File: archives/59/p59_0x06_Defeating Forensic Analysis on Unix_by_the grugq.

txt
==Phrack Inc.==

Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3b, Phile #0x06 of 0x12

|=--------------=[ Defeating Forensic Analysis on Unix ]=----------------=|

|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=-------------=[ the grugq <[email protected]> ]=----------------=|
|=--------------------[ www.anti-forensics.com ]=------------------------=|

--[ Contents

1 - Introduction
1.1 - Generic Unix File Systems
1.2 - Forensics

2 - Anti-Forensics

3 - Runefs
3.1 - Creating hidden space
3.2 - Using hidden space
3.3 - TCT unclear on ext2fs specifications

4 - The Defiler's Toolkit

4.1 - Necrofile
4.1.1 - TCT locates deleted inodes
4.1.2 - Necrofile locates and eradicates deleted inodes
4.1.3 - TCT unable to locate non-existant data
4.2 - Klismafile
4.2.1 - fls listing deleted directory entries
4.2.2 - Klismafile cleaning deleted directory entries
4.2.3 - fls unable to find non-existant data

5 - Conclusion

6 - Greets

7 - References

8 - Appendix
8.1 - The Ext2fs
8.2 - runefs.tar.gz (uuencoded)
8.3 - tdt.tar.gz (uuencoded)

--[ 1 - Introduction

Anti-forensics: the removal, or hiding, of evidence in an attempt to

mitigate the effectiveness of a forensics investigation.

Digital forensic analysis is rapidly becoming an integral part of

incident response, capitalising on a steady increase in the number of
trained forensic investigators and forensic toolkits available. Strangly,
despite the increased interest in, and focus on, forensics within the
information security industry, there is surprisingly little discussion of
anti-forensics. In an attempt to remedy the lack of coverage in the
literature, this article presents anti-forensic strategies to defeat
digital forensic analysis on Unix file systems. Included are example
implementations of these strategies targeting the most common Linux file
system -- ext2fs.

To facilitate a useful discussion of anti-forensic strategies it is

important that the reader possess certain background information. In
particular, the understanding of anti-forensic file system sanitization
requires the comprehension of basic Unix file system organisation. And, of
course, the understanding of any anti-forensic theory demands at least a
rudimentary grasp of digital forensic methodology and practise. This
article provides a limited introduction to both Unix file systems and
digital forensics. Space constraints, however, limit the amount of coverage
available to these topics, and the interested reader is directed to the
references, which discuss them in greater depth.

----[ 1.1 - Generic Unix File Systems

This section will describe basic Unix file system theory (not focussing
on any specific implementation), discussing the meta-data structures used
to organise the file system internally. Files within the Unix OS are
continuous streams of bytes of arbitrary length and are the main
abstraction used for I/O. This article will focus on files in the more
general sense of data stored on disk and organised by a file system.

The data on a disk compriising a Unix file systems is commonly divided

into two groups, information about the files and the data within the files.
The organizational and accounting information (normally only visible only
to the kernel) is called "meta-data", and includes the super-block, inodes
and directory files. The content stored in the files is simply called
"data".

To create the abstraction of a file the kernel has to transparently

translate data stored across one or more sectors on a hard disk into a
seemless stream of bytes. The file system is used to keep track of which,
and in what order, these sectors should be group together into a file.
Additionally, these sector groups need to be kept seperate, and
individually distinguishable to the operating system. For this reason there
are several types of meta-data, each responsible for accomplishing one of
these various tasks.

The content of a file is stored on data blocks which are logical

clusters of hard disk sectors. The higher the number of sectors per data
block the faster the speed of the disk I/O, improving the file system's
performance. At the same time, the larger the data blocks the larger the
disk space wasted for files which don't end on block boundaries. Modern
file systems typically compromise with block size of 4096 or 8192 bytes,
and combat the disk wastage with "fragments" (something not dealt with
here). The portion of the disk dedicated to the data blocks is organised as
an array, and blocks are referred to by their offsets within this array.
The state of a given block, i.e. free vs. allocated, is stored in a bitmap
called the "block bitmap".

Data blocks are clustered and organised into files by inodes. Inodes
are the meta-data structure which represent the user visible files; one for
each unique file. Each inode contains an array of block pointers (that is,
indexes into the data block array) and various other information about the
file. This additional information about the file includes: the UID; GID;
size; permissions; modification/access/creation (MAC) times, and some other
data. The limited amount of space available to inodes means the the block
pointer array can only contain a small number of pointers. To allow file
sizes to be of substantial length, inodes employ "indirect blocks". An
indirect block acts as an extension to the block array, storing additional
pointers. Doubly and trebly indirect blocks contain block pointers to
further indirect blocks, and doubly indirect blocks respectively. Inodes
are stored in an array called the inode table, and are referred to by their
0-based indexes within this table. The state of an inode, i.e. free vs.
allocated, is stored in a bitmap called, imaginitively, the "inode bitmap".

Files, that is, inodes, are associated with file names by special
structures called directory entries stored within directory files. These
structures are stored contigously inside the directory file. Directory
entries have a basic structure of:

struct dirent {
int inode;
short rec_size;
short name_len;
char file_name[NAME_LEN];
};

The 'inode' element of the dirent contains the inode number which is
linked with the file name, stored in 'file_name'. To save space, the actual
length of the file name is recorded in 'name_len' and the remaining space
in the file_name array is used by the next directory entry structure. The
size of a dirent is usually rounded up to the closest power of two, and
this size is stored in 'rec_size'. When a file name/inode link is removed,
the inode value is set to 0 and the rec_size of the preceding dirent is
extended to encompass the deleted dirent. This has the effect of storing
the names of deleted files inside directory files.

Everytime an file name is linked with a file name, and internal counter
within the inode is incremented. Likewise, everytime a link is removed,
this counter is decremented. When this counter reaches 0, there are no
references to the inode from within the directory structure; the file is
deleted. Files which have been deleted can safely have their resources, the
data blocks and the inode itself, freed. This is accomplished by marking
the appropriate bitmaps.

Directories files themselves are logically organised as a tree starting

from a root directory. This root directory file is associated with a known
inode (inode 2) so that the kernel can locate it, and mount the file
system.

To mount a file system the kernel needs to know the size and locations
of the meta-data. The first piece of meta-data, the super block, is stored
at a known location. The super-block contains information such as the
number of inodes and blocks, the size of a block, and a great deal of
additional information. Based on the data within the super block, the
kernel is able to calculate the locations and sizes of the inode table and
the data portion of the disk.

For performance reasons, no modern file system actually has just one
inode table and one block array. Rather inodes and blocks are clustered
together in groups spread out across the disk. These groups usually contain
private bitmaps for their inodes and blocks, as well as copies of the
superblock to aid recovery in case of catastrophic data loss.

Thus concludes the whirlwind tour of a generic unix file system. A

specific implementation is described in Appendix A: The Second Extended
File System. The next section will provide an introduction to digital file
system forensics.

----[ 1.2 - Forensics

Digital forensic analysis on a file system is conducted to gather

evidence for some purpose. As stated previously, this purpose is irrelevant
to this discussion because anti-forensics theory shouldn't rely on the
intended use of the evidence; it should focus on preventing the evidence
from being gathered. That being said, ignorance as to the reasons behind an
analysis provides no benefit, so we will examine the two primary motivators
behind an investigation.

The purpose of an incident response analysis of a file system is either

casual, or legal. These terms are not the standard means to describing
motives and because there are significant differences between the two, some
explanation is in order.

Legal investigations are to aid a criminal prosecution. The strict

requirements on evidence to be submitted to a court of law make subversion
of a legal forensic investigations fairly easy. For instance, merely
overwriting the file system with random data is sufficient to demonstrate
that none of the data gathered is reliable enough for submission as
evidence.

Casual investigations do not have as their goal the criminal

prosecution of an individual. The investigation is executed because of
interest on the part of the forensic analyst, and so the techniques, tools
and methodology used are more liberally inclined. Subverting a casual
forensic analysis requires more effort and skill because there are no
strict third party requirements regarding the quality or quantity of
evidence.

Regardless of the intent of the forensics investigation, the steps

followed are essentially the same:

* the file system needs to be captured

* the information contained on it gathered
* this data parsed into evidence
* this evidence examined.

This evidence is both file content (data), and information about the
file(s) (meta-data). Based on the evidence retrieved from the file system
the investigator will attempt to:

* gather information about the individual(s) involved [who]

* determine the exact nature of events that transpired [what]
* construct a timeline of events [when]
* discover what tools or exploits where used [how]

As an example to how the forensics process works, the example of the

recovery of a deleted file will be presented.

A file is deleted on a Unix file system by decrementing the inode's

internal link count to 0. This is accomplished by removing all directory
entry file name inode pairs. When the inode is deleted, the kernel will
mark is resources as available for use by other files -- and that is all.
The inode will still contain all of the data about the file which it
referenced, and the data blocks it points to will still contain file
content. This remains the case until they have been reallocated, and
reused; overwriting this residual data.

Given this dismal state of affairs, recovering a deleted file is

trivial for the forensic analyst. Simply searching for inodes which have
some data (i.e. are not virgin inodes), but have a link count of 0 reveals
all deleted inodes. The block pointers can then be followed up and the file
contents (hopefully) recovered. Even without the file content, a forensic
analyst can learn much about what happened on a file system with only the
meta-data present in the directory entries and inodes. This meta-data is
not accessable through the kernel system call interface and thus is not
alterable by normal system tools (this is not strictly true, but is
accurate enough from a forensics POV).

Unfortunately, accomplishing this is extremely difficult, if not

impossible, when the forensic analyst is faced with a hostile
anti-forensics agent. The digital forensics industry has had an easy time
of late due to the near absense of anti-forensics information and tools,
but that is (obviously) about to change.

--[ 2 - Anti-Forensics

In the previous section forensic analysis was outlined, and means of

subverting the forensic process were hinted at, this section will expand on
anti-forensic theory. Anti-forensics is the attempt to mitigate the
quantity and quality of information that an investigator can examine. At
each steps of the analysis, the forensics process is vulnerable to attack
and subversion. This article focuses primarily on subverting the data
gathering phase of a digital forensics investigation, with two mechanisms
being detailed here: the first is data destruction, and the second data
hiding. Some mention will also be given to exploiting vulnerabilities
throughout the analytic process.

The digital forensics process is extremely vulnerable to subversion

when raw data (e.g. a bit copy of a file system) is converted into evidence
(e.g. emails). This conversion process is vulnerable at almost every step,
usually because of an abstraction that is performed on the data. When an
abstraction layer is encountered, details are lost, and details *are* data.
Abstractions remove data, and this creates gaps in the evidence which can
be exploit. But abstractions are not the only source of error during a
forensic analysis, the tools used are themselves frequently flawed and
imperfect. Bugs in the implementations of forensic tools provide even
greater oppurtunities for exploitation by anti-forensic agents.

There is little that a remote anti-forensics agent can do to prevent

the file system from being captured, and so focus has been given to
exploiting the next phase of a forensic investigation -- preventing the
evidence from being gathered off the file system. Halting data aquisition
can be accomplished by either of two primary mechanisms: data destruction
and data hiding. Of the two methods, data destruction is the most reliable,
leaving nothing behind for the investigator to analyse. Data destruction
provides a means of securely removing all trace of the existance of
evidence, effectively covering tracks.

Data hiding, on the other hand, is useful only so long as the analyst
doesn't know where to look. Long term integrity of the data storage area
cannot be garaunteed. For this reason, data hiding should be used in
combination with attacks against the parsing phase (e.g. proprietary file
formats), and against the examination phase (e.g. encryption). Data hiding
is most useful in the case of essential data which must be stored for some
length of time (e.g. photographs of young women in artistic poses).

The two toolkits which accompany this article provide demonstration

implementations of both data destruction, and data hiding methodologies.
The toolkits will be used to provide examples when examining data
destruction and hiding in greater detail below. The first anti-forensics
methodology that will be examined in depth is data hiding.

--[ 3 - Runefs

The most common toolkit for Unix forensic file system analysis is "The
Coronor's Toolkit"[1] (TCT) developed by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema.
Despite being relied on for years as the mainstay of the Unix digital
forensic analyst, and providing the basis for several enhancements [2][3],
it remains as flawed today as when it was first released. A major file
system implementation bug allows an attacker to store arbitrary amounts of
data in a location which the TCT tools cannot examine.

The TCT implementations of the Berkley Fast File System (FFS or

sometimes UFS), and the Second Extended File System (ext2fs), fail to
correctly reproduce the file system specifications. TCT makes the incorrect
assumption that no data blocks can be allocated to an inode before the root
inode; failing to take into account the bad blocks inode.

Historically, the bad blocks inode was used to reference data blocks
occupying bad sectors of the hard disk, preventing these blocks from being
used by live files. The FFS has deprecated the bad blocks inode, preventing
the successful exploitation of this bug, but it is still in use on ext2fs.
Successfully exploiting a file system data hiding attack means, for an
anti-forensics agent, manipulating the file system without altering it
outside of the specifications implemented in the file system checker: fsck.
Although, it is interesting to note that no forensic analysis methodology
uses fsck to ensure that the file system has not been radically altered.

The ext2fs fsck still uses the bad blocks inode for bad block
referencing, and so it allows any number of blocks to be allocated to the
inode. Unfortunately, the TCT file system code does not recognise the bad
blocks inode as within the scope of an investigation. The bad blocks inode
bug is easy to spot, and should be trivial to correct. Scattered throughout
the file system code of the TCT package (and the related toolkit TASK) is
the following errorneous check:

/*
* Sanity check.
*/
if (inum < EXT2_ROOT_INO || inum > ext2fs->fs.s_inodes_count)
error("invalid inode number: %lu", (ULONG) inum);

The first inode that can allocate block resources on a ext2 file system
is in fact the bad blocks inode (inode 1) -- *not* the root inode (inode
2). Because of this mis-implementation of the ext2fs it is possible to
store data on blocks allocated to the bad blocks inode and have it hidden
from an analyst using TCT or TASK. To illustrate the severity of this
attack the following examples demonstrate using the accompanying runefs
toolkit to: create hidden storage space; copy data to and from this area,
and show how this area remains secure from a forensic analyst.
----[ 3.1 - Example: Creating hidden space

# df -k /dev/hda6
Filesystem 1k-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/hda6 1011928 20 960504 1% /mnt
# ./bin/mkrune -v /dev/hda6
+++ bb_blk +++
bb_blk->start = 33275
bb_blk->end = 65535
bb_blk->group = 1
bb_blk->size = 32261
+++
rune size: 126M
# df -k /dev/hda6
Filesystem 1k-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/hda6 1011928 129196 831328 14% /mnt
# e2fsck -f /dev/hda6
e2fsck 1.26 (3-Feb-2002)
Pass 1: Checking inodes, blocks, and sizes
Pass 2: Checking directory structure
Pass 3: Checking directory connectivity
Pass 4: Checking reference counts
Pass 5: Checking group summary information
/dev/hda6: 11/128768 files (0.0% non-contiguous), 36349/257032 blocks
#

This first example demonstrates the allocation of 126 megabytes of disk

space for the hidden storage area, showing how this loss of available disk
space is registered by the kernel. It is also evident that the hidden
storage area does not break the specifications of the ext2 file system --
fsck has no complaints.

----[ 3.2 - Example: Using the hidden space

# cat readme.tools | ./bin/runewr /dev/hda6

# ./bin/runerd /dev/hda6 > f
# diff f readme.tools
#

This second example shows how data can be inserted and extracted from
the hidden storage space without any data loss. While this example does not
comprehensively explore the uses of a hidden data storage area, it is
sufficient to demonstrate how data can be introduced to and extracted from
the runefs.

----[ 3.3 - Example: TCT incorrect ext2fs implementation

# ./icat /dev/hda6 1
/icat: invalid inode number: 1
#

This last example illustrates how the forensic analyst is incapable of

finding this storage area with the TCT tools. Clearly, there are many
problems raised when the file system being examined has not been correctly
implemented in the tools used.

Interesting as these examples are, there are problems with this runefs.
This implementation of runefs is crude and old (it was written in November
2000), and it does not natively support encryption. The current version of
runefs is a dynamicly resizeable file system which supports a full
directory structure, is fully encrypted, and can grow up to four gigabytes
in size (it is private, and not will be made available to the public).

The final problem with this runefs in particular, and the private
implementation as well, is that the bad blocks data hiding technique is now
public knowledge (quite obviously). This highlights the problem with data
hiding techniques, they become out dated. For this reason data hiding
should always be used in conjunction with at least one other anti-forensics
technology, such as encryption.

There are more ways of securely storing data on the file system far
from the prying eyes of the forensic analyst, and a research paper is due
shortly that will detail many of them. However, this is the last this
article will mention on data hiding, now the focus shifts to data
destruction.

--[ 4 - The Defiler's Toolkit

The file system (supposedly) contains a record of file I/O activity on

a computer and forensic analysts attempt to extract this record for
examination. Aside from their forensic tools incorrectly reporting on the
data, these tools are useless if the data is not there to be reported on.
This section will present methodologies for thoroughly eradicating evidence
on a file system. These methodologies have been implemented in The
Defiler's Toolkit (TDT) which accompanies this article.

The major vulnerablity with data aquisition is that the evidence being
gathered must be there when the forensic analyst begins his investigation.
Non-existant data, obviously, cannot be gathered, and without this crucial
information the forensic analyst is incapable of progressing the
investigation.

File system sanitization is the anti-forensic strategy of removing this

data (evidence), and doing so in such a way so as to leave no trace that
evidence ever existed (i.e. leave no "evidence of erasure"). The Defiler's
Toolkit provides tools to remove data from the file system with surgical
precision. By selectively eradicating the data which might become evidence,
the anti-forensics agent is able to subvert the entire forensics process
before it is even begun.

Within a Unix file system all of the following places will contain
traces of the existence of a file -- they contain evidence:

* inodes
* directory entries
* data blocks

Unfortunately, most secure deletion tools will only remove evidence

from data blocks, leaving inodes and directory entries untouched. Included
with this article is an example implementation of an anti-forensic toolkit
which performs complete file system sanitization. The Defiler's Toolkit
provides two tools, necrofile and klismafile, which, combined, securely
eliminate all trace of a file's existance.

The Defiler's Toolkit consists of two complimentary tools, necrofile

and klismafile. Their design goals and implementation are described here.
----[ 4.1 - Necrofile

Necrofile is a sophisicated dirty inode selection and eradication tool.

It can be used to list all dirty inodes meeting certain deletion time
criteria, and then scrub those inodes clean. These clean inodes provide no
evidence for the forensic analyst investigating the file system contained
on that disk.

Necrofile has some built in capabilities to securely delete all content

on the data blocks referenced by the dirty inode. However, this is not the
ideal use of the tool because of the race conditions which afflict all
tools handling file system resources without the blessing of the kernel.

When necrofile is invoked, it is supplied with a file system to search,

and a number of criteria be used to determine whether a given dirty inode
should be scrubbed clean. As necrofile iterates through the inode table, it
check the state of each inode, with dirty inodes being given extra
attention. All dirty inodes that meet the time criteria are written back
to the inode table as virgin inodes, and the iteration continues.

------[ 4.1.1 - Example: TCT locates deleted inodes

# ./ils /dev/hda6
class|host|device|start_time
ils|XXX|/dev/hda6|1026771982
st_ino|st_alloc|st_uid|st_gid|st_mtime|st_atime|st_ctime|st_dtime|st_mode|\
st_nlink|st_size|st_block0|st_block1
12|f|0|0|1026771841|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|545|0
13|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|546|0
14|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|547|0
15|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|548|0
16|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|549|0
17|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|550|0
18|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|551|0
19|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|552|0
20|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|553|0
21|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|554|0
22|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|555|0
23|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|556|0
24|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|557|0
25|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|558|0
26|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|559|0
27|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|560|0
28|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|561|0
29|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|562|0
30|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|563|0
31|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|564|0
32|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|565|0
33|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|566|0
34|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|567|0
35|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|568|0
36|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|569|0
37|f|0|0|1026771842|1026771796|1026771958|1026771958|100644|0|86|570|0
#

------[ 4.1.2 - Example: necrofile locates and eradicates deleted inodes

# ./necrofile -v -v -v -v /dev/hda6
Scrubbing device: /dev/hda6
12 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
13 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
14 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
15 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
16 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
17 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
18 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
19 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
20 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
21 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
22 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
23 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
24 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
25 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
26 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
27 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
28 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
29 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
30 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
31 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
32 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
33 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
34 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
35 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
36 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f
37 = m: 0x3d334d4d a: 0x3d334d4d c: 0x3d334d4f d: 0x3d334d4f

------[ 4.1.3 - Example: TCT unable to locate non-existant data

# ./ils /dev/hda6
class|host|device|start_time
ils|XXX|/dev/hda6|1026772140
st_ino|st_alloc|st_uid|st_gid|st_mtime|st_atime|st_ctime|st_dtime|st_mode|\
st_nlink|st_size|st_block0|st_block1
#

Little explanation is necessary with these examples. The "ils" tool is

part of TCT and lists deleted inodes for potential recovery. The necrofile
tool is being run in its most verbose form, as it locates and overwrites
the same inodes found by ils. Necrofile is more effective, however, when
used to target inodes deleted during specific time slices, leaving all
other deleted inodes untouched. This tactic eliminates evidence of erasure,
i.e. indications that evidence has been removed. After the deleted inodes
have been converted into virgin inodes, ils is justifiably incapable of
finding them. After removing the inodes which contain valuable forensic
data, the other location which needs to be sanitized is the directory
entries.

----[ 4.2 - Klismafile

Klismafile provides a means of securely overwriting deleted directory

entries. When a file name/inode link is terminated, the content of the
directory entry is not overwritten; simply included in the slack space of
the preceeding entry. Klismafile will search a directory file for these
"deleted" entries, and overwrite them. Regular expressions can be used to
limit the number of directory entries removed.
 When klismafile is invoked, it is provided with a directory file to
search, and can optionally recurse through all other directory files it
encounters. Klismafile will iterate through the directory entries, and
search for dirents which have been deleted. When it encounters a deleted
dirent, klismafile will compare the 'file_name' against any regular
expressions provided by the invoker (the default is '*'). If there is a
match, klismafile will overwrite the dirent with zeroes.

Klismafile is not a completely secure solution. A skilled forensic

analyst will note that the preceeding directory entry's rec_len field is
larger than it should be, and could infer than a tool such as klismafile
has artificially manipulated the directory file's contents. Currently,
there are no tools which perform this check, however that will no doubt
change soon.

------[ 4.2.1 - Example: fls listing deleted directory entries

# ./fls -d /dev/hda6 2
? * 0: a
? * 0: b
? * 0: c
? * 0: d
? * 0: e
? * 0: f
? * 0: g
? * 0: h
? * 0: i
? * 0: j
? * 0: k
? * 0: l
? * 0: m
? * 0: n
? * 0: o
? * 0: p
? * 0: q
? * 0: r
? * 0: s
? * 0: t
? * 0: u
? * 0: v
? * 0: w
? * 0: x
? * 0: y
? * 0: z
#

------[ 4.2.2 - Example: Klismafile cleaning deleted directory entries

# ./klismafile -v /mnt
Scrubbing device: /dev/hda6
cleansing /
-> a
-> b
-> c
-> d
-> e
-> f
-> g
-> h
-> i
-> j
-> k
-> l
-> m
-> n
-> o
-> p
-> q
-> r
-> s
-> t
-> u
-> v
-> w
-> x
-> y
-> z
Total files found: 29
Directories checked: 1
Dirents removed : 26
#

------[ 4.2.3 - Example: fls unable to find non-existant data

# ./fls -d /dev/hda6 2
#

These examples speak for themselves. The 'fls' utility is part of the
TCT-UTILS package, and is intended to examine directory files. In this
case, it is listing all deleted directory entries in the root directory of
the file system. Klismafile is then run in verbose mode, listing and
overwriting each directory entry it encounters. After klismafile, fls is
incapable of noting that anything is amiss within the directory file.

Note: The linux 2.4 kernel caches directories in kernel memory, rather
than immediately updating the file system on disk. Because of this, the
directory file that klismafile examines and attempts to clean might not be
current, or the changes made might get overwritten by the kernel. Usually,
performing disk activity in another directory will flush the cache,
allowing kilsmafile to work optimally.

The Defiler's Toolkit has been written as a proof of concept utility to

demonstrate the inherent flaws with all current digital forensic
methodologies and techniques. The toolkit successfully accomplishes the
goals for which it was designed; proving that forensic analysis after an
intrusion is highly suspect without significant prior preparation of the
targeted computers.

--[ 5 - Conclusion

Digital forensic tools are buggy, error prone and inherently flawed.
Despite these short comings they are being relied on more and more
frequently to investigate computer break-ins. Given that this
fundamentally broken software plays such a key role in incident response,
it is somewhat surprising that no-one has documented anti-forensic
techniques, nor sort to develop counter-measures (anti-anti-forensics).
Some suggestions regarding anti-anti-forensics methodology are presented
here, to provide the security community a foothold in the struggle against
anti-forensics.

The Defilers Toolkit directly modifies the file system to eliminate

evidence inserted by the operating system during run time. The way to
defeat the defiler's toolkit is to not rely on the local file system as the
only record of disk operations. For instance, make a duplicate record of
the file system modifications and store this record in a secure place. The
simplest solution would be to have all inode updates be written to a log
file located on a seperate box. A trivial addition to the kernel vfs
layer, and a syslog server would be more than adequate for a first
generation anti-anti-fornesics tool.

The only means of effectively counteracting an anti-forensics attack

is to prepare for such an eventuality prior to an incident. However,
without the tools to make such preparation effective, the computing public
is left vulnerable to attackers whose anonymity is assured. This article is
intended as a goad to prod the security industry into developing effective
tools. Hopefully the next generation of digital forensic investigating
tookits will give the defenders something reliable with which to
effectively combat the attackers.

--[ 6 - Greets

Shout outs to my homies!

East Side: stealth, scut, silvio, skyper, smiler, halvar, acpizer, gera
West Side: blaadd, pug, srk, phuggins, fooboo, will, joe
Up Town: mammon_, a_p, _dose
Down Town: Grendel, PhD.

--[ 7 - References:

[1] Dan Farmer, Wietse Venema "TCT"

www.fish.com/security
[2] Brian Carrier "TCTUTILS"
www.cerias.purdue.edu/homes/carrier/forensics
[3] Brian Carrier "TASK"
www.cerias.purdue.edu/homes/carrier/forensics
[4] Theodore T'so "e2fsprogs"
e2fsprogs.sourceforge.net

--[ 8 - APPENDIX A

----[ 8.1 - Ext2fs

In the honored phrack tradition of commented header files, here is a

guide to the second extended file system.

The second extended file system (ext2fs) is the standard file system on
the Linux OS. This paper will provide an introduction to the file system.
Reading this document is no substitute for reading the src, both in the
kernel and in the ext2fs library.

What follows is a bottom up description of the ext2 file system;

starting with blocks and inodes and concluding, ultimately, with
directories.

. o O ( B L O C K S ) O o .

The basic component of the file system is the data block, used to store
file content. Typically, the smallest addressable unit on a hard disk is a
sector (512 bytes), but this is too small for decent I/O rates. To increase
performance multiple sectors are clustered together and treated as one
unit: the data block. The typical block size on an ext2fs system is 4096
bytes; however, it can be 2048 bytes or even as small as 1024 (8, 4 and 2
sectors, respectively).

. o O ( I N O D E S ) O o .

The second core part of the file system, the inode, is the heart of
the Unix file system. It contains the meta-data about each file including:
pointers to the data blocks, file permissions, size, owner, group and other
vital peices of information.

The format of an ext2 inode is as follows:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct ext2_inode {
__u16 i_mode; /* File mode */
__u16 i_uid; /* Owner Uid */
__u32 i_size; /* Size in bytes */
__u32 i_atime; /* Access time */
__u32 i_ctime; /* Creation time */
__u32 i_mtime; /* Modification time */
__u32 i_dtime; /* Deletion Time */
__u16 i_gid; /* Group Id */
__u16 i_links_count; /* Links count */
__u32 i_blocks; /* Blocks count */
__u32 i_flags; /* File flags */
union {
struct {
__u32 l_i_reserved1;
} linux1;
struct {
__u32 h_i_translator;
} hurd1;
struct {
__u32 m_i_reserved1;
} masix1;
} osd1; /* OS dependent 1 */
__u32 i_block[EXT2_N_BLOCKS];/* Pointers to blocks */
__u32 i_version; /* File version (for NFS) */
__u32 i_file_acl; /* File ACL */
__u32 i_dir_acl; /* Directory ACL */
__u32 i_faddr; /* Fragment address */
union {
struct {
__u8 l_i_frag; /* Fragment number */
__u8 l_i_fsize; /* Fragment size */
__u16 i_pad1;
__u32 l_i_reserved2[2];
} linux2;
struct {
__u8 h_i_frag; /* Fragment number */
 __u8 h_i_fsize; /* Fragment size */
__u16 h_i_mode_high;
__u16 h_i_uid_high;
__u16 h_i_gid_high;
__u32 h_i_author;
} hurd2;
struct {
__u8 m_i_frag; /* Fragment number */
__u8 m_i_fsize; /* Fragment size */
__u16 m_pad1;
__u32 m_i_reserved2[2];
} masix2;
} osd2; /* OS dependent 2 */
};
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The two unions exist because the ext2fs is intended to be used on

several operating systems that provide slightly differing features in their
implementations. Aside from exceptional cases, the only elements of the
unions that matter are the Linux structs: linux1 and linux2. These can
simply be treated as padding as their contents are ignored in current
implementations of ext2fs. The usage of the rest of the inode's values are
described below.

* i_mode The mode of the file, this is the usual octal permissions
that Unix users should be familiar with.

* i_uid The UID of the owner of the file.

* i_size The size of the file, in bytes. Clearly the maximum size is
4G, as size is an unsigned 32bit integer. Support for 64bit
file sizes had been hacked in with the following define
supplying the high 32bits:
#define i_size_high i_dir_acl

* i_atime The last time the file was accessed. All times are stored
in usual Unix manner: seconds since the epoch.

* i_ctime The creation time of the file.

* i_mtime The last time the file was modified.

* i_dtime The deletion time of the file. If the file is still live
then the time will be 0x00000000.

* i_gid The GID of the file.

* i_links_count The number of times that the file is referenced in the high
level file system. That is, each hard link to the file
increments this count. When the last link to the file is
removed from the FS, and the links count reaches 0, the
file is deleted. The blocks referenced by the inode are
marked as free in the bitmap.

* i_blocks The number of blocks referenced by the inode. This is count

doesn't include the indirect blocks, only blocks that
contain actual file content.

* i_flags The extended attributes of the ext2fs are accomplished with

 this value. The valid flags are any combination of the
following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_SECRM_FL 0x00000001 /* Secure deletion */
#define EXT2_UNRM_FL 0x00000002 /* Undelete */
#define EXT2_COMPR_FL 0x00000004 /* Compress file */
#define EXT2_SYNC_FL 0x00000008 /* Synchronous updates */
#define EXT2_IMMUTABLE_FL 0x00000010 /* Immutable file */
#define EXT2_APPEND_FL 0x00000020 /* append only */
#define EXT2_NODUMP_FL 0x00000040 /* do not dump file */
#define EXT2_NOATIME_FL 0x00000080 /* do not update atime */
/* Reserved for compression usage... */
#define EXT2_DIRTY_FL 0x00000100
#define EXT2_COMPRBLK_FL 0x00000200 /* compressed clusters */
#define EXT2_NOCOMP_FL 0x00000400 /* Don't compress */
#define EXT2_ECOMPR_FL 0x00000800 /* Compression error */
/* End compression flags --- maybe not all used */
#define EXT2_BTREE_FL 0x00001000 /* btree format dir */
#define EXT2_RESERVED_FL 0x80000000 /* reserved for ext2 lib */
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* i_block[] The block pointers. There are 15 array elements, the first
12 elements are direct blocks pointers; their blocks
contain actual file content. The 13th element points to a
block that acts as an extension of the array. This block is
an indirect block, and the pointers it contains point to
additional direct blocks. The 14th element points to a block
containing an array of block pointers to indirect blocks.
This element is the doubly indirect block. The last element
is the trebly indirect block. This block contains pointers
to doubly indirect blocks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_NDIR_BLOCKS 12
#define EXT2_IND_BLOCK EXT2_NDIR_BLOCKS
#define EXT2_DIND_BLOCK (EXT2_IND_BLOCK + 1)
#define EXT2_TIND_BLOCK (EXT2_DIND_BLOCK + 1)
#define EXT2_N_BLOCKS (EXT2_TIND_BLOCK + 1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* i_version The file version. Doesn't appear to be used.

* i_file_acl A pointer to an ACL list. This is not used on ext2, as

there are no ACLs implemented for this version of the file
system.

* i_dir_acl A pointer to an ACL list. This is not used on ext2 as an

ACL pointer, but rather as the value: [ i_size_high ]. This
is an additional 32bits of file size, allowing the file size
to be treated as a 64bit unsigned intetger. This is not
generally used on ext2fs.

* i_faddr The fragment address. Fragments are not used on the ext2fs;
therefore, this value is always 0.

Certain inodes have special significance within the file system.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_BAD_INO 1 /* Bad blocks inode */
#define EXT2_ROOT_INO 2 /* Root inode */
#define EXT2_ACL_IDX_INO 3 /* ACL inode */
#define EXT2_ACL_DATA_INO 4 /* ACL inode */
#define EXT2_BOOT_LOADER_INO 5 /* Boot loader inode */
#define EXT2_UNDEL_DIR_INO 6 /* Undelete directory inode */
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The bad blocks inode contains block pointers to data blocks that occupy
bad sectors of the hard disk. The root inode is the root directory that
contains the head of the file system tree. The other inodes are not
typically used on production systems. The first inode used for user files
is inode 11. This inode is the directory "lost+found", created by the tool
mkfs.

. o O ( S U P E R B L O C K ) O o .

The super block is the most basic means that the kernel has of
determining the status of the file system. It indicates the number of
inodes, blocks, and groups, in addition to various other pieces of
information. The elements within the super block structure change more
rapidly than the inode or group data. This is because libext2fs adds
features to the ext2fs which might not be implemented in the kernel. The
format we examine is from e2fsprogs-1.19.

The super block is 1024 bytes in size, and offset 1024 bytes from the
start of the partition.

The format of the super block is as follows:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct ext2fs_sb {
__u32 s_inodes_count; /* Inodes count */
__u32 s_blocks_count; /* Blocks count */
__u32 s_r_blocks_count; /* Reserved blocks count */
__u32 s_free_blocks_count; /* Free blocks count */
__u32 s_free_inodes_count; /* Free inodes count */
__u32 s_first_data_block; /* First Data Block */
__u32 s_log_block_size; /* Block size */
__s32 s_log_frag_size; /* Fragment size */
__u32 s_blocks_per_group; /* # Blocks per group */
__u32 s_frags_per_group; /* # Fragments per group */
__u32 s_inodes_per_group; /* # Inodes per group */
__u32 s_mtime; /* Mount time */
__u32 s_wtime; /* Write time */
__u16 s_mnt_count; /* Mount count */
__s16 s_max_mnt_count; /* Maximal mount count */
__u16 s_magic; /* Magic signature */
__u16 s_state; /* File system state */
__u16 s_errors; /* Behaviour when detecting errors */
__u16 s_minor_rev_level; /* minor revision level */
__u32 s_lastcheck; /* time of last check */
__u32 s_checkinterval; /* max. time between checks */
__u32 s_creator_os; /* OS */
__u32 s_rev_level; /* Revision level */
__u16 s_def_resuid; /* Default uid for reserved blocks */
__u16 s_def_resgid; /* Default gid for reserved blocks */
/*
* These fields are for EXT2_DYNAMIC_REV superblocks only.
*
* Note: the difference between the compatible feature set and
* the incompatible feature set is that if there is a bit set
 * in the incompatible feature set that the kernel doesn't
* know about, it should refuse to mount the filesystem.
*
* e2fsck's requirements are more strict; if it doesn't know
* about a feature in either the compatible or incompatible
* feature set, it must abort and not try to meddle with
* things it doesn't understand...
*/
__u32 s_first_ino; /* First non-reserved inode */
__u16 s_inode_size; /* size of inode structure */
__u16 s_block_group_nr; /* block group # of this superblock */
__u32 s_feature_compat; /* compatible feature set */
__u32 s_feature_incompat; /* incompatible feature set */
__u32 s_feature_ro_compat; /* readonly-compatible feature set */
__u8 s_uuid[16]; /* 128-bit uuid for volume */
char s_volume_name[16]; /* volume name */
char s_last_mounted[64]; /* directory where last mounted */
__u32 s_algorithm_usage_bitmap; /* For compression */
/*
* Performance hints. Directory preallocation should only
* happen if the EXT2_FEATURE_COMPAT_DIR_PREALLOC flag is on.
*/
__u8 s_prealloc_blocks; /* Nr of blocks to try to preallocate*/
__u8 s_prealloc_dir_blocks; /* Nr to preallocate for dirs */
__u16 s_padding1;
/*
* Journaling support.
*/
__u8 s_journal_uuid[16]; /* uuid of journal superblock */
__u32 s_journal_inum; /* inode number of journal file */
__u32 s_journal_dev; /* device number of journal file */
__u32 s_last_orphan; /* start of list of inodes to delete */

__u32 s_reserved[197]; /* Padding to the end of the block */

};
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_inodes_count The total number of inodes within the file system.

* s_blocks_count The total number of blocks within the file system.

* s_r_blocks_count The number of blocks reserved for the super user.

If the FS becomes too full, these last reserved
blocks will prevent users from making the FS
unusable.

* s_free_blocks_count The number of unused blocks. This value is

constantly updated as blocks are freed or
allocated.

* s_free_inodes_count The number of unused inodes. This value is

constantly updates as inodes are freed or allocated.

* s_first_data_block A pointer to the first data block, after all the

blocks used to store inode tables, bitmaps and
groups. This value is either 0, or the correct
value.

* s_log_block_size The size of a block. This value is stored as a

 shift value. The number to be shifted is 1024;
therefore, to retrive the actual block size use:
bs = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;

* s_log_frag_size The size of a fragment. This value is stored as a

shift value. Fragments are not used on the ext2fs;
therefore, this value is ignored.

* s_blocks_per_group The number of blocks in a group.

* s_frags_per_group The number of fragments in a group.

* s_inodes_per_group The number of inodes in a group.

* s_mtime The last time the file system was mounted. All time
values are stored as seconds since the epoch.

* s_wtime The last time the file system was written.

* s_mnt_count The number of times the file system has been

mounted.

* s_max_mnt_count The maximum number of times the file system can be

mounted before it needs to be fsck'd. The default
value is 20.

* s_magic The magic number of the file system: 0xEF53.

* s_state The state of the file system: either clean, or

dirty. The flags are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_VALID_FS 0x0001 /* Unmounted cleanly */
#define EXT2_ERROR_FS 0x0002 /* Errors detected */
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_errors The response to take when an error is encountered.

The following are valid values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_ERRORS_CONTINUE 1 /* Continue execution */
#define EXT2_ERRORS_RO 2 /* Remount fs read-only */
#define EXT2_ERRORS_PANIC 3 /* Panic */
#define EXT2_ERRORS_DEFAULT EXT2_ERRORS_CONTINUE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_minor_rev_level The minor number of the ext2fs revision. This value

can be safely ignored.

* s_lastcheck The last time the file system was fsck'd, stored in
typical Unix sec's since epoch format.

* s_checkinterval The maximum amount of time that can elapse between

fsckings. The file system needs to fscked if either
this value is exceeded, or s_max_mnt_count.

* s_creator_os The OS that created this file system. Valid values

are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_OS_LINUX 0
#define EXT2_OS_HURD 1
#define EXT2_OS_MASIX 2
#define EXT2_OS_FREEBSD 3
#define EXT2_OS_LITES 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_rev_level The revision of the file system. The only

difference in values deals with inode sizes. The
current version uses a fixed inode size of 128
bytes. The following are valid values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_GOOD_OLD_REV 0 /* The good old (original) format */
#define EXT2_DYNAMIC_REV 1 /* V2 format w/ dynamic inode sizes */
#define EXT2_CURRENT_REV EXT2_GOOD_OLD_REV
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_def_resuid Default UID for reserved blocks. The default is 0.

* s_def_resgid Default GID for reserved blocks. The default is 0.

* s_first_ino The first non reserved inode. Inodes < 10 are

reserved, so the first valid inode number is 11.
This inode is almost always the file "lost+found".

* s_inode_size The size of an inode. The size is 128 bytes for

current ext2fs implementations.

* s_block_group_nr The block group that this super block is stored in.

* s_feature_compat Flags of features that this ext2fs supports. Valid

features are the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_FEATURE_COMPAT_DIR_PREALLOC 0x0001
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_feature_incompat Flags of features that this ext2fs doesnt' support.

Valid incompatabilities are the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_COMPRESSION 0x0001
#define EXT2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FILETYPE 0x0002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_feature_ro_compat Flags of features that this ext2fs supports as read

only. Valid features are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SPARSE_SUPER 0x0001
#define EXT2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_LARGE_FILE 0x0002
#define EXT2_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_BTREE_DIR 0x0004
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* s_uuid The unique ID of this ext2fs.

* s_volume_name The name of the volume. (I don't know what this is

used for, but it sertainly isn't important).

* s_last_mounted The directory on which this file system was last

mounted.

* s_algorithm_usage_bitmap (I don't know how this is used. No

interest in FS compression.)
* s_prealloc_blocks The number of blocks to try to preallocate for a
file.

* s_prealloc_dir_blocks The number of block to try to preallocate for a

directory file.

* s_padding1 padding.

* s_journal_* (I don't have journalling support on my FS,

therefore I do not know how these values are used.)
* s_reserverd[] This is padding to fill the super block out to 1024
bytes.

. o O ( G R O U P S ) O o .

Ext2fs groups are used to organise clusters of blocks and inodes.

Groups each contain a bitmap of free inodes, and one of free blocks.
Additionally each group has a copy of the super block to help prevent
against catastrophic data loss. Group descriptors are stored on the blocks
immediately after the super block, following them are bitmaps and inode
tables, and following that data blocks.

The format of a group descriptor is as follows:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct ext2_group_desc
{
__u32 bg_block_bitmap; /* Blocks bitmap block */
__u32 bg_inode_bitmap; /* Inodes bitmap block */
__u32 bg_inode_table; /* Inodes table block */
__u16 bg_free_blocks_count; /* Free blocks count */
__u16 bg_free_inodes_count; /* Free inodes count */
__u16 bg_used_dirs_count; /* Directories count */
__u16 bg_pad;
__u32 bg_reserved[3];
};
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

* bg_block_bitmap A block pointer to the block bitmap. The bits in

the bitmap are set to indicate free/in-use.

* bg_inode_bitmap A block pointer to the inode bitmap. The bits in

the bitmap are set to indicate free/in-use.

* bg_inode_table A block pointer to the start of the inode table.

* bg_free_blocks_count The number of blocks within the group that are

available for use.

* bg_free_inodes_count The number of inodes within the group that are

available for use.

* bg_used_dirs_count The number of inodes from this group used for

directory files.

* bg_pad padding.
* pg_reserved[] padding.
 . o O ( D I R E C T O R I E S ) O o .

Directories are used to organize files at the Operating system level.

The contents of a directory file is an array of directory entry structures.
Each contains the name of a file within the directory, and the inode of
that file.

The format of ext2 directory entries is as follows:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
struct ext2_dir_entry_2 {
__u32 inode; /* Inode number */
__u16 rec_len; /* Directory entry length */
__u8 name_len; /* Name length */
__u8 file_type;
char name[EXT2_NAME_LEN]; /* File name */
};
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* inode The inode number of the file within the directory. If a

file has been deleted, the inode number is set to 0.

* rec_len The size of the directory entry. As the length of the name
can be anything up to 255 byte, this allows for more
efficient use of space within the directory file.

* name_len The length of the file's name. This can be up to 255 bytes.

* file_type The type of file, i.e. symlink, device, etc. etc. The
following are valid values:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define EXT2_FT_UNKNOWN 0
#define EXT2_FT_REG_FILE 1
#define EXT2_FT_DIR 2
#define EXT2_FT_CHRDEV 3
#define EXT2_FT_BLKDEV 4
#define EXT2_FT_FIFO 5
#define EXT2_FT_SOCK 6
#define EXT2_FT_SYMLINK 7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This concludes the walk through of the physical layout of the ext2 file
system. Further information is available from
http://e2fsprogs.sourceforge.net.

----[ 8.2 - runefs.tar.gz (uuencoded)

begin 600 runefs.tar.gz

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`
end

|=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|