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Farzin Asadi

Essentials of C Programming with

Microsoft® Visual Studio®
Farzin Asadi
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Maltepe
University, Istanbul, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-031-35710-7 e-ISBN 978-3-031-35711-4

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35711-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive

license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively
licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in
any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks,

service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the
absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the
relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general
use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the
advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate
at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer
Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham,
Switzerland
In loving memory of my father Moloud Asadi and my mother Khorshid
Tahmasebi, always on my mind, forever in my heart.
Preface
C is a general-purpose procedure-oriented computer programming
language. C programming language was developed in 1972 by Dennis
Ritchie at Bell Laboratories. It was named “C” because it is an offspring
of BCPL (Basic Combined Programming Language) which was
popularly called “B” language. C was invented to write an operating
system called UNIX. The UNIX OS was totally written in C.
C is a procedure-oriented language. Procedures, also known as
routines, subroutines, or functions, simply consist of a series of
computational steps to be carried out. In procedural programming
model, the problem is break down into some small tasks and one or
more procedures are written to do each task. Then written procedures
are called to obtain the problem solution. Another programming model
is Object Oriented Programming (OOP). OOP can be defined as a
programming model which is based upon the concept of objects.
Objects contain data in the form of attributes and code in the form of
methods. OOP is not supported in C. C++ was developed in the 1980s by
Bjarne Stroustrup as an extension of C. C++ can be considered as the
OOP version of C.
C has now become a widely used professional language. Some of the
advantages of C language are:
1. Learning C programming is easy: C language has a small number
of keywords and symbols to learn. C language has one of the
simplest syntax in comparison to another programming languages.

2. C has enriched library for built-in functions: C has many pre-

written, ready-to-use libraries which contain useful functions to do
a specific task. Presence of these libraries eliminates the need to
write the code from the ground up.

3. Compiled C code has a fast execution speed: C code executes

faster than other programming languages such as Java, Ruby, PHP,
etc.

4. C language supports dynamic memory allocation: In C Language

you can allocate memory dynamically or statically. In static memory
 allocation, the allocation of memory performs at the compile time.
In dynamic memory allocation, the allocation of memory performs
at the execution or run time.
Generally, C programming is the first programming course that
students of engineering and science take. This book is written to
support a first course on C programming language. There is no
prerequisite for this book.
This book contains many examples to show how different tasks can
be done in C. All of the given examples are tested in Microsoft Visual
Studio® to ensure that they work properly without any error.
I hope that this book will be useful to the readers, and I welcome
comments on the book.
Farzin Asadi
Istanbul, Turkey
Contents
1 Installation of Microsoft® Visual Studio®
1.​1 Introduction
1.​2 Installation of Visual Studio
1.​3 Entering the C Code to Visual Studio
1.​4 Running the C Code with Visual Studio
1.​5 Errors in the Code
1.​6 Color of Keywords in Visual Studio
1.​7 Comments
1.​8 C Is a Case Sensitive Language
Further Reading
2 Basics of C Programming
2.​1 Introduction
2.​2 Primary Data Types in C
2.​3 Creating Variables
2.​4 C Programming Naming Conventions
2.​5 Printing on the Screen
2.​6 Overflow of Variables
2.​7 size_​t Data Type
2.​8 Minimum and Maximum of Primary Data Types
2.​9 Taking a Value From the User
2.​10 Blocks
2.​11 Global Variables
2.​12 Constants
2.​13 Enumeration
2.​14 typedef Keyword
 Further Readings
3 Conditional Statements
3.​1 Introduction
3.​2 if Command
3.​3 if-else Command
3.​4 Conditional Ternary Operator
3.​5 Logical Operators
3.​6 Nested if Statements
3.​7 switch-case Statement
Further Reading
4 Loops
4.​1 Introduction
4.​2 for Loop
4.​3 break Command
4.​4 continue Command
4.​5 while Loop
4.​6 Infinite Loop
4.​7 do-while Loop
Further Reading
5 Arrays
5.​1 Introduction
5.​2 Defining an Array
5.​3 Arrays and Pointers
5.​4 Length of an Array
5.​5 Removing an Element from the Array
5.​6 2D Arrays
 5.​7 Size of 2D Arrays
5.​8 malloc Function
5.​9 calloc Function
Further Reading
6 Functions
6.​1 Introduction
6.​2 Definition of a Function
6.​3 Pass by Value
6.​4 List of Functions
6.​5 void Functions
6.​6 Scope and Lifetime of Variables
6.​7 Function to Convert Fahrenheit to Celsius
6.​8 Combinations (nCr) Calculator
6.​9 Password Checker
6.​10 Heads and Tails
6.​11 Cost of a Hotel
6.​12 Fibonacci Sequence (Iterative Approach)
6.​13 Fibonacci Sequence (Recursive Approach)
6.​14 Recursive Factorial
6.​15 Recursive Product
6.​16 Recursive Max and Min
6.​17 Static Variables
6.​18 Pass by Reference
6.​19 Passing an Array to a Functions
6.​20 Functions with Variable Number of Arguments
6.​21 Entering the Functions to Separate Files
 6.​22 extern Keyword
Further Reading
7 Some Useful Functions
7.​1 Introduction
7.​2 Running an .​exe File
7.​3 Playing a .​wav File
7.​4 main Arguments
7.​5 exit Function
7.​6 atexit Function
7.​7 Reading the Mouse Pointer Position
7.​8 Timer
7.​9 Shutting Down the Computer
Further Reading
8 Pointers
8.​1 Introduction
8.​2 Address-of (&​) Operator
8.​3 Pointers
8.​4 Dereferencing (*) Operator
8.​5 Pointer Arithmetic
8.​6 Call by Reference
8.​7 malloc Function
8.​8 NULL Pointer
8.​9 void Pointer
Further Reading
9 Structures and Unions
9.​1 Introduction
 9.​2 Defining a Structure
9.​3 typedef Keyword
9.​4 Copying the Content of a Structure Variable Into Another
Structure Variable
9.​5 Functions with Structure Arguments
9.​6 Array of Structures
9.​7 Arrow Operator
9.​8 Dereferencing a Pointer to a Structure
9.​9 Unions
9.​10 Pointer to a Union
Further Reading
10 Mathematical Functions
10.​1 Introduction
10.​2 Precedence of Operators
10.​3 Remainder of Division
10.​4 sizeof Operator
10.​5 Type Casting
10.​6 Mathematical Constants
10.​7 Power Function
10.​8 Square Root Function
10.​9 Cubic Root Function
10.​10 Logarithm Function
10.​11 Trigonometric Functions
10.​12 Inverse Trigonometric Functions
10.​13 Hyperbolic Functions
10.​14 Inverse Hyperbolic Functions
 10.​15 Exponential Function
10.​16 Rounding and Truncating Numbers
10.​17 floor and ceil Functions
10.​18 fabs and hypot Functions
10.​19 Generation of Random Numbers
10.​20 Floating Point Numbers
10.​21 Complex Functions
10.​22 Binary and Hexadecimal Numbers
10.​23 Bitwise Operation
10.​24 GNU Scientific Library
Further Readings
11 String Processing
11.​1 Introduction
11.​2 Defining a String
11.​3 String Inputs
11.​4 strlen Function
11.​5 strcpy Function
11.​6 strncpy Function
11.​7 memset Function
11.​8 memcpy Function
11.​9 memmove Function
11.​10 strcmp Function
11.​11 strncmp Function
11.​12 memcmp Function
11.​13 strcat Function
11.​14 strncat Function
 11.​15 strtok Function
11.​16 strcspn Function
11.​17 strspn Function
11.​18 atoi Function
11.​19 atof Function
11.​20 sscanf Function
11.​21 sprintf Function
11.​22 strchr Function
Further Reading
12 Character Processing
12.​1 Introduction
12.​2 isalnum Function
12.​3 isalpha Function
12.​4 isdigit Function
12.​5 iscntrl Function
12.​6 ispunct Function
12.​7 isspace Function
12.​8 islower Function
12.​9 isupper Function
12.​10 tolower Function
12.​11 toupper Function
12.​12 getch Function
Further Reading
13 Time and Date
13.​1 Introduction
13.​2 Making Delay with Sleep Function
 13.​3 Time Measurement
13.​4 time Function
13.​5 Date and Time
13.​6 gmtime Function
13.​7 localtime Function
13.​8 asctime Function
13.​9 strftime Function
13.​10 _​strtime and _​strdate Functions
Further Reading
14 Sorting and Searching
14.​1 Introduction
14.​2 Bubble Sort
14.​3 Insertion Sort
14.​4 Quick Sort Algorithm
14.​5 Quick Sort for Integer Values
14.​6 Quick Sort for Double Values
14.​7 Quick Sort for Strings
14.​8 Binary Search
Further Reading
15 File Processing
15.​1 Introduction
15.​2 Creating a New File
15.​3 Append Mode
15.​4 ftell Function
15.​5 fprintf Function
15.​6 fseek Function
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
 BETWEEN THE MARQUIS OF LONDONDERRY AND MR. GRATTAN.
January 13, 1839.

In consequence of some expressions which were made use of by

the Marquis of Londonderry in the House of Lords, in reference to a
speech reported to have been made by Mr. Henry Grattan at a public
meeting in Dublin, Mr. Grattan addressed a letter of inquiry to the
Marquis, to which the following answer was returned:—
“Holdernesse House, June 12.
“Lord Londonderry presents his compliments to Mr. Henry Grattan.
Lord Londonderry read, in his place in the House of Lords, an extract
from the reports of the newspapers of a speech of Mr. O’Connell’s,
stated to have been made at a public meeting in Dublin, to address
the Queen; in which accusations were made against that party to
which Lord Londonderry is proud to belong. The paragraph Lord L.
cited is as follows:—‘Mr. Grattan had said, that her Majesty’s life
would not be safe if the Tories came into power; and he (Mr.
O’Connell) declared solemnly he was convinced she would not live
six months, if that event took place.’ Lord Londonderry at once
admits, if these sentiments are accurately reported, accusing the
Tory party of the intention of murdering the Queen, he considers
them as base and infamous. It was to such accusations Lord
Londonderry’s epithets applied.”
In a second letter, Mr. Grattan begged to say, that he was not
accountable for any opinion or expression in Mr. O’Connell’s
speeches. As he had not alluded, in any speech of his, in any way to
Lord Londonderry, he requested his lordship would distinctly say,
whether he intended that the words ‘base’ and ‘infamous’ should be
applied to him? In answer to this letter. Lord Londonderry observed,
that, unwilling as he should be to fix upon any individual the
responsibility of having uttered such sentiments as those reported in
the public accounts of the meeting to which he alluded, he must
adhere to the opinion he had already expressed, as applying to any
individual who was prepared to avow such language. The epithets
complained of were, he said, applied, not to individuals, but to
injurious accusations reported to have been publicly uttered against
a political body; and since there was no disavowal, on Mr. Henry
Grattan’s part, of the language and sentiments reported to have
been used, Lord Londonderry regretted he could not recede from the
opinions he had already expressed.
In consequence of this correspondence, a meeting was arranged,
which took place this day, at three o’clock, on Wimbledon Common.
Upon the signal being given, Lord Londonderry received Mr. Grattan’s
fire, and fired in the air. Mr. Bodkin, on the part of Mr. Grattan, then
expressed himself perfectly satisfied, and the affair terminated.
 BETWEEN LORD POWERSCOURT AND MR. ROEBUCK.
February 28, 1839.

A hostile meeting took place this day at Coombe Wood, between

Lord Powerscourt and Mr. Roebuck; the former attended by the
Honourable H. Fitzroy, and the latter by Mr. Trelawney. On the
ground endeavours were made in vain to prevent proceeding to
extremities; Lord Powerscourt’s second insisting on Mr. Roebuck’s
retracting, or apologising for, certain words delivered in a speech at
Bath. Mr. Roebuck received his adversary’s fire, discharged his pistol
in the air, and, advancing to Lord Powerscourt, said, “Now, my lord, I
am ready to make any apology your lordship may suggest; for
certainly, in my speech at Bath, I did not mean to imply anything
personally offensive.” With this declaration all parties being satisfied,
the affair terminated.
 BETWEEN LORD GEORGE LOFTUS AND LORD HARLEY.
December 10, 1839.

A duel was this day fought near Boulogne, between Lord George
Loftus and Lord Harley. Shots were exchanged without effect; and
the parties returned to Dover on the evening of the same day. The
affair originated in certain expressions used by Lord George Loftus
towards Lord Harley, on occasion of Lord Harley’s presenting himself
to the notice of Lord George, and claiming an acquaintance, of which
Lord George had no recollection whatever. Lord Harley stated, that
his introduction to Lord George had been at the instance of his
brother, Lord Loftus; and, on the faith of this statement, Lord
George’s second retracted, in his name, the expressions that gave
the offence.
 BETWEEN LORD WILLIAM PAGET AND MR. FISKE.
December 20, 1839.

A meeting took place on Wimbledon Common between Lord

William Paget and Mr. Thomas Fiske. The former was attended by
Captain Baillie, of the Lancers; and the latter by Mr. Nightingale. Mr.
Fiske received his lordship’s fire, and fired in the air; when the
seconds interfered. It appears that Lord William had called upon Mr.
Fiske to deny that he had ever lent money to his lordship, as had
been stated in a morning paper; which request was refused to be
complied with, on the ground of its being accompanied by a threat;
but, after receiving his lordship’s fire, he had no hesitation in
declaring, in the presence of Captain Baillie and Mr. Nightingale, that
he never had lent any money to his lordship.
 BETWEEN MR. WYNN AND MR. BROWN, IN A STAGE-COACH.
May 17, 1840.

The following is from a New York paper:—On the 17th of May, two
persons, one named Robert Wynn, and the other Joseph D. Brown,
quarreled in a stage-coach between Peru and Chicago, Illinois. Both
drew their pistols, fired, and killed each other. One was shot in the
head; the other in the heart. They were the only passengers.
 BETWEEN M. THROUET AND M. PAULIN PRUÉ.
June, 1840.

The following account of a frightful duel fought near New Orleans,

is from the Courier de la Louisiane:—A meeting, as atrocious in the
mode of conducting it, as it was disastrous in its result, has just
taken place between M. Hippolyte Throuet and M. Paulin Prué, both
Frenchmen by birth, and long resident in this city. It originated in a
bitterly contested law-suit, and took place in the following manner.
The principals were placed at five paces distant from each other,
back to back, with a pistol in each hand. At a signal agreed upon,
they were to turn round and fire. At the first discharge they fired
together, but without effect. Prué then took his second pistol into his
right hand; but so precipitately, that it was discharged in the air.
Seeing himself thus exposed, without any means of defence, to his
adversary’s fire, he presented his bosom to him, and said, “Fire!”
Several of the bystanders, of whom there were a great number,
trembling for the fate which awaited the disarmed man, cried out
from their places, “Don’t fire!” but the seconds interposed, and,
demanding who dared to interfere in a matter of the sort, invited
Throuet to discharge his pistol against his opponent. Throuet needed
not the invitation; but, having kept both Prué and the bystanders for
a considerable time in a state of the most painful suspense, still
holding Prué covered with his pistol, and grinning ferociously, fired at
last, and, the ball passing through Prué’s body, he died
instantaneously.
 BETWEEN MR. ANTONIO GARBONIA AND MR. KECHOFF.
July 4, 1840.

A meeting took place in one of the Kilburn fields, adjoining the

New North-road, St. John’s Wood, between Mr. Antonio Garbonia
and Mr. Nicholas Kechoff. On the first fire Mr. Garbonia received his
antagonist’s ball in his left groin, and fell. Mr. Kechoff advanced to
the wounded man, shook hands with him, and immediately quitted
the ground with his friends. The cause of the meeting arose from
disputed betting at a billiard-table.
 BETWEEN THE EARL OF CARDIGAN AND CAPTAIN HARVEY GARNETT PHIPPS
TUCKETT.
September 12, 1840.

In consequence of the Earl of Cardigan having ascertained, that

certain letters which had recently been published in the Morning
Chronicle, reflecting, as his lordship considered, on his character as
an officer and a gentleman, were written by Lieutenant Tuckett, late
of the 11th regiment of Dragoons, of which his lordship is
Lieutenant-Colonel, the noble Lord sent him, through Captain
Douglas, a challenge. This was accepted, and Captain Wainwright, of
the Half-pay, was selected by him to arrange the preliminaries. An
apology was demanded by the noble Earl; to which the reply was,
that if he would deny the allegations contained in the letters referred
to, it should be given. Lord Cardigan declared that certain portions
were true; but that the greater part were calumnies. On this the
apology was refused, and a meeting was the consequence.
It took place on the afternoon of Saturday, the 12th of September,
on Wimbledon Common. The first shot was ineffectual on both sides:
on the second, Mr. Tuckett received his adversary’s ball in the back
part of the lower ribs, which traversed round to the spine. As Lord
Cardigan and his second were moving off after the duel, they were
taken into custody, but liberated on bail being given to the police for
their appearance before the magistrates at Wandsworth on Monday:
when Sir James Anderson deposed, that, after the removal of Mr.
Tuckett to his house, he made an examination, and found that a
pistol bullet had entered on the upper part of his right hip-bone,
slightly shattering it, had passed transversely, and come out over the
spine of the back-bone. He said he had visited the patient again on
Sunday, and saw no symptoms of present danger. The magistrates
decided, that, as the case was one of a serious nature, they could
not be contented with ordinary recognizances, but should order the
Earl of Cardigan to enter into his own recognizance in the sum of a
thousand pounds, and Captain Douglas in the sum of five hundred,
to ensure their reappearance before that bench on Monday, the
28th.
The following statement of this affair was published by Lord
Cardigan:—“Lord Cardigan having been informed, upon good
authority, that the editor of the Morning Chronicle, upon application
being made to him for the name of the writer of a letter dated the
3rd of September 1840, signed ‘An Old Soldier,’ which appeared in
that paper of the 4th of September, had stated it to come from Mr.
Harvey Tuckett, Captain Douglas, at the request of Lord Cardigan,
waited upon Mr. Tuckett, on the 11th instant, to demand satisfaction.
Mr. Tuckett acknowledged himself the author, and requested time to
go into the country, to consult Captain Wainwright as his friend. On
Saturday, the 12th instant, Captain Douglas met Captain Wainwright,
when the latter solicited in writing the grounds upon which Lord
Cardigan demanded satisfaction of his friend Mr. Tuckett. Captain
Douglas delivered, about half-past two, P.M., the following statement,
viz.—
“‘Lord Cardigan yesterday authorised Captain Douglas to require
of Mr. Tuckett to afford him satisfaction, in consequence of a letter,
of which Mr. Tuckett has avowed himself the author, and which
appeared in the Morning Chronicle of the 4th instant, signed ‘An Old
Soldier;’ many parts of which contained matter entirely false, and
the whole of which was slanderous, insulting, and calumnious.
“‘Cardigan.’”
“London, September 12”

September 28.
Lord Cardigan, his second, and the second of Lieutenant Tuckett,
were brought before the bench of magistrates at Wandsworth, and
were all committed to take their trial at the ensuing sessions of the
Central Criminal Court. The charge, as against the noble Lord, was
for “shooting with a pistol at Lieutenant Harvey Tuckett, with intent
to murder or do him some bodily harm;” and, as against Captain
Douglas and Captain Wainwright, for aiding and abetting, in the
character of seconds. Lord Cardigan was admitted to bail on his own
recognizance of 2000l., and two sureties of 1000l. each; and the two
other prisoners were required severally to give bail in the sum of
500l., and two sureties in 250l. each. The parties were then bound
over to appear and prosecute the prisoners at the ensuing sessions.
October 14.
Lieutenant Tuckett being sufficiently recovered to appear before
the magistrates of the Wandsworth Court, a special session was this
day held, for the purpose of entering into his examination, on the
charge of shooting at the Earl of Cardigan, with intent to murder
him. The former evidence having been read over, he was fully
committed to take his trial upon the charge of felony, and ordered to
enter into his own recognizance in the sum of 1000l., and two
sureties in 500l. each.
October 21.
At the session of the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Adolphus, in
behalf of the Earl of Cardigan, this day begged leave to ask the
judges on the bench a question, before their lordships proceeded to
the business of the day. He found, he said, that on the list of causes
to be tried, there appeared against the seventh, the name of James
Thomas Brudenell, Earl of Cardigan. Now, Lord Cardigan, being a
peer of the realm, could not be tried in that court. He therefore
submitted, that the name of the noble Earl should be taken from the
list. Mr. Justice Bosanquet and Mr. Justice Erskine agreed, that the
course would be to remove the indictment, by a writ of certiorari,
into the Court of the Lord High Steward, and that it would be very
inconvenient to try the case of Captain Douglas before that of Lord
Cardigan. It was finally arranged, that the recognizances of all the
parties should be respited until the next session.
February 16.

TRIAL OF THE EARL OF CARDIGAN, BEFORE THE HOUSE

OF LORDS, IN FULL PARLIAMENT, FOR FELONY.
A little before eleven o’clock. Lord Denman, in the absence of the
Lord Chancellor, on account of indisposition, entered the House of
Lords in his robes, preceded by the Sergeant with the mace, Black
Rod carrying the Lord High Steward’s staff, and Garter with the
sceptre, and took his seat on the woolsack as Lord Speaker. After
prayers the roll of peers was called over, beginning with the junior
Baron; after which, the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery delivered the
commission to the Lord Speaker, who gave it the Deputy Clerk of the
Crown in the Queen’s Bench to read; which he did, the peers
standing. The commission authorised their lordships to proceed with
the trial of James Thomas Earl of Cardigan, on an indictment found
against him for felony, which had been removed before them by
certiorari, and appointed Lord Denman Lord High Steward. After the
writ of certiorari and the record of the indictment had been read,
proclamation was made for the Yeoman Usher to bring the Earl of
Cardigan to the bar. On approaching it, he made three reverences,
and knelt till directed by the Lord High Steward to rise. He then
made three reverences, one to the Lord High Steward, and one to
the peers on each side: after which, he was conducted to the stool
provided for him within the bar, near to his counsel. The Lord High
Steward informed him, that he was charged with the offence of
firing with a loaded pistol at Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, with
intent to murder him; in a second count with firing with intent to
maim and disable him; and in a third count with firing with intent to
do him some grievous bodily harm. Being then arraigned by the
Deputy Clerk of the Crown, and asked whether he was guilty of the
said felony, and how he would be tried, the Earl answered, “By my
Peers.” The Attorney-General and Mr. Waddington appeared as
counsel for the prosecution; and Sir William Follett, Mr. sergeant
Wrangham, and Mr. Adolphus, for the Earl of Cardigan. Mr.
Waddington having opened the indictment.
The Attorney-General then addressed their lordships as follows:
—“I have the honour to attend your lordships on this occasion as
Attorney-General for her Majesty, to lay before you the
circumstances of the case upon which you will be called to
pronounce judgment, without any object or wish on my part, except
that I may humbly assist your lordships in coming to a right
conclusion upon it, according to its merits. An indictment has been
found against a peer of the realm by a grand jury of the country,
charging him with a felony, the punishment of which is
transportation or imprisonment. That indictment has been removed
before your lordships, at the request of the noble prisoner; and, I
must say, most properly removed; for an inferior court had no
jurisdiction to try him. The charge is, upon the face of it, of a most
serious character, and it would not have been satisfactory if it had
gone off without any inquiry. The policeman, however, who was
bound over to prosecute, fulfilled his recognizances by appearing at
the Central Criminal Court, and preferring the indictment.—It is
possible, my Lords, that in the course of this trial, questions of great
magnitude on the construction of acts of parliament, or respecting
the privileges of the peerage, may arise, which it is of great
importance to this House, to the Crown, and to the community,
should be deliberately discussed. According to all the precedents
that can be found, whenever a peer has been tried in parliament,
the prosecution has been conducted by the law-officers of the
Crown. Fortunately, we have no living memory on this subject. It is
now sixty-four years since any proceeding of this sort has taken
place; and I am rejoiced to think, that on the present occasion the
charge against the noble prisoner at the bar does not imply any
degree of moral turpitude, and that, if he should be found guilty, his
conviction will reflect no discredit on the illustrious order to which he
belongs. At the same time, my Lords, it clearly appears to me, that
he has been guilty of infringing the statute law of the realm, which
this and all other courts of justice are bound to respect and enforce.
Your lordships are not sitting as a court of honour, or as a branch of
the legislature: your lordships are sitting here as a court bound by
the rules of law, and under a sanction as sacred as that of an oath.
“My Lords, the indictment against the Earl of Cardigan is framed
upon an act of parliament which passed in the first year of the reign
of her present Majesty. It charges the noble defendant with having
shot at Captain Harvey Tuckett, with the several intents set forth in
the indictment. I think I shall best discharge my duty to your
lordships by presenting to you a brief history of the law on this
subject. By the common law of England, personal violence, where
death did not ensue from it, amounted to a mere misdemeanour;
and, if the wounded party did not die within a year and a day, no
felony was committed. The first act which created a felony where
death did not ensue was the 5th of Henry IV. cap. 5. By that act
certain personal injuries without death were made felonies, with
benefit of clergy. Then came the Coventry Act, in the 22nd and 23rd
of Charles II, whereby any person lying in wait for, and wounding
another with intent to maim or disfigure, was guilty of felony,
without benefit of clergy. Under both these acts no offence was
committed unless a wound was inflicted; and it was not until the 9th
of George I, commonly called the Black Act, that an attempt, where
no wound was given, was made a felony. By that act it was enacted,
that if any person should wilfully and maliciously shoot at any person
in any dwelling-house or other place, he should be guilty of felony,
without benefit of clergy, although no wound were inflicted: but it
was determined upon that statute,—and in fairness to the noble
prisoner it is my duty to remind your lordships of it,—that unless the
case was one in which, if death had ensued, it would have
amounted to murder, no offence was committed under the statute.
That was determined in the case of the King and Gastineaux, which
is reported in the first volume of Leach’s Crown Cases, page 417. In
that case the law was thus laid down:—‘The offence charged in this
indictment is described by the statute on which it is framed, in very
few and very clear words, which are—That if any person or persons
shall wilfully and maliciously shoot at any person in any dwelling-
house or other place, he shall be adjudged guilty of felony, without
benefit of clergy. The word ‘maliciously’ is made to constitute the
very essence of this crime; no act of shooting, therefore, will
amount, under this statute, to a capital offence, unless it be
accompanied with such circumstances as, in construction of law,
would have amounted to the crime of murder if death had ensued
from such act. This proposition most clearly and unavoidably results
from the legal interpretation of the word “maliciously,” as applied to
this subject; for there is no species of homicide in which malice
forms any ingredient but that of murder; and it follows that neither
an accidental shooting, nor a shooting in the transport of passion,
excited by such a degree of provocation as will reduce homicide to
the offence of manslaughter, are within the meaning of the statute;
for from both of these cases the law excludes every idea of malice.’
The law continued on this footing until an act was passed in the
43rd of George III, which is commonly called Lord Ellenborough’s
Act. This act did not repeal the Black Act, but greatly extended its
operation, and among other enactments contains this:—‘That if any
person or persons shall wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully shoot at
any of his Majesty’s subjects, or shall wilfully, maliciously, and
unlawfully present, point, or level any kind of loaded fire-arms at any
of his Majesty’s subjects, and attempt, by drawing a trigger or in any
other manner, to discharge the same at or against his or their person
or persons, or shall wilfully, maliciously, or unlawfully stab or cut any
of his Majesty’s subjects, with intent in so doing, or by means
thereof, to murder, or rob, or to maim, disfigure, or disable such his
Majesty’s subject or subjects, or with intent to do some other
grievous bodily harm to such his Majesty’s subject or subjects, shall
be guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy.’ This act, however, has
the following express proviso:—‘Provided always, that in case it shall
appear on the trial of any person or persons indicted for the wilfully,
maliciously, and unlawfully shooting at any of his Majesty’s subjects,
that if death had ensued therefrom the same would not in law have
amounted to the crime of murder; that then and in every such case
the person or persons so indicted shall be deemed and taken to be
not guilty of the felonies whereof they shall be so indicted, but be
thereof acquitted.’ Your lordships will observe, that by this act it is
made a capital offence to shoot at, with intent to murder, or maim,
disfigure, or do grievous bodily harm; but the offence came within
the statute only when, if death should have ensued, it would have
amounted to the crime of murder.
“Next came the statute of the 9th of George IV. cap. 31, which, I
believe, is generally called Lord Lansdowne’s Act; that noble Lord
having introduced it into parliament when he was Secretary of State
for the Home Department. This is entitled ‘An Act to consolidate and
amend the statutes relating to offences against the person.’ It
repeals the Black Act and Lord Ellenborough’s Act, but it contains
provisions similar to those of the latter. The eleventh section enacts,
‘That if any person unlawfully and maliciously shoot at any person,
with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or do some
other grievous bodily harm to such person, he shall be guilty of
felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall suffer death as a felon.’
But this act contains the same proviso as was inserted in Lord
Ellenborough’s Act, ‘That in case it shall appear on the trial of any
person, that, if death had ensued therefrom, the same would not
have amounted to the crime of murder, the person so indicted shall
be acquitted of felony.’ Still it remained a capital offence to shoot at
with intent to murder, or maim, or disfigure, or do bodily harm,
although no wound was inflicted.
“Things remained on this footing until the act was passed on
which the present indictment was framed. This act, which received
the royal assent on the 17th of July 1837, is the 1st of Victoria, cap.
85, and is entitled, ‘An Act to amend the laws relating to offences
against the person.’ The preamble recites that ‘it is expedient to
amend so much of the act of the 9th of George IV. as relates to any
person who shall unlawfully and maliciously shoot at any person, or
who shall, by drawing a trigger, or in any other manner, attempt to
discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person,’ &c.; and by the
second and third section it enacts, ‘That whosoever shall stab, cut,
or wound any person, or shall, by any means whatsoever, cause to
any person any bodily injury dangerous to life, with intent in any of
the cases aforesaid to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and,
being convicted, shall suffer death.’ Therefore, by this act, to shoot
at a person and inflict a wound dangerous to life remains a capital
offence; but the act of shooting, when no wound is inflicted, is no
longer a capital offence, and remains a felony only, punishable with
transportation or imprisonment. The fourth section enacts, ‘That
whosoever unlawfully and maliciously shall shoot at any person, or
shall, by drawing a trigger, attempt to discharge any kind of loaded
arms at any person, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such
person, or do some other grievous bodily harm to such person, he
shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable
to be transported beyond the seas,’ &c. This act contains no such
proviso as is to be found in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, and that of the
9th of George IV.; a circumstance which it is material your lordships
should bear in mind, when you come to deliberate on your judgment
with regard to the second and third counts of the indictment.
“My Lords, I am happy to say that the indictment contains no
count on the capital charge: a wound was inflicted; but the
prosecutor has very properly restricted the charge to firing at, with
intent, without alleging that any wound dangerous to life was
inflicted. The first count charges, that the Earl of Cardigan shot at
Captain Tuckett with intent, in the language of the law, to commit
the crime of murder. The second count charges the Earl of Cardigan
with the same act, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable Captain
Tuckett; and the third count charges his lordship with the same act,
with intent to do some grievous bodily harm. It will be for your
lordships to say whether, upon the facts which I shall lay before you,
and which I am instructed to say can be clearly made out in
evidence, each and every one of the counts must not be considered
as fully established. The substance of the evidence in this case is,
that on the 12th of September last the Earl of Cardigan fought a
duel with pistols, on Wimbledon Common, with Captain Tuckett, and
wounded him at the second exchange of shots. It will appear that,
about five o’clock in the afternoon of that day, two carriages, coming
in opposite directions, were seen to arrive on Wimbledon Common,
and a party of gentlemen alighted from each. It was evident to those
who observed what was going on, that a duel was in contemplation.
The parties went to a part of the common between the road that
leads to Lord Spencer’s park and a windmill. The seconds made the
usual preparations: the principals, the Earl of Cardigan and Captain
Tuckett, were placed at a distance of about twelve yards; they
exchanged shots without effect; they received from their seconds
each another pistol; they again fired, and Captain Tuckett was
wounded by the Earl of Cardigan. Mr. Dann, who occupied the mill,
his son, and Sir James Anderson, a surgeon, who was standing close
by, went up immediately. The wound was examined, it bled freely;
but fortunately—and I am sure no one rejoices at the circumstance
more than the noble prisoner—it proved to be not of a dangerous
nature. Mr. Dann, the miller, who was a constable, took the whole
party into custody. The wound was again formally examined, and Sir
James Anderson pressed that he might be set at liberty, and allowed
to take Captain Tuckett to his house in London; which was
immediately acceded to, upon the Captain’s promising to appear
before the magistrates, when he was recovered. The miller retained
the Earl of Cardigan, and his second, Captain Douglas, as well as
Captain Wainwright, the second of Captain Tuckett. The Earl of
Cardigan had still a pistol in his hand when the miller approached
him; and two cases of pistols were on the ground, one of which bore
the crest of the noble Earl, and was claimed by him as his property.
The parties in custody were conducted before the magistrates at
Wandsworth, when the Earl of Cardigan made use of these words:
—‘I have fought a duel; I have hit my man, I believe not seriously.’
Then, pointing to Captain Douglas, he said, ‘This gentleman is also a
prisoner, and my second.’ He was asked whether the person he had
hit was Captain Reynolds; upon which he replied, ‘Do you think I
would condescend to fight with one of my own officers?’ His lordship
was compelled by the magistrates to enter into recognizances to
appear when called upon; which he did from time to time, till at last
the matter was carried to the Central Criminal Court. The witnesses I
shall call before your lordships are the miller, his wife and son, and
the policeman named Busain, who was at the station-house, and will
speak to the declarations made by the Earl of Cardigan. I can offer
no evidence respecting the origin of the quarrel. Captain Douglas is
to take his trial for his share in the transaction: he, as your lordships
will observe, is jointly indicted with the Earl of Cardigan. A bill was
also preferred against Captain Tuckett and Captain Wainwright, but
the grand jury had thrown it out. Those gentlemen, however, are still
liable to be tried; and it would not be decorous to summon them
before your lordships, to give evidence which might afterwards be
turned against themselves when they would be on trial for their
lives. I shall call Sir James Anderson, who has hitherto spoken fairly
on the subject, and, I suppose, will now make no objection to state
all that fell within his observation.
 “Upon these facts it will be for your lordships to say whether all
the counts of the indictment are not fully proved and supported.
With respect to the first count, it is painful to use the language
which it necessarily recites; but it will be for your lordships to say
whether, in point of law, the noble prisoner at the bar did not shoot
at Captain Tuckett with intent to commit the crime therein
mentioned. I at once acquit the Earl of Cardigan of anything unfair
in the conduct of this duel. Something has been said respecting the
noble Earl’s pistols having rifle barrels, while those of Captain
Tuckett had not such barrels. However that may have been, I have
the most perfect conviction, that nothing but what was fair and
honourable was intended; and that the Earl of Cardigan most
probably imagined, when he carried his pistols to the field with him,
that one of them would be directed against his own person. Nor do I
suppose that there was any grudge, any personal animosity, any
rancour or malignity, on the part of the noble Earl towards his
antagonist. Whether the noble Earl gave or received the invitation to
go out, I believe his only object was to preserve his reputation, and
maintain his station in society as an officer and a gentleman. His
lordship is in the army; he is Lieutenant-Colonel of the 11th Hussars;
and no doubt he, on this occasion, only complied with what he
considered to be necessary to be done, according to the usages of
society. But, if death had ensued under these circumstances, it
would have been a great calamity; and, although moralists of high
name have excused and even defended the practice of duelling, your
lordships must consider what, in this respect, is the law of England.
There can be no doubt that, by the law of England, parties who go
out deliberately to fight a duel, if death ensues, are guilty of murder.
It will be my duty to state to your lordships a few of the leading
authorities on this point. I will mention the highest authorities known
to the law of England—Hale, Hawkins, Foster, and Blackstone. Hale,
in his Pleas of the Crown, vol. i. page 453, says:—‘If A and B
suddenly fall out, and they presently agree to fight in a field, and run
and fetch their weapons, and go to the field and fight, and A kills B,
this is not murder, but homicide; for it is but a continuance of the
sudden falling out, and the blood was never cooled; but if there
were deliberation, as that they went on the next day,—nay, though it
was the same day, if there were such a competent distance of time
that in common presumption they had time of deliberation,—then it
is murder.’ In the first volume of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, c. 31,
sec. 21, the law on this subject is thus laid down:—‘It seems agreed,
that whenever two persons in cool blood meet and fight on a
precedent quarrel, and one of them is killed, the other is guilty of
murder, and cannot help himself by alleging that he was struck first
by the deceased; or that he had often declined to meet him, and
was prevailed upon to do it by his importunity; or that it was his
intent only to vindicate his reputation; or that he meant not to kill,
but only to disarm his adversary; for, since he deliberately engaged
in an act highly unlawful, in defiance of the laws, he must, at his
peril, abide the consequence thereof. And from hence it follows, that
if two persons quarrel over-night, and appoint to fight next day, or
quarrel in the morning and agree to fight in the afternoon, or such a
considerable time after, by which, in common intendment, it must be
presumed that the blood was cooled, and then they meet and fight,
and one kills the other, he is guilty of murder. And whenever it
appears, from the whole circumstances, that he who kills another on
a sudden quarrel, was master of his temper at the time, he is guilty
of murder; as if, after the quarrel, he fall into a discourse, and talks
calmly thereon; or, perhaps, if he have so much consideration as to
say that the place wherein the quarrel happens is not convenient for
fighting, or that, if he should fight at present, he should have the
disadvantage by reason of the height of his shoes.’ The last
observation refers to Lord Morley’s case, where, though a case of
manslaughter, it was a circumstance strongly pressed to show that
the offence was one of a deeper dye. Sir Michael Foster, in his
Discourse on Homicide, says:—‘Upon this principle, deliberate
duelling, if death ensues, is, in the eye of the law, murder; because
duels are generally founded on a feeling of revenge: and though a
person should be drawn into a duel upon a motive not so criminal,
but merely upon the punctilio of what the swordsmen call honour,
that is no excuse; for those who deliberately seek the blood of
another, act in defiance of all laws, human and divine. But if, on a
sudden quarrel, they fight upon the spot, or if they presently fetch
their weapons, and go into a field and fight, and one of them falleth,
that is but manslaughter, because it may be presumed the blood
never cooled. It will be otherwise if the parties appoint the next day
to fight, or even the same day, at such an interval as that the
passion may have subsided, or if, from any circumstances attending
the case, it may reasonably be presumed that their judgment had
controlled the first transports of passion before they engaged. The
same rule will hold if, after a quarrel, the parties fall into other
discourse or diversions, and continue so engaged as to afford
reasonable time for cooling.’ Blackstone, in his fourth volume, page
199, thus writes, when describing and defining the crime of murder:
—‘This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties
meet avowedly with an intent to murder; thinking it their duty, as
gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own
lives and those of their fellow-creatures; without any warrant or
authority from any power, either divine or human, but in direct
contradiction to the laws both of God and man; and therefore the
law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder on them,
and on their seconds also.’
“My Lords, these are the highest authorities known to the law of
England, and they are uniformly followed by the English judges. The
most recent cases of this nature which have occurred within the last
few years, are those of Sir John Jeffcott,[8] and the parties concerned
in the death of Mr. Mirfin; and in these the doctrine I have stated to
your lordships was laid down and acted upon strictly. Such, then,
being the definition of murder constantly given from the bench on
trials for life and death, are not your lordships to suppose that the
legislature has made use of the word ‘murder’ in the same sense;
and that when we find in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, in the 9th of Geo.
IV. and in this of the 1st of Victoria, the expression ‘with intent to
commit murder,’ it means with intent to do that which, if
accomplished, would amount in law to the crime of murder? The
legislature, and your lordships as part of it, must be taken to have
well known what was the legal definition of murder, and to have
used the expression, in a judicial act, in its legal sense. Then, my
Lords, however painful the consideration may be, does it not
necessarily follow, that the first count of the indictment is completely
found? The circumstances clearly show that the Earl of Cardigan and
Captain Tuckett met by appointment. The arrangements being
completed, they fired twice; the Earl of Cardigan took deliberate
aim, fired, and wounded his antagonist. He must be supposed to
have intended that which he did. If, unfortunately, death had
ensued, would not this have been a case of murder? The only
supposition by which the case could be reduced to one of
manslaughter would be, that the Earl of Cardigan and Captain
Tuckett met casually on Wimbledon Common; that they suddenly
quarreled; and that, whilst their blood was hot, they fought; but
your lordships will hardly strain the facts so far as to say that this
was a casual meeting, when you see that each party was
accompanied by a second, and supplied with a brace of pistols, and
that the whole affair was conducted according to the forms and
solemnities observed when a deliberate duel is fought.—With respect
to the second and third counts, I know not what defence can
possibly be suggested; because, even if it had been a casual
meeting, and if death had ensued under circumstances which would
have amounted only to manslaughter, that would be no defence to
the second and third counts. I presume to assert that, on the
authority of a case which came before the fifteen judges of England,
and which was decided; two most learned judges doubting on the
occasion, but not dissenting from the decision. The two judges who
doubted, were his Grace the Lord High Steward, who presides over
your lordships’ proceedings on this occasion, and Mr. Justice
Littledale. It would not become me to say anything of the learning
and ability of the noble High Steward in his presence; but, with
respect to Mr. Justice Littledale, I will say, that there never was a
more learned or acute judge than he was, whose retirement from
the bench the bar has lately witnessed with reluctance and regret. I
therefore attach the greatest weight to any doubts proceeding from
such a quarter; but the thirteen other judges entertained no doubt
upon that occasion, and came to the conclusion, that, upon the
fourth section of the act upon which the present indictment was
framed, it is not necessary for a conviction, that if death ensued the
offence should amount to murder. The case to which I refer is to be
found in the second volume of Moody’s Crown Cases, page 40. It
was a case tried before Mr. Baron Parke, on the Norfolk Spring
Circuit, in 1838.”
The Lord High Steward.—“What is the name?”
The Attorney-General.—“The case is anonymous, the name of the
prisoner not being given; but it is an authentic case, and the point in
doubt is clearly set forth in the question submitted to the fifteen
judges. I will read what is material to your lordships:—‘The opinion
of the judges is requested by Mr. Baron Parke and Mr. Baron Bolland,
upon two questions which arose in the Norfolk Spring circuit, 1838.’
The first question only is material. The case first recites the 9th
George IV. sec. 11 and 12, and the preamble and enacting part of
1st Victoria; points out the circumstance that the latter act does not
contain the same proviso as is found in those of Lords Ellenborough
and Lansdowne; and then submits this question for the opinion of
the judges:—‘Is it now a defence to an indictment for wounding with
intent to maim, &c. that, if death had ensued, the offence would not
have been murder, but manslaughter?’ Your lordships will observe,
that shooting at, with intent to maim or disable, and stabbing with
the same intent, are in the same category, and must be attended
with all the same rules and incidents. This opinion will therefore
have the same authority as if the question submitted by Barons
Parke and Bolland had been whether, on an indictment for shooting
at, with intent to disable, it would be a defence to show, that, if
death had ensued, the offence would not have amounted to murder.
The opinion of the judges was as follows:—‘At a meeting of the
judges in Easter term, 1838, they all thought it to be now no
defence to such an indictment, that, if death had ensued, the
offence would not have been murder, but manslaughter; except the
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Denman, and Mr. Justice Littledale.’ The Lord
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Littledale, it will be observed, did not
dissent, they only doubted; but the other thirteen judges seem
clearly to hold, that the plea set forth does not now amount to any
defence; and I apprehend that the judges probably reasoned in this
manner,—the intention of the legislature being to make offences
which before were capital, punishable only with transportation or
imprisonment, the quality of the offence is not precisely the same as
before; and that if a person maims another or disables him, or does
him some grievous bodily harm, even though it were an
unpremeditated act, arising out of a sudden scuffle, it should
nevertheless be an offence under this act, which gives a
discretionary power to the court before whom the offence is tried,
either to transport for fifteen years, or to imprison for a single hour.
The judges, doubtless, considering this discretionary power, and the
omission of the proviso which was in the preceding acts,—seeing
that the capital punishment was abolished,—came to the conclusion
that the offence was committed, though, if death had ensued, it
would not under the circumstances have amounted to the crime of
murder. Looking to the authority of this case, I know not what
defence can possibly be urged with respect to the second and third
counts. I rejoice, my Lords, to think the noble prisoner will have an
advantage upon this occasion, which has never before been enjoyed
by any peer who has been tried at your lordships’ bar; an advantage
which neither Lord Lovat, Lord Byron, Lord Ferrers, nor the Duchess
of Kingston could claim. He will have the advantage of the assistance
of my most able, ingenious, zealous, and learned friend. Sir William
Follett, who will address your lordships in his behalf upon the facts
and merits of the case. This privilege is secured to the noble
prisoner under that most admirable law which your lordships passed
a few years ago, by which, in all cases of felony, the party accused
has the advantage of addressing, through his counsel, the tribunal
which is to determine on his guilt or innocence. Notwithstanding,
however, all the learning, ability, and zeal of my honourable and
learned friend, I know not how he will be able to persuade your
lordships to acquit his noble client on any one count of this
indictment. My learned friend will not ask your lordships—and if he
did, he would ask you in vain—to forget the law by which you are
bound. My Lord, Captain Douglas stands on his trial before another
tribunal, and his trial has been postponed by the judges, on the
express ground that the same case is first to be tried by the highest
criminal court known in the empire. Your lordships are to lay down
the law by which all inferior courts are to be bound. I beg leave, on
this subject, to read the words made use of at this bar by one of the
most distinguished of my predecessors, who afterwards, for many
years, presided with great dignity on the woolsack—I mean Lord
Thurlow. When Lord Thurlow was Attorney-General, in addressing
this House, in the case of the Duchess of Kingston, he made use of
this language:—‘I do desire to press this upon your lordships as a
universal maxim; no more dangerous idea can creep into the mind
of a judge, than the imagination that he is wiser than the law. I
confine this to no judge, whatever may be his denomination, but
extend it to all; and, speaking at the bar of an English court of
justice, I make sure of your lordships’ approbation when I comprise
even your lordships, sitting in Westminster Hall. It is a grievous
example to other judges. If your lordships assume this, sitting in
judgment, why not the King’s Bench? Why not commissioners of
oyer and terminer? If they do so, why not the quarter-sessions?
Ingenious men may strain the law very far; but to pervert it, was to
new-model it. The genius of our constitution says, judges have no
such authority, nor shall presume to exercise it.’ I conclude, my
Lords, with the respectful expression of my conviction, that your
lordships’ judgment in this case, whatever it may be, will be
according to the law and justice of the case; and that you will
preserve the high reputation, in the exercise of your judicial
functions, which has so long been enjoyed by your lordships and
your ancestors.”—The honourable and learned gentleman then
bowed to their lordships, and was about to withdraw, when he again
turned to the House and said: “Will your lordships allow me to
mention, that, on account of the sudden illness of my learned friend,
the Solicitor-General, he is deprived of the honour of attending to-
day before your lordships, as he had intended.”
Thomas Hunt Dann, the miller at Wimbledon, was then examined
by Mr. Waddington, and deposed to the facts, as described by the
Attorney-General. He said, he consented to allow the wounded
gentleman to go home, on his giving him a card, with the address of
the party upon it.—After which, the Attorney-General offered to give
in as evidence the card which the witness received.—Sir William
Follett objected to the reading of it as evidence; and, after
considerable discussion, the Lord High Steward proposed to
postpone the consideration of the objection.—The son and wife of
the miller were then examined; after which, Sir James Anderson
being sworn, the Lord High Steward said:—“With the permission of
the House, I think it my duty to inform you, that, after the opening
we have heard from the Attorney-General, you are not bound to
answer any question which may tend to criminate yourself.” Sir
James was then thus examined by the Attorney-General:—“Of what
profession are you?”—“I am a physician.”—“Where do you
live?”—“In New Burlington Street.”—“Are you acquainted with
Captain Tuckett?”—“I must decline answering that question.”—“Were
you on Wimbledon Common on the 12th of September?”—“I must
decline answering that also.” (Laughter.)—“Were you on that day
called on to attend any gentleman that was wounded?”—“I must
decline that again.” (Laughter.)—“Can you tell where Captain Tuckett
lives?”—“I must decline the question.”—“Has he a house in
London?”—“I decline answering that question.” (Laughter.)—“Do you
decline answering any question whatever respecting Captain
Tuckett?”—“Any question that may criminate myself.”—“And you
consider answering any question respecting Captain Tuckett may
tend to criminate you?”—“Possibly it would.”—“And on that ground
you decline?”—“I do.”
John Busain, an inspector of the metropolitan police, was
examined by the Attorney-General. He deposed, that he was on duty
when Lord Cardigan and Captain Douglas came to the station-house
at Wandsworth, on the evening of the 12th of September.—“I
bowed, and asked his business. He said he was a prisoner, he
believed. ‘Indeed, sir,’ said I; ‘on what account?’ His lordship said, ‘I
have been fighting a duel, and I have hit my man; but not seriously,
I believe; slightly, merely a graze across the back.’ He then pointed
over his shoulder and looked over, and said, ‘This gentleman also is
a prisoner; my second. Captain Douglas.’ He presented me with his
card, and I saw ‘The Earl of Cardigan, of the 11th Dragoons.’ I then
alluded to the duel, and said, ‘Not with Captain Reynolds, I hope?’
and his lordship spurned the idea of fighting a duel with one of his
own officers.” On being desired to repeat the words of the Earl of
Cardigan, the witness said, “To the best of my recollection his
lordship’s reply was—when I said I hoped it was not with Captain
Reynolds, he stood up erect, and seemed to reject it, by his action,
with the utmost disdain, and said, ‘Oh, no; do you suppose I would
fight with one of my own officers?’ These were the words, to the
best of my recollection.”
Charles William Walthew, chemist, residing at No. 29, in the
Poultry, deposed, that Captain Tuckett occupied rooms in his house,
and had carried on business there for fifteen months. His residence
was at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. On being asked to tell
what the Captain’s Christian names were, if he knew them, Sir
William Follett objected to this course of examination. Their
lordships, he said, observed the question put: his learned friend had
asked where Captain Tuckett lived, and the answer was, No. 13,
Hamilton Place, New Road, for the purpose of identifying this
Captain Tuckett, who carried on business in the Poultry, with a
Captain Tuckett who lived in that place. The Lord High Steward
agreed that there was no proof at present that that person lived at
No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. The examination was not
proceeded with. The last witness called was Edward Septimus Codd.
He said he knew Captain Tuckett, of the 11th Light Dragoons. His
Christian name was Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett.
The Attorney-General said, he would now, with their lordships’
permission, propose to read the card, upon which their lordships had
been pleased to say that they would consider whether it was
admissible or not. On being asked by Lord Brougham whether that
was his case, he replied, that he should first wish to know whether
the card was to be received or rejected. Sir William Follett requested
to see the card; and, having examined it, he said he did not think it
necessary to object to its being read. It was accordingly delivered in
and read. Upon one side was engraved “Captain Harvey Tuckett, 13,
Hamilton Place, New Road;” and on the other was written “Captain
H. Wainwright.” The Attorney-General said that that was the case on
the part of the prosecution.
 Sir William Follett.—“This being the case on the part of the
prosecution, I venture to submit to your lordships, that there is no
case which calls on the prisoner for an answer; and I think your
lordships will see at once, that the counsel for the prosecution have
failed in proving an essential part of their case. My Lords, I
apprehend it is not necessary to cite any authority to show that the
prosecutor is bound to prove the Christian and surname of the
person against whom the alleged offence is committed; and that if
he fails to prove either the Christian or the surname, he fails in his
case. Now, there is no evidence whatever to show that the person
against whom the shot was discharged was Harvey Garnett Phipps
Tuckett. The evidence before your lordships would rather lead to a
contrary presumption, if presumption could be acted upon in a case
like this. I apprehend that positive evidence must be given to prove
the identity of the party. The evidence is this,—the counsel for the
prosecution have called a person named Codd, who is an army-
agent, and who receives the half-pay of a Captain Tuckett, who was
formerly in the 11th Dragoons, and is named Harvey Garnett Phipps
Tuckett. Is there anything in this evidence to identify that Captain
Tuckett with the person alleged to have been on Wimbledon
Common on the 12th of September? Mr. Codd does not know where
that Captain Tuckett lives; he never saw him except at his office in
Fludyer Street, and at an insurance office. What is the rest of the
evidence on this point? A person who lives in the Poultry says that a
Captain Harvey Tuckett rents offices of him, but that he does not
know where he lives. There is, therefore, not an iota, not a scintilla
of evidence, to connect that Captain Tuckett with the gentleman
supposed to be engaged in this transaction. I therefore submit that
my learned friends have entirely failed in an essential part of the
case for the prosecution. I would beg leave to refer your lordships to
the case of the King v. Robinson, in Holt’s Reports, p. 595, in which
it is laid down that it is essentially necessary to prove the Christian
and surname of the party against whom the offence is alleged to
have been committed, and there is no proof of his Christian name in
this case.”
 The Attorney-General.—“My Lords, the question is, whether there
is any evidence whatever to prove the fact of the Christian name of
Captain Tuckett, the gentleman wounded. If there is the smallest
scintilla of evidence on this point, the prosecution cannot be stopped
on the ground taken up by my learned friend. We are now as if we
were before a jury, and the learned judge who presided were called
upon to direct an acquittal, upon the ground that there was no
evidence for their consideration. I submit to your lordships, that
there is abundant evidence to show that the name of the party
wounded is Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett. How does the case
stand? My learned friend withdrew all objection to the reading of the
card. Well, then, the gentleman who was wounded by Lord Cardigan
on the 12th of September, was Captain Harvey Tuckett. We have
got, therefore, one of his names; and how does the case stand with
regard to the rest? Am I obliged to call the clerk of the parish where
he was baptised, in order to prove his baptismal register? Am I to
call his father or his mother, or his godfathers or godmothers, to
prove the name that was given to him at the baptismal font? I
apprehend that such evidence is wholly unnecessary. I contend that,
from the facts proved, there is abundant evidence to show the
identity of the party wounded was Captain Harvey Tuckett. I
suppose my learned friend will not deny that there is abundant
evidence to show that the Captain Tuckett who was wounded lived
at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road. One of the witnesses called
there three times; he asks each time for Captain Tuckett, and each
time he is introduced to a gentleman bearing that name. Your
lordships, therefore, will have no doubt that the Captain Tuckett who
lives at No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road, is the one who fought
the duel with Lord Cardigan on the 12th of September, on
Wimbledon Common. Now, my Lords, we go by steps. Is there any
doubt that this Captain Tuckett is the Captain Tuckett who took the
offices in the Poultry? At the time he did so, he gave a reference to
No. 13, Hamilton Place, New Road; and your lordships will therefore
feel, no doubt, that there is evidence to show that the Captain
Tuckett who took the place of business in the Poultry, was the same
who lived in Hamilton Place. Then we have only one other stage,
and that is to see whether the Captain Tuckett is the Captain Tuckett
of whom Mr. Codd spoke, whose name he proved to be Harvey
Garnett Phipps Tuckett, and who had been an officer of the 11th
Dragoons, of which regiment the Earl of Cardigan was, and still is,
the colonel.”
Sir W. Follett.—“There is no proof of that whatever.”
The Attorney-General.—“It was so stated, and the witness was not
cross-examined. Well, then, my Lords, a Captain Tuckett, whose
name is Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett, was proved by Mr. Codd to
have been an officer of the 11th Hussars, Lord Cardigan’s regiment.
He gave his card, with the 11th Hussars upon it.”
Sir W. Follett.—“No, no; you are quite mistaken.”
The Attorney-General.—“Well, he has one name at least
corresponding with that of the Captain Tuckett who fought the duel
on Wimbledon Common. Will your lordships require strict evidence of
this gentleman’s Christian name—evidence that will amount to a
demonstration? If there is evidence from which the inference may be
fairly drawn, is not that sufficient? Well, then, here is a Captain
Tuckett, whose name is proved to be Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett,
who has been in the 11th Hussars, from which he retired three or
four years ago, and who receives his half-pay quarterly from Mr.
Codd, his agent. May it not be fairly inferred from these
circumstances, that this was the same Captain Tuckett who had
offices in the Poultry, and who had fought a duel? Is there not
evidence from which that identity may be fairly inferred? Is the
prosecution to be stopped on the ground that there is no evidence
whatever to go to a jury, or to your lordships, that this Captain
Tuckett, whose name is proved to be Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett,
is the same who was the antagonist of the Earl of Cardigan on the
12th September? I believe there is no reasonable being, who, having
heard this evidence out of a court of justice, would hesitate in
drawing the inference. I apprehend, that what is sufficient to
convince a reasonable man out of a court of justice ought to be
sufficient to convince a judge or judges sitting in a court of justice, if
the inference which is to be drawn can be drawn according to the
rules of evidence. Now, according to the rules of evidence, would
any person out of a court of justice doubt for a moment that this is
the same individual who fought on the 12th of September? Well,
then, if that inference would be drawn out of a court of justice, can
it be said that in a court of justice there is not a scintilla of evidence
from which such an inference can be drawn? This would be a most
unsatisfactory conclusion of such a trial. Your lordships will weigh
the evidence maturely and deliberately, and if you think that it is not
sufficient to convict the noble Lord at the bar, of course you will
acquit him, and will say, ‘Not guilty, upon my honour,’ but you will
not stop the prosecution upon an objection like this.”
Sir W. Follett.—“My Lords, I will trouble your lordships with a very
few words in reply to the observations of the Attorney-General. It
may be a very unsatisfactory termination of this case after all the
care and trouble which has been bestowed upon the prosecution,
but I apprehend that this is not a case in which the noble lord at the
bar will have to appeal to the honour or the conscience of his peers.
The question is, whether sufficient evidence of identity has been
given. My learned friend asks whether he is to call the clerk of the
parish, or the father or mother of Captain Tuckett, to prove his
Christian name. Now, that is not the objection, and the Attorney-
General knows it perfectly well. What we object to is, that the
counsel for the prosecution have called a person of the name of
Codd, who has proved that he was acquainted with a Captain Harvey
Garnett Phipps Tuckett, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to
connect that Captain Tuckett with the gentleman who fought the
duel on Wimbledon Common. What is the proof? Does any judge
who hears me feel himself prepared to say that the fact of a Captain
Tuckett having been in a particular regiment is evidence of identity in
this case? My learned friend says, that if a person out of the House
may fairly draw such an inference, such an inference may properly
be drawn within its walls. May I ask your lordships if that is the way
in which trials of this nature are to be conducted? It is possible that
your lordships sitting out of the House, after all that has been said
and written, might draw such an inference as that which my learned
friend wishes you to make; but you are now sitting here, as if you
had never heard one word of the case before. You are now sitting as
judges on the evidence adduced, and you are to say whether,
because a Captain Tuckett who was formerly in the 11th Dragoons
has the same Christian name, he is to be identified with the Captain
Tuckett who fought on Wimbledon Common. There is no evidence to
show that the Harvey Tuckett mentioned in the evidence of Codd, is
the same Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett mentioned in this
indictment. Mr. Codd does not know him to be the same; he never
saw him either in the Poultry or at Hamilton Place. The whole of his
evidence is this,—that he knows a Captain Harvey Garnett Phipps
Tuckett, that he was in the 11th Dragoons; and that he receives for
him his half-pay. There may be two Harvey Tucketts; and since my
learned friend, the Attorney-General, has referred to your lordships’
knowledge of what may have occurred out of doors, I would remind
your lordships that in the very regiment commanded by the noble
Lord at the bar there were two officers bearing the same surnames
certainly, and I think the same Christian names. I submit to your
lordships, that there is no evidence whatever to prove that Captain
Harvey Tuckett mentioned in the evidence of Mr. Codd, is the same
person as the Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett mentioned in this
indictment; and, however unsatisfactory a termination it may be to
the persons conducting the prosecution, I submit to your lordships
that they have entirely failed in the proof of their identity.”
The Lord High Steward.—“I stated, when this objection was first
taken, that I thought strangers ought to withdraw, and I am still of
that opinion. The learned counsel, however, did not object to the
argument of the Attorney-General, and therefore I did not think it
right to interrupt him; but I wish to say, with a view to the general
administration of criminal justice, that, when similar objections are
taken in a criminal court, the counsel for the prosecution is at the
utmost called upon to state what portion of evidence he believes to
be sufficient to make out his case. I do not recollect any case in
which an argument has been heard on the subject. I mention this as
a point which may be of consequence in the practice of the courts of
criminal law hereafter; and I now move your lordships that strangers
be ordered to withdraw.”
 The counsel and strangers were then ordered to withdraw, and
the Earl of Cardigan retired in the custody of the Yeoman Usher. A
protestation of the Archbishop of Canterbury, for himself and the
rest of the Bishops, was delivered, desiring leave to be absent when
judgment was given; leave was accordingly given. After which, the
objection taken by Sir William Follett was taken into consideration.
After the Lord High Steward had delivered his opinion thereupon, as
an individual member of the court, and declared it to be his
judgment that the Earl of Cardigan was entitled to be declared Not
guilty, it was moved, that the House do now proceed to give their
opinion whether the said Earl is guilty or not guilty of the charge in
the indictment; which, being put, passed in the affirmative.
Strangers being again admitted, after proclamation made for silence,
the Lord High Steward, standing up, by a list called every peer by his
name, beginning with the junior Baron, and asked him, “John Lord
Keane, how says your lordship; is James Thomas Earl of Cardigan
guilty of the felony whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty.”
Whereupon each peer, upon his name being called, standing up in
his place uncovered, and laying his right hand upon his breast,
answered, “Not guilty, upon my honour:” the only exception being
the Duke of Cleveland, who said, “Not guilty legally, upon my
honour.” After all the peers had given their verdict, the Lord High
Steward, standing up uncovered, declared his opinion to the same
effect. The Earl of Cardigan being then brought to the bar, the Lord
High Steward said, “James Thomas Earl of Cardigan, you have been
indicted for a felony, for which you have been tried by your peers,
and I have the satisfaction of informing you that their lordships have
pronounced you not guilty, by an unanimous sentence. The number
of their lordships who gave this verdict I have not precisely at this
moment before me, or I should have been glad to have stated it to
your lordship; but their lordships have unanimously said ‘Not guilty.’”
The Earl of Cardigan having retired, proclamation was made for
dissolving the commission; and the white staff being delivered to the
Lord High Steward by the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, his
Grace stood up uncovered, and, holding the staff in both hands,
broke it in two, and declared the commission to be dissolved.
 HOUSE OF LORDS,

February 19, 1841.

In the House of Lords, on the motion that the trial of the Earl of
Cardigan be printed,
The Earl of Eldon said, there were some matters connected with
the subject, that ought not to pass without notice. It would be
recollected that the right reverend prelates, towards the latter part
of the trial, requested permission to withdraw, and did so. In a
portion of the address of the Attorney-General to their Lordships, the
learned gentleman made use of a certain expression,—no doubt out
of his kind regard towards the noble Earl at the bar,—in which his
feelings seemed to have carried him a little beyond what he
originally intended. The expression to which he alluded was this:
—“That he was glad that nothing of moral turpitude had occurred in
this case.” Now, he was perfectly prepared to say, that, in the
present state of society in this country, it was difficult to suppose
that it could go on as it now did, unless certain allowances were
made for the feelings of respectable individuals placed in situations
of great difficulty, where, perhaps, their sentiments differed
materially from the line of conduct they were pursuing. No man was
more ready to make that allowance than he himself was; but, even
admitting that, it appeared to him that the Attorney-General, in
making the observation to which he had alluded, had gone a little
beyond what he ought to have done. Now, as the trial had gone off
on matter totally irrelevant to that point,—as no opinion had been
given by their Lordships on the subject,—he thought it right to
notice it, lest it might be supposed that their Lordships concurred in
the sentiment to which he had referred. He believed their Lordships
would agree with him in saying, that, in whatever situation a
gentleman might be placed when driven to have recourse to
duelling, it was not a custom that was sanctioned either by the law
or by the moral principle of the country. Each specific case must
stand between the individual, his conscience, and his God; but he
could not conceive it possible how any man could pursue such a