Informal Land Rights
Informal Land Rights
Informal Land Rights
Prepared for the 2006 meeting of the International Society for New Institutional
Economics in Boulder., Colorado. A longer version of the paper is available from the
author on request.
1
Applying Property Rights Theory to Africa: The consequences of formalizing
Literature in the field of economics reveals the accepted wisdom that clearly
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2004; De Soto 2000; Libecap 2003; Norton 2000).
Anthropologists (Berry 1992; Chanock 1991; Platteau 1996) and political scientists
(Fukuyama 2004; Weimer 1997) have also noted the importance of property rights in
issues of economic and political development. Secure property rights encourage people
to invest their resources and protect their investments against expropriation. Scholars
have argued that economic efficiency requires a clear definition of the rights of ownership,
contract and transfer (Johnson 1972). Ambiguity in the definition or enforcement of any of
these rights leads to an increase in transaction costs in the exchange as well as residual
Economic arguments for stronger property rights correspond with a demand for
clarity of property rights by people across the African continent. Evidence to this
demand is present in the plethora of legal disputes started in national courts, addressed in
alternative dispute resolution bodies and through local conflict resolution mechanisms
(Deininger and Castagnini 2004; Fenrich and Higgens 2001; Human Rights Watch 2003;
Joireman 1996; Toulmin, Lavigne Delville, and Traore 2002). Legal disputes heard in
national courts represent a costly allocation of state resources to the adjudication and
enforcement of ownership.
2
If policy-makers and people in both rural and urban communities across Sub-
Saharan Africa believe that well-defined property rights are important then why have
argued elsewhere (Joireman 2000)? Governance may be one part of the problem, but
governments that have in good faith tried to implement new property rights and faced
limited success, such as those in Kenya and Uganda, suggest that we might look further
on the enforcement of law because this is the area of greatest challenge for many states.
Countries across the continent have exerted great effort and resources writing property
and inheritance laws that are conducive to economic growth. This is a necessary but
insufficient means of clarifying property rights. Effectively implementing laws that are
passed and then utilizing state resources to ensure their enforcement, particularly in areas
far from the center of power in a country is a pressing challenge to almost all African
states.1 This paper will seek to elucidate these issues by first giving some background
regarding the issue of property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa and their interaction with
customary law will follow. This leads to the second issue, the particular position of
women in African economies and culture, which is then linked to property rights in the
subsequent section. The paper will conclude by addressing how theories of property
rights depart from realties in Sub-Saharan Africa and what the potential effects of this
1
Ideally, law relating to property rights develops organically from the bottom (practice) up to statutory law.
There is ample evidence, some which will be discussed here, that the imposition of legal reforms from the
top down will not achieve the desired outcomes.
3
disconnect might be.
and local organization in many parts of Africa. It has been defined by various ethnic
groups for their internal organization and administration. Customary law exists as a
second body of law (in addition to statutory law) governing citizens in countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa. It has the greatest control over people in rural areas, but also affects
Saharan Africa it is estimated that 90% of the land is held under forms of customary
tenure and 10% formalized title (Deininger 2003: 78).2 Since colonial times customary
Customary law regulated access to land for Africans during the colonial era.
Virtually every colonized country had two systems of land holding, one which was
regulated by the state and one by customary law and traditional leaders.3 The land
regulated by the state was privately held by citizens of the metropole, settlers and
sometimes by Africans; but much of the land was governed by customary law since at
2
Even if these percentages are exaggerated, they mark the fact that customary control over land as
significant .
3
The exception would be India where there was not such a pronounced dichotomy between the property
rights of the colonizers and those of the colonized. That said, there was also not equality. For more
information see Joireman, Sandra F. 2006. The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development in
Kenya and India. Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 44 (2).
4
independence few countries had the capacity to embark on the Herculean effort of
unifying the disparate land holding institutions, even if there was the desire to do so.
Instead an institutional lock-in occurred and the existing, bifurcated, land holding system
remained intact with all of the resulting problems of definition and control.
Privatized and customary land tenure institutions articulated two very different
bundles of rights to land. In the colonial era this dual system followed racial lines; natives
used land, white colonizers owned it. Since colonial governments did not find
conceptions of land holding that were equivalent to that of fee simple or exclusive land
ownership among colonized peoples, it was assumed that landholding must be vested in
the community.4 Africans maintained rights to land as groups and those groups were
overseen by a chief who controlled land allocation. The belief in African communal land
rights was supported by two linked administrative impulses of the colonial government 1)
the colonial need to expropriate land and govern its occupation and exchange with some
degree of legality (even if this was merely a creation of their own administrative fiat);
and 2) the necessity of space for the indigenous population to live and to farm. Under the
demands of indirect rule, the best type of arrangement to meet the second need required
4
It would be more accurate to say that community rights and individual rights in pre-colonial Africa were
not mutually exclusive. The conception that Africans held all land communally was incorrect in two ways
1) it minimized the individual rights to land which existed short of alienation and 2) it disregarded the
multiple and overlapping forms of rights that might exist among separate individuals to the same plot of
land. Take as an example a farmer cultivating a crop near the side of a stream. She has been given the
right to use the field by the chief and to harvest the crop that she grows there. She anticipates maintaining
the use rights to this field well into the future. However, there are several fruit trees on her farm land which
belong to someone else. The owner of the fruit trees has the right to harvest his fruit and look after his tree.
There may also be another person in the area who has the right to graze cattle or goats on the crop residues
after the field is harvested. Here we have a complex array of long-term use rights (the farmer), ownership
(the tree owner) and seasonal privileges. Not all of these rights are equally protected in a system that
assumes group rights to resources; the rights of the individuals tend to be minimized or overlooked.
5
no administrative oversight by colonial officials, hence the creation of native reserves or
without requiring expatriate civil servants working in the adjudicative and administrative
institutions of the colonial state. Where traditional rulers could not be found, they were
created. Where their previous powers did not relate to the administration of land, they
were given new powers. Firmin-Sellars notes the complicity of the colonial state in
supporting property rights claims proffered by traditional leaders when they served the
goals of administration and control. Her interesting study of Ghana also illustrates that
different versions ‘customary law’ were presented to colonial officials for their support
(Firmin-Sellers 1996).
institutional system that either governs directly or significantly influences the allocation
of land in many African countries to the present day. There are three effects of
customary law as it pertains to property rights that are worth noting; 1) the creation of an
institutions that are resistant to change; and 3) the enrichment and empowerment of those
In areas where land is relatively plentiful, customary law effectively regulates the
distribution of land in a way that has fewer transaction costs than going a more
plentiful, privatized, national systems of property rights show few benefits over
6
customary systems of land rights, so even when new systems of property rights are
adopted from the top down they are unlikely to be fully implemented. Jean Ensminger
the gains of new property rights justify the transaction costs and (2)
whether the fit between customary tenure, social norms and the new
Perhaps even more unsettling are assertions that rather than promoting security of
tenure titling efforts can lead to higher levels of conflict over land and thereby reduce
productivity (Deininger and Castagnini 2004). In areas where the value of land is
relatively low, the transaction costs of land registration appear to be too high to make it
worthwhile for people to register their land through formal channels. After the Ugandan
Land Act of 1998 made it possible for people on customary land to title their land and
areas still chose to go through locally recognized institutions of exchange rather than the
legal system to document land transfers. Their land was sufficiently secure to preclude
any need to go beyond the recognition of members of their local government in a land
exchange. Until the value of land or its attributes increases sufficiently to offset the
transaction costs, titling and more formalized land transfers will not be embraced
But not everywhere is land abundant. In areas of Africa where land is scarce and
population densities are higher, land allocation is more contested, conflict over land is
7
frequent and resort to government bureaucracies for dispute settlement and recognition of
land transfer is more likely. Consistent with the economic literature on institutional
change, ample evidence exists demonstrating the breakdown of institutions and the
innovation of new ones when land values increase in Africa (Bruce 1976; Joireman 1996;
Joireman 2000). In areas where land has a higher value, customary land ownership
patterns can empower and enrich those who make decisions regarding its allocation.
“Authority in land whether vested in the chiefs, or in the government officials and
political leaders, can in turn, lead directly to private economic benefits for these actors,
derived from land accumulation, patronage and land transactions" (Toulmin and Quan
2000). Traditional leaders can practice the politics of exclusion, denying resources to
groups with less political power, such as divorced women and migrants, who are easily
There is a tremendous difference in the treatment of land in urban and rural areas
in Africa. In rural areas control over land is a means of gaining food. In urban areas
control over land is control over wealth. In Uganda conflict over land and corruption
with regard to the administration of land in the capital city is a matter of daily news. In
one high profile case, the Kampala City Council was accused of obtaining title to land on
which public schools were present, then selling the titled land. This particular case led to
a public statement by the Minister of Local Government, that anyone dealing with the
5
For a recent example of precisely this problem see the work of Marja Spierenburg on the Mid-Zambezi
Rural Development Project in Zimbabwe. In this case it was the government of Zimbabwe that in the
1990s recognized an area of communally held land in Dande. They sought to reallocate the land in a more
ecologically sustainable way that would be conducive to agricultural development and the resettlement of
families living on former European-owned land. In the process of doing so they effectively stripped land
rights from migrants who had been living in the area peacefully and cooperatively for years Spierenburg,
Marja J. 2004. Strangers, Spirits, and Land Reforms: Conflicts about Land in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe.
Boston: Brill.. By not recognizing that migrants were part of this community, and instead adhering to the
old idea of communally held lands belonging collectively to one people group, the government repeated the
error of colonization.
8
Kampala City Council does so “at his or her own risk” (2005)! In the case of urban
lands in Uganda, there is no doubt that the value of formal titling offsets the costs
incurred.
Current economic theories such as that of Hernando De Soto (2000), would posit
that customary land holding systems are less conducive to economic development
because they do not give those who are present on the land the power to acquire title and
mortgage their possessions. While this idea is true for areas in which land is in high
demand, in land abundant areas, any effort to formalize title may be undesirable because
of increased transaction costs and difficulties in enforcement therefore title would only
labor, they are the mainstay of the agricultural economies, yet legally, their position is
equivalent to those of women in Europe during the Victorian era.6 Women in Sub-
Saharan Africa do not share the same legal protections of their property and inheritance
rights as men, or women in other parts of the world such as the Global North or Latin
America.7 They face difficulty in representing themselves economically and legally, for
example in selling their own produce or in buying new fields on which to grow crops.8 In
6
In England women were not given co-ownership right to the homes in which they lived until The
Matrimonial Homes Act of 1967 which required that a wife protect her right to reside in her home through
registration. Double check this and expand if necessary
7
In Latin America women have more legal protections. This, combined with the absence of a competing
system of customary law had made their situation with regard to property ownership better than that of
women in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Deere, Carmen Diana, and Magdalena Leon. 2001. Empowering
Women: Land and Property Rights in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
8
In Uganda, while women grow food crops, many ethnic groups view it as the job of the husband to sell
the agricultural produce at the market.
9
Rwanda, women were not recognized as full citizens until the 1998 constitution.
Previous to that point they were legal minors. If a Rwandan woman wanted to buy a plot
of land, a building or even a home she had to either do so in the name of a male relative
Even when law enables women to operate as legally recognized economic actors,
social impediments to their doing so are abundant. In Western cultures most married
women would not own property individually, but jointly with their husbands. In Africa,
the idea of co-ownership is an alien one. The idea of a woman acquiring property in her
own name during marriage is incendiary as it implies that she is not committed to the
husband or his family.9 In the few African countries where there are laws providing for
the co-ownership of marital property such as the family home or other assets; these laws
have proven very difficult to enforce because they go against the grain of cultural
Because of the women are supposed to provide food for their families either through their
farming or waged employment, they are involved in the market and have obligations in
9
This point was driven home to me in conducting interviews on the new land law in Uganda in 2006. I
had an interview with a woman who was the regional gender officer for her part of the country, a fairly
elevated position and one in which she was required to assist women in defending their property rights.
She told me that "Women can't own land and have stable marriages." This is a sentiment that I had heard
before in many different contexts. See also Human Rights Watch. 2003. Double Standards: Women's
Property Rights Violations in Kenya. In Kenya. New York: Human Rights Watch.
10
women perform about 90 percent of the work of processing food crops and
In terms of property rights to land, women typically have secondary rights to land
access, meaning they can farm land because they have married a man who is of a
particular kinship group or they have children who are seen as belonging to a particular
kinship group (Bikaako and Ssenkumba 2003; Wanyeki 2003; Whitehead and Tsikata
2003; Yngstrom 2002). Women do not receive land access because they are not
only the right to till land owned by the group.10 Because they marry and go to live with
their husband’s family, women in most parts of East Africa are not viewed as having
membership in their lineage, but are seen, at best, as a member of their husband’s lineage
and at worst only as a means of perpetuating the kinship group.11 In West Africa and
among some ethnic groups in other parts of the continent, women are never considered to
have left their natal families and they have no share in his property even after marriage.
10
Yngstrom argues that in Tanzania this was not always the case, that women used to be able to claim land
from their families, but secondary rights became standard practice by the late 1950s when men began to
‘assert greater control over land, by limiting land transfers made by lineage members to female family
members” Yngstrom, Ingrid. 2002. Women, Wives and Land Rights in Africa: Situating Gender Beyond
the Household in the Debate over Land Policy and Changing Tenure Systems. Oxford Development Studies
30 (1):21-39.
11
That said, it would be wrong to suggest that in all circumstances under customary tenure women have no
access to land through their own kin group. Often they will have some residual claim to land in their natal
kinship group or through wider social ties Whitehead, Ann, and Dzodzi Tsikata. 2003. Policy Discourses
on Women's Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Implications of the Re-turn to the Customary.
Journal of Agrarian Change 3 (1 and 2):67-112.. However, this is more the exception than the rule.
11
There is a fundamental conflict between gender equality and the upholding of
traditional customary law regimes – nowhere is this more apparent than South Africa
where there has been overt contestation over social rights as a result of constitutional
guarantees of gender equality. In South Africa women are guaranteed equal rights under
the law by a constitution which also recognizes the rights of traditional leaders to allocate
land. Given that in customary tenure systems women have no access to land in their own
right, it was inevitable that a case would be brought on behalf of a woman denied access
to land. In South Africa the decision of the constitutional court in the Bhe case argued
that a woman must be allocated land by a traditional leader.12 However, the reason given
in the ruling was not that she had equal standing as a citizen of South Africa and a
member of that kin group, but rather that she had children that were members of that kin
group and their rights could not be denied. What was important in the Bhe case was that
the children happened to be girls. A decision that these girls deserve access to land
because they are members of the kin group, was an affirmation of their membership in
the lineage – a membership which was not previously explicit in the case of girls or
women. While case law is being developed in South Africa that moderates the
differences between constitutional and customary law, evidence suggests that widowed
and divorced women with children obtain land under customary land tenure systems
Inheritance
12
Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others
12
Women’s property rights and access to land are linked to inheritance patterns. Under
customary law girls tend to inherit less than boys, and often nothing at all.13 In a
polygamous household, if the husband, or head of household dies, any childless wives
will receive nothing and will have to return to their natal family. Because these women
have not provided the lineage with heirs they have no status and no further link to any
member of the lineage. Women with children are in a slightly less precarious position.
They are still not regarded as members of the lineage, however, if they are taking care of
minors who are, their use rights to their husband’s land and house will often be respected.
The evidence regarding women’s inheritance rights after the death of a spouse in
Africa is mixed. Examining the Kenyan case Aliber et al. note that most women are able
to hold onto their land after the death of a husband by turning to the community as a
whole to gain support in legitimizing the wife’s claim to the land. In their study, a
woman losing home and land after a husband has died is the exception rather than the
rule (Aliber et al. 2004). This would be consistent with the findings of Rose and
Khadiagala that women are able to negotiate customary law and maintain usufruct rights
to land through social networking (Khadiagala 2002; Rose 2002). However, the weight
of evidence seems to emphasize the vulnerability of women’s property rights after the
death of a spouse. Human Rights Watch has documented findings in Kenya that argue
that spousal loss of property is a frequent occurrence (Human Rights Watch 2003). This
is further supported by anthropological studies such as that of Verma among the Maragoli
13
This is true even in Islamic areas where sharia law controls inheritance for women. In Nigeria in the
northern states where sharia law is recognized, women still do not inherit as dictated by sharia law. The
reason given is that according to the Maliki school of sharia law Nigeria is an area in which Islam was
imposed by conquest and therefore some allowance for pre-existing customs, urf, must be allowed.
Abdullah, Hussaina J., and Ibrahim Hamza. 2003. Women and Land in Northern Nigeria: The Need for
Independent Ownership Rights. In Women and Land in Africa, edited by L. M. Wanyeki. New York: Zed
Books, Ltd.
13
(Verma 2001). In Uganda in 1995, FIDA reported that 40% of the cases they handled
were related to the harassment of widows and property grabbing by their husbands
relatives (Bikaako and Ssenkumba 2003: 250). Evidence from other parts of Africa
supports the finding that women’s property rights and use rights to land are insecure after
the death of a husband. This evidence is further detailed in the longer version of this
paper.
De Soto has argued that “The only way to touch capital is if the property system can
record its own economic aspects on paper and anchor them to a specific location and
owner” (De Soto 2000: 63). His idea is that formalizing the informal property rights that
already exist will empower people with access to capital provided by way of mortgage
and sale. Yet, ‘formalizing the informal’ could have potentially disastrous consequences
where customary law regulates access to land and where the co-ownership of women is
In many African contexts where customary law is regulating the access to land,
formalizing existing property rights will effectively alienate women from access to
capital. This was precisely what occurred in the titling of land in Kenya. Under
customary tenure Kenyan women had use rights and 'considerable management control
over plots allocated to them by household heads'. When land was registered in the name
of the male household head they lost that control (Ensminger 1997). As long as land is
untitled women have usufruct rights. They may not be able to control all aspects of the
land use, but they also may have relative security of occupation as long as land values
14
remain relatively low. If there is an effort to formalize the informal customary law that
exists in Africa, the land becomes titled but not in the names of women.14 This makes
them vulnerable to loss of their use rights if those in whose name the land is titled seek to
The dual systems of law in Africa may have a positive benefit in allowing flexible
rights in areas where there is a high demand for land. Formalizing customary law
without providing for joint ownership will undermine both the ownership and use rights
of those most involved in the production of food crops and other agricultural products.16
In summary there are two fundamental problems regarding women’s land rights in
many parts of Africa. The first is the absence of autonomous property rights to either
customary or privately held land and the second is the lack of enforcement of women’s
inheritance rights. In the first case the absence of law guaranteeing co-ownership is the
problem, in the second case the law exists in many places and is sufficient for the
protection of women and children, but it is sporadically enforced. Creating law regarding
co-ownership without effective enforcement of that law will not better the current
situation.
14
Either in their own name or jointly with spouses.
15
The Ugandan Land Act of 1998 has attempted to surmount this problem by requiring the consent of the
spouse on land sales. However, in a polygynous society it is relatively easy to get around this problem by
having another spouse sign the consent form, or even marrying another woman in order to ensure a spousal
consent.
16
John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government argued that property rights naturally accrue to an
individual as a result of the contribution of his or her labor Locke, John. 1764. Two Treatises of
Government. London: A. Millar et al. This idea is alien to the kinship based customary land institutions in
Sub-Saharan Africa in which a man may possess land but his children and wives are supposed to provide
the labor for the production of crops without gaining any interest in the land for themselves.
15
Enforcing Property Rights
Many scholars approach the issue of property rights assuming that legislative
decisions will be enforced throughout a country by states that have effective control over
the entirety of their territory. The belief that states automatically enforce decisions
regarding property rights leads to seriously misplaced policy initiatives that focus more
strong local administrative structure, enforcement of laws regarding property is far less
(Boone 2003). Enforcement is a particularly salient issue with regard to the property
rights of women and migrants who are less powerful and more vulnerable to the
expropriation of their property should they face a major life change. In Namibia, the
Married Persons Equality Act of 1996 and the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002
protected women by allowing them to remain in their houses and on their land after the
death of a spouse. However, this legislation has had little impact as women do not know
their rights under statutory law and customary law continues to control the dispossession
of property (PlusNews 2006). The Namibian government has not made the necessary
investment in civic education to promote the enforcement of these laws. Without both
the laws in place and the education of legal and traditional authorities, women will
17
Enforcement is dependent on a local administration that has the capacity to police and administer its
areas and a judiciary that is free to make decisions in accordance with the law.
16
Conclusion
Well defined and protected property rights are critical to achieving the best use of
resources and promoting the economic development of a country, though no one form of
property rights is best suited to all countries and contexts.18 In developing countries the
property rights of the poor must be adequately defined and protected so that they are able
to leverage the capital they have to take advantage of economic opportunities outside the
define and protect their property rights specifically and not to simply view them as
creation of new law, or the enforcement of co-ownership where laws protecting it already
exist. Where customary law governs land allocation, efforts must be made to ensure in
the process of codifying those rights, women are not completely without access to capital
in land. If customary law has been defined in such a way as to prohibit women’s access
to land or eliminate women’s ability to pursue title, then customary law must be changed
typically uncodified it may be changed through the education and enlightenment of the
leaders who control land allocation and set the rules governing communal land holdings.
New laws designed to formalize informal property rights and free up capital for
the poor in Africa must give attention to both customary law and women’s property
rights. But law alone is not the solution unless it is combined with enforcement.
18
Terry Anderson and Fred McChesney provide a comprehensive introduction to property rights and law in
a variety of settings. Anderson, Terry, and Fred McChesney. 2003. Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict
and Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
17
penetrating into rural areas where conflict between statutory and customary law will be
most pronounced. It also assumes that there is an effective and independent judiciary.
With a few exceptions, state capacities in Sub-Saharan Africa do not meet this
threshold.19 Moreover, the property law that is most conducive to economic growth is
that which develops organically (Anderson and Hill 2004; De Soto 2000). Custom and
history in Sub-Saharan Africa have created a set of circumstances in which the most
beneficial types of property rights are unlikely to develop on their own due to preexisting
ownership that protects women’s property rights. However, civic education campaigns
that emphasize the importance of women’s statutory rights to property may help as may
concerted efforts to educate traditional leaders (Strickland 2004) or other efforts that
could be made to strengthen the negotiating abilities of women so that they might make
the case for the particular set of property rights that would be most helpful.
19
For example, in East Africa Uganda and Kenya are adjacent to one another and have radically different
judicial capabilities. Judicial independence in Uganda is one of the most positive results of the
democratization process there, while in Kenya the judiciary has been notoriously corrupt and under the
control of the government. In both countries, however, state strength in the countryside is limited. In
Uganda the government barely functions in the northern parts of the country where a civil conflict has been
raging and in Kenya, the strength of the state in the West is certainly not what it is in the capital. Catherine
Boone and Jeffrey Herbst have both written about the challenges of local administration in African states
from very different perspectives. Boone, Catherine. 2003. Political Topographies of the African State:
territorial authority and institutional choice. New York: Cambridge University Press, Herbst, Jeffrey.
2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton,, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
18
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