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TECHNOLOGY & MANAGEMENT 6 Programs Accredited by NBA
(CSE, ISE, ECE, EEE, MECH, CIVIL)

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS

QUESTION BANK

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY

(BAI405D)

(2023 - 2024)

Prepared by
Dr. K. A. VIDYA

Course Outcomes
Students will be able to
CO1 Understand the basic concepts of strategic games and extensive
games
CO2 Apply techniques of Game theory to solve real life problems
CO3 Analyze real time situations using gaming strategies
CO4 Develop models of Game theory using real life examples
 Module -1
Introduction to Strategic Games
1. Analyze the game theoretical model - Prisonner’s Dilemma and hence find the pure
Nash equilibrium. (CO3)
2. Analyze the game theoretical model- Bach or Stravinsky and hence find the pure
Nash equilibrium.
(CO3)
3. Analyze the game theoretical model- Matching Pennies and hence find the pure Nash
equilibrium, if it exists. (CO3)
4. Analyze the game theoretical model- Stag Hunt and hence find the pure Nash
equilibrium, if it exists. (CO3)
5. Define and explain each of the below with examples (CO1)
1)Strategic game
2) Game theory
3)Nash Equilibrium
4)Strict Nash Equilibrium
5)Best Response Function
6)Strict Domination
7)Weak domination

6. Apply dominance method to find Nash Equilibrium in (CO2)

7. Apply best response functions to find Nash Equilibrium in

a) (CO2)

Player 2
L C R
U 13,3 1,4 7,3
Player 1 M 4,1 3,3 6,2
D -1,9 2,8 8,-1
 b)

c) d)

8. Analyze the below payoff matrix to find the Nash Equilibria and check whether it is a
strict Nash Equilibrium or not with appropriate reasoning. (CO3)

Player 2
L M R
T 1,1 1,0 0,1
Player 1 B 1,0 0,1 1,0

9. Analyze the below game to determine, for each player whether any action is strictly
dominated or weakly dominated. Find the Nash Equilibria of the game, determine
whether any equilibria is strict. (CO3)

Player 2
L C R
T 0,0 1,0 1,1
Player 1 M 1,1 1,1 3,0
D 1,1 2,1 2,2
 Module -2
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

1. Apply mixed strategy algorithm to find the expected payoffs for each player in the
game of Matching Pennies (CO2)
2. Apply mixed strategy algorithm to find the expected payoffs for each player in BoS
model (CO2)
3. Define mixed strategy in a strategic game. Also List out the components of strategic
Game with vNM preferences. (CO1)
4. Apply mixed strategy algorithm to find the expected payoffs for each player in the
following Game (CO2)
a)

Player 2
L C
T 3,-3 -2,2
Player 1 D -1,1 0,0

b) c)

5. Apply method of best responses to find mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game
of Matching Pennies (CO2)
6. Apply method of best responses to find mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in BOS
Model (CO2)
7. Analyze whether a mixed strategy (3/4,0, 1/4) for player 1 and (0, 1/3, 2/3) for player
2 in the following game is a mixed strategy nash equilibrium.

(CO3)
8. Analyze whether a mixed strategy (1/3,1/3,1/3) for both players is a mixed strategy
equilibrium in the following Game
(CO3)
 Player 2
P S R
P 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
Player 1 S 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
R -1,1 1,-1 0,0
9. Analyze whether the mixed strategy(0,1/2,1/2) yields a better payoff to Player 1 than
pure strategy in the following Game
(CO3)

Player 2
P S
P 1,0 1,0
Player 1 S 4,1 0,1
R 0,1 3,1

10. Find all the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria of the game by eliminating any strictly
dominated actions and then constructing the player’s best response functions. (CO2)

a)

Player 2
L C
T 1,2 2,0 4,3
Player 1 D 2,3 2,1 1,2

b)

c) d)

11. Analyze the game theoretical model – Expert diagnosis model and hence find the pure
and mixed Nash equilibrium. (CO3)
12. Analyze the game theoretical model – Approaching pedastrians model and hence find
the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium. Aslo check whether it is a symmetric game or
not and also check whether it has symmetric pure equilibrium
(CO3)

Module -3
Extensive Games with perfect equilibrium
1. Analyze the game theoretical model – Entry Game and hence find subgame perfect
equilibrium (CO3)
2. Define Extensive Game and its Nash Equilibrium. Also List out the components of
Extensive model (CO1)
3. Using Backward induction, find the subgame perfect equilibrium for the following
game (CO2)

a)

b) c)

d) e)

4. Find all the subgames of

 (CO2)
5. Analyze the game theoretical model – The Ultimatum game and hence find its
subgame perfect equilibrium
(CO3)
6. Analyze the game theoretical model –Stackelberg’s model of duopoly and hence find
its subgame perfect equilibrium for constant unit cost and linear inverse demand
(CO3)

Module -4
Bayesian Games
1. Analyze the a variant of BoS model –where player 1 is unsure whether player 2 wants
to meet or avoid him and hence find its Nash equilibrium (CO3)
2. Analyze the a variant of BoS model –where both players are unsure whether other
player wants to meet or avoid him and hence find its Nash equilibrium (CO3)
3. Define Bayesian Game and its Nash Equilibrium. Also List out the components of
Bayesian model (CO2)
4. Find the Nash Equilibrium for the following model, in which Player 1 chooses T with
probability 1/2 and e is a real number between 0 and ½.

5. Find the Nash Equilibrium in the following model

6. Develop a model in case of Cournet’s game with imperfect information about cost
(CO4)
7. Develop a model in case of Cournet’s game with imperfect information about both
cost and information
(CO4)
8. Develop a model in case of Providing public good where each person knows only his
valuation. (CO4)
9. Develop a model in case of first and second price auctions with independent private
valuations (CO4)
10. Analyze the model-Auctions for a arbitarary distribution of valuations (CO3)

Module -5
Repeated Games
1. Find the Nash equilibrium of finitely repeated prisonner’s Dilemma (CO2)
2. Analyze Infinitely repeated prisonners Dilemma(with the following payoff matrix)
with Grim Trigger Strategy and hence find the Nash Equilibrium. (CO3)

Player 2
Quiet Confes
s
Quiet 2,2 0,3
Player 1 Confes 3,0 1,1
s

3. Analyze Infinitely repeated prisonners Dilemma with Tit for Tat Strategy and hence
find the Nash Equilibrium. (CO3)

Player 2
Quiet Confes
s
Quiet 2,2 0,3
Player 1 Confes 3,0 1,1
s
4. Analyze Infinitely repeated prisonners Dilemma with Grim Trigger Strategy with
limited punishment and hence find the Nash Equilibrium. (CO3)

Player 2
Quiet Confes
s
Quiet 2,2 0,3
Player 1 Confes 3,0 1,1
s

5. Analyze Infinitely repeated prisonners Dilemma with Grim Trigger Strategy with
punishment is delayed by one period and hence find the Nash Equilibrium. (CO3)

Player 2
Quiet Confes
s
Quiet 2,2 0,3
Player 1 Confes 3,0 1,1
s

6. Define (i)Strictly competitive games (ii) maxminimization Strategy in strictly

competitive games (CO1)
7. Find the maxminimization strategy for each player, both pure and mixed, for the
following games. (CO2)

Player 2 Player 2
L R L R
L 6,0 0,6 L 2,-2 -3,3
Player 1 R 3,2 6,0 Player 1 R 0,0 1,-1

Player 2 Player 2
L R L R
L 2,1 0,0 L 20,80 70,30
Player 1 R 0,0 1,2 Player 1 R 90,10 30,70

8. Determine whether the following games are strictly competitive or not in (i) Pure
Strategies (ii) mixed strategies

Player 2 Player 2
L R
U 1,-1 3,-5
Player 1 D 2,-3 1,-1
 L R
L 2,2 0,3
Player 1 R 3,0 1,1
Player 2 Player 2
L R L R
L 2,1 0,5 U 1,-1 3,-6
Player 1 R 1,3 5,0 Player 1 D 2,-3 1,-1