available courses of action. Determine the
degree of detail required and then develop all courses of
action to that level of detail.
Always work in a priority order established by the
commander's intent and needs. If he is particularly
pressed for time, he may specify which courses of action
he wants you to focus on, such as the most likely or the
most dangerous. This implies that you first identify all
courses of action and evaluate them to determine which is
the most likely or most dangerous. You abbreviate the IPB
process by developing in detail only those he has
specified.
STAY OBJECTIVE ORIENTED
The objective of IPB is to help the commander and his
staff put together the best possible plan in the time
available. This requires models of the range of viable
threat courses of action that will influence mission
accomplishment. Supporting the finished plan with
intelligence requires a good event template and matrix.
Everything else is only a means to producing these
essentials.
2-97
FM 34-130
I The abbreviated IPB process (cant)

The minimum essentials
I
THE MINIMUM ESSENTIALS
In a pinch you can get by with just a good set of threat
course of action models and a good event template and I
matrix. To save time and materials, you can combine all
threat course of action models templates and the event
template on a single map overlay or use cartoons and I
sketches as a map substitute.
If you have not yet described the battlefield I
environment's effects, work directly from the map'or a -.
sketch of major terrain features. Start by identifying
the set of threat courses of action and briefly comparing
them to determine which is most likely and which is most i
dangerous, considering the current situation and your
command's mission. Rank the remainder in order of likely
adoption. I
Begin by developing the most dangerous or most likely

threat course of action. In the absence of guidance from
the commander you will have to use your own judgment on
which to do first. Develop the selected course of action
to as much detail as the available time allows before
turning to the other. I
Next, construct an event template that focuses on

identifying which of the two courses of action the threat r
has adopted. Then turn to developing the remaining
courses of action. Work each COA in the priority order
you put them in when evaluating their likelihood of
adoption.
As each COA is finished to the determined degree of
detail, incorporate NAIS associated with it into the event I
template. The initial structuring of the collection
requirements can actually wait until after staff
wargaming. The most important milestone prior to
r
wargaming is to develop the most likely and most dangerous
COAs.
If the most likely COA is also the most dangerous COA,
develop the second most likely or the second most
dangerous COA. NEVER take just one COA into wargaming -
this is not an acceptable way to abbreviate the IPB or
staff planning processes.
2-98
FM 34-130
The abbreviated IPB process (cant)
The minimum essentials (cant)
The single product that results from this approach is a

far cry from the full-blown set of products described in
the first scenario of chapter three. However, the
"one-overlay product," when developed to a quality
standard, has repeatedly proven to be effective on the
battlefield. This is IPB in its most elementary form, and
it proves the strength of the fundamental IPB process.
2-99
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 3'
EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE
PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Basic IPB doctrine can be applied to support planning in any

situation. However, the application of doctrine will vary
according to the circumstances. This.chapter shows application
of the IPB process to four different METT.7T situations.
Four scenarios are used to illustrate the application of IPB
in very different situations.
0 Scenario 1 portrays a heavy division attacking'an _
understrength enemy division (Figure 3-l through
Figure 3-l-38).
0 Scenario 2 portrays a light or heavy brigade defending
against a heavy division (Figure 3-2 through
Figure 3-2-9).
0 Scenario 3 portrays a light infantry battalion in a
counterinsurgency mission (Figure 3-3 through
Figure 3-3-18).
0 Scenario 4 portrays an evacuation of noncombatants by an
infantry brigade (Figure 3-4 through 3-4-12).
Although all four scenarios use the same basic IPB process,
each, one emphasizes different techniques. Combine or discard
these various TTP'to suit the situation with which your command
is faced. Innovate as required. Use the doctrine of IPB in
Chapter 3 to guide you in applying or creating your own TTP. Use
these four scenarios as a source of inspiration; not as the
t*school solution".
::::::::::::::::::::: Scenario One : Division Conventional Offense i.i.ii.i.i~.i.iii.i.iliiii.i.iii!.i.i

iiiiiiilnill~il~liri
As the attacking enemy reaches his culminating point, the

corps prepares to launch a counteroffensive. The corps will .
attack with its main effort in the north. Our division will
conduct a supporting attack in the south, crossing the
Kald River and establishing a hasty defense once it reaches the
corps limit of advance (LOA).
The division is composed of one armored brigade, two
mechanized infantry brigades, one light infantry brigade, and the
normal complement of aviation, artillery, and combat support and
combat service support units.
3-1
.
FM 34-130
The enemy in the division's sector is one understrength

mechanized infantry division. Beyond the limit of advance is the
enemy's second echelon, two armored divisions, also
understrength. An air assault brigade and surface-to-surface
missile units are located in the enemy's depth
(Figure 3-l).
25 X X X/fLOA-------
1 PL wasp
Figure 3-l. Scenario 1, general situation.
3-2
FM 34-130
DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
The operations graphics from corps specify the division's AO. 4
It lies within the current boundaries and extends out to the LOA
fFiaure 3-l-11.
Figure 3-l-l. Operations graphics specify the AO.
3-3
FM 34-130
We establish the AI to include'all 'likely threats to our

mission. We know from previous operations in the. sector now
controlled,by the enemy that the populace's sympathies are
mixed. We define the battlefield environment as including the
civilians within the sector, and their,political sympathies, and
establish the limits of the AI (Figure 3-l-2).
XXX
l * LOA
XX
IM! } v y'/ ''

JL2L. V "N irfenl K<P?^\ i
A^
PLWASP ---I
Figure 3-l -2. Expand the Al to include potential threats affecting friendly COAs.
3-4
FM 34-l :0
DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS

Since the division contains a mix of heavy and light forces,
we must evaluate the effects of the battlefield environment on
both types of forces. We start with the environment's effects on
the mobilitv of the heaw forces (Fiaure 3-1-31.
LEGEND:
^^ - NO-GO **+H*
<^ - SLOW-GO
, _I
Y_-- ______ \------AL.
I LOA
-
Figure 3-13. The combined obstacle overlay depicts effects on mobility.
The engineer (terrain) detachment conducts an analysis of the
various terrain factors that constitute obstacles to movement to
produce a base graphic depicting the environment's effects on
mobility. Because of the availability of logging roads and the
lack'of dense undergrowth, the woods are passable. Some branches
of the river system are fordable and pose no real obstacle to
maneuver. The Kald River, however, is a major obstacle that will
require the division to conduct river crossing operations if the
bridges cannot be taken, intact.
3-5
FM 34-130
To the engineer detachment's base graphic we add any other

characteristics of the battlefield that will affect mobility. In
this case,. it consists of the apparently unrestricted terrain at
(A); which is SEVERELY RESTRICTED due to the presence of a
historic and religious landmark, a 10th century abbey, protected
by international laws and treaties (see Figure 3-l-3).
Using 'the combined obstacle overlay as a base, we identify
mobility corridors between areas of restrictive terrain and
determine the size force they will accommodate. This requires
some basic knowledge of friendly unit frontages during the
attack. Areas which are not restricted are not marked
(Figure 3-l-4). ~_ __. ..-.---~ ~~ -. _~~'~,.
~~~- _
C'Z,, ' ' -
.--__--., -. --.- ~~.___.~~..
Figure314 Mobility corridorssupporting enemy maneuver.
3-6
FM 34-130
We group mobility corridors together to identify heavy force

avenues of-approach-(Figure 3-l-5).
--_.~..-.. -_.-_-..
Figure 3-l-S. Avenues of approach indicate the general

areas through which a force can move.
Although they have already included the effects of current and
expected weather into their analysis, we ask the engineer
(terrain) detachment to evaluate the effects of the worst
possible weather expected during the operation's duration.
3-7
FM 34-130
Based on climatic studies provided'by the supporting Air Force

weather team, the engineers predict that the worst expected
weather would restrict mobility corridors along the river valleys
due to the effect of rain on the soil types in the area
(Figure 3-l-6). By comparing the new ,evaluation with previous
ones (see Figure 3-l-3), we note that these weather conditions
would cause some water features to go from a fordable to an
unfordable condition; requiring a greater need for tactical
bridsins assets.,
- NO-GO
- SLOW-GO
e
+Hm - obstacles
LOA
Figure31-6. Possible effects of weather on mobility.

More significantly, we note that some mobility corridors
become infeasible, causing one avenue of approach to detour
around terrain now classified as SEVERELY RESTRICTED. The avenue
of approach, now less direct than the others, is still viable
although less likely to be used.
We reserve the second overlay for use in the event of poor
weather during-the operation.
3-8
FM 34-130
We next identify defensible terrain along the avenues of

approach (see Figure 3-l-5). We evaluate observation, fields of
fire, concealment and cover and obstacles to identify areas that
offer ootential defensive positions against forces using each
avenue'of approach (Figure-3-l-7).
-
Figure 3-l -7. Defensible terrain along avenues of approach.
3-9
FM 34-130
Using the defensible terrain as likely objectives for the

division's light forces, we evaluate available infiltration
lanes. We look for areas that offer concealment and cover to
dismounted'forces as they approach their likely objectives. Only
the streams offer any obstacles to light forces, and these are
only minor obstacles except during periods of flooding
(Figure 3~1-8). ,,
We include an evaluation of suitable zones of entry. In this
case, we identify potential helicopter landing zones that support
annroaches to, the likely objectives.
_..--. .__- -_ -._ _ -A
+ 6krr) --+ !A&
- >
?- ~.
:.> __
w
-C 3
LEGEND:
^^ - Infiltration lane
| 12 J - Landing zone
-- x x------- _---.----___
LOA
Figure 3-l -8. Approach routes for friendly light intantry.
3-10
FM 34-130
We identify friendly air avenues of approach to the landing

zones and into the enemy's depth for deep battle'attacks
(Figure 3-l-9).
__--
-~
2555 Y. .--.----.--- I /
-s.... xx .----.--- - ---.- _- -....-- ;;t;---
\.1 UUM
rlgure Y-1-9. Friendly air avenues of approach.
3-11
.
FM 34-130
Even though we expect the enemy to defend, we must consider

his avenues of approach as well. These may support
counterattacks or the commitment of additional forces into the
sector (Figures 3-l-10 and 3-1-11).
Figure 3-l-10. Avenues of approach available to the enemy.
3-12
FM 34-130
--_ . -a _ -.-i- --.-..-- ---;$P--.

/
.
xx
E3l.
xxx
llsl
I PL WASP
Figure 3-l-l 1. Avenues of approach for reinforcing and counterattack forces.
3-13
FM 34-130
We also identify the air avenues of' approach available to the

enemy. These will support their defensive operations and their
own deep battle operations in our rear area
(Figure 3-l-12).
v- XXX
XX /
XX / L
1
Bl -^> I
3
LD/LC
I
-.-.-...~---~---__~~~~ ~.~~~ _~ ~-.
PL WASP
Fiaure 3-l-12 Enemv air avenues of aooroach.
3-14
FM 34-130
We have already included the effects of the expected weather

in the terrain analysis. To evaluate the direct effects of
weather on,military operations, we start with identifying
critical values relevant to the situation (Figure 3-1-13).
- -
MISSION AREA OR USE FAVORABLE MARGINAL UNFAVORABLE
IVrobilky (ground) Vi01 mile Vis 0.5 to 1 mile Vls<O.5 mile

Rain ~0.1 inch/hr Rain 0.1 to 0.5 inch/h! Rain SO.5 incNhr
IWect fire target acquisition 1 Vis >2 miles Vis 0.5 to 2 miles ViscO.5 mile
Templl -iO Temp<-10
I4irmobile (K) CIG/vis X100 and CIG/vis 1300 and C$/vis < 200 and l/Z
1 -l/2 miles. 1-i/2 miles but>200
and f/2 mile
No icing or turbulence Moderate icing and
Surface winds Light icing and turbulence
at ~120 knots turbulence
Surface wind > 30
Surface wind> 20 knots
knots but < 30 knots
Night
Jight vision goggles Sky clear Scattered clouds Overcast clouds or
(PVS-5)
PVS-5) and starlight scope Moon>one quarter New moon to one new moon
Elevation > 3oD quarter
Figure 3-l. 3. Critical weather values support weather analysis.
3-15
FN 34-130
We compare the critical values with the forecasted weather to

evaluate its effects on operations. We present the weather's
effects on.operations in a 88forecast style" format that allows
the commander to easily match the weather's predicted effects on
operations (Figure 3-1-14). In this example, he can easily see-
that airmobile operations in the early hours of 8 October will be
hampered by weather and that ground mobility will be hampered *
late that same day. As the staff develops friendly courses of
action they consider this information. ,Por example, in this case
they may plan to make rapid progress before 8 October, and then
use the period of poor mobility conditions to conduct
reconstitution operations. They can-also plan any airmobile
operations around the poor weather forecasted for early
0 October.
MISSION AREA OR USE
NBC
ikORAf3LE (No Shading-Green) UNFAVORABLE (0 -Red) MARGINAL (m -yellow)
-. - ._.
rlgure a-l-14. Weather effects charts and matrices present
the resutts of weather analysis.
3-16
FM 34-130
The commander wants to exploit his technical advantage in

limited visibility target acquisition. Accordingly, we evaluate
predicted light data and the effects of temperature changes and
other weather factors to identify periods that will allow us to
optimize our target acquisition technology (Figure 3-1-15). The
staff incorporates this information into their planning. For
example,, they may time the start of the attack to force major
engagements to take place just after midnight.
,. 2400
1800 0600
1200
Figure 3-l-15. Weather effects on target acquisition.

Focus on specific evaluations as needed.
3-17
FM 34-130
Earlier, we identified the'populace's political sympathies as

a characteristic of the environment likely to have a significant
effect on operations. Here we identify the general political
stance of the major population centers on the battlefield
(Figure 3-1-16). From this analysis we can make conclusions
about areas where rear area units can expect problems with local
civilians. Similarly, it indicates areas where the local '
population might support friendly operations in the enemy's
rear. We can also make deductions about how lines of
communication will be ,affected by refugee'flows. For example, it
is more likely that refugees from pro-friendly areas will move
westward, leaving eastbound roads relatively clear. We can also
identify the pro-enemy town near the line of contact as a risk to
operations security during the division's preparations for .-.
attack, allowing the staff to plan accordingly. Conversely, the
deception planning staff can easily identify the pro-enemy town
as a target for their deception efforts with reasonable assurance
that the enemv has intellioence sources there.
_-, ___ ~
I._._ xx.- _---.--- __----. --- 1----
Figure 3-l -16. Population status overlay.

LOA
3-18
m
FM 34-130
EVALUATE THE THREAT
We start with the common understanding of the battlefield. We

use the SITMAP to determine what we know about the enemy's
dispositions (Figure 3-1-17). Since the enemy has not completed
his shift to a defensive posture, we expect changes in his
disposition.
)A
,__I~i
LOA
Figure 3-l-l 7. The current SITMAP is one tool used in

evaluating the enemys current state.
3-19
FM 34-130
To identify the likely changes, we'examine the other

intelligence holdings to identify how the enemy ugually defends.
We then evpluate his current state to determine his capabilities
to execute his normal or preferred defensive tactics. We are
careful to include available air support and the uncommitted
armored divisions and air assault brigade in our evaluationsi
From the data b&e we extract the threat model that depicts
the enemy's VzypicalB1 defensive operations. We first look at the
typical defending division to get an und@rstanding;for the
overall defensive framework (Figure 3-1-18). We examine current
intelligence reports and determine that the enemy's recent
defensive operations are consistent with the model in the data
base. -.-.--
.x x -
AA
I=
Main
X X
Figure 3-l -18. Dcctrinal template for a defending division.
3-20
FM 34-130
We next examine the typical defending brigade to add greater

detail to the threat model (Figure 3-1-19). We normally work
down two levels, depicting the brigade's subordinate battalions,
even though the data base threat model depicts dispositions down
to company level. We include likely high value targets such as
command posts, the tank platoons, and certain air defense and ',
fire support assets.
..-__ ~~.___ .-~-~-----.~--
I
.
(DAG)
d>
J||l
Figure 3-l -19. Doctrinal template for a defending brigade.
3-21
FM 34-130
The threat model already includes a description of the

"normal" tactics used by the forces depicted on the template. We
check all recent reports of enemy defensive operations against
the model and determine that it needs no changes (Figure 3-l-20).
r - Defense in two echelons with a reseIve.
- Local counterattacks to restore defensive

pasitjons
- Tank t5attafion counterattacks if defense

atllp-mised.
- Detailed and coordinated fire support plan

supporting defense and counterattack.
Failure Options:
- Local counterattacks.
- Counterattack by division reserve.
- Withdraw.
Figure 3-l-20. Use text or a matrix to describe conduct of the COA.
3-22
.
FM 34-130
The threat model also contains a list of assets normally

critical to the operation, in this case defensive'operations.
Since it is based on operations in doctrinally "ideal" conditions
we identify that we will have to modify the list when we develop
enemy courses.of action. In this example, we know that the
enemy's tactical doctrine is built on the assumption of air
superiority. Since he does not currently have air superiority
ADA assets will probably increase in relative value.
(Figure 3-1-21).
D : I Command centers 1
coordinate move and
LDL
I I I I commitment of reserves.
RE I RELATIVE Central FS centers nearby. +
u I L I M I TARGET SET WORTH
PA I
TI Y I T I I LOC allow raoid move of
resuppty.
FS
MANEUVER Reserve units critical to
*+!--I success of defense. j
AHA
ENGINEER
RISTA FS masses fires to assist
REC of reserves.
NUKE/CHEMICAL
CLASS ill POL Acquire deep targets to
CLASS V AMMO disrupt friendly attack.
/ 1 CLASS IX MAINT 1
LIFT Stockpiles vulnerable,
Figure 3-l -21. Relative target values.
3-23
FM 34-130
Since the threat model indicates defensive operations include

counterattack options (see Figure 3-l-20) we also.examine the
threat models for counterattack operations by the enemy
division's tank brigade (Figure 3-l-22).
- Movement begins as ~eariy as 1.5 hours after order.

- Movement along previously rehearsed routes.
- Supported by well-planned and coordinated FS.
- Lead elements and supporting defenses fix friendty forces
wfih fires.
- Main body seeks flanks of friendly forces.
Failure Options:
- Hastv defense.
- Fix fiendlv forces for counterattack bv reserve of higher HO.
Figure 3-l -22. Enemy counterattack options.
We must also consider counterattacks by the armored divisions

and the operations of the air assault brigade., We examine the
threat models depicting their operations and make any changes
indicated by current intelligence reporting on these types of
operations.
3-24 i -
FM 34-130
DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

We start by comparing the enemy's doctrine for defense with
the results of describing the battlefield. Using the potential
defensive positions we identified earlier (see Figure 3-l-7) we
identify three potential defensive lines. Because the western
most set of defensive positions (positions a, b, and c) can be
easily bypassed, a defense there will not accomplish the enemy's
likely objective (Figure 3-l-23). Accordingly, we set this
course of action aside ,as a low priority. If time permits, we
will later develop it as an alternative course of action. For
the present we'.concentrate on defenses.along a line from position
"d" to position V8g11 and along a line from position 81h81 to
position 8818q.
iwi^
4*tf
'^Vftx^Mmyfc^'" *"*
- Defensible terrain
Figure3-1-23. Terrain suppotting defensive COAs.
3-25
FM 34-130
As enemy course of action (COA)'one, we place the enemy's

covering force in the western most set of positions. We array
the main defense in the remaining positions by modifying the
doctrinal dispositions depicted in the threat model to account
for the effects of the terrain. We also identify likely
locations of counterattack objectives and include the enemy's~
counterattack options on the developing situation template
(Figure 3-l-24).
V. L^=^y
l^-CTf ''c
Figure 3-l -24. Enemy COA 1.
3-26
FM 34-130
We use the same technique to develop COA two. We place the

covering force in the center set of defensive terrain
(positions d, e, f, and g) and place the main defense in the
eastern most set. The defense is weighted more heavily in the
north than in the south (Figure 3-l-25).
+ 5.a -+i XT } i rr.
Figure 3-l-25. Enemy COA 2.
3-27
FM 34-130
Obviously, the enemy has the optioti to weight the south more
heavilv than the north. We depict this option as'COA 3
(Figure 3-1-26)
5hl f-LoA
II /
\ICATK i/v _S '
^ *^^_ V.- .W.WA .-- X^J . . mm m*J .'. \ OBJ * W>J j/tf)
Figure 3-l -26. Enemy COA 3.
3-28
FM 34-130
The enemy also has the option of withdrawing from his current
positions and taking up defensive positions east of the Kald
River. However, the description of the battlefield's effects
indicated a lack of suitable positions on the east bank of the
river and the enemy's TTP discourages the "sacrifice" of terrain
in this manner. It is, however, a feasible COA that the enemy
could adopt if faced with overwhelming friendly strength. A
defense on the east bank of the river'; even without suitable
positions would force our division to conduct an opposed
crossing, significantly slowing the attack. Conversely, if
friendly forces catch the enemy during his withdrawal over the
river they co'uld readily destroy any opposition to our attack.
Based on these considerations we add enemy withdrawal to
positions east of the river as COA 4 and highlight potential. _.
crossing sites as target areas of interest and potential
engagement areas.
figure 3-l-27
new figure
3-29
I
FM 34-130
We continue to develop each COA by adding more detail. We use

doctrinal templates as a guide and modify the portrayed
dispositions to take advantage of the available defensive
terrain. We also use the doctrinal templates to determine the =
likely locations of high value targets (HVT). We evaluate the
effects of the battlefield on the enemy's mobility and determine
likely movement~rates along each counterattack avenue of i
approach. We use time-phase lines (TPL) to depict his expected
progress along each avenue (Figure 3-1-28). For the present,
these reflect only the time it will take to form the unit and m
conduct movement. Later, during staff wargaming, we will update
the TPLs to 'incorporate consideratioh of events that are likely
to initiate or influence movement, such as friendly ,penetration
of the enemy defense, or enemy reserve contact with friendly- I,
forces or unexpected obstacle systems.
__.c_ -' _____..--_.--.i'---...

-i-c .._ xx.- ----.--
Figure 3-l -28. Develop situation templates to include TPLs and HVTs.
FM 34-130
Using the description of tactics from the threat model as a
guide, we mentally wargame each situation template. This allows
us to tailor the description of the tactics associated ,with the
COA to the specific situation. We focus on activities that are
associated with the enemy's adoption of each option open to him
or those likely to lead to a friendly decision. In this case, we
use a matrix style format (Figure 3-l-29). The matrix addresses
each of the enemy's battlefield operating systems in as much
,~,.. detail as necessary to support friendly planning. Like the
situation templates, we will update and refine,it during staff
wargaming.
r H-10 . H-l 1 H 1 H+4 ( .H+7 H+8.5 H+lO
I Beoin move I 1 Engage 1 Defeat

+iendly action to Attack 1st 1st
position Pre&re fires Crass LD Echelon Echelon
DP 1
Local ReseNes
Maneuver counter- begin ReseNes
attacks move pass NAI
SUDDOlt
Fs Counter- IFsage l!efensivelfounermobility Icoifiter- 1
mely hrls 1~ 1 nres , anacn !
Locate arty, I,ocate I I I I
Intelligence Locate ID main Ireserve,
main effort (?ffOffoR / HPTs
I I I I Icxmnil I I
reserve to
counterattack
I I , I I
or block / 1
1 Continue (Quntermobilii 1
Engineers counter- support to
m3my counterattack
Figure 3-l -29. Each situation template includes a description of the COA.
3-31
FM 34-130 \
We also refine the list of high value targets to reflect any

changes due to the specific situation at hand. We consider the
enemy's current situation, and the effects of friendly forces and
the battlefield environment on the enemy's course of action. In
this case we increase the relative value oft the enemy's air
defense assets to account for friendly'air superiority. The
enemy needs his ADA assets to protect his reserve forces from
friendly air attacks before and during the enemy counterattack.
Otherwise, the counterattack might fail without ever contacting
attacking friendly ground
attacking friendly ground forces
forces(Figure .3-l-30).
(Figure .3-l-30).
-_
tt -r
D Command centers
I coordinate move and
SDL commitment of reserves.
RE I RELATIVE Central FS centers nearby.
L M TARGET Sti
woFlTH
I-
PA I
T Y T LOC allow rapid move of
resuppty.
!
FS
MANEUVER
ADA
ENGINEER
Reserve units critical to
success of defense.
1
I
RJSTA FS masses fires to assist
REC
NUKE/CHEMICAL
1
CLASS III POL Acquire deep targets to
CLASS V AMMO disrupt friendly attack.
1
/ / ClASS IX MAINT I
LIFT Stockpiles vulnerable,
Figure 3-l -30. Doctrinal HVTs are refined and included in the description of the enemy COA.
.
3-32
FM 34-130
To establish initial collection requirements designed to tell
us which COA the enemy will adopt, we,compare the four situation
templates and identify differences among them. The unique
locations and events associated with each COA, if detected, serve
as reliable indicators of adoption of the COA. The event
template focuses on the locations where events unique to each COA
are expected to occur. We extract the named areas of interest
depicting unique events from each situation template and
consolidate them on a single overlay.(Figure 3-1-31). The
resulting event ,template allows us to focus collection planning
on confirming the "set" of the enemy's defenses. This, however,
is just the s,tart of the event template.
t-- 6h --I .'/ / ,tOA
- --_-----
a...
--
/
I
LOA
Figure 3-l 31. Base the event template on the set of enemy COAs.
3-33
FM 34-130
We examine the situation,templates to identify NAIs associated

with the various counterattack options of the enemy's armored
brigade. We add these NAIs onto the event template., along with
time lines that reflect the expected arrival time of the
counterattacking brigade in each NAI (Figure 3-l-32). Some of
the NAIs may be dropped during staff wargaming, while additional
NAI may be added.
--
jAiSO.
r^^^^ftÔv
LEGEND:
^^ - NAl
Figure 3-l-32. Refine the event template to include key events in each enemv COA
3-34
FM 34-130
We turn next to the COAs available to the two armored
divisions. After identifying likely counterattack objectives, in
priority order, we identify available avenues of approach. We
evaluate each COA for NAIs that will provide confirmation or
denial of its adoption by the enemy. We include these NAIs on
the event template, along with the TPLs associated with the
armored divisions' movement (Figure 3-l-33).
,J'" J
5km
.A4A /'tOA '
I!!
I
7
';.iti .',
.^dffS^?| 2
C
*M3" ?'*&? >A ^
5?
x;-*> 1 *"YV^ \ \
LEGEND:
{ J - Objective
I -NAl .I -.
C<-r^_)
I -- x x------A (tte~r
-_-_.,- IAll/
.r. I
I .- .I. --.---. --
Figure 3-l -33. Consider the COAs of reinforcing or counterattacking forces.
3-35
FM 34-130
We evaluate the COA available to the air assault brigade in
the same way. Because of friendly air superiority, enemy air
assaults into the friendly rear are unlikely. Accordingly we
concentrate on COAs that use air assault assets to block friendly
penetrations. We identify NAIs associated with each COA and
transfer them to the event template .(Figure 3-l-34).
/ /
___.-----
TX7 -LOA-----
, .>
.- .-
A XX
., 2
5 XX
o
LEGEND:
; J - Objective and NAI ea
I I -NAI LD/LC
1~. PL WASP
Figure S-l -34. NAls associated with the air assault brigades COAs.
3-36
FM 34-130
We prepare an event matrix to accompany the event template

(Figure 3-l-35). The event matrix adds the indicators associated
with each NAI and additional information to aid in collection
planning. We will refine and update the event matrix during
staff wargaming.
TIME i
NAI EVENT INDICATES COA
EARLIEST LATEST
; 1 Covering force 1
2 Covering force 1
3 Covering force 3
Battalion defense 1
Figure 3-1-35. The event matrix supports the event template.
3-37
FM 34-130
DISSEMINATE, USE, AND REFINE IPB PRODUCTS
Completing the event template and event matrix does not end
the IPB process. As we receive new information and
intelligence, we re-evaluate the IPB products to ensure they are
still accurate. If intelligence indicates the need, we
reinitiate the IPB process to include information that changes
initial assumptions and evaluations..
We disseminate the results of IPB to other staff sections and
Units to use in their own IPB efforts. Subordinat~e units and
other staff sections take the results of our IPB and refine and
adapt them tomeet their own needs. (See Figures 3-l-36 through
3-l-39.)
~~
For example, among other things, the Fire Support Element -
uses the results of describing the battlefield's effects to
identify areas that are not suited to the large-scale deployment
of friendly artillery units (Figure 3-l-36). Notice that the
Fire Support Element has included areas inhabited by a large
number of enemy sympathizers in this category.
xx.---1 ---, - _,____________ 1

LOA
Figure 3-l-36. Potential locations for fire support assets.

3-38
FM 34-130
The Fire Support Element also uses the results of terrain
analysis as a start point for identifying potential locations
for friendly and enemy counter-mortar and battery'radars or
other target acquisition assets. Based on the evaluation of
observation and fields of fire, the Fire Support Element may
request that the engineer (terrain) detachment conduct
line-of-sight studies for selected sites.
The targeting cell uses the set offs situation templates as the
starting point for their own templates emphasizing HVTs
(Figure 3-l-37). They further develop descriptionq of tactics
and target relative value matrices that focus on the IiVTs to
support development of high payoff targets during the targeting
process. . .
. .-p+-;,,-- \ ;-, cqy;;Iy .,
- - "" --L--I
__---.,
I Y. A;.- x x. ------- ----_.--_ il---
LOA
Figure 3-l -37. Templated locations of HVTs.
3-39
FM 34-130
The Electronic Warfare Officer uses the situation templates
as a starting point for his own situation templates that depict
enemy communication nodes. Here, he uses a segmented wheel to
depict the locations of the various communication sites. The
letters within each seament correspond to a matrix that further
defines the communication systems associated with each node
(Figure 3-l-3.3).
+ 5km ---/ .- ;' /
- XX 1
-.-- - ..~~~._--. : ._ - LOA
Figure 3-l-38. Tamplated composition and locations of communication nodes.
Q
3-40
3
FM 34-130
The Counterintelligence analysis section uses the situation
templates as a starting point forits own templates that focus
on the enemy's electronic attack and collection assets
(Figure 3-l-39). In turn, the counterintelligence analysis
section passes its IPB products on to the Deception and
-~Targeting
~. -~~Cell for their own use.
- am ---I \......
y /<?-+A/~ / Hi n i
- --. .i~
^wrm /''
"11 JWW(.,m. \
Figure 3-l-39. Ternplated locations of enemy IEW assets.
3-41
e
FM 34-130 -?
The chemical section uses the threat models and situation I

templates to develop the NBC threat assessment and to conduct
vulnerability analysis. They identify contaminated areas and
likely targets for the enemy's use of chemical weapons. As a I
result, specific NAIs are assigned for focused NBC
reconnaissance efforts.
The chemical section uses the results of terrain analysis as I
a starting point for identifying potential friendly
decontamination sites (Figure 3-l-40). Terrain and weather
analysis products also allow them to evaluate the terrain's
effects on chqmical agent and obscurant clouds.
figure 3-l-40
new figure
chemical school input
3-42
3
FM 34-130
iiiiliiiiiiiililiilli Scenario Two: Brigade Conv&ntional Defense .. ..... ... .. . . . ..... . . .

I::l::::::i:::::::l::::liiiilriiiiiiiir
.::.:::::::::i::::.::::..:.::::::,:::::
After a rapid deployment in support of a threatened ally, our

parent division begins to organize its defense. Our brigade is
assigned to the center of the division's sector. Due to the
relatively close terrain, the brigade has been organized with
one armor battalion, one mechanized battalion, and two light
infantry battalions.
The threat directly opposite our sector is one mechanized
infantrvdivision. Available as the threat corps' reserve is an
armored division I Figure 3-2).
xx
1109
xx------@
Fordable
rv- River= International border (fordable)
Figure 3-2. Scenario 2, general situation.
Because of the uncertain political situation, with the threat
of imminent hostilities, we conduct the IPB process as quickly
as prudence allows. This is an example of abbreviated IPB.
. 3-43
FM 34-130
We define our AI to include all probable threats to the
brigade's defensive mission. We consider concentration for an
attack in our sector as well as the risk of attacks from
adjacent sectors (Figure 3-2-l).
-\\
\
i1
xx
lroll
iAl'
----~alional border (fordable)
Figure 3-2-l. Area of-interest.
3-44
FM 34-130
We examine the map for the various terrain factors that
create obstacles to mobility within the AI. Rather than create
separate overlays for each factor, we record the end results
(mobility corridors and avenues of approach) on a single graphic
product (Figure 3-Z-2). To determine avenues of approach, we
must first identify likely objectives. To keep the graphic from
getting too cluttered, we put air avenues of approach on a
separate overlay.
X X
X X
)ISI
LEGEND:
Vi^' Likely objectives
Hivei =^ fntonational border (fordable)
Figure 3-2-2 Mobility corridors and avenues of approach.
3-45
FM 34-130
There are few obstacles to flight within the AI. Accordingly
our evaluation of threat air avenues of approaches focuses on
direct routes that offer some protection to aircraft
(Figure 3-2-3). - .~ 7
I
I
ional border (fordable !-) ~

__I -,--
Figure 3-2-3. Air avenues of approach.
3-46
FM 34-130
We next identify defensible terrain within the brigade's
sector. We identify potential defensive positions for both the
heavy and light forces within our brigade, oriented on the
threat's likely avenues of approach (Figure 3-2-4).
xx
JZL
AAA X X
Isl
"TO 1 S3 X X
:GEND:
^S Defensible te/^n
xx--
[ Tofdabio border (fordable:
Figure S-2-4. Defensible terrain.
3-47
FM 34-130
RVALUAT.E THE THREAT
Our evaluation of the threat model reveals the ,threat's
similarity to our own forces in doctrine and organization
(Figure 3-2-5). In this case, even their equipment is
identical. Accordingly, since the entire staff is familiar with
US style operations, we save time by using mental doctrinal
templates for ground forces instead of creating physical
products. .
Units are equipped, organized, Available Avn Assets (for~,each division)

and operate (tactically) exactiy X
like US Unts-Mls, AH&&s, BFVs,
DISCOM, DIVARTY, MI, etc.
1001
-EU G3 ED C3
m -
XX
t^d
- EU A X
GSAC
A -A A A AH-64s UH-60S
(Including
XX
A = A A A A OH-58Ds)
QE3 A
XX
A=A A A A f~?$-!&FS
=
<0 A = A A A I 14 soniesof
m =,--,
A-10 ,-, n n CAS.
-A A A
Available Avn - Corps
XX
-a E3
- ED A 00
-A A A E3
-A A A A
D4< C><]
CH-47S
AH-64S
Figure 3-2-5. Enemy organization.
3-48
FM 34-130
We can not count on air superiority during the opening stages
of the conflict and therefore must pay special attention to the
threat's air support capabilities. Evaluation of the threat
model indicates we can expect up to 14 fighter/bomber sorties
against targets in the brigade's sector each day. We extract
the appropriate doctrinal template from the threat model.
figure 3-2-6
new figure
3-49
FM 34-130
During the fight for air superiority the threat will probably
pass deep strike aircraft over the brigade sector en route to
deeper targets. The threat model indicates that the threat may
attack air defense assets deployed in the brigade sector in
order to create the necessary air corridors. Accordingly, we
examine the template that depicts threat force large scale air
operations.
figure 3-2-7
new figure.
3-50
FM 34-130
Overlaying our mental doctrinal templates on the evaluation
of the terrain's effects, we create a graphic depiction of the
set of threat COAs. This serves as our situation template
(Figure 3-2-8). For the moment, we put off developing the COAs
in detail.
m
Ali
y2!i/ her =International border (fordable:
Figure 3-2-8. Enemy COAs.
3-51
FM 34-130
We create a matrix to describe each COA within the set
(Figure 3-2-9). This helps us to.visualize the conduct of each
threat COA during wargaming and aids collection planning.
Note that the matrix reads from right to left in'order to
match the flow of action on the graphic (see Figure 3-2-8).
This is one acceptable technique.
INDICATORS INDICATORS INDICATORS THAl

THAT WOULD WOULD HELP
HELP CONFleM HELP CONFIRM HELP CONFIRM CONFIRM OTHER
NA1 COM COA2 COA3 COAs OF CONCERI
2 -' Air assault forces
Air assault forces
4 infiltration of light Inf

10 Poised to attack Poised to attack Poised to attack TD attacks

abreast .
11 Shifts N
Figure 3-2-9. Event matrix.
3-52
FM 34-130
Using the situation template and the matrix describing the
COAs, we prepare an event template. We focus on NAIs that will
confirm or deny adoption of each COA within the set. The nature
of the terrain causes some of the NAIs to take untraditional
shapes (Figure 3-2-10).
LEGEND:
Figure 3-2-10. Event template.
3-53
FM 34-130
We prepare an event matrix to describe the activities we
expect to find in each NAI if the'threat adopts its associated
COA (Figure 3-2-11).
INDICATORS INDICATORS INDICATORS INDICATORS THAT

THAT WOULD HAT WOULD OULD HELP
HELP CONFIRM HELP CONFIRM HELP CONFIRM CONFIRM OTHER
NAI COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 COAs OF CONCERfs
3 Air assault forces Air assault forces
4 Infiltration of light Inf

-
10 Poised to attack Poised to attack . Poised to attack TD attacks

abreast
11 Shifts N
Figure 3-2-11. Event matrix.
DISSEMINATE, USE, AND REFINE IPB PRODUCTS

As usual, we disseminate the products of IPB to other staff
sections and subordinate units to support their planning
efforts.
We use the time remaining before the onset of hostilities to
refine and improve our basic IPB products. As needed to support
planning, we develop the target relative value matrices and
develop detailed situation templates. As we receive new
information and intelligence, we refine, update, and
3-54
FM 34-130
incorporate it into the initial IPB. If incoming intelligence
denies assumptions made during planning, we reinitiate the IPB
process to identify the impact on current plans. If necessary,
we recommend to the commander that he reinitiate the decision
making process in order to change or modify the friendly plan.
::::::::::::::::::::: ..........
~~~.zzE~:~~ Scenario Three: Counterinsurgency Operations ffiiiliiiiii;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;i
The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (Light [L]), is conducting
counterinsurgency,operations within the rural country of
Forgotonia. The host nation is plagued bye an insurgency which
is sponsored by Metropolania, the country that neighbors
Forgotonia to the east.
The advance party for the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, has
just arrived at the capital city staging base. The staff of thk
9th Regimental Combat Team has issued an OPORD at the arrival
airfield.
The battalion executive officer (X0) initiates the command
estimate process. The X0 informs the 52 that he must present
the initial set of IPB products to the battalion staff in
6 hours.
The regimental 52 and several intelligence experts from the
host nation present the battalion S2 section with a 15-minute
overview of the division and regimental level intelligence
situations. They also leave several boxes of intelligence
reports that may be pertinent to the battalion mission.
The 52 reflects upon the briefings he has received. He
realizes that the regimental 52 developed good IPB products for
the regimental level of focus. However, their level of detail
will not support planning at the battalion level of focus. As
he sifts through the stack of intelligence reports, he realizes
that these files contain raw information in enough detail to
support battalion planning, but they must first be analyzed
within the context of the battalion's mission.
In order to produce the IPB products necessary to support
staff wargaming, which starts in 5-l/2 hours, the 52 sets the
following schedule for the section:
0 10 Minutes: Define the Battlefield: Determine the types
of information that need to be extracted from the
intelligence files and define the limits of the
battlefield.
3-55
FM 34-130
0 2 Hours: Process the stack of intelligence using the
filter procedures established in ,define the battlefield.
0 30 Minutes: Describe the Battlefield's Effects:
Evaluate the battlefield's effects on military
operations. Develop overlays that depict the effects of
the battlefield on enemy and friendly COAs within the TAO.
0 30 Minutes: Evaluate <the Threat: Identify the
organization, composition, and tactics of the enemy that
the 2d Battalion,, Sth'Infantry (L), ':is likely to face
within the AO.
,.
0 1 Hour: Determine Threat COAs: :Although he has studied
the "doctrine" of insurgents operating in this region
and the tactics of light infantry, the 52 will "bounce". -
the IPB products against the battalion personnel who best
understand the tactics of dismounted infantry; that is,
the S3, the C Company commander, the A Company first
sergeant (lSG), and the scout platoon sergeant (PSG).
These "second opinions" help the S2 ensure that he has
considered all possibilities. Meanwhile, the remainder
of the S2 section will re-process the stack of
intelligence reports to find any pertinent information
they may have overlooked during the initial processing.
0 20 Minutes: Determine the most effective methods for
presenting the IPB products to the battalion staff.
Conduct rehearsal briefing.
Using the resulting time schedule, the S2 section jumps into
the IPB process.
As usual, the A0 is established by higher headquarters. The
S2 examines the characteristics of the battlefield and
determines that the populace as well as terrain and weather will
have a significant effect on friendly and threat force options
and operations. He also determines that the complicated rules
of engagement included in the brigade's operation order are a
significant characteristic of the environment. Not only will
they affect friendly options but, once the threat learns of
their nature, they are likely to influence threat courses of
action as well.
3-56
FM 34-130
Because the insurgents are getting some assistance from
Metropolanian military units (the .otNuevo Metropolanio
Ejercito8'-NHE), the S2 notes the nearby NME regiment as an
additional significant characteristic of the battlefield.
Based on these considerations the S2 recommends the area of
interest depicted in Figure 3-3.
mmm
-V^-A -^^M^^ River=International boundary
Figure 3-3. A0 and Al.
3-57
FM 34-130
The 52 decides that the population is one of the most
important characteristics of the battlefield, likely to have a
major influence on both friendly and enemy COAs. Accordingly,
he prepares a population status overlay depicting their
political sympathies (Figure 3-3-l). He will use it later in
determining enemy COAs. Other staff sections will use it while
developing potential friendly COAs.
tj i f .:>J
[ff &.
mSB,
LEGEND: ^fi) - Supports HN

HN

PH -WS
**/ insurgents
-Neutral ^strong
apatnetic ^^ insurgentsupport
ft ."r_|ll u.LT^-T^, tfW Numbers"*
""'"*"?"" are^w^mwww.
populationwww
count
.t^SffiSSffJ^ i^y, fltvftr=traernannnainniinfiafyji-:vj::^>:\::-^::'
Flgure 3-3-l. Population statue overlay.
3-58
m
FM 34-130
Although unusual, the 52 decidesto prepare a legal status
overlay (Figure 3-3-2) that considers rules of engagement. In
this case, the host nation has established an elaborate status
of forces agreement which drastically alters the.rights and
authority of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (L), as it moves
through the AO. This varying sets of restrictions and rules of
engagement obviously affect the COAs open to the friendly
command. Similarly, since the enemy will no doubt learn of
these restrictions on the friendly force, they will probably
influence enemy COAs as well. The SZ will use this overlay to
integrate the effects of friendly rules of engagement on threat
COAs as he .develops them.
~.---~-~---- .._~~ .._...
! i j \.y 4 S I f, / --
' ....!
^- 'teM^^^v'
V-K-; /. /
IS!
uJ!
x. *
./-.
-:/.-.
IS!
Mgff4?'?!^\v' (R*flMl"'S) "\
LEGEND:
- ROE sat 1
. ROE set 2
Unmarked - ROE set 3
*fti@tf*w^3|fr> ^ River internatioi
International oounaary -'*
A
Figurs3-3-2 Legal ~~AIUO OVWI~Y.
3-59
FM 34-130
The S2 section then prepared an overlay depicting LOC within
the AI. After evaluating the effkts of the various military
aspects of terrain, the S2 section identified the' areas along
each MC that best lend themselves for use as ambushes sites
(Figure 3-3-5).
V
/
*W:
'SU WJEL^'fB
:>"x^
S WAK:***--:
ll ...>. A
\ vK
\y?k>
-.. 7r*"->^'^- \\\./ "V.<>
> & ss:

1 s* v-v;:i-:-
?>';
'$* 1/// )^^.V-.:^-, I I '
=N^ i WvU'&Vl*
ift: IV
V
J^fe
ltfi\' K^' .x- ....
M \\ ^K ,^^rJJ-~'
<&
:#ra#*
L:-;
33Era
<//*
&$*
SI
XN Vfl Sxfc^S
-v.'.->.-?vvv. ^ LEGEND:
>*ÂWMMV ?$^H -Ambushsites - Roads
yi i?
>
-A; - Favors
- -Trails
insurgents
f^^S'v^y ,#/? RivercInternationalboundary -' : '"''-V:;.
Flgure 3-3-5. LOC and likely ambush sltes.
3-62
FM 34-130
EVALUATE THE THHEAT
The S2 section begins evaluating the threat by.reviewing the
common understanding of the battlefield. They examine the
organizations of the nearby NME infantry
. regiment as well as
that of the insurgents operating within the A0 (Figure 3-3-6).
Neither the insurgents or the Metrolpolanians have any
sisnificant air Dower canabilities..
INsLmGEtfr COMPANY N.M.E. REGULAR INFANTRY BRIGADE
lxl
M Ml Ml > 9 Ml
Appox 1 | ' | 60
60mm
mm ' J unk
1*1 Hi EE
4.2- inch I ' nk
Approx moaarc unk
6 pax * monarc
monars W
Apprax M60MG. 20 'mules'
20 men a LAWS a + 4 lo 5
M16sand appro* specialist ea
AK-47S 20 pax
ai r,m
81 mm *
LM* unk
monan
Each:
wmen
/M16s al-id NC.475
60mnmvr
--
Figure 3-3-6. Enemy organuarlons.
3-63
P
FM 34-130
I
The S2 section started to plot a SITMAP in order to record
the mass of available information, but realized that a time
event chart described the general intelligence situation in the
A0 more effectively (Figure 3-3-7). Instead of a SITMAP they
decided to use coordinates registers to track activity within
selected areas.
h 1 h
1
N.LM (local)
A qm
_l----- b,eaceful
Local training reported
HN activates Cl -
- 8-7s ,.: + in the Monmouth-
methoda,lullll
A insurgency----
r;ulllpany.
Beardstown-Bushnell program.
triangle.
I
1
J
1
Reinforcina trooos U
Reinforcing HN troops
1 ambushedi&&& m arnbushedinMcCimb. p
U; Blood Day': 7 x local
politicians loyal to HN
I
the area.
Beardstown is proclaimed
Reinforcing HN troops independent/ Insur- HN barracks in
ambushed in McComb. gents declare marshal Bushneil is raided.
law. HN troops kill 35 killed.
approx 15 guerillas.
2 ambushes of HN American Peace Corps Mortar rounds land on I

troops in 1 day: worker assassinated in
seardstown during + the Pro-HN towns of
McComb and Monmouth. + Carthage and Rushville. +
insurgent Co raid.
I
US troops arrive in Advance party of US Bn

country. Arrival ambushed in Bardolph. US Bn occupies AO.
airfields attacked.
Figure 3-3-7. Time event chart. -
3-64
r
FM 34-130
While processing the stack of intelligence reports, the S2
section noticed certain recurring 'names. The S2 section
established an activities matrix to quickly display which
prominent personnel within the A0 were related to each
organization or type of activity (Figure 3-3-S).
~~ --.~~~-~ .-_
People's Democratic
(unk peasant group)
order (right wingers)
>.
Movement (political
LEGEND: c
Party (good guys)
Society (peaceful
front for N.M.E.)

Farmer's alliance
Christian Reform
8.
New Liberation
# - Confirmed 0 Probable
preservation of
Society for the
E
0 - Possible o
U
moderate)
ui . Name of
Remarks 3
s Individual -
C z
Leader in the insurgent Johnston, S.D.
Warrant co. Possible pit cdr alias
The Red'
Possibly linked to
death squad activities. O Garra, NA 1
g.
Mayor, ineffective due Mulvihill.P. 3"
to war-torn town.
Possible pit leader. 0 0 0 0 Daniels.P.
Regional governor. 0 0 O Jenkins.T.L

Tactical genius,
Warrant
principal trainer of 0 Cormier, J. z
outstanding
insurgent co. 80
3
O o o 0 Webb, C.
o o o Seipel, B.
Leader in the insurgent
co. Pit leader or XO. 0 0 o o Trollinger,L
Possible head of 01
intelligence. 0 Ahearn, E. o
Probable pit leader. 0 0 Timoney.J.

o
*
Thompson.J. 3
Probable hvy wpn pR

0 0 l Bridgeford,R.
Possible liaison between

insurgent co and the 0 0 0 0 Halbleib,M.
N.M.E.
Doctor of Death
leads the SPO. 0 l 0 0 Mueller, H.
0 0 0 Martinez, E.
Figure 3-3-8. Activities matrlx.
3-65
FM 34-130
The intelligence reports also revealed.that certain of these I

individuals associated with others. The section used an
association matrix to show the relationships (Figure 3-3-9).
-
^v loh nstc
LEGEND:
A
3ar 'a l - Confirmed
\l dulvihill b - Possible
Suspected
0 0 0
^ taniels 0 ~- Probable I-
0 0 o 0 ^Jenkins
0
VCormier
D 0 0 ^Vebb
y 1 Seipel
0 0
0 0 0 V rollinger
0 o 0 V/toeam
0 0 0 0 0 V flmc
0 0 0 0 0 VT
Thompson
1 o Bridgeford
3 moo o o o .
moo0
B 000000000 I
Figure 3-3-S. Assoclatlon math.

i
3-66
FM 34-130
Using all of the information shown in the products above, the
section then developed a link diagram to show the
interrelationship of individuals, organizations, and activities
(Figure 3-3-10).
N ,M,C. ."' '' *-'A '*" '- '/ "x "" "'"' - -
: I'M m Î^VÎI!^
Wpn Ptt Intel Spt Inf Pit InlPtt Inf Pit unk
^H^ft MaiUne^ II Daniels II Webb II limuncy
N.LM.
N.M.E.
rlgure il-a-I u. unn olagram.
3-67
FM 34-130
To better illustrate the events that have occurred within the
AO, the S2 section established a set of coordinates registers.
Coordinates registers aid in pattern analysis and'help build
doctrinal templates from scanty intelligence databases: This
coordinates register page shows activities around the town of
Macomb, one of the biggest @hot spotsNB (Figure 3-3-11).
i
Figure 33-11. Coordinates register.
3-68
FM 34-130
The S2 section also constructed a time pattern analysis
worksheet to record the date and time of each serious incident.
The rings depict days of,the month, the segments depict hours of
the day. Similar tools help distinguish patterns in activity
that are tied to particular days, dates, or times.
figure 3-3-12
new figure
3-69
FM 34-130
After studying the coordinates registers, time pattern
analysis worksheets and the associated intelligence reports, the
analysts realize that the insurgent techniques for conducting
ambushes have evolved over time. Each operation is more
sophisticated than those that preceded it as the insurgents
learn from their mistakes. To reflect the most current
sstandardll techniques, the section prepares doctrinal
templates. The doctrinal template at Figure 3-3-13 shows the
section's best asses,sment of the current procedures used by the
insurgents during ambushes.
06 Pla&s E&E on
preplanned routes ft
.-.(3) Approximately 10 to 2CJt;g

>iSk->: Guerillas open fire on !
:j:-:-:-:S> f^Tlf?ir*}9. .Vf.hjples g:g
PJlead" vehicle is $*
grgdestroyed by $
>cmd-detonated $>>>
reinforcing
HN/US troop
catches
?inforcements
mines and booby traps have been established on the
natural survivability positions to kill HN/US troops seeking cover.
Frgure3-3-13. Doctrinaltemplatefor insurgent ambushes.
3-70
FM 34-130
The section does the same for insurgent raids. The result is
a doctrinal template that depicts current O1standardlB techniques
for raids on facilities or installations (Figure 3-3-14).
_.. ~~-~~-----~~~~ __- -
LTAA
Firing positions will be established

in any covered and concealed
position, urban or forest
insurgent company MMmblea in
covered and concealed TAA No. 1. < Raid objective will not be selected
if adequate concealment and cover
are not available.
Final reoon of objective. n
LAW* and mortar destroy key
facilities DDDDNJ
ODD nan
(comma, generator,
vehiciea. etc).
i DDDD
Snipers kilt:
a Guard.
tx
c.
Key peraonnei.
QRF forces, defenders.
DDDD DDDD
DD DDD
Ambushes kill reinforcing units
and personnel trying to escape.
Insurgents usually will not sweep

DDDDD
across the objective.
Insurgents withdraw on preselected

routes 10 TAA No. 2.
<0
($\ Insurgents return to civilian life.
L

Fi&re33-14. Doctrinal template for insurgent raid.
3-71
FM 34-130
To study the Metropolanian threat the S.2 section only
received an a-year-old Defense Intelligence Agency handbook,
some sketchy reports on recent training exercises,, and some
educated assessments by analysts at the division and re,gimental
levels., The battalion S2 integrated the results of his analysis
of these products into the doctrinal template (Figure 3-3-15).
(2)Two battalions attack

as the 'hammer to
destroy enemy in detail.
(3) Entire regiment disperses

by companies to E&E
back to sanctuary.
Fiwre3-a-15. Doctrinal template for Metropohian attack.
3-72
FM 34-130
Having finished the initial three steps of IPB, the S2
section turned to determining enemy,COAs. The section focused
its efforts around a reliable and.credible intelligence report
that narrowed guerrilla targets down to incoming .US Army
personnel and government forces within areas sympathetic to the
host nation.
The S2 prepared a situation template depicting likely
insurgent COAs. He did this by integrating his IPB products
depicting population status, availability of concealment and
cover, and potential ambush sites with,,,the threat model
developed in the previous step.
In this case, the situation template takes the form of a key
facilities and targets overlay, sometimes known as,a Itrap map,"
which shows likely targets for the insurgents (Figure 3-3-16).
The S2 also included in the situation template the areas most
likely to be used by an assembling insurgent company, and the
infiltration routes between the objective sites and the assembly
areas. This situation template also shows the safehouses that
V'wantedV* personnel will probably use between insurgent
operations.
12 3 4
*=4m*xL /
//>/ \vfs^'
$>
v-v'vyl
<;vSr
*^V>
>^r*z;:
S&.
;am / Hfif JE3
7NS
fc- x /V
* N/ /:r=y=
&
;-xv
..v *;... V^
<RftfiMirn-tf) \
^/l O
. Ukely
LEGEND:
^ Likely safe
'*. ^r^. ambushes XS houses
A' SjJ. Raid objectives . infiltration
.'V .<? . Ukely assembly ' lanes
^ areas
11
>^^^>:^^^^>rYy /;/'' River = International boundary \
Figure 3-3-16. Situation template for insurgent ambushes.
.
FM 34-130
Although an attack by the Metropolania~n infantry regiment is
unlikely, the 52 must evaluate all reasonable threats to mission
accomplishment. He develops a situation template.showing three
COAs available to the NME infantry regiment should it decide to
attack (Figure 3-3-17). All three COAs are predicated on the
assumption that the friendly battalion will locate itself in one
of the three objective areas and that the destruction of the
battalion will be the Metropolanian objective (Figure 3-3-17).
In all three COAs the Metropolanian attack will be preceded
by the infiltration of 'one battalion to establish !anvil"
blocking positions. The remaining two battalions will attack
abreast as the "hammer I1 to destroy the 2d Dattalion,
9th Infantry (L), forces within the objective areas.
r
-" -\ ..XV*.V.v .. ^^ -.. Av .
_L1
ill II
//_._ *x:.:.?"'' ,/* (HeyuJi:
V / ../ffiiVI I ":'?
*-->^^^^**^^>^>^V;.: ^j^ River international boundary .--:>""--". A^'V

Figure 3-3-17. Situation template foTMetropoianian attack.
3-74
FM 34-130
The S2 section develops an event ,template that supports
intelligence collection against the insurgent COAs and those of
the Metropolanian infantry regiment (Figure 3-3-18). The
relatively limited number of NAIs made this possible.
Alternatively, the S2 could have used a separate event template
for each type of enemy threat.
ft ft I . .'
i i 7 ' ...' M
IS
;,.(û|yu-> \
- - J'* *^lMi^0mm:mr^
i
luri I.
LEGEND:
f"A - Area NAI
""5?" " ^-% Linear NAJ
.:<i>yyyî^^:^X" /'/? River International boundary -'': \
Figure 3-3-l 8. Event template.
3-75
FM 34-130
To further aid collection planning, the 52 developed an event
matrix indicating the type of activity in each NAI
(Figure 3-3-19). Cross-reference to the COA that.each NAI and
activity indicates allows the S2 to quickly determine which COA
- 1 ;he enemy has adQDted *.
EXPECTATION
N/u Insurgent Company Regimental Attack
1 Insurgent TAA -
3 I lnfiltrationlexfiftration l2nes I I
4 I TAA I
5 InWatWexfiltration lanes
i
6 Inriltration/exfiltration lanes
7 Movement corridor for attack on obiective 2
I
8 I hfikration/exfiltration lanes I
9 1 Movement corridor for assemblina olatoons I Movement corridor for attack on objective 2
10 TAA .m
11 InNtration/exfiitration lanes
I
12 TAA 1 Movement corridor for attack on objective 3 I

13 Infiltration/exfiltration lanes Movement corridor for attack on objective 3
14 TAA i
15 InfCtratkx&diitration lanes
16 Infiltrafion/exfiltration lanes
17 Infiltration lane for attack on objective 1
->~.LL 1 Poszme 2rw1r w ror anasK. on oopx~~~
F-35-1 9. Event matrix.
Based upon the initial set of IPB products, the battle staff
completes the decision making process. As planning for the
operation continues, the S2 continues to update his IPB products
based on the intelligence received. As intelligence confirms or I
denies his initial evaluations, the S2 refines and updates his
IPB. As necessary, members of the staff meet to reevaluate the
developing friendly COA in light of the S2's updated IPB and r
intelligence estimate.
3-76
FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::::::
:;;i;i;i;c;;;ii; Scenario Four: Nonco*atant Evacuation iiiijiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~
...................................................
Following intense political debate over an issue of regional
politics, civil war has broken out on the island nation of
Lilliput. -With most of the is.land divided between them, the two
rebel factions now confront each other--and the remaining
government police forces --over control of the capital city of
Gulliver (Figure 3-4). Fighting has died down while
negotiations aimed~.at a peaceful transfer of the governmental
center open. But all sides involved in,,the conflict patrol the
fringes of the contested area, and ~there are still.occasional
armed clashes.
Hemmed in by~the two warring factions, the otherwise
ineffectual government forces have thus far managed to hold -the
capital city and safeguard the American citizens living there.
The Lillipution president has requested US evacuation of its
citizens because he feels his forces will surrender to the first
of the two factions to make a renewed assault on the city
center, should negotiations collapse.
SCALE: Ocman
25 50 75
The Island Nation

of Lillioti
Figure 34. Scenario 4. general situation.
3-77
FM 34-130
Our division has been ordered to evacuate American citizens
from the capital of the island nation.
Neither of the two warring factions has displayed any openly
anti-American sentiment. The.greatest threat to the
noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is posed by the
resumption of fighting between the two factions. There is also
a risk of interference by groups of anti-American student
activists-from the"city's university.
DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT .
.*
Our brigade (the 1st Brigade) is assigned responsibility for
the center of the city itself. The brigade's boundary '. _
identifies the limits of its A0 (Figure 3-4-l).
p.'MiOTAi'.' vMwmmm.
j LEGEND:
: mm Donse, random
Figure 3-4-1. The area of operations.
3-78
FM 34-130
The AI includes our routes of ingress and egress in addition
to any likely threats to the mission (Figure 4-4-2). Due to the
nature of the operation and the battlefield environment, most of
the city is included in the AI.
SCALE:
(kilometer) 0
The island Nation

of Lilliput
The Nation of Candid
Figure 34-2. The area of interest.
The nature of the operation requires us to include several

other factors into the definition of the battlefield
environment. The politics of the capital city and its populace
will have considerable impact on the ease with which we can
conduct the operation. The interactions between the two rival
forces, and their interaction with US forces and diplomats, are
also critical aspects of the definition of the battlefield
environment. Should the negotiations occurring within the
governmental center collapse, full-scale hostilities between the
two rebel factions would likely resume, regardless of the risks
to US citizens. Additionally, we must consider the role of the
US country team, and the missions and activities of any friendly
special operations forces that may be operating within the area
of interest.
3-79
FM 34-130
DESCRIBE THE @ATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS
The nature of the operation requires a focus on the populace
of the city and their political affiliations. This form of
population status overlay allows us to identify areas where US
citizens may be more or less at risk (Figure 3-4-3).
r |Territory under the control oi the 'Big End" facoaf |J

Resilientialpopuhtion holdsmlxad
;Big End-LitUe Et-@ issue and US
US &ens ?I Gulliver live here.

[t-t- HNtraum uNtuwb riWWd, IICUUCM
1 Very pro-US, neutral on the
; \ on the *BIg End-Little End' issue.'-;
\ 4-
^lllll^^ : Big End-We End issue.
University of llipaT'pprox 3,500'students, anti-USV-î il : tf :

mixed opionions on the ~Big
^territory controlled by the 'Uttle End''faction!' Residemiai pdpdtjon holds"

!?^..0P.l^9[!s-.0.nJJS presence and the 'Big End-Little End* issue.
Figure 3-4-3. Population status overlay.
3-80
FM 34-130
We examine how the battlefield environment will affect our
courses of action as those of the Vzhreat*'. We start with an
evaluation of potential zones of entry (helicopter landing zones
(Figure 3-4~-4). With this we integrate an evaluation of areas
suitable for use as assembly or @1holding81 areas for large
numbers of civilians while they await evacuation.
$ LEGEND:
Dense, random
' construction
Figure 344. Zones of entry.
3-81
FM 34-130
In urbanized terrain, the buildings themselves are the most
dominating aspect of the terrain. We evaluate the type of
building construction within our AI to determine its likely
effects onoperations (Figure 3-4-5). Building construction
affects mobility, concealment and cover, and observation and
fields of fire.
Figure 34-5. Building and construction types.
3-82
FM 34-130
Although both rebel forcesare now using roads to conduct
their patrolling activities, we evaluate other suitable avenues
of approach. The areas with densely constructed woodframe
buildings offer the best general avenues of approach for
dismounted-infantry (Figure 3-4-6). The nature of,the
construction type in these areas may permit the rebels to form
their own infiltration lanes by knocking holes in the walls of
adjoining buildings; allowing them easy movement under cover.
Additionally, the dense construction also makes the use of
rooftop avenues'of approach possible. Should full-scale
hostilities break out, these areas may be the focus, of a rebel.
faction's operations aimed at securing control of areas under
the control of the opposing faction.,
Should the government's police forces collapse, other avenues
of approach might be used by either faction in a Q'dash*l to seize
the governmental center. These areas, such as the recreational
parks, offer little cover but facilitate rapid movement by both
dismounted infantry or the light trucks used by both rebel
factions.
Control of the high-rise buildings in the city center will
give our forces the best observation points within our A0 and
over the areas contested
- by the two rebel facttins.
Figure 34-6. Avenues of approach. .

3-83
FM 34-130
Another consideration in urban terrain is the possible use of
underground avenues of approach prbvided by subway and other
'under-street" utilities, such as sewer systems (Figure 3-4-7).
_.
figure 3-4-7
,. new figure
subways and sewers
3-84
FM 34-130
EVALUATE THE THREAT
We begin with an examination of the little we know about the
rebel forces and activist student organizations within the
country (Figure 3-4-8).
GULLIVER BR!GADEFOR LITKE ENDS GULLIVER BRIGADE FOR BIG ENDS
rh
4.2 inch, unk
cb
4.2
81 mm
inch, unk
81 mm
Mortars mortars
is?hn rrn r&n

II 1 1 1
- 81mm unk W 81 mm
65 men mortars 65 men mortars
60 mm 60 mm
ME%% Mzii&
Students Yearning for a Free Lilliput (SYFL).
Organization-unknown.
Estimated approximately 125 hardcore students.

Approximately 1,800 sympathizing students.
Figura3+8. Enemy organizations.
..
3-85
FM 34-130
In order to develop threat models, we examine the operations

the rebel forces have conducted in the recent past
(Figure 3-4-g). Although we use all available information, we
focus~ on their operations within the capital city itself. This
allows us to account for any peculiarities in their Wormal"
tactics caused by the political battle for control of the
capital.
" "" Lr;:.pj ffim|t^3|[ LEGEND:

tJS&dl -!^SS"3J'~*'nrjQ| "^ ~ Clashes between
patrols
+ - Big End patrols
---- - Little End patrols
!
Figure 3-4-9. Situation map.
3-86
FM 34-130
We also conduct a time-pattern analysis to determine the

periods of highest threat to the evacuation operation. Patterns
show up on the wheel as @@funnel" shapes (Figure 3-4-10).
Knowing the times of highest threat allows the commander to plan
critical stages in the operation, such as the movement of
non-combatants, for "low-threat" periods.
figure 3-4'10
new figure
time pattern wheel
3-87
FM 34-130
Evaluating the information.available, we construct a
doctrinal template for the operations of both rebel groups,,
which are similar (Figure 3-4-11). In the margins we include a
description of their normal tactics and reactions, as well as
HVTs to camnlete the threat model.
Figure 3-4-l 1. Threat model of militia operations.

FM 34-130
We use similar techniques to template the activities of

student demonstrators. Although more difficult, we are able to
prepare a graphic depiction of their normal "operations"
(Figure 3-4-12).
- -
Breaking into and

looting stores and
resiclences.
Molotov cocktails. -
Demonstration Zone
(Speakers/Protesters) Overturning cars.
\ \ \ I
Dipping Americans in
maple syrup
(Lilliipufs No. 2 export)
and then covering
with chicken feathers.
Figure 34-12. Threat model of student activities.
3-89
FN 34-130
We construct a situation template based on the threat models
and patterns of recent activity (Figure 3-4-13). It focuses on
likely clashes between the two rebel factions and possible
demonstrations by the student activists, the most likely threats
to accomplishment of our mission. Like a more traditional
situation template, the staff uses it during wargaming to
evaluate friendly COAs against the potential threats to mission
accomplishment.
__ .~___~~~~_~_
Area of likely
demonstrations.
Area contested
by Big End-ttla
End military
factions.
Figure 34-13. Situation template depicting threats to the mission.
3-90
FM 34-130
The situation template forms the.basis for the event
template. In this case, the event template depicts NAIs that
will alert us of impending clashes between the rival military
factions or demonstrations by the students (Figure 3-4-14). The
status of the negotiations within.the governmental center are
included on the event template and in our collection planning,
since progress or failure there has a direct bearing on the
|
act i v i t y
LEGEND:
o f . . . t f t e t wo rebel factions.
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - - -
-_
As the st esfhecommandemi.
begins planning and executing of the friendly COA, we evaluate
incoming intelligence against the event and situation templates-
to quickly identify developing threats. As incoming
intelligence confirms or denies the accuracy of our initial
assessments and evaluations, we continue to refine and update
our IPB.
3-91
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 4
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR
SPECIAL STAFF AND SUPPORT UNITS
The products of IPB prepared by a division or corps G2 will
only partially satisfy the requirements of most other staff
sections and subordinate units. At the-very least these
products must be refined to meet the particular needs of the
staff or unit that 'will use them. In many cases they will be
supplemented by the user's own IPB products.
This is especially true in special staff sections and units
outside the combat arms. The particular needs of these,elements
require a slightly different focus in the application of the IPB-
process to their mission requirements. Although the following
lists are not all-inclusive, they provide example considerations
in applying the IPB process to the needs of some of these units
and staff sections. They do not replace the considerations
presented in chapter 2; always consider the full set of
battlefield characteristics. The following lists are intended
as guides to areas on which to focus.
liljjjill!! Air Defense I
Define the
Battlefield Environment
The A0 in air defense operations focuses on the third

dimension: the element of altitude. As usual, this is
assigned to the commander as his geographic area for the
conduct of operations. Unlike "ground" AOs, the air A0 often
encompasses smaller areas, that are not within the
commander's AO, such as "no-fire" areas.
Similarly, the air AI most often consists of a set of
scattered points rather than a contiguous area. This is
primarily due to the speed and range capabilities of modern
aircraft. Factors to consider in determining the locations of
these points and the limits of the air AI are--
0 Location of tactical ballistic missiles.
0 Location of threat airfields.
0 Location of forward area arming and refueling positions.
0 Location of aids to navigation.
o Range capabilities of threat aircraft.
.
4-l
FM 34-130
Describe the
Battlefieldfs Effects
o Altitude capabilities of threat aircraft.

o Range capabilities of tactical ballistic missiles. m
0 Flight profiles of tactical ballistic missiles.
As usual, this effort focuses on the effect of the Y

battlefield on,:threat and friendly operations. Specific
considerations include--
i
0 Probable target installations or areas. Where are the
threat's likely targets located?
0 Likely air avenues of approach. Do they provide ease of
navigation? Do they provide protection to the aircraft -
from radars and weapons? Do they allow evasive
maneuver? Do they allow for the full use of aircraft
speed? Do they support ground force operations?
0 Likely landing or drop zones. Are they near likely
objectives? Do they provide concealment and cover to the
delivered forces? Do they allow easy aircraft ingress
and egress? ,-
0 Likely standoff attack orbits.
0 Lines-of-sight from proposed ADA weapon locations.
0 Limiting and success-inducing effects of weather on air I
operations.
0 Expected times on target based on weather effects or
light data. i
Evaluate the Threat

-
Air defense units and staffs focus on threats posed by:

0 Unmanned aerial vehicles;
o Missiles (cruise and ballistic);
0 Fixed wing aircraft;
0 Rotary wing aircraft; and,
0 Airborne and air assault forces.
4-2
FM 34-130
In addition to the broad range of,OB factors and threat
capabilities air defense staffs and units evaluate--
0 Flight operations tactics.
o Ordnance types and availability.
o Ordnance delivery techniques such as standoff ranges,
release speeds and altitudes, and guidance system.
o Technical capabilities of aircraft such as all-weather or
night capability as well as maximum and minimum speeds,
ceilings, range, payloads (in terms of ordnance, numbers
of types of equipment, or passengers), and aerial
refueling capability.
o Target selection priorities for air strikes or attack by
air assaults.
A'r strike allocation procedures.
"0 C3 procedures and techniques.
0 Navigation capabilities.
o Threats to friendly ADA assets, including threat ground
forces and EW assets.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
The threat's air activities will be a part of his overall

operation. Therefore, begin determining air courses of
action by acquiring the supported command's basic IPB
products, including situation templates. Evaluate the
general courses of action they portray and determine how the
threat might support them with air power. Do not attempt to
determine air courses of action in isolation from the
maneuver forces they support.
The employment flexibility of modern aircraft makes the
determination of specific COAs extremely difficult.
Nevertheless, you should consider--
o Likely locations of forward area arming and refueling
points.
0 Likely timing of air strikes or air assault operations
(best presented in a matrix format, see Figures 3-2-6
through 3-2-9 in Chapter 3).
0 Likely targets and objectives. Will the threat attempt
destruction or neutralization?
0 Likely air corridors and air avenues of approach.
0 Strike package composition, flight profiles, and spacings
in time and space, including altitudes (best presented in
a matrix format).
4-3
FM 34-130
o Where do friendly air defense assets fit into the threat
course of action? Do they need to be destroyed or
suppressed to ensure the operation's success?
o Threat ground CO&i that might require movement of
friendly ADA assets.
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiiliiiiiiiiliiiIiiii Artillery iiiii~i~~::=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~
. . . . . . - . . . ..-.. -...-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ** . . . . . . . . . . . . **....
Define the
The A0 and AI normally will be the same as those of the

supported force.
Describe the
Battlefield's Effects I
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain's effects on operations,
consider--
0 Areas best suited to artillery deployments, such as--
- Accessibility to ammunition carriers.
- Defilading and masking effects of terrain.
- Security from Levels I, II, and III rear area
threats.
0 Potential sites for target acquisition assets, both
threat and friendly. Request or conduct
line-of-sight studies as required.
0 Effects of terrain on munitions'effectiveness, such
as soft sand, dense trees, or shallow bedrock.
0 Areas suitable for delivery of special purpose
munitions such as artillery delivered mines, etc.
Weather
When conducting weather analysis, consider effects on
target acquisition systems, target activity, and munition
accuracy.
).
4-4
FM 34-130
Other Characteristics
Consider factors that are associated with rear area
operations. See the sections on Counterintelligence and
Rear Area and Combat Service Support in this chapter.
Evaluate the Threat
In descri,bing the threat--

0 Refine standard threat models to focus on HVTs.
0 Evaluate the threat's ability to fight the counter-fire
battle: .
- Identify target acquisition assets; describe their
normal deployment patterns and tactics.
- Describe the capability of each target acquisition
system in terms of accuracy and timeliness.
- Identify the coyand, control, communications, and
intelligence (C I) system that moves target
acquisition information to decision makers or weapon
systems. Describe it in terms of efficiency and
timeliness.
0 Describe the threat's ability to locate and destroy your
target acquisition assets.
o Use techniques associated with the rear battle to
evaluate rear area threat to artillery units. See the
sections on Counterintelligence and Rear Area and Combat
Service Support in this chapter.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Start with the threat COA models developed by the supported

force. Refine them to focus on--
o HVTs. These will be further developed into HPTs during
staff wargaming and the targeting process.
o Dispositions and activity of threat fire support.
o Dispositions of threat target acquisition assets.
o Rear area threats to your units. Use the techniques
discussed in the sections on Counterintelligence and Rear
Area and Combat Service Support in this chapter.
4-5
FM 34-130
0 Focus on threat COAs relevant to your commander, not the
supported force commander (his G2jS2 will do that). The
COAs you focus on should deal primarily with counter-fire
against your assets, force protection, and activities
that will require your units to displace.
iilliiiiiii Aviation I=5lIsIIsgfIfg5511^^g^lIfIflllllllfIII1llli=lllllII=s=IIIIIIIll
Define the
The air AI includes--

Q All threat radars or air defense weapons that can affect
flight operations within the AO. Include threat
airfields within range of the AO.
0 Possible flight routes outside the AO. These could
support friendly forces, with coordination, or threat
counter-air aviation assets.
[
Describe the Battlefield's
Effects on COAs
I
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain, identify--
0 Potential battle positions. Consider:
- Potential engagement areas.
- "Danger areas" that optimize threat ADA system
fields of fire.
- Areas that mask threat radar and air defense
systems.
- Areas that provide good terrain background
(ground clutter) effects.
- Terrain shadowing effects.
0 Potential locations for landing or pickup zones,
forward area arming and refueling positions, and
forward assembly areas.
0 Avenues,of approach. Consider:
- Obstacles to flight such as power lines, towers,
or rapidly rising terrain features.
- Areas where birds gather.
- Contaminated areas or other man-made obstacles.
4-6
FM 34-130
- Areas that give threat air defense systems
distinct advantages in covering air avenues of
approach.
- Concealed and covered routes into potential
battle positions.
- Routes that provide for ease of navigation.
- Potential safe areas for downed pilots. Evaluate
infiltration corridors.
- Other effects on Army Aviation Command and
Control planning.
0 Bear in mind that pilots usually think in terms of
feet of altitude and degree of slope (instead of
meters and percentage). Make the conversions for
them.
Weather
Focus on conditions that affect flight in general and
aircraft systems in particular. Do not overlook factors
that affect target acquisition and night vision
capabilities. Consider--
Density altitude effects on performance and payload.
Weather effects on threat air defense systems.
Effects of wind speed and turbulence on flight
operations, especially in close terrain.
How.wind speed and turbulence will affect target
acquisition
0 Weather effects on target acquisition systems (for
example, laser or infrared).
0 Restricting effects of low ceilings in air avenues of
approach.
0 Conditions that may cause "white out" or "brown out.l'
0 Probability of icing.
0 Precipitation effects on forward area arming and
refueling activities.
Consider any other aspects of the battlefield environment
that may affect flight operations, such as--
0 Restrictions imposed by air space managers.
o High intensity radiation transmission areas.
4-7
FM 34-130
Evaluate the Threat
In describing the threat, identify--

o Units supported by ADA assets.
o The types of ADA systems and their capabilities, such
as--
- Maximum and minimum ranges.
- Maximum and minimum engagement altitudes.
- Minimum engagement times.
- Type of fusing systems in use..
- Effectiveness against our countermeasures.
- Type radar associated with each system.
- Number of .firing units per radar.
- Range capability of radar versus weapon system.
- Minimum altitude restrictions on radar.
- Ability of radar detectors (APR (1) or (2)-39) to
detect the radar.
0 Other threats such as lasers or artillery fire zones.
o Artificial illumination effects on target acquisition and
night vision devices.
o Target characteristics, such as--
- Normal deployment patterns in march or attack order.
- Capability to detect attacking aircraft.
- Typical reactions when attacked by aviation.
HVTs
nvib within
WJ.UUI each formation.
Determine Threat
+,
Courses of Action
Refine the hiaher command's threat COA model in order to--

Include ADA system range fans.
Determine where radars or weapon systems are masked by
terrain.
Identify areas with least amount of ADA coverage.
Identify likely threat air approaches to your engagement
areas and battle positions.
Develop situation templates for threat actions within the
engagement area; include reactions to aviation attack.
Identify threat units along flight paths; consider their
reactions and develop the appropriate situation
templates.
Consider threat reactions to downed pilots.
4-8
FM 34-130
::::::::::::::::::
;ii;~i:~:~:;;;;; Counterintelligence and Counter-reconnaissance iiiiiilltiiiitittiiiiilitiiiii
Refer to FM 34-60 for a full discussion of the
multi-discipline counterintelligence (MDCI) analysis process.
Define the
The A0 normally remains the same as that of the supported

unit. Expand the AI to include t-he access of the opposing
threat force to the intelligence,assets of higher echelons.
For example, if a threat corps has reasonable access to
space-based intelligence systems, then the AI should be -
expanded to-include the appropriate orbits. Also consider
launch sites for aerial collection assets.
Activities or characteristics of interest are any which
affect the threat's access to human intelligence (HUNINT),
imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT),
and other collection capabilities.
Describe the
Battlefield's Effects
In describing the battlefield environment--

0 Identify the locations that best support collection
coverage by threat collection systems. Consider ground
based (observation or equipment positions) and airborne
(standoff positions or orbits) assets.
0 Identify approach routes for each type of system.
Consider the unique needs of each type. For example,
covered and concealed infiltration routes and landing
zones for reconnaissance and surveillance units, high
speed -air avenues of approach for airborne IMINT systems,
etc.
0 Identify the areas within the A0 that offer friendly
forces concealment from threat collection systems.
0 Identify populated areas that would facilitate special or
clandestine HUMINT operations.
0 Identify the friendly units, locations, and information
vulnerable to collection through the threat capture of US
prisoners of war.
0 Determine the effect of weather upon collection systems.
4-9
FM 34-130
0 Identify political, legal, and moral constraints upon
collection efforts. For example, are there unique legal
or religious circumstances that might inhibit collection
operations? I
o Identify the effect of local culture upon collection.
For example, HDMINT collection efforts might be
ineffective against a closed, ethnically distinct I
community.
-
Evaluate the Threat
.^
In describing the threat-- I

0 Describe the threat decision making process. Include
descriptions of the threat counterparts to--
- The IPB process.
- The command estimate process, particularly wargaming.
- Techniques for selecting intelligence requirements.
- Collection planning and collection management.
- Asset reporting system. ,i
- Intelligence processing architecture.
- Dissemination procedures.
0 Estimate the standard lengths of the threat decision -3
r
cycle for both anticipated and unanticipated decisions.
For example:
- How long does it take the threat staff to plan and
execute an entirely new mission?
- How long does it take the threat staff to plan and
execute changes to the current mission?
- For a decision anticipated in wargaming, what is the i
length of time between acquisition 'of key indicators
by collection assets until execution of that
decision? How long would it take for an r
unanticipated decision?
0 Identify the collection systems available'to each threat
unit. Develop doctrinal templates and descriptions for I
the standard employment of these systems. Rank each
collection system in relative order of importance to
standard threat operations.
4-10
FM 34-130
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
In determining threat COAs--

o Use the basic maneuver COA model as a start point to
determine threat intelligence requirements. What does he
need to know to make the operation successful? Where are
the decision points? When does he need to know?
0 Estimate the threat's intelligence requirements and
attempt to recreate his version of the event template and
matrix (NAIs and indicators), and his collection plan.
(Which threat collection asset will collect against what
NAI or indicator?)
0 Develop products that show the employment of each
collection system and the ensuing coverage.
- Depict range fans for each system.
- Describe the type activity that can be collected
against within each range fan.
- Highlight the weaknesses of the overall threat
collection plan. For example, display any gaps in
coverage, nonredundant coverage, single-source
coverage, or collection coverage vulnerable to
deception.
- Highlight the strengths of the threat collection
plan. Identify the coverage that is balanced (all
source), redundant, and less vulnerable to deception.
0 Develop a friendly event template to support
counterintelligence and counter-reconnaissance. Identify
locations (NAIs) and activities (indicators) that will
confirm or deny key elements of the assumptions you have
made about the threat collection effort.
lisilliillili::: Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is a broad category, including--
o Electronic warfare support (ES).
o Electron attack (EA).
o Electronic protection (EP).
Responsibilities for these various functions are shared among
the G2's intelligence and counterintelligence staffs, the G3's
electronic warfare and operations security staffs, and Signal
and MI units supporting the command. Each of these elements
will conduct some or all the IPB required to support EW
operations.
4-11
FM 34-130
Define the
As usual, the A0 is assigned by the higher'command. The AI

must consider the electronic dimension. Depending on
echelon, it may include--
0 Fixed ES or EA sites that support threat operations.
o Airfields that support ES or EA aircraft.
0 Certain portions of~the electro-magnetic spectrum while
excluding others.
i
Describe the
Battiefield's Effects
Terrain
Evaluate the terrain from two perspectives:
0 How it enhances and supports communications and
target acquisition.
0 How it can be used to protect communications and
target acquisition systems from exploitation or
disruption.
Evaluate the terrain's effects on both threat and
friendly systems. Consider: i
0 Line-of-sight characteristics of the terrain,

including effects on both communications and
noncommunications emitters.
0 Vegetation and its effects on radio wave absorption
and antenna height requirements.
0 Locations of high power lines and their interference I
with radio waves.
0 Large vertical objects, such as buildings or cliffs,
that will influence radio waves.
0 Effects of soil types on the electrical grounding of
equipment.
4-12
FM 34-130
Weather
Evaluate the effects of weather on both threat and
friendly systems. Consider:
0 Effects of extreme weather conditions on sensitive
electronic equipment. Do not overlook high humidity
or large amounts of dust in this evaluation.
0 Electrical storms and other electromagnetic
phenomenon.
0 Effects of high winds or obscurants, such as
.precipitation or blowing,.dust, on antennas and
line-of-sight systems.
o Weather effects on flight operations of .ES nor Efi
aircraft.
Evaluate the Threat
Use the standard OB factors to structure your analysis.

Focus on--
0 Types of communication equipment available.
o Types of noncommunications emitters.
0 Surveillance and target acquisition assets.
T chnological sophistication of the threat.
: C 5 structure of the threat.
0 Tactics, from a communicafions perspective, such as--
- Deployment of their C assets.
- Remoting of communications systems.
- Flexibility, or lack of, in procedures.
- Communications security discipline.
- Operations security discipline.
0 Reliance on active or passive surveillance systems.
0 Electromagnetic profiles of each node.
0 Unique spectrum signatures.
o Technical data bases, such as--
- Signal operating instructions.
- Communications net structure.
- Frequency allocation techniques.
- Operating schedules.
- Station identification methods.
- Measurable characteristics of communications and
noncommunications equipment.
4-13
FM 34-130
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
(1
Use the supported command's situation templates as a starting

point. Refine them to include--
0 Electromagnetic profiles.
o Reactions to 'EA at.critical junctures. in the battle.
0 Threat use of ES and EA to support their own operations.
.i
z::::::::::::::::::: ......................
iii!iiitiii~iiiii~iii Engineer fffiillff~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
r
Define the
The A0 and the AI for an engineer unit are generally the same
as that of the supported maneuver unit.
Describe the
Battlefield1s Effects
)I
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain's effects on engineer
operations--
o Analyze the defensible terrain within each avenue of
approach to determine locations which lend themselves
to the use of obstacles.
0 Further identify where the terrain lends itself to
breaching operations at each loc~ations. This
includes concealed and covered routes towards-the
breach site and terrain that supports suppressing
fire during the breaching operation.
0 Analyze streams and rivers within the AO. Focus on
bridges, ford sites, and areas that lend themselves
to river-crossing operations.
0 Identify other man-made or natural obstacles within
the AO, such as railroad tracks with steep
embankments. Identify the effect of each obstacle
upon the movement of different type units. Further
analyze the locations where these obstacles can be
;\
easily traversed or crossed.
4-14
FM 34-130
Weather
When conducting weather analysis for engineer operations
determine--
The visibility constraints for each obstacle system,
particularly around areas likely to be breached.
How weather affects the performance of each type of
obstacle for the local terrain. For example, how
does recurring rain change the effectiveness of a
standard antitank ditch in this particular soil type?
How does weather affect trafficability?
How does weather affect dust control?
The effects of weather upon survivability positions,
The:.effect of precipitation upon rivers and'streams.
During winter, also estimate the degree to which each
water source would be frozen and its subsequent load
capacity.
Logistics Infrastructure of the Battlefield
When evaluating the logistics infrastructure of the
battlefield--
0 Identify local sources of potable water.
0 Identify local sources of barrier material.
o Analyze the ability of the local road network to
support anticipated traffic. Are immediate repairs
required? How much maintenance will each road
require to support sustained operations?
0 Do local airfields require repairs or maintenance?
Economics
When considering economics, identify the engineer
projects which would most help the local population if
time permits. Such projects are especially pertinent for
nation assistance and counterinsurgency operations.
Projects could include building roads, school houses,
power generation facilities, water sanitation, or other
public buildings and services.
Treaties, Agreements and legal Restrictions
During peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, the unit
should determine legal constraints for engineer
operations.
4-15
e
FM 34-130
Evaluate the Threat
Threat Order of Battle

Your evaluation should include-- I
Organizati,on, equipment, and stand~ard operations of

threat engineer units. Consider the capability to I
conduct the following types of operations.
- MobiIity;
- Counter-mobility;
- Survivability; I
- Obstacle placement; and,
- Breaching.
Capabilities of engineer units measured in-- I
- Time required to lay each type of obstacle
system.
- Time needed to breach obstacles.
- Time required to entrench a mechanized infantry d
company.
- Ability of engineers to bridge different size
rivers and streams, and time required for each. i
- etc.
o Tactics that threat engineers employ while conducting
each of the above operations.
o Ability of the threat's logistical system to sustain
engineer operations.
o Capabilities of threat weapons to penetrate friendly
survivability measures and systems. i
o Include information on survivability techniques. For
example, threat use of chain link fences to defeat
high explosive antitank rounds and missiles. i
Engineer capabilities of threat infantry, armor, and
other nonengineer units.
i
Threat Models
Threat models should include--
0 Schematic drawings of standard obstacle systems.
0 Schematics of vehicle survivability positions.
0 Standard threat employment of obstacle support to
defensive systems. Categorize each obstacle by its
effect (disrupt, turn, fix, or block).
0 Typical employment techniques for combined arms units
during breaching operations.
.~j,
4-16
FM 34-130
0 Typical employment of combined arms units during
river or gap crossing operations.
o Descriptions of mine warfare doctrine, marking
systems, and standard patterns.
o Technical information on obstacle system material,
mine fuses, delivery systems (air, artillery, etc.),
and details of construction.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Threat COA Models

In order to develop situation templates for engineers,
begin with the maneuver situation templates of the
supported unit. For each maneuver COA available to the
threat, develop multiple engineer COAs that include--
o An estimate of the engineer status of each threat COA
for the defense. This should be measured in the
percentage of combat vehicles with entrenched
primary, alternate, supplementary, and deception
positions; and the likely extent of obstacle systems.
0 Likely locations and extent of obstacle systems
required to support each defense system. Categorize
the systems by effect (disrupt, turn, fix, or block).
0 An estimate of the mobility support for each threat
COA for the offense. This should be measured in the
breaching and fording capabilities of both the
maneuver and the supporting engineer detachments.
Event Template
When using event templates--
0 Attempt to use the same NAI system established by the
supported unit. The advantage of this technique is
that the supported 52 can easily add one indicator or
SOR requirement to collection assets that are already
being deployed.
0 If necessary, establish separate NAIs to support the
execution of engineer operations.
4-17
FM 34-130
Decision Support
Decision points (DPs) for engineer units should focus on
decisions such as--
~0 Forward deployment of breaching teams.
o The employment of artillery scatterable mines.
0 Shifting the priority of engineer missions (mobility
to counter-mobility, etc.).
o Redirecting direct support or general support
engine.er assets.
0 Closing lanes in obstacle systems (to support battle
handover during a rearward passage of lines).
0 Forward deployment of obstacle teams to close.~
breaches between the first and second echelons. '.
Intelligence jiyiJljjjJDHIHi;!^
Intelligence units perform a wide variety of missions. For
considerations that apply to some of these functions, see
relevant sections throughout this chapter. For example:
0 For aerial exploitation assets, including unmanned aerial
vehicles, refer to the section on AVIATION.
0 For units involved in EW, refer to the section on
ELECTRONIC WARFARE.
0 For units that operate in the rear area, refer to the
sections on COUNTERINTELLIGENCE and REAR AREA AND COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT.
Define the
As usual, the A0 is assigned by the higher command. The AI

must consider the electronic dimension. Depending on
echelon, it may include--
0 Fixed ES or EA sites that support threat operations.
0 Airfields that support ES or EA aircraft.
4-18
FM 34-130
Describe the
Battlefields Effects
Terrain
Evaluate the terrain from two, perspective:
o How it enhances and supports communications and
target acquisition
o How it can be used to protect communications and
target acquisition systems from exploitation or
disruption.
Evaluate-the terrain's effects on both threat and
friendly systems. Consider:
0 Line-of-sight characteristics of the terrain, to
include both communications and noncommunications
emitters.
0 Vegetation and its effects on radio wave absorption
and antenna height requirements.
0 Locations of high power lines and their interference
with radio waves.
0 Large vertical objects, such as buildings or cliffs,
that will influence radio waves.
0 Effects of soil types on the electrical grounding of
equipment.
0 Areas best suited to deployment of your systems, such
as--
- Accessibility.
- Defilading and masking effects of terrain.
- Security from Levels I, II, and III rear area
threats.
Weather
Evaluate weather effects on both threat and friendly
systems. Consider:
0 Effects of extreme weather conditions on sensitive
electronic equipment. Do not overlook high humidity
or large amounts of dust in this evaluation.
0 Electrical storms and other electromagnetic
phenomenon.
o Effects of high winds or obscurants, such as
precipitation or blowing dust, on antennas and
line-of-sight systems.
0 Weather effects on flight operations of your
collection aircraft.
4-19
FM 34-130
Evaluate the Threat
Use the standard OB factors to structure your analysis.

Focus on how the threat (targets) will appear to your
collection systems.
0 Use the techniques detailed in the ELECTRONIC WARFARE
section.
0 Identify signature items of equipment that are easily
identified by your collection assets.
0 Identify the threat's normal OPSEC and COMSEC procedures.
0 Identify systems that are direct threats to your
collectors. -
0 Describe the threat's ability to locate and destroy your
assets.
0 Use techniques associated with the rear battle to
evaluate rear area threat to your assets. See the
sections on COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE and REAR AREA AND COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Start with the threat COA models developed by the supported

force. Refine them to focus on--
o The targets of your collection operations. Use the
techniques described in the ELECTRONIC WARFARE section.
0 Dispositions of threat target acquisition assets.
o Rear area threats to your units.' Use the techniques
discussed in the sections on COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE and REAR AREA COMBAT SERVICE AND
SUPPORT.
0 Focus on threat COAs relevant to your commander, not the
supported force commander. These COAs should deal
primarily with collection operations, force preservation,
and activities that will require your units to displace.
The supported command's intelligence officer (G2 or S2)
develops COAs relevant to the needs of the supported
force commander.
4-20
i
FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiifiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii Nuclear, Biological , and Chemical !!f!!ffitfif.fftf!!lffilillilii!i!!i!ii
Chemical units perform decontamination, obscurant, and NBC
reconnaissance missions. NBC staffs are,interested in both
friendly and threat capabilities to employ nuclear weapons and
obscurants, friendly and threat vulnerability to nuclear
weapons, and friendly vulnerability to chemical and biological
weapons.
Define the
The A0 will normally be the same as that of the supported

force.
The NBC AI includes--
0 All threat missile and artillery weapons that can deliver
NBC weapons into the AO.
0 All threat aircraft capable of delivering NBC weapons
into the AO.
Describe the'
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain's effects on NBC operations:
0 Identify critical terrain features (e.g., defiles,
choke points, rivers, key terrain).
o Analyze the avenues of approach and mobility
corridors developed by the G2/S2 for areas of
vulnerability to NBC weapons or areas that are
especially suitable for the use of obscurants.
Weather
When conducting weather analysis for NBC operations:
0 Identify critical weather information needed to
determine ,the effects of weather on NBC weapons or
4-21
FM 34-130
obscurants. Refer to FM 3-6, Field Behavior of NBC
Agents, for more information.
Logistics Infrastructure of the Battlefield
When evaluating the infrastructure of the battlefield:
0 Identify local sources of water suitable for
decontamination operations. Consider natural and
industrial or civic sources.
I Evaluate the Threat ~,
In addition to the-broad range of OB factors and threat

capabilities, NBC staffs evaluate:
0 Threat capabilities to employ NBC weapons and obscurants.
0 Types of delivery systems, including minimum and maximum
ranges.
o Threat NBC weapons employment doctrine and TTP.
Determine if NBC weapon employment is terrain oriented,
force oriented, or a combination of both. Pay particular
attention to recent operations.
Threat NBC protection capabilities.
0 Indicators of preparations to employ NBC weapons.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Refine the supported unit's threat COA models to focus on the

considerations listed under Evaluate the Threat (above).
Evaluate the threat COA models to identify--
0 Likely areas of ground force penetration of forward lines
(a suitable NBC target).
0 Friendly assets the threat is likely to consider HPT for
engagement by NBC weapons as part of the COA.
o Existing contaminated areas that may indicate the course
of action adopted
. by the threat.
4-22
...
FM 34-130
iiiililiiiiililliiili s igna i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiliililiiililiiiiiiiiiilij HHH::H:H:H:::iii::i::;i:::iHi:::i:::H::::::::::::i::::::::::
Define the
The A0 is the same as that of the supported unit. The AI

must include--
o Required links with higher and adjacent commands.
0 Threat jamming assets capable of affecting communication.
o Threat SIGINT collection assets that may target your' -
systems or customers.
Describe the
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain's effects on signal
operations--
0 Evaluate location of customers and communication
density.
0 Evaluate best lines-of-sight for required
communication links.
0 Identify locations that provide line-of-sight
defilade from potential threat collection or jamming
systems.
0 Identify site access and escape routes.
0 Evaluate sites for tenability.
Weather
When conducting weather analysis for signal operations--
0 Evaluate effects of forecasted weather on
frequencies. Identify optimal frequencies for use.
0 Identify potential communication degradation caused
by high winds (antenna wobble) or precipitation.
0 Evaluate weather effects on site access or
tenability.
4-23
FM 34-130
Other factors
Other factors to consider in signal operations:
0 Frequency deconfliction.
0 Identify host nation frequency restrictions.
o Identify any host nation or local restrictions on
terrain use.
Evaluate the Threat
Evaluate the capabilities of the threat to disrupt or '. ._ I

intercept communications. In particular, identify--
0 Ability to locate or intercept your systems. I
0 Targeting accuracies of collection systems.
0 Speed with which the threat can collect, process, and
then target communication sites.
EA effectiveness (equipment and techniques). i
Ability to link collection systems to indirect fire
assets.
Range capabilities of supporting indirect fire systems.
Ability to conduct deep strikes or operations.
Threat models, to include--
- Deployment patterns and tactics of SIGINT collection
systems.
- Deployment patterns and tactics of EA assets.
- Deployment patterns, tactics, and range capabilities
of long-range indirect fire systems. I
- Techniques of intrusion or electronic deception.
i
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Use the supported unit's threat COA models as a base. Refine

and supplement these to include the considerations listed
under EVALUATE THE THREAT discussed above.
Evaluate the supported unit's threat COA to identify--
0 Direct threats to communication due to the expected flow
of battle (over-running of sites).
o Probability of Levels I, II, or III rear area threats.
0 Potential requirements to move sites or replace destroyed
sites.
i
4-24
i
FM 34-130
:t:::
Special Operations
Define the
The A0 is normally assigned by a higher command. The AI

extends from home base, through operational bases, into the
Joint Special Operations Area, to the TAI. It can also
include--
0 Infiltration and exfiltration routes and corridors. -
o Areas or countries that provide military, political,
economic, psychological, or social aid to the target
forces or threats to the mission.
o The air AI, which is the same as for other aviation
units.
0 Psychological operations AIs which are tied to the target
population and may include entire countries.
Describe the
Terrain
When evaluating the terrain's effects on special
operations--
0 Include all potential zones of entry and
infiltration corridors. Do not overlook waterborne
access routes or rooftop zones of entry.
0 Identify sources of food and potable water.
0 Evaluate slopes as obstacles to fast rope assault
operations.
0 Identify ultra-low level flight corridors.
Other characteristics to consider are--
0 Conduct "factor analysis" to evaluate--
- Density and distribution of population groups.
- Composite groups based on political behavior and
the strengths of each.
- Issues motivating political, economic, social, or
military behaviors of groups.
4-25
FM 34-130
0 Evaluate economic infrastructure.
0 Identify economic programs which can cause desired
changes in population behavior.
0 Evaluate the formal and informal political structure
of the government.
0 Identify legal and illegal political parties.
0 Identify nonparty political organizations and special
interest groups.
0 Evaluate the independence of the judiciary.
0 Evaluate the independence of the mass media.
0 Evaluate the administrative competence of the
bureaucracy.
0 Identify the origin of the incumbent government.
0 Evaluate the history of political violence inthe
country..,
Evaluate the Threat
0 Identify external support to the threat. Consider the

probability of military intervention by third-party
nations.
0 Identify the threat's desired end state.
0 Evaluate the groups and subgroups supporting the threat.
0 Identify discord within the threat.
0 Identify any groups that may have been mislead about the
threat's desired end state.
0 Evaluate organizational structures or patterns within the
threat.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
Identify the threat's likely responses to special operations,

to include--
0 Political.
0 Social.
o Military.
4-26
FM 34-130
Rear Area and Combat Service Support IIIIIIIIIHIII

The difference between rear area IPB and IPB for a combat
service support unit is one of scope. For example, a division
rear command post is responsible for the area between the rear
boundaries of the maneuver brigades and the division's rear
boundary. The rear command post will identify, analyze, and
wargame level II II, and III threats.
In contrast, a medical unit is responsible only for that
small piece of terrain which the division support command has
allocated to it. Within its assigned area, the staff will
usually identify, analyze, and wargame only level I threats.
Furthermore,. the rear command post is exclusively concerned
with the rear area. combat service support units, however, will
also analyze the threat to their personnel and equipment while
they conduct operations in the main battle area.
Military Police apply many of the tactics, techniques and
procedures of the IPB process during the planning and execution
of battlefield circulation control, area security, and law and
order operations. As a response force, MP units actively detect
and destroy level II threats and support rear echelon operations
in the detection, delay and defeat of level III threats.
Define the
The supported maneuver unit will designate the unit rear A0

and appropriate A0 for combat service support units. The MP
A0 will usually be the same as that of the supported unit.
The AI must incorporate--
o Airfields and air avenues of approach for threat air
assault, airborne; and air interdiction forces.
o Locations of threat artillery units capable of delivering
NBC rounds.
o Operational reserves capable of penetrating the MBA.
0 Insurgent forces that are capable of operating within the
rear area or that can affect combat service support
operations in the MBA.
o Terrorist organizations that can attack the rear area or
otherwise interfere with combat service support
operations.
o Hostile forces that could affect CSS units' moving
forward in the offense.
4-27
FM 34-130
Threat Model
Threat models should include--
P
0 Pursuit and exploitation procedures for conventional
forces.
0 Air assault, airborne, and light infantry techniques
for deep attack.
0 unconventional warfare techniques for deep
operations.'
o Standard, procedures for insurgent raids and ambushes.
standard pr<
o Typical:procedures
Typical pro< for terrorist attacks.
Determine Threat
p&&q
Courses of Action
Threat COA Models

Threat COA models should start with the maneuver COAs
developed by the supported unit. For each maneuver COA
available to the threat, the analyst should develop
multiple combat service support COAs that include-- r
0 Likely areas of penetration for ground forces.

0 Likely objectives in the rear area that will r
facilitate.the threat main attack or defense.
0 The HVTs and HPTs that the threat will identify to
support their concepts of operations. This could be
either key terrain in the rear area or specified i
combat service support activities themselves.
0 Situation templates for air assaults and airborne
operations. Ensure you identify complete COAs--air D
avenues to landing and drop zones, infiltration lanes
to the objective, and exfiltration lanes.
I
0 Insurgent or partisan COAs. Complete COAs should
include their assembly in hide areas, movement
through infiltration lanes, actions on the objective,
and exfiltration. (See COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS I
in Chapter 6 for a complete discussion on this
subject.)
0 Terrorist COAs. See the ANTITERRORISM OPERATIONS in
Chapter 6 ,for a complete discussion.
4-30
FM 34-130
Event Template
In event templates--
o The rear command post of the supported unit should
establish NAIs for levels I, II, and III rear area
threats.
0 The individual combat service support units should
establish NAIs for levels I and II threats against
their ,specific areas.
Decision Support for the rear command post
This should focus on decisions, such as--
o Request for commitment of the level III tactical
combat force.
0 Commitment of level II response forces.
0 Request for fire support to preplanned TAIs.
Decision Support for combat service support Units
This should focus on decisions, such as--
0 "Pushing forward" support packages that the supported
unit will require given anticipated operations.
0 Request for commitment of Level II response forces or
the level III tactical combat force.
o Commitment of the local quick reaction force for the
base or base cluster.
0 Request for fire support to preplanned TAIs.
0 "Jumping" to a new location.
4-31
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 5
TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The basic IPB process remains the same, regardless of the

level of war at which it is conducted. Some considerations for
the application, of IPB doctrine at different levels are
discussed in this chapter.
The examples given are certainly not all-inclusive. An
exhaustive list~would be impossible'to present due to the
dramatic variance of the situations that the US Army~might
conduct operations within. IPB at the operational and strategic
levels will usually be "custom built" and tailored for each
METT-T situation. However, the basic process of IPB will always
remain the same.
::::::::::::::::::::::::
Iililliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiili Define the Battlefield Environment iiiii.iti!f!l!!iiiiiiiiiiiiifiii;ii!!iti
Regardless of the level of execution, the A0 is almost

always confined to the geographical boundaries specified on the
operations overlay given from higher headquarters. In terms of
time, it is always for the duration of the operations specified
in the operations order.
However, the nature of the AI and the types of activity with
which a command is concerned vary significantly according to the
level of war at which IPB is conducted. Establishing an AI that
exceeds the limits of the A0 and the command's battle space
allows the command to anticipate significant developments.
Following are considerations for establishing the AI at various
levels.
( TACTICAL
0 The AI is almost always confined to the physical
location and avenues of approach of threat units that
have the time and mobility to enter the AO.
0 Significant characteristics of the battlefield during
war are usually limited to--
Influence of the terrain and weather on military
operations.
Ability of the local infrastructure to support
operations.
5-1
FM 34-130
Environmental health hazards.

Employment of threat combat forces.
Location of noncombatant populations.
Refugee flows.
Status of force agreements.
Rules of engagement and other restraints and
constraints on military operations.
0 As tactical units operate in operations other than war,
the characteristics they are interested in usually
expand to include items such as--
Press coverage and threat propaganda.
Sympathies and reactions of local population-and -
organizations to friendly operations.
Local economy, including "black markets".
Local legal system.
Unofficial organizations, including clans, tribes,
etc.
Local government, including unofficial parties,
meeting sites, activities, contentious issues, etc.
Para-military organizations and police forces.
Governmental and non-governmental organizations
that may interact with the friendly force during
execution of the mission.
OPERATIONAL
At the operational level the AI expands to include items

such as--
0 Location of threat combat service support units.
0 Local infrastructure required to support,threat resupply
operations.
The types of activity of concern during military operations
at the operational level generally include--
0 Potential effects of third-nation involvement.
0 Press coverage and threat propaganda.
0 Sympathies and reactions of regional population and
organizations.
0 Regional economies.
0 Regional legal systems.
5-2
FM 34-130
STRATEGIC I
At the strategic level the AI expands to include the entire

world. Significant characteristics expand to include--
0 World opinion and international law.
0 US public support.
0 Support base land political objectives of the threat
government.
0 Threat, host nation, and coalition partner national
economies and legal system.
::::::::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiiiiiIIiiiiiiiiiiii Describe the Battlefield I s Effects ~r~iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiriiiiiii~~~~~
. . . . . . . . ::::: . . . . . . . . . . . ::::::: . . . . . . . . . . . . . :::::::
TACTICAL
During war, terrain considerations are usually confined to

identifying terrain objectives, specific avenues of
approach, and infiltration lanes that support attacks, and
terrain that supports defense.
Weather considerations are usually confined to the effects
of weatherupon personnel, weapons systems, force mobility,
and tactical military operations.
During operations other than war, other characteristics of
the battlefield gain in importance. 'Characteristics of the
battlefield are always analyzed in terms of their effect
upon threat and friendly COAs. Some examples are--
0 "The Carter-Torrijos Treaty does not allow us to conduct
the operation being considered in the areas marked in
red."
0 "The threat cannot establish any defense larger than
company size for three weeks because the militia will be
harvesting."
0 "A surprise attack on objective BUTKUS will probably
convince the people in the surrounding village that-the
insurgent propaganda is correct and the stated US
position is a lie. The people will support an attack
only if we give reasonable opportunity for noncombatants
to evacuate."
5-3
FM 34-130
OPERATIONAL
Terrain analysis at the operational level focuses on the

general effects of terrain on operations within the
battlefield framework. At this level it incorporates such
items as--
0 Ability of large pieces of terrain to support the combat
operations.- of large units in the A0 and AI.
Large forests generally inhibit
~. mounted movement
and favor the employment of dismounted forces.
Forestscomplicate the employment of intelligence
gathering assets, communications, and coordination
between adjacent forces.
Open and gentle rolling terrain favors the
employment of mounted forces.
Swamps and other wetlands limit mounted movement to
road networks and hamper dismounted, off-road
movement. These areas tend to be easily dominated
by air units.
Deserts hamper large-scale or long movements.
Although terrain within the desert may vary
greatly, deserts are characterized by a lack of
natural concealment, lack of cover, lack of fresh
water, ,and difficulties with LOC.
Mountainous terrain normally restricts operations
to valley areas and passes. Lateral LOC are
generally restricted, making it difficult to move
reserves or shift main efforts.
0 Transportation networks (for example, road, rail, air,
sea) and zones of entry into and through the A0 and AI.
0 Ability of transportation networks to support the
movement of forces and prpvide logistical support to
large unit operations in various parts of the A0 and AI.
Weather analysis at this level usually addresses the
seasonal climatic effects on the combat, combat support, and
combat service support operations of large units.
5-4
FM 34-130
Other significant characteristics of the battlefield gain
importance at the operational level. Express their
influence in terms of their effect on threat and friendly
COAs . Examples are--
0 "The Kuntz tribe will resist any attempt to establish
military lines of operation through their land. They do
not have the military means ~to significantly interfere
with our lines, but two international treaties make
operations in this region inadvisable for either side."
0 "The Neroth TruffleWald supplies 100 percent of the
truffles for both the Good Duchy of Fenwick and the Evil
Emirate of Vulgaria. The truffle harvest from this
region is valued so highly by both countries-that -.
off-road maneuver will not be tolerated. Except for, the
paved roads, it is considered SEVERELY RESTRICTED
terrain."
STRATEGIC I
At strategic levels the battlefield is described in terms of

geography and climate rather than terrain and weather.
Focus on the effects of major terrain features and weather
patterns. How do mountain ranges, flood plains, and tracts
of forest within the theater influence operations and
available courses of action?
Other characteristics of the battlefield take on an
increased importance at the strategic level. For example,
the industrial and technological capabilities of a nation or
region will influence the type of military force it fields.
Similar factors may influence the ability of a nation to
endure a protracted conflict without outside assistance.
Political and economic factors may be the dominant factors
influencing threat courses of action. Always express the
evaluation of their effects in terms of operations and
courses of action. For example--
0 "The threat's state of technological development makes
him dependent on outside sources for sophisticated
military equipment."
0 "World opinion prevents us from pursuing the enemy
across the border."
5-5
FM 34-130
"The enemy can prosecute the war only as long as the oil
shipments continue from the west. Any significant
interdiction of the oil flow will render the enemy
immobile at the strategic and operational levels."
"At the moment, popular support for the enemy government
is very precarious. However, friendly advances further
into the vital northern region will rally the people
around the war effort. This would probably enable the
enemy to mobilize more strategic reserves.8V
"The Montreal Treaty, designed to maintain the regional
balance of power, forbids us to conduct any operation
without the consent of all six nations."
"The probability of Chinese intervention increases as we
approach the Yalu River."
"The sea lines of communication best support opening the
second front in northern France. However, the second
front could still be well supplied through southern
France, and marginally through Yugoslavia.V1
"The winter climate in this region is too severe for an
army of southern Europe to endure in the field.
Napoleon must either destroy the Russian army before
winter, or conduct a strategic withdrawal.
Evaluate the Threat
This usually involves analysis and evaluation of the 08

factors (composition, disposition, strength, tactics,
training status) for threat units at the tactical level. As
a result of studying the threat OB factors the analyst
produces threat models. Tactical examples are--
0 "Layout and defensive measures for the typical insurgent
base camp."
0 "Standard demonstration tactics for the Students for a
Democratic Society."
0 "Typical security echelon for a mechanized infantry
division in the defense."
5-6
FM 34-130
0 "Surveillance procedures that the People's Democratic

Army uses prior to a terrorist attack."
0 "Standard narco-terrorist security measures for the
protection of cocaine-producing laboratories."
Analysis'of the OB factors at this level should include

weapons of ma s destruction and the threat's doctrine for
operational C 5 . This includes his doctrine for
determining~operational missions and objectives and the.TTP
associated with gaining nuclear or chemical release
authority. Express vulnerabilities and HVTs in terms of the
threat's centers of gravity.
Evaluate all military forces available. Include
para-military forces and special operations forces that
operate in the communications zone as well as forces
operating on the battlefield.
Some examples of threat models at the operational level
are--
0 18Normal sequence of events for the conduct of a national
offensive by the insurgents."
0 "Typical enemy campaign plan for an operational delay."
0 "Theater support structure for enemy logistics."
0 "Procedures that regional paramilitary forces could use
to interfere with non-combatant evacuation."
0 "Standard exploitation and pursuit procedures employed
by enemy tank armies."
STRATEGIC I
OB analysis at this level includes considerations such as--

o Relationship of the military to the government. Who
sets national and theater objectives? How?
5-7
FM 34-130
o Non-military methods of exerting power and influence. m
o National will and morale.

o Ability to field, train, and maintain large military
forces.
Threat capabilities and models depicting them take a
strategic view of operations and courses of action.
Examples of threat models at the strategic level are--
0 "Possible forms of intervention by third-party
countries."
0 "Normal timetables for the enemy mobilization and.
train-up of -corps-size units."
0 "Techniques for transporting large volumes of narcotics I
through source, intermediate, and destination
countries."
0 "Typical movement rates when shifting strategic reserves
between theaters."
::::::::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiiitiiiiiiiiiiiilii Determine Threat Courses of Action iiiiiiiiijiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~::~~~:~~~:::~~:: . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ::...:...:::::::
To determine a threat COA at any level, the, analyst must I

first identify the threat's likely objectives, then identify
the various threat models that will accomplish the
objectives under the specific METT-T conditions under I
consideration.
,-
11 TACTICAL r
Some examples of threat course of action models at the

tactical level are--
0 "Most likely response of 8th Company (Atlantica) upon a
treaty violation by 3d Troop (Pacifico)."
0 "Likely infiltration lanes, ambush sites, and
exfiltration lanes for an insurgent attack against
Thursday's convoy.**
0 "How the 35th Motorized Rifle Regiment would defend I
Mulvihill pass using a reserve slope defense."
i
5-8
FM 34-130
1 OPERATIONAL
Course of action models at the operational level focus on

lines of communication, lines of operation, phasing of
operations, operational objectives, the movement and
employment of large forces, etc.. Express high value targets
in terms of centers of gravity and operational targets that
expose centers of gravity to destruction.
Some examples of threat course of action models at the
operational level are--
0 "Most likely COAs of the six warring factions upon 'the
introduction of US peace-enforcement troops."
0 "Probable LOC if the enemy attacks in the northern half
of the theater."
0 "Course of action 3: The rival warlords are unable to
come to an agreement and cannot generate enough force to
effectively oppose the entry of US forces. In this
case, they do not interfere with US operations, and
might even facilitate the relief efforts, hoping for a
speedy withdrawal of US forces once the mission is
complete. Once US forces have withdrawn, its back to
business as usual."
0 "General forecast of guerrilla attacks assuming that
Route 88 is successfully interdicted for the next 3
months."
0 "Course of action 1: put the army boundary along the
WHETSTONE MOUNTAINS and commit 2nd Army with four
divisions against the MONS TONITRUS sector, and 3rd Army
with five divisions against the TIR YSGITHER sector."
0 "The enemy's operational center of gravity is his
ability to quickly shift the two reserve corps to
reinforce any one of the three front-line armies. The
key to his center of gravity is the rail-transportation
network centered in the RISSE-MESS-SCHMID area."
5-9
.
FM 34-130
1 STRATEGIC 1
Threat course of action models at the strategic level

consider the entire resources of the threat. Include
non-military methods of power projection and influence.
Identify theaters of main effort and the major forces
committed to each. Depict national as well as strategic and
theater objectives.
Some examples:of situation templates at the strategic level
are--
0 "The three best options for the Trojans if presented '-
with a war on two fronts."
0 "The directions that Chairman Cormier will probably
issue to his military council, given the current
political situation."
0 "Military resources that the Spartans will probably
commit to pacify the population within the occupied
territories."
**Course of action 1: the main effort is the Atlantic
theater. The allies will attempt to open a second front
as soon as possible while conducting a strategic defense
in the Pacific."
0 "Probable reactions of Metropolania and Urbanity to US
operations in support of insurgency within Forgotonia."
0 "Military options available to Garraland that might
break the blockade and embargo."
0 "Course of action 3: because of political and economic
ties, as well as the availability of resources, the
allies will split responsibility for the Pacific~
theater. The most likely boundary is shown on
sketch C."
0 "The terrorist organization's strategic center of
gravity is their ability to use the area along the
border as a sanctuary. The lack of cooperation between
the two countries in policing their common border is the
key to the center of gravity."
5-10
FM 34-130
CHAPTER 6
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
t
Operations other than war can occur unilaterally or with

other military operations. It is possible that US forces could
be involved in operations other than war while the host nation
is at war. Operations other than war can evolve to war; be
prepared for the transition. Operations other than war include,
but are notlimited to, the operations described in this
chapter.
The four steps of the IPB process remain constant-regardless
of the mission; unit, staff section or echelon. The art of
applying IPB to operations other than war is in the proper
application of the steps to specific situations. The primary
difference between IPB for conventional war and operations other
than war is focus -the degree of detail required- and the demand
for demographic analysis required to support the decision making
process.
When conducting operations other than war within the United
States bear in mind that there are legal restrictions on
intelligence operations that gather information on US citizens.
See Department of Defense Directive 5240.1, Department of
Defense Regula,tion 5240.1-R and Army Regulations 380-13 and
381-10 for more information. Coordinate with legal sources,
such as local law enforcement agencies, for information on US
citizens required to support operations other than war in the
United States.
::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiliiiiiiiliii Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Humanitarian assistance operations provide emergency relief

to victims of natural disasters when initiated in response to
domestic, foreign governments, or international agency
requests for immediate help and rehabilitation. Disaster
relief operations include activities such as refugee
assistance, food distribution programs, medical treatment and
care, restoration of law and order, damage and capabilities
assessment, and damage control (including environmental
cleanup and programs such as fire fighting).
6-l
FM 34-130
Define the
Battlefield Environment I
The A0 will normally be assigned by higher headquarters. The

AI should include--
0 Potential sources of assistance from outside the disaster
area.
I
0 Areas or activities that might generate refugees moving .
into the AO.
m
0 Further threats to the AO, such as severe weather
patterns or para-military forces and gangs.
,,#
0 Identify all military, para-military, governmental, and m
non-governmental (Red Cross, Hope, etc.) organizations
that may interact with the friendly force.
0 Establish criteria to judge extent of the disaster and
track the progress of recovery operations.
Describe the
0 Determine the present and potential extent of the

disaster. Identify the likelihood of additional floods,
earthquakes, mud slides, displaced persons, etc.
0 Identify the population sectors which require assistance
and determine the type needed.
0 Coordinate with local law enforcement agencies for
information on gang "boundaries". Identify the amount of
influence each group has over the local population.
6-2
I
FM 34-130
0 Focus on demographics. Consider the effects of--
population distribution patterns;
ethnic divisions;
religious beliefs;
language divisions;
tribe, clan, and sub-clan loyalties;
health hazards;
political sympathies;
etc.
0 Consider the effects of the logistic infrastructure--
location, activity, and capability of care
distribution points (food, health care, etc.);
sources of food and water;
housing availability;
hospital capabilities;
utility services (water, electricity, etc.);
law enforcement agencies and capabilities;
emergency services (fire department, etc.).
0 Determine if the environment is permissive or hostile to
the introduction of US forces. While governmental
agencies may welcome US forces, other elements of the
population may not.
0 Use non-Department of Defense assets and host nation
resources to fill voids in the data base and map coverage
of the AO. For example, census data can provide
demographic data, law enforcement and emergency service
organizations can provide information on local
infrastructure.
0 Identify the limits of your commander's authority. Can
he financially obligate the government? Does he have the
authority to enforce laws? To assist law enforcement
agencies?
Evaluate the Threat
0 Consider weather and the environment as potential

threats. Weather will impact on your ability to conduct
relief operations. For example, if the target of a
relief effort is a village isolated by mud slides or
another natural disaster, inclement weather may limit or
curtail air operations to the site.
6-3
FM 34-130
0 The environment may pose threats to the health of both
mission and host nation personnel in the forms of
waterborne diseases, spoiled or contaminated foodstuffs,
and other environmental hazards.
0 Identify and evaluate the threat posed by any groups that
may oppose friendly force operations. Consider groups
that may clandestinely oppose the-operation even though
they publicly pledge support.
0 Consider initially neutral groups and personnel that may
become hostile as the operation progresses. What action
is necessary to keep them neutral?
0 During support to law enforcement agencies, elements of
the population may pose significant threats. Use the
traditional OB factors, with modifications to fit the
specific situation, to evaluate the threat posed by gangs
or similar "organized" groups. Adhere to legal
restriction on intelligence operations against US
citizens; coordinate with law enforcement agencies for
assistance.
0 When confronted with riots or similar threats identify I
"opinion makers" and other influential members of the
local population. Identify potential trouble spots and
contentious issues. Adhere to legal restrictions on
intelligence.operations against US citizens. I
Determine Threat m
Courses of Action
I
Start with threat objectives and develop courses of
action from there. Consider all courses .of action. For
example, if the threat objective is to get US forces out
of the host nation, one course of action could be to S
allow the US force to complete its mission quickly. Do
not focus on strictly confrontational courses of action.
I
Consider the effect the threat's perception of US forces
has on potential courses of action. If US forces appear
overwhelmingly powerful, non-confrontational COAs may be r
preferred. .If US forces project only minimal power, the
threat may pursue higher risk COAs.
Consider the interaction of each group if faced with
multiple threats. Will they cooperate against US
forces? Will they.engage each other?
i
6-4
I
,
FM 34-130
0 Evaluate the threat imposed by a degradation of the
capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
0 Identify likely targets of looting and vandalism.
0 Use MDCI for force protection. It provides you with
vulnerability assessments and will assess all threats
whether actual or potential.~ As they are identified,
pursue them accordingly.
iiii~~iiiiiliiliiiiii Support to Counterdrug Operations ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
..................................................................
Military efforts support and complement rather thank replaces
the counterdrug efforts of other US agencies, the states, and
cooperating foreign governments. Army support can occur in.any
or all phases of a combined and synchronized effort to attack
the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during
distribution. Army participation in counterdrug operations will
normally be in support of law enforcement agencies.
Support to host nations includes assistance to their forces
to destroy drug production facilities, collaboration with host
nation armed forces to prevent export of illegal drugs, and
nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to drug
related activities.
Support for domestic counterdrug operations includes military
planning and training assistance for domestic law enforcement
agencies, participation by the National Guard, equipment loans
and transfers, use of military facilities, and other assistance
as requested and authorized. Military support to counterdrug
operations may expand as national policy and legal prohibitions
evolve.
Define the
AI: Consider both air and ground AIs. Questions include--

0 What drugs is the operation directed against?
0 What precursor elements are required for production and
where do they originate?
0 How and where do drugs and related materials enter the
host nation and the AO?
6-5
FM 34-130
Significant characteristics of the battlefield include local

economic conditions, effectiveness of host nation military
and law enforcement agencies, and the nature of the ghost
nation government.
I
I Describe the
0 Consider that map, chart, and graphics coverage of your

A0 and AI may be lacking.
0 Identify agricultural areas for drug crops. Determine -
the periods that comprise their growing seasons.
0 Consider the hydrography necessary to support the drug
crop.
0 Consider terrain and weather in relation to production,
growth, and movement cycles of drug crops.
0 Identify routes and techniques available to traffickers I
for infiltration by air, ground, and sea.
0 Identify exfiltration routes, including transshipment I
points, and techniques for air, land, and water movement.
0 Identify likely storage areas (such as caches and
warehouses) for drug shipments awaiting transit. I
0 Identify the economic conditions and procedures that
affect trafficking (such as customs inspection stations,
amount of vehicle traffic across the border).
Evaluate the Threat
0 Consider the structure of the drug organization:

- Look at family relationships:
- Identify key personnel, such as leaders,
logisticians, security specialists, and chemists.
0 Consider security elements and methods of production,
concealment, and transportation.
6-6
FM 34-130
0 Identify narco-terrorist groups, their tactics and

procedures.
0 Consider support that the local government cannot or will
not give to the local populace.
0 Consider the threat use of "forceV8 tactics such as
blackmail, kidnapping, and threats of violence to gain
support 'and control the populace'and the government.
0 Bearin mind that the threat's wealth gives him access to
many high-technology systems:, What ability does he have
to detect the friendly force and their operations? Can
he detect radars? What communications abilities does he
have? Are his communications encrypted? What weapons
and target acquisition systems does he use? What are his
night vision capabilities? Use the traditional OB
factors as a guide for analysis.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Template or describe the activities of drug producers in

the A0 and AIs.
0 Template or describe production activities. Consider
logistics, security, and training.
0 Template or describe the specific actions of the
traffickers through the A0 and AI. Consider storage
areas, drying areas, surface routes, and air routes.
Include an evaluation of zones of entry, such as
airstrips and ports, and types of vehicles or animals
used by the traffickers.
0 Template trafficker and producer actions upon
confrontation, including legal evasion.
0 Template or describe the support activities associated
with trafficking in the A0 and AI. Consider finances,
front organizations, civic actions, money laundering,
others.
0 Template the security procedures and other techniques to
avoid detection for all of the templates described above.
6-7
FM 34-130
0 During wargaming the G2 or S2 should role-play producers,

traffickers, support, and security personnel.
I
0 The G2 or S2 ensures that trafficker and producer actions
when confronted are wargamed in detail.
Peacekeeping Operations
I
Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to
maintain peace inareas of potential conflict. They stabilize
conflict between two or more belligerent nations and as such
require the consent of all parties involved in the dispute. The.-
US may participate in peacekeeping operations when requested by
the United Nations, with a regional affiliation of nations, with
other unaffiliated countries or unilaterally. US personnel may I
function as observers, as part of an international peacekeeping
force, or in a supervisory and assistance role. Peacekeeping
operations follow diplomatic negotiations that establish the
mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate describes the
scope of the peacekeeping mission in detail.
As outlined in Joint Publication 3-07.3, "Intelligence" is i
not conducted during peacekeeping operations. Instead, there
will be an information section which performs many of the duties
and functions normally associated with intelligence sections. I
Define the
Battlefield Environment I
AI: Identify and locate all outside influences on the I

operation. Consider political groups, media, and
third-nation support to the belligerents of the conflict.
Types of activity to consider: s
0 Identify the legal mandate, geographic boundaries, and
other limitations upon both the peacekeeping forces and
the belligerent forces.
0 Identify the pertinent demographic and economic issues.
These might include living conditions, religious beliefs,
r
cultural distinctions, allocation of wealth, political
grievances, social status, or political affiliations.
0 Identify the best case and worst case time lines of the
operation.
6-8
FM 34-130
Describe the
Battlefields Effects
0 Demographics.
- What are the root causesof the conflict? Analyze
this from the perspective of both belligerents.
- What would cause (or caused): each side to agree to
peace?
- Are there any new issuesthat have increased tensions
since peace was initiated?
- How committed is each belligerent to keeping the
peace? How much trust and faith do the belligerents
have in each other to keep the peace?
- How capable is each belligerent of keeping the
peace? Can the leadership which negotiated the peace
enforce discipline throughout the belligerent
parties?
- How do these factors affect the COAs of each
belligerent? How do they affect the COAs available
to the peacekeeping force?
0 Legal. What legitimate COAs are available to the
belligerents and the peacekeeping force? How likely is
each belligerent to obey the laws and provision of treaty
agreements?
0 Terrain.
- Does terrain lend itself to military operations?
Conduct terrain analysis. Identify good infiltration
lanes, engagement areas, defensive positions, attack
routes, and staging areas.
- Does the terrain lend itself to peacekeeping
operations? Can the peacekeepers see and be seen?
If so, the belligerents may be less likely to violate
the peace. If necessary, where can the peacekeeping
force establish blocking positions to blunt possible
violations of the peace?
- Identify the terrain that allows all belligerents
equal access to the peacekeepers.
- Analyze the terrain to identify likely current
dispositions of belligerent forces.
o Weather.
- Analyze the affect of weather on visibility among all
parties, including the peacekeepers.
6-9
FM 34-130
- Consider the influence of weather on mobility and
operations. (See FM 34-81-1.)
- Weather may affect the turnout at activities such as
demonstrations.
0 Other. Identify and analyze government, military, and
agency support available to the peacekeeping force.
Evaluate the Threat
0 Identify all factions involved inthe peacekeeping

operation. Which are likely to violate the peace,and _ I
why?
0 What is the political organization and military OS of I
each of the belligerent groups? Who are the key
personnel that control the rank and file of each faction?
0 Identify the political and religious beliefs that
directly affect or influence the conduct of the
belligerents.
0 Identify belligerent tactics for offense and defense.
Use this as the basis for doctrinal templates.
0 Identify local support to all belligerent parties.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
I
0 Template or describe the actions of the belligerents that
would violate the peace. Crossing borders, entering
demilitarized zones, and initiating hostilities are
examples of violations. I
0 Template or describe the actions associated with

violations of the peace such as occupation of assembly r
areas, training, C I, logistics.
0 Template or describe the response of belligerents to u

violations of the peace.
0 Template or describe the reactions of all belligerents to
US actions within the A0 and AI.
6-10
FM 34-130
0 Identify the possible actions of the belligerents to the

peacekeeping mission. Consider acts of terrorism.
0 How will the local populace react to friendly COAs?
0 How will the host nation government and military react to
friendly COAs?
0 During w&gaming, the Chief of Staff, X0, G2, or S2
should designate separate individuals to role-play each
of the belligerents.
0 Wargame each COA.
0 Wargame terrorist actions and other activities where
belligerents could reasonably avoid claiming
responsibility.
jjijjjtjjjijjij Combatting Terrorism

Combatting terrorism has two major sub-components
antiterrorism and counterterrorism. During peacetime, the Army
combats terrorism primarily through antiterrorism - passive
defense measures taken to minimize vulnerability to terrorism.
Antiterrorism is a form of force protection and, thus, the
responsibility.of Army commanders at all levels. Antiterrorism
complement counterterrorism, which is the full range of
offensive measure taken to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism.
Define the
AI: Consider--
0 Known terrorist activity.
0 Terrorist activities in nations that sponsor terrorist
groups.
0 International and national support to the terrorists.
Include sources of moral, physical, and financial
support.
6-11
FM 34-130
0 If US presence, or potential presence, by itself could be
a catalyst for terrorist activity.
0 The identity of recent worldwide anti-US terrori,st
activity, or intent to conduct such activity.
Types of activity to consider:
0 Identify the demographic issues that make protected areas
or personnel attractive to terrorists<:~
0 Identify any time constraints that might limit the
availability of a target,.
I
0 Coordinate with supporting MP and MI activities when
preparing initial threat analyses and their updates.
m
Describe the
,i
o Demographics.
- What demographic issues make a target attractive to
terrorists? I
- How do these demographic issues shape terrorist
COAs? For example, the political grievances of a
terrorist organization might make some targets more I
attractive than others. Religious convictions might
cause terrorists to disregard assassinations in favor
of kidnaping. I
0 Targets and routes.
- Identify the susceptibility of targets to terrorists.
- Identify infiltration routes and avenues of approach. r
Evaluate the Threat
0 Determine the type of terrorist groups you might face. m

Are they state supported, non-state supported, or state
directed?
0 Identify which terrorist groups are present, thought to il
be present, or have access to your AO.
0 Conduct OB analysis for each group, to include-- r
- Organization and cellular composition.
6-12
FM 34-130
Internal discipline.
Long- and short-range goals.
Dedication (willingness to kill or die for the
cause).
Religious, political, and ethnic affiliations of the
groups.
The identity of leaders, trainers, opportunists, and
idealists.
Group skills and specialties of each organization
such'as sniping, demolition;:air or water operations,
electronic surveillance, tunneling.
Describe the preferred tactics of each organization.
These might include assassination, arson, bombing,
hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnaping, maiming; raids',-
seizure,- sabotage, hoaxes, or use of chemical or
biological weapons. Consider the international writings
on terrorist and insurgent operations such as Mao or Che
Guevarra.
Describe or template demonstrated terrorist activity over
a perrod of time in the local area.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Identify likely terrorist targets within the protected

entity by matching friendly vulnerabilities against
terrorist capabilities and objectives.
0 Template terrorist actions on likely objectives within
the protected entity. Remember that the choice of
tactics is often related to a desire for attention.
0 Template terrorist activities near the objective such as
assembly areas, movement to the objective site,
surveillance, and escape routes.
0 Template or describe the supporting functions for
terrorism such as training, logistics, C I, and
finance. During antiterrorism operations these
activities will be observed to warn of coming attacks.
6-13
FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii Shows of Force iiiiiiii~iiitiiieirirjiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
..-.A.....::::::::::,: .,,..,......... ::::::.:....::...::.:.....::::::::::::i:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
A show of force is a mission carried out to demonstrate US
resolve in which the US forces deploy to defuse a situation that
may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.
Shows of force lend credibility to the nation's commitments,
increase regional influence, and demonstrate resolve. They can
take the form of combined training exercises, rehearsals,
forward deployment of military forces, or introduction and
buildup of military forces in a region. Shows of force may
transition into combat operations; be prepared for the
transition.
Define the
-1
AO: Define the boundaries for the maneuver of US forces

relative to both the host nation and the target nation. For
the AI--
0 Expand the AI to include all military and paramilitary
forces, or other organizations that might interact with
friendly forces.
0 Identify nations that influence or are influenced by
events in the AO.
,
0 Study in detail the psychology of all key decision
makers. This is probably the dominant consideration for
show of force operations.
0 Identify the legal parameters that bind the activities of
the host nation, target nation, and US forces in the
region. This includes treaties, international law,
status of force agreements, and rules of engagement
restrictions.
0 Identify the moral issues that affect the activities of
the nation involved.
0 Identify the scope of pertinent political issues within
the region. For example: Do the actions of local
6-14
FM 34-130
politicians affect mission success, or should friendly
concern be confined to decision makers at the national
level?
0 Which economic issues influence the crisis?
Describe the
Battlefield1s Effects
0 Psychological.~ What is the p,sychological environment in

which key decision makers find themselves? Is the key
leadership secure, or is there a legitimate threat to
their power base? How would compliance with US desires
affect their positions?
0 Legal. Identify the--
- Terrain that is legitimate for use by US Forces.
- Legal restrictions that affect friendly terrain use
and COAs.
0 Moral. What friendly actions would be encouraged,
tolerated, discouraged, and not tolerated by--
- US public opinion? (Consider actions that are
legally correct but morally suspect.)
- The international community?
0 Political.
- How does the regional political situation (host
nation, target nation, and neighboring states) affect
friendly COAs?
- How does the world political situation affect
friendly COAs?
- How does the political situation affect target COAs?
0 Economic.
- How does the economic situation in the region affect
friendly COAs? Would a particular-friendly action
unduly interfere with a vital economic function such
as farming?
- How does the economic situation affect target COAs?
0 Terrain.
- Which terrain best lends itself to the show of force
operations being considered? For example, does the
terrain allow for observation of and by the target
audience?
6-15
FM 34-130
- Consider that the show of force could escalate to
war. Conduct a standard OCORA analysis to determine
terrain which best supports offensive and defensive
operations. =
0 Weather. Remember to evaluate the impact of weather upon

any psychological operations. I
Evaluate the Threat
0 Decision makers. Develop a psychological profile of the

key target decision makers. Include--
- Personal objectives, goals, concerns, values, Andy .
perspectives of each individual. Are there any
support bases, material possessions, official I
positions, ranks, titles, privileges, or
relationships that the individuals value over the
good of their country?
- Current position, attitude, opinions, and views of
each individual towards the contentious issues.
- Decision-making procedures for each individual.
Determine the influence of emotion and logic as the I
individual deliberates. When does each individual
actively seek information? When do they allow
information to come to them?
- The ability of each individual to access
information. Do the decision makers get complete,
honest, and unbiased information? Are the decision
makers surrounded by cowards or sycophants who would m
withhold or change information forpersonal reasons?
- Other psychological aspects that affect decision
making, to include-- I
0 Ability to objectively reason.
0 Ability to compare long-term versus short-term
gain.
0 Ability to calculate risks, and courage to take
risks.
- Doctrinal templates. What do key decision makers
usually do when confronted with similar situations?
0 Target nation. What friendly COAs would increase or
decrease popular support for target decision makers?
I
- Is the target nation prepared for escalation to war?
- Conduct traditional OB analysis and develop doctrinal
templates in case the crisis escalates to war.
- Carefully identify the willingness to fight of the
target nation military. Do they believe they can
.
6-16
FM 34-130
successfully fight US Forces should the crisis
escalate? What friendly actions would help the US
gain moral ascendancy over the target nation
military?
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Template or describe the possible decision-making

processes of key target leadership. What are the crux
elements of each individual's position? What are likely
and unlikely leveraging forces that would lead to desired
and undesired decisions?
0 Template or describe threat actions to be influenced.
Describe the key elements that would lead to the
implementation of desired actions or the cessation of
undesired actions.
0 Template or describe threat support functions associated
w'th both desired and undesired actions such as movement,
C 3I, rehearsals, and propaganda.
0 Template or describe threat reactions to friendly
actions. For example, will they fight? Will they
comply? Will they resort to legal or political recourse?
0 Consider illegal threat actions for which the target
nation does not need to claim responsibility. For
example, terrorism or agitation of the host nation.
0 The G2 or 52 should role-play the target audience as well
as the target nation intelligence services that can
collect against friendly actions.
0 Wargame target nation reactions to friendly actions. The
psychological reactions of key decision makers should be
wargamed in detail.
0 What friendly COAs would influence target decision makers
to comply?
0 Events that would lead to the escalation to hostilities
should be wargamed in detail. The staff judge advocate
should be involved in this wargaming to determine the
moral, legal, and political status of both sides during
escalation.
6-17
FM 34-130
::::::::::::::::::::: ...............
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii Attacks and Raids iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :.:::::. . . . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . .
The Army conducts attacks and raids to create situations that I

permit seizing and maintaining political and military
initiative. Normally, the US executes attacks and raids to
achieve specific objectives other than gaining or holding
terrain. Attacks by conventional forces damage or destroy high
value targets or demonstrate US capability and resolve to do
Raids are usually small-scale operations~involving swift
;znetration of hostile territory to secure information, U
temporarily seize.& objective, or destroy a target. Raids end
with a rapid, pre-planned withdrawal.
Define the
m
Most of the factors and considerations used in conventional pi

operations apply in attacks and raids. When establishing the
AI consider--
0 Target areas; r
0 Friendly approach and withdrawal routes, including zones
of entry;
0 Threat reaction forces;
Describe the
0 Attacks and raids are often dependent on speed of

operation for success. Planning speedy operations
requires detailed and precise information on the target I
area.
0 Outside of the target area, focus on aspects of the
battlefield that will affect the friendly forces movement
to and from the objective. Also consider the effects of
the battlefield on threat forces that may attempt to
block or delay the friendly force. ii
6-18
i
FM 34-130
Evaluate the Threat
0 Identify high value targets within the target area.

0 Consider available reinforcing forces as well as forces
within the target area.
0 Model the decision making process used to commit
reinforcing forces. Who makes the decision? What are
the decision maker's sources of information? How are
orders communicated to the reinforcing forces? What are
the time lines involved?
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Develop threat COA models that depict in detail the

threat's dispositions and actions in the objective area.
0 Consider the COAs of available reinforcing forces. Will
they move to engage friendly forces within the engagement
area, or block their withdrawal? Might the target force
choose to engage some other friendly target instead of
reacting directly to the attack or raid?
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations relocate threatened
civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or
host nation. These operations involve US citizens, or friendly
host nation or third country nationals, whose lives are in
danger. Noncombatant evacuation operations may occur in a
permissive environment or require the use of force.
Define the
AI:
0 Within the nation where noncombatants will be evacuated,
identify the locations of all groups that might influence
operations.
6-19
FM 34-130
0 Check which countries might accept evacuees.
0 Which countries might assist or hinder the operation?
0 Identify whether evacuation is expected to be permissive
or forced.
0 Identify the operational time sensitivity.
0 Fully identify the scope of the demographic situation
that has prompted the evacuation. Consider the
political, social, economic, legal, and religious
situations. Look at the government, military, and
population, in general.
Describe the
The staff judge advocate should identify all legal issues

that impact on the evacuation.
0 Identify how local political issues will shape friendly
COAs. Learn if--
- Hostile groups oppose the evacuation of
noncombatants?
- The source of irritation can be minimized?
- There are areas where anti-evacuation sentiment is
strongest?
- There are identified areas where sympathy for the
evacuation is strongest?
0 Identify the logistics infrastructure that might support
the evacuation. Choose--
Consolidation points that are secure from attack and
well equipped with power, water, restrooms, and
heat. Consider football or soccer stadiums,
gymnasiums, auditoriums, large halls, and recreation
centers.
Evacuation routes that are fast and secure.
Means of transportation for evacuees. Consider the
local transport system.
Available sources of food and potable water for
evacuees.
Communications systems that can support evacuation
operations. Analyze the ability of isolated evacuees
to contact evacuation authorities.
.
6-20
FM 34-130
0 Map the location of key facilities to include foreign

embassies, military installations, hospitals, police
stations, and government buildings.
0 Conduct a standard OCOKA terrain analysis to--
- Identify probable locations for ambushes of
evacuation vehicles. Within urban areas, look at
major thoroughfares and public transportation
systems.
- Identify infiltration routes and assembly areas for
threat attacks on evacuee consolidation points.
- Identify places suited for'anti-US demonstrations and
their relative position to evacuation sit~es and US
installations.
0 Analyze the effect of weather upon--
- Adverse groups. Dedicated insurgents prefer poor
weather conditions while casual demonstrators do not.
- Evacuation operations. Will sudden rain, cold, or
extreme heat require changing evacuation facilities?
Evaluate the Threat
0 Identify all groups that might intentionally interfere

with the NEO. Consider host nation law enforcement
agencies,' military forces, political groups, religious
factions, and the general population. Focus on hostile
groups such as insurgents, terrorists, and radical
extremists.
0 Using a population status overlay, conduct an OB analysis
for each of these potentially hostile groups:
- Disposition. Where do hosti,le groups live and gather
in relation to evacuation objectives? Focus on
neighborhoods near embassies, US citizen population
centers, and US businesses.
- Composition and strength. How are these groups
organized? What kind of weapons do they possess?
- Tactics. What resistance methods and techniques can
these groups employ against the evacuation? Consider
attacks, raids, ambushes, sniping, bombings,
hijacking, hostage taking, kidnapping, and
demonstrations.
0 Identify all groups that might unintentionally interfere
with the evacuation. Consider groups such as students,
labor unions, demonstrators, rioters, host nation forces,
and criminal elements.
6-21
FM 34-130
0 Conduct OB analysis on the adverse groups. Identify

their goals and objectives as well as their position
towards the evacuation operation. Focus on the methods
of resistance and techniques employed to achieve"these
objectives. How would they interfere with the
evacuation?
- Use a population status overlay to identify the areas
most likely to harbor people who would interfere with
evacuation, operations.
- Use a coordinates register to record activities
around-key routes and consolidation points.
- Use an intelligence workbook and OB files to record
information about potentially hostile and adverse.
groups. -.
- Use activities and association matrices to identify
which key individuals are actively interfering with
evacuation.
- Use the LOC and key facilities and targets overlays
to determine where interference will occur.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Consider threat influence on the logistics

infrastructure. Look for control of workers such as bus
drivers, dock'workers, police, food service personnel,
and labor groups.
0 Use the key facilities and targets overlay to ident~ify
the most likely points of interference with the
evacuation.
0 Template intentional interference with the, evacuation by
hostile groups at each likely interference site.
Consider terrorist actions, ambushes, delays at
checkpoints, demonstrations, raids on consolidation
points, and sniping. Determine alternate routes or COA
at these points.
I
0 Identify unintentional interference with the evacuation
by "wild card" groups and template their activity.
Consider riots, criminal activity, arson. I
0 Template or describe the support functions for groups

that would 'nterfere with the evacuation. Consider I
planning, C 3I, weapons, ammunition, food, water,
shelter, training, etc. \
.
I
6-22
FM 34-130
0 Template threat influence on local transportation

systems. For example, control of workers such as bus
drivers, dock workers, police, or labor groups.
0 During wargaming, the G2 or S2 should role-play both
intentionally and unintentionally hostile or adverse
groups.
Peace Enforcement
Peace enforcement operations are military operations in
support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between hostile
factions which may not be consenting to intervention and'may .be
engaged in combats activities. Peace enforcement implies the use
of force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to cease and
desist from violent actions.
Define the
AI:
0 Identify third-nation support for any of the belligerent
parties.
0 Identify other outside influences, such as world
organizations and news media.
Significant characteristics of the battlefield includes almost
every demographic factor (religion, politics, ethnic"
differences, etc.).
Describe the
0 Legal. Identify the legal limits of friendly use of

force in the AO. What COAs does this allow, and under
what conditions?
0 General demographics.
- A comprehensive and continuing demographic study is
required to support peacemaking operations. The
symptoms, causes, and aggravations of the conflict
should be defined in terms of the population and
economics.
6-23
-
FM 34-130
- Identify and study obstacles to,resolutions in mP=
detail.
- Identify how demographics allow for, encourage, and
discourage belligerent COAs. For example, a .
historical feud between two religious sects might
designate certain monuments or other icons as key
terrain.
- Also identify which friendly CQAs will be tolerated, I
encouraged, or discouraged given the demographic
situation.' Consider the balance of forces in the
area. I
,.
o Terrain.
- Conduct a standard OCOKAanalysis to determine where
the terrain lends itself to offensive and defensive - i
operations-for all belligerents.
- Identify the terrain which is best suited for police
action to support friendly patrols. i
Evaluate the Threat I
0 Fully identify all belligerent groups. If the

relationship between two groups is in question, consider i
them distinct even if their political objectives are the
same.
I
0 What is the relationship of each group to every other
group? Allied, neutral, or hostile?
0 What is the political organization of each group? What
are the political objectives of each group? How strong
are each of their convictions?
0 How much discipline can the leadership of each group
expect from their followers? How likely are rank and
file members to violate a truce negotiated by their
leaders?~
0 Fully identify the military capability of each group.
Start with traditional OB factors to develop doctrinal I
templates.
0 What friendly COAs would induce the belligerents to obey I
the law? Some options to consider are--
- Show of force.
- Defensive measures for key facilities, police #ii
patrols, cordon and search operations.
. i :
i
6-24
I
FM 34-130
- Designating territorial boundaries.
- Establishment of demilitarized zones.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Template or describe the belligerent actions such as

raids, ambushes, occupation of contested areas that
prevent peace or other desired end-states.
0 Template or describe the supporting functions associated
with the belligerent actions of the warring groups s ch
as massing at assembly areas, logistics, finan'ce, Y C I-..~
0 Template or describe the responses of belligerent groups
to US actions within the A0 and AI. Consider terrorist
actions.
0 During wargaming, the G2 and 52 should role-play each of
the belligerent parties.
::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::.:::::::::
:~;;i;;~;;i;ii;:i: Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies ;;;;~;;;~&~~;~~;:~
At the direction of the National Command Authority, US
military forces may assist either insurgent movements or host
nation governments opposing an insurgency. In both instances,
US military forces predominantly support political, economic and
informational objectives.
The US supports selected insurgencies opposing oppressive
regimes that work against US interests. The feasibility of
effective support and the compatibility of US,and insurgent
interests are major considerations. Because support for
insurgencies is often covert, special operations forces are
frequently involved. General purpose forces may also be called
upon when the situation requires their particular specialties or
when the scope of operations is so vast that conventional forces
are required.
6-25
FM 34-130
Define the
AI:
0 Consider strategic location: neighboring countries,
boundaries, and frontiers.
- The use of, coastal waterways.
- Third-country support for the insurgency.
I
0 Types of relevant activity:
- Analyze host nation population, government, military,
demographics, and threat.
- Evaluate political structure, economics, foreign
policy and relations, policies on military use.
Describe the
0 Terrain dictates points of entry, infiltration and

exfiltration routes, c structures for operations, and
agricultural centers.
0 Weather affects availability of food supply to
insurgents. Floods limit cache sites. Drastic changes
in climate may limit usefulness of existing terrain
L intelligence.
0 Migration and settlement patterns will help indicate
which areas are becoming pro-government or pro-insurgent.
0 Politics may influence the people's attitude towards both
threat and friendly operations.-
0 Economics may affect the insurgent's ability to conduct
operations. A lack of money may cause the theft of
equipment.
0 Economics may also influence the populace's political
leaning. This could contribute to an increase or
decrease in insurgent capability to conduct offensive
operations.
6-26
FM 34-130
Evaluate the Threat
0 Include 88personalities" in the OB analysis. Identify

leaders, trainers, recruiters, staff members, and
logistics personnel. Develop doctrinal templates based
on observed operating procedures.
0 In describing personalities, look at the functional
specialty of each individual. The number of trainers for
a speci~fic weapon might indicate the type of tactics or
readiness due to time and the number of personnel
trained.
0 Consider the types of weapons the insurgent has at his
disposal. Sophisticated weaponry is an indicator of
external support as well as his capability to attack more
sophisticated or well-protected targets.
0 Consider unit organization. It takes insurgent
organizations longer than conventional units to train for
major attacks. This is because larger insurgent units
require more planning and training time; large training
areas; and fast, effective, and secure communications.
All of these are capabilities that are difficult for the
insurgents to acquire.
0 Analyze movement patterns. They may coincide with
logistics or operational activities.
0 Consider where the insurgent lives and works. He may be
located near key terrain such as major LOC, agricultural
areas, or government installations.
Determine Threat
Courses of Action
0 Threat COAs on the objective might include--

- Attacks and raids on military installations or other
host nation government facilities.
- Attacks on public utilities installations or other
forms of economic sabotage.
- Kidnappings and assassination of public officials.
- Psychological operations directed against the
population (for example, intimidation and
propaganda).
.
6-27
FM 34-130
- Ambushes of host nation or US c,onvoys.
- Evasion from friendly troops.
0 To determine the most likely insurgent COAs, template the
best locations for potential insurgent attacks, sabotage,
raids and roadblocks. Use the key facilities and targets
overlay as a basis for this evaluation.
0 Template insurgent activity near the objective to
include--
- Movement around objectives, such as infiltration and
exfiltration routes.
- Assembly points, rally points,'and staging areas.
- Surveillance positions.
0 Template insurgent activity away from their objective
areas to include--
- Locations of known and suspected base camps.
- Locations of known and suspected training areas.
- Centers of pro-insurgent population. Include an
evaluation of individual villages and large political
divisions such as states and provinces. Identify
areas of guerilla influence and residences of
insurgent leadership or key sympathizers.
0 Template insurgent support functions to include--
- Logistic routes and transhipment hubs.
- Cache sites, water sources, agricultural areas, and
POL storage and production areas. Include commercial
sites and those of the government.
- Locations of communications equipment. Include
commercial establishments and government
installations where they may be purchased or stolen.
0 During wargaming, the G2fS2 or the G5fS5 (Civil Affairs
officer) should role-play the population in addition to
the insurgents.
........................
::::::::::::::::::::: Support to Domestic Civil Authorities ~j~jjiiiji~j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cii;i;;;i~i;ii;:i:;i
When appropriate governmental authority directs the armed
forces to assist in domestic emergencies within the continental
United States, the Army has primary responsibility. Army units
support disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and similar
operations. Federal law also authorizes the use of military
force to suppress domestic violence or insurrection.
6-28
FM 34-130
Techniques for applying IPB in operations that provide
support to domestic authorities are determined primarily by the
type of operation undertaken. For example, during support to
law enforcement agencies engaged in counterdrug operations, use
the considerations put forth for counterdrug operations. If
supporting disaster relief, use the considerations described
under Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief earlier in
this chapter.
6-29
FM 34-130
APPENDIX A
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD,
WARGAMING, AND INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION
Staffs use wargaming to refine and compare potential friendly
courses of action. Comparing potential courses of action, based
on the results of wargaming, allows the staff to identify the
best course of action for recommendation to the commander.
Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of an
operation, given friendly strengths and dispositions, threat
assets and probable courses of action, and a given battlefield
environment. Wargaming attempts to foreseethe action,
reaction, counteraction dynamics of operations. As a result the
staff--
0 Develops a shared vision of the operation.
0 Anticipates events.
0 Determines the conditions and resources required for
success.
0 Identifies a course of action's strengths and weaknesses.
0 Identifies the coordination requirements to produce
synchronized results.
0 Determines decision points.
0 Determines information required to plan and execute the
course of action.
0 'Identifies branches and sequels for further planning.
The entire staff participates; the G2 or S2 plays a pivotal

role in the process by role-playing the threat commander. If
the G2 or S2 accurately portrays a thinking, aggressive,
noncooperative threat, then the staff is forced to plan for
eventualities on the battlefield. The G2 or 52 can accomplish
this vital task only if he has used the IPB process to develop
threat course of action models that reflect the actual COAs
available to the threat.
During staff wargaming a designated staff officer records the
results of wargaming into the decision support template (DST)
and battlefield operating systems (BOS) synchronization matrix.
The results of wargaming enable the staff to plan and execute
operations that will accomplish the command's mission.
.
A-l
FM 34-130
The G2 or S2 uses the results of wargaming to identify

intelligence requirements and recommend PIR that support each I
friendly course of action. He also uses the results of
wargaming to create a strategy for the unit collection effort.
The intelligence synchronization matrix is the tool the G2 or S2
uses to link and,synchronize the intelligence collection I
strategy with the expected flow of the operation. Finally, the
G2 or 52 builds a detailed collection plan from the intelligence
synchronization matrix. I
..
IPB and the G2/S2 play a critical role in the wargaming
process. Guidelines for the G2fS2's role in the wargaming I
process follow below. For a complete discussion of the
wargaming process see.'FM 101-5, Command and Control for
Commanders and Staff.
.z:::::::::::::::::::
. . . . . . . . . . General Rules iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
::::::::::::::::::::: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :.:.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::...: . . . . . . . . :..::.:.:::::::::::.:::
I
The reliability and quality of the products that result from
wargaming are dependent on adherence to a few basic rules. The
general rules that follow are designed to avoid introducing bias
into the wargaming process. I
0 List the advantages and disadvantages as they become

obvious during the wargaming process. Waiting until i
afterwards forces you to rely on your memory.
0 Remain unbiased. Keep an open mind. Do not be I
influenced by the personality of the commander or other
staff officers. Do not get emotionally involved in
making any particular course of action successful.
Remain impartial when comparing friendly and enemy i
capabilities in a given situation.
0 Ensure each course of action remains feasible. If it
becomes infeasible at any time during the wargame, stop
the wargame and reject the course of action.
0 Avoid drawing premature conclusions and then presenting
facts and assumptions to support them.
0 Avoid compari.ng one course of action with another during I
the wargame. Wait until the comparison phase.
0 Wargame each course of action separately.
A-2
FM 34-130
Prepare for Wargaming ijjilliijj![jjiljiiijji!!ijjijji

Determine the amount of time available for wargaming. Time
constraints may force the staff to consider only the most
dangerous and most likely threat courses of action rather than
the complete set. Time constraints may also limit the level of
detail to which each course of action is wargamed.
Gather the tools. The G2 or S2 must bring enemy course of
action models to the wargaming session that accurately reflect
the sets of available threat COAs. The G3 or 53 will bring
potential friendly COAsto the wargaming session.
Prepare the wargaming mapboard by posting the initial
dispositions of friendly and threat units. Most often the staff
uses a standard military map. Some situations may require the.
use of sketches or detailed terrain models.
Identify assumptions. Assumptions are tools that help to
shape courses of action. They address flank activities and
other factors beyond the command's control. Assumptions about
the threat, such as strength, rates of march, etc., are included
in the threat models that generated the COA models and situation
templates.
List known critical events and decision points. Critical
events identified before wargaming are usually specified or
implied tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment.
Other critical events will become apparent during wargaming.
The staff should agree to explore and pre-plan decisions that
their commander might have to make during the operation. They
should avoid the temptation to wargame decisions of higher or
subordinate headquarters. If time permits the staff may
identify tasks to subordinate units that require
synchronization.
Identify the echelons for consideration. Usually the
friendly echelon under consideration is limited to the units
directly subordinate to the friendly commander. The threat
echelon under consideration is usually determined by the
friendly mission. Offensive missions usually require more
resolution.
Identify the battlefield operating systems for
consideration. The G2 or 52 will usually confine his discussion
to the primary enemy BOSS under consideration for each
engagement. If time permits the remainder of the staff may
coordinate the effects of each friendly BOS during the wargaming
of each COA.
A-3
FM 34-130
Identify a 'Vbattlemaster" to referee and facilitate the
wargaming session. The battlemaster is usually the commander,
deputy commander, chief of staff, or executive officer. The
battlemaster must remain impartial. Impartiality is best I
accomplished if the battlemaster does not also control the
friendly forces during the wargame.
Identify the recording techniques to be used and a recorder. I
The recorder is usually the assistant G3/S3 or G2/S2. The
recorder prepares the decision support template, BOS
synchronization matrix, and any other records of the wargame.
Select a wargaming method. Common techniques are the belt,
avenue-in-depth, box, adversarial, narrative, and sketch and.
note techniques. See FM 101-5 for an indepth discussion of each--
technique.
Establish time limits for wargaming each part of the battle.
If time limits are not established, staffs often find that they
plan one part of the battle in extraordinary detail at the
expense of other areas. The battlemaster might even consider
limiting the amount of time each participant has to speak. In
any event the staff should discipline itself to avoid long,
fruitless discussions.
I Conduct the Wargame

i
Begin the wargame'of a course of action by visualizing the
operation from the initial dispositions through each critical
event (identified earlier) to completion of the commander's
objective or failure of the course of the course of action. 1
The wargame sequence is action - reaction - counteraction.

Whichever side (G2/S2 or G3fS3) has the initiative will begin L
the discussion by articulating the appropriate CGA. For
example, if a staff is planning a defense, the G2 or S2 will
begin the wargaming session by talking through one of the threat I
COAs for attack. He should start with either the most likely or
most dangerous COA.
As the side with initiative describes his COA, the other side I
will interrupt, as appropriate, to describe his reactions or
attempts to preempt his opponents action. The initial force
then interrupts at the appropriate moment to describe his I
counteraction, starting the action - reaction process over
again. Each interruption represents a decision that will be
made either by the commander or staff during execution of the I
course of action under consideration.
A-4
FM 34-130
During the action - reaction - counteraction drills the G2 or

S2 describes the location and activities of enemy HVTs. He
highlights points during the operation where these assets are of
importance to the threat's COA. This may prompt the staff to
nominate certain HVTs as HPTs, making their engagement an
integral part of the friendly COA under consideration. The G2
or S2 updates the situation and event templates associated with
the threat course of action to reflect-the TAIs supporting
engagement of those HPTs.
The G2 or S2 prompts staff planning by describing the various
actions available to the threat. In addition to the basic set
of threat COAs, the G2 or 52 should describe the threat actions
that might prompt the execution of the following friendly, _
decisions:
o Commit the reserve.
o Use attack helicopters or close air support (CAS).
o Artillery barrages against TAIs.
o Scatterable mine delivery.
o Shift the main effort.
o Advance to the next phase of the operation.
o Change overall mission.
o Call to higher headquarters for help.
If, while wargaming a friendly course of act.ion the staff
identifies --
0 an enemy reaction that would prevent success of the
operation which the friendly force could not counteract,
or,
0 a series of friendly actions and counteractions that deny
the contradict the friendly deception story,
the battlemaster stops the wargame and notes the specifics of
the problems encountered. The staff proceeds to wargame the
friendly course of action against any remaining threat COAs.
Only after the COA has been wargamed against all threat COAs
should the staff decide whether to modify the course of action
to correct its deficiencies, to retain the course of action as
it is (noting the risk of failure), or to discard the course of
action altogether.
A-5
FM 34-130
Similarly, the G2 or 52 uses the wargame to identify
modifications and refinements to the threat COA models. As
critical events become apparent, the G2 or 52 prepares situation
templates to @8capture*8 threat dispositions during the event. He
identifies any necessary modifications or refinements to the
threat COA models as the wargame progresses, either making them
immediately or noting the necessary changes for later.
The G2 or S2 should ensure that the staff considers all
threat COAs and other, options available to the threat. The
staff should NEVER wargame~against only one threat COA. As a
minimum, the staff-should wargame against the most likely and
the most dangerous threat COAs.
The battlemaster should ensure that all decisions identified
are ones that his staff or commander will make during battle.
Do not waste time wargaming the decisions of a higher or
subordinate unit.
:::::::::::::::::::::
Iillilllilliiiiiiliii Record +-he Results of Wargaming ~~iilii~iiiiiififiiifiiiiiilfiifiiifif
i
Each interruption in the action - reaction - counteraction

drill corresponds to a decision by the commander or staff. Each
time the staff identifies a decision point, the recorder makes i
the appropriate entries in the staff's recording tools, such as
the decision support template and the BOS synchronization
matrix. The recorder should "capture" enough information to
allow the staff to anticipate and plan for each decision. As a
minimum this includes--
0 Decision criteria. What activity, event, or information
prompts the decision? The decision criteria is usually
related to threat activity. Sometimes it is related to
friendly forces or third party activity. I
0 Friendly action or response. What is the result of the
decision? Decisions usually result in engagement of i
HPTs, a change in the friendly COA, or the execution of
an on-order or be-prepared mission by subordinate units.
0 Decision point (DP). When the decision criteria is I
related to the threat, the DP is the location and time
where collection assets will look for indicators to
verify or deny that the decision criteria has occurred. I
If the decision criteria is related to friendly force
information, the DP usually corresponds to a time-phase
line. The recorder ensures that he captures both the r
A-6
r
FM 34-130
time and geographic location of the DP. The staff
ensures they select DPs which allow decisions in time to
properly synchronize the resulting friendly actions.
When placing DPs, consider time for--
,Intelligence collection.
Processing and disseminating the intelligence to the
commander or other decision maker.
Preparation and movement time of friendly forces or
assets that will execute the mission.
Activities or movement of the target or threat during
the time elapsed between decision and execution.
0 Target areas of interest (TAI). '~This is the location
where the effects of friendly actions are synchronized.
TAIs are often engagement areas or sets of targets: The
staff ensures that the physical distance between a DP and
its associated TAI allows for the time delays involved in
collecting, processing, and communicating intelligence;
the movement of threat forces; and the time lines
associated with friendly activities.
0 Update the high payoff target (HPT) list. If the
friendly action involves engaging a threat HVT, the
recorder adds the HVT to the list of high payoff targets
for the COA under consideration. If there is a time
element involved (i.e., if the HPT is only high payoff
during a particular phase of the battle) he makes the
appropriate notations.
0 Named areas of interest (NAI) that support the DP. The
G2 or S2 usually records the NAI, but some staffs make it
the responsibility of the recorder. The DP is almost
always the only NAI associated with a particular
decision. Sometimes, however, the G2 or S2 needs
information from more than one NAI in order to confirm or
deny that the decision criteria has occurred.
If time permits, the battlestaff may also discuss and record
the synchronization of friendly actions not related to decision
points (i.e., which will occur regardless of events on the
battlefield). Examples include--
0 Crossing the line of departure (LD) or line of contact
WC) *
0 Initiating prepatory fires.
0 Shifting preparatory fires.
A-7
FM 34-130
Croaa Cro
PL S*idd PL Troll
12th MecfL Moving
73d ID Moving
SP
AA Smyth
3d AD
4P
Figure A-l. The two-rlded time Ilne.
SP AA Campbelh
ENEMY
Moon
73% ILLUM S.t BMNT Sunrli
2400 0200 0400 0600 oaoo 1000

A-8
FRIENDLY
COVERING_ TT^ Covering

overing
Counter Recce -^t
*<^ force
orce fight
FORCE Arrlv
Cro
PL STU PL Dana
MAIN BODY SP Moving

Cro
PL M-rbta
SPI Moving
RESERVE
FIRES Priority to covering force

-
r
,,,
FM 34-130
If the interaction of anticipated friendly and threat events
is particularly complicated the staff might prepare a two-sided
time line. The two-sided time line serves as a quick reference
tool for planning the synchronization of effects in fluid
situations. The example shown in Figure A-l depicts the
reaction of enemy reserve forces to an envelopment by friendly
forces. In this example, the time line depicts enemy options
(DPs) and anticipated critical events, such as the covering
force battle, a refueling-on-the-move -operation, etc. Friendly
DPs and options, though not shown in thisexample, are also
included on the time line.
After the primary wargaming session-distinct members of the
battlestaff may initiate specialized sessions for their function
areas. For example, the G4 or S4 support operations staffs may
want to wargame logistics activities throughout the operation.
Conduct the Targeting Conference

The fire support officer almost always convenes a targeting
session after the base wargaming. The targeting conference
further refines HPTs nominated during wargaming and develops
plans to engage them. During the targeting conference--
0 The staff develops recommendations on how each HPT should
be engaged.
0 Using situation templates and other IPB products, the
staff assesses the risk to friendly attacking assets.
0 The G3 or S3 and fire support officer develop the attack
guidance matrix (see Figure l-3).
0 The G2 or S2 identifies NAIs that will locate and track
HPTs and includes them on the event template.
0 The G3 or S3 and fire support officer determine battle
damage assessment needs. The G2 or S2 includes these as
intelligence requirements that support the friendly COA
and develops NAIs that support them. These NAIs are
often the TAI where the target is engaged.
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiiliiiiiiiIiiiiiiiii Compare Friendly Courses of A&-on ff;fflilliiliiiiliiiiitftftftftftiilf
Following wargaming, the staff compares friendly COAs to

identify the one that has the highest probability of success
against the set of threat COAs. Each staff officer uses his own
A-9
FM 34-130
criteria for comparing the friendly COAs in his own staff area I
of responsibi.lity. The G2 or S2 compares friendly courses of
action based on their ability to defeat the threat's COA and his
ability to support the command with the intelligence required to
-
execute each friendly COA.
Led by the G3 or 53, each staff officer presents his findings
to the remainder of the staff. Together they determine which I
friendly COA they will recommend to the commander. In the event
they cannot reach a conclusion, the chief of staff or executive
officer will determine which COA to recommend to the commander.
..
::::::::::::::::::
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiili Synchronize Intelligence iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiijijiijiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,...,....,....................................~.......................
I
The staff then presents its recommendation to the commander.
The G3 or 53 briefs each COA, including any branches and
sequels, using the results and records of wargaming such as the I
DST and BOS synchronization matrix. He highlights the
advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
I
The commander decides upon a COA and announces his concept of
the operation. Using the results of wargaming associated with
the selected COA, the staff prepares plans and orders that
implement the commander's decision. I
Decisions made during wargaming form the basis for the "Be
Prepared" and "On Order" tasks specified in operations order and I
fragmentary orders. ,The decision criteria associated with each
DP accompanies the task as it is written into paragraph 3 of the
operations order. For example: "On order, Task Force HONABACH
will attack to destroy enemy forces vicinity objective HEAD. r
This order will be given if the 32d Division turns southwest
onto Highway 34."
Prioritizing Intelligence
Requirements
The G2 or 52 normally discards the initial set of

intelligence requirements developed during mission analysis and i
replaces them with the intelligence requirements developed
during wargaming. The G2 or S2 should designate the decision
criteria for each DP as an intelligence requirement. The ii
intelligence requirement should not be larger than the decision
criteria. In other words, the G2 or S2 should resist the
temptation to combine two decision criteria into a single
i
intelligence requirement. He should also avoid adding
additional requirements
i
A-10
FM 34-130
onto the intelligence requirement. If the battlestaff fully
considered the G2 or S2's prompting during wargaming, additional
information is unnecessary for the successful execution of the
unit mission.
The G2 or S2 should prioritize the list of intelligence
requirements to reflect his recommended PIR and present it to
the commander. The commander will designate the most important
intelligence requirements as PIR, prioritizing them to reflect
their relative importance. The remaining,intelligence
requirements are prioritized among themselves as information
requirements (,IR).
If intelligence requirements vary over the course of
operation the G2 or 52 prepares several prioritized lists,. F0.r
example, PIR may-vary in importance depending on the phase of
the operation. PIR during the first phase of an operation may
be unnecessary in later phases.
The Intelligence
Synchronization Matrix
The intelligence synchronization matrix is the expanded

intelligence portion of the BOS synchronization matrix. The G2
or S2 begins the intelligence synchronization matrix by
establishing blank time lines for each collection asset that
match the time lines on the BOS synchronization matrix.
The G2 or S2 then establishes the "latest-time-information-
of-value" (LTIOV) times for each intelligence requirement. This
is easy to determine since each intelligence requirement is
exactly matched to the criteria to execute a decision identified
in wargaming. The LTIOV time lines are determined from the
decision points recorded on the DST.
The 52 or collection manager then develops a collection
strategy for each intelligence requirement that will ensure it
is answered on time. He considers--
0 Tasking time lines associated with each collection system
or discipline.
0 Collection and processing time lines.
0 Dissemination time lines.
0 Type of target or activity collected against.
A-11
.~ -
FM 34-130 \
I
0 Location of the NAI collected against.
0 Time lines associated with the expected threat activity.
I
The collection strategies, which are designed not only'to
collect the intelligence but to deliver it on time, are then
entered onto the intelligence synchronization matrix. The 52 or
collection manager then develops a detailed collection plan
using the intelligence synchronization matrix,,as the basic
structure.
,~
:::::::::::::::::::::
iiiliiiiiliiiiiiiiiii Execute ,-he Battle iiiiiiiii~ii~i~ii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I
As the staff tracks the battle, they refer to the DST and"BOS _
synchronization matri-x to determine which decisions are
becoming due. The G2 or S2 then looks at the intelligence
synchronization matrix to determine which collection agencies
owe the information and intelligence which will enable the
decision to be made in a timely manner. The G2 or 52 may have
tom re-prompt the collection asset to the upcoming intelligence 5
requirement. This is especially true if the course of the
battle is occurring faster than anticipated.
As the collection assets report, the intelligence section
conducts analysis to determine if decision criteria have been
met. If not, the collection manager must retask the collector I
or the intelligence section must make an educated guess based on
available information. As each decision criteria is satisfied,
the 52 or collection manager refers to the DST and BOS
synchronization matrix to ensure that all decision makers r
receive the appropriate intelligence.
Mini-Wargaming and
the Dynamic,
Recurring Nature of IPB
I
The DST, BOS synchronization matrix, and intelligence

synchronization matrix are based on assumotions about the I
threat's courses of action and the dynamics of the operation.
It will often occur that the assumptions prove less than 100%
accurate. Often the only change is in the time lines; the I
operation may progress more or less quickly than anticipated.
Sometimes, however, the threat executes a course of action not
completely anticipated during wargaming, or the operation's
dynamics lead to unexpected branches and sequels. I
i
A-12
FM 34-130
In order to anticipate the changes such eventualities
dictate, the staff uses mini-wargaming to continually
re-evaluate their assumptions, re-initiating the IPB and
decision making processes as necessary. When any member of the
staff identifies conditions which require revalidation or
refinement of the plan, he initiates a mini-wargame. The G2 or
52 prompts mini-wargame sessions whenever he develops
intelligence that runs counter to planning assumptions.
The G2 or 52 usually begins by discussing the current state
of the common understanding of the battlefield:
0 He reviews the IPB predictions .that have been confirmed,
denied, and are yet to be confirmed. These are usually
assumptions about threat COAs but might also be.
assumptions about the terrain or other factors. -~
0 He follows this with a full report of the unanticipated
intelligence that led to the mini-warqame. He emphasizes
the significance of the intelligence in terms of the
threat COAs that it indicates or fails to indicate.
The G2 or 52 should then present an informal, revised set of
threat COAs that account for the new intelligence. The revised
COAs usually result from an abbreviated IPB process that may
have been executed in only a few minutes.
If the new intelligence is too contrary to the original IPB,
the commander may want to initiate a completely new planning
session. Otherwise the personnel present at the mini-wargame
modify the current plan based on the revised IPB. Because time
during conduct of the operation is usually limited, the staff
follows an abbreviated form of the warqaminq and intelligence
synchronization techniques discussed above.
The G3 or 53 usually prepares a fragmentary order to
incorporate new tasks to subordinate units. .The G2 or S2 should
use this opportunity to retask collection assets in accordance
with the revised collection plan.
The staff should conduct numerous mini-wargame sessions
during the course of an operation. A good technique is to
pre-schedule mini-wargame sessions every 2 to 6 hours. At each
session the staff reviews the current situation and the V'health88
of its current plans.
A-13
FM 34-130
.iiiiiilliiiiIiiiillil
. ..*
. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ....*.*..
. . . . . . . An Example Application ijljiiliilniiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
i.:.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:~::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::
The following example illustrate how a G2 or S2 can use

products from IPB and wargaming to synchronize intelligence. It
shows the process for'two decisions only, but.the same process
applies to all decisions that arise from wargaming.
1 SCENARIO 1
The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (Light); is conducting

counterinsurgency operations in the country of Daemonia. The
battalion has a large area of operations. From the brigade ,~
intelligence estimate, the S2 learns that an insurgent company
of regular infantry is expected to enter the battalion A0 within
72 hours.
The S2 section initiated an IPB process similar in style and
approach to that shown in scenario 3 of Chapter 3. Figure A-2
shows a sketch map of the AO. The battalion situation templates
highliqht--
Bn Ai .^_
/IS!Insurgent
Currant AO for COIN operation!
i
^ regulars
--_---mm ----
^^ Expected InAO
from the NW 1 / .\ i
!
within 72 Hrs
If3 \
t
\
\
\
\
\
\
Bn Al
Flgure A-2. The area of operations.
A-14
FM 34-130
0 Key facilities and targets overlay (potential targets for
the insurgents).
0 Infiltration and exfiltration routes.
0 Likely base camps within the AO.
0 Probable logistics, intelligence, and security activities
within the AO.
Pressed for time, the commander selected a friendly COA
immediately after conducting mission analysis. The friendly
plan includes.two phases:
0 Phase I: Establish platoon-sized ambushes along the 5
likely infiltration routes while conducting _
reconnaissance of the 11 possible base camp areas.
0 Phase II: Destroy the insurgent company in its base
camp.
During both phases the battalion will accept risk at
insurgent target areas identified on the key facilities and
targets overlay.
The battalion will also retain a company (-) as a mobile
reserve for the entire mission. The division has given the
battalion operational control of enough air assault assets to
conduct immediate lift of one platoon for the duration of the
mission.
The 52 and S3 have verified that the commander's plan should
succeed against all the threat COAs developed during IPB.
Wargaming 1
Due to the large size of the A0 and the limited number of

critical areas, the S2 and 53 have decided to use the box
technique of wargaming. The first box includes three possible
locations for enemy base camps. The wargaming begins with the
S2 describing the enemy COA models for each of the three
possible base camps, one each located in NAIs 1, 2, and 3 in
Figure A-3. The S2 describes how each base camp would be
physically arranged to include--
0 Their warning system for attacks.
A-15
FM 34-130
0 Defense and security system. I
0 Their evacuation and exfiltration procedures.
Due to the proximity of the three base camps and other common
features identified .during IPB, the 53 decides to use the same
control measures for actions against any of the three base
camps. The staff synchronizes their plan for phase II of the I
operation in this box of the battlefield:
0 When the insurgent company is located in any of these
three NAIs,,A Company will immediately occupy tactical
assembly area BEAUTY~while C Company will immediately
occupy tactical assembly area LOGIC.
_~. -__---__ __-~ - - - - .--.-. I
I
>
OT
Figure A-3. Named areas of interest.
0 If the insurgents are in base camp 1 or 3: I

A Company receives 3d platoon of B Company.
On Order C Company will occupy battle positions 3, 4,
and 5 in order to block the southern and eastern I
evacuation routes.
On Order B Company (-) will conduct air assault to
occupy battle positions 1 and 2 in order to block the
northern evacuation routes.
A-16
FM 34-130
On Order A Company will conduct movement to contact
along AXIS KEN as the battalion main effort to
destroy insurgents vicinity objectives in NAI 1 or
NAI 3.
o If the insurgents are in base camp 2:
C Company receives 3d platoon of B Company.
On Order A Company will occupy battle positions 1, 2,
and 3 in order to block the.northern and eastern
evacuation routes.
On Order B Company (-) will conduct air assault to
occupy battle positions 4 and 5 in order to block the
southern evacuation routes.
On Order C Company will conduct movement to contact
along AXIS LANCE as the battalion main effort,to
destroy insurgents vicinity objectives in NAI ~2. .~
The battle staff then plans appropriate support from each BbS
for each scheme of maneuver.
While the staff synchronizes the concept of operations for
this part of the battlefield, the recorder enters information
into the DST and BOS synchronization matrix. For purposes of
clarity he decides to combine the operations graphics and the
i. DST (see Figure A-4).
5
After wargaming, the S2 translates the decision criteria for
each decision from the BOS synchronization matrix into an
intelligence requirement (see Figure A-5). As the S2
prioritizes the list, he places intelligence requirements number
1 and 2 at the top of the list as his recommended PIR. The
commander agrees and the new PIR are--
0 PIR 1: Has the insurgent company established a base camp
in NAIs 1 or 3?
0 PIR 2: Has the insurgent company established a base camp
in NAI 2?
As part of his collection strategy, the 52 decides to use the
battalion scouts to answer PIR 1 and a patrol from B Company to
answer PIR 2. The insurgent company is expected to occupy the
base camp only for a limited time. Maneuver and OPSEC
constraints narrow the window even further. The 52 records all
this information into his intelligence synchronization matrix
(see Figure A-6).
A-17
FM 34-130
1
Figure A-4. Declslon support template.
DP No. No. 1 No. 2 No. 3
Decision criteria Insurgent Camp is in Insurgent Camp is in

NAI No. 1 or No. 3 NAI No. 2
Manauver A Co receives 3/B, A Co occupies TA4

occupy TAA BAUl-Y O/O BEAUTY, O/O Occupy
movement to CATK along BPS 1, 2, and 3
AXIS KEN
B Co Air Assaults O/O to B Co Air Assaults O/O

occupy BPS 1 and 2 to occupy BPS 4 and 5
C Co occupies TAA C Co receives 3/B occupy

LOGIC, O/O occupy TAA LOGIC, O/O movement
BPS 3, 4, and 5 to CATK along AXIS LANCE
Fs Priority: A, B, C Priority: C, B, A
MCM-S lllV13th Engr to A IiAll3th Engr to C
rlgure A-5. BOS synchronlzatlon matrix.
A-18
FM 34-130
21 March 22 March 23. March

Tlmellna: 2400 1200 2400 1200 2400 1200 2400
PlR/lR No: Pi II P2 P3/14 I2 I8 14
Scouta: __ -X xx
A Co
B Co ~~~~~~~~~~~~~---x
c co
Bde ______ L ____ x X,
l Scouts will not proceed to P3/14 if they find the insurgent company in NAI No. 1 -(Pm 1)
Flgure A-6. The lntelllgence synchronlzatlon matrix.
Eleven hours after the battalion issued the operations order,

the scouts report significant insurgent activity in NAI 3, with
no activity in NAIs 1 or 2. Additionally, the scout platoon
leader, who sat in on the wargaming session, reports that the
hill selected for,use as BP 1 is actually a cliff that would not
support exfiltration lanes for insurgents. However, the gap
vicinity BP 4 supports more escape lanes than one infantry
platoon can block.
The S2 prompts a mini-wargame session where he presents the
new intelligence provided by the scout platoon. The commander
and 53 decide to modify the original plan--
B Company will occupy BPS 1, 2, and 3.
C Company will occupy BPS 4 and 5 only.
The 53 issues the appropriate fragmentary orders while the S2 .
retasks the scout platoon to provide additional information on
the guerrillas' early warning and defense system.
.g;i;ix;ig;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . summary ftiii;i.ii;;iiiiiiii;ili!!!flflffiifi;~~~~~~~~~~:~~
. .. .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . , .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
The synchronization that occurs during staff wargaming

drastically multiplies the combat effectiveness of a unit. To
make wargaming work, the G2 or 52 needs to force the staff to
consider the full set of COAs available to the threat. The G2
or S2 develops threat COAs during the IPB process.
A-19
FM 34-130
During wargaming the staff plans responses or preemptive

actions to deal with threat actions. The G2 or S2 uses the
records and products of wargaming, such as the DST and BOS
synchronization matrix to structure the unit collection effort
to deliver the intelligence the decision makersneed at the
times they need it. He does this through the use of
intelligence requirements and the synchronization of
intelligence.
Because the threat follows his own plan, the staff must
constantly review the current situation and update their plan as
needed to ensure success. Incorporation of'new information into
the continuous IPB process ensures that the necessary changes~
are identified, prompting additional iterations of the decision '-
making process as necessary.
A-20
FM 34-130
I
APPENDIX B
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR USE DURING
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
When conducting IPB, the analyst should endeavor to acquire

facts and develop detailed products appropriate for the specific
METT-T situation under consideration. This involves a
significant amount of research about the threat and the
battlefield environment,. However, this information will not
always be available.
Fortunately, the/analyst can still produce quality IPB
products even when some of the conclusions are built using
"ball-park " figures based on assumptions. This appendix '.
provides generalized rules of thumb and guidelines for each step
in the IPB process for use in the absence of more exact
information.
Be forewarned, these figures should be used as a last resort,
and only when better information will not be available in a
timely manner.
In 1939 the British and French Armies used a rule of thumb to
lassify the Ardennes Forest as unsuitable for use by German
danzer units. In 1944 the American Army assumed an economy of
force posture in the Ardennes for similar reasons. In both
cases the Allies paid dearly for not having forecast and
wargamed the COA the Germans actually chose.
The guidelines listed below are statistical averages, or are
based on specific forces, and will sometimes be misleading when
applied to a particular situation. For example; the guidelines
in the section on "Evaluating the Threat" are based on Soviet
style and US style forces. If you are evaluating a threat that
does not follow one of these two models, you must develop the
data base to the point where you can construct similar
guidelines for the force under consideration.
Avoid relying on "ball-park" figures as much as possible.
Acquire the information that is pertinent to your specific
circumstances. Tailor your evaluations to the specific
equipment types, organizations, and training status of the units
you are evaluating. For example, if a unit is especially
skilled in night operations, periods of low visibility or
illumination are likely to have little effect on their
operations. Units equipped with a particular vehicle type may
be less affected by mobility constraints than the tables that
follow indicate.
B-l
FM 34-130
In a pinch, however, judicious use of the tables and

guidelines that follow can help you through most situation.
.. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. ....... .. .. .. .. .. ......

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiti Define the Battlefield Environment iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiriiliiiirriiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
..,.... :...:..:.:.::::::::i::::::::;:~:::::::::::::~~::::
The A0 will almost always be established by higher

headquarters. In those cases where it is not, your commander
establish its limits base on his intent and desired end-state.
The AI should"be drawnto include the'terrain in which
activity may occur that would affect the upcoming mission,. fin a
conventional war a typical mission for a maneuver battalion ~.
might last 12 hours.- Therefore, the AI should be drawn to
include any characteristics of the battlefield, including threat
units, that can affect the mission's success within the next 12
hours.
Figures B-l and B-2 give rules of thumb for establishing the
limits of ground and air AIs.
AREA OF INTEREST
COMMAND ECHELON (HOURS)
Battalion up lo 1~2
Brigade Up to 24
Dhision Up lo 72
corps Up 10 96
E4C Over 96
rlgure t4-1. huefaon umes.
ORGANIZATION OPPONENT DEPTH OF Al WIDTH
Rotary-wing airfields end futed

Division Army TBM sites 10 depth of 240 km KIT-T
Enemy airfields and fixed TBM sites
cocps Front 10 corps rear MElT~T
Figure B-2. Alr areas of interest.
B-2
FM 34-130
::::::::::::::::::::::::
iiiiliiiiiliiis;iiiiii Describe the Battlefield 1 s Effects Ifffti;:iii!illtft:fii;f;;;iilttfliiiii
Products of this step in the IPB process depict,the effects

of the battlefield environment on the operations and broad
courses of action available to threat and friendly forces (see
Chapter 3 for examples). Regardless of the detail in the
initial overlays, the final product should show the options for
the employment of. both threat and friendly forces.
The final,product prepared to support planning for a
conventional operation by a friendly mechanized or armor unit,
regardless of who is attacking or defending, should include--
0 Mobility corridors for units two echelons below the .
level of major unit under consideration.
0 Avenues of approach through the A0 for units one echelon
below the level of the major attacking unit. These are
constructed by connecting mobility corridors and
RESTRICTED terrain to likely objectives.
0 Locations along the avenues of approach that offer
defensible terrain to units two echelons below the level
of major defending unit.
0 Key and decisive terrain.
0 The most important of other characteristics of the
battlefield environment (such as weather, politics).
The final product prepared to support planning for a
conventional offense by a light infantry command (threat or
friendly) should include--
0 Objective areas that allow for a surprise attack by
light infantry. This usually means an objective area
near close terrain.
0 Terrain near the objective areas that allow for
concealed assault positions.
0 A combination of infiltration lanes, landing zones, and
air avenues of approach that allow for the stealthy
movement of light infantry to the assault positions.
B-3
FM 34-130
The final product prepared to support planning for a
conventional defense by a light infantry battalion (threat or
friendly) should include--
0 Chokepoints along the mechanized or armor avenues of
approach that allow for strongpoints that would not be
easily bypassed.
0 Close terrain (usually RESTRICTEDj within the mechanized
or armor aven,ues of approach that allow large amounts of
light infantry to achieve flank and rear shoots against
armored vehicles
.. ate ranges of 100 meters or less.
0 Defensible terrain along light infantry avenues of
approach. Ideally the defense is comprised of a network' -.
of ambushes. .~
See Chapters 4 through 6 for ideas on conducting IPB under
conditions not listed above. Figures B-3 through B-21 provide
some rules of thumb for describing the battlefield's effects.
M48 M60
VEHICLE Ml M60A1 M109 M113 N35A2 M151 T62 T72 M2 M3 AVLB AVLB MLR!
Maximum road
speed (kph) 71 48 56 48 56 50 50 (60) 66 66 48 51 64
Maximum on-
road gridability
(%) 68.7 60 60 60 64 60 62 (62) 60 60 30 30 60
Maximum off-
road gradability
(%) 53 45 45 45 30 28 (45) (45)
Vehicle width
(m) 3.65 3.63 3.10 2.69 e43 1.69 3.37 3.38 6.2 6.2 4.3 4.3 2.97
Override diameter
at breast height
(m) .25 .15 (.12) .10 .06 .04 (.15) .18
Vehicle cone
index 1 pass
(VCh) 25 20 25 17 26 19 21 (25) 15 15 26 22
Vehicle cone
index 50 passes
(VCIso) 58 48 57 40 59 44 49 35
(60) 35 60 51
Minimum turning
radius (m) 9.9 9.4 6.6 4.8 5.3 5.8 9.33 9.2 6.2 6.2 9.6 9.6 6.97
Vehicle length
(m) 9.9 9.4 6.6 4.8 6.7 3.35 9.33 9.2 6.2 6.2 9.6 9.6 6.97
Military load class 60 54 24 12 10 NA 42 45 24 24 62 63 28
Figure B-3. vehicle charscterlstlcs.

B-4
:
FM 34-130
t 3
SLOPE STREAMS VEGETATION
DEPlH CURRENT wlom SPACING TRUNK ROADS/TRAILS
w-4 (fPS) (feet) (few DfAMETER (per km)
(Inches)
t t
GO <30 <2 ..--- <5 ~>20 <2 2l4
SLOW- 301045 2104 <AVLB

GO s-5 length dOsnd2to6 1n
NO-GO a45 z-4 z-5 >AMS <MuId> iI<2

length
gfgure B-4. Terraln types for mechenfked or armor forcer.
PARAMETER _ FACTOR CRITERIA (PERCENT) -

slope s30
Gcq Canopy closure >50
Roof coverage z-40
slope 10to30
Canopy closure 40
FAIR Roof coverage** 201040
Slope Cl0
POOR Non-forested
Roof coverage** <20
l Or stem spacing 5 m ~~~ I

l * If evaluated I
Figure B-5. Cover from flat trajectory weapons.

- -
1 I I
I ROOF COVERAGE
(percentage)
I
CATEGORY
I CONCEALMENT
75 to loo EXC&llt
50 to 75 Good
I
25 to 50 Modmte Fair
5 to 25 Sparse Poor
0 to 5 Open None
Figure B-6. Concealment from aerfal detectlon end percentage of roof coverage.
B-5
e
FM 34-130
-
1
WATER DEPTH OTHER
CATEGORY VESSEL (meters) (meters)
Deep draft * NiWal 10
cqltalner 10 to 15
Bulk carrier 12 to 18
Tankers 10 to 28
Shallow draft l * lish i 3
Seabee 3.4 31
h9e 38 33
1 Each vessel hatch re&ires 30 meten 01 wharf space, with the wharf at least 30 meters wide.
l * The wharf length must be 12 meters.
-~ Figure B-7. Port categories.
B-6
FM 34-130
--
Height
(feet)
N6utlc6l
mllsa mllrs (IWil)
iiziz
mllca statute
mllaa
Helghl
(feel)
NtlUlhl
mllea
statute
mlle6
l 7
1.6
1.3
1.9
120 (2.5 7
14.7
940 36.1 40.4
2
3 2 . 0
2.3
2.3
2.6
t
:zi
136
:z 15.0
15.3
Ei 35.6 35.4 2::
4
5 2.6 2.9 140 ::ls 16.6 ::z 37.9 36.2 :::;
145 15.9 1200
6
7
8
::o"
32
3.2
3.5
3.7
160
160
2:
14:5
16.1
16.7
I.300 m.; ::::
9 3.4 4.0 170 14.9 17.2 :Gfi 43.8 44.6 49.6 52.0
10 3.6 4.2 160 15.3 17.7 1:6w 45.6 52.8
It 3.6 4.4 190 15.6 1.7M 47.2
12 4.0 162 :i:: ::z 49.9 46.5 57.8
2::
13 4.1 4.6
4.7 E 19.1
14 43~ ;;:t g:; 51.2 58.9
15 4.4 5.1
4.9 i% 17.3 z% 52.4 50.4
16 4.6 17.7 M.4 2.200 53.7 61.8
17 4.7 5.3
5.4 ;: 18.1 2.300 54.9 63.2
ia 4.9 5.6 18.4 2: 2.400 56.0 64.8"
19 5.0 5.7 E 18.8 21.6 2,500 57.2 65.8
20 5.1 5.9 260 19.1 22.0 2,600 56.3 67.2
21 5.2 19.5 22.4 2,700 59.4 66.4 1
22 5.4 6.0
6.2 z 19.8 22.8 2,600 60.6 69.7
23 5.5 6.3 310 20.1 239 2,900 61.6 70.9
24 5.6 23.6 3,000 62.7 72.1
25 5.7 2: 52 $2: 23.9 3.100 63.7 73.3
26 5.8 21.1 24.3 3,200 64.7 74.5
27 5.9 6.7
6.6 E 21.4 24.6 3.300 65.7 75.7
28 6.1 7.0 360 21.7 25.0 3,400 66.7 76.8
29 6.2 7.1 370 25.3 3,500 67.7 77.8
30 6.3 7.2 300 2: 25.7 3600 66.6 79.0
31 6.4 7.3 390 22.6 26.0 3,700 69.6 80.1
32 6.5 7.5
33 6.6 7.6 it-i E:Z % :Ei 70.5 71.4 61.3 62.3
34 6.7 7.7 420 23.4 27.0 4:M0 72.4 63.3
35 6.6 7.8 430 23.7 27.3 4.100 73.3 04.3
36 6.9 7.9 440 24.0 27.6 4.Mo 74.1 85.4
37 8.0 459 24.3 27.9 4.300 75.0 06.4
36 ::: 8.1 460 24.5 26.2 ,.ao 75.9 87.4
39 7.1 8.2 470 24.6 26.6 4.m 76.7 88.8
t 25.1 28.9 4.600 T1.6 89.3
40 7.2 6.3 460
41 7.3 6.4 493 25.3 4.703 78.4 90.3
42 25.6 z::
43 ;I; 8.5
6.6 E 26.1 30.0 %z 79.3
80.1 91.2 92.2
44 8.7 540 26.6 30.6 5:Ow 80.9 93.1
45 7.7 6.6 560 27.1 31.2 WJW ea.6 102.0
46 7.6 27.6 31.7
47 7.6 6.0
9.0 iti xci 102.3 95.7 x
46 7.9 9.1 m ;::i 5: 9:aw 108.5 124:6
49 8.0 26.9 lo.m 114.4 131.7
SO 6.1 9.3
9.2 z 29.4 ii:; 15,wo 140.1 161.3
55 a.5 9.8 34.3 zg8i ;%:i 206.2 186.3
60 6 . 9 10.2 E $2 24.8
65 9.2 30.7 35.3 19&, P&l
70 9.6 10.6
11.0 E 31.1 35.6 $?E
75 a.9 11.4 31.5 35.3 &Gil 214.0
22tl.8 246.4 263.8
60 10.2 11.6 :t 31.9 36.6 45,ooo 242.7 279.4
85 '10.5 12.1 32.4 37.3 z%i 255.8 294.5
90 iii 37.7
95 :::; ;::i 2 70:OM EP2:: iZ:
100 11.4 33:s $1: 322.6 372.5
105 11.7 :::: E
880 33.9 39.1 l&W
%E ii::; 395.1
110 13.8 600 34.3 39.5
115 :;:i 14.1 92-a 34.7 39.9 2wMQ 511.6 2%
Flgure B-8. Height of eye versus ho&on range.
B-7
I
FM 34-130
Ditches Tree stumps Hedgerows
Embankments Stone walls Scattered trees
Large rocks Bushes Barbed wire ,fences
Boulders Buildings Cemeteries
Wood fences Minefields KarSt topograpy
Quarries Levees Overhead power-lines
Ruins Towers Overhead telephone lines
Rice paddy dikes . Cuts and fills

J
Flguro S-9. Polentlal obstacles for entry zones.
LANDING PA0 I RUNWAY I
Hover,
Hellpsd or Shoulder Lsnr Shoulder
Heliport Length Width Wldlh Wldlh Length Width Wldlh
TLPO (feet) (itet) (feet) (feel) (feet) (feet) (feet)
Forward Ares I)
OH-6A 12 12 NA 75 NA NA NA
UH-1H 20 20 NA 140 NA NA NA
CH-47 50 25 NA 180 NA NA NA
CH-54 50 50 NA 200 NA NA NA
Support Area
OWSA 12 12 10 100 NA NA NA
LJtl.lH NA NA NA
cf-l-47 z 4.50 10
Cli-5.4 250 450 10
Rear Area
OH-6A 25 25 25 100 NA NA NA
UH-1H 40 40 25 200 NA NA NA
CH-47 100 50 25 240 450 40 25
CH-54 100 100 25 250 450 60 25
1 I 1 I I I I
i Taxi/hover lane Is used for rakeoh and tending where provided; lenglh is variable.
Where runway Is not shown, takeoff and landiio are oh laxkhover lane.
Figure S-10. Mlnlmum hellprd and hellport requlremenls.
B-g
. I
FM 34-130
Runw8y Total
Runwily funwsy Shoulder Aircraft
Length Width Width Trofflc Area*
Alrileld Type (feet) (feet) (feet) i ,000 6q n
Battle Area:
Lighl Lift and Medium Lilt ewe 60 10 223
Fowrrd Area: :
Liaison 1,ooa NA 37.5
Surveillance 2.500 iTi 10 337
Lighl tih and Meaium Liit: 2soLl Ml 10 358
Support Area:
LS60n law0 50 NA 50 .~
Surveillance
Light Lilt and Medium Lift i%z 60 10 E.5
Heavy Lib 6:ooo 100 10 1.421
Tactical 5.oco 60 4 1,071
IR e a r A r e a : I I I I
Army 3,fJ@J 72 10 882
IMedium Liil 6,330 72 ii 2,362
IHeavy Lih 10,ow 156 3,926
racticar 8,~ 108 20 1.999
This area includes parking, runway, laxbay, and warm-up apron.

h
Flgure B-11. Mlnlmum slrfleld requlrements.
B-9
FM 34-130
DEGREE OF SLOPE CALCULATOR
Many slope calculators have been made by various terrain
detachments. These calculators show different contour densities
to be used on maps at various scales with various contour
intervals.' They are usually reproduced on transparent plastic
by photography laboratories. Figure B-12 is an example of a
slope calculator.
Ill Mll 1 I I I
45 25 10
SCALE SCALE
0 USEWfTH D
RF. with CONTOUR INTERVAL
1:25.000 25 FEET
1.50.000 50 -
1:100.000 100
1:125.000 125
1,250.000 _ 25Q -
Figure B-12. Degree of slope calculator.
To construct a slope calculator, you must know:

o The map scale, for example l:lOO,OOO.
o The map contour interval, for example 10 meters.
o The percentage of slope you wish to calculate, for example
20 percent.
To determine the amount of space between each line on your
slope calculator, first determine the amount of ground distance
by using the formula:
contour interval x 100
% slope
In our example, we get: 10 x 100 = 1.ooo= 50 meters
20 20
Next, convert the ground distance into map distance with the
formula:
ground distance
map scale
In our example we get: 50meters = 0.0005 meters (or
0.5 mm) 100,000
This gives the amount of space between each line on the
slope calculator. Use at least five lines. Place the slope
calculator over the map section you are evaluating. If the
contours on the map are more closely spaced than those on the
calculator, the slope is greater than that depicted by the
calculator. Conversely, if they are less closely spaced the
slope is less than that depicted on the calculator.
B-10
FM 34-130
I METERS FEET I
TtiL Leas than 1.5 LeatIm
TRACK Al least 1.5 but leas than 25 Atleast$butlesstlmn6
I ONE LANE At lea925 butlersthan 5.5 Atle%t8but!&slhan16 I
TWO LANE!,. Al Iasl5.5 butlessll?m 8.2 Atless 18 btilessthan28
MORE THAN TWO LANES At least 8.2 Allm!5l28
Figure B-H. Lane widths currently shown on US mllltafy maps.
UNIT WIDTH
Division 6km
Brigade or Regiment 3km
Battalion 1.5 km
Company 500 m
Figure B-14. Widths of mobility corridora.
AVENUESOFAPPROACH MOBILITY CORRIDOR MAXIMUM DISTANCE

Division Brlgade or 10 km
Regiment
Brigade or Battalion 6km
Regiment
Battallons Comoanv 2km
Figure B-15. Maximum distance between mobility corridors.
B-11
FM 34-130
/Soldier on fool
LOAD
LOAD
MINIMUM ICE
THICKNESS (CENTIMETER
5
I~- M!NIMUM DISTANCE
BETWEEN
LOAD IMETERS)
Soldier on skis or snowshoes
Vehicles:
l/4-Ion truck ~!a
3HOrl IluCk 25
1 l/4-IOn Uutk 25
2 l/4-Ion lruck 2 25
2 1,2-lorl truck 40 25
5.Ion lruck 55 60 .:
&Ion lanker 90 . 80
5401-1 lraclor w/loaded lreiler 90 80
hi561 Cargo carrier 25 20
MS.ln bSllls lank aa
t&8 recovery vehicle 65 :,
MlOfl HOW, Sr: l&mm 50 40
Ml09 HOW, Sp. 155mm 53 40
M1l0HOW.SP:sin 55
Ml13APC
hi548 cargo carrier
45
45
E25
M577 carrier command post 45 25
M578 recovecy vehicle 60
av209 susv .E 15
Figure B-1 6. Loed-baerlng capacity of iresh-water Ice.
MARCH RATES IN DISTANCE COVERED MAXIMUM SNOW

EXTREME COLD IN ONE DAYS MARCH DEPTHS
infUIlfy (SnOw less ihan Infanlly . . . . . . 12 lo 24 km WET SNOW:
30 cm deep) . . . . . . . . 3104kmph Ski Unit . . ,,...... 32M4Cikm Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . 121016in
Infantry (snow over Tracked Vehicles . . .96 lo 112 km Wheeled Vehicles
30 cm deep) . . . . . . . 1 lo 2 kmph (with chains) . . . . . . . . 16in
Soldier on Ski.3 . . . . . 6106kmph THICKNESS OF ICE Tracked Vehicles . . . .30 in
Subunk on skis . . . . ..3106kmph
Tracked vehicles . . . ..16to24kmph REDUIRED FOR PASSAGE DRY SNOW:
Tanks and ApCs in: Personnel . . . . . . . . . 161024in
o Snow under 50 cm . Employed as usual FrFrn 7;;; : : : : : : $ Ez Wheeled Vehicles
0 Snuu 50 lo 75 cm . . (short moves) 10 (wilh cnains) . . . . . . .24 In
0 snow over 75 cm . . . fiesttlcled lo roads Tracked Vehicles . . . .46 in
or clearad roulas I
Figure B-17. Extreme battlefield and weather condlllons.
B-12
FM 34-130
ESTIMATED SPEED OFMOVEMENT

TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS DAY NIGHT
Sandy hills, lo&e sanb, shale 7 to 6 kmph 5 to 6 kmph

Sandy valleys 10 to 12 kmph 8tolOkmph
Clay-surfaced desen 24 to 26 kmph 22 to 24 kmph
Figure E-1 6. Deaeft movement.
TEMP6RATURC HUMIOITT WINDS (KT6) PREClPlTATtON CEILINGS (feel1

COLO
lr
YE0 HOT LOW HIOH
T 1
WIN SNOW FOG
1.500 to
cl3
ATTACK + 0 . 0 . 0 + 1 + -1 + 0 0 0
DEFEND 0 2 0 -2 0 0 0 0
REINFORCE + 0 0 0 0 +/-a * 0 0 0
VITHDRAW + 0 0 0 + W-3 + 0 0 0
ARTILLERY 0 0 0 0 0 0
AIRMOBIUTY . 0 . 0 0 X X X + +
AIRBORNE 0 .0 0 X * 0 *
CAS 0 0 0 0 X X X X f
CHEMICAL 0 + 0 + + * 0 0 0 +
uw 0 0 0 0 + + - 0 - + + 0 -
INTELCOL - 0 - 0 - 0 - - - . . - - 0
N/COMMO - 0 . 0 . 0 0 -, * . . 0 0 0
+ - FAVORS 0 - NEITHER FAVORS NOR OEQRADES
- - DISFAVORS X - STRONQLY DISFAVORS/PRECLUDES
+/- - MAY FAVOR OR DISFAVOR DEFENDINO ON CIRCUMSTANCES
NOTES: 1. Doi not favor any military operation; (vor attack ralativ to delaneo.
2. Do not favor moat military operations; favor d(na relativ to attack.
3. Hindar mobility but increa* concJmnt.
WEATHER EFFECTS DEPEND ON TACTICAL SiTL!ATlON. USE CHART AS A OENER4L GUIDE ONLY
NOTE EFFECTS ON AlTACK AND DEFENSE ARE SHOWN IN ISOUITION, RATHER THAN AS RELATIVE
TO EACH OTHER
Flgure 8.19. Weather effects on courses of rctlon.
B-13
FM 34-130
ACTUAL TEMPERATURE READING fF)

1 ESTIMATED
WIND SPEED 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30- -40 50 -60
(in mph)
EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE (*F)
Calm SO 40 30 20 10 0 10 .20 -30 -40 50 60
S 48 37 27 16 6 -5 -15 26 36 47 -57 -66
10 40 28 16 4 9 -24 -33 -46 56 -70 63 -95
15 36 22 9 -6 -10 -32 -45 56 -72 65 .99 -112
20 32 16 4 -10 -25 -23 53 67 42 . -96 -110 -121

25 30 16 0 -15 -29 -44 -59 -74 -66 .104 -118 -133
30 28 13 ~-2 -18 -33 48.. 43 -79 -94 -109 -125 -140
I 35 1 27 t 11 / -4 t -M 1 -35 1 -61 1 67 1 82 1 .SS I -113 I -129 I -145 I

40 26 10 -6 .21 -37 53 -69 -85 -im .116 .132 -146
(Wind speeds UlTLE DANGER INCREASING DANGER GREAT DANGER

greater ulan IS <IV wilt! dry skin. Danger lrom freezing of Flesh may freeze
40 mpn nava Maximum danger ol ,eaeas!d flesh within one within 30 seconds.
liflle addllional false ssnss of secufky.
dlt3Cl.)
Trenchfool and immersion foot may occur a! any poinl on tnis cnan.
Developed by U.S. Army Researcn Inslitule of Environmental Medicine. Nalick, MA.
Figure B-20. Wlndchlll taclor chart.
B-14
FM 34-130
WEATHER FAVORABLE MARGINAL UNFAVORABLE

MISSION ELEMENT (GO) (SLOW-GO) (NO-GO)
Maneuver: Mobility Visibility > 1.5 km 0.8 to 1.5 km < 0.8 km
(Track vehicles, Day) Rainfall < 0.1 in/hr 0.1 to 0.5 in/hr > 0.5 in/hr
Snow depth <12in 12 to 20 in >20ln
Maneuver: Mobility Visibility > 0.2 km 0.1 to 0.2 km < 0.1 km
(Track vehicles, Night Rainfall < 0.1 in/hr 0.1 to 0.5 in/hr > 0.5 in/hr
w/PVS-5 NVG) Snow depth < I2in 12 to 20 in > 20 in
Maneuver: Mobility Visibility > 0.3 km 0.1 io0.3km < o.i km
(Oismoumed lnfanuy) Rainfall < 0.1 in/hr 0.1 lo 0.5 in/hr > 0.5 in/hr
Snow depth <3ln 3 10 6 in > 6 in
Wind chill temperature >o*c 0* C to -30* C <-30*C

Maneuver: Weapons Visibility > 3.0 km 0.5 to 3.0 km < 0.5 km
positioning Temperature >-18'C " <-18*C
(Antiarmor direct fire)
Fire Support Visibility > 5.0 km 1.5 to 5.0 km < 1.5 km
(155-mm) Ceiling >800ft 50010 800 ft <500ft
Surface wind <35kn 36 to 50 kn >50kn
Snow depth < 4.0 in 4.0 to 6.0 in >6in
Fire Support Visibility > 8.0 km 5.0 to 8.0 km < 5.0 km
(CAS A-10) Ceiling > 3.000 ft 500 to 3,000 ft < 500 ft
ntelligence Visibility > 5.0 km 3.0 to 5.0 km < 3.0 km

[Fixed-wing visual recon) Ceiling < 3/8 clouds 3/8 to 5/8 clouds > 5/8 clouds
Mr Defense Artillery. Visibility > 5.0 km 3.0 to 5.0 km < 3.0 km
[Vulcan, Chaparral, Ceiling > 5,000 ft 3.000 to 5.000 ft < 3,000 ft
5tinger) Rainfall < 0.5 in/hr 0.5 to 1.0 in/hr > i.o in/hr
*JBC Wind below 16 meters < 5kn 5 to 7 kn > 7kn
Chemical, artillery Stability Stable Neutral Unstable (lapse)
delivery) Temperature > 21* C 4*10 21'C <4*C
Humidity > 60 percent 40 to 60 percent < 40 percent
>moke Precipitation None Light Moderate or heavy
Urborne Visibility > 5.0 km 1.0 to 5.0 km < t.Okm
,From C-130 10 C.141) Ceiling > 500 ft 300 to 500 ft < 300 ft
Surface Wind < 10 kn 10 to 13 kn > 13 kn
Precipitation None Light Freezing rain or hail
Wiatlon Visibility > 1.5 km 0.4 to 1.5 km > 0.4 km
Rotary wing) Ceiling > 500 ft 300 to 500 ft > 300 ft
<V\ tn Q/\ Irn ^ 4SI Im
Precipitation None Light Freezing rain or hail
Flgurc B-21. Weather 8ffeCls ErlllCPl VPIUQI.
B-15
FM 34-130
::::::::::::::::::::::::
........................ Evaluate +-he Threat iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
:::::::::::::::::::::::: :..: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i......:: . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluating the threat comprises two efforts; building the

data base, and using the data base to construct threat models.
Use the traditional OB factors to evaluate the threat (see
FM 34-3). IPB analysts may often find it necessary to construct
their own OB files using the following toolsfrom the processing
step of the intelligence cycle:
0 Intelligence files.
o SITMAP.
o Coordinates register.
0 Intelligence journal.
o Intelligence workbook.
o Activities matrix.
o Association matrix.
o Link diagram.
o Time event chart.
"Composition" can be described using standard line and block
charts; "disposition" can be described using a SITMAP.
Similarly, other graphic aids can be used to show many of the OB
factors.
The V'tacticslW portion of the OB files requires significant
effort for effective presentation. The analyst should first
build "threat models" by observing, or studying reports of, I
threat training or combat operations. Once the analyst gains an
understanding of threat procedures, he can document the threat
model using the following techniques: I
0 Develop a doctrinal template--graphically portray the

employment of threat units throughout the operation.
Concentrate. on the details. What speeds do threat i
forces move at when deployed? What speeds when in
column? How much space between individual weapons
systems? How much space between units? How much space
does a unit occupy on the offense? How much space on
the defense?
B-16
FM 34-130
0 Develop a doctrinal narrative--describe the tasks that
each subordinate unit will accomplish during the
operation. The written narrative can be expressed
either in paragraph form or in a standard
synchronization matrix that has subordinate units on one
axis and time duration on the other axis.
0 Develop HVTs based on doctrine--what are the tactical
systems that the threat depends upon for the successful
accomplishment of the procedure?
Fortunately, there are certain constants affecting the
operations of the military forces of any nationality. These
fundamentals of tactics can be learned through--
0 Effectivebattle-focused training.
0 The study of military history.
0 Mentoring by battle-seasoned soldiers.
You will discover that sustained pursuit of "battlefield
common sense" greatly simplifies the development of threat
models.
Learn the tactics of your own forces. This gives you a
common framework that enables you to communicate with your
commander and understand how best to support his operations. It
also provides you with a basis against which to compare the
doctrine of any threat you may face:
0 How is it different from US doctrine?
0 How is it the same?
0 What does the threat do to minimize the vulnerabilities
associated with any given operation?
0 How do the details of the threat model relate to
doctrine and TTP? For example, how does the spacing of
units relate to weapon range capabilities? If range
capabilities increase will units deploy further apart?
For more ideas on developing threat models, refer to the
techniques on building threat COAs in the final section of this
appendix. Remember that threat models are generalized
procedures; they do not depend upon the specific battlefield
environment. Threat COAs are tied to specific METT-T
situations.
Figures B-22 through ****** offer some guidelines for use in
evaluating the threat.
B-17
FM 34-130
DIV . REGT EN CD
Frontage 20 to 30 1oto15 3to5 0.5 to 1

Depth ~ 15to20 71010 2to 3 0.5
Gaps between untta 0.510 2 0.5 to 1.5
Tanks may deploy 200 to 300 meters apart and APCs up to 200 maters apart. Antitank obstacles
are placed so that they are covered by direct fire.
Figure B-22. Frontages end depths for unhe In kllometers,(defense).
ARMY DIV REGT EN
ZONE OF ATTACK _~ 6010100 15to25 5to15 2to3 1
MAIN ATTACK AXIS 35to45 61010 3to 5 1 to2
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE
DEPTH 100t0150 201030 5to15 2104
SUBSEQUENT OBJECTIVE
DEPTH 250to350 501070 20to30 BtO15
NOTE: These figures will vary with the tactical situation and terrain.
Figure E-23. Frontages and depths of objectlves In kllometers (offense).
B-18
FM 34-130
ELEMENT DEPLOYMENT
DIVISION FIRST ECHELON Concentrated to attack on two OI three axes each several kilometers wide.
DIVISION SECOND ECHELON OR Moves by bounds 15 to 30 km behind the first echelon until committed.
COMBINED ARMS RESERVE
REGIMENTAL Af&ERY GROi$ ~~1 to 4 km from the FESA.
DlVlSlONM ARTILLERYGROUP 3to6kmfromtheFESA . .
MULTIPLE ROCKET WNCHER 3to6kmfromtheFESA

0AlTALlON
DIVISIONAL ANTITANK RESERVE Between fii and second echelotu oruhe axis of the main snack or on a
threatened flank.
DIVISION t&UN CP Up to 15 km from the FESS
DIVISION FORWARD CP Up to 5 km from the FE&%
DIVISION REAFt AREA CP Up to 30 km from the FESA and located near the rear service elements.
I
REGIMENTAL MAIN CP . Up to 5 km from the FESA.
LOGISTIC UNITS The divisional medical post, togehter with repair and avacuation elements.
moves behind the fist echelon The rest of the divisional logislic units
will be some 5 to 10 km bahind the second echelon.
Flgurc B-24. Deployment of dlvlalon elmenta In an attack.
I Reaction Times to Mounting an Attack March Column Assembly Times

UNIT REACTION TlME PLANNING TIME UNIT MINUTES
Motorized rifle company 5

Dlvlslon 2104houra lto3hoUrs
Motorized ritle battelion 10 to 15
Roglment 1 IO 3 hours 30 minutes to 2.5 AiUllery battallon 151020

hours Anillery regiment 401050
aan~llon
Mciorlzed Ma regiment SOlO
25 lo 69 minutes mlo45mlnutsr
[reinforced)
Flgure B-25. Rerction and march Umea.
B-19
FM 34-130
CONDITION MARCH RATES

Day, on roads . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . a20to30kmph
: Night, on roads . . , , I...,....... 15 to 20 kmph
Cross-countty , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . ..51015kmph
Flguro B-26. Average march rates for mixed columns.
:tJfJ;;J;~~D 10% SURFACE MORE THAN 10%

1
TYPE OF ROAD DESTRUCTION SURFACE DESTRUCTION
Concrele, espheil-concrete 40 IO 50 ml035 10 IO 20
Gravel and fubble 40 IO 5Q 20 IO 30 10 IO 20
Dirt 151025 81015 5to10
Figure B-27. Average speeds of vehicles.
UNIT NORMAL INTERVAL VARIATIONS
Between vehicles in a company. 20 to50m Increased at high speeds and when

traversing conlaminaled or rugged terrain
or on icy roads. May be decreased at night.
Between companies in a battalion. 25 to 50 m Up to 300 m or more under nuclear

conditions.
Between battalions on the same route. 3 to 5 km
Between regiments on the same route. StolOkm Can vary as contact becomes imminent.
Between regimental rear services and 3to5km

main force.
Between division rear services and main 15 to 20 km

force.
NOTE: Vehicles speeds are determined by road conditions.

Flgurr B-28. Unlt dlsperesl Intervale.
B-20
r
FM 34-130
9
UNIT DIESEL ,GAS I TOTAL
I
67,860 59,990 127,859 liters
MRR (BTR EOUIPPED)
57.7 45.0 102.7 metric tons
101.737 40,896 . 142,632 liters

MRR (BMP EOUIPPEP)
. 86.5 30.6 117.1 metric tons
115.350 31,763 147.113 liters

TANK REGT
98.1 23.6 121.9 metric tons
53,246 4.636 57,882 liters '.. ..

INDEPENDENT TANK BN ,(MRD)
45.3 3.5 48.8 metric tons
2,835 6,132, 8,967 liters

ANTITANK BN (MRD)
2.4 4.6 7.0 metric tons
2,756 38,472 41,228 liters

ARTY REGT (DIVJ
31.1 metric tons
26,010 14,121 42,131 liters

ARTY REGT (ARMY)
23.8 10.6 34.4 metric tons
NOTE: A unils refill Is the total requlremenl for sll vehicles h the unil.
Figure B-35. POL refill.
FORCE RATIO TYPICAL MISSION
1:3 Defecd (prepared)

1:2.5 Defend (hasty)
25:1 Attack (hasty position)
I 3:l I Attack (Prepared Position)
I 1:i Counterattack (flank)
Figure B-36. Typlcal planning force ratlos.
B-25
FM 34-130
- --__-.
- - m
FOOT MARCHES
BASIC DATA TABLE, FOOT MARCHES I

Vlslbllity *Rate of March Normal March Forced March
(6 hours) (12 hours)
r
. Qay I :. 4kmph 32km 48 km
ROADS
Night 3 kmph 24 km .. 36 km Y
Day .~ 2 kmph 16km 24 km
CROSS-
ZOUNTRY Night 1 kmph 6km 12km. mi
NOTE: Computed on a 53minute hour, allowing for lo-minute halt each hour.
u
.ength of a Column. To determine the length of a column occupied by a dismounted unit.
nuttiply the estimated or known number of personnel by the applicable IactOr.
LENGTH OF COLUMN, FACTOR TABLE FOOT MARCHES

3
*FormatIon 2mlperron dlotance Sm/percon distance

r
Single File 24 5.4
Column of Twos 1.2 2.7
NOTE: Foot marches will vary with the tactical situation: normal formation is a column of twos
vith a file on either side of the road and staggered, much like US Forces. However, columns of
hrees and fours may be employed where conditions permit.
i
ass Time. To determine the pass time in minutes ior a dismounted unit, multiply the length
,I the column by the appropriate (actor lor the estimated or known rate of march.
i
PASS TIME FACTORS, FOOT MARCHES
Rate (kmph) Factors

i
4 .015
3 .016
2 ,020 r
.023
Flgurr B-26. Foot marches factors.
B-21
. I
ucyrcc wi RED DEFENSE ^ w^
'*"' î
Attacker to GO SLOW-GO NO-GO GO SLOW-GO NO-GO

Defender TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN
Radio
Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Irrt Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf
intense
Resistance 2 2 1 1 .6 6 4 4 2 2 .1.2 1.2
1:1
Very Heavy 5106 4 2lo3 2 1.5 to 1.8 1.2 10 to 12 '*. 5to6 4 3 to 3.6 2.4
2:1 (-)
Heavy 7to8 5 3to4 2.5 2.1 to 2.4 1.5 13 to 16 10 8 5 3.9 to 4.8 3
3:1
D Medium 81010 6 4lo5 3 2.410 3 1.8 16lo20 12 10 6 4.6 to 6 3.6

4:1
<
Light j 16to20 10 8 to 10 5 4.8 to 6 3 30 to 40 18 20
W 9 9 to 12 5.4
H- 5:1
0
CO 3 Negligible ! 24to30 12 1210 15 6 7.2 to 9 3.6 48to60 24 30
I 12 14.41018 7.2
to 6:1
to O

o sowx Numbers, Prcdldlons and War. Depw. T. N.. 1979.
tt
(D
& men there k surpriie, mu&ply these figures b a SUrpriSa factor as fObwS:
_ ~omple!e 9urprisa x 5 (e.g., Germans al the Ardennes In 1944, Arabs in 1973).
1
&> _ ~ubsfarvt(la~ Surprise x 3 (e.g., German invasion ol Russia In 1941. Israeli invasion of Sinal in ,967).
rr -Minor Surprise x 1.3 (e.g., Allied Normandy landing in 1944. Paklnani attack on India In 1971).
R
in The effects of surprise IM for 3 days, being reduced by one-lhird on day 2 and two-lhirds on day 3.
o
2 se Ihe relaiiw combai power from paragraph 2a(4) in lhe operations eslimale.
o
a 3 Prepared defense is based on defender in prepared postiions (24 hours or more).
<
3 4 Hasty defense is based on 2 lo 12 hours preparation time.
O
me ratios used here are to delenine lhe degree of teSiStanCs:e. There is no direCl le!aliOmhip be?waan advance ,fies and forCe ,a,ios.
However, suslalned advances probably are not possible wilhov( a 3 lo 1 ratio. Advance is possible againg superior forces b,,, canno, ba
sustained.
6 Rates greater than 6 lo 1 will result In advances between lhese and Ihe unopposed rales.
Degree of PREPARED DEFENSE3 | HASTY DEFENSE/DELAY4
Resistance
Attacker to GO SLOW-GO NO-GO GO SLOW-GO NO-GO
| Defender TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN TERRAIN
Radio
Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf Armor/Mech Inf
CO
Intense
Li I Resistance .6 .5 .5 .3 .15 .1 1.0 .8 .8 .5 .4 .2
1:1
Very Heavy .4 .3
tfl .9 .6 .6 .2 1.5 1.0 1.0 .7 .6 .3
2:1
Heavy
Q 1.2 .7 .75 .5 .5 .3 2.0 1.2 1.3 .9 .8 .5
0 3:1
a
Medium . 1.4 .8 1.0 .6 .5 .5 2.4 1.4
in 1.75 1.1 .9 .8
4:1
P
Ught .7 .6
1.5 .9 11 .5 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.0 .9
a 5:1
tr Negligible
1.7+ 1.0+ 1.3+ .8+ .6+ .6+ 3.0+ 1.7+ 2.3+ 1.3+ 1.1 + 1.0
6+:1
o
4
;ource: Adapted from CACDA Jiffy Ill War Game, Vol II, Methodology.
o
Unils cannd sustain these rates for 24 hours. These rates are reduced by l/2 at night.
O
w
ro 2 The relative combal power ratio must be computed for Ihe unil under consideration:
a
When there is surprise, mullipty lhese figures by a surprise factor as follows:
DJ - Complete Surprise x 5 (e.g.. Germans at the A:dennes in 1944. Arabs in 1973).
ft - Substanllal Surprise x 3 (e,g. German invasion ol Russia in 1941. Israeli Invasion oi Sinai in 1967).
fO
W - Minor Surprise x 1.3 (e.g., Allied Normandy landing in 1944. Pakislani allack on India in 1971).
The effects of surprise ksl for 3 days, being reduced by one-third on day 2 and lw&thirds on day 3.
O
H>
Prepared defense is based on defender in prepared posi(ions (24 hours or more).
Ql
a 5 Hasty defense Is based on 2 lo 12 hours preparaiion lime.
<
a
3 6 The ralios used here are lo determine Ihe degree of resisiance. There Is no direcl relationship between advance rates and force ratios,
o
However, l uslalned advances probably are not possible wkhoul a 3 lo 1. ratio. Advance is possiblO againsi super&forces bu( canno, be
sustained.
Rales greater lhan 6 lo 1 Will resull in advances between these and the unopposed rates.
FM 34-130
I
MULTIPLE ROCKET
DISTANCES MORTARS GUNS I HOWIRERS LAUNCHERS
Between Weapons 16106Om . 2dto4om .15toSOm
Between Bslterle~ . . ..----. SWto1,5OOm 1,000 to 2,000 m

(normally about
1,000 ml
From the FEBA 500 to 1,ooO m 5 to 8 km (AAG) StoBkm
,. .: ~ .. 3 to 6 km (OAG) 3toBkm
1 10 4 km,(RAG)
Flgure KU.. Taotlcal deployment norms. ..
UNIT TIMES (mlnutoa) ~
. Mortarbattery , , . . . . , . . . . , , , lto1.5
Artillery battalion . . . . . . . , . . . . . 2103
MRL battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
RAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
OAG . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The standard reaotion time for shifting fire is 2 minutes.
Flguro B-33. Roacllon tlmos for llrst rounds of flro.
DISTANCE FROM FEBA DISTANCE FROM FEBA

UNIT LOGISTIC ELEMENT (IN THE OFFENSE) (IN THE DEFENSE)
Ammunition Supply Point lWlo15Om

COMPANY Ranons Supply Poinl Up101 km
Medical Point 1Mm
Ammunklon Suppty Point 4km 2103 km

BAlTAlJON Repair Point 5km 3toSkm
Rations Supply Point 5km 3105km
Medical Poinl 15103km 1.5 lo 3 km
Ammunklon Supply Point 1oto15km lOlo2Okm

Repair Poinl Up IO 15 km UploMkm
POL supply POinl 101olSkm lOlo20km
REGIMENT Rations Suppb Point 101015km 10loMkm
MedicsI Poklt 5lo7km 6lolOkm
Damaged Molar Vehicle 5lo7km 6lolOkm
Cokecling Point
Supply Dump (Ammunition. 25103OkiTl 35lo5Okm

POL, Rations)
Repair Poinl (Tanks, 20104OkfIl 35to5Okm
DIVISION Weapons)
Repair Poirk (Wheeled 1010 14 km Upto2Okm
Motor Vehicles)
Medical Point 1010 14 km Upto2Okm
. Flguro B-34. Locatlona of taotlcal loglstlc olomonte.
B-24
P
FM 34-130
:::::::::::::::::::::::: ... . . . . . . . . . . .
iiiiiiiii;i~~i~iiiiii Determine Threat Courses of Action ~lll~iiiiiiji~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
As mentioned in the previous section, threat models are
generalized procedures. Threat COAs are the situational
application of the threat model. Furthermore, one threat model
may generate a number of threat COAs when-applied to a specific
battlefield environment. For example, a "typical guerrilla
ambush" threat model,may spawn several ambush threat COAs along
a specific route.
,.
A threat course of action model has three components:
I
0 Situational template --a graphic portrayal of the '-
employment oft threat subordinate units and assets during
execution of the COA.
0 Situational narrative--a written description of threat
actions during the COA. This can be in the form of a
paragraph or a synchronization matrix. I
0 Situational HVTs--the identification of specific HVTs

that the threat needs to retain for successful execution
of the COA.
1 Defense )
When developing threat COAs for a traditional mechanized or

armor defense--
Consider the general threat COA options by studying the
options for defense identified during your evaluation of the
battlefield environment's effects on operations. Where are
potential defensive positions and engagement areas? Fully
_I
consider: I
0 Reverse slope and forward slope defenses.

0 Defenses that are weighted more heavily on one avenue of I
approach (or mobility corridor) than another.
.,-
0 Defenses that are positioned farther forward in sector r
versus defenses that are weighted farther back.
0 Area defenses versus mobile defenses.
B-26
FM 34-130
0 Linear defenses versus defenses in depth.
0 Mixed defensive system.
0 Delaying defenses.
0 Use of battle positions, strongpoints, and defenses in
sector.
For each threat COA identified, situationally template (in
order):
0 Engagement areas and supporting obstacle systems.
0 Unit range fans covering engagement areas with.:direct.
fire weapons. Template units two echelons below-the _
level of the major defending unit.
0 Counterattack force locations, routes, and firing

lines. Include time-phase lines depicting the force's
movement from assembly areas to commitment.
0 Artillery locations supporting the main and covering

force battles. Include range fans for the closest
possible gun, howitzer, or mortar.
0 Primary and subsequent positions for the covering force
units.
0 ADA positions.
0 EAs and air avenues of approach for close-air-support
aircraft and attack helicopters.
0 Reconnaissance positions.
0 C2 positions.
0 Combat service support unit and activity positions.
0 Alternate and supplementary positions for maneuver
forces.
0 Control measures, particularly boundaries and
counterattack objectives.
B-27
FM 34-130
For each threat COA, situationally narrate or depict in a
matrix the timing and sequencing of--
0 Initial engagements by covering force, artillery, and
the main battle forces.
0 Withdrawal of the covering force.
0 Commitment of threat reserves.
0 Possibility of repositioning defending forces from the
supporting attack area to the main attack area.
0 Failure options statement for the main battle forces.
Offense
When developing threat COAs for a traditional mechanized or

armor offense--
Consider the general threat COA options by studying the
effects of the battlefield environment on military
operations. Fully consider--
0 Movement to contact versus deliberate attack procedures.
0 Attack formations, such as subordinate units in column,
subordinate units abreast, or in some combination.
0 Attacking on multiple avenues of approach versus
attacking on a single avenue of approach.
0 Positioning the main attack versus supporting attack on
different avenues of approach.
0 Depth of threat objectives within sector.
0 Threat intent. Is his objective to destroy friendly
forces or seize key terrain?
0 Use of follow-on forces. Will he use reserves or
"follow-on and support" forces?
0 Use of "fixing" forces or support by fire forces.
i
B-28
FM 34-130
0 Combined arms operations. Consider mixing heavy and
light forces, for example, using air assaults to seize
key terrain, using special forces for deep objectives,
or amphibious operations to turn flanks.
0 Defeat mechanisms via forms of maneuver, such as
infiltration, frontal attack, envelopment, turning
movement, penetration.
For each threat COA, situationally template:
0 Axis of advance.
0 Objectives.
0 Control measures. _~
0 Time-phase line estimates depicting movement.

0 Support positions for artillery and ADA assets. Include
range fans.
0 EAs and air avenues of approach for use by CAS aircraft
and attack helicopters.
0 Failure option statements; for example, what might the
threat do if his COA begins to fail?
For each threat COA, situationally narrate the scheme of
maneuver through the duration of the attack. A particularly
effective technique is to use a matrix similar to that used in
scenario 2 of Chapter 3. Do not limit the description to only
the maneuver forces. Examine how each battlefield operating
system (BOS) supports the course of action. If time permits,
the IPB analyst should prepare a full BOS synchronization matrix
for each threat COA.
Another technique is to show "snapshots" of the threat COA
at different times during the battle. This would include a set
of situational templates with narratives to describe each threat -
COA at various points during its execution.
Usually, the most effective way to present threat COAs iS to
use the US methodology and symbols described in FM 101-5 and
FM 101-5-l.
Another technique is to use the actual operational graphics
of the threat force. This technique is effective only if all
unit personnel who will use the IPB products are familiar with
the threat's graphics and symbology techniques.
B-29
FM 34-130
I
Event
Templates I
Event templates always focus on features of the threat's

COAs that will allow you to confirm or deny their adoption. In m
the offense and defense, consider the following:
Offense: m
0 Linear NAis across avenues of approach.

0 NAI at intersecting points of avenues of approach'orl~ '. I
mobility corridors that define threat COAs.
0 NAIs on threat time-phase lines to facilitate friendly I
tracking of threat movement.
NAIs on expected locations of HPTs. HPTs and their I
supporting NAIs are developed during wargaming and the
targeting process.
Defense: r
0 Defensive positions, both primary and secondary.

r
0 Counterattack force assembly areas.
0 Counterattack routes.
m
0 Withdrawal routes.
0 NAIs on expected HPT locations. HPTs and their Y
supporting NAIs are developed during wargaming and the
targeting process.
m
B-30
FM 34-130
The simplist method of calculating force ratios is a

straight comparison of the number of units on each side.
For example, 27 enemy battalions opposed by 9 friendly
battalions gives a force ratio of 3:l. Using. this
technique, count brigades and regiments as roughly
equivalent and simply total the number available to each
force.'
But not all units are equal. For example, VS tank
battalions.have a little over 50 tanks while sonic Soviet
style tank?battalions have only about 30. To account for
this size difference, convert the_ actual number of units
into *UUS equiva1ents.l'
<We begin by dividing the number of tanks in the Soviets
style battalion by the number of tanks in the US battalion.
This gives us a value of 0.6 as the US equivalent size of
one Soviet style tank battalion (30 - 50 = 0.6). We then
multiply the total number of such battalions by this value
to get a total of US equivalent strength of 16 battalions
(27 x 0.6 = 16.2). Our force ratio is now 16 enemy
battalion equivalents opposed by 9 friendly battalions, or
1.a:1.
We can further refine this force ratio by accounting for
the difference in combat capability of the type of equipment
in each unit.' For example, we may decide that an M-l tank
has twice the combat power of a T-55 tank. Assuming that
the tank battalions in our example are equipped with M-1s
and T-55s, respectively, this gives us a multiplier Of 2 for
the friendly~battalions and 1 for the enemy battalions.
This now gives us battalion equivalents of 16 enemy and
18 friendly battalions, changing our force ratio to about
1:l.l.
Assigning these values requires careful judgment of the
relative capabilities of the equipment involved. Be careful
to avoid letting wishful thinking cloud your judgment. YOU
should also resist the temptation to attempt to account for
other, less tangible factors such as leadership and
flexibility.
Figure 8.37. Calculallng Force Ratios.
B-31'
.
FM 34-130
GLOSSARY
AA - see Avenue of Approach.
ADA - Air Defense Artillery.
AI - see Area of Interest.
A0 - see Area of Operations.
Area of Interest (AI) - The geographical area from which
information and intelligence are required,:to permit planning or
successful conduct of the command's operation. The area of
interest is usually larger than the command's area of operations
(q.v.) and battle space (q.v.). The area of interest includes
any threat forces or characteristics of the battlefield
environment that will significantly influence accomplishment of'
the command's mission.
Area of Operations (AO) - That portion of an area of conflict
necessary for military operations. Areas of operations are
geographical areas assianed to commanders for which they have
responsibility and in which they have the authority to conduct
military operations.
Assumptions - Information used to replace missing facts (q.v.)
necessary for command and staff planning, estimating, and
decision making. Assumptions may also be required for facts that
change due to the time difference between receipt of the mission
and the time of execution, such as threat dispositions.
Assumptions should be confirmed or denied by intelligence
collection whenever practical.
Avenue of Approach (AA) - An air or ground route of an attacking
force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain
in its path. Avenues of approach are based on the capabilities
and opportunities offered by the battlefield environment and may
not necessarily form part of a course of action. Defensive
avenues of approach support counterattacks and the commitment of
reserves. Note the difference between avenues of approach, axis
of advance (q.v.) and direction of attack (q.v.).
Axis of Advance - A general route of advance, assigned for
purposes of control, which extends toward the enemy. An axis of
advance symbol graphically portrays a commander's intention, such
as avoidance of built-up areas or envelopment of an enemy force.
Glossary-l
FM 34-130
It follows terrain suitable for the size of the force assigned

the axis and is often a road, a group of roads, or a designated
series of locations. A commander may maneuver his forces and
supporting fires to either side of an axis :of advance provided
the unit remains oriented on the axis and the objective.
Deviations from an assigned axis of advance must not interfere
with the maneuver of adjacent units without prior approval of the I
higher commander. Enemy forces that do not threaten security or
jeopardize mission accomplishment may be bypassed. An axis of
advance is not used to direct the control of terrain or the I
clearance of enemy forces from specific locations. Intermediate
objectives are normally assigned for these purposes. Note that
an axis of advance is'a control measure that is assianed as part
of a course of action; the term "axis of advance" is not
synonymous with avenue of approach (q.v.).,, See also Direction of
Attack.
I
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) - The timely and accurate estimate'-
of damage resulting from the application of military force,
either lethal or non-lethal, against an objective or target.
ri
Battle Position (BP) - A defensive location oriented on the most
likely enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend or
attack. Such units can be as large as battalion task forces and m
as small as platoons. A unit assigned a BP is located within the
general outline of the BP. Security, combat support, and combat
service support forces may operate outside a BP to provide early i
enemy detection and all-around security. Note that although most
BPS are based on terrain features they are control measures.
Battle Space - Components determined by the maximum capabilities m
of a unit to acquire and dominate the enemy; includes areas
beyond the area of operations; it varies over time according to i
how the commander positions his assets. It depends on the I
command's ability to both acquire and engage targets using its
own assets or those of other commands on its behalf.
Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) - The major functions
performed by the force on the battlefield to successfully execute
Army operations in order to accomplish military objectives. They
form a framework for examining complex operations in terms of I
functional operating systems. The systems include maneuver, fire
support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility
and survivability, and combat service support. 3
BDA - see Battle Damage Assessment.
Glossary-2
FM 34-130
Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) - Morning nautical
twilight begins when the sun is 12 degrees below the eastern
horizon. It is the start of that period where, in good
conditions and in the absence of other illumination, enough light
is available to identify the general outlines of ground objects,
conduct limited military operations, and engage in most types of
ground movement without difficulty. See End Evening Nautical
Twilight.
BMNT - see Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight.
Boer - A Dutch colonist or a descendant of a Dutch colonist in
Southern Africa. The Boers created several independent states in
Southern Africa in the early 19th century after the British
annexed their lands in South Africa. Economic competition, the
discovery of gold an< diamonds, and other factors led to
increased hostility between the Boers and the British, resulting
in the Boer War (1899-1902).
BOS - see Battlefield Operating Systems.
BOS Synchronization Matrix - A written record of wargaming. The
BOS synchronization matrix depicts the criteria that generate
each anticipated friendly decision and the resulting action by
each friendly BOS (q.v.). Other information required to execute
a specific friendly course of action may also be included.
BP - see Battle Position.
Branch - A contingency plan (an option built into the basic plan)
for changing the disposition, orientation, or direction of
movement of the force.
Capability - The ability to successfully perform an operation or
accomplish an objective. The evaluation of capabilities includes
an assessment of a force's current situation as well as its
organization, doctrine and normal tactics, 'techniques and
procedures. Capabilities are stated in terms of broad courses of
action and supporting operations. Generally, only capabilities
that will influence accomplishment of the friendly command's
mission are addressed.
COA - see Course of Action.
Common Understanding of the Battlefield - How the commander and
staff perceive the battlefield environment. It includes the sum
of all that is known or perceived of friendly and threat forces
and the effects of the battlefield environment.
Glossary-3
FM 34-130
Confirmed - Confirmed intelligence is information or intelligence I
reported by three independent sources. The test for independence
is certainty that the information report of one source was not
derived from either of the two other sources, usually resulting
in reliance on original reporting. Analytical judgment counts as I
one source-. Ensure that no more than one source is based solely
on analytical judgment.
Course of Action (COA) - A possible plan open to an individual or
commander that would accomplish or is related to accomplishment
of the mission. A course of action is initially stated in broad
I
terms with the details determined during staff wargaming. To
develop courses of action the staff must focus on key information
and intelligence necessary to make decisions. ~1 Courses of action
include five elements: what (the type of operation), when (the I
time the action will begin), where (boundaries; axis, etc.),. how
(the use of assets), and why (the purpose or desired end-state).
Culminating Point - The point in time and space when the .' '~ -
attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender or
when the defender no longer has the capability to defend
successfully.
Decision Point (DP) - The point in space and time where the
commander or staff anticipates making a decision concerning a
specific friendly course of action. Decision points are usually
associated with threat force activity or the battlefield
environment and are therefore associated with one or more NAI
(q-v.). Decision points also may be associated with the friendly
force and the status of ongoing operations.
Decision Support Template (DST) - A graphic record of wargaming. i
The decision support template depicts decision points (q.v.),
timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the
operation, and other key items of information required to execute
a specific friendly course of action.
Defensible Terrain - Terrain that offers some concealment and
cover to defending forces while also providing observation and
fields of fire into potential engagement areas. Ideal defensible
terrain is difficult to bypass, offers-concealed and covered
battle positions, covered withdrawal routes, and overlooks
engagement areas that allow the defending force to use all of
their weapon systems at their maximum ranges. Defensible terrain
must defend a likely objective or avenue of approach (otherwise, i
why defend it?).
Glossary-4
FM 34-130
Delaying Operation - An operation usually conducted when the
commander needs time to concentrate or withdraw forces, to
establish defenses in greater depth, to economize in an area, or
to complete offensive actions elsewhere. In the delay, the
destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing his
advance to gain time. Delay missions are delay in sector, or
delay forward of a specified line for a specified time or
specified event (see FM 101-5-l).
Direction of Attack - A specific direction or route that the main
attack or the main body of the force will follow. If used, it is
normally at battalion and lower levels. Direction of attack is a
more restrictive control measure than axis of advance, and units
are not free to maneuver off the assigned~route. It usually is
associated with infantry units conducting night attacks, or units
involved in limited visibility operations, and in counterattack.
In NATO terminology it is referred to .as an Attack Route. Note
that directions of attack are control measures that are assisned
as part of a course of action; the term is not synonymous withy
avenue of approach (q.v.). See also Axis of Advance.
DMA - Defense Mapping Agency.
Doctrinal Template - A model based on postulated threat
doctrine. Doctrinal templates illustrate the disposition and
activity of threat forces and assets (high value targets)
conducting a particular operation unconstrained by the effects of
the battlefield environment. They represent the application of
threat doctrine under ideal conditions. Ideally, doctrinal
templates depict the threat's normal organization for combat,
frontages, depths, boundaries and other control measures, assets
available from other commands, objective depths, engagement
areas, battle positions, etc. Doctrinal templates are usually
scaled to allow ready use on a map background. They are one part
of a threat model (q.v.).
DP - see Decision Point.
Drift - A colloquial expression for a ford; a shallow place in a
stream or river that can be crossed by ~walking or riding on
horseback.
DST - see Decision Support Template.
Duffer - British colloquial expression for an incompetent,
awkward, or stupid person.
EA - Electronic Attack; a sub-component of Electronic Warfare,
formerly known as Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).
EA - see Engagement Area.
Glossary-5
FM 34-130
EAC - Echelon(s) Above Corps.
I
EENT - see End Evening Nautical Twilight.

End Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT) - Occurs when the sun has I
dropped 12 degrees below the western horizon, and is the instant
of last available day light for the visual control of limited
ground operations. At EENT there is no further sunlight I
available. See Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight.
Engagement Area (EA) - An area in which the commander intends to
trap and destroy an enemy force with the massed fires of all
available weapons. Engagement areas are routinely identified by
a target reference point in the center of the~trap area or by
prominent terrain features around the area. Although engagement
areas may also be,,divided into sectors of fire, it is important
to understand that defensive systems are not designed around
engagement areas, but rather around avenues of approach.
Envelopment - An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking
force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive
positions to secure objectives to the enemy's rear.
EP - Electronic Protection; a sub-component of Electronic
Warfare, formerly known as Electronic Counter-countermeasures i
(ECCM).
ES - Electronic Warfare Support; a sub-component of Electronic
Warfare, formerly known as Electronic Support Measures (ESM). r
Event Matrix - A description of the indicators and activity
expected to occur in each NAI (q.v.). It normally i
cross-references each NAI and indicator with the times they are
expected to occur and the course(s) of action they will confirm
or deny. There is no prescribed format.
Event Template - A guide for collection planning. The event
template depicts the named areas of interest (q.v.) where
activity (or its lack) will indicate which course of action I
(q.v.) the threat has adopted.
EW - Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare consists of three i
sub-components: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Warfare
Support Measures (ES), and Electronic Protection (EP).
ii
Facts - Information known to be true. In terms of intelligence,
facts include confirmed (q.v.) intelligence. See Assumptions.
i
Glossary-6
FM 34-130
High Payoff Target (HPT) - High value targets (q.v.) whose loss
to the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly
course of action.
High Value Target (HVT) - Assets that the threat commander
requires for the successful completion of a specific course of
action.
HUMINT - Human Intelligence.
I&W - Indications and Warning; one of the six IEW (q.v.) tasks
(see FM 34-l).
IEW - Intelligence and Electronic Warfare,
IMINT - Imagery Intelligence.
Indicators - Positive or negative evidence of threat activity or
any characteristic of the area of operation which pointsl+oward~
threat vulnerabibities or the adoption or rejection by the threat
of a particular capability, or which may influence the
commander's selection of a course of action. Indicators may
result from previous actions or from threat failure to take
action.
ISOs - Intelligence System of Systems (see FM 34-l).
HPT - see High Payoff Target.
HVT - see High Value Target
Infiltration Lane - A route used by forces to infiltrate through
or into an area or territory. The movement is usually conducted
in small groups or by individuals. 'Normally, infiltrating forces
avoid contact with the enemy until arrival at the objective
area. Because of the emphasis on surprise, infiltration lanes
usually make use of terrain that offers concealment and cover,
even if some sacrifice in mobility results.
Information Requirement (IR) - An intelligenc,e requirement (q.v.)
of lower priority than the PIR (q.v.) of lowest priority.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) - The
systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and
environment in a specific geographic area. IPB is designed to
support the staff estimate and military decision making process.
Most intelligence requirements (q.v.) are generated as a result
of the IPB process and its inter-relation with the decision
making process.
Glossary-7
FM 34-130
Intelligence Requirement - A requirement for intelligence to fill
a gap in the command's knowledge and understanding of the
battlefield or threat forces. Intelligence requirements are
designed to reduce the uncertainties associated with successful
completion of a specific friendly course of action; a change in
the course of action usually leads to a change in intelligence
requirements. Intelligence requirements that support decisions
which affect the overall mission accomplishment (such as choice I
of a course of action, branch, or sequel) are designated as
priority intelligence requirements (PIR-q.v.). Less important
intelligence requirements are designated as information
requirements (IR-q.v.). I
IPB - see Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

IR - see Informat,ion Requirement
KM - Kilometer; a unit of linear measure equal to one thousand m
meters or 0.62137 miles. To convert miles to kilometers multiply-
the number of miles by a factor of 1.60934.
KN - Knot(s); a unit of speed roughly equal to 1.15 miles per i
hour. Sometimes also used to denote a linear distance measured
in nautical miles (q.v.).
m
LC - see Line of Contact.
LD - see Line of Departure.
LD/LC - Line of departure is the line of contact.
Limit of Advance (LOA) - An easily recognized terrain feature
beyond which attacking elements will not advance. Note that it
is a control measure rather than a terrain restriction.
I
Lines of Communication (LOC) - All the routes ~(land, water, and
air) that connect an operating military force with one or more
bases of operations and along which supplies and military forces
move. Note that not all roads, rails, etc., are lines of r
communication; some are unsuited, others may be suitable but not
used. Note also that in this context a communications center is
an area where LOC converge, such as transshipment points or
hub-pattern cities (e.g. Bastogne, Belgium).
Line of Contact (LC) - A general trace delineating the location m
where two opposing forces are engaged.
Glossary-8
FM 34-130
Line of Departure (LD) - A line designated to coordinate the
commitment of attackinq units or scouting elements at a specified
time. A start line. -
LOA - see Limit of Advance.
LOC - see Lines of Communication.
LTIOV - Latest Time Information of Value; the time by which
information must be delivered to the requestor in order to
provide decision makers with timely intelligence. Sometimes the
LTIOV is the expected time of a decision anticipated during staff
wargaming and planning. If someone other than the decision maker
must first proces,s the information, the LTIOV is earlier than the
time associated with the decision point. The time difference
accounts for delays in processing and communicating the final
intelligence to the decision maker. :
MASINT - Measurement and Signature Intelligence. .~
MC00 - Modified Combined Obstacle 0verlay;~a product used to
depict the battlefield's effects on military operations. It is
normally based on a product depicting all obstacles to mobility
modified to also depict:
o Cross country mobility classifications (Restricted, etc.)
o Avenues of approach and mobility corridors.
o Likely locations of counter-mobility obstacle systems.
o Defensible terrain.
o Likely engagement areas.
o Key terrain.
The list is not prescriptive or inclusive.
METT-T - Commonly used acronym for "mission, enemy, terrain,
troops, and time available," used to describe the factors that
must be considered during the planning or execution of a tactical
operation. Since these factors vary in any given situation, the
term "METT-T dependent" is a common way of denoting that the
proper approach to a problem in any situation depends on these
factors and their interrelationship in that specific situation.
MI - Military Intelligence; a branch of the United States Army.
Mile - A unit of linear measure equal to 5,280 feet, 1,760 yards,
or 1.60934 kilometers. To convert kilometers to miles multiply
the number of kilometers by a factor of 0.62137.
Mobility Corridor - Areas where a force will be canalized due to
terrain restrictions. They allow military forces to capitalize
on the principles of mass and speed and are therefore relatively
free of obstacles.
Glossary-9
FM 34-130
MRR - Motorized Rifle Regiment; name of a soviet-style maneuver
unit normally consisting of three mechanized infantry battalions,
one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, and enough combat
support and combat service support assets to make it capable of
independent action for at least limited periods of time. The
term motorized dates from World War II when most units depended
on trucks for transportation. Today most units with this name
are actually mechanized.
NAI - see Named Area of Interest
Named Area of Interest (NAI) - The geographical area where
information that will satisfy a specific information requirement
can be collected. NAI are usually selected to capture
indications of threat courses of action but also may be related
to conditions of the battlefield.
Nautical Mile - a unit of linear measure equal to 1.852
kilometers or approximately 1.15 miles. Nautical miles are
commonly used in sea end air navigation.
NBC - Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical; used to denote weapons
or operations which depend on nuclear, biological, or chemical
warheads or agents for their casualty producing effects; or which
protect or defend against or react to their use.
NLT - Not later than; the time by which something must be
accomplished.
NME - Nuevo Metropolanio Ejercito; a fictitious organization
created for purposes of illustrating the application of the
doctrinal principles,put forth in this manual.
OB - see Order of Battle.
OCOKA - A commonly used acronym and mnemonic for the factors of
terrain analysis. The acronym does not dictate the order in
which the factors are evaluated; use the order best suited to the
situation at hand. The factors of terrain analysis are
observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles,
key terrain, and avenues of approach.
Order of Battle (OB) - Intelligence pertaining to identification,
strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel, units,
and equipment of any military force. The order of battle factors
form the framework for analyzing military forces and their
capabilities, building threat models, and hence, course of action
models. See FM 34-3.
Glossary-10
FM 34-130
Pattern Analysis - Deducing the doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures of a force by careful observation and evaluation
of patterns in its activities. Pattern analysis leads to the
development of threat models and hence to course of action
models.
Penetration - A form of offensive maneuver that seeks to break
through the enemy's defensive position, widen the gap created,
and destroy the continuity of his positions.
Phase Line (PL) - A line used for control and coordination of
military operations. It is usually a recognizable terrain
feature extending across the zone of action. Units normally
report crossing PLs, but do not halt unless specifically
directed. PLs often are used to prescribe the timing of delay
operations.
PIR - see Priority Intelligence Requirement.
PL - see Phase Line.
Possible - Information or intelligence reported by only one
independent source is classified as possibly true. The test for
independence is certainty that the information report of a source
was not derived from some other source, usually resulting in
reliance on original reporting. A classification of possibly
true cannot be based on analytical judgment alone.
Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) - An intelligence
requirement (q.v.) associated with a decision that will affect
the overall success of the command's mission. PIR are a subset
of intelligence requirements of a higher priority than
information requirements (q.v.). PIR are prioritized among
themselves and may change in priority over the course of the
operation's conduct.
Probable - Information or intelligence reported by two
independent sources is classified as probably true. The test for
independence is certainty that the information report of one
source was not derived from the other source,, usually resulting
in reliance on original reporting. Analytical judgment counts as
one source. Ensure that no more than one source is based solely
on analytical judgment.
R & S - see Reconnaissance, see also Surveillance.
REC - Radio Electronic Combat; a term sometimes used to denote
electronic warfare (q.v.) operations in non-NATO armed forces.
Glossary-11
FM 34-130
Reconnaissance - A mission under taken to obtain information by
visual observation, or other detection methods, about the
activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or about
the meteorologic, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of
a particular area. Reconnaissance differs from surveillance
(q.v.) primarily in duration of the mission.
Restricted - A classification indicating terrain that hinders
movement. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility through
restricted terrain but units may have difficulty maintaining
preferred speeds, moving in combat formations or transitioning
from one formation to another.
Retirement - A retrograde operation in which a force out of
contact moves away from the enemy.
Retrograde - An or'ganized movement to the rear or away from the
enemy. It may be forced by the enemy or may be made
voluntarily. Such movements may be classified as withdrawal-~ - i
(q.v.), retirement (q;v.) , or delaying operations (q.v.).
Sequel - Major operations that follow an initial major
operation. Plans for sequels are based on the possible
outcome-victory, stalemate, or defeat-of the current operation.
Severely Restricted - A classification indicating terrain that
severely hinders or slows movement in combat formations unless
some effort is made to enhance mobility. Severely restricted
terrain includes man-made obstacles~, such as minefields, cities,
etc., as well as natural barriers.
SIGINT - Signals Intelligence.
SIR - see Specific Information Requirement
m
SITMAP - Situation Map; a recording device used as an aid in
situation development and pattern analysis. See FM 34-3.
.s
Situation Template - Depictions of assumed threat dispositions, m
based on threat doctrine and the effects of the battlefield, if

the threat should adopt a particular course of action. In
effect, they are the doctrinal template (q.v.) depicting a
particular operation modified to account for the effects of the
battlefield environment and the threat's current situation
(training and experience levels, logistic status, losses,
I
dispositions, etc.). Normally the situation template depicts
threat units two levels of command below the friendly force as
.,
Glossary-12
I
FM 34-130
well as the expected locations of high value targets. Situation
templates use time-phase lines (q.v.) to indicate movement of
forces and the expected flow of the operation. Usually, the
situation template depicts a critical point in the course of
action. Situation templates are one part of a threat course of
action model (q.v.). Models may contain more than one situation
template.
SOR - see Specific Order or Request
Sortie - One aircraft making one takeoff and one landing; an
operational flight by one aircraft. Hence, six sorties may be
one flight each by six different aircraft, or six flights by a
single aircraft. Threat air capabilitiesare often stated in
terms of the number of sorties per day by a particular type of
aircraft. They are based on an evaluation of the available
number of aircraft and aircrews (ideally more than one crew per
aircraft), and the threat's maintenance, logistics, and training
status.
Specific Information Requirement (SIR) - Specific information
requirements describe the information required to answer all or
part of an intelligence requirement. A complete SIR describes
the information required, the location where the required
information can be collected, and the time during which it can be
collected. Generally, each intelligence requirement (q.v.)
generates sets of SIR.
Specific Order or Request (SOR) - The order or request that
generates planning and execution of a collection mission or
analysis of data base information. SORs sent to subordinate
commands are orders. SORs sent to other commands are requests.
SORs often use system-specific message formats but also include
standard military operations and fragmentary orders.
Surveillance - The systematic observation of airspace or surface
areas by visual, aural, photographic, or other means.
Surveillance differs from reconnaissance (q.v.) primarily in
duration of the mission.
TAI - see Target Area of Interest.
Target Area of Interest (TAI) - The geographical area where high
value targets (q.v.) can be acquired and engaged by friendly
forces. Not all TAI will form part of the friendly course of
action; only TAI associated with high payoff targets (q.v.) are
of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff
planning and wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas (q.v.)
in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of ,a11 available
weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon.
. Glossary-13
FM 34-130
TECHINT - Technical Intelligence.
Threat Course of Action Model - A model of one course of action
available to the threat. It consists of a graphic depiction
(situation template - q.v.); a description (narrative or matrix),
and a listing of assets important to the success of the course of
action (high value targets - q.v.). The degree of detail in the
model depends on available time. Ideally, threat course of
action models address all battlefield operating systems'. At a
minimum, threat course of action models address the five standard
elements of a course of action: what (the type of operation),
when (in this case, the earliest time the-action can begin),
where (boundaries, axis, etc.), how (the use of assets), and why
(the purpose or desired end-state). Threat course of action
models should also meet the tests of suitability, feasibility,
acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine (see
chapter two). Threat courses of action are derived from
capabilities (q.v.).
Threat Model - A model of the threat force's doctrine and
tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of a
particular operation. Threat models are based on a study of all
available information, structured by the order of battle (q.v.)
factors, of the particular threat force under consideration.
Ideally, threat models consider all battlefield operating systems
(q.v.) in detail. Threat models are normally prepared prior to
deployment.
Time Phase Line (TPL) - A line used to represent the movement of
forces or the flow of an operation over time. It usually
represents the location of forces at various increments of time,
such as lines that show unit locations at two hour intervals.
TPLs should account for the effects of the battlefield
environment and the anticipated effects of contact with other
forces. For example, TPLs depicting threat movement through an
area occupied by friendly forces should use movement rates based
on a force in contact with the enemy rather than convoy movement
speeds.
TPL - see Time Phase Line.
TR - Tank Regiment; name of a soviet-style maneuver unit normally
consisting of three tank battalions, one mechanized infantry
battalion, one artillery battalion, and enough combat support and
combat service support assets to make it capable of independent
action for at least limited periods of time.
Glossary-14
_' FM 34-130
Unrestricted - A classification indicating terrain that is free
of restrictions to movement.
USAF - United States Air Force.
UTM - Universal Transverse Mercator; the geographical coordinate
system used by Army and Marine ground forces. Named for the
Flemish cartographer Gerhardus Mercator (1512-1594).
Withdrawal - A retrograde operation in which a force in contact
with the enemy frees itself for a new mission.
Glossary-15
.
FM 34-130
90-3 Desert Operations (How To Fight).

90-5 Jungle Operations (How To Fight).
90-6 Mountain Operations.
90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT).
90-11 Cold Weather Operations. I
Department of Army (DA) Forms

2028 Recommended Changes to Publiq,ations and Blank
Forms.
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FM 34-130

US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

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FIELD MANUAL 34-130 Headquarters

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................... l-l

CHAPTER 2. CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

CHAPTER 3. APPLICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

This publication supersedes FM 34-130, 23 May 1989.

CHAPTER 4. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FOR

APPENDIX B. GUIDELINES FOR INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

Intelligence preparation of the-battlefield (IPB) is the

A brief overview of each function is presented below. For a

Define the Battlefield Environment

In step one of the IPB process the GZ/SZ"identifies

Once approved by the commander, the specific intelligence

Describe the Battlefield's Effects

Step two evaluates the effects of the environment with which

Evaluate the Threat:

Step four integrates the results of the previous steps into

0 The counterintelligence analysis section refines the all-

IPB identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield

In order to facilitate staff planning, the G2/S2 prepares

Paraaravh & of the intelligence estimate restates the command's

The relationship of the IPB process to each step in the

In this step IPB products enable the commander to assess

CoHimand and Staff Actions Operational

Figure l-l. The S2 or 62 c support the tactical decision-

Enemy course of action models developed in step four of the

Develop Courses of Action:

The staff develops friendly COAs based on the facts and

Analyze and Compare Courses of Action: I

During the wargaming session the staff 1'fights'8 the set of

Armed with SfT

(Records DST & Synch Matrix)

o Refine the enemy course of action models and event

Following staff recommendations, the commander decides upon

As intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on

For a complete discussion of the decision making process see

CATEGORY HP+ WHEN HOW ~ RESTRICTIONS

2 W I,%7 A N DNE MRL older Itian tiinutes. _

3 (MANUEVER) 25.28 A S Lest volley RAAhis/ADAM

5 (ENGR) 85 P N ci?uruermobili1y program o/o

11 (MAINTAINANCE) P N NOI HVT nor HPT

13 (LOC) I lp 1 N and 03 INot HVT nor HPT-No FASCAhi

Numbers refer 10 large1 spreadsheets (FM B-20-10).

Figure l-3. _ IPB supporlo devolopmenl of lho Mrck guidance malrlx.

The command's collection manager uses the refined templates