Nego Eng

Institute for Leadership Development
Negotiation Training
Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

2007: ILD / Rasmus Tenbergen
Definition of Negotiation
Negotiation is joint decision-making.
02

Relevance of Negotiation
Why are negotiations so important? Everybody negotiates every day.
03

The Harvard Negotiation Concept
How should one negotiate? Oriented on Principles

(Harvard Negotiation Project)
04

Analysis Appleton vs. Baker

- Best results - BATNA and ZOPA - No deal? - The opening bid - Ratification - Honesty - Take it or leave it
05

BATNA and ZOPA

BATNA: best alternative to negotiated agreement
ZOPA: zone of possible agreement
BATNA A
ZOPA
BATNA B
06

The Tendley Contract

- Rescope the task - Think long term - Seek outside resources - Invent creative options - Build workable packages
07
Source: The Tendley Contract, Teaching Notes, Harvard Program on Negotiation

Closing a Gap
- Risk of playing the wrong game - Need for joint problem solving - Requires mutual commitment - Disclosure of needs - Trading on differences (!)
08
Source: The Tendley Contract, Teaching Notes, Harvard Program on Negotiation

Creating and claiming value

- Creating value and claiming value - The size of the pie - My piece of the pie - Expanding the pie
09

Negotiation Styles
Soft versus hard:
- Soft negotiation: focus on integrative aspect
- Hard negotiation: focus on distributive aspect
10

Hard and Soft Negotiation

Soft Bargaining?
Participants are friends. The goal is agreement. Make concessions to cultivate the relationship. Be soft on the people and the problem. Trust others. Change your position easily. Make Offers. Disclose your bottom line. Accept one-sided losses to reach agreement. Search for the single answer: the one they will accept. Insist on agreement. Try to avoid a contest of wills. Yield to pressure.
Hard Bargaining?
Participants are adversaries. The goal is victory. Demand concessions as a condition of the relationship. Be hard on the problem and the people. Distrust Others. Dig into your position. Make threats. Mislead as to your bottom line. Demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement. Search for the single answer: the one you will accept. Insist on your position. Try to win a contest of wills. Apply pressure. Source: Fisher and Ury (1991), p. 9
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Creating and Claiming Value
Claiming value: divide the pie
Creating value: expand the pie
12

Trading on Differences
The orange example: skin or fruit?
The why-question (Fisher and Ury)
Trading on differences (Lax and Sebenius)
13

Win - Win
Behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests, as well as conflicting ones. We tend to assume that because the other sides positions are opposed to ours, their interests must also be opposed. If we have an interest in defending ourselves, then they must want to attack us. .... In many negotiations, however, a close examination of the underlying interests will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared or compatible than ones that are opposed. Fisher and Ury
14

Does Principled Negotiation Ignore the Distributive Aspects of Negotiation?

Principled Negotiating
Too soft?
Hard against Soft
15

Principled Negotiating
Soft Bargaining?
Participants are friends. The goal is agreement. Make concessions to cultivate the relationship. Be soft on the people and the problem. Trust others. Change your position easily. Make Offers. Disclose your bottom line. Accept one-sided losses to reach agreement. Search for the single answer: the one they will accept. Insist on agreement. Try to avoid a contest of wills. Yield to pressure.
Hard Bargaining?
Participants are adversaries. The goal is victory. Demand concessions as a condition of the relationship. Be hard on the problem and the people. Distrust Others. Dig into your position. Make threats. Mislead as to your bottom line. Demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement. Search for the single answer: the one you will accept. Insist on your position. Try to win a contest of wills. Apply pressure.
Principled Negotiation
Participants are problem solvers. The goal is wise outcome reached efficiently and amicably. SEPERATE PEOPLE FROM THE PROBLEM. Be soft on the people, hard on the problem. Proceed independent of trust. FOCUS ON INTERESTS NOT POSITION. Explore interests. Avoid having a bottom line. INVENT OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN. Develop mutual options to choose from; decide later. INSIST ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA. Try to reach a result based on standards independent of will. Reason and be open to reasons; yield to principle not pressure.
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Source: Fisher and Ury (1991), p. 13

Too soft?
...the books emphasis upon mutually profitable adjustment, on the problem solving aspect of bargaining, is also the books weakness. It is a weakness because emphasis of this aspect of bargaining is done to almost total exclusion of the other aspect of bargaining, distributional bargaining, where one for me is minus one for you... White
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Hard against Soft
Hard beats soft because soft accepts all demands to reach an agreement. Hard and hard cannot reach agreement because they do not want to give in. Soft and soft reach a mutual acceptable agreement.
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Principled Negotiation and the Negotiators Dilemma

The Negotiators Dilemma Prisoners Dilemma Applied Prisoners Dilemma The Winner The Successful Negotiator The Challenger: Pavlov Defense
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The Negotiators Dilemma

Best case: I claim the value the other party creates
Second best case:
We both create value
Third best case:
We both claim value
Worst case:
The other side claims the value I create
20

Prisoners Dilemma
Row player 1: cooperate (soft, creating value) Row player 2: defect (hard, claiming value)
Column player 1: cooperate (soft, creating value) R = 3, R = 3 Reward for mutual cooperation S = 0, T = 5 Suckers payoff and temptation to defect P = 1, P = 1 Punishment for mutual defection
Column player 2: defect (hard, claiming value)

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T = 5, S = 0 Temptation to defect and suckers payoff
R: reward S: sucker T: temptation P: punishment Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Applied Prisoners Dilemma

Axelrods computer tournaments
The evolution of cooperation
The easiest system won
22

The Winner
Tit-for-Tat:
- Start with cooperation - Mirror counterparts move from previous round
23

The Successful Negotiator
- Be nice - Dont be envious - Dont be too complex - Be provocable AND able to forgive
24

The Challenger: Pavlov
Win stay, lose shift
25

Defense
Is the Harvard-Concept naive? In defense of principled negotiation Escalation and the spiral theory
26

In Defense of Principled Negotiation
Why People do not Cooperate Creating or Claiming Value? Misperception
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Why people do not cooperate (Ury)
1. They are afraid 2. They dont know better 3. They dont see whats in it for them 4. They think they can win
28

Creating or Claiming Value?

Create or claim?
They create
They claim Why? They think They dont they can win see whats in (Pavlov) it for them They dont know better They are afraid
CREATE! (Getting to Yes) (Tit-for-tat)

29
CLAIM! (Tit-for-tat)
CREATE! (Getting Past No)

Misperception (Dixit & Nalebuff)

Round:
1
Player 1:
9 10
C C C C D C D D D D
Player 2: Misperception Misperception
C C C
30
D C D D D D D
D: defection
C: cooperation

Conclusion / Recommendation
Conditional openness (Lax and Sebenius)
A hardened version of the Harvard-Concept
conditional principled negotiation (Tenbergen)
31

Contents of a More Detailed Learning
Principled Negotiation Concepts The Harvard Approach Structure
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Principled Negotiation
The Harvard Concept of Principled Negotiation Everyone is a negotiator, every day. The Harvard concept of principled negotiation offers a method to optimize negotiations (defined as collective decision-making). Participants learn the skills of principled negotiation to apply them successfully to their own negotiations. Participants learn to identify "win-win options" and to overcome obstacles to agreement.
33

Concepts
Basic concepts of negotiation:
Introduction to decision analysis The importance of the BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated--Agreement) The evolution of cooperation in a competitive environment Creating and claiming value
34

The Harvard Approach
Hard and soft negotiation styles Distinguishing between positions and interests Objective criteria in negotiations How to expand the pie Simulations of different negotiation situations
35

Structure
Basics and simulation of different case studies are based on material of the Harvard Project on Negotiation. Reflections on individual negotiations and preparation of individual case studies. Simulation and analysis of prepared case studies including feedback and individual coaching. Participants get a detailed documentation of the seminar material.
36

Common Mistakes in Negotiations (Sebenius)

The Effective Negotiator How to Become One Mistake 1 - 6
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The Effective Negotiator
Could you be a more effective negotiator?
Like many executives, you know a lot about negotiating. But still you fall prey to a set of common errors. The best defence is staying focused on the right problem to solve.
Sebenius: "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators"
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How to Become One

How does one become a brilliant negotiator?
First, you must learn to solve the right negotiation problem. Understanding your counterparts interests and shaping the decision so the other side agrees for its own reasons is the key to jointly creating and claiming sustainable value from a negotiation.
To do this, ensure that you are aware of and do not make the following common mistakes of many negotiators.
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Mistake 1
Neglecting the other sides problem
In order to negotiate effectively, you must understand your own interests and no-deal options. However, understanding and addressing your counterparts problem as a means to solving your own, is just as important. If you want to change someones mind, you should first learn where that persons mind is.
40

Mistake 2
Letting price bulldoze other interests
Negotiators who only pay attention to price turn potentially positive deals into negative ones. It is important to acknowledge that economics are not everything in negotiations there are a number of competing interests. Learn how such factors as: the importance of the relationship, the social contract, the process and the interests of the full set of players, play a part in your negotiations.
41

Mistake 3
Letting positions drive out interests
Interests are underlying concerns that would be affected by a solution. An effective negotiation process is the reconciliation of underlying interests. Through joint problem solving, you should be able to meet both parties sets of interest, and thus, make a mutually beneficial deal.
42

Mistake 4
Searching too hard for common ground
When negotiating, people often become caught up in finding common ground, however, the most frequently overlooked sources of value arise from differences among the parties. Differences of interest or priority can open the door to finding different elements and giving each party what it values most, at the least cost to the other. While common ground helps, differences drive deals.
43

Mistake 5
Neglecting BATNAs
A BATNA is the course of action a party would take if the proposed deal were not possible. BATNAs set the threshold that any acceptable agreement must exceed. A strong BATNA is a necessary negotiation tool, and can serve as leverage to improve the deal. However, it is crucial to assess both your BATNA and the other partys BATNA as well.
44

Mistake 6
Failing to correct for skewed vision Even if you avoid the above five problems, a negotiation can go horribly wrong if you make one of the following errors: Self-serving role bias where one gets too committed to his / her own point of view. Partisan perceptions the inability to see biased perceptions, both on your side and the other side. To prepare effectively for negotiation, one must undertake competitive research and reality-test their views with independent parties to ensure the elimination of biased vision.
45

Pareto-Efficiency
Distribution in which the result for one party cannot be improved without making it worse for one other party Go North East!
46

Three Parties
A+B+C A+B A+C B+C
121 118 84 50
47

Objective Criteria
1. Algebra (76 / 42 / 8) 2. Equal Distribution (40,3 / 40,3 / 40,3) 3. Shapley Value (57,3 / 40,3 / 23,3)
48

Algebra
A + B = 118 A + C = 84 B + C = 50
76 + 42 = 118 76 + 8 = 84 42 + 8 = 50
A = 76 B = 42 C = 8
49

Shapley Value
A B C 118 84 71 71 0 0 344 :6 = 57,3
50
B A C 118 50 37 37 0 0 242 :6 = 40,3 A B
C 84 50 3 3 0 0 140 :6 = 23,3
B+C C+B A+B A+C -
A+C C+A B+A B+C -
A+B B+A C+A C+B -

Harborco
ZHAG HAK GWS PFULL BATNA 55 31 50 50 A1 14 0 15 0 A2 8 4 20 22 A3 0 10 0 45 B1 11 0 0 0 B2 7 0 0 25 B3 0 0 0 55 C1 0 12 42 0 C2 5 8 35 0 C3 10 6 25 0 C4 17 0 0 0 D1 35 0 30 0 D2 29 8 20 0 D3 20 13 10 0 D4 0 18 0 0 E1 0 60 2 0 E2 5 45 4 0 E3 10 30 6 0 E4 15 15 8 0 E5 23 0 0 0 Other Consensus No deal aspects = 10 = 160, against > 31 x 0.8= 10 ISK 65 0 11 5 0 20 25 0 2 4 9 10 26 40 0 4 8 15 12 0 MP 30 14 8 0 12 8 0 24 18 12 0 40 30 23 0 0 2 4 7 10 Total 281 43 73 60 23 60 80 78 68 57 26 115 113 106 18 66 64 65 57 33
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Harborco Options
1. No deal: Harborco 55, Other 150, Union 50, Env 50, Fed 65, Gov 30 2. Original: Other 0, Env 0 failed 3. Consensus (f. e. A1 B3 C2 D2 E3): Harborco 68, Other 46, Union 76, Env 55, Fed 68, Gov 66 4. Anti-Env (f. e. A2 B2 C2 D2 E3): Harborco 65, Others 50, Union 81, Env 47, Fed 74, Gov 68 5. Anti-Union (f. e. A1 B3 C4 D2 E2): Harborco 65, Others 53, Union 19, Env 55, Fed 68, Gov 46 6. Anti-Others (f. e. A1 B3 C2 D3 E5): Harborco 62, Others 21, Union 60, Env 55, Fed 67, Gov 65
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Cross-Cultural Complications (The Mouse)
Partisan perceptions Expectations Interpretation Negotiation Style
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Literature Cross-Cultural Negotiations

F.L. Acuff (1993): How to Negotiatate Anything with Anyone Anywhere Around the World, New York G. Faure and J. Rubin (eds.) (1993): Culture and Negotiation, Newbury Park G. Fisher (1980): International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, Chicago S. Weiss and W. Stripp (1985): Negotiating with Foreign Businesspersons. An Introduction for Americams with propositions on Six Cultures, New York
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Preparation of a Negotiation (I)

1. Interests: my / others 2. Issues: how many? 3. Parties: how many? 4. Possible results: value (for me / for others) 5. Options to enlarge the pie 6. Prepare cooperation test
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Preparation of a Negotiation (II)

Parties/ Possible Results BATNA P1 P2 P3 Pn
Value x
R1
x (in relation to BATNA) x
R2
Rn
56

Definition Mediation
Mediation is a process in which a neutral third party assists two or more disputants to reach a voluntary, negotiated settlement of their differences.
Lewis and Singer
57

Resolving Disputes Continuum
Negotiation Mediation Adjudication Violence
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Outline of the Mediation Process (Patton)

Advantages of mediation Goals of mediation Principled negotiation process Goals of the opening statement Elements of the opening statement Goals of the joint session Techniques Purposes for caucusing Closure and drafting
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Advantages of Mediation
More time More participation More accommodation of emotional needs More flexibility of relief More ownership Better and sooner compliance
60

Goals of Mediation
To help the parties separate relationship from substance To elucidate their interests To focus their attention on options that take into account both sides` interests To develop independent objective standards for choosing among such options
61

Goals of the Opening Statement
Establish your credibility Set the parties expectations Put people at ease Assess ownership of and responsibility for the process and its success on the parties Set the ground rules
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Elements of the Opening Statement

Introduction Explanation of the process (voluntary, your role, advantages, confidentiality) Ground rules (plaintiff first, no interruption, confidential notes, private meetings) Status of any agreement (if yes, binding, if no judge will start from scratch) Questions
63

Goals of the Joint Session

Get out the facts Discuss options Adjust the relationship between the parties Make proposals Reach agreement Put your role and ground rules into practice
64

Techniques
To generate options without commitment To get information that they will only tell you confidentially To ask tough questions without compromising your sense of impartiality To ask questions the answer to which you do not want the other party to hear To explore BATNAs and vulnerabilities To translate the concerns of one side to the other To educate a party To try out possible solutions
65

Closure and Drafting

Do not procrastinate: write it down and get it signed Avoid premature optimism Give the parties ownership Rather than writing out agreements, focus on immediate implementation Get as much implementation as you can at the time of the agreement Make the agreement as forward-looking as possible
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Be persistent

Literature
K. G. Allred and B. Mandell (2000): Positive Illusions That Backfire: The Implications of Viewing Yourself as More Cooperative Than Your Counterpart Views You. Paper presented at the June, 2000 meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management in St. Louis, MO K. G. Allred (2000): Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Model of Prescriptive Advice for Managing the Dilemma between Claiming and Creating Value. Paper presented at the June, 2000 meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management in St. Louis, MO R. Axelrod (1984): The Evolution of Cooperation, New York 1984 R. Axelrod (1997): The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration, Princeton 1997 A.K. Dixit and B. J. Nalebuff (1991): Thinking Strategically. The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, New York 1991 R. Fisher and W. Ury (1991): Getting to Yes, New York 1991 R. Fisher (1992): A Note on Tit-for-Tat, Cambridge 1992 S. B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander and Nancy H. Rogers (1999): Dispute Resolution. Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes, New York 1999 D. Lax and J. Sebenius (1986): The Manager as Negotiator, New York 1986 M. Novak and K. Sigmund (1993): A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift That Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoners Dilemma Game, in: Nature 364, 56-58 H. Raiffa (1982): The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge 1982 J. Sebenius (1992): Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review, in: Management Science, Volume 38, Number 1, January 1992, 18-38 J. Sebenius (2000): Dealmaking Essentials: Creating and Claiming Value for the Long Term, Boston 2000 R. Tenbergen (2001): Principled Negotiation and the Negotiators Dilemma: Is the Getting To Yes- Approach too soft? Paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Conference on Negotiation, Harvard University, May 2001 W. Ury (1991): Getting Past No, New York 1991 J. White (1984): The Pros and Cons of Getting to Yes, in: 34 Journal of Legal Education 115 67

Contact

Institute for Leadership Development Hhenweg 17, D-53347 Alfter Tel: +49-(0)2222-977584 E-mail:[email protected] Fax: +49-(0)2222-977585 Internet: www.ifld.de
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Institute for Leadership Development

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Negotiation is joint decision-making.

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Why are negotiations so important? Everybody negotiates every day.

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

The Harvard Negotiation Concept

How should one negotiate? Oriented on Principles

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Analysis Appleton vs. Baker

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

BATNA and ZOPA

ZOPA: zone of possible agreement

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

The Tendley Contract

Source: The Tendley Contract, Teaching Notes, Harvard Program on Negotiation

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Source: The Tendley Contract, Teaching Notes, Harvard Program on Negotiation

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Creating and claiming value

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

- Soft negotiation: focus on integrative aspect

- Hard negotiation: focus on distributive aspect

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Hard and Soft Negotiation

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Creating and Claiming Value

Claiming value: divide the pie

Creating value: expand the pie

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

The orange example: skin or fruit?

The why-question (Fisher and Ury)

Trading on differences (Lax and Sebenius)

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Does Principled Negotiation Ignore the Distributive Aspects of Negotiation?

Hard against Soft

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Source: Fisher and Ury (1991), p. 13

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Hard against Soft

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Principled Negotiation and the Negotiators Dilemma

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

The Negotiators Dilemma

Second best case:

We both create value

Third best case:

We both claim value

The other side claims the value I create

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Column player 2: defect (hard, claiming value)

T = 5, S = 0 Temptation to defect and suckers payoff

R: reward S: sucker T: temptation P: punishment Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen

Applied Prisoners Dilemma

The evolution of cooperation

The easiest system won

Dr. Rasmus Tenbergen