B-GL-321-007 LAV Company Tactics (Interim) (2003)

B-GL-321-007/FP-001
LAND FORCE
LAV COMPANY TACTICS

(INTERIM)
(ENGLISH)
(Supercedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001, dated 1989-03-01)
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT,
MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

B-GL-321-007/FP-001
LAND FORCE
LAV COMPANY TACTICS

(INTERIM)
(ENGLISH)
(Supercedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001, dated 1989-03-01)
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT,
MAY BE EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE
RELEASED.
Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Land Staff
OPI: DAD 4 2003-10-14

LAV Company Tactics (Interim)
FOREWORD
1. B-GL-321-007/FP-001, LAV Company Tactics (Interim) is

issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff.
2. This publication is effective on receipt and supercedes B-GL-

301-002/FP-001 The Combat Team Command Hanbook.
3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-321-007/FP-002,

Les tactiques de la compagnie du VBL.
4. Unless otherwise noted, masculine pronouns contained herein

refer to both genders.
5. Suggestions for amendment and/or improvement shall be

forwarded through normal channels to the to the Army Lessons
Learned Centre or to the Directorate of Army Doctrine as appropriate.
6. This publication is available electronically on both the

Defence Information Network (DIN) and the World Wide Web in the
Army Electronic Library. Keyword—Army Electronic Library.
©DND/MDN 2003
i
PREFACE
GENERAL
1. This Interim edition of LAV Company Tactics builds upon the

previous work of the Infantry School’s LAV Implementation Cell and
also incorporates many lessons learned from the Mobile Automated
Instrumentation Suite (MAIS) Trial conducted in CFB Gagetown. In
some areas further information has been inserted, based upon feedback
from users or from previous publications such as The Combat Team
Commanders Handbook. This interim edition supersedes all earlier
drafts and is the principal reference for units equipped with the
LAV III.
PURPOSE
2. The purpose of B-GL-321-007/FP-001, LAV Company

Tactics (Interim), is to provide LAV equipped units with the low level
tactical knowledge that will maximize their effectiveness when
fighting the LAV III vehicle.
DOCTRINAL RELEVANCE
3. LAV Company Tactics, along with its complementary

manual, B-GL-321-006/FP-001, Combat Team Operations, are being
produced as interim editions. While the fielding, integration, training,
and level of experience with the LAV III continues across the field
force, there are many issues yet to be resolved. In the meantime, LAV
equipped units shall use LAV Company Tactics and Combat Team
Operations as primary doctrinal guidance for training and operations.
Only through application of this doctrine for the tactical employment
of the LAV III will we be able to effectively gauge the precision and
relevance of these manuals.
4. In the near future, LFDTS will coordinate an Army-wide

review of these manuals to include your feedback regarding all aspects
of integrating and fighting the LAV III. Following the review process,
the manuals will be improved, perhaps integrated into one publication,
and will then be produced as final editions. Your assistance in this
iii
B-GL-321-007/FP-001
process is critical to the success of the review and to the standard of
our LAV III doctrine.
5. Feedback on the information contained in these manuals is

encouraged and it need not wait until the execution of the formal
review process. In this regard, units are asked to submit observations
to the Army Lessons Learned Centre or to the Directorate of Army
Doctrine as appropriate, which they consider would improve the
doctrine contained in either manual.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD ................................................................................. i
PREFACE
General ...................................................................................iii
Purpose ...................................................................................iii
Doctrinal Relevance ...............................................................iii
CHAPTER 1 ALL OPERATIONS OF WAR
ANNEX A LAV STOWAGE PLAN
Stowage List—LAV III APC ................................................ 43
ANNEX B VISIBILITY........................................................ 49
ANNEX C URBAN OPERATIONS
Introduction ........................................................................... 51
APPENDIX 1 LAV COMPANY TACTICS ............................. 65
Engagement Heights—Tanks and LAVs............................... 65
ANNEX D NINE RULES TO HELP STAY ALIVE WITH
THE LAV III ...................................................... 67
CHAPTER 2 OFFENCE
General .................................................................................. 69
Attacking with Tanks............................................................. 73
Attacking Without Tanks....................................................... 94
CHAPTER 3 DEFENCE
Area Defence ......................................................................... 99
Mobile Defence ................................................................... 114
ANNEX A LAV RANGE CARD........................................ 117
CHAPTER 4 DELAY ............................................................. 119
CHAPTER 5 TRANSITIONAL PHASES
Advance to Contact ............................................................. 121
Withdrawal .......................................................................... 124
v
B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Relief in Place ..................................................................... 135
Passage of Lines .................................................................. 136
ANNEX A OBSTACLE HELD-UP AND CONTACT
DRILLS............................................................. 137
CHAPTER 6 ADMINISTRATION
To be issued......................................................................... 171
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Team Frontal Fire—Edge Adjust .................................... 9
Figure 1-2: Team Frontal Fire—Centre Adjust.................................. 9
Figure 1-3: Platoon Frontal Fire....................................................... 10
Figure 1-4: Team Cross Fire—Edge Adjust..................................... 11
Figure 1-5: Team Cross Fire—Centre Adjust .................................. 11
Figure 1-6: Platoon Cross Fire ......................................................... 12
Figure 1-7: Team Depth Fire............................................................ 12
Figure 1-8: Platoon Depth Fire ........................................................ 13
Figure 1-9: Area Suppression Using the “Z” Pattern ....................... 14
Figure 1-10: Section Vehicle—Mounted Locations ........................ 25
Figure 1-11: Platoon HQ Vehicle—Mounted Locations.................. 27
Figure 1-12: Formations................................................................... 28
Figure 1-13: Central Tire Inflation System Setting Speeds.............. 36
Figure 1B-1: Dead Ground for Viewing—Turret Straight
Forward...................................................................... 49
Figure 1B-2: Dead Ground for Turret Engagements........................ 50
Figure 1C-1: Maximum Height of Targets—Urban Operations ...... 56
Figure 2-1: Action in the Attack Position During the Breaching ..... 76
Figure 2-2: Move Through the Obstacle—One Breach ................... 77
Figure 2-3: Move Through the Obstacle—Two Breaches ............... 78
Figure 2-4: Sample Assault Formation ............................................ 79
Figure 2-5: Left Section Vehicle—Dismounting to the Right ......... 81
Figure 2-6: Left Front Platoon Dismounting.................................... 82
Figure 2-7: Zulu LAVs Behind Dismounted Infantry ..................... 86
Figure 2-8: Zulu LAVs in Line with the Dismounted Infantry ........ 88
Figure 2-9: Zulu LAVs to the Flank(s) ............................................ 91
Figure 2-10: Zulu LAVs Between the Intimate Support Tanks
and the Dismounted Infantry ..................................... 93
Figure 2-11: LAV Company Quick Attack...................................... 97
Figure 2-12: LAV Company Deliberate Attack ............................... 98
Figure 3-1: Area Defence General Concept ................................... 100
Figure 3-2: LAV Firing Position Stage 1—Hull-Down Position
Only ........................................................................... 103
Figure 3-3: LAV Firing Position Stage 2—Hull- and Turret-
Down Positions.......................................................... 103
Figure 3-4: Occupying a Prepared Position ................................... 105
Figure 3-5: Jockeying to the Right................................................. 108
Figure 3-6: Mobile Defence General Layout ................................. 116
Figure 5-1: LAV Company Behind the Tanks in the Advance ...... 122
vii
B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 5-2: LAV Company Using Leap Frog—One Platoon
Supporting the Other Two ......................................... 124
Figure 5-3: Dismounted Withdrawal ............................................. 127
Figure 5-4: Mounted Withdrawal Stages 1 and 2—Single
Route ........................................................................... 130
Figure 5-5: Mounted Withdrawal Stages 1 and 2—Individual
Zulu Platoon routes ..................................................... 131
Figure 5-6: Mounted Withdrawal Stages 3 and 4—Single
Route ........................................................................... 133
Zulu Platoon Routes .................................................... 134
Figure 5A-1: Crest Drill—Part 1 ................................................... 139
Figure 5A-4: Gap Drill—Clear with Dismounted Infantry—Part 1 .... 142
Figure 5A-7: Gap Drill—Gap not Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry—Part 1 ..................................................... 144
Infantry—Part 2 ..................................................... 145
Infantry—Part 3 ..................................................... 145
Figure 5A-10: Defile Drill—Defile Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry—Part 1 ................................................... 148
Infantry—Part 2 ................................................... 149
Infantry—Part 3 ................................................... 149
Figure 5A 13: Defile Drill—Defile Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry—Part 4 ................................................... 150
Figure 5A-14: Defile Drill—Defile not Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry—Part 1 ................................................... 152
Infantry—Part 2 ................................................... 153
Figure 5A-16: Defile Drill—Defile not Cleared by Dismounted
Infantry—Part 3 - Two Vehicles Forward ........... 154
Infantry—Part 3—One Vehicle Forward ............. 155
Figure 5A-18: Blind Corner Left/Right Drill—Defile and Blind
Corner Cleared with Dismounted Infantry—
Part 1 .................................................................... 157
viii
Part 2 .................................................................. 157
Figure 5A-20: Blind Corner Left/Right Drill—Defile not Cleared with
Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner Cleared with
Dismounted Infantry—Part 1 ............................. 159
Figure 5A-21: Blind Corner Left/Right Drill—Defile not Cleared with
Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner Cleared with
Dismounted Infantry—Part 2 ............................. 160
Corner not Cleared with Dismounted Infantry—
Part 1 .................................................................. 161
Part 2 .................................................................. 162
Figure 5A-24: Blind Corner T-Junction Drill—Defile and Blind
Part 1 .................................................................... 163
Part 2 .................................................................... 164
Part 3 .................................................................. 164
Figure 5A-27: Blind Corner T-Junction Drill—Defile not Cleared
with Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner Cleared
with Dismounted Infantry—Part 1 ..................... 166
Part 1 .................................................................. 168
Part 2 .................................................................. 169
Part 3 .................................................................. 169
ix
B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 5A-33: Deliberately Emplaced Point Obstacle Drill—
Part 1 .................................................................. 171
Part 2................................................................... 171
x
CHAPTER 1
ALL OPERATIONS OF WAR
1. Tasks. The Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III armoured

personnel carrier (APC) has three main tasks. In order of priority,
these are:
a. to provide protected transport for the infantry to get

them as close as possible to the objective;
b. to provide fire and other mounted support to

dismounted infantry; and
c. to kill enemy LAVs.
2. Principles of Employment. The principles of employment

are guidelines, rather than hard and fast rules, designed to assist
commanders. They are:
a. Tanks and mechanized infantry are complementary

and normally operate together on the battlefield.
b. The LAV and its section form a total weapons

system. Only when the section is dismounted is the
full effectiveness of all the weapons realized.
NOTE
This principle should not be interpreted to mean that the
vehicle and section must always be co-located or
engaging the same target. The dismounted section and
the vehicle work to a joint aim. The location of each
relative to the other, its exact tasks and command
relationships will be decided by the commander based
on the situation.
c. The aggressive use of the LAV must be tempered

with the knowledge that it does not have the
firepower or protection of a tank.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 1
d. Commanders are at the point they can most
influence the battle. Circumstances dictate whether
or not they dismount.
3. Ammunition Selection. Only two natures of 25 mm ammo

can be loaded at any given time. The time necessary to unload one
nature and load a new nature (approximately 15 minutes) means that
the decision as to what nature is loaded in what bin must be made by
the commander before going into action. Capabilities of the rounds
are:
a. APFSDS-T. The armour-piercing, fin stabilized,

discarding sabot-tracer (APFSDS-T) is a long rod
penetrator with high kinetic energy concentrated
over a very small surface area. The APFSDS-T has
the following capabilities:
(1) It has the best penetration of any 25 mm

round but not as great behind-armour
effects as the frangible, armour piercing,
discarding sabot-tracer (FAPDS-T).
(2) It will defeat all wheeled APCs, including

those with appliqué armour.
(3) It will defeat most tracked APCs, including

BMP-1 and 2 with appliqué armour.
(4) It will defeat most other light armour,

including self-propelled guns.
(5) It will not defeat any modern NATO or

former Warsaw Pact (T-80 and later) main
battle tank (MBT) from any angle.
(6) It will penetrate the back rear on older

(T-72 and older) former Warsaw Pact tanks.
2 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
All Operations of War
NOTE
This penetration will eventually stop the engine, resulting in

a mobility kill, but it will not kill the crew or disable the
gun.
b. FAPDS-T. Frangible, armour piercing, discarding

sabot-tracer (FAPDS-T) has less penetration than
APFSDS-T but better behind armour effects. The
penetrator is designed to fragment on contact
resulting in a shower of high velocity particles. If
the FAPDS-T strikes an object such as a trim vane
or vehicle skirt before it hits the armour, however, it
will fragment in front of the armour and probably be
defeated. FAPDS-T has the following capabilities:
(1) It will defeat all wheeled and most tracked

APCs without appliqué armour if it strikes
the armour cleanly. It will not defeat
appliqué armour.
(2) It will defeat most other light armour,

including self-propelled guns.
(3) It will not penetrate MBTs from any angle.

SECONDARY NORMALLY
AMMUNITION PRIMARY USE
USE LOADED
Field
APFSDS-T LAVs Fortifications Primary Bin
Anti Air
Field fortifications
FAPDS-T LAVs Secondary Bin
Anti Air
Suppression of soft Suppression of
HEI-T targets beyond coax soft targets within As Ordered
range coax range
Destruction/
suppression of soft Suppression of
7.62 mm COAX targets to tracer soft area targets
burnout (approx 800–1,400 m
800 m)
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 3
4. Engagement Ranges:
a. Minimum Distances:
(1) Direct Fire. The LAV with appliqué

armour provides frontal protection against
BMP-2 30 mm AP (armour piercing)
rounds from 800 m and out. It also
provides all round protection against
14.5 mm AP from 500 m and out. LAVs
should be sited to engage those threats
beyond those minimum ranges whenever
possible.
(2) Indirect Fire. The LAV’s base armour

protects against 155 mm shell splinters at
10 m.
b. Maximum Effective Range—25 mm Cannon:
(1) The maximum effective range for the

APFSDS-T and FAPDS-T is defined as the
range at which the LAV should achieve a
kill with no more than three 3-round bursts
against a fully exposed BMP-2 size target.
When firing against hull-down targets,
effective ranges are reduced and
ammunition expenditure is increased.
LAV MOVING,
BOTH LAV AND TARGET
TARGET
TARGET MOVING, LAV
STATIONARY OR
STATIONARY STATIONARY
MOVING
APFSDS-T 2,200 m 1,800 m 1,600 m
FAPDS-T 1,700 m 1,600 m 1,400 m
(2) The maximum effective range for the high

explosive incendiary-tracer (HEI-T) and
coax is defined as the distance at which soft
targets can be suppressed.
4 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
POINT TARGETS AREA TARGETS
HEI-T 2,000 m 2,400 m
COAX 800 m 1,400 m
(3) Whenever possible, LAVs should be sited,

and routes chosen, so as not to expose
LAVs to effective enemy fire beyond these
maximum distances.
5. Surveillance and Target Acquisition. The LAV III turret

sensors have the following surveillance and target acquisition (STA)
characteristics:
a. Stationary, Exposed Targets:
DETECT RECOGNIZE IDENTIFY
Day Sight
3,000(+) m 3,000 m 2,800m
(Clear daylight conditions)
Thermal Sight
(High thermal contrast, low 3,000 m 2,000 m 1,200 m
clutter conditions)
Image Intensifying Sight
(Heavy overcast, very low 1,500 m 800 m 800 m
light)
Unknown Unknown Unknown
(No overcast, full moon)
b. Stationary, Cold, Hull-Down, Camouflaged

Targets:
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 5
Day Sight
2,800 m 2,000 m 1,200 m
Thermal Sight
(High thermal contrast, low 2,000 m 1,200 m 600 m
clutter conditions)
(Heavy overcast, very low Unknown Unknown Unknown
light)
c. Moving Targets:
Day Sight
3,200 m 3,000 m 2,800 m
Thermal Sight
(High thermal contrast, low 3,500 m 2,400 m 1,800 m
clutter conditions)

(Heavy overcast, very low 1,500 m 800 m 800 m
light)

6. All Weather Operations:
a. The LAV's excellent STA, poor weather, and night

capabilities allow mechanized operations to be
conducted under most conditions. These capabilities
should be exploited, particularly against an enemy
with inferior STA capabilities. There are, however,
significant limitations on human endurance using TI
(thermal imagery) and II (image intensifier) sights,
and continuous operations require either the rotation
of crews (two crews in each vehicle) or rest periods.
Details are at para 21g.—Viewing Aids.
6 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
b. When operating against an enemy with less
sophisticated night vision equipment than Canada’s,
the use of active illumination usually assists the
enemy more than it assists Canadian forces.
c. Even during periods of poor visibility, turret crews

should periodically check non-thermal sights as
changing conditions (moon coming out from behind
clouds, etc.) may make them at least temporarily
more effective than thermal.
7. Priority of Targets. The default priority of targets is based

upon the threat they pose to the LAV and the mission requirements.
Targets are engaged in the following priority:
a. Most Dangerous Target. A target with a weapon

system that can defeat the LAV and that is engaging
or about to engage the LAV.
b. Mission Imposed Targets. Targets that have been

ordered as a high priority due to the mission.
c. Dangerous Targets. A target with a weapon

system that can defeat the LAV but that is not
engaging or about to engage the LAV.
d. Least Dangerous Targets. A target without a

weapon system that can defeat the LAV.
e. Sub Categories. Within each of the above types of

Targets, the following sub-priority list is used:
(1) close targets are engaged before far targets;
(2) stationary targets are engaged before

moving targets; and
(3) head on targets are engaged before flank

targets.
8. Firing Patterns. Pre-arranged firing patterns are used to

ensure that multiple targets are engaged by multiple LAVs in a fast
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 7
and efficient manner. As with other drills, they provide a workable
solution immediately as opposed to a better solution later. As such,
they are particularly suited to meeting engagements and hasty
ambushes where time for orders and explanations is minimal. While
they can be used at higher levels, the patterns are designed for use at
the team (two vehicles) and platoon levels. To be effective, the firing
patterns require that each crew commander know where his vehicle is
in relation to every other vehicle in his team and platoon. The options
of edge adjust and centre adjust are chosen based upon the threat. The
standard firing patterns are:
a. Frontal Fire. Frontal fire is used to engage multiple

targets arranged in a linear manner to the LAVs
where good flank shots are not available:
(1) Team. There are two options for team

frontal fire—Edge Adjust and Centre
Adjust:
(a) Edge Adjust. On the command

TEAM FRONTAL FIRE,
EDGE ADJUST, the left-hand
LAV starts firing at the left-hand
target and works its way towards
the centre, and the right-hand
LAV starts firing at the right-hand
target and works its way towards
the centre.
8 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 1-1: Team Frontal Fire—Edge Adjust

(b) Centre Adjust. On the command
TEAM FRONTAL FIRE,
CENTRE ADJUST, the left-hand
LAV starts firing at the centre
target and works its way to the
left, and the right-hand LAV starts
firing at the centre target and
works its way towards the right.
Figure 1-2: Team Frontal Fire—Centre Adjust
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 9
(2) Platoon. On the command PLATOON
FRONTAL FIRE, the left- and right-hand
LAVs use Edge Adjust, and the centre two
LAVs use Centre Adjust.
Figure 1-3: Platoon Frontal Fire

b. Cross Fire. Cross fire is used to engage multiple
targets arranged in a linear pattern to the LAVs
where good flank shots are available:
(1) Team. There are two options for team

cross fire—Edge Adjust and Centre Adjust:
(a) Edge Adjust. On the command

TEAM CROSS FIRE, EDGE
ADJUST, the left-hand LAV
starts firing at the extreme right-
hand target and works its way
towards the centre, and the right-
hand LAV starts firing at the
extreme left-hand target and works
its way towards the centre.
10 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 1-4: Team Cross Fire—Edge Adjust

(b) Centre Adjust. On the command
TEAM CROSS FIRE, CENTRE
ADJUST, the left-hand LAV
starts firing at the centre target and
works its way right, and the right-
hand LAV starts firing at the
centre and works its way left.
Figure 1-5: Team Cross Fire—Centre Adjust

CROSS FIRE, the left-hand LAV starts at
the right-hand side using edge adjust, and
the right-hand LAV starts at the left side
using edge adjust. At the same time, the
centre right LAV starts at the centre and
works its way left, and the centre left LAV
starts at the centre and works its way right.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 11
Figure 1-6: Platoon Cross Fire

c. Depth Fire. Depth fire is used to engage enemy
vehicles in column when it is wanted to engage the
entire length of the column simultaneously and not
to concentrate on the front:
(1) Team. On the command TEAM DEPTH

FIRE, the left-hand LAV starts at the back
end of the column and works its way
forward, and the right-hand LAV starts at
the front of the column and works its way
backward.
Figure 1-7: Team Depth Fire

DEPTH FIRE, the left-hand LAV starts at
the back end of the column and works its
way forward, while the right-hand LAV
starts at the front of the column and works
its way backward. At the same time, the
centre left LAV starts at the centre and
12 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
works its way backward, and the centre
right LAV starts at the centre and works its
way forward.
Figure 1-8: Platoon Depth Fire

9. Area Targets. Area targets are suppressed using a “Z”
pattern out to 1,400 m with the coax and out to 2,400 m using the HEI-
T. If the target is large enough that more than one LAV is required to
suppress it, the target should be sub-divided between LAVs to ensure
proper coverage:
a. The engagement starts at the front of the target as

that is most likely the greatest threat and to take
advantage of the HEI-T fragment pattern.
b. The crew commander chooses which edge the

gunner is to start at based on the threat, ease of
identification or ease of engagement.
c. If HEI-T is to be used, as opposed to the coax, the

gunner switches to 100 rounds per minute.
d. The gunner then uses three long bursts—one across

the front, one diagonally from the front to the back
and one across the back—to suppress the target.
The pattern is repeated as required.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 13
Figure 1-9: Area Suppression Using the “Z” Pattern

10. Searching for Targets. Both the crew commander and the
gunner scan within their arcs. Light and obscuration conditions
permitting, targets are usually detected easiest and furthest with the TI.
They are recognized and identified easiest with the day sight and the II
sight. The gunner usually scans using the TI on low magnification and
switching to high magnification once a target has been detected. How
the crew commander scans depends on the circumstances. Whenever
possible, however, two different sensors are used to complement each
other.
a. Day, No Obscuration, Crew Commander Able to

Operate Head Out. The crew commander and
gunner each scan the arcs independently. The crew
commander scans head up using binoculars as this is
the only method that allows him to quickly scan a
wide area both with and without magnification.
b. Day, No Obscuration, Crew Commander Not

Able to Operate Head Out. The crew commander
scans using the periscopes, switching to the sights
when necessary.
c. Obscuration, Day or Night. The crew commander

uses the TI on wide field of view along with the
gunner.
d. Night, No Obscuration. The crew commander

scans using the II sight while the gunner uses the TI.
11. The 5 million candlepower co-axially mounted spotlight with

IR filter can be used at night to dramatically extend the effective range
of passive II devices. It must be remembered, however, that the
spotlight is active and can be detected well beyond the range at which
14 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
it can illuminate targets. As with any active illumination source, its
use is a command decision.
12. Target Detection. When either the crew commander or the

gunner detects a target, the following occurs:
a. A target indication is given. If the target cannot be

recognized or identified, the person giving the target
indication will state that he cannot recognize or
identify the target.
b. If the target is detected by the gunner and the crew

commander is operating heads up, the crew
commander aligns himself with the gun barrel and
attempts to detect the target using binoculars. If the
crew commander is operating hatches down, he uses
the sight appropriate to the conditions.
c. If the target is detected by the crew commander, he

roughly aligns the turret to the target and,
simultaneously, issues a target indication. The
gunner automatically places the appropriate aiming
mark on the target, begins to track and reports ON.
13. Target Engagement:
a. The crew commander is responsible for ensuring

that targets engaged are enemy and of the
appropriate type. His decision is based on a
combination of situational awareness (where are
friendly forces and could some of them be in the
area of the target?) and his confidence in his ability
to identify the target. In circumstances where the
crew commander has good overall situational
awareness, such as an area defence where all
friendly covering forces have been withdrawn, he
may be able to fire on recognition (APC, tank, truck,
etc.) only. In circumstances of where his overall
situational awareness is lower, such as a meeting
engagement, he probably has to first identify the
target (BMP-2, T-72, etc.). The situation is
worsened in coalition operations, where similar
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 15
equipment may be used on both sides. Regardless,
once the crew commander has made the decision to
fire, he issues the standard fire order using the
acronym GRIT:
(1) Group. 25 mm ammunition type or coax.

For example, SABOT.
(2) Range. Either estimated, battle or lazed.

For example, BATTLE.
(3) Indication. A target description. For

example, BMP LEFT SIDE OF BARN.
(4) Type of Fire. Either FIRE for a point

target or Z PATTERN, FIRE for an area
target.
b. The crew commander maintains overall

responsibility for the engagement. It is the crew
commander’s responsibility absolutely to ensure that
the gunner is laid on and does engage the correct
target. Once the crew commander is confident of
this, however, he can concentrate on other things
such as the next target, the friendly call signs, the
next bound, etc. and not on supervising the gunner,
unless the gunner is experiencing difficulty. In
particular, if:
(1) the gunner reports NOT SEEN after a

burst, the crew commander observes the
strike of the next burst and gives the
adjustments to the gunner; and
(2) after three bursts the gunner has still not

reported TARGET DESTROYED, the
crew commander determines the problem
and intervenes as required.
c. Once the target has been destroyed, the crew

commander either brings the gunner onto the next
target or orders him to TRAVERSE YOUR ARCS.
16 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
14. Ammunition Reload. The section in the back of the vehicle
must be prepared to hand forward linked ammunition to refill the
primary ready bin. If there are no troops in the rear of the vehicle, the
primary bin is replenished in the same manner as the secondary bin.
The secondary bin is refilled by the crew commander with the turret
rotated to the 4 o’clock position because it cannot be replenished from
the back. The ammunition, if left on the floor, is exposed to dirt and
grit that may cause the cannon to jam. It cannot, therefore, be readied
before it is needed. The procedure is as follows:
a. The crew commander orders the linking, the type,

and the number of rounds in groups of 15 (for
example, LINK, SABOT, 45). The executive
LINK is given first so that the gunner cannot
confuse the command to link ammo with a fire
order.
b. The commander in the back orders the correct

number and nature of ammunition unboxed, verifies
both the number and nature are correct, and
supervises its being linked. The ammunition must
be protected from dirt and grit.
c. The ammunition is then laid across the laps of the

section members ready to be fed forward through the
gap. The end of the belt to be fed through the gap
first must be SINGLE LINK UP, PROJECTILE
TO THE RIGHT. This allows the belt to be loaded
into the bin first and then either linked to the
existing belt or fed into the forwarder.
d. When the crew commander is ready to replenish the

ready bin, he locks the turret and orders the belt
forwarded through the gap in the sequence of executive,
type and number. As with the command to link, the
executive is given first so it cannot be confused with a
fire order (for example, LOAD, SABOT, 45).
e. The commander in the back:
(1) confirms the correct type and number;
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 17
(2) confirms the correct link is up and the
projectile is pointing to the right;
(3) opens the gap; and
(4) drapes the end of the belt over the edge of
the gap.
f. The crew commander, with the assistance of the

gunner if practical, loads the belt into the bin and
attaches the two belts together.
WARNING
Both the turret crew and the soldiers in the back must
ensure that they do not put their hands through the gap in
the turret basket guard. If someone’s hand were to be
caught by a traversing turret, it could be cut off.
15. Company Communications. High tempo operations require

the use of an all informed company net. For mounted operations, this
results in one company command net being established from section to
company commander. For dismounted operations, a second net will
usually have to be established as the sections’ light assault radios
cannot frequency hop. Dismounted platoon and company
commanders maintain two nets on two different radio types:
a. a fixed frequency dismounted net on the light assault

radio; and
b. a frequency-hopping vehicle net on the man-packed

AN/PRC-522.
16. Command Relationships. The LAV is the section’s vehicle.

When the section is mounted, the LAV is commanded by the section
commander, who normally commands from the turret. When the
section dismounts, however, there are various command options.
Whichever option is chosen, it must be explicitly stated in orders to
avoid confusion:
a. Zulu LAVs OPCOM to the Section Commander.

Each dismounted section is supported, individually,
by its own LAV. The crew commander directs his
18 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
LAV IAW the orders he has received from the
dismounted section commander. This method
provides the most immediate fire support to the
sections but has several disadvantages:
(1) Communications:
(a) Frequency Hopping versus

Fixed Frequencies. In
circumstances where the enemy
has an electronic warfare
capability, vehicle mounted radios
normally operate in frequency
hopping mode and cannot
communicate with the sections’
light assault radios. The company
(or combat team) must switch to
the fixed frequency net before the
dismount.
(b) Net Congestion. The addition of

nine dismounted sections to the
company (or combat team) net
increases net congestion.
(2) Lack of Fire Coordination. With each

Zulu LAV looking after its own section, it
is very difficult to concentrate fire from
several vehicles on a key spot.
(3) Lack of Protection for Zulu LAVs. With

each Zulu LAV operating independently of
the other Zulu LAVs, there is no ability to
use fire and movement. This increases
their vulnerability.
(4) Lack of Flexibility. Zulu LAVs

individually tasked to individual sections
are very difficult to regroup and reorganize
to meet an unexpected threat or exploit an
opportunity.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 19
b. Zulu LAVs OPCOM to the Platoon Commander,
OPCON to the LAV Sgt. The platoon commander
commands the Zulu platoon through the LAV Sgt.
The platoon commander provides the overall
direction and key tasks. The LAV Sgt provides the
detailed coordination to meet those tasks. Key
points to consider in this option include:
(1) Communications:
(a) There is no need for the company

(combat team) to switch to a fixed
frequency net on dismount as the
platoon commander has a
frequency hopping man-pack.
(b) The platoon commander must also

monitor the sections’ fixed
frequency net using a second
radio. While he has a signaller to
assist him, the platoon commander
cannot be in constant radio contact
with both elements.
(2) Responsiveness. The dismounted platoon

is guaranteed responsive support though not
necessarily from each rifle section.
(3) Coordination. The fire of more than one

Zulu LAV can be quickly coordinated to
deal with particularly difficult or dangerous
targets.
(4) Flexibility. The Zulu platoon can be

quickly redirected to deal with unexpected
threats or opportunities.
(5) Zulu LAV Protection. The Zulu platoon

can move using internal fire and movement
to increase its protection.
20 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(6) Span of Control. While the platoon
commander is responsible for both
elements, he can concentrate on the
dismounted element while the LAV Sgt
controls the Zulu LAVs in accordance with
the platoon commander’s orders.
(7) The Zulu platoon is normally controlled in

this manner in circumstances where platoon
objectives/locations permit the coordinated
fire support of the entire Zulu LAV platoon
but do not reasonably allow the coordinated
fire support from other Zulu LAV platoons.
c. Zulu LAVs OPCOM to the Coy Comd, OPCON

to the LAV Capt. The company commander
commands the Zulu LAVs through the LAV Capt.
The company commander provides the overall
direction and key tasks. The LAV Capt provides the
detailed coordination to meet those tasks. This may
include providing Zulu platoons OPCON to rifle
platoons but, unlike the above, this support may be
withdrawn at any time. Key considerations include:
(1) Communications:
(a) There is no requirement for the

company (combat team) to switch
to a fixed frequency on dismount.
(b) There is the least net congestion as

the platoon commanders can
concentrate on the section battle
with the light assault radios.
(2) Responsiveness. Fire support to individual

platoons is not guaranteed.
(3) Coordination. The fire support of the

maximum number of vehicles can be
coordinated on the most dangerous or
difficult targets.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 21
(4) Flexibility. Entire Zulu platoons can be
quickly reoriented to meet unexpected
threats and opportunities. Additionally, this
is the lowest level of command where a
Zulu LAV reserve is expected to be
established.
(5) Zulu LAV Protection. It is when

operating as a single, coordinated
organization that the Zulu LAVs are best
able to protect themselves through the use
of ground, fire and movement.
(6) Span of Control. While the company

commander is responsible for both
elements, he can concentrate on the
dismounted element while the LAV Capt
controls the Zulu LAVs in accordance with
the company commander’s orders. At the
platoon level, the platoon commander can
concentrate on the dismounted battle.
(7) Zulu LAVs are normally controlled in this

manner in circumstances where the fire
support of the Zulu company as a whole
should be coordinated.
d. Zulu LAVs Independently Commanded by the

LAV Capt or Sgt. Zulu LAVs may be
independently commanded by the LAV Capt or Sgt
in circumstances where they are required to act
independently of the dismounted element. Tasks
such as delay (while the dismounted company is
digging in) or exploitation would use this command
structure. The lowest level at which Zulu LAVs
would normally be tasked independently of the
dismounted element is the Zulu platoon.
17. Chain of Command. When a commander becomes a

casualty, it can cause a significant loss of momentum and increase of
friendly casualties as the organization either stops and waits for
direction that is not coming or carries on with inappropriate actions.
22 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
The next in the chain of command must take over as quickly as
possible and ensure that the organization knows that he has taken over.
Unfortunately, battle is often such that subordinates cannot see that the
commander has become a casualty. In an effort to ensure that positive
control is maintained, the following SOP may be adopted:
a. If the commander, at whatever level, does not

respond to the radio twice in a row, he is assumed to
be a casualty. As an example, call sign (C/S) 11
calls C/S 19 and offers a SITREP. C/S 19 does not
respond. C/S 11 offers the SITREP again and
C/S 19 still does not respond. C/S 19 is assumed to
be a casualty.
b. Call sign 1A, who is monitoring, comes up on the

net and assumes command. If C/S 1A does not
come up automatically and assume command, then
C/S 11 calls CS 1A, explains that C/S 19 is not on
the air, and recommends the C/S 1A assumes
command.
c. If C/S 1A cannot be reached, then the next in the

chain of command automatically takes command, in
this case C/S 1B.
18. Section Command Structure. There are three command

positions within the section:
a. Section Commander. The section commander is

crew commander qualified. When the vehicle is
moving, he usually commands from the right-hand
seat in the turret. He may or may not lead the
dismounted element. If he does dismount, his
position in the turret is taken by the section 2IC. If
the section commander does not dismount, he
commands the Zulu LAV.
b. Section 2IC. The section 2IC is crew commander

qualified. When the vehicle is moving, he is usually
in the rear. If the section commander dismounts, the
section 2IC replaces him in the turret. If the section
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 23
commander does not dismount, the 2IC commands
the dismounted section.
c. Section 3IC. The section 3IC is not necessarily

crew commander qualified and always dismounts
with the section.
19. Dismounting in Contact with the Enemy. Dismounting

while in contact with the enemy is conducted as either a deliberate or a
hasty action as follows:
a. Deliberate Dismount. In this circumstance, the

commander knows in advance that he is going to
dismount in contact with the enemy and will usually
know where and when. An example of this would
be the dismount that precedes the fight through the
objective in either a hasty or a deliberate attack. The
commander has the ability to reorganize the
personnel within the LAV in preparation for the
dismount. Specifically, he ensures that the
commander he wants to lead the dismounted
element has moved to the back and the commander
he wants to command the vehicle has moved to the
turret. This occurs while the vehicle is out of
contact, normally at the RV.
b. Hasty Dismount. In this circumstance, the

commander does not know in advance that he is
going to be required to dismount in contact. An
example of this would be the normal immediate
reaction drills to an ambush. It is essential to both
keep the gun in action and to dismount the section
immediately. In a hasty dismount there is no
changing of command positions within the vehicle:
the commander in the turret remains there and the
commander in the back leads the dismounted
element.
20. Personnel Locations Inside the LAV III. Section, platoon

and company commanders normally command from the right-hand
side of the turret. If they are dismounting to lead operations on the
ground, they move to the rear of the vehicle and are replaced in the
24 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
turret. Due to the necessity of taking the turret out of action when
changing personnel, the change around normally takes place before the
dismount. Positions in the back of the vehicles described below are
recommended and can be changed depending on the circumstances:
a. Section Vehicle—Mounted Locations. When the

section is expected to remain mounted, the section
commander usually occupies the right-hand turret
seat to maintain maximum situational awareness.
The section 2IC usually sits in the rear at the middle
right, where he has the best access to the crew
situational awareness monitor (CSAM), control
integration (CI) and TacNav. The section 3IC sits
beside him. The two C9 gunners sit beside the ramp
where they can:
(1) be the first personnel out of the vehicle on

the dismount, and
(2) act as sentries in the rear cargo hatches and

be attached to the rear CI.
Figure 1-10: Section Vehicle—Mounted Locations
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 25
b. Section Vehicle—Dismount Locations. If the
section commander is going to dismount, before
doing so, he moves to the rear of the vehicle and is
replaced in the turret by the section 2IC. The only
change in the back is the section commander takes
the section 2IC’s seat. If possible, this change is
made via the cargo and turret hatches as this is much
faster than going through the hole in the turret
basket guard. Regardless, the crew commander
locks the turret before the change around to prevent
injury.
NOTE
During training, consideration should be given to placing
the platoon commander and 2IC in the same vehicle until
each is familiar with the other.
c. Platoon Commander Vehicle—Mounted

Locations. When the platoon is expected to remain
mounted, the platoon commander occupies the right-
hand seat in the turret. The LAV Sgt occupies the
left-hand seat, acts as the platoon commander’s
gunner, and is in a position where he is fully current
with the situation. The platoon 2IC rides in the back
of the Charlie C/S and, if that section is fully up to
strength, one soldier from that section rides in the
platoon HQ vehicle. The gunner sits in the middle
right seat, where he can maintain situational
awareness and listen via the CI.
26 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 1-11: Platoon HQ Vehicle—Mounted Locations

d. Platoon HQ Vehicle—Dismount Locations.
Before the dismount, the platoon commander moves
to the rear of the vehicle and takes the gunner’s seat,
the LAV Sgt takes the platoon commander’s place,
and a gunner moves up from the back. If at all
possible, this change around is done externally,
using the turret and cargo hatches as this is much
faster than going through the hole in the turret
basket guard. Regardless, the turret is locked by the
platoon commander before the change around begins
and is not unlocked by the LAV Sgt until the change
around is completed.
21. Movement. The LAV company moves using a variety of

different techniques depending on the composition of friendly forces,
threat, ground and speed required
a. Formations. There are no additions to the basic

formations used for mechanized movement. Given
the firepower of the vehicle and its STA capabilities,
however, the formations may be more spread out
than before.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 27
Figure 1-12: Formations

b. Maximum Distance Between LAVs. Whenever
practical, vehicles should be spread out to lessen the
danger from indirect fire. Commanders, however,
must be constantly alert to ensure that they do not
inadvertently spread out or lengthen bounds to the
point where vehicles can no longer support one
another.
c. Commanders Heads Up / Heads Down. Crew

commanders usually operate heads up as this is the
28 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
most effective way of maintaining situational
awareness. When commanders must operate heads
down, movement rates and vehicle spacing are likely
to have to be reduced. See Annex B, Visibility to
this section.
d. Movement with Tanks. There is no change to the

drill of tanks leading mechanized infantry in open
country and dismounted infantry leading tanks in
close country. The LAV company behind the tanks
can move from position of cover to position of cover
or from position of observation to position of
observation. The LAV company is far more capable
than an M-113 or Grizzly company, however, in
providing flank security and all-arms air defence
(AAAD) on the move. See Section 5, Advance to
Contact with Tanks, for details.
e. Direct Fire Support. The LAV company is

organized to provide, if necessary, its own internal
fire support while moving. This fire support can
take the form of:
(1) Company Level. Two platoons can

support the move forward of one platoon.
Once that bound is complete, the forward
platoon can then support the rear two
platoons moving forward.
(2) Platoon Level. Within each platoon, the

four LAVs are organized into 2 two-vehicle
teams—usually the HQ vehicle and Bravo
C/S form one team and the Alpha and
Charlie C/Ss form the other. The platoon
commander (or if he has dismounted, the
LAV Sgt) commands one team and the
platoon as a whole. The second team is
commanded by the Alpha call sign. Each
two-vehicle team is able to support the
other team.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 29
(3) Team Level. Each two-vehicle team can
conduct its own internal fire and movement
under the command of the team leader. See
Chapter 5, Advance to Contact Without
Tanks, for more details.
f. Speed. The limiting factor determining an

organization’s overall speed is often the time
required to search the ground before the next bound.
When actually moving, however:
(1) Despite gun stabilization, the vehicle can

move faster cross-country than the gunner
can track. This maximum speed for the
gunner varies depending on the type of
terrain. The rougher the terrain, the slower
the vehicle must move to allow the gunner
to remain effective.
(2) The gunner must immediately advise the

crew commander if he is no longer able to
track. The commander must then decide
whether high speed or accurate fire is more
important while moving and, if necessary,
order the driver to slow down.
g. Viewing Aids. The LAV is provided with a variety

of vision aids—TI and II sights, driver’s thermal and
II goggles. They allow the vehicle to move faster
and more safely under certain adverse light
conditions than was previously possible. The choice
is determined by circumstances. If ambient light
conditions are good (under a full moon for
example), the naked eye must be considered as an
alternative to any viewing aids. If a viewing aid is
required, considerations include:
(1) Driver:
(a) II Goggles. Under conditions of

good ambient light and no
obscuration, II goggles provide a
30 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
better picture than the thermal
viewer and allow the driver to
quickly scan from left to right.
They require him to operate head
out of the hatch, however, which
restricts the use of the gun and
increases his vulnerability. They
also prevent him from seeing his
instruments.
(b) Thermal Viewer. The thermal

viewer works through most
obscurants, during periods of
extremely low light and hatches
down. Its use does not interfere
with the driver’s view of his
instruments. It prevents him from
easily scanning left and right,
however. There are also periods
most days when low thermal
contrast renders the driver’s
viewing aid ineffective.
(2) Crew Commander:
(a) II Goggles. If light conditions

prevent the crew commander from
using the naked eye, II goggles
provide the next best method of
maintaining overall visual
situational awareness. In addition
to the benefits and problems
above, they do not come close to
matching the range of the gunner’s
thermal sight. The crew
commander often cannot detect
targets until they are very close. If
the gunner detects a target, the
crew commander is unlikely to see
it through the II goggles. The
crew commander must then make
a decision whether he will allow
the gunner to shoot without the
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 31
crew commander verifying the
target or if he will remove the
goggles and verify the target—a
time consuming process. The
circumstances do not absolve the
crew commander of his
accountability if he does not verify
the target and the gunner shoots a
friendly vehicle.
(b) Thermal Sight. If light

conditions do not permit the use of
II goggles, or if the commander
must operate hatches down, he is
restricted to the same arc as the
gunner.
(3) The 5 million candlepower, co-axially

mounted spotlight with IR filter can be used
at night to dramatically extend the effective
range of passive II devices. It must be
remembered, however, that the spotlight is
active and can be detected well beyond the
range at which it can illuminate targets. As
with any active illumination source, its use
is a command decision.
h. Endurance. The major limiting factor on endurance

is the strain placed by the viewing aids on the
crewmembers. The second limiting factor is motion
sickness for soldiers closed down in the back.
(1) Viewing Aids. The longest that personnel

can be expected to remain effective
constantly using thermal or II is two hours.
After that time they will be ineffective for a
prolonged time and can be expected to still
have headaches up to eight hours later. For
long distance moves, or any other time the
sensors must be used for a prolonged
period, there are two options:
32 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(a) A routine of breaks when
personnel can look away from the
various viewing aids is necessary.
Thirty minutes moving followed
by 10 minutes stationary is
recommended. During the
10-minute break, either the vision
aids must go unattended or a
temporary substitute must be
rotated into those positions.
(b) A complete second crew (gunner,

driver and crew commander) is
carried in the vehicle. This allows
the turret crew to be rotated to the
back where they can rest their
eyes.
i. Motion Sickness. Motion sickness is a problem for

some soldiers for prolonged cross-country
movement. Breaks in the movement would alleviate
the problem.
j. Hatches. The vehicle normally moves tactically

with all hatches except the crew commander’s
closed. This provides:
(1) unrestricted traverse and firing of the turret;
(2) protection to the soldiers from shell

fragments;
(3) protection to the soldiers from liquid

chemical agents;
(4) improved effectiveness of the automatic

fire explosion suppression system (AFES)
if the vehicle armour is penetrated; and
(5) maximum speed over rough terrain because

the personnel in the back must be sitting
not standing.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 33
k. In circumstances where it is necessary to have
additional observation, two personnel can stand in
the rear cargo hatches. They should be linked to the
intercom system through the rear CI.
22. TacNav System. Commanders use the TacNav to assist

them in navigation and target location tasks. The aim is to reduce the
time taken to perform these tasks, while increasing their accuracy, so
that commanders can spend more time concentrating on other aspects
of their jobs:
a. Responsibilities. The commander is responsible for

navigation. He ensures:
(1) the TacNav system has been calibrated and

is working properly (see sub-para c below);
(2) all waypoints, routes and areas of interest

have been input and labelled;
(3) all critical areas and lines, with their

associated alarms, have been input and
labelled;
(4) the driver is ordered to use either Steer To

or Cross Track modes of navigation; and
(5) if the TacNav is operating in Dead

Reckoning mode, the location is updated
whenever possible using the GPS
initialization settings.
b. Mode of Navigation:
(1) Steer To. Steer To mode gives the

commander constant updates on the
distance and heading to the waypoint. It
does not provide him with a specific route.
It is used when the destination is important
and it is expected that there will be
flexibility in the route. Steer To would
34 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
normally be used in operations such as
advance to contact.
(2) Cross Track. Cross Track mode keeps the

commander to a specific route, defined by a
series of waypoints. As every twist and
turn of the route must be defined, it is far
more time consuming than to program.
Cross Track would normally be used for
defining routes from the hide to battle
positions or when moving through lanes or
gaps in obstacles.
(3) Assigning Way Points and Routes. When

precision lightweight GPS receivers
(PLGRs) are used and a PLGR-to-PLGR
data transfer is done, it over-writes the data
in the same numbered routes and waypoints
in the recipient’s PLGR. To avoid this,
separate blocks of waypoints and routes
should be assigned to subordinate units.
With 999 possible waypoints and routes
available, this should not cause a problem.
c. Checking TacNav Calibration/Function. The

commander must know when the TacNav is no
longer properly calibrated or not functioning
correctly. A simple way to confirm the function is
through use of the far target indicator. The correct
functioning of the far target indicator requires that
the vehicle’s position (GPS or dead reckoning), hull
alignment (digital magnetic compass), turret
alignment (turret angle encoder), and distance to the
target (laser range finder) all must be correctly
calculated and processed. To confirm the TacNav
calibration/function, the crew commander selects an
identifiable point on the ground (within 10 km) and
lazes. He then compares the read-out on the TacNav
display to the grid from the map. If they are within
100 m for each 1,000 m of distance to the target, the
system is probably functioning correctly.
23. Central Tire Inflation System:

B-GL-321-007/FP-001 35
a. It is the crew commander’s responsibility to order the
correct tire setting for the central tire inflation system
(CTIS). It is the driver’s responsibility to advise the
crew commander when he believes the setting should be
changed. Given that changing the CTIS setting has a
major effect on the LAV’s speed, the company is
usually ordered to adopt one setting, with crew
commanders only changing from that setting
temporarily to cross particularly difficult terrain.
b. If the driver attempts to drive too quickly for the

setting chosen, the CTIS automatically re-inflates
the tires to the minimum safe pressure for that speed.
The four settings available, with their maximum
speeds, are shown below:
Figure 1-13: Central Tire Inflation System Setting Speeds
c. The CTIS is far more effective in preventing a
vehicle from being stuck than it is in getting it
unstuck. Crew commanders should order tire
pressure to be reduced before entering soft ground.
The reduced tire pressure setting should not be used

longer than necessary, however, because it greatly
increases the risk of damage to the tire.
d. When the driver switches from one tire setting to

another, the change is not instantaneous and the
delay must be taken into account in any time
estimate. The times to change from one tire setting
to another are as follows:
(1) approximately 4½ minutes to inflate to the

next higher setting; and
36 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(2) approximately 1½ to 2 minutes to deflate to
the next lower tire setting.
24. Reaction to Vehicle Alarms. All vehicle alarms give an

audible alarm that is repeated through the vehicle intercom. Reaction
to these alarms depends on circumstances:
a. Engine. The engine alarm signifies a serious fault

that may cause the engine to fail within a short
period. If circumstances permit, the crew
commander orders the driver to stop and shut off the
engine.
b. Fire. The fire alarm and the first shot of the AFES
should happen simultaneously. On hearing the fire
alarm:
(1) The driver stops, if possible.
(2) The driver confirms that the first AFES

shot has fired. If not, he fires it manually.
He then confirms whether the fire is still
active. If it is, he fires the second shot
manually.
(3) The crew commander determines whether

the vehicle should be abandoned and gives
the appropriate orders.
(4) If the vehicle is abandoned, the crew

attempts to evacuate taking the manual fire
extinguishers with them so that they can
continue to fight the fire from the outside.
This is only attempted if the extra time
needed to get the manual fire extinguishers
will not endanger the personnel.
(5) Once the fire is extinguished, and assuming

the vehicle is still serviceable, it should be
properly ventilated.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 37
c. Laze. Even more than most other reactions to
alarms, reaction to being lazed depends on the
circumstances. The specific circumstances for being
lazed while in an area defence are covered in that
section. For more general circumstances:
(1) The laser warning receiver provides

information to the crew commander and the
driver that:
(a) the vehicle has been lazed;
(b) whether the laser is eye safe or

not;
(c) whether the laser is a range finder

or a target designator; and
(d) the direction of the laze relative to

the turret for the crew commander
and relative to the hull for the
driver.
(2) Upon being lazed, the following actions

should normally occur:
(a) the crew commander should align

the turret with the direction of the
laze;
(b) the gunner should search for and

automatically engage any targets
in that area; and
(c) the driver should search for cover

for the vehicle.
(3) In addition, the following actions may be

taken depending on the circumstances:
(a) Smoke. The crew commander

may fire smoke.
38 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(b) Manoeuvre. The crew
commander may order the driver
to manoeuvre, either to a location
the driver has chosen or to a spot
ordered by the crew commander.
d. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical. Both the

GID-3 (one per company) and the AN/VDR-2 (one
per platoon) are linked to the vehicle intercom
system. On receipt of an NBC alarm, through any
means, the following shall occur:
(1) Driver. In this sequence, the driver shall:
(a) stop the vehicle;

(b) mask;
(c) close his hatch (if open);
(d) turn off all interior ventilation
systems;
(e) turn on the ventilated respirator
system;
(f) put on his NBC suit (if not already
on and circumstances permit at
that time);
(g) hook up his mask to the ventilated
respirator system; and
(h) prepare to drive.
(2) Crew Commander and Gunner. In this

sequence, the crew commander and gunner
shall:
(a) mask;
(b) close the hatches (if open);
(c) put on their NBC suits (if not
already on and circumstances
permit at that time);
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 39
NOTE
For the crew commander and gunner to put on their suits

while inside the vehicle, they must move to the back of the
vehicle via the exit in the turret basket guard. This is a
difficult process, particularly for the gunner.
(d) hook up their masks to the

ventilated respirator system; and
(e) resume their normal duties.
(3) Personnel in the Back. In this sequence,

the personnel in the back shall:
(a) mask;
(b) close the hatches (if open);
(c) put on their NBC suits (if not

already on); and
(d) hook up their masks to the

ventilated respirator system.
25. Smoke. The LAV III can carry two types of 76 mm smoke
grenades for the multi-barrel grenade dischargers (MBGDs)—
hexachloroethane (HC) and visual and infrared screening smoke
(VIRSS):
a. Hexachloroethane Smoke. Hexachloroethane

(HC) smoke screens the LAVs and dismounting
troops from most of the enemy’s direct fire
weapons. At the same time, the LAVs can see and
shoot through it using TI. It takes 30 seconds to
build, however, and prevents the friendly
dismounted troops from being able to see their
objectives.
b. Visual and Infrared Screening Smoke. Visual and

infrared screening smoke (VIRSS) forms an almost
40 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
instantaneous curtain that screens the LAVs and any
dismounted troops from all the enemy’s weapons
and observation devices. However:
(1) VIRSS is highly toxic. Troops must either

wait for it to dissipate or mask before
moving forward.
(2) VIRSS blinds not only the enemy’s STA

devices but the LAV’s as well.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 41
ANNEX A
LAV STOWAGE PLAN
STOWAGE LIST—LAV III APC
SERIAL LOCATION STOWAGE ITEMS

1 Exterior left -1 x tow cable (14 tonne)
side, front to -7 x support for camouflage net
rear -1 x crowbar pinch point
-2 x tire chains in tire chain compartment
-1 x POL
Pioneer tool rack with:
-1 x axe
-1 x mattock pick/handle
-2 x round top shovels
-1 x bow saw
-1 x 5 lb sledge hammer
-1 x stretcher
-5 x snow shoes (in winter)
2 Exterior rear - 4 x 20 L jerry cans--usually 2 x diesel and 2 x water
but may be changed depending on circumstances
-1 x tire with bracket and strap
-2 x shackles—30 tonne
-2 x shackles—12 tonne
3a ISC only, Pioneer tool rack with:
exterior right -1 x axe
side, -1 x mattock pick/handle
rear to front -2 x round top shovels
-1 x bow saw
-1 x 5 lb sledge hammer
-2 x tire chains in tire chain compartment
-13 x support for camouflage net
3b CP only, -1 x antenna group
exterior right -2 x purloin frame section arches
side, rear to -3 x purloin pole
front -2 x tire chains in tire chain compartment
-13 x support for camouflage net
4 Exterior, front -2 x barbed tape concertina (highway operation)
-2 x shackles (30 tonne)
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 43

5a Top, front to -2 x barbed tape concertina (off road operation)
rear Administration box with:
-1 x lantern with case
-1 x stove (2 burner)
-1 x cook set
-3 x 4-person tent (CP 2x)
-12 x straps
-1 x strap bag
-1 x panel marker, fluorescent
-1 x reflector set, highway
-1 x flag set signal (3)
-4 x wire cable locks
-1 x air hose and tire inflation adapter
-1 x tire repair kit
-1 x trailer brake hose assembly
-1 x hydraulic jack with wooden block
-1 x spot light
On the lid of the administration box:
-1 x vehicle tarp
-1 x driver windshield with case
-1 x commander’s wind screen with case
On the left side of the admin box:
-2 x 4.5 L naphtha cans
On the right side of the admin box:
-2 x 4.5 L naphtha cans
Winter -1 x toboggan
-1 x 10-man arctic tent group with equipment
5b CP only Administration box with:
-1 x tent adapter
-1 x modular section centre
-1 x modular door
6 Turret, left 1 x C42 ammo can with:
basket -2 x night vision goggles (NVGs)
1 x PA 125 ammo can with:
-12 x fragmentation grenades M67
-4 x smoke grenades
7 Turret, bustle 1 x C42 ammo can with 3 x claymore mines
basket complete
-2 x M19A1 (7.62 mm) ammo box with 5 x each
cap camouflage net supports
-2 x camouflage nets (winter/summer)
-1 x booster cable with adapter connector
-1 x NBC decontamination apparatus
8 Turret, right 1 x C42 ammo can with:
basket -2 x C9 drums
-4 x smoke grenades (76 mm)
-4 x fragmentation grenades (76 mm)
44 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Annex A to Chapter 1

-12 x C3 para flare
-2 x M49 A1 trip flare
-signal flares hand :
6 x red
6 x green
9 Inside -1 x driver’s web gear bag
driver’s/crew -1 x pamphlet bag
stowage area Stowage box with:
-1 x driver’s tool bag
-1 x grease gun
-1 x spout can flex
-1 x hand oiler
-1 x siphon
-1 x 6v DC lantern
-1 x various POL
-1 x wire cutters
-1 x 5 lb fire extinguisher
-3 x rucksacks (driver, gunner, crew comd)
-1 x driver’s NBC/IPE (individual protective
equipment) bag
-1 x driver’s C7A1 rifle
-1 x boresight and container
-2 x 20 L water jerry cans (normally carried only in
winter instead of external jerry cans but can be in
addition depending on circumstances)
-1 x gunner NBC/IPE bag
10 Inside -1 x crew boiling unit (CBU)
compartment, -1 x first aid kit (top left) in bag strapped to AFES
left side, left to bottles
right -1 x 5 lb fire extinguisher (below rear LHS seat
back)
-4 x rucksack (pouches facing forward).
-rations for 24 hours (2nd 24 hrs carried on soldiers)
-1 x M2A1 ammo can with:
-1 x driver’s NVGs
-1 x C42 ammo can with:
-1 x spot light, battery and equipment issue
scale (1 per pl)
-1 x battery charger in Pelican case
-1 x cargo stowage net complete (for left side)
11 Inside back left -2 x ramp safety chains
seat bin -1 x 25 mm cleaning kit (1 x cleaning rod in
4 sections, 2 x wire brush, 1 x plastic barrel plug)
-1 x 76 mm bore brush and cleaning kit
-1 x 76 mm circuit tester (1 per pl)
-6 x M19A1 ammo boxes of 7.62 mm link
-2 x NBC/IPE bags
-1 x machete strapped to the seat bin
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 45

-1 x ramp vision block cover
12 Inside front left -8 x drums (C-9) 5.56 mm in 2 x C42 ammo
seat bin containers
-2 x NBC/IPE bags
-5 x skop kit
-3 x pairs of wire gloves
-1 x asbestos gloves
-1 x wire cutter with case
13 Inside front, -2 x C7A1 left side of turret guard
left to right -1 x C7A1 right side of turret guard
-7 x 25 mm ammo PA125 ammo containers
14a Inside -1 x crew comd’s NBC/IPE bag
compartment, -1 x AN-VDR 2 (1 x pl)
right side, left -1 x GID 3 (1 x coy)
to right -1 x battery stowage box
-3 x rucksack (pouches facing inside)
-1 x cargo stowage net complete (for right-hand
side)
14b Pl Comd’s -1 x short-range anti-armour weapon (medium)
vehicle only (SRAAW(M)) 84 mm
-6 x SRAAW(M) 84 mm ammo in the containers
-3 x bags in the front left seat bin with:
-cleaning kit
-boresight kit
-telescopic/class sight
14c Sect vehicle -2 or 3 x ERYX missile
only -1 x ERYX system (tripod, firing post and thermal
sight)
15 Inside, right -8 x drums (C-9) 5.56 mm in 2 x C42 ammo
seat bin containers
-3 x NBC/IPE bags
-1 x chemical agent monitor (CAM) (1 per pl)
-2,450 rounds 5.56 mm ball
16 Winch kit -1 x winch
equipped -1 x snatch block (10 tonne)
vehicles only -1 x master link
-1 x shackle (12 tonne)
-1 x fairlead
-1 x winch controller and extension cable
-1 x cleaning brush
17 Gunner’s tool -1 x hand crank
rack in turret -1 x screw driver (flat tip 12")
-1 x pri bar
-1 x pliers, snubnose
-1 x ratchet and socket (14 mm)
18 Other -16 x locks
-environmental kit (held by CQ)
46 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

19 Combat POL:
supplies -200 L diesel in vehicle gas tanks
summary -up to 80 L diesel in external jerry cans (if no
external water jerry cans carried)
-18 L naphtha
Water:
-up to 120 L in jerry cans (if both external and
internal water jerry cans are carried and no
external diesel jerry cans are carried)
-1 to 3 L per soldier in webbing
Food:
-24 hrs IMPs (individual meal packs) stowed
-24 hrs IMPs in soldiers’ rucksacks
Ammo:
-25 mm
210 ready rounds (rds)
210 stowed rds
-7.62 mm link
440 ready rds (coax)
1,320 stowed rds
880 rds carried by pl wpns det (pl HQ veh
only)
-5.56 mm link
200 ready rds (pintle)
3,200 stowed rds
1,400 rds carried by sect (sect veh only)
-5.56 mm ball
2,450 stowed rds
2,450 carried by sect pers (350 per soldier with
C7 rifle)
-grenade, 76 mm (smoke or HE)
8 ready rds
8 stowed rds
-grenade, frag, hand x 12 (stowed)
-grenade, hand, smoke x 4 (stowed)
-Eryx missiles x 3 (sect veh only) or
-84 mm rounds x 6 (pl HQ veh only)
-claymore mines x 3
-para flare x 12
-trip flare x 2
-signal flare x 12
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 47
Lav Company Tactics (Interim)
ANNEX B
VISIBILITY
Figure 1B-1: Dead Ground for Viewing—Turret Straight

Forward
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 49
Figure 1B-2: Dead Ground for Turret Engagements
50 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
ANNEX C
URBAN OPERATIONS
It cannot be emphasised too strongly, therefore, that the key to

success in urban warfare is good infantry. And the key to
good infantry, rather than good weaponry, is a traditional
mixture of training, leadership qualities in NCOs and junior
officers, and morale—implying a readiness to take casualties.1
1. References:
a. B-GL-300-002/FP-000, Land Force Tactical

Doctrine;
b. B. US Army FM 3-06.11 (90-10-1) An
Infantryman's Guide to Urban Operations (Co-
ordinating Draft);
c. B-GL-322-008/FP-001, Soldiers Guide for Urban
Operations (Draft).
INTRODUCTION
2. Background. This annex on urban operations is based upon,

primarily, the two references; no independent research was completed.
The application of the information in the references was refined,
however, through the application of the LAV’s physical characteristics
and the Canadian company structure to the templates provided.
3. General. The intent of this annex is to provide guidance on

how to use the LAV to support the dismounted company in urban
operations. While much of this annex is applicable to tanks as well as
LAVs, the Tactics School remains the Centre of Excellence for
combined arms warfare. Specific direction on tank–infantry co-
operation in an urban environment should be requested from the
Tactics School.
1
The World Turned Upside Down: Military Lessons of the Chechen
War, by Mr. Anatol Lieven
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 51
4. Characteristics and Limitation. The characteristics and
limitations of urban operations, as defined by Land Force tactical
doctrine, are listed below. Those characteristics and limitations
expected to have particular affect on the use of LAV have been
amplified.
a. Characteristics:
CHARACTERISTICS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES
Limited fields of fire and Whether stationary or moving, LAVs are unlikely to be
observation. able to see and dominate the approaches to them.
Dismounted infantry are likely to be required to cover
these approaches and provide close protection.
Protection, cover and Good areas of cover should be available both as waiting
concealment for troops areas and fire positions.
and equipment.
Reduced possibilities for LAVs will be unable to manoeuvre tactically in most urban
manoeuvre, particularly areas and may be unable to negotiate large areas due to
for mechanized units, but rubble or narrow, twisting streets. Dismounted soldiers
increased possibilities for will be required to protect LAVs from enemy soldiers who
infiltration and bypassing. have been bypassed or who have infiltrated.
Close-quarter combat LAVs cannot see or shoot close-in targets at ground level
including the increased (see Annex B to Chapter 1). Dismounted soldiers will be
vulnerability of vehicles required to protect the LAV in close quarters.
to short-range attack.
The presence of a civilian The possibility of civilian casualties and their attendant
population. political consequences can very seriously limit military
actions.
Difficulties in command, At company level, commanders are likely to have to be
control and forward with their troops to maintain control. They are
communication. unlikely to be able to exercise effective control from the
LAV.
Higher rates of The LAV can be used to bring forward ammunition and
consumption of other combat supplies. Additional LAV ammunition is
ammunition and combat likely to be required as the 25 mm cannon will be used in
supplies. suppression roles with correspondingly higher ammo
expenditure rates.
A battle that is likely to be The LAV’s turret is very effective at engaging targets in
fought on multiple levels: buildings.
at street level, on rooftops
and in buildings and
underground in sewers
and subway systems.
b. Limitations:
52 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Annex C to Chapter 1
LIMITATIONS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

Fields of Observation and Fire.
Fire positions will be selected to
take advantage of the limited
observation and fields of fire
available.
Information. Detailed knowledge Key positions should be input into the TacNav
of the area may offer a relative system, along with both primary and alternate
advantage to the defender. routes.
Concealment. Positions are Visibility is limited in the LAV, particularly when
difficult to locate, strengths are hatches are closed. Dismounted infantry are likely
hard to estimate, and enemy to be needed to assist in target locating.
intentions are hard to define.
Movement. The ability to move is As the urban area becomes damaged, it may be
generally very limited. The more impossible to move LAVs forward to support the
buildings are damaged, the more advance or to withdraw them from a defensive
cover there is for the defender, and position.
the harder it is for the attacker to
advance.
Weapon Employment. Short- Dismounted infantry will be needed for the close-
range weapons and grenades will in protection of the LAV.
be used extensively. Mutually
supporting fire will be difficult to
achieve. Indirect fire weapons and
tanks may be of limited use.
Fire. Depending upon the 25 mm ammunition carries more tracer element
construction, building fires may be than small arms and has, therefore, a greater
an important consideration. inherent ability to start fires. Additionally the
HEI-T ammo is designed to start fires. This may
impose limitations on its use.
Stress. Street fighting is
physically and mentally
exhausting, success being
measured in metres, building by
building. In these circumstances,
much will depend on the initiative
and standard of leadership at the
lower levels of command. The
maintenance of combat efficiency
may require the frequent rotation
of troops in contact.
5. Weaknesses and Strengths of Dismounted Infantry and

LAVs. Because of the decentralized nature of urban combat and the
need for a high number of troops to conduct operations in dense,
compact terrain, infantrymen will always represent the bulk of forces.
At the small-unit tactical level, dismounted infantry forces have
disadvantages that can be compensated for by LAVs (and tanks).
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 53
Conversely, LAVs (and tanks) face problems in the confines of urban
areas that place them at a severe disadvantage when operating alone:
a. Dismounted Infantry Weaknesses:
(1) Infantry forces lack heavy supporting

firepower, protection, and long-range
mobility.
(2) Exposed dismounted infantry forces are

subject to taking a high number of
casualties between buildings.
(3) Dismounted infantry forces are more

subject to fratricide-related casualties from
friendly direct and indirect fire.
b. LAV Weaknesses:
(1) Crewmen in LAVs have poor all round

vision through their vision blocks; they are
easily blinded by smoke or dust. Even
when the crew commander is operating
head-up, he cannot see close in to his
vehicle at ground level. This can make it
extremely difficult for the crew commander
to direct the gunner onto the target.
(2) LAVs are noisy compared to dismounted

infantry. There is little chance of LAVs
arriving in an area undetected.
(3) Improvised barricades, narrow streets and

alleyways or large amounts of rubble can
block the LAV’s movement.
(4) If isolated or unsupported by dismounted

infantry, LAVs are vulnerable to enemy
hunter/killer teams firing light and medium
anti-armour weapons as well as less
sophisticated weapons such as petrol
bombs.
54 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
c. Dismounted Infantry Strengths:
(1) Infantry small arms fire within a building

can eliminate resistance without seriously
damaging the structure.
(2) Infantrymen can move stealthily into

position without alerting the enemy.
Infantrymen can move over or around most
urban terrain, regardless of the amount of
damage to buildings.
(3) Infantrymen have excellent all round vision

and can engage targets with small arms fire
under almost all conditions.
(4) In the end, only infantry can route the

enemy out of well-prepared urban battle
positions.
d. LAV Strengths:
(1) The thermal sights on LAVs can detect

enemy activity through darkness and
smoke, conditions that limit even the best-
equipped infantry.
(2) LAVs can deliver devastating fire, are

protected against fragments and small arms,
and have excellent mobility along
unblocked routes.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 55
Figure 1C-1: Maximum Height of Targets—Urban Operations

(3) LAVs can move mounted infantrymen
rapidly to points where, together, they can
dominate and isolate the cordoned area.
With their long-range sights and weapons,
LAVs can dominate large expanses of open
area and thus free infantry to isolate closer
terrain and visual dead space.
(4) The mobile protected firepower of LAVs

can be used to add security to resupply
convoys and to extract wounded personnel
under fire. The LAV’s smoke-generation
capability can aid this and other small-unit
actions.
6. LAV Employment Considerations:
a. General. Urban combat is often decentralized and

avenues of approach for vehicles canalized. This
urban situation calls for fewer armoured vehicles
employed over broader areas. Decentralized armour
support greatly increases a small infantry unit’s
combat power. However, dispersed vehicles cannot
be easily and quickly concentrated. Their sudden
56 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
removal from throughout the combat area will
necessitate a tactical pause for reorganization and a
change of tactical tempo that could disrupt the
ongoing combat operation at a critical time.
b. Employment. LAVs can support infantry during

urban combat operations by:
(1) providing shock action and firepower;
(2) isolating objectives with direct fire to

prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement
or counterattack;
(3) neutralizing or suppressing enemy positions

as infantry closes with and destroys the
enemy;
(4) obscuring enemy observation using smoke

grenade launchers;
(5) holding cleared portions of the objective by

covering avenues of approach;
(6) attacking by fire any other targets

designated by the infantry;
(7) establishing roadblocks or checkpoints; and
(8) suppressing identified sniper positions.
c. Vehicle Characteristics. Fighting in urban areas is

centred on prepared positions in houses and
buildings. Such positions cover street approaches
and are protected by mines, obstacles, and booby
traps. Therefore, bridges, overpasses, and buildings
must be inspected and cleared of mines before they
are used. Reconnaissance parties must ascertain the
weight-supporting capacity of roads, bridges, and
floors to determine if they can support the weight of
LAVs. When uparmoured and fully loaded, the
LAV III weighs 20 tonnes.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 57
7. Offence. LAVs provide a very flexible direct fire support
asset to dismounted infantry companies conducting operations on
urban terrain. The 25 mm cannon and 7.62 mm coax machine-gun
provide the company commander powerful combat multipliers during
urban combat. As well, the short-range anti-armour weapon (heavy),
or SRAAW(H), which may not be practical to carry with the
assaulting dismounted infantry, can be quickly brought into action:
a. Target Engagement. Streets and alleys are natural

firing lanes and killing zones. Because of this, all
vehicle traffic is greatly restricted and canalized and
subject to ambush and short-range attack. Tanks are
at a disadvantage because their main guns cannot be
elevated enough to engage targets on the upper
floors of tall buildings. The LAV, with +60 to
-10 degrees elevation of the 25 mm gun and
7.62 mm coax machine-gun, has a much greater
ability to engage targets in urban terrain.
b. Local Security for the LAVs:
(1) The need to provide local protection for the

LAVs, plus the need to be able to deploy
any required support weapons, is likely to
require a rifle section for each LAV.
Dismounted infantry companies may be
task organized with LAV platoons, as
opposed to Zulu LAV platoons, when
conducting operations in urban terrain. A
LAV platoon is capable of providing its
own infantry support. Generally, LAVs
should not be separated from their infantry.
Working as a team, infantrymen (the rifle
sections) provide security for the vehicles;
the LAVs provide critical fire support for
the dismounted company. In more detail:
(a) Two soldiers will normally be in

the air sentry hatch covering arcs
not being observed by the gunner
and crew commander. They are
wearing headsets so they can warn
the crew commander of any
58 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
threats and receive direction or
warning from him.
(b) The remainder of the section will

be dismounted and providing local
protection.
(c) The LAV’s radio will usually be

operating in non-frequency
hopping mode so that the crew
commander and dismounted
commander can communicate
using the section’s light assault
radio.
(2) Providing a complete LAV platoon per

dismounted rifle company is a major
challenge that often will not be obtainable,
particularly when the unit has suffered
casualties. Options include:
(a) One rifle company can provide a

LAV platoon to each of the other
two companies working
dismounted. This effectively
reduces the battalion to two
companies with a reserve of a
LAV platoon.
(b) One platoon in each company can

be tasked as the LAV platoon to
support the dismounted platoons.
This has the advantages that
i. it leaves rifle companies

intact; and
ii. company commanders

can rotate rifle platoons
through the LAV role.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 59
c. Movement. When moving, if the street is large
enough, LAVs should stay close to a building on
either side of the street. This allows each LAV to
cover the opposite side of the street. Regardless
whether he is head up or down, the crew commander
must remain alert for signals from the infantry.
Coordination between mounted and dismounted
elements is critical in urban terrain.
d. Organization. The company commander will

determine how the LAVs will support the
dismounted company. Due to the decentralized
nature of urban operations, it is likely that the LAVs
will be placed in support of individual platoons or
sections. Considerations include:
(1) Whenever practical, at least two LAVs

should be committed as opposed to a single
vehicle.
(2) The dismounted infantry commander tells

the LAV element commander what he
needs done. The LAV commander should
be allowed to determine how best to
provide that support.
(3) Given the decentralized nature of the battle,

many of the tasks for the LAVs are likely to
come directly from sections. The vehicle
radios must be in non-frequency hopping
mode so they can communicate via the
sections’ light assault radios.
e. Tasks. The most likely tasks that will be given to a

LAV platoon supporting a dismounted infantry
company in urban combat will be fire support to the
dismounted assault element. Direct fire support and
other assistance to facilitate the advance of the
assault element are provided by the support element.
The LAV platoon is well suited to act as the support
element for the dismounted infantry company team
60 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
during offensive operations. Specific LAV platoon
tasks include, but are not limited to:
(1) suppressing enemy gunners within the

objective building(s) and adjacent
structures;
(2) destroying enemy positions within a

building;
(3) providing replacements for the assault

element from the LAV’s security team;
(4) providing a mobile reserve for the

company;
(5) providing resupply of ammunition and

explosives; and
(6) evacuating casualties, prisoners and non-

combatants.
f. Direct Fire Support. The LAV is best used to

provide direct fire support to infantry. The LAV
should move behind the infantry, when required, to
engage targets located by the rifle sections. The
dash speed of the LAV enables it to rapidly cross
streets, open areas or alleys:
(1) Weapons. The LAV mounted element

provides fire with its 25 mm gun and
7.62 mm coax machine-gun for infantry on
the opposite side of the street. Of the three
natures of 25 mm ammo, frangible will
most often be loaded in the primary bin
because of its usefulness against
fortifications and buildings.
(2) Sabot. The sabot from 25 mm APFSDS-T

and FAPDS-T is dangerous out to 100 m
from the muzzle in an arc of 200 mils left
and right of the barrel. Crew commanders
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 61
must be aware of this when providing close
fire support.
(3) SRAAW(H). SRAAW(H) is more likely

to be carried in the LAVs than by the
dismounted company. It and any other
support weapons being carried can be
quickly brought into action by the LAV’s
own local protection party.
(4) Smoke. The LAV can also provide a

smoke screen by using its smoke grenade
launchers. This requires careful analysis of
wind conditions to ensure that the smoke
does not adversely affect friendly units.
This is a difficult task since wind currents
tend to be erratic between buildings. The
smoke can also screen the movements of
the LAVs after the infantry moves.
8. Defence:
a. General. The LAV can provide a valuable combat

multiplier in the defence. The following are typical
defensive missions that may be given to a LAV
platoon:
(1) providing fire support for infantry and

mutual support to other LAV teams;
(2) destroying enemy armoured vehicles and

direct fire artillery pieces;
(3) destroying or making enemy footholds

untenable by fire using the 25 mm gun;
(4) providing rapid, protected transport;
(5) reinforcing threatened areas by movement

through covered and concealed routes to
new firing positions;
62 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(6) providing mutual support to other anti-
armour fires;
(7) providing a mobile reserve and

counterattack force;
(8) providing resupply of ammunition and

other supplies; and
(9) evacuating casualties, prisoners, and non-

combatants.
b. Company Fire Plan. The LAVs will be integrated

into the company’s defensive fire plan. The 25 mm
gun and 7.62 mm coax machine-gun fields of fire
should cover streets and open areas. Once placed in
position, LAVs should not be moved for logistical or
administrative functions—such movement draws
attention. Other vehicles should accomplish these
functions, when possible:
(1) Positioning of Vehicles and Weapons.

Once the company commander gives the
LAV platoon commander his mission, the
platoon commander will position his LAVs
and supporting infantry. For the coax to
have grazing fire, the LAV must be in a
hull-down position. LAVs are assigned
primary, secondary and alternate positions.
(2) Engagement Ranges. The anti-armour

capability of the LAV is degraded by short
ranges and must be supplemented by
SRAAW(H). Anti-armour positions should
be placed where they can support the LAV
but must not attract enemy attention to the
LAV location.
(3) Integration of Fire. All of the LAV’s

crew-served weapons are integrated with
the rest of the company team’s weapons
and assets. The positions are recorded on a
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 63
company sector sketch and forwarded to
the battalion.
64 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
APPENDIX 1
ENGAGEMENT HEIGHTS—TANKS AND LAVS
1. Urban operations frequently impose very short ranges on

weapon systems. For turret-mounted systems, this can have major
limitations on the maximum height of target that can be engaged
successfully. The maximum heights for both the LAV and Leopard
C2, for a given range, are shown below (for the purpose of this
appendix, the average height of a building storey is estimated at
3.5 m):
Distance to Max Height of Target— Max Height of Target—

Tgt LAV Tank
Metres Storeys Metres Storeys
5 11 3 4 1
10 19 6 6 2
20 37 10 9 3
30 54 15 13 4
40 71 20 17 5
50 89 25 20 6
60 106 30 24 7
70 123 35 27 8
80 141 40 31 9
90 158 45 35 10
100 175 50 38 11
150 262 75 57 16
200 348 100 75 21
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 65
ANNEX D
NINE RULES TO HELP YOU STAY ALIVE
WITH THE LAV III
1. Don’t move close to, and especially don’t stop close to

destroyed friendly vehicles. That spot is obviously in the enemy’s kill
zone, and he has a weapon system that is ranged in and watching that
area.
2. If you would use a landmark, an object, a crossroads, etc. as a

direct fire target reference point or as an indirect defensive fire
reference point, so would the enemy. Stay away from it and, in
particular, don’t use it as a rally point.
3. Look before you move. Take the time to search the ground
before the next bound.
4. When searching the ground, if possible, use more than one

type of sensor—visual and TI by day and TI and II by night. They are
complementary and increase the chance of your seeing the enemy
before he sees you.
5. Jockey after engagements. As soon as you fire, you draw

attention to yourself.
6. Don’t crest unless you absolutely have to. If possible, try to

position yourself so there is something behind you—vegetation,
another hill, etc.—so you are not silhouetted. If you must crest, do the
actual cresting as quickly as possible and, if more than one vehicle is
cresting, simultaneously. While neither is good, you are better off on
the forward slope than the crest.
7. Listen to your driver. He knows better than you what terrain

the LAV will and will not get through and when you must slow down
and lower the tire pressure.
8. Remember that, as infantry, you have the ability to dismount

and investigate. A 17-tonne vehicle is easier to spot than a motivated
infantryman.
9. A 4,000-metre line of sight allows the enemy to shoot you

2,000 m before you can shoot him.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 67
CHAPTER 2
OFFENCE
GENERAL
1. Combined Arms Team. The light armoured vehicle (LAV)

company normally conducts offensive operations as part of a combat
team. This combined arms grouping is always desirable and is
essential when the defending enemy has tanks. Details of LAV
company, tank squadron, and engineer troop co-operation in the
offence are in B-GL 321-006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations,
published by the Tactics School.
2. LAV Tasks. Light armoured vehicles are not normally sent

to a Zulu harbour on the fight through the objective. The LAV can be
used to:
a. provide intimate support to dismounted infantry at

the section, platoon or company level;
NOTE
Intimate support does not refer to the proximity of the

LAVs to the supported infantry. It is a measure of the
responsiveness of the supporting unit and the effectiveness
of the fire. For the LAVs to provide intimate support, they
must be able to communicate directly with the supported
organization and must be able to respond quickly with
effective fire.
b. establish a supplemental fire base or to re-enforce an

existing one;
c. cut off;
d. provide flank security, if teamed with heavy anti-

armour in the face of a tank threat; or
e. exploitation.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 69
3. Attack by Fire. It may not always be necessary to close with
the enemy and fight through the objective to effectively destroy him.
Ideally, the company (combat team) will place the enemy in a situation
where he must either surrender or face total destruction from direct
fire cannon, machine-gun (MG) and missile fire, and indirect assets.
As a minimum, to be considered successful, the attack by fire must
result in the destruction of the enemy’s major weapons and ability to
manoeuvre so that he is unable to interfere with friendly operations.
The remaining enemy can then be dealt with by follow-on forces.
Considerations for the attack by fire include:
a. Weight of Fire. More is better than less. While

taking into account the need to maintain security and
flexibility, all direct and indirect assets able to bring
effective fire to bear on the enemy should be used.
b. Simultaneous Commitment of Forces. All forces

engaged in the attack by fire should be committed to
the battle as simultaneously as possible. Ideally, the
entire force committed to the task should crest
simultaneously with the kill zone having been
previously divided between them by the
commander. This provides the heaviest possible
initial strike on the enemy with multiple friendly
weapon systems engaging each of the key enemy
systems. This helps to ensure that the most
dangerous enemy systems are destroyed before they
have an opportunity to return fire. Committing
friendly forces piecemeal can result in their being
destroyed piecemeal.
c. Range. Forces should be committed within their

effective range but beyond the effective range of as
many of the enemy weapon systems as possible. For
the LAV III, the effective range is generally between
800 and 1,800 m.
d. Infantry. The commander must decide what he will

do with his infantry during the attack by fire, in
particular, with those whose weapons cannot be
brought to bear on the objective. Considerations
include:
70 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
(1) Remaining Mounted. If the commander
keeps his infantry mounted, they will be
immediately available for follow-on tasks
and have good protection against the
indirect fire that the enemy will almost
certainly call in. When a LAV is
destroyed, however, this will result in a
larger number of casualties than if the
infantry had not been mounted.
(2) Local Security. The infantry could be

tasked to provide local security. In this
option, casualties incurred when LAVs are
destroyed will be reduced and the infantry
will be close enough to the LAVs to be
quickly remounted for follow-on tasks.
The infantry, however, will be extremely
vulnerable to the enemy’s indirect fire and
can be expected to suffer significant
casualties if it is effective.
(3) Left in Another Location. The infantry

could be left in another location before the
attack by fire begins. This option would
effectively be a Zulu harbour for personnel
instead of vehicles. Depending on
distances and terrain, this option may
impose significant additional delays on the
company before it can carry out follow-on
tasks.
e. Enemy Artillery. Enemy artillery and other cluster-

type munitions pose a major threat. To minimize the
threat, the commander should:
(1) spread his forces out as much as practicable

consistent with concentrating their fire on
the objective; and
(2) move as soon as possible once the task is

finished.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 71
f. Fighting Through the Objective. There is always
the possibility that the attack by fire will not be
wholly successful. The commander must be
prepared to commit forces to close with the enemy
and fight through the objective if the attack by fire
does not achieve its aims.
4. Attacking Mounted. The LAV III armoured personnel

carrier (APC) is not designed for mounted attacks, that is, conducting
the fight through the objective with the infantry remaining mounted. It
has no firing ports, firing from the cargo hatches restricts the turret
from being used over the rear third of the vehicle, and the vehicle is
vulnerable to all hand held anti-armour weapons. The large amount of
firepower carried by the rifle section can only be brought to bear on
the enemy when the section dismounts. Attacking mounted should
only be considered when:
a. the enemy does not have a credible anti-armour

defence, including simple, short- range systems; and
b. it is not intended to clear the enemy from his

positions at this time (this would have to be the task
of some other follow-on organization) but simply to
suppress him long enough to allow the force to press
on through.
5. Dismount Options. The dismount options of short, on and

beyond the objective remain valid. Considerations for each are shown
below:
a. Short. The commander dismounts short of the

objective when terrain makes proceeding mounted to
the objective impossible or when the enemy’s anti-
armour defence is strong. The commander must
weigh the casualties he believes he will suffer from
the enemy’s indirect and small arms fire, while
closing dismounted to the objective, with the
casualties he believes he would suffer from bringing
loaded LAVs within range of the enemy’s short-
range anti-armour weapons (SRAAWs).
72 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
b. On. In this option, the commander uses the LAV’s
armour to protect his soldiers from the enemy’s
small arms and indirect fire in their move to the
objective. In doing this, however, he brings loaded
LAVs within range of all of the enemy’s anti-armour
weapons. For this option to be viable, the
commander must have suppressed the enemy’s anti-
armour defences, including simple, short-range
systems.
NOTE
If the dismount point is closer than 15 m from the forward
enemy trenches, then the gunner and crew commander
cannot bring fire to bear upon them.
c. Beyond. By dismounting beyond the objective, the

enemy is attacked by an unexpected direction.
Specific considerations with this option include:
(1) Suppression of Enemy Anti-armour

Defences. To get beyond the objective
requires that the LAVs, with their infantry,
travel over the objective. Enemy anti-
armour defences must be suppressed to an
even greater extent than that required for
dismounting on the objective.
(2) Enemy Depth Positions. If the

commander does not have accurate
information as to what is beyond the enemy
position, this option may simply place him
in the kill zone of the depth position.
ATTACKING WITH TANKS
6. General. As stated earlier, attacking with tanks is the rule. It is

not the intent to repeat the information provided in B-GL 321-006/FP-001,
Combat Team Operations, but to amplify those aspects of particular
importance to the infantry.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 73
7. Action on Contact. On contact, the company commander
moves to a position of observation to see the situation and confer with
the squadron commander. If he can do so, the company commander
lazes key points on the objective to get accurate grids. The LAV
captain ensures the company is out of contact and able to move to an
RV as soon as ordered. The company 2IC, who is travelling with the
A1 echelon (but not commanding it), sends the appropriate reports and
returns to battalion and acts as the company’s command post.
8. Action at the Rendezvous. Once the combat team

commander has chosen the RV, the company moves to it. Artillery
and air launched cluster munitions pose a major threat to a stationary
armoured / mechanized organization. Vehicles in the RV spread out
as much as possible consistent with the need to pass information and
maintain local security and to minimize the artillery/ cluster munitions
threat. The following actions should then take place:
a. Once orders have been given, all key grids are input
into the TacNav system. If there is time for only one
grid, it should be that of the objective.
b. Any change around between commanders in the

turret and in the back must be done out of contact.
Commanders who are dismounting on the objective
move to the back of the vehicles as described in
figure 1-10. An exception to this is the company
commander. If he chooses to dismount on the
objective, he is likely to stay in the turret until the
actual moment of dismount.
c. If it is intended to have the LAVs provide intimate

support to their individual sections, the company
then switches the A sets for its internal net to fixed
frequency so they can speak to the dismounted
element using the light assault radio.
9. Move to the Attack Position:
a. The LAVs follow the tanks to the attack position.

Once in the attack position, if not before, all LAVs
go hatches down. If there are no obstacles to be
breached, the LAVs assume their assault formations
74 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
behind the intimate support tanks at the attack
position. The assault formation and the number of
platoons initially committed depends on the plan.
b. Regardless as to the assault formation chosen,

adopting the assault formation requires the force to
close in. If it remains stationary for any length of
time, it provides an ideal artillery/ cluster munitions
target. The commander should aim to roll through
the attack position without stopping.
10. Obstacle Breaching. If there are obstacles to be breached,

the LAVs do not assume their assault formations until through the
obstacle. Obstacles are normally breached by a combination of
engineers, plough and roller tanks IAW breaching drills outlined in
B-GL-321-006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations. While this is
happening, the LAVs remain spread out in the attack position to the
maximum extent practicable. While the assault tanks are providing
fire support for the breaching, the LAVs provide:
a. provide flank and rear security for the attack

position; and
b. provide all-arms air defence (AAAD).
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 75
Figure 2-1: Action in the Attack Position During the Breaching

11. Move Through the Obstacle. On order, the LAVs move
through the obstacle behind the intimate support tanks. The order of
the LAVs depends on whether one or two breaches are used:
a. One Breach. The order for the LAVs behind the

intimate support tanks is:
(1) first assault platoon (platoon HQ is usually

the second vehicle);
(2) company commander;
(3) second assault platoon (platoon HQ is

usually the second vehicle);
(4) LAV captain; and

76 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
(5) third platoon (platoon HQ is usually the
second vehicle).
Figure 2-2: Move Through the Obstacle—One Breach

b. Two Breaches. The normal distance between
breaches in a combat team assault is 200 to
300 m. If two breaches are used, the order for the
LAVs behind the intimate support tanks for each of
the breaches is:
(1) lead assault platoon;
(2) company commander on the side where he

believes he can most influence the battle
and LAV captain on the other side; and
(3) third platoon to whichever side ordered.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 77
Figure 2-3: Move Through the Obstacle—Two Breaches

12. Assault Formations. If the combat team has not been able to
move directly from the attack position to the dismount point in its
assault formation, it must assume that formation immediately after
moving through the obstacle. The example given below is a template
that can and will be modified depending on the circumstances.
78 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
Figure 2-4: Sample Assault Formation

13. Move to the Dismount Point. The LAVs follow behind the
intimate support tanks to the dismount point at best possible speed. If
it is good going, the option of having the LAVs break cover after the
tanks have covered a portion of the distance to the objective should be
considered. With their higher speed, the LAVs can catch up to the
tanks by the dismount point while being exposed to enemy fire for a
shorter period. This option must be tempered with the knowledge that
LAVs moving at maximum speed cross-country cannot bring effective
fire to bear on the enemy:
a. Arcs of Responsibility. Lead LAVs engage targets

of opportunity to their front. Depth LAVs cover the
flanks. Care must be taken not to strike friendly
tanks as the 25 mm armour-piercing, fin stabilized,
discarding sabot-tracer (APFSDS-T) and frangible,
armour piercing, discarding sabot-tracer (FAPDS-T)
can penetrate the rear of the hull and disable the
tank’s engine.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 79
b. Navigation. If there is a single company dismount
point, the company commander is responsible to
ensure that the intimate support tanks are headed
towards it. If there are separate platoon dismount
points, the intimate support tanks are usually divided
between the two lead platoons. In this case, it is the
platoon commanders’ responsibility to check the
tanks’ navigation. In either case, the TacNav in
Steer To mode is used to assist the commanders.
14. Action at Dismount Point. The dismount point should not

be closer than 15 m from the nearest trenches as this is the closest the
crew of the LAV can bring the turret to bear. If there is one dismount
point, the company commander’s vehicle gives the order to dismount.
If there are separate platoon dismount points, the platoon
commanders’ vehicles order the dismount. Regardless, on the order to
dismount:
a. Intimate support tanks stop approximately 20 m in

front of the enemy trenches and the LAVs close up
with the tanks and stop. Both bring the maximum
possible fire to bear on any enemy positions. If the
enemy location is well fortified and there are
specific break in points, then those areas in
particular are suppressed.
b. At the dismount, smoke may be popped by the

LAVs. At this time, the only smoke grenades
available for the LAV are hexachloroethane (HC).
Considerations are:
(1) A volley of eight HC smoke grenades takes

approximately 30 seconds before the smoke
has built to the point where it is effective.
(2) When fired, the 76 mm smoke grenades go

approximately 40 m. If the soldiers are
dismounting on the objective, the smoke
screen is likely to be behind the forward
trenches. This may be desirable, however,
in that the dismounting troops will be able
80 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
to see their objectives while being screened
from fire from depth positions.
(3) The LAVs will be able to see and shoot

effectively through the smoke using
thermal sights.
c. The crew commander opens his hatch so he can

operate head out.
d. Forward sections dismount to the inside, left-hand

sections to the right of their vehicles and right-hand
sections to the left of their vehicles. Rear section
and platoon HQs usually dismount to the right side,
where they can be seen by the crew commander.
Once the last man has cleared the back of the
vehicle, the section signals the vehicle with a
thumbs up (to the crew commander for those on the
right side of their vehicles and to the gunner for
those on the left side).
Figure 2-5: Left Section Vehicle—Dismounting to the Right

e. Once the section has given the thumbs up, the Zulu
LAVs move to their locations in preparation for the
fight through the objective.
f. Within the forward platoons, all sections and the

platoon HQ normally dismount.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 81
Figure 2-6: Left Front Platoon Dismounting

15. Fighting Through the Objective. Within the assault force,
intimate support tanks and Zulu LAVs work to maximize their
combined effective fire on the enemy and minimize each individual
element’s weaknesses. Assuming that the objective is passable to
vehicles, the intimate support tanks will normally lead the assault over
the objective. The role and tasks of the intimate support tanks are
covered in B-GL 321-006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations. In
summary, however, the intimate support tanks use their main gun to
destroy hard targets on the objective and their shock action and coax
MGs to destroy and/or suppress enemy dug-in infantry. There are
several options, however, for how the dismounted infantry and Zulu
LAVs can co-operate during the fight through the objective.
a. General:
(1) Command:
(a) Single Company Objective. If

there is a single company
objective where the fire of the
Zulu LAVs can be co-ordinated,
then the Zulu LAVs are usually
controlled by the LAV Capt on
behalf of the company
commander. The company
commander orders the LAV Capt
82 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
and the intimate support troop
leader to resume moving forward
once the lead platoons have
dismounted.
(b) Platoon Objectives. If there are

separate platoon objectives where
the fire of the entire Zulu company
cannot be effectively controlled
from one point, then the Zulu
LAVs are usually controlled by
the LAV Sgt on behalf of the
platoon commander.
(2) Targets. The Zulu LAVs use their 25 mm

cannons to destroy any hard targets missed
by the intimate support tanks and their coax
MGs to destroy and/or suppress enemy
dug-in infantry to their front.
(3) Arcs. In the absence of specific orders to

concentrate or co-ordinate fire, each Zulu
LAV covers a 60o arc directly to its front.
(4) Company Commander’s LAV. If the

company commander dismounts, his LAV
teams with the LAV Captain’s vehicle. If
the company commander does not
dismount, his vehicle moves independently.
(5) Depth Platoon:
(a) Mounted Reserve. If the depth

platoon is to be kept as a mounted
reserve, it should be kept in a
covered location until tasked.
Given the speed capability of the
LAV, it does not have to be right
up with the assaulting troops.
(b) Depth on the Assault. If the

depth platoon is to be used during
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 83
the fight through as depth, then it
should be dismounted to bring all
the platoon weapons into play and
to minimize casualties if a vehicle
is destroyed.
(c) The depth platoon Zulu LAVs can

be given other tasks such as:
i. moving forward to
provide additional fire
support for the
dismounted company;
ii. flank guard (if teamed

with adequate heavy anti-
armour resources) or
screen (if operating
alone);
iii. cut-off;
iv. establishing a
supplemental fire base; or
v. exploitation with the

tanks.
b. Zulu LAVs Behind Dismounted Infantry. In this

option, the dismounted infantry moves behind the
intimate support tanks followed by the Zulu LAVs.
(1) Advantages:
(a) Simplicity. There is minimal

reorganization and movement of
vehicles on dismount. Once the
dismounted element is ready, it
simply moves forward behind the
intimate support tanks. The Zulu
LAVs then follow.
84 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
(b) Command Structures. All
command structures are available.
LAVs can be controlled at the
section, platoon or company level.
(c) Protection of LAVs. With the

Zulu LAVs at the rear, they are
somewhat more difficult targets
for simple hand-held anti-armour
weapons on the position.
Additionally, the LAVs can
manoeuvre, supporting each other
at the team, platoon or company
level.
(d) Flexibility. The LAVs are all

together and not intertwined with
the dismounted element. It is
likely to be easier to commit Zulu
LAVs to meet an unexpected
threat if they are at the rear than in
some other locations.
(2) Disadvantages. The chief disadvantage of the

Zulu LAVs being behind the dismounted
infantry is a lack of fire support from the Zulu
LAVs. Having the dismounted infantry in
front of them is likely to screen the Zulu
LAVs for much if not all of the time. Under
those circumstances, Zulu LAVs may simply
become targets without being able to add
anything to the battle.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 85
Figure 2-7: Zulu LAVs Behind Dismounted Infantry

c. Zulu LAVs in Line with the Dismounted
Infantry. In this option, the Zulu LAVs move into
line with the dismounted infantry, each beside its
own element:
(1) Advantages:
(a) Fire Support. Fewer LAVs are

screened by friendly soldiers than
with the previous method. This
allows more effective fire to be
brought to bear by the LAVs.
(b) Frontage. The addition of the

LAVs to the frontage of the
86 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
platoon allows the platoon to
cover a larger area.
(2) Disadvantages:
(a) Command and Control:
i. The vehicles amongst the

dismounted troops may
make it difficult for the
platoon commander to
see all his soldiers.
ii. Because the vehicles are

amongst the soldiers,
they are tied to their
sections. Command of
the Zulu LAVs at levels
above section is not
likely to be practical.
(b) Vulnerability. With the LAVs

amongst the troops, there is little
scope for the LAVs being able to
manoeuvre to support one another
at any level.
(c) Inflexibility. The LAVs are too

tightly entwined with the
dismounted soldiers to allow for
quick regrouping to meet an
unexpected threat.
(d) Gaps. There are likely to be gaps

in the assaulting element, in
particular between the two lead
platoons, where there are no
dismounted infantry. This may
allow enemy positions to be
bypassed accidentally.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 87
Figure 2-8: Zulu LAVs in Line with the Dismounted Infantry

d. Zulu LAVs to the Flank. After the dismount, the
Zulu LAVs move to the flank(s), where they
establish supplemental fire bases. From there, they
fire in front of the intimate support tanks and
dismounted troops.
(1) Advantages:
(a) Fire Support. Once in location,

the LAVs should have few
restrictions on their fire.
Additionally, because they will be
stationary, their fire should be
more accurate. This should result
in large volumes of effective fire
being brought to bear on the
enemy.
88 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
(b) Protection. The LAVs may be
able to establish their
supplemental fire bases outside of
simple, hand-held anti-armour
range. They should have hull-
down and, ideally, turret-down
positions. As well, flank positions
should allow the Zulu LAVs to
operate in platoon-sized groups as
a minimum. These factors should
improve LAV survivability.
(c) Flexibility. Because the Zulu

LAVs are grouped at least at
platoon level, and because they are
not intertwined with the
dismounted infantry, they can be
relatively easily reoriented and/or
regrouped to deal with an
unexpected threat.
(d) Objective Impassable to LAVs.

If the objective is impassable to
LAVs, the positioning of Zulu
LAVs on the flank(s) may be the
only option that allows for the
contribution of the LAV in the
close battle.
(2) Disadvantages:
(a) Time. It may take several minutes

after the dismount for the Zulu
LAVs to move to a flank(s) and
establish the supplemental fire
base(s). During this time, they are
unlikely to be able to contribute to
the fight.
(b) Vulnerability. During the move

to the flank(s), the Zulu LAVs are
likely to be very vulnerable to
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 89
anti-armour fire. In particular, if
the Zulu LAVs must expose their
flanks to the enemy to get to the
supplemental fire base(s), they
may suffer significant casualties.
(c) Command and Control. Not all

command and control structures
are appropriate. Distances from
the supplemental fire base(s) to the
objective are likely to make
intimate support at the section
level impractical. Zulu LAVs
OPCOM to the platoon
commander and OPCON to the
LAV Sgt is the lowest level of
command and control that could
be exercised effectively. In cases
where suitable fire positions exist
on one flank only, Zulu LAVs
OPCOM to the company
commander and OPCON to the
LAV Capt may be the only
command and control option.
(d) Dead Ground. There are likely to

be areas of dead ground on the
objective that cannot be
suppressed from the supplemental
fire base(s).
90 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
Figure 2-9: Zulu LAVs to the Flank(s)

e. Zulu LAVs Between the Intimate Support Tanks
and the Dismounted Infantry. In this option, the
Zulu LAVs move forward of the soldiers after the
dismount and follow immediately behind the
intimate support tanks. The dismounted soldiers
follow behind the Zulu LAVs. The tanks and Zulu
LAVs use their stabilized armaments to
destroy/suppress targets to the front. The
dismounted soldiers follow closely enough behind to
destroy any remaining targets before they are able to
shoot the intimate support tanks and Zulu LAVs
from the side or rear:
(1) Advantages:
(a) Fire Support. This arrangement

allows close to the maximum
effective fire to be brought on the
enemy. The tanks can use all of
their armament without restriction.
The LAVs can use their coax
without restriction but must
exercise some caution with the
25 mm cannon as the back of the
Leopard can be penetrated by it.
The dismounted element can use
all of their small arms without
restriction.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 91
(b) Shock Action. There is the
maximum shock action on the
enemy.
(2) Disadvantages:
(a) Co-ordination. It is critical that

the dismounted infantry remain
closed up behind the Zulu LAVs.
If they fall behind, then enemy
anti-armour gunners who were not
destroyed will be able to shoot the
Zulu LAVs and intimate support
tanks from the rear as they pass
by.
(b) Restrictions on Zulu LAV

Movement. Having the
dismounted infantry follow behind
the Zulu LAVs restricts the Zulu
LAVs’ ability to manoeuvre, as
they cannot reverse without the
chance of running over friendly
troops.
(c) Regrouping. With the Zulu

LAVs between the intimate
support tanks and the dismounted
infantry, it may be difficult to pull
them out to deal with an
unexpected threat.
92 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
Figure 2-10: Zulu LAVs Between the Intimate Support Tanks

and the Dismounted Infantry
16. Reorganization:
a. On reorganization, the LAVs stop in the best

available local cover, while the dismounted infantry
conduct their normal reorganization. Once the
dismounted troops have assumed their
reorganization positions, section guides guide in
their respective LAVs.
b. Once the LAVs have linked up with their sections,

they resupply ammunition and dismount support
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 93
weapons as required. Once the ammunition
resupply and dismounting of support weapons is
complete, the LAVs are available for other tasks,
depending on the mission and the state of the
company. These include:
(1) assisting in casualty evacuation;
(2) re-mounting the infantry;
(3) moving forward to reinforce the tanks;
(4) providing a flank screen, if operating alone,

or guard, if reinforced with adequate heavy
anti-armour assets; and
(5) taking up a hasty defensive posture.
ATTACKING WITHOUT TANKS
17. General. Without adequate anti-armour of its own, the LAV

company does not conduct mechanized offensive operations against an
enemy with tanks. There are other circumstances, however, when the
LAV company conducts mechanized offensive operations. These
circumstances can include:
a. destroying enemy positions bypassed by lead

combat teams; and
b. rear area security operations against parachute or

helicopter inserted troops.
18. Sequence of Events. Most elements of the attack without

tanks follow the same general sequence and method as the attack with
tanks. Key differences are shown below.
19. Enemy Strength. When attacking without tanks, the LAV

company must form its own fire base. This reduces the amount of
combat power that can be used to close with the enemy. Additionally,
the mine ploughs and rollers on the tanks provide the chief means of
breaching minefields. An isolated rifle platoon with its APCs, but
94 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
without serious obstacles, is the limit that the unsupported LAV
company can reasonably expect to attack.
20. Action on Contact:
a. A BMP-2 equipped enemy will seek to bring the

LAV company under missile fire beyond the
effective range of the LAV’s cannon. Under these
circumstances, the LAVs must move as quickly as
possible to cover and, from there, close to within the
effective range of the 25 mm cannon using cover. If
caught in the open away from any cover, the
commander must make an immediate decision—
either to move forward at maximum possible speed
until within the effective range of the 25 mm cannon
or to withdraw at maximum possible speed out of
the effective range of the BMP-2 missile (5 km for
the AT-5).
b. The company commander normally moves to where

he can see the objective. Before he moves,
however:
(1) the lead platoon(s) should be allowed to

develop the situation—how many, how big,
what weapons, where;
(2) the lead platoon(s) should recommend a

location and a route that will allow the
company commander to see what he needs
to see without becoming a target of
opportunity for the enemy; and
(3) the company commander confirms over the

net his route so that he does not
accidentally become a target for friendly
forces.
21. Winning the Firefight. The key elements in winning the

firefight are the destruction of the enemy APCs and the
suppression/destruction of his anti-armour weapons. The LAVs
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 95
should attempt to win the firefight at ranges between 800 and 1,800 m.
At those ranges:
a. the uparmoured LAV is protected, frontally, against

BMP-2 30 mm AP (armour piercing) rounds;
b. the 25 mm cannon’s combination of speed of

engagement and accuracy is superior to the BMP-2
missile; and
c. the LAV is beyond the range of non-guided, ground

mounted anti-armour weapons.
22. As many LAVs as practicable should be committed to

winning the firefight, and they should be committed to that action as
simultaneously as possible. Initial forces should piquet without
engaging unless the enemy attempts to manoeuvre. Having two or
three LAV platoons engage the enemy simultaneously greatly
increases the chances that all the enemy APCs and anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs) will be destroyed or suppressed before the enemy
has had a chance to guide a missile onto a LAV. Once the firefight
has been decisively won, some LAVs can be re-tasked for the assault.
23. Secondary Fire Base. If the initial LAV fire base is beyond
7.62 mm coax suppression range, it should move forward to the 800 to
1,200 m range once the APCs have been destroyed. This allows the
maximum MG fire to be brought to bear on the objective.
24. Enemy Artillery. As was described earlier in this chapter,

enemy artillery and cluster-type munitions form a major threat. The
company, particularly when it is stationary, must spread out as much
as possible, consistent with accomplishing its tasks, and move as soon
as possible after the task is completed.
25. Quick Attack. In a quick attack, once the firefight has been
won, the fire base normally is made up of an infantry platoon
complete, usually one of those that first came under fire. While this is
likely to result in riflemen who are unable to engage the enemy, it is
usually not possible to conduct a major regrouping within the
company once in contact with the enemy. Other considerations are as
follows:
96 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Offence
a. If practical, and if the fire base is close enough to the
objective for their weapons to effectively engage,
the quick attack is reinforced by the weapons
detachments from the company HQ and the other
two platoons.
b. The fire base commander must weigh the danger of

leaving the troops in the LAVs or dismounting them.
If they remain in the LAVs, they become additional
casualties if a LAV is destroyed. If they dismount
from the LAVs, they become vulnerable to artillery.
Figure 2-11: LAV Company Quick Attack
26. Deliberate Attack. In a deliberate attack, the company could

be regrouped to maximize the firepower of the fire base and the
number of riflemen available to close with the enemy. To accomplish
this:
a. each platoon detaches to the fire base one vehicle, its

weapons detachment and enough additional soldiers
to man all the platoon support weapons;
b. the company weapons detachment is detached to the

fire base;.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 97
c. the company 2IC commands the fire base;. and
d. the remaining platoon personnel are redistributed

among their three remaining vehicles.
27. The result is a fire base with four LAVs, four SF general
purpose machine-guns (GPMGs) and four 60 mm mortars and an
assault force with 11 LAVs and nine rifle sections.
Figure 2-12: LAV Company Deliberate Attack
28. Fighting Through the Objective. The Zulu LAVs, not
tanks, lead across the objective. This is the only significant difference
between fighting through the objective with tanks and without tanks.
29. Reorganization. There are no significant differences

between the reorganization with and without tanks.
98 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
CHAPTER 3
DEFENCE
AREA DEFENCE
1. General. The light armoured vehicle (LAV) company area

defence consists of two main elements—the dismounted company
with its weapons and the Zulu LAVs. The two elements are each sited
to their maximum effective ranges and so that they do not receive
return fire from beyond their maximum effective ranges. The general
concept is shown below in figure 3-1.
2. Division of Targets. Short-range anti-armour weapons

(heavy) (SRAAW(H)) concentrate on tanks. LAVs concentrate on
killing light armour, in particular armoured personnel carriers (APCs),
before they dismount their troops.
3. Simultaneous Open Fire. Short-range anti-armour weapons

(heavy) and LAVs are sited so that they can open fire simultaneously.
By opening fire simultaneously, the coy:
a. retains surprise longer;
b. kills the maximum number of enemy vehicles in the

first exchange, leaving fewer to return fire; and
c. prevents the enemy from being able to concentrate

his return fire on one element of the defence.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 99
Figure 3-1: Area Defence General Concept

4. Size of Zulu LAV Kill Zone. The maximum range from the
Zulu LAV battle positions to the far end of the kill zone should not be
greater than 1,800 m. The limiting factor is the maximum effective
range of the 25 mm cannon against moving targets.
5. Prepared Positions. Light armoured vehicles do not

normally occupy their battle positions. As with tanks, they usually
remain in a hide until needed to occupy their battle positions. As for
the positions themselves:
a. Number of Prepared Positions. The number of

positions for each LAV depends upon the threat,
terrain and time available. Ideally, each LAV
should have a:
(1) primary position—the most likely position

to cover the main threat;
(2) alternate to primary position—a second

location to cover the main threat; or
(3) secondary position—a position to cover

another threat.
100 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
b. Selection of Prepared Positions. Individual
vehicle positions should be as spread out as possible
while still allowing them to concentrate their fire on
the kill zone and the LAV Sgt to maintain control of
his Zulu platoon and to concentrate their fire on the
kill zone. Such positioning reduces the danger from
enemy artillery and cluster-type weapons. The
following criteria apply to the selection of the
prepared position:
(1) covered route in from the hide and from

other battle positions;
(2) terrain to allow for the adoption of turret-

down and hull-down positions;
(3) terrain to allow for jockeying; and
(4) ability to cover the kill zone.
c. Preparation:
(1) The routes from the hide to each battle

position and from each battle position to
every other battle position must be recced
and timings determined by day and by
night. Route details are input into the
TacNav system.
(2) Each initial LAV firing position should be

marked with three stakes—one centred on
the first and fourth left-hand side tires and
one directly in front of the driver. This
staking is done during the recce with an
actual LAV in the hull-down fire position.
Their purpose is to allow the vehicle to
move, once ordered, directly from the
turret-down to hull-down position with
minimum time wasted and with the least
chance of the vehicle being unnecessarily
exposed.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 101
NOTE
The top of the stake directly to the driver’s front must be at

driver’s eye level or higher. If not, the driver will lose sight
of it as he gets close to it.
(3) Range cards must be prepared by each crew

and consolidated by the LAV Sgt. The
LAV Capt prepares the company’s light
anti-armour template. The kill zone is
divided up between the Zulu LAV platoons
and, within each platoon’s portion of the
kill zone, individual vehicle arcs are
assigned. The LAV Capt and LAV Sgts
must ensure, however, that all areas of the
overall kill zone that can be seen and/or
engaged by any LAV are marked on that
LAV’s range card using company co-
ordinated target reference points. This
ensures that the fire of the maximum
number of LAVs can be concentrated
quickly and efficiently on any point within
the kill zone. See Annex A for sample
range cards.
(4) If natural fire positions do not exist, it may

be necessary to create them. This is a last
resort as the engineer resources and time
required to do so are formidable.
Whenever possible, natural fire positions
are preferred. After that, the preference is
to improve natural positions. The
construction is broken into two stages—
stage one provides only a hull-down
position, and stage two provides both hull-
and turret-down positions.
102 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
Figure 3-2: LAV Firing Position Stage 1—Hull-Down Position

Only
Figure 3-3: LAV Firing Position Stage 2—Hull-and Turret-Down

Positions
6. Sequence of Occupying Prepared Positions. The LAVs are
the largest, most difficult items to camouflage in the company. With
the exception of a small number that are being used to reinforce the
company’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability, the remainder are normally in the
hide until it is necessary for their battle positions to be occupied.
When the command to occupy the battle positions is given:
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 103
a. The Zulu LAV company follows the LAV Capt to
the battle positions. As was stated above, the battle
positions are rarely dug-in but, instead, are natural
hull and turret-down positions that have been recced
and staked in.
b. It may be necessary for Zulu LAV platoons to

proceed at least part of the way by themselves. In
this case, a release point should be used.
Regardless, the complete route, including the actual
fire positions themselves, is programmed into the
TacNav, and the cross-track setting should be used.
c. All vehicles stop in turret-down positions facing

their staked in prepared positions. They do not
occupy them at this time but remain in turret-down
positions.
d. In good visibility, the LAV Capt, LAV Sgts and

crew commanders observe the kill zone using
binoculars from turret-down positions. In poor
visibility, the LAV Capt and LAV Sgts may be
given permission to adopt sights up positions to
observe using thermal imagery (TI) and/or image
intensification (II) sights. Given the possibility that
surprise may be compromised, the decision to risk
even partially exposing LAV turrets before the open
fire is normally made by the company commander.
e. Normally the Zulu LAVs do not occupy hull-down

positions until the enemy light armour is within
effective range and it is time to open fire. On the
command OPEN FIRE, or when the enemy reaches
a pre-designated open fire line, LAVs move forward
from their turret-down positions into hull-down
positions and begin to engage the enemy IAW the
orders previously given. If it has been decided to
occupy hull-down positions in advance of opening
fire, then the command HULL-DOWN NOW is
given.
104 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
f. Upon receipt of either order, the driver advances
into the prepared position, lining up the three stakes.
Because the position has been recced and staked, the
driver can move directly to the position without
requiring further instructions from the crew
commander or gunner. Once in position, the driver
puts his foot on the brake and shifts into reverse to
be able to jockey out of the position as quickly as
possible when necessary.
Figure 3-4: Occupying a Prepared Position

7. Conduct of the Battle:
a. The Zulu LAV company should occupy hull-down

positions en masse and engage en masse. Zulu
platoons should not be exposed individually as this
invites all return fire, both direct and indirect, to be
concentrated against one small area. The Zulu LAV
company should begin engaging the light armour at
the same time as the SRAAW(H) are engaging the
tanks.
(1) If the LAVs attempt to engage the light

armour before the SRAAW(H) engage the
tanks, then the tanks can concentrate their
fire on the LAVs.
(2) If the LAVs wait for the SRAAW(H) to

first kill the tanks before engaging the
enemy light armour, the enemy light
armour will probably have reached its
dismount point before the LAVs engage.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 105
b. Jockeying. Once the battle has started, LAVs
commence jockeying. The LAVs work in
two-vehicle teams, the intent of which is to have one
vehicle firing while the other vehicle is jockeying.
Where terrain permits, the vehicle reappears in a
new position. If not, the vehicle reappears in the
same position but after a delay of 30 seconds to a
minute. This is done to make it more difficult for
the enemy to acquire his target. Additionally, if the
crew commander believes that he is being targeted,
he immediately orders a jockey. The sequence for a
jockey is as follows:
(1) Crew commander orders JOCKEY

RIGHT (or LEFT or REAR).
(2) Driver takes his foot off the brake and

presses the accelerator to drive straight
back, as quickly as he can.
(3) Once the crew commander is satisfied he is

in a turret-down position, he orders the
driver to go right. The driver now heads
diagonally back and right at a 45º
(approximate) angle.
NOTE
It is extremely important that the vehicle is turret-down

before the flank is turned toward the enemy.
(4) When the crew commander believes he has

gone far enough to the right, he orders
DRIVER HALT, and then direct the driver
toward the new firing position. If possible,
the LAV should move approximately
200 m laterally to help ensure it is not still
in the enemy’s sight when it reappears.
(5) In good visibility, the crew commander first

adopts a turret-down position before
106 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
adopting a hull-down position. In this case
he orders: DRIVER HALT. PREPARE
TO ADOPT TURRET-DOWN. The
driver stops and shifts into Low. The crew
commander orders DRIVER ADVANCE
and directs the driver toward the turret-
down position. Driver advances slowly,
without using the accelerator, and with his
foot resting on the brake.
(6) Once in the turret-down position, the crew

commander orders HALT and scans the
kill zone using binoculars.
(7) If the crew commander is still happy with

his new firing position, he quickly briefs
the gunner, giving him an anticipatory fire
order and possibly roughly aligning the
gun, and then orders PREPARE TO
ADOPT HULL-DOWN. The gunner
ensures the gun is at minimum elevation
and oriented to the threat. The gunner then
orders DRIVER ADVANCE. The driver
advances straightforward, without using the
accelerator and with his foot resting on the
brake.
(8) As soon as the gunner can see the kill zone

through his sights, he orders DRIVER
HALT. The driver stops, keeps his foot on
the brake, and shifts into reverse.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 107
Figure 3-5: Jockeying to the Right

c. Laser Warning Receiver. If the enemy lazes
before firing, the laser warning receiver should give
the crew 2-5 seconds between the time the alarm
goes off and when the round(s) arrive. If the laser
warning receiver goes off when the LAV is
occupying a hull-down position, the driver
immediately, and without order, jockeys back. Once
the vehicle is turret-down, the crew commander
directs the driver into his jockey position.
8. Ceasing to Jockey. At some point in the battle, it may

become essential to have the absolute maximum amount of fire on the
kill zone. In this case, the order NO JOCKEYING is to be given.
All vehicles adopt hull-down positions and remain in them until the
battle is won or the order RESUME JOCKEYING is given. The
order NO JOCKEYING should only be given if absolutely necessary
as it greatly increases the chances of the Zulu LAVs coming under
effective fire.
9. Responsibilities. The officer commanding is responsible for

all aspects of the defence. As a rule, however, he delegates some
authority to avoid having an unworkable span of control. The
108 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
command relationship for the Zulu LAVs is normally OPCOM to the
company commander, or OPCON to the LAV Capt.
a. Company Commander. In addition to the overall

conduct of the battle, the company commander is
responsible for:
(1) refinement of the kill zone(s) and

identification of approaches, both mounted
and dismounted;
(2) production of the consolidated company

anti-armour plan;
(3) selection and detailed layout of the dug-in

company position(s) as well as the detailed
fighting of the dismounted battle;
(4) selection of the general location for Zulu

LAV primary, secondary and alternate
locations;
(5) providing mission imposed priority of

targets;
(6) ordering the move of any portion of the

company to alternate positions or
committing the reserve;
(7) ordering the ammo loads for the Zulu

LAVs; and.
(8) detailed siting of the assigned obstacle

group.
b. LAV Capt. The LAV Capt is responsible for:
(1) detailed layout of all Zulu LAV positions;
(2) construction of the light anti-armour plan as

part of the consolidated anti-armour plan;
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 109
(3) co-ordinating the LAV fire plan with the
machine-gun (MG) matrix, in
circumstances when the LAVs coax MGs
could reasonably be brought into play as
part of the company’s defence against
dismounted enemy;
(4) detailed fighting of the Zulu LAVs,

including concentration of fire and ordering
Zulu platoons to secondary positions; and
(5) construction of the company’s ISTAR plan

IAW the company commander’s priorities.
c. LAV Sgt. The LAV Sgt is responsible for:
(1) detailed layout of the Zulu platoon’s

positions including:
(a) verification of routes in and out;
(b) verification of adequacy of hull-

down, turret-down and jockey
positions;
(c) verification of the ability of the

assigned positions to cover the
Zulu platoon’s area of
responsibility within the kill zone;
and
(d) creation of an ISTAR trace for

each of the Zulu platoon’s
positions;
(2) breaking down the Zulu platoon’s area of

the kill zone into individual Zulu LAV
portions; and
(3) detailed fighting of the Zulu platoon

including:
110 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
(a) co-ordinating the Zulu platoon’s
fire;
(b) ordering jockeying if necessary;

and
(c) leading the Zulu platoon to

secondary or alternate positions as
ordered.
d. Crew Commander. The crew commander is

responsible for:
(1) preparation of all assigned positions

including:
(a) verification of routes in and out;
(b) verification of adequacy of hull-

down, turret-down and jockey
positions;
(c) verification of the ability of the

assigned positions to cover the
Zulu LAV’s area of responsibility
within the kill zone; and
(d) creation of a range card for each

prepared posn;
(2) inputting of all routes and key points into

the TacNav; and
(3) detailed fighting of the vehicle, including

the ordering of jockeying, as required.
10. Other LAV Tasks:
a. Other Tasks. In addition to supporting the main

defensive battle, Zulu LAVs can also be used for a
variety of other tasks. These tasks include:
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 111
(1) observation posts (see below);
(2) reserve;
(3) overwatch on probable landing/drop zones

(LZs/DZs);
(4) emergency resupply;
(5) casualty evacuation; and
(6) flank screen, if operating alone, or guard if

paired with adequate heavy anti-armour
resources.
b. Effect on the Main Defensive Battle. The LAVs

are the company’s prime anti-LAV weapons system
and the major factor in determining whether enemy
APCs reach their dismount point. Within the
company defensive context, Zulu LAVs should not
be assigned tasks that take them away from the main
defensive battle unless those tasks are essential.
11. Observation Posts. The LAV turret sensors (8 power day,

4/8 power TI and 8 power II), combined with the far target indicator,
provide the company with a potent surveillance and target acquisition
capability to reinforce its dismounted sensors. A limited number of
vehicles should be used to reinforce the company’s ISTAR plan:
a. Ranges. The ranges of the various sensors are given

in section 1-4 and are for an operator trained to
level 2 armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) recognition
in both visual and thermal. During periods of low
thermal contrast, the ranges for the TI is reduced.
During periods of low ambient light, the ranges for
the II is reduced.
b. Siting:
(1) The sight heads are on the top of the turret.

The vehicle should be sited so that, ideally,
only the sight heads are visible.
112 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
(2) There should be a covered approach for the
LAV to the OP location.
(3) There should be cover from both ground

and air observation.
c. Camouflage and Concealment:
(1) The issued camouflage net should be used

to supplement natural camouflage.
(2) The vehicle should remain on silent watch

as long as possible. To extend the time on
silent watch:
(a) turret traversing and elevating

should be done manually;
(b) radio speakers should be off; and
(c) all non-essential power draws,

such as the heating and boiling
vessel and the interior lights,
should not be used.
(3) The crew heater should not be used as it

increases the vehicle’s thermal signature.
(4) When the batteries must be recharged, it

should be done with the auxiliary power
unit (APU) and, if possible, before dusk or
after dawn.
(5) The vehicle and crew should be as self-

sufficient as possible for at least 48 hours
so as to minimize the chance of the location
being compromised during replenishment.
d. Manning. A two-person turret crew plus a driver

with no turret training cannot maintain a continuous,
systematic watch over the battlefield for a prolonged
period, maintain local security and have adequate
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 113
time for rest and food. Ideally, all soldiers in the
section should have LAV familiarization training
and be qualified level 2 AFV recognition, including
thermal. Manning of a LAV observation post for
more than short periods is a section task. The ideal
manning of the turret in temperate weather is two
personnel for two hours—one gunner or crew
commander qualified and the other turret
familiarization training qualified. This allows:
(1) the two soldiers to spell one another off

while still having a qualified person always
in the turret;
(2) staggering of the shift rotation so that every

hour a fresh person is coming on while
maintaining someone else in the turret for
continuity; and
(3) adequate numbers to do all the tasks needed

to support the observation post.
NOTE
In cold weather, the shift length must be reduced.
MOBILE DEFENCE
12. General. The mobile defence uses a series of battle positions

to shape, wear down and destroy the enemy as he advances. The
enemy is then finally fixed and destroyed. No individual battle
position is of particular importance. In open country, emphasis is
placed on the use of mobile, long-range weapon systems as opposed to
dismounted infantry.
13. Combined Arms Team. The LAV company lacks the

organic long-range anti-armour weapons (LRAAWs) to conduct a
mobile defence by itself against armoured forces. It normally takes
part in the mobile defence as part of a combat team.
114 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Defence
14. Tasks:
a. LAVs. LAVs support the tanks and LRAAWs in

the destruction of the enemy’s armour. LAVs
concentrate on killing the enemy’s light armour,
particularly anti-tank guided missile (ATGM)
launchers, to allow the tanks and LRAAWs to kill
tanks.
b. Infantry. The dismounted infantry themselves have

little ability to support the long-range battle. If they
are dismounted, their weapons are out of range, they
are very vulnerable to indirect fire, and they slow
down the redeployment of friendly forces to the next
battle position because of the need to remount before
moving. If infantry stay in the vehicles, they have
no function but to add casualties if the vehicle is hit.
Instead, the infantry should be used for:
(1) Area Defence. Even within a mobile

defence, there are areas of key terrain that
the commander wants held. Properly
sighted, these positions can help channel
the enemy toward the mobile defence kill
zones. Alternately, the dismounted infantry
can form the framework for the final fixing
position within the mobile defence that sets
up the ultimate destruction of the enemy.
(2) Dismounted Mobile Defence.

Dismounted infantry can be sighted to
conduct a mobile defence in areas of
difficult going for armoured forces. To be
effective, the terrain must allow the
dismounted infantry to engage an armoured
force at no greater than 600 m, impose
casualties and then successfully withdraw.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 115
Figure 3-6: Mobile Defence General Layout
116 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
ANNEX A
LAV RANGE CARD
Legend / Légende
Symbol Symbol Symbol Symbol

Description Description Description Description
Symbole Symbole Symbole Symbole
Notes
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 117
CHAPTER 4
DELAY
1. General. As with the mobile defence, the delay uses a series

of battle positions to shape, wear down and destroy the enemy as he
advances with the aim of providing time for other tasks. No individual
battle position is of particular importance. In open country, emphasis
is placed on the use of mobile, long-range weapon systems as opposed
to dismounted infantry.
2. All-arms Team. The light armoured vehicle (LAV)

company normally conducts delay operations in an all-arms
framework. The company by itself lacks the heavy anti-armour
firepower at medium and long ranges necessary to stand up to enemy
tank forces:
3. Tasks:
a. LAVs:
(1) LAVs assist in the delay battle by

destroying enemy LAVs, in particular anti-
tank guided missile (ATGM) launchers, to
allow the tanks to concentrate on enemy
tanks.
(2) LAVs provide the best all-arms air defence

(AAAD) asset in the battle group. Some
LAVs may be tasked to provide AAAD for
the combat team.
b. Dismounted Infantry and SRAAWs. The

dismounted company and its short-range anti-
armour weapons (SRAAWs) are not normally
employed in the medium- to long-range delay battle.
Instead, they will:
(1) be preparing the main defensive position;

or
(2) conduct a separate, dismounted delay in

close country.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 119
4. Method of Engagement:
a. The tanks out range the LAV. This is exacerbated

by the fact that the LAV’s targets—enemy armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) and ATGM launchers—
normally travel behind the enemy tanks. The
company commander / LAV Capt must ensure that
the LAVs are not exposed to enemy fire before their
targets are within range. It will not be unusual for
the commander to order the move to the next
position without the LAVs having been engaged.
b. Once the enemy LAVs have come within range, the

company commander / LAV Capt orders the LAV
company to move into fire positions. All LAVs
move simultaneously to:
(1) hit the enemy with an initial burst of fire as

hard as possible; and
(2) make it impossible for the enemy to

concentrate his return fire on only a few
LAVs.
120 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
CHAPTER 5
TRANSITIONAL PHASES
ADVANCE TO CONTACT
1. General. The mechanized advance to contact normally takes

place in a combat team setting. In particular, mechanized infantry do
not advance against an enemy who has tanks without tanks of their
own. Details of the combat team in the advance to contact are
provided in B-GL 321-006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations. Some
amplification of the role and tasks of the infantry is provided below.
2. Movement. The light armoured vehicle (LAV) company

normally moves behind the tanks from positions of cover to positions
of cover while maintaining observation. Despite the LAV’s increased
firepower and protection over previous armoured personnel carriers
(APCs), its gun is still out ranged by the tank’s and its armour is much
inferior. Instead, the LAVs concentrate on flank security and all-arms
air defence (AAAD).
a. Flank Security. Outside LAVs maintain a constant

watch on the flanks to engage any threats.
b. All-Arms Air Defence. The 25 mm turret is the

best AAAD weapon available. Inside LAVs should
normally be tasked with 360o AAAD.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 121
Figure 5-1: LAV Company Behind the Tanks in the Advance

3. Location of Commanders. The company commander
moves with the squadron commander. The LAV Capt moves with the
company and controls its movement. The company 2IC moves with
the A1 echelon but does not command it.
4. Advance to Contact without Tanks. As stated above, the

LAV company rarely conducts advance to contact outside of a combat
team. Some operations, such as reacting to a rear area incursion or
advancing on a secondary axis, may require the LAV company to
either advance to contact or advance in contact without integral tank
support. Under those circumstances, the LAV company must provide
its own security as it moves. To do so, it moves in a manner similar to
the tank squadron:
a. Fire Position to Fire Position. The company

moves in bounds from fire position to fire position.
Both groups of LAVs must remain in contact with
one another if effective support is to be maintained.
This overwatch is vital if security is to be
maintained.
b. Direct Fire Support:
(1) The company provides its own internal fire

support on the move. This is usually one
platoon set supporting the other two
122 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
forward and then two platoons set
supporting the third platoon forward.
Depending on terrain and threat, platoons
can provide their own support with two
vehicles supporting the other two and, if
necessary, each team of two vehicles can be
broken down into one moving and one
supporting. At this point, however, the
commander must question whether it would
not be faster to have the infantry dismount
and move in front of the Zulu LAVs.
(2) In any of the above options, the company

can move in either leapfrog or caterpillar
formation.
(3) Location of Commanders. Between the

two of them, the company commander and
the LAV Capt control the movement of the
company. One commander will normally
be with the forward element (one platoon if
the company is advancing one-up or two
platoons if two-up) and one will move with
the rear element. The company commander
will decide, based on the circumstances,
whether he will always be with the forward
element, always with the rear or will
alternate. Regardless as to which
commander is with the forward element, he
must ensure that he does not become the
prime target for the enemy. Therefore, as
guidelines:
(a) The company commander / LAV

Capt do not physically lead the
forward element over the bound to
their next fire positions.
(b) Company command / LAV Capt

vehicles should not be the first to
move into the new fire positions.
The lead platoon(s) should be
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 123
allowed to establish itself first and
search the ground.
(c) The company commander / LAV

Capt is there to oversee as
opposed to fight. He should
choose a position of observation

that provides him maximum cover.
Figure 5-2: LAV Company Using Leap Frog—One Platoon
Supporting the Other Two
WITHDRAWAL
5. General. The LAV company can withdraw in one of two

basic manners. The first is the traditional withdrawal from the battle
position on foot, through a series of checkpoints and RVs, until
arriving at the company embussing point. In the second manner, the
company embusses much further forward, normally at the section RV.
6. Withdrawal on foot to a company embussing point:
124 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
a. General. In the traditional withdrawal on foot, the
commander is trading decreased speed for increased
stealth. The conventional withdrawal on foot to a
company embussing point is used when:
(1) the commander believes he can withdraw

unseen;
(2) the route for the LAVs to the company

position is dominated by enemy anti-
armour fire; or
(3) the route to the company position is

impassable or extremely difficult for
vehicles.
b. Preparation:
(1) Normal thinning out is conducted as with

all withdrawals. Additionally, LAV
positions where the LAVs can support the
withdrawal must be recced and, if
necessary, prepared. Ideally, the LAV
battle positions are used. It may be
necessary to select new ones, however,
depending on the dismounted withdrawal
route. The selection of these positions and
the recce of the routes both to the positions
and from the positions to the company
embussing point are the LAV captain’s
responsibility. All positions, and the routes
between them are programmed into the
TacNav systems.
(2) The LAVs also have the company’s

dismounted withdrawal routes programmed
into their TacNav systems. This is for the
contingency that the dismounted
withdrawal becomes untenable, and the
LAVs must move forward to pick up the
soldiers before the embussing point.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 125
c. Conduct. LAVs may or may not support the
dismounted company’s withdrawal from positions of
observation and fire but may, instead, move directly
to the embussing point. The commander makes this
decision based on his estimate. If LAVs are used to
support the withdrawal from positions of
observation and fire:
(1) The LAVs should arrive at their support

positions just before the dismounted
withdrawal begins. If visibility is good,
they remain in turret-down positions and
the crew commanders scan using
binoculars. In poor visibility, they adopt
hull-down positions and scan using the
thermal imagery (TI).
(2) Just before the first platoon withdraws, all

LAVs adopt a hull-down position and scan
their arcs.
(3) The Zulu LAVs maintain their support to

the withdrawing troops throughout their
move back to the embussing point. As the
dismounted company approaches the
embussing point, the LAVs move under
command of the LAV captain to link up
with the company.
126 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
Figure 5-3: Dismounted Withdrawal

7. Mounted withdrawal from the section rendezvous:
a. General. The mounted withdrawal trades off the

chance of being able to withdraw from the position
unseen for far greater speed of withdrawal. It is
particularly appropriate where it is likely that the
enemy would be able to bring indirect fire on the
withdrawing infantry and would be unlikely to be
able to launch a quick counter move once he
becomes aware that the withdrawal is underway. It
is not appropriate when the route the LAVs would
have to travel to the section locations is dominated
by enemy anti-armour weapons or is impassable to
vehicles.
b. Preparation. Normal thinning out is conducted as

with all withdrawals. Speed is the key to this
method as it is impossible to prevent the enemy
from knowing something is happening once the
LAVs move to the dug-in location. To ensure that
the LAVs can move at high speed, the routes should
be recced in detail. Specifically:
(1) Routes must be chosen so that they avoid

obstacles, bad ground, dismounted troop
locations, etc. If different Zulu platoons are
using different routes, they must be co-
ordinated to ensure that they do not
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 127
interfere with one another. This is the LAV
captain’s responsibility.
(2) The specific route for every vehicle should

be programmed into its TacNav system.
The routes should be walked with a global
positioning system (GPS) to record key
waypoints. Certainly, the location of all
embussing points must be recorded using
GPS. It is the LAV Capt’s responsibility to
ensure that all routes are entered into the
vehicle GPSs.
(3) Embussing points must be as close to the

sections as possible and normally are no
more than 20 m behind the section
trenches.
c. Conduct. As stated earlier, surprise and speed are

the keys to success. The Zulu LAVs must move to
the dug-in company and off the position before the
enemy has time to react with anything other than
indirect fire:
(1) Stage 1—Move to the Assembly Area:
(a) Zulu Company. The Zulu

company moves under command
of the LAV captain from the hide
to the assembly area. Both the
assembly area and the route to it
must be covered. To maintain
surprise, the Zulu company should
not move to the assembly area
until just before the withdrawal is
scheduled to begin. Ideally, the
assembly area should be treated
like the attack position, and the
Zulu company should roll through
it in its correct order.
(b) Dug-in Company. No change.
128 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
(2) Stage 2—Move to the Embussing Point:
(a) Zulu Company. The Zulu

company moves from the
assembly area to the individual
vehicle embussing points. The
drivers follow the TacNav
directions automatically unless
they are countermanded by the
crew commanders. The crew
commanders are usually hatches
up confirming the route visually,
using image intensification (II)
goggles at night. Depending upon
the situation, the Zulu company
may move in one of two ways:
i. Single Route. The single

route provides the most
positive control. The
Zulu company moves,
initially, on a single route
with the platoon that has
the furthest to go leading.
At the Zulu company
release point
(programmed into the
TacNav system), the Zulu
platoons move to platoon
routes. Once the Zulu
platoon reaches the
platoon release point
(programmed into the
TacNav system), the
individual Zulu vehicles
proceed directly to their
individual embussing
points.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 129
Figure 5-4: Mounted Withdrawal Stages 1 and 2—Single Route
ii. Individual Zulu Platoon
Routes. If the dug-in
platoons are well spread
out, individual Zulu
platoon routes may be the
fastest method of moving
to the embussing point(s).
Each Zulu platoon
proceeds directly from
assembly area to its own
dug-in platoon location.
The action at the Zulu
platoon release point is as
above.
(b) Dug-in Company. No change.
130 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
Zulu Platoon Routes
(3) Stage 3—Action at the Embussing Point:
(a) Zulu LAV Company. As each

vehicle reaches its embussing
point, it stops in the best available
cover, ensures the gun is covering
the main threat and drops the
ramp. The crew commander
watches for the section and is
prepared to provide assistance as
required.
(b) Dug-in Company. The dug-in

section does not leave its trenches
until its own LAV arrives. This is

to ensure that the soldiers are
protected from indirect fire until
the last moment and to ensure the
soldiers on the ground are not run
over by other LAVs. Once the
LAV arrives:
i. The section, led by the

section 3IC, moves to the
LAV and mounts up.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 131
ii. The dismounted section
commander confirms that
all trenches are empty
and then moves to the
LAV and mounts up.
iii. The dismounted section

commander physically
confirms that all his
soldiers are in the vehicle
and reports this to the
platoon commander via
the radio. The platoon
commander conducts the
same count for platoon
HQ and then reports via
the radio to the company
commander when his
platoon complete has
mounted up.
iv. If some Zulu LAVs have

been destroyed by the
enemy en route, the
platoon commander
divides his troops
between the remaining
LAVs.
v. There is no change round

in the turrets at this time.
(4) Stage 4—Move to the Company RV.

Once the sections are mounted, they move
to the platoon RV. This is right behind the
platoon and may be the same location as
the platoon release point. Platoons stay in
the RV for the minimum possible time.
The platoons then move to the company
RV, through the company checkpoint,
under the direction of the LAV captain.
This move may take place in one of two
ways—a single route or separate platoon
132 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
routes. The company commander’s vehicle
is the last LAV to leave the position, and
only when he is satisfied that all other
personnel have withdrawn:
(a) Single Route:
i. If there is a single route

to the company RV, the
LAV captain orders
platoons to head to the
RV in a pre-arranged
sequence. Normally, the
platoon closest to the RV
is ordered to move first,
followed by the next
closest, and so on with
the LAV captain
following the last
platoon.
ii. This method imposes the

most centralized control
on the process but takes
longer to execute and is
more dependent on radio
communications.
Figure 5-6: Mounted Withdrawal Stages 3 and 4—Single Route
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 133
(b) Separate Platoon Routes:
i. If there are separate

platoon routes, platoons
normally move to the RV
as soon as they are
mounted up, advising the
company commander and
LAV captain as opposed
to requesting permission.
The LAV captain moves
to the RV as soon as the
last platoon has advised
that it is moving.
ii. This method is faster and
less dependent on radio
communications. It has
more potential for
confusion, however, with
the possibility of three
platoons moving at speed
at night on converging
axes.
Zulu Platoon Routes
134 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Transitional Phases
(5) Stage 5—Action at the RV. The company
RV is commanded by the company
sergeant-major (CSM). At the RV:
(a) The CSM establishes an all around

defence. If vehicles are expected
to be in location for longer than
five minutes, or if the CSM deems
it necessary, dismounted security
is established. The dismounted
security remains close to their
vehicles, however, to prevent
confusion on the ground and allow
them to remount quickly.
(b) Any change arounds necessary in

the turrets are completed.
(c) Any confirmatory orders

necessary are given, and the
company prepares to move off.
(d) The LAV captain confirms that all

company vehicles are moving.
His is the last vehicle to leave the
RV.
8. Rear Guard. Regardless of the method of withdrawal, it

may become necessary to form a rear guard to allow the main body to
break clean. The rear guard is commanded by the LAV captain and
usually consists of a platoon.
RELIEF IN PLACE
9. The relief in place is covered in detail in B-GL 321-006/FP-001,

Combat Team Operations.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 135
PASSAGE OF LINES
10. Passage of lines is covered in detail in B-GL 321-006/FP-

001, Combat Team Operations.
136 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
ANNEX A
OBSTACLE HELD-UP AND CONTACT DRILLS
1. General. Contact and held-up drills for the combat team are
found in B-GL-321-006 FP-001, Combat Team Operations. This
annex details the drills used by the LAV company when operating
without tanks. The term “held-up” is used for natural obstacles and
inadvertent man-made ones such as a village. The term “contact” is
used for deliberately emplaced obstacles such as a roadblock or
minefield. The difference in terms acknowledges that while the
natural or inadvertent obstacles may or may not be covered by fire, the
deliberately emplaced obstacles almost certainly are.
2. Sequence. All drills follow the same basic sequence:
a. Warning. Lead elements report the obstacle using

either “held-up” or “contact” and then a report as to
the nature of the obstacle.
b. Security. The commander ensures that his force

deploys in a manner that allows fire to be brought to
bear on the obstacle as well as maintain the overall
security of his force from both direct and indirect
fire.
c. Recce. The commander either conducts a recce or

orders one to be conducted for him. This may be as
simple as the commander looking at the obstacle
through a set of binoculars.
d. Plan. Based on the recce and the overall situation,

the commander makes a plan.
e. Execution. The plan is executed, the obstacle

overcome, and the force moves on.
3. Speculative Fire. Speculative fire can be used in any of the

drills in an attempt to draw the enemy into exposing himself before
forces are committed to the clearing of the obstacle. Circumstances
will determine whether it is appropriate.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 137
4. Enemy Contact. If the enemy is contacted during the drill,
the drill ceases and the commander revises his plans as appropriate.
5. Crest Drill. The crest drill is used when the company must
crest. If practicable, the company should attempt to avoid cresting by
moving to the flanks of the hill/crest. It is appreciated that this cannot
always be accomplished or that this course may lead the platoon into
even more dangerous potential enemy kill zones. When the company
does crest, the standard drill is:
a. Warning. Lead platoon(s) report HELD-UP

CREST.
b. Security. Company adopts position of cover and

concealment.
c. Recce. Lead platoon(s) and the forward observation

officer / fire controller (FOO/FC) adopt positions of
observation to see beyond the crest versus positions
of fire. In good visibility, this is likely to be turret-
down positions, though the commander may choose
to partially expose some turrets in sights-up
positions so that their TI can be used.
d. Plan/Execution. Upon the lead elements reporting

that there does not appear to be any enemy, the rear
platoon(s) adopts fire positions to cover forward of
the crest. The lead platoon(s) then jockey and cross
the crest simultaneously in new locations. At the
end of the bound, the lead platoon(s) establishes
itself in fire positions and covers the move of the
rear platoon(s) off the crest. The rear platoon(s)
move off the crest in the same manner as the
forward platoon(s).
138 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
Figure 5A-1: Crest Drill—Part 1
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 139

6. Gap Drills—General. This drill covers the action of the
LAV company from identification of a gap that presents a threat to a
flank until the company has moved beyond the gap. The gap can be
cleared dismounted, or the company can push past mounted using fire
and movement to reduce the threat. Clearing dismounted is more
secure but takes significantly longer. Smoke and speculative fire can
be used as the commander deems appropriate and the situation allows.
a. Gap Drill—Gap Cleared by Dismounted

Infantry:
(1) Warning. Lead element that encounters

the gap reports HELD-UP GAP
RIGHT/LEFT and moves into a position
of observation.
(2) Security. The lead elements move into fire

positions to cover both the gap and the axis
of advance. The FOO/FC moves to a
position where he can call down fire on
either the gap or the axis of advance. The
remainder of the company moves into a
position of cover.
(3) Recce. The company commander moves to

where he can see both the gap and the axis
of advance.
140 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(4) Plan/Execution. The commander decides
to clear the gap with dismounted infantry.
(a) The company commander assesses

whether clearing the gap will
require a rifle section or an entire
platoon and tasks a section or
platoon from the rear element.
(b) The commander of the tasked

element moves forward to see the
ground and to liaise with the
platoon providing overwatch.
Speculative fire may be used to
attempt to draw the fire of any
enemy in the gap.
(c) The tasked element moves down

to the gap, either on foot or in
vehicles depending on the
circumstances. Regardless, those
who clear the gap on foot will
carry the short range anti-armour
weapon (heavy) (SRAAW[H])
with them.
NOTE
To physically clear a gap so that no fire can be brought to
bear on a force moving past it could take a very long time,
especially given the range of modern dismountable ATGMs
(anti-tank guided missiles). Under most circumstances the
clearing force will only be able to move to a position inside
the gap where they can see down it.
(d) Once the gap is reported clear, the

company continues with the
advance and the clearing element
is picked up.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 141
Figure 5A-4: Gap Drill—Clear with Dismounted Infantry—Part 1
142 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

b. Gap Drill—Gap not Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry. If time or speed is critical, such as in the
pursuit, or if the commander judges the risk to be
acceptable, he may choose to move past the gap
without clearing it:
(1) Warning. Lead element that encounters

the gap reports HELD-UP GAP
RIGHT/LEFT and moves into a position
of observation.
(2) Security. The lead elements move into fire

positions to cover both the gap and the axis
of advance. The FOO/FC moves to a
position where he can call down fire on
either the gap or the axis of advance. The
remainder of the company moves into a
position of cover.
(3) Recce. The company commander moves to

where he can see both the gap and the axis
of advance.
(4) Plan/Execution. The commander decides

to not clear the gap with dismounted
infantry.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 143
(a) The company commander orders
the platoon that can best cover the
gap and the FOO/FC to remain in
location.
(b) The other two platoons, in

succession, move past the gap
using echelon formation and into
fire positions beyond the gap.
Suppressive fire and smoke may
be used as appropriate.
(c) The last platoon and the FOO/FC

move past the gap using echelon
formation.

Infantry—Part 1
144 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Infantry—Part 2

Infantry—Part 3
7. Defile Drills—General. Defiles are defined as short or long.
A short defile is one where the end of the defile can be seen from the
mouth of the defile. A long defile is one where the end of the defile
cannot be seen from the mouth. Defiles can be cleared either mounted
or dismounted. It is a command decision based upon the threat and
time constraints. Clearing dismounted is more secure but takes longer.
On a short defile, the FOO/FC and engineer/pioneer (engr/pnr) do not
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 145
accompany the clearing element because they can see the length of the
defile from outside the defile. On a long defile, they follow the
clearing platoon.
a. Defile Drill—Defile Cleared by Dismounted

Infantry:
(1) Warning. The lead elements of the

company report HELD-UP—
SHORT/LONG DEFILE and move into a
position of observation.
(2) Security. The remainder of the company

moves into a covered location, and the lead
element ensures that it can quickly move
from positions of observation overlooking
the defile to positions of fire.
(3) Recce. The company commander and the

FOO/FC move to a position overlooking
the defile.
(4) Plan/Execution. The company

commander decides to clear the defile
dismounted:

one of the depth platoons to move
to the mouth of the defile and clear
the defile.
(b) The lead element moves from

positions of observation to fire
positions and prepares to cover the
move of the clearing platoon.
(c) The clearing platoon moves either

mounted or dismounted,
depending on the circumstance, to
the mouth of the defile.
146 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(d) At the defile, the clearing platoon
dismounts, if it moved mounted,
and clears both sides of the defile.
One or more Zulu LAVs move
with the dismounted platoon to
provide intimate support. The
depth section can either remain
mounted at the entrance to the
defile or follow on foot.
NOTE
If the defile shown in the example below were a long defile,

the clearing platoon would be followed by FOO/FC and
engr elements.
(e) At the far end of the defile, the

dismounted platoon and intimate
support LAVs take up fire
positions and report the defile
clear.
(f) The remainder of the company

moves through the defile, one
platoon at a time, takes up fire
positions at the far end and
prepares to take up the advance.
Succeeding LAVs alternate in
covering left and right with their
turrets, while soldiers in the air
sentry hatch cover the areas not
being covered by the turret. Crew
commanders must ensure that their
vehicles are far enough away from
the edge of the defile—no closer
than 20 m—so that the turrets can
bring down effective fire if
needed.
(g) Lastly, the remaining Zulu LAVs

and depth section of the clearing
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 147
platoon pass through. The
clearing platoon remounts and
takes up the rear on the advance.

Infantry—Part 1
148 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Infantry—Part 2

Infantry—Part 3
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 149

Infantry—Part 4
b. Defile Drill—Defile not Cleared by Dismounted
Infantry:
(1) Warning. The lead elements on the

company report HELD-UP—
LONG/SHORT DEFILE and move into a
position of observation.
(2) Security. The remainder of the company

moves into a covered location, and the lead
element ensures that it can quickly move
from positions of observation overlooking
the defile to positions of fire.
(3) Recce. The company commander and the

FOO/FC move to a position overlooking
the defile.
(4) Plan/Execution. The company

commander decides he will not clear the
defile with dismounted infantry.
150 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
one of the depth platoons to clear
the defile mounted.
(b) The lead element moves from

positions of observation to fire
positions and prepares to cover the
move of the clearing platoon.
(c) The clearing platoon moves

mounted to the mouth of the
defile.
(d) The clearing platoon clears the

defile using either successive or
alternate bounds, depending on the
ground and the platoon
commander’s assessment. The
number of LAVs forward—one or
two—depends on the ground.
(e) If the defile is wide enough to

allow two LAVs forward, then the
turrets usually cover the frontal arc
while soldiers in the air sentry
hatch cover to the sides and rear.
If the platoon has only one vehicle
forward, then the two rear vehicles
will usually cover alternate sides
of the defile with their turrets.
(f) Once the lead platoon has exited

the defile, it takes up fire
positions. The remainder of the
company then moves through, one
platoon at a time, and moves one
bound past the defile.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 151
NOTE
In the example given below, if the platoon were clearing a

long defile, the FOO/FC and engr elements would follow
the clearing platoon.

Infantry—Part 1
152 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Infantry—Part 2
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 153
Figure 5A-16: Defile Drill—Defile not Cleared by Dismounted

Infantry—Part 3—Two Vehicles Forward
154 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Infantry—Part 3—One Vehicle Forward
8. Blind Corner Drills—General. Blind corners are most
likely to be encountered during long defile drills. They are usually
cleared dismounted but can be cleared mounted if the commander
judges the risk to be worth the savings in time. Clearing dismounted
takes more time but is more secure. Smoke and speculative fire can be
used at any stage of the drill if the commander deems it appropriate
and the circumstances permit.
a. Blind Corner Left or Right Drill—Defile Being

Cleared Dismounted, Blind Corner Cleared
Dismounted:
(1) Warning. Lead element reports HELD-

UP—BLIND CORNER LEFT/RIGHT.
(2) Security. Clearing sections adopt fire

positions at the edge of the corner. The
Zulu LAV(s) moves forward to cover as
much of the corner as they can without
going past the corner. Zulu LAV(s) is also
prepared to fire smoke, if necessary, to
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 155
blind any enemy who may be covering the
corner.
(3) Recce. Platoon commander moves forward

to the edge of the corner and observes as
best he can.
(4) Plan / Execution. The platoon commander

decides to clear the blind corner
dismounted:
(a) The inside section reorients itself,

if necessary, to ensure it is
covering around the inside corner
and across the defile.
(b) The outside section clears around

the corner until it is even with the
inside section.
(c) The Zulu LAV(s) is prepared to

fire smoke to blind the enemy
should the outside section come
under fire from further down the
defile.
(d) Once the outside section has come

level with the inside section, both
sections carry on with clearing the
defile. Once the sections have
cleared past the corner, the Zulu
LAV(s) recommences moving to
support the dismounted sections.
156 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Corner Cleared with Dismounted Infantry—Part 1

b. Blind Corner Left or Right Drill—Defile Not
Cleared with Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner
Cleared with Dismounted Infantry:
(1) Warning. The lead element reports

HELD-UP, BLIND CORNER
LEFT/RIGHT.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 157
(2) Security. The LAVs stop in fire positions.
The sections and platoon headquarters
weapons detachment dismount, move into
the woods and cover the left and right of
the defile.
(3) Recce. The platoon commander moves, if

necessary, to where he can see the blind
corner.

decides to clear the blind corner
dismounted:
(a) The platoon commander orders

two sections to clear the blind
corner.
(b) The inside section reorients itself,
if necessary, to ensure it is
covering around the inside corner
and across the defile.
(c) The outside section clears around
the corner until it is even with the
inside section.
(d) The Zulu LAV(s) is prepared to
fire smoke to blind the enemy
should the outside section come
under fire from further down the
defile.
(e) The sections continue clearing
down the defile until the platoon
commander is decides the blind
corner is clear. They then halt in
fire positions.
(f) The soldiers providing local
security for the LAVs mount and
the LAVs move round the corner
in bounds.
158 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(g) The LAVs stop momentarily as
they come up to the clearing
section to allow the sections to
mount.
(h) The platoon continues clearing the
defile.
NOTE
In the example below, the LAVs are clearing two LAVs

leading. Depending on the circumstances, it could be one
LAV leading.
Figure 5A-20: Blind Corner Left/Right Drill—Defile not Cleared

with Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner Cleared with
Dismounted Infantry—Part 1
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 159
Figure 5A-21: Blind Corner Left/Right Drill—Defile not Cleared

c. Blind Corner Left or Right Drill—Defile and
Blind Corner not Cleared with Dismounted
Infantry:

UP BLIND CORNER LEFT/RIGHT.
(2) Security. LAVs stop in fire positions.

Sections and weapons detachment
dismount for local security.
(3) Recce. The platoon commander moves to

where he can see the blind corner.

orders the lead LAVs to clear the defile
mounted:
(a) The front LAVs mount their

infantry and move so they can
cover as much of the blind corner
as possible without exposing
themselves. Infantry in the air
sentry hatches cover left and right.
160 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(b) The front two LAVs move around
the corner and take up fire
positions. They report the corner
clear.
(c) The rear two LAVs mount their

infantry, and the advance
continues.

Corner not Cleared with Dismounted Infantry—Part 1
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 161

d. Blind Corner T-Junction Drill—Defile and Blind
Corner Cleared with Dismounted Infantry:

UP—BLIND CORNER T-JUNCTION.
(2) Security. Clearing sections adopt fire

positions at the edge of the corner. Zulu
LAV(s) moves forward to cover as much of
the corner as they can without going past
the corner. The Zulu LAV(s) is also
prepared to fire smoke if necessary to blind
any enemy who may be covering the
corner.
(3) Recce. Platoon commander moves forward

to the edge of the corner and observes as
best he can.
(4) Plan / Execution:
(a) The two lead sections reorient

themselves, if necessary, to cover
across the defile and around the
corners.
162 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
(b) The depth section moves up under
cover to the corner on the side
opposite to which the company
will turn—if the company is
turning left at the T- junction, the
depth section goes to the right-
hand side.
(c) Under cover of the two lead

sections and the Zulu LAV(s), the
depth section crosses the road and
begins clearing in the direction the
company will turn. When the
section comes level with the
section on the opposite side of the
defile, the two sections clear
forward until the platoon
commander is satisfied the
T-junction is clear.
(d) The Zulu LAV(s) and the

remaining section round the corner
and the defile drill continues.

B-GL-321-007/FP-001 163


e. Blind Corner T-Junction Drill—Defile not
Cleared with Dismounted Infantry, Blind Corner
Cleared with Dismounted Infantry:

164 B-GL-321-007/FP-001
the defile.

corner.

decides to clear the defile dismounted:
(a) Two sections, one on either side of

the defile, move to the corner and
cover left and right and across the
defile.
(b) The Zulu LAV(s) moves forward

to where they can provide the
maximum support without
exposing themselves. The Zulu
LAV(s) is prepared to fire smoke.
(c) The remaining section moves to

the corner on the side opposite to
the direction the company will
travel. It crosses the defile under
cover of the other sections and the
Zulu LAV(s).
(d) The section that crossed the road

now clears forward, along the
company’s route, until it is
opposite the section on the other
side of the road. Both sections
then clear forward until the
platoon commander is satisfied
that the T- junction is clear.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 165
(e) The LAVs move forward, the
sections mount, and the defile drill
continues.


166 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

f. Blind Corner T-Junction Drill—Defile and Blind
Corned not Cleared with Dismounted Infantry:


the defile.

corner.

decides he will not clear the blind corner
with dismounted infantry:
(a) The sections and weapons

detachment mount. Soldiers in the
air sentry hatches cover the sides
of each vehicle.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 167
(b) The first two LAVs move to the T-
junction and cover left and right as
much as possible without going
past the corner. Both LAVs are
prepared to fire smoke if
necessary.
(c) The LAV covering the direction

opposite to the way the company
is going to travel (the right-hand
LAV if the company is turning left
and the left-hand LAV if the
company is turning right) moves
into the junction to cover down the
defile.
(d) The other LAVs turn the corner

and continue with the defile drill.
The LAV covering down the
defile then moves to join them.

168 B-GL-321-007/FP-001


9. Deliberately Emplaced Point Obstacle Drill. A
deliberately emplaced obstacle is normally covered by fire, direct or
indirect. As such, the possibility of bypassing the obstacle must be
examined. If bypass is not practical, or in the opinion of the
commander it would simply lead the force into an even more
dangerous situation, then the use of speculative fire and smoke should
be considered before committing troops to the clearing of the obstacle.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 169
a. Warning. The lead element reports CONTACT
ROADBLOCK (or MINEFIELD, etc., depending
on the type of obstacle).
b. Security. The company moves into concealed
locations (turret-down) while keeping observation
on the obstacle.
c. Recce. The company commander, FOO/FC and
engr move into a position of observation.
d. Plan / Execution. The company commander
decides that the obstacle cannot be avoided and must
be breached:
(1) Two platoons move into fire positions
covering the obstacle.
(2) The FOO/FC is prepared to bring down
high explosives (HE) or smoke if
necessary.
(3) An engr recce party moves down to the
obstacle with a rifle platoon for protection.
(4) The engr party determines what time and
resources are required to clear the obstacle.
(5) If the company has the necessary
engineering resources, they move down to
the obstacle, clear it, and the advance
continues.
(6) If the company does not have the resources
needed, it must get them from higher or
find an alternate route. Based on his risk
management, the commander may simply
force the obstacle, accepting the resultant
casualties.
170 B-GL-321-007/FP-001

Part 1
Figure 5A-34: Deliberately Emplaced Point Obstacle Drill—Part 2
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 171
CHAPTER 6
ADMINISTRATION
To be issued.
B-GL-321-007/FP-001 173

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B-GL-321-007/FP-001

LAV COMPANY TACTICS

(Supercedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001, dated 1989-03-01)

Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

LAV COMPANY TACTICS

(Supercedes B-GL-301-002/FP-001, dated 1989-03-01)

Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Land Staff

OPI: DAD 4 2003-10-14

1. B-GL-321-007/FP-001, LAV Company Tactics (Interim) is

2. This publication is effective on receipt and supercedes B-GL-

3. The French version of this publication is B-GL-321-007/FP-002,

4. Unless otherwise noted, masculine pronouns contained herein

5. Suggestions for amendment and/or improvement shall be

6. This publication is available electronically on both the

1. This Interim edition of LAV Company Tactics builds upon the

2. The purpose of B-GL-321-007/FP-001, LAV Company

3. LAV Company Tactics, along with its complementary

4. In the near future, LFDTS will coordinate an Army-wide

5. Feedback on the information contained in these manuals is

1. Tasks. The Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III armoured

a. to provide protected transport for the infantry to get

b. to provide fire and other mounted support to

c. to kill enemy LAVs.

2. Principles of Employment. The principles of employment

a. Tanks and mechanized infantry are complementary

b. The LAV and its section form a total weapons

c. The aggressive use of the LAV must be tempered

3. Ammunition Selection. Only two natures of 25 mm ammo

a. APFSDS-T. The armour-piercing, fin stabilized,

(1) It has the best penetration of any 25 mm

(2) It will defeat all wheeled APCs, including

(3) It will defeat most tracked APCs, including

(4) It will defeat most other light armour,

(5) It will not defeat any modern NATO or

(6) It will penetrate the back rear on older

This penetration will eventually stop the engine, resulting in

b. FAPDS-T. Frangible, armour piercing, discarding

(1) It will defeat all wheeled and most tracked

(2) It will defeat most other light armour,

(3) It will not penetrate MBTs from any angle.

(1) Direct Fire. The LAV with appliqué

(2) Indirect Fire. The LAV’s base armour

b. Maximum Effective Range—25 mm Cannon:

(1) The maximum effective range for the

(2) The maximum effective range for the high

POINT TARGETS AREA TARGETS

HEI-T 2,000 m 2,400 m

COAX 800 m 1,400 m

(3) Whenever possible, LAVs should be sited,

5. Surveillance and Target Acquisition. The LAV III turret

a. Stationary, Exposed Targets:

DETECT RECOGNIZE IDENTIFY

b. Stationary, Cold, Hull-Down, Camouflaged

DETECT RECOGNIZE IDENTIFY

DETECT RECOGNIZE IDENTIFY

Image Intensifying Sight

Image Intensifying Sight

6. All Weather Operations:

a. The LAV's excellent STA, poor weather, and night

c. Even during periods of poor visibility, turret crews