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Data Science Fundamentals with R Python and Open Data 1st Edition Marco Cremonini download

The document is a promotional and informational piece about the book 'Data Science Fundamentals with R, Python, and Open Data' by Marco Cremonini, aimed at a broad audience beyond just data scientists, including professionals from various fields. It emphasizes the accessibility of data science skills for non-specialists and outlines the contents of the book, which covers fundamental programming concepts and data analysis techniques using R and Python. The book is published by John Wiley & Sons and is available for digital download.

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37 views

Data Science Fundamentals with R Python and Open Data 1st Edition Marco Cremonini download

The document is a promotional and informational piece about the book 'Data Science Fundamentals with R, Python, and Open Data' by Marco Cremonini, aimed at a broad audience beyond just data scientists, including professionals from various fields. It emphasizes the accessibility of data science skills for non-specialists and outlines the contents of the book, which covers fundamental programming concepts and data analysis techniques using R and Python. The book is published by John Wiley & Sons and is available for digital download.

Uploaded by

cgrbgeyxc1933
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Data Science Fundamentals with R Python and Open
Data 1st Edition Marco Cremonini Digital Instant
Download
Author(s): Marco Cremonini
ISBN(s): 9781394213269, 1394213263
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 7.67 MB
Year: 2024
Language: english
Table of Contents
1. Cover
2. Table of Contents
3. Title Page
4. Copyright
5. Preface
6. About the Companion Website
7. Introduction
1. Approach
2. Open Data
3. What You Don't Learn
8. 1 Open-Source Tools for Data Science
1. 1.1 R Language and RStudio
2. 1.2 Python Language and Tools
3. 1.3 Advanced Plain Text Editor
4. 1.4 CSV Format for Datasets
5. Questions
9. 2 Simple Exploratory Data Analysis
1. 2.1 Missing Values Analysis
2. 2.2 R: Descriptive Statistics and Utility Functions
3. 2.3 Python: Descriptive Statistics and Utility Functions
4. Questions
10. 3 Data Organization and First Data Frame Operations
1. Datasets
2. 3.1 R: Read CSV Datasets and Column Selection
3. 3.2 R: Rename and Relocate Columns
4. 3.3 R: Slicing, Column Creation, and Deletion
5. 3.4 R: Separate and Unite Columns
6. 3.5 R: Sorting Data Frames
7. 3.6 R: Pipe
8. 3.7 Python: Column Selection
9. 3.8 Python: Rename and Relocate Columns
10. 3.9 Python: NumPy Slicing, Selection with Index, Column
Creation and Deletion
11. 3.10 Python: Separate and Unite Columns
12. 3.11 Python: Sorting Data Frame
13. Questions
11. 4 Subsetting with Logical Conditions
1. 4.1 Logical Operators
2. 4.2 R: Row Selection
12. 5 Operations on Dates, Strings, and Missing Values
1. Datasets
2. 5.1 R: Operations on Dates and Strings
3. 5.2 R: Handling Missing Values and Data Type
Transformations
4. 5.3 R: Example with Dates, Strings, and Missing Values
5. 5.4 Pyhton: Operations on Dates and Strings
6. 5.5 Python: Handling Missing Values and Data Type
Transformations
7. 5.6 Python: Examples with Dates, Strings, and Missing
Values
8. Questions
13. 6 Pivoting and Wide-long Transformations
1. Datasets
2. 6.1 R: Pivoting
3. 6.2 Python: Pivoting
14. 7 Groups and Operations on Groups
1. Dataset
2. 7.1 R: Groups
3. 7.2 Python: Groups
4. Questions
15. 8 Conditions and Iterations
1. Datasets
2. 8.1 R: Conditions and Iterations
3. 8.2 Python: Conditions and Iterations
4. Questions
16. 9 Functions and Multicolumn Operations
1. 9.1 R: User-defined Functions
2. 9.2 R: Multicolumn Operations
3. 9.3 Python: User-defined and Lambda Functions
4. Questions
17. 10 Join Data Frames
1. Datasets
2. 10.1 Basic Concepts
3. 10.2 Python: Join Operations
4. Questions
18. 11 List/Dictionary Data Format
1. Datasets
2. 11.1 R: List Data Format
3. 11.2 R: JSON Data Format and Use Cases
4. 11.3 Python: Dictionary Data Format
5. Questions
19. Index
20. End User License Agreement

List of Tables

1. Chapter 2
1. Table 2.1 R utility functions.
2. Table 2.2 Python utility functions.
2. Chapter 4
1. Table 4.1 Main logical operators.
2. Table 4.2 Truth tables for binary operators AND, OR, and
XOR.
3. Chapter 5
1. Table 5.1 Main functions of package stringr.
2. Table 5.2 Data type verification and transformation
functions.
3. Table 5.3 Dataset Fahrraddiebstahl in Berlin (translated),
column descriptio...
4. Table 5.4 Symbols for date formats.
5. Table 5.5 Pandas functions for string manipulation.
6. Table 5.6 Data type verification and transformation
functions.
4. Chapter 7
1. Table 7.1 Columns selected from the US domestic flight
dataset.
5. Chapter 8
1. Table 8.1 Unit of measurement and symbols.
6. Chapter 11
1. Table 11.1 Methods for Python dict data format.

List of Illustrations

1. Chapter 1
1. Figure 1.1 RStudio Desktop's standard layout
2. Figure 1.2 Example of starting JupyterLab
3. Figure 1.3 Ambiguity between textual character and
separator symbol
2. Chapter 4
1. Figure 4.1 Binary logical operators AND, OR, and XOR: set
theory.
3. Chapter 6
1. Figure 6.1 Example of long-form dataset.
2. Figure 6.2 Wide-long transformation schema.
4. Chapter 10
1. Figure 10.1 Example of join between data frames.
5. Chapter 11
1. Figure 11.1 The list structure of a3 with the native RStudio
viewer.
2. Figure 11.2 RStudio viewer visualization of data frame df2.
3. Figure 11.3 Result of the unnest_longer() function.
4. Figure 11.4 The Nobel Prize JSON data format.
Data Science Fundamentals with R,
Python, and Open Data

Marco Cremonini

University of Milan

Italy
Copyright © 2024 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey.


Published simultaneously in Canada.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or


transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of
the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of
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the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978)
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Cover Design: Wiley


Cover Image: © Andriy Onufriyenko/Getty Images
Preface
Two questions come along with every new text that aims to
teach someone something. The first is, Who is it addressed to?
and the second is, Why does it have precisely those contents,
organized in that way? These two questions, for this text, have
perhaps even greater relevance than they usually do, because
for both, the answer is unconventional (or at least not entirely
conventional) and to some, it may seem surprising. It shouldn't
be, or even better, if the answers will make the surprise a
pleasant surprise.

Let's start with the first question: Who is the target of a text that
introduces the fundamentals of two programming languages, R
and Python, for the discipline called data science? Those who
study to become data scientists, computer scientists, or
computer engineers, it seems obvious, right? Instead, it is not
so. For sure, future data scientists, computer scientists, and
computer engineers could find this text useful. However, the
real recipients should be others, simply all the others, the non-
specialists, those who do not work or study to make IT or data
science their main profession. Those who study to become or
already are sociologists, political scientists, economists,
psychologists, marketing or human resource management
experts, and those aiming to have a career in business
management and in managing global supply chains and
distribution networks. Also, those studying to be biologists,
chemists, geologists, climatologists, or even physicians. Then
there are law students, human rights activists, experts of
traditional and social media, memes and social networks,
linguists, archaeologists, and paleontologists (I'm not joking,
there really are fabulous data science works applied to
linguistics, archeology, and paleontology). Certainly, in this
roundup, I have forgotten many who deserved to be mentioned
like the others. Don't feel left out. The artists I forgot! There are
contaminations between art, data science, and data
visualization of incredible interest. Art absorbs and re-
elaborates, and in a certain way, this is also what data science
does: it absorbs and re-elaborates. Finally, there are also all
those who just don't know yet what they want to be; they will
figure it out along the way, and having certain tools can come in
handy in many cases.

Everyone can successfully learn the fundamentals of data


science and the use of these computational tools, even with a
few basic computer skills, with some efforts and time, of course,
necessary but reasonable. Everyone could find opportunities
for application in all, or almost all, existing professions,
sciences, humanities, and cultural fields. And above all, without
the need to take on the role of computer scientist or data
scientist when you already have other roles to take on, which
rightly demand time and dedication.

Therefore, the fact of not considering computer scientists and


data scientists as the principal recipients of this book is not to
diminish their role for non-existent reasons, but because for
them there is no need to explain why a book that presents
programming languages for data science has, at least in theory,
something to do with what they typically do.

It is to the much wider audience of non-specialists that the


exhortation to learn the fundamentals of data science should be
addressed to, explaining that they do not have to transform
themselves into computer scientists to be able to do so (or even
worse, into geeks), which, with excellent reasons that are
difficult to dispute, have no intention to do. It doesn't matter if
they have always been convinced to be “unfit for computer
stuff,” and that, frankly, the rhetoric of past twenty years about
“digital natives,” “being a coder,” or “joining the digital
revolution” sounds just annoying. None of this should matter,
time to move on. How? Everyone should look at what digital
skills and technologies would be useful for their own discipline
and do the training for those goals. Do you want to be a
computer scientist or a data scientist? Well, do it; there is no
shortage of possibilities. Do you want to be an economist, a
biologist, or a marketing expert? Very well, do it, but you must
not be cut off from adequate training on digital methodologies
and tools from which you will benefit, as much as you are not
cut off from a legal, statistical, historical, or sociological training
if this knowledge is part of the skills needed for your profession
or education. What is the objection that is usually made? No
one can know everything, and generalists end up knowing a
little of everything and nothing adequately. It's as true as clichés
are, but that's not what we're talking about. A doctor who
acquires statistical or legal training is no less a doctor for this;
on the contrary, in many cases she/he is able to carry out the
medical profession in a better way. No one reproaches an
economist who becomes an expert in statistical analysis that
she/he should have taken a degree in statistics. And soon
(indeed already now), to the same economist who will become
an expert in machine learning techniques for classification
problems for fintech projects, no one, hopefully, will reproach
that as an economist she/he should leave those skills to
computer scientists. Like it or not, computer skills are spreading
and will do so more and more among non-computer scientists,
it's a matter of base rate, notoriously easy to be misinterpreted,
as all students who have taken an introductory course in
statistics know.
Let's consider the second question: Why this text presents two
languages instead of just one as it is usually done? Isn't it
enough to learn just one? Which is better? A friend of mine told
me he's heard that Python is famous, the other one he has never
heard of. Come on, seriously two? It's a miracle if I learn half of
just one! Stop. That's enough.

It's not a competition or a beauty contest between


programming languages, and not even a question of cheering,
as with sports teams, where you have to choose one, none is
admissible, but you can't root for two. R and Python are tools, in
some ways complex, not necessarily complicated, professional,
but also within anyone's reach. Above all, they are the result of
the continuous work of many people; they are evolving objects
and are extraordinary teaching aids for those who want to
learn. Speaking of evolution, a recent and interesting one is the
increasingly frequent convergence between the two languages
presented in this text. Convergence means the possibility of
coordinated, alternating, and complementary use: Complement
the benefits of both, exploit what is innovative in one and what
the other has, and above all, the real didactic value, learning
not to be afraid to change technology, because much of what
you learned with one will be found and will be useful with the
other. There is another reason, this one is more specific. It is
true that Python is so famous that almost everyone has heard
its name while only relatively few know R, except that
practically everyone involved in data science knows it and most
of them uses it, and that's for a pretty simple reason: It's a great
tool with a large community of people who have been
contributing new features for many years. What about Python?
Python is used by millions of people, mainly to make web
services, so it has enormous application possibilities. A part of
Python has specialized in data science and is growing rapidly,
taking advantage of the ease of extension to dynamic and web-
oriented applications. One last piece of information: Learning
the first programming language could look difficult. The
learning curve, so-called how fast you learn, is steep at first, you
struggle at the very beginning, but after a while it softens, and
you run. This is for the first one. Same ramp to climb with the
second one too? Not at all. Attempting an estimate, I would say
that just one-third of the effort is needed to learn the second, a
bargain that probably few are aware of. Therefore, let's do both
of them.

One last comment because one could certainly think that this
discussion is only valid in theory, putting it into practice is quite
another thing. Over the years I have required hundreds of
social science students to learn the fundamentals of both R and
Python for data science and I can tell you that it is true that
most of them struggled initially, some complained more or less
aloud that they were unfit, then they learned very quickly and
ended up demonstrating that it was possible for them to
acquire excellent computational skills without having to
transform into computer scientists or data scientists (to tell the
truth, someone transformed into one, but that's fine too),
without possessing nonexistent digital native geniuses, without
having to be anything other than what they study for, future
experts in social sciences, management, human resources, or
economics, and what is true for them is certainly true for
everyone. This is the pleasant surprise.

Milan, Italy Marco Cremonini


2023
About the Companion Website
This book is accompanied by student companion website.

www.wiley.com/go/DSFRPythonOpenData

The student website includes:

MCQs
Software
Introduction
This text introduces the fundamentals of data science using two
main programming languages and open-source technologies : R
and Python. These are accompanied by the respective
application contexts formed by tools to support coding scripts,
i.e. logical sequences of instructions with the aim to produce
certain results or functionalities. The tools can be of the
command line interface (CLI) type, which are consoles to be
used with textual commands, and integrated development
environment (IDE), which are of interactive type to support the
use of languages. Other elements that make up the application
context are the supplementary libraries that contain the
additional functions in addition to the basic ones coming with
the language, package managers for the automated
management of the download and installation of new libraries,
online documentation, cheat sheets, tutorials, and online
forums of discussion and help for users. This context, formed
by a language, tools, additional features, discussions between
users, and online documentation produced by developers, is
what we mean when we say "R" and "Python," not the simple
programming language tool, which by itself would be very little.
It is like talking only about the engine when instead you want to
explain how to drive a car on busy roads.
R and Python, together and with the meaning just described,
represent the knowledge to start approaching data science,
carry out the first simple steps, complete the educational
examples, get acquainted with real data, consider more
advanced features, familiarize oneself with other real data,
experiment with particular cases, analyze the logic behind
mechanisms, gain experience with more complex real data,
analyze online discussions on exceptional cases, look for data
sources in the world of open data, think about the results to be
obtained, even more sources of data now to put together,
familiarize yourself with different data formats, with large
datasets, with datasets that will drive you crazy before
obtaining a workable version, and finally be ready to move to
other technologies, other applications, uses, types of results,
projects of ever-increasing complexity. This is the journey that
starts here, and as discussed in the preface, it is within the
reach of anyone who puts some effort and time into it. A single
book, of course, cannot contain everything, but it can help to
start, proceed in the right direction, and accompany for a while.

With this text, we will start from the elementary steps to gain
speed quickly. We will use simplified teaching examples, but
also immediately familiarize ourselves with the type of data
that exists in reality, rather than in the unreality of the teaching
examples. We will finish by addressing some elaborate
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philosophical subjects. The magnificent ruins, which subsist up to
this day in that locality, have been minutely examined, measured,
and described by several visitors. The great temple must, in the
opinion of A. Cunningham, have been built in the sixth century of
our era.
14. Kootheinaron is the place in the neighbourhood of which
Buddha entered into the state of Neibban, or died. Some
antiquarians, laying much stress on the name of a village up to this
day called Kushia, have placed the position of Kootheinaron on the
road between Betiah and Goruckpore. On that spot is to be seen a
pyramidical-looking mound of bricks, over which spreads a large
banyan tree. But, from the narrative of the legend, we must look for
the site of Kootheinaron nearer to the river Higniarati or Gunduck,
since the spot where Gaudama died was near to the city, and is
described as surrounded on three sides by the river. Kootheinaron
was situated a little north or north-west of Betiah, on or near the
banks of the Gunduck. There too ruins are to be seen, which
doubtless will prove to be those of Kootheinaron. The name may
have subsequently migrated to the locality above mentioned.
15. Papilawana, the capital of the Mauria princes, was situated
between the Rapti and the Gunduck, nearly east of Goruckpore.
South of that place Fa-Hian visited the dzedi of the coals. The Mauria
princes, agreeably to the text of the legend, having come too late for
sharing in the partition of the relics, took with them the coals that
remained after the cremation of Buddha’s remains, carried them into
their country, and built a dzedi over them. It was not far from that
place that the Brahmin Dauna built another dzedi over the vessel
that had contained Buddha’s relics.
16. The village of Rama is the same as the Ramaganio of the
Cingalese collection. The two Chinese pilgrims in their relations call
that place Lan-mo. Can it be that the modern Ramnagar is indicative
of the ancient Ramaganio? At all events we would not be far from
the truth if we place it between the Gogra and the Rapti, but nearer
to the latter, almost due west of Goruckpore.
17. The Pawa town is supposed by A. Cunningham to have
occupied the same site as the large village of Padarawana, twelve
miles to the west of the river Gunduck, and forty miles north-north-
east of Goruckpore. A large mound of more than 200 feet in length
by 120 in breadth exists in that locality. From the excavations made
on the place, it is supposed that there was a courtyard, with cells for
monks, on each side, the centre being, as was often the case,
occupied by a dzedi. The people of Pawa obtained one-eighth of the
relics, after the cremation of Buddha’s remains, and built one dzedi
over them.
18. Kapilawot, or Kapilawastu, was situated between Fyzabad and
Goruckpore, but a little nearer to the latter place. It was on or near
the banks of the Gogra. The small river Rohini formed the boundary
between the territory of Kapilawot and that of Kaulia.
19. Gaya and Buddha-Gaya are two distinct places. The first is well
known as the town of Gaya. The second lies six miles southward,
and is famous as the locality of the Pipal or Bodi tree, under which
Gaudama obtained the Buddhahood. A tree of the same description
is still to be seen on the same spot. The present one was in full
vigour in 1811, when Dr. Buchanan saw it. He describes it as not
being more than a hundred years old. A. Cunningham says that it is
now much decayed. One large stem with three branches on the
westward side are still green; but the other branches are barkless
and rotten. Hwen Thsang, in his itinerary, speaks of an early renewal
of that tree by King Purna Varmma, after its destruction by King
Sasangka, who, with a true Brahminical and inimical feeling, dug up
the very ground on which it had stood, and moistened the earth with
sugar-cane juice, to prevent its renewal. The same eminent
archæologist describes a massive brick temple, standing east of the
Bodi tree, and with great plausibility maintains that it is the same
which has been described by the above-named Chinese pilgrim. As
Fa-Hian is silent respecting that temple, A. Cunningham concludes
that it was erected during the sixth century of the Christian era,
when Buddhism, under the favour of King Amara-sinha and some of
his successors, regained a vigorous ascendancy at least in Magatha.
It is probable that all the temples, the ruins of which have been
examined at Buddha-Gaya, Nalanda, and Behar, having a similarity in
architectural plans and ornaments, were erected during the sixth
and a part of the seventh century of our era. The inference
therefrom is that Buddhism was flourishing in Magatha at that
period. Hwen Thsang, who has visited and described those
monuments in or about 625, speaks of them in the highest terms.
How long lasted the prosperous days of Buddhism in those parts? It
is difficult to state with any degree of accuracy. But it seems
probable that it maintained itself in a satisfactory condition until the
beginning of the tenth century. It had then to give way before the
irresistible and triumphant ascendancy of Brahminism.
To the south-east of the great temple is a small tank which is
probably that of the Naga, who protected Buddha during one of the
several stations that he made round the Bodi tree.
20. Anawadat is the name of a lake famous in Buddhist sacred
history. Its etymological meaning is, agreeably to some savans,
exempt of tumult, and, according to others, not brightened. This last
appellation is owing probably to the high peaks that surround it and
prevent its being brightened by the rays of the sun. This is certainly
the famous and extensive lake, which covers a portion of the high
table-land of Pamir. It has been visited and described by Lieutenant
Wood. What he states from a careful observation on the spot agrees
well with what is found in the itineraries of the Chinese travellers.
From that high plateau which embosoms the lake flows in an eastern
direction one of those small streams that form the river Ganges;
whilst, in an opposite direction, the Oxus, issuing from the western
slope, shapes its course nearly towards the west.
21. Udiana is a country the position of which is fixed on the banks
of the Indus, between Cabul and Cashmere, west of the latter
country. Gandara is, it appears, the country called Candahar by the
Mussulmans, lying between the Swat and the Indus. The Burmese
author mentions always Kashmera along with Gandara. This would
indicate that the two places are in the vicinity of each other, and that
they formed primitively one and the same state. Yaunaka is perhaps
the peninsula of Guzerat. But the writer entertains serious doubts on
this subject. It might be the countries situated west of the Hindu
Kush, that is to say, the ancient Bactriana. The Burmese author
states that Yaunaka was inhabited by a people called Pantsays. What
people were they? Is it an allusion to the Greeks that had settled in
Bactriana? It is not without interest to hear our Chinese traveller
stating that religion was flourishing in the above-mentioned
countries, whilst in the Punjaub he met with religious with whom he
declined holding intercourse, and of whom he speaks in rather
unfavourable terms. Hence we may conclude that heretical opinions
were then prevailing in that country, and that doctrines at variance
with those of Buddha had already taken a deep root, and in their
growth almost choked genuine Buddhism, if it had ever been the
prevailing creed in the land of the five rivers.
22. On his way down the Ganges, our pilgrim does not appear to
have left his boat for any considerable time; he contents himself
with mentioning a fact that to some may appear somewhat doubtful,
viz., the flourishing condition of the Buddhist religion as far as the
neighbourhood of the present metropolis of India. He speaks of the
kingdom of Champa. Campapuri, or Karnapura, was the capital of
that state. It was situated on the site of the present Bhagulpore, or
not far from it. Thence Fa-Hian came to the state of Tamaralipti. The
town which bore that name is the modern Tumlook, on the right
bank of the Hoogly, not far from Calcutta. It was at that port that he
embarked on board of a ship bound to Ceylon. Tamaralipti must
have been a famous sea-port several centuries before Fa-Hian’s
days. We are informed that Maheinda and his companions, who
were appointed to proceed to Ceylon to preach Buddhism to the
people of that island, embarked at the same place.
THE SEVEN WAYS TO NEIBBAN.
This is an abridgment of all the principles that constitute the
system of Buddhism. In the Legend of Buddha the reader has become
acquainted with the life of the founder of Buddhism, the
establishment of his religion, and the promulgation of his chief
doctrine. In the following pages he will find compressed within
narrow limits the several observances to be attended to in order to
reach the goal of quiescence. As it is chiefly and principally by the
help of meditation and contemplation that such a point can ever be
attained, the reader must be prepared to wade up to his very chin in
the somewhat muddy waters of metaphysics if he has a wish to
penetrate into the very sanctuary of Buddhism.
To encourage the reader, and console him in the midst of his
fatiguing journey through such dreary tracts, the writer would
remind him that he has first borne up the fatigues of such a journey,
and that, impelled by friendly feelings, he has endeavoured to
smooth the rugged path in behalf of those that would follow him on
the same errand. How far he has succeeded in his well-meant efforts
he will not presume to state. But he will say this much, that if his
success be commensurate with his exertions he may entertain a
well-founded hope that he will not be altogether disappointed in his
anticipation, and feel somewhat confident that he has afforded to
the uninitiated some help to go over the difficult ground of
metaphysics.
Following, in this instance, the line of conduct he has adopted
through the foregoing pages of this book, the writer will allow the
Buddhist author to speak for himself and explain his own views on
the different subjects under consideration. His sole aim will ever be
to convey as faithfully and as succinctly as possible the meaning of
the original he has under his eyes. The task, however simple it may
appear, is far from being an easy one, as the Burmese are utterly
incapable of fully understanding the metaphysical portion of their
religious system. Their ignorance is calculated to render even more
obscure what is per se almost beyond the range of comprehension,
because they must have frequently put an erroneous interpretation
on many Pali words, the meaning of which is far from being
accurately determined.
Our Buddhist doctor begins his work with enumerating the
advantages to be derived from a serious and constant application to
the earnest study of these seven ways. “Such an exercise,” says he,
“has the virtue to free us from all evils; it expands the intelligence in
the highest degree, and leads straight to Neibban. Man, through it,
is delivered from all errors, is happy, and becomes during his life an
honour to the holy religion of Buddha.”
The various subjects he intends to treat of in this work are
arranged under seven heads, which are laid down in his own original
way as follows:—The observance of the precepts and the practice of
meditation are the two-fold foundation of the spiritual edifice. The
consideration of the nature and form of matter shall be the right foot
of the sage; the investigation about the causes and principles of
living beings shall be as his left foot; the application of the mind to
find out the four high-roads to perfection, and the obtaining the
freedom from all passions, shall be as his right and left hands; and
the possession of the perfect science or knowledge shall be as his
head. The happy man who shall have reached so far will be certain
to obtain the deliverance.
This summary is thus divided by our guide into seven distinct
parts, which will be condensed into six articles.
It is as well to add that this work, an abridged translation of which
is now set before the reader, was composed at first in the Siamese
language at Bangkok, and has been subsequently translated into
Burmese. We find, therefore, that all the principles expounded
throughout are received as genuine on the banks of the Irrawaddy
as well as on those of the Meinam, and may be looked upon as a
faithful exposition of the highest tenets of Buddhism, such as they
are held in both countries. This observation confirms a notion which
has been denied by many, viz., that the chief doctrines of Buddhism
are pretty nearly the same in all the places where it has become the
dominant creed. The discrepancies to be met here and there relate
principally to practices and observances which present to the eyes of
the observer an infinite variety of hues and forms. When Buddhism
was established in several countries, it did not destroy many
observances and practices that were found deeply engrafted on the
customs and manners of the people; it tolerated them, and made
with them a tacit compromise. As, for instance, the worship of Nats
existed among the tribes of the Irrawaddy valley long before the
introduction of Buddhism. Most of the superstitious rites now
prevailing in Burmah originate from that belief. With the Chinese the
worship of ancestors continues to subsist side by side with
Buddhism, though the latter creed has nothing to do with it. In
Nepaul and at Ceylon, Hindu superstitions obtrude themselves on
the view of the observer to such an extent that it is not easy to state
which of the two creeds obtains the preference.

ARTICLE I.
OF THE PRECEPTS.

Our author, in a truly philosophical spirit, at first puts to himself


the three following questions: What is the origin of the law? What is
man, the subject of the law? What is the individual who is the
promulgator of the law? The three questions he answers in the
following manner: 1st. All that exists is divided into two distinct
parts, the things which are liable to change and obey the principle of
mutability, such as matter, its modifications, and all beings which
have a cause;[45] and those which are eternal and immutable, that is
to say, the precepts of the law and Neibban. These have neither
author nor cause; they are self-existing, eternal, and placed far
beyond the reach of the influence that causes mutability. 2d. As to
the publisher of the law, Buddha, he is a mere man, who during
myriads of centuries has accumulated merits on merits, until he has
obtained the Neibban of Kiletha, or the deliverance from all passions.
From that moment till his death this eminent personage is
constituted the master of religion and the doctor of the law. Owing
to his perfect science he finds out and discovers all the precepts that
constitute the body of the law. Impelled by his matchless
benevolence towards all beings, he promulgates them for the
salvation of all. He is not the inventor of those precepts; he merely
discovers them by the power of the supreme intelligence, in the
same manner as we perceive clearly during the night, by the help of
a light, objects hitherto wrapped in utter darkness. 3d. Man, who is
to be subjected to the observance of the law, is distinguished by the
following characteristics. He possesses more knowledge than the
animals and other beings, except the Nats and Brahmas; his
intelligence and thoughts reach farther than those of other beings;
he is capable of reflecting, comparing, drawing inferences, and
observing freely the rules of life;[46] despite the allurement of his
passions, he can free himself from the three great passions,
concupiscence, anger, and ignorance; finally, he is a descendant
from those Brahmas who, in the beginning of this world, came from
their seat, lived on earth, and, by their eating the rice Tsale, lost all
their glorious privileges, and became beings similar to those who are
known to us under the denomination of men.
The great end to be aimed at in the observance of the precepts of
the law and the exercise of meditation is the obtaining of a state of
complete indifference to all things. The state of indifference alluded
to does not consist in a stupid carelessness about the things of this
world. It is the result of a knowledge acquired with much labour and
pain. The wise man who has possessed himself of such science is no
longer liable to the influence of that vulgar illusion which makes
people believe in the real existence of things that have no reality
about them, but subsist only on an ephemeral basis, which
incessantly changes and finally vanishes away. He sees things as
they truly are. He is full of contempt for things which are at best a
mere illusion. This contempt generates a complete indifference for
all that exists, even for his own being. He longs for the moment
when it shall be given to him to cast away his own body, that he
may no longer move within the circle of endless and miserable forms
of existence. In this sense must be understood the state of perfect
quietism or indifference, which is the last stage the wise man may
reach by the help of the science he possesses. The religious of the
Brahminical creed have professed the same indifference for all the
accidents of life. Hence our Buddha, when he became a perfected
being, looked on the wicked Dewadat with the same feelings as he
did on the great Maia, his mother. Numberless Rathees or anchorites
have ever been eulogised for having allowed themselves to be
devoured by ferocious beasts or bit by venomous snakes, rather
than offer the least resistance that could exhibit a sign of non-
indifference. Entire was their unconcern towards their very body,
which they knew well is, as everything else, a compound of the four
elements, a mere illusion, totally distinct from self.
Five commandments constitute the very basis whereupon stand all
morals, and are obligatory on all men without exception. They
include five prohibitions. (It is not a little surprising that the five
precepts obligatory on all men are merely five prohibitions designed
not to teach men what they have to do, but warning them not to do
such things as are interdicted to them. This supposes that man is
prone to do certain acts which are sinful. The Buddhist law of the
five precepts forbids him to yield to such propensities, but it does
not teach him particular duties to perform. It does not elevate man
above his original level, but it aims at preventing him from falling
lower.) The five prohibitions are: Not to destroy the life of any being;
not to steal; not to commit adultery; not to tell lies; not to drink any
intoxicating liquors or beverages.
Our author seems to be a perfect master in casuistry, as he shows
the greatest nicety and exactness in explaining all the requisite
conditions that constitute a trespassing of those precepts. We will
give here but a few samples of his uncommon proficiency in this
science. As regards the first prohibition, he says, five things are
necessary to constitute an offence against the first commandment,
viz., a being that has life, the intention and will of killing that being,
an act which is capable of inflicting death, and the loss of life of that
being consequent on the inflicting of that action. Should but one of
these conditions be wanting, the sin could not be said to have taken
place, and therefore no complete trespassing of the first prohibition.
Again, as regards the second precept, five circumstances or
conditions are necessary to constitute a trespassing, viz., an object
belonging to another person, who neither by words nor signs
showed any intention to part with it; the knowing that the owner
intends to keep possession of it; having the actual intention to take
away secretly or forcibly that object; an effort to become possessed
of the thing by deceiving, injuring, or by mal-practices causing the
owner or keeper of the thing to fall asleep; and, finally, removing the
thing from its place, however short may be the distance, should it be
but that of the length of a hair of the head.
For the infraction of the third precept the following conditions are
required: the intention and will of sinning with any person of another
sex, which comes within the denomination of Akamani-jathan, that is
to say, persons whom it is forbidden to touch; acting up to that
intention and the consummating of such an act. Women that fall
under the above denomination are divided into twenty classes. The
eight first classes include those that are under the guardianship of
their parents or relatives; the ninth class comprises those affianced
before they be of age; the tenth, those reserved for the king. Within
the ten other classes come all those who, owing to their having been
slaves, or from any other cause, have become concubines to their
masters, or married their seducers, &c.
The fourth prohibition extends not only to lies, but likewise to
slander, coarse and abusive expressions, and vain and useless
words. The four following conditions constitute a lie, viz., saying a
thing that is untrue; the intention of saying such a thing; making
manifest such an intention by saying the thing; and some one’s
hearing and clearly understanding the thing that is uttered. That the
sin of medisance may be said to exist, it is required that the author
of it should speak with the intention of causing parties to hate each
other or quarrel with each other, and that the words spoken to that
end should be heard and understood by the parties alluded to.
The fifth precept forbids the drinking of Sura and Meria, that is to
say, of distilled liquors and of intoxicating juices extracted from fruits
and flowers. The mere act of putting the liquor in the mouth does
not constitute a sin; the swallowing of it is implied.
Besides these five general precepts, obligatory on all the faithful
without exception, there are three other precepts, or rather
counsels, that are strongly recommended to the Upasakas, or pious
laymen. They are designed as barriers against the great propensity
inherent in nature which causes men to exceed in all that is used,
through the senses of taste, hearing, seeing, smelling, and feeling.
They are so many means that help to obtain a sober moderation in
the daily use of the things of the world.
The first counsel regulates all that regards eating. It forbids using
any comestible from noon to daybreak of the following morning. The
second interdicts the assisting at plays, comedies, and the use of
flowers and essences with the intention of fondly handling and
smelling them. The third prescribes the form and size of beds, which
ought never to be more than one cubit high, plain and without
ornaments. The use of mattresses and pillows, filled with cotton or
other soft substances, is positively prohibited. The very intention of
lying upon these enervating superfluities, and a fortiori reclining on
them, constitutes the breaking of such a command.
These three latter precepts are to be observed chiefly in the
following days, on the 5th, 8th, 14th, and 15th of the waxing moon,
and on the 5th, 8th, and 14th of the waning moon, as well as on the
new moon. The pious Upasakas sometimes observe them during the
three consecutive months of the season of Lent.
In the opinion of our author those men and women are deserving
of the respectable title of Upasakas who have the greatest respect
for and entertain a pious affection towards the three precious things,
Buddha, the law, and the assembly of the perfect. They must ever
view them as the haven of salvation and the securest asylums. They
must be ready to sacrifice everything, their very life, for the sake of
these three perfect things. During their lifetime, under all
circumstances, they must aim at following scrupulously the
instructions of Buddha, such as they are embodied in the law and
preached by the Rahans.
Five offences disqualify a man for the honourable title of Upasaka,
viz., the want of belief and confidence in the three precious things,
the non-observance of the eight precepts, the believing in lucky and
unlucky days,[47] or in good and bad fortune, the belief in omens
and signs, and keeping company with the impious, who have no
faith in Buddha.
We now come to the rules which are prescribed to all the Buddhist
religious. They are 227 in number, and are found in a book called
Patimauk. This book is the vade mecum of all religious. They study it
and often learn it by heart. On certain days of each month the
religious assemble in the Thein. The Patimauk is then read,
explained, and commented upon by one of the elders of the
fraternity. It is an abridgment of the Wini, the great book of
discipline. It teaches the various rules respecting the four articles
offered by the faithful to the religious; that is to say, vestments,
food, mats, and the ingredients for mastication. These rules likewise
regulate all that relates to the mode of making prayers, devotions,
walking, sitting, reclining, travelling, &c. Everything is described with
a minute particularity.
Here, if any interest could be awakened, would be the place to
enter into the system of casuistry carried by Buddhist religious to a
point of nicety and refinement truly astonishing. Suffice it to state
that they have gone over the boundless field of speculative
conjectures respecting all the possible ways of fulfilling or
trespassing the precepts and regulations that concern the body of
religious.
Every law and precept must have a sanction. This essential
requisite is not wanting in the Buddhist system. Let us examine in
what consists the reward attending a regular and correct observance
of the precepts, and what is the punishment inflicted on the
transgressors of these ordinances. As usual, we will follow our
author and allow him to make known his own opinions on this
important subject. It is often inquired of us, says he, why some
individuals live here during many years, whilst others appear but for
a short time on the scene of this world. The reason of the difference
in the respective condition of these persons is obvious and evident.
The first, during their former existence, have faithfully observed the
first command and refrained from killing beings, hence their long
life; the second, on the contrary, have been guilty of some
trespassings of this precept, and therefore the influence of their
former crimes causes the shortness of their life. In a similar manner
we account for all the differences that exist in the conditions of all
beings. The observance or trespassing of one or several precepts
creates the positions of happiness and unhappiness, of riches and
poverty, of beauty and ugliness, that chequer the lives and positions
of mortals in this world.
In addition to the rewards bestowed immediately in this world,
there are the six seats of Nats, where all sorts of recompenses are
allotted, during immense periods, to those who have correctly
attended to the ordinances of the law. There are likewise places of
punishment in the several hells, reserved to the transgressors of the
precepts. The conditions of animal, Athoorikes and Preittas, are
other states of punishment.
A lengthened account of all that relates to the blissful regions of
Nats and the gloomy abodes of hell is found in one of the great
Dzats, or accounts of the former existences of Gaudama, given by
himself to his disciples, when he was a prince under the name of
Nemi. The writer has read and partly translated this work, which
delightfully reminded him of the fine episodes on similar subjects he
had read in the sixth book of the Æneid. The wildest, most fertile,
and inventive imagination seems to have exhausted its descriptive
powers, on the one hand, in multiplying the pleasures enjoyed in the
seats of Nats, and beautifying and adorning those delightful regions;
and, on the other, in representing with a dark and bloody pencil the
frightful picture of the numberless and horrid torments of the
regions of desolation, despair, and agony.
All that is so abundantly related of the fortunate abodes of Nats in
their sacred writings supplies the Buddhist religious with agreeable
and inexhaustible topics of sermons which they deliver to their
hearers, to excite them more effectually to bestow on them
abundant alms. The credulous hearers are always told that the most
conspicuous places in those regions are allotted to those who have
distinguished themselves by their great liberalities. We think it idle
and superfluous, uninteresting and fatiguing to repeat those
fabulous accounts of the seats of Nats and abodes of hell, as given
at great length by Buddhist authors. The only particulars deserving
to be attended to are these: the reward is always proportionate to
the sum of merits, and punishment to that of demerit. There is no
eternity of reward or of punishment.[48]
This first article shall be concluded by an important remark
bearing upon the system under consideration. The seats of
happiness, as already mentioned, are divided into two great classes;
the one including the superior, and the other the inferior seats. The
latter are the six seats of Nats, and are tenanted by beings as yet
under the influence of concupiscence and other passions. Those who
observe the five general precepts have placed, and, as it were,
established themselves on the basis whereupon stands perfection,
but not yet in perfection itself; they have just crossed the threshold
thereof. They are as yet imperfect; but they have prepared
themselves for entering the way that leads towards perfection; that
is to say, meditation, or the science of Dzan. The very reward
enjoyed in those seats is, therefore, as yet an imperfection. The
superior seats can only be reached by those who apply themselves
to mental exercises. These exercises are the real foundation of the
lofty structure of perfection and the high-road to it.
ARTICLE II.
OF MEDITATION AND ITS VARIOUS DEGREES.

This and the following articles contain subjects of so abstruse and


refined a nature, that it would require one to possess the science of
a Buddha to come to a right understanding of them. The difficulties
arising from this study are due to the confused and very
unsatisfactory ideas of the Buddhist philosophers respecting the soul
and its spirituality, and perhaps to the inability of the writer to
understand the vague and undefined terms employed to convey
their ideas on these matters. The field of Buddhist metaphysics is, to
a European, in a great measure a new one; the meaning of the
terms is half-understood by the Burmese translators; definitions of
terms do not convey explanations such as we anticipate, and ideas
seem to run in a new channel; they assume, if we may say so,
strange forms: divisions and subdivisions of the various topics have
no resemblance to what a European is used to in the study of
philosophy. The student feels himself ushered into a new region; he
is doomed to find his way by groping. Finally, the false position
assumed by the Indian philosophers, and the false conclusions they
arrive at, contribute to render more complicated the task of
elucidating this portion of the Buddhist system. That the difficulties
may be somewhat lessened, and the pathway rendered less rugged
and a little smooth, the writer proposes to avoid as much as it is in
his power overcharging with Pali terms the explanations he is about
to afford, under the guidance of the Buddhist author.
In the preceding article we have treated of meritorious actions
that are purely exterior, and briefly alluded to the nature of the
rewards bestowed on earth and in the six seats of Nats upon those
who have performed these good actions. Now we leave behind all
the exterior good deeds, and turn the attention of our mind to
something more excellent, to those acts that are purely interior, and
are performed solely by the soul and the right exercise of its
faculties; that is to say, by meditation and contemplation.
The root of all human miseries is ignorance. It is the generating
principle of concupiscence and other passions. It is the dark but lofty
barrier that encircles all beings and retains them within the vortex of
endless existences; it is the cause of all existences, and of all those
illusions to which beings are miserably subjected; it causes those
continual changes which take place in the production of all beings.
This great cause once found and proclaimed by Buddha, it was
necessary to procure a remedy to counteract the action of
ignorance, and successfully oppose its progress. Another
antagonistic and opposite principle had to be found, adequate to
resist the baneful agency of ignorance and stem its sad and
misfortune-creating influence. That principle is science or
knowledge. Ignorance is but a negative agent: it is only the absence
of science. Let knowledge be, and ignorance shall vanish away in the
same manner as darkness is noiselessly but irresistibly dissipated by
the presence of light.
All beings in this universe, says our author, are doomed to be born
and die. We quit this place to go and live in another; we die here to
be born elsewhere. We can never be freed from pain, old age, and
death. Whether we like it or not, we must suffer and always suffer.
But why is it so? Because we do not possess the perfect science.
Were we blessed with it, we would infallibly look towards Neibban,
and then, escaping from the pursuit of pain and miseries, we would
infallibly obtain the deliverance from those evils which now
incessantly press upon us. It rests with us only to perfect our
intelligence, so that we might gradually attain to the perfect science,
the source of all good. But by what means is so desirable an end to
be obtained? By the exercise of meditation, answers, with a decided
tone, our philosopher. This word implies, besides, our intellectual
operations of a superior order, such as contemplation, visions,
ecstasy, union, &c., which are the more or less complete results of
that intellectual exercise.
The act of meditating can take place but in the heart, where
resides the mano, or the faculty of knowing. Its object can never be
but the nam-damma, literally the name of the thing; or, in other
terms, the things of a purely intellectual nature. But it can by no
means happen in the seats of the other senses or organs, such as
the eyes, the ears, &c., which are only channels to communicate
impressions to the faculty of mano.
The constitutive parts of meditation are five in number. Witteka,
the action of raising the mind to an object; Witzara, the attentive
consideration of that object; Piti, the bringing of the soul and body
to a state of satisfaction; Suka, the pleasure enjoyed in the thing
considered; Ekatta, the perseverance or stability of the mind in that
object. There is also Upekka, which implies a greater and more
intense degree of fixity of the mind, extending not only to one object
in particular, but to all things.
It may be called the absolute quietism of the soul, and the net
result of a complete course of general meditation on the universality
of things. It is the last and highest point that can ever be reached.
To explain more fully the nature and definitions of the two first
parts, our philosopher has recourse to the following comparison. Let
us suppose a man that has to cleanse a rusty copper vessel. With
one hand he grasps the vessel, and with the other he rubs it up and
down, right and left. This is exactly what is done by the means of
Witteka and Witzara. The first gets hold of the object of meditation,
and the second causes the mind to pass and repass over it, until it
has perfectly seen it in all its particulars.
The third stage in the exercise of meditation is that of Piti, which
consists in a sort of transitory delectation, experienced by him who
has reached that third step of mental labour. It produces on the
whole frame the following effects:—It seems to him that is engaged
in that exercise that the hairs of his head stand on an end, so strong
is the sensation he then feels; at other times it produces in the soul
sensations similar to that of the lightning that rends the atmosphere.
Sometimes it is in a commotion resembling that of mighty waves
breaking on the shore; at other times the subject is, as it were,
carried through the air, or only raised above the ground, and
occasionally it causes a chill running throughout all the limbs. When
these results have been, through persevering efforts, repeatedly
experienced with an ever-increasing degree of intensity, the
following effects are attained:—The body and the soul are
completely restrained, subdued, and composed; they are almost
beyond the influence of concupiscence. Both acquire a remarkable
lightness, so that the exercise of meditation offers no further trouble
or labour; the natural repugnance or opposition to self-recollection is
done away with, then the exercise of meditation becomes pleasing
from the pleasurable state of the soul and body, and finally both
parts are in a true and genuine condition, so that what there was
previously in them either vicious or opposed to truth disappears at
once and vanishes away. Such are the various effects experienced by
the soul that has reached the degree of Piti, or mental satisfaction.
When the soul and body have thus been perfectly subdued, and
freed from all that could wrongly affect them, the soul then reaches
the state of Suka, that is to say, of perfect and permanent pleasure
and inward delight. The effects or results thereof are called Samati,
or peace or quiescence of the soul. As a matter of course, that state
of inward peace has several degrees both as regards the time it lasts
and the intensity of the affection. It lasts sometimes for a moment,
or for a period of uncertain duration, as it happens when we reflect
on some subject, or we listen to a sermon. At other times its
duration is longer; when, for instance, we are about to enter into
contemplation or ecstasy, and it lasts as long as we are in one of
these states.
From Piti originates the Samati-tseit, the idea or consciousness of
inward quiescence. It is the secondary cause of the real joy and
delight, and is followed by an unshaken resolution to adhere to all
the precepts of the law. It produces in the soul a certain freshness,
expansion, and ravishment in the practice of virtue. Such a state is
illustrated by the following comparison. A traveller has to go over a
very difficult road; he is exposed to an intense heat, and tormented
with a burning thirst. Let us imagine the intensity of his delight when
he finds himself on the brink of a rivulet of clear and cool water;
such is precisely the state of the soul under the influence of Piti. The
state of Suka follows it very soon. It is exemplified by the condition
of the traveller who has been perfectly refreshed and relieved from
thirst and fatigue, and enjoys the delightful and pleasurable effects
resulting therefrom.
The last state or the crowning point to be arrived at by the means
of meditation is that of Upekka, or perfect fixity, whence originates
an entire indifference to love or hatred, pleasure or pain. Passions
can no more affect the soul in that happy condition. But in this, as
well in the preceding states, there are several degrees, according to
the various objects it refers to. In the Upekka, relating to the five
senses, man is no more affected by beautiful or unseemly objects,
by harsh or melodious sounds, &c. As to what refers to creatures,
man has neither love nor dislike for them. Man obtains the state of
Upekka, relating to science or knowledge, by examining and
considering all things through the medium of the three great
principles, aneitsa, duka, anatta, that is to say, change, pain, and
illusion. There is also the uirya upekka; as when a man, after great
struggles and efforts to obtain a certain object, sees that he cannot
reach it, he becomes indifferent to it, and without trouble or the
least disquiet gives up the undertaking. There are many other
effects of the Upekka mentioned by our author, the enumeration of
which would prove tedious. What has been just stated is sufficient to
afford a correct idea of the nature of the highest state of meditation
that the human mind can ever reach. The last and most
transcendent result of the condition of Upekka is this: when an
individual, by successful exertions, has ascended to the top of the
spiritual ladder, there is a certain virtue that attracts everything to
him. He becomes a centre to which all appear to converge. He is like
the central point of our planet, that ever remains distinct from the
bodies it incessantly draws to itself. Seated in the centre of the most
complete quietism, the sage contemplates, without the least effort,
the unclouded truth that indefinitely unfolds itself before him. Hence,
as our author observes, the sage that has reached the state of
Upekka has no more to pass successively through the four preceding
stages to be enabled to meditate; that is to say, he no more requires
the help of thought, reflection, satisfaction, and pleasure. He is in
the middle of the cloudless atmosphere of truth which he enjoys,
and therein remains as unmoved as truth itself.
As stated in the previous article, the observance of the precepts,
or the performance of exterior good actions, draws abundant
rewards upon those who faithfully comply with them. These rewards
are bestowed either in the seat of man or in the six abodes of Nats,
which we will agree to call the six inferior heavens, where
concupiscence as yet holds its empire.
The inward good deeds produced by the operation of the
intellectual faculties of the soul being of an incomparably greater
value than the external ones, the recompense of the former is of a
higher order than that of the latter. Hence there are twenty superior
heavens reserved to the sages that have made progress in
meditation.[49] The accounts of the Buddhists respecting the extent
of these seats, their respective distance in a perpendicular direction,
the myriads of centuries to stay in each of them, &c., are puerilities
not worth attending to, and in no way belonging to the genuine and
original Buddhism. They are the inventions in subsequent ages of
individuals who wished to emulate their neighbours and rivals, the
Hindus, at a time when the latter substituted the gross and revolting
idolatry of the Puranas for the purer doctrines of the Vedas. But
what is directly to our purpose is the distinction of these twenty
seats into two classes. The first comprises sixteen seats, under the
designation of Rupa, or matter; the second includes four seats,
called Arupa, or immaterial abodes or conditions. Here are located
on a grand and immense scale, according to their respective
proficiency in science and meditation, the beings that have striven to
advance in knowledge by the exertion of the mental faculties. The
general appellation given to each class bears a great meaning, and
therefore deserves explanation. In the sixteen seats of Rupa are
placed the contemplatives who have as yet a body, and have not
been hitherto able to disengage themselves from some affection to
matter. The subjects of their meditations are still the beings
inhabiting this material world, together with some of the Kathain, or
coarser portion of their being. But in the four seats called Arupa,
which terminate the series of Buddhist heavens, the contemplatives
are destitute of shape and body; they are almost brought to the
condition of pure spirits. In their sublime and lofty flight in the
regions of spiritualism, they seem to have bid a last farewell to this
world, and to be no longer concerned with material things.
Let us glance rapidly over these various seats, and pay a visit to
the beings that have been rewarded with a place in them, owing to
their great proficiency in the mental exercise of meditation. We will
begin with the lowest seat, and from it successively ascend to the
loftiest. We must bear in remembrance that there are, as above
stated, five degrees of meditation or five parts, viz., perception,
reflection, satisfaction, happiness, and fixity. He who has been much
exercised in the first degree shall inhabit one of the three first seats
of Rupa. Those who, leaving aside the first degree, shall delight in
the second and third, shall inhabit, according to their respective
progress, one of the three following seats. Those who take delight
only in the fourth degree, having no further aid of the three first
parts, perception, consideration, and satisfaction, shall be located in
the seventh, eighth, and ninth seats. When the fifth degree of Dzan,
or meditation, has been attained, that is to say, when a privileged
contemplative is able to meditate and contemplate, without having
recourse to the representation and consideration of the object,
without allowing himself to be influenced by pleasures or joy, then
he has attained to the state of fixity and indifference; he occupies
the tenth and eleventh seats. The five remaining seats bear the
collective name of Thoodawata, or abodes of the pure or perfect,
that is to say, the dwelling-place of those who have entered into the
current of perfection. They are inhabited by the Kaliana Putadzans,
and the four sorts of contemplatives called Thautapan, Thakadagan,
Anagan, and Rahandas. The latter have entered into the Thoda, or
current of perfection. The Thautapans and Thakadagans are pure
and exempt from all influence of demerits; the Anagans are
delivered from the five concupiscences. The Rahandas are enjoying
a perfect indifference for all. They are strangers to such language as
this: I am great, I am greater, I am greatest. Such terms of
comparison are but mere illusions; they are deceitful sounds that
confuse, distract, and bewilder the ignorant.
Above the Thoodawata seats are the four called Arupa, or
immaterial. The denizens of these places first recognise that the
miseries attending man in this world have their origin in the body.
They then conceive the utmost disgust and horror for it; they long
for the dissolution of this agent to all wickedness. So great is their
horror for bodies and matter, that they no longer select them for
subjects of meditation; they endeavour to cross beyond the limits of
materiality, and launch forth into the boundless space, where this
material world does not seem to reach. The inhabitants of the first
seat have assumed for their subject of meditation the Akasa, the air,
the fluid of the atmosphere, or the space. Those of the second
meditate on the Winiana, or the spirit, or life of beings, taken in an
abstract sense; those of the third contemplate the Akintzi, or
immensity; those of the fourth, Newathagnia, lose themselves in the
infinity.
By what mental process has the sage to pass in order to reach the
first degree of sublime contemplation? He will have to begin with the
consideration of the form of some material object, say one of the
four elements. Let him afterwards set aside those Kathain, or
material portions of the element brought under consideration, and
occupy his mind with the ether, or fluid, or space; the former, that is
to say, the kathain, shall disappear to give place to something
divested of all those coarser forms, and the mind shall be fixed only
on the akatha. The sage then shall repeat ten hundred thousand
times these words,—The space or air is infinite, until there will
appear at last the first tseit, or idea of arupa. In a similar manner,
the tseit akan, or the idea of conformity with purpose, disappears;
then begins the science of upekka, or indifference, with its four
degrees; the idea that then succeeds is precisely that of akasa
ananda, or infinite ether, or space. This unintelligible mental process
is explained by a comparison. If they shut with a white cloth the
opening of a window, the persons inside the room, turning their eyes
in the direction of the opening, see nothing but the white cloth.
Should the cloth be suddenly removed, they perceive nothing but
that portion of the space corresponding with the extent of the
window. The piece of cloth represents the material forms, that are
the subjects of meditation, or contemplation, of those living in the
seats of Rupa; the free opening of the window exemplifies the
subjects of contemplation reserved to the first class of arupa. Having
reached so far, the contemplative soon feels the utmost disgust for
all material forms, and is entirely delivered from the three Thagnia,
or false persuasions, supplied by matter, by the action of the senses,
and by the result of merits and demerits. He is displeased with all
the coarser forms of beings. The action of the contemplative has its
sphere in the mano, or seat of knowledge. The ideas originating
from the action of the senses have no share in that purely
intellectual labour. In that state, the sage has fallen into a condition
of so perfect abstraction, that all the accidents on the part of the
elements can produce no effect over him. The action of the senses is
completely suspended during all the time that the contemplation
lasts. In fact this is nothing else but thamabat, or ecstasy.
The same course of meditation must be followed by the sages
inhabiting the other three seats; only the object to be contemplated
will be different.
Having explained the important subject of meditation,
endeavoured to show the different parts or degrees of that
intellectual exercise, and given a faint outline of the recompenses
bestowed on those that have distinguished themselves by
proficiency in that exercise, we have now to follow our author, and,
with him, make ourselves acquainted with the principal subjects that
attract the attention of the contemplative.

ARTICLE III.
OF THE NATURE OF BEINGS.
The Buddhist philosopher, in his earnest prosecution after the
antidote of ignorance, that is, science, rightly states that all beings,
and man, in particular, must ever be the first and most interesting
subject the sage has to study. The knowledge of man in particular
constitutes a most important portion of the science he must acquire,
ere he can become a perfect being, and be deemed worthy to be
admitted to the state of Neibban. In the very limited sketch of this
part of the work under consideration, the attention of the reader will
be directed on man as the most interesting of all beings. With our
Buddhist author, therefore, he will take human beings as the subject
of his investigations. Provided with the philosophical dissecting knife,
he will anatomise all the component parts of that extraordinary
being, whose nature has ever presented an insoluble problem to
ancient sages. What is to be said on this subject will be sufficient to
convey a correct idea of the mode of reasoning and arguing followed
by Buddhist philosophers, when they analyse other beings and select
them for the subjects of their meditations.
At the very beginning, our author proclaims this great maxim: All
beings living in the three worlds, heaven, earth, and hell, have in
themselves but two things or attributes, Rupa and Nam, form and
name. Accustomed as we are to a language that expresses clear and
distinct notions, we would like to hear him say, in nature there are
but two things, matter and spirit. But such is not the language of
Buddhists, and I apprehend that were we giving up their somewhat
extraordinary, and, to us, unusual way of expressing their ideas, we
could not come to a correct knowledge of the notions they entertain
respecting the nature of man. Let us allow our author to speak for
himself, and, as much as possible, express himself in his own way.
By rupa, we understand form and matter; that is to say, all that is
liable per se to be destroyed by the agency of secondary causes.
Nam, or nama, is the thing, the nature of which is known to the
mind by the instrumentality of mano, or the knowing principle. In
the five aggregates constituting man, viz., materiality or form, the
organs of sensation, of perception, of consciousness, and those of
intellect, there is nothing else to be found but form and name. We
are at once brought to this materialist conclusion, that in man we
can discover no other element but that of form and that of name.
To convey a sort of explanation of this subject, our author gives
here a few notions respecting the six senses. I say six senses,
because with him, besides the five ordinary senses, he mentions the
mano, or the knowing principle that resides in the heart, as one of
the senses. The organs or faculties of seeing, hearing, feeling,
tasting, smelling, and knowing, he calls the inward senses. These
same organs, as they come in contact with exterior objects, are
called exterior senses. The faculty inherent in each of the senses
whereby is operated the action between the organ and its object is
designated by the appellation of the life of the senses, as, for
instance, the eye seeing, the ear hearing, &c. In this treble mode of
considering the senses, what do we meet with but form and name,
ideas and matter? Supposing the organ of seeing to exist, and an
object to be seen, there will necessarily result, as an essential
consequence, the perception or idea of such a thing. Even as
regards the mano, where there exists the heart on one side, and
truth on the other, there will follow immediately the idea or
perception of truth.
This materialist doctrine, if the meaning of our author be
accurately understood, is further confirmed by the method he
proposes for carrying on the investigation respecting the nature of
things. He who desires to penetrate deeply into such a sublime
science must have recourse to the help of meditation. Having
selected an object, he considers it by the means of witekka. He
passes successively through the ideas and impressions he derives
from the contemplation of such an object. He then says to himself:
the ideas obtained by means of witekka, or the first degree of dzan,
or meditation, are nothing but nam-damma, since their nature is to
offer themselves to the arom, as the thought to its object. But where
is the seat of that arom? It resides in the substance of the heart,
which, in reality, affords asylum both to it and to the nam-damma. It
is nowhere else to be found. But what is the heart? Whence does it
come? By what is it formed? To these three questions we answer,
that the heart is composed of the four elements. It is but one and
the same thing with them. This startling doctrine is explicit, and
excludes at once the idea of a spiritual substance.
Our author has now reached the elements of the parts
constituting all that exists with a form. He boldly asserts that all that
has an existence is but an aggregate of earth, water, fire, and air; all
the forms are but modifications and combinations of the four
elements. The bare enumeration of this general principle is not
sufficient to satisfy our philosopher. He wishes to know and explain
the reason of everything. Here begins an analysis entirely unknown
to our chemists and philosophers of the west. The body is divided
into thirty-two parts, which are often enumerated in formulas of
prayer by pious Buddhists. Each of these thirty-two parts is
subdivided into forty-four. The hair, how slender soever it appears, is
submitted to that minute analysis. The result of this subtle division is
to show what is the proportion of each element that enters into the
formation of these atomical parts. We have not the patience to write
down these uninteresting details, nor do we believe that the reader
will be displeased if we spare him the trouble of going over such
worthless nomenclature. There is another division of matter, or body,
into forty-two parts, called akan. This is based upon the distinction
of the four elements that enter unequally into the formation of the
body; twenty parts belong to the earth, twelve to water, six to fire,
and six to wind. Then again the body is divided into sixty parts; the
division is based upon the distinction of the ten constitutive parts
belonging to each of the senses, as it will be hereafter explained.
The object which Buddhist philosophers have in view in entering into
so many divisions and subdivisions of the forms of the body is to
prove, in their opinion to demonstration, that, by the nicest analysis
of every part of the body, we find in the end nothing but the primary
elements that are called the supports of all that exist.
We have now to follow our author through a path more difficult
than the preceding one, and hear him explain the theory of ideas
and their various modifications. These, says he, are known, not by
their forms, since they have none, but only by their name. Through
the practice of reflection and meditation we become acquainted with
them. We call them arupa damma, things without a form or shape.
They are designated under the name of tseit and tsedathit,[50] that
is to say, ideas and the result of ideas. Where are these ideas to be
met? Where have they their seat? In the six senses and nowhere
else, is the answer. Having already become acquainted with the
organs of the senses, it will be easy to find out the ideas that are as
the tenants of the senses.
All the tseits inhabiting the organs of sense are called loki tseit,
that is to say, ideas of the world, because they are to be met with in
all the beings as yet subjected to concupiscence. They are distinct
from lokoudra tseits, which belong properly to the beings free from
passions, and who have entered into the four megga, or ways to
perfection. The tseits of this world are eighty-one in number,
classified as follows: the perception of each of the five organs, and
the perception of the respective faculties of those organs. This gives
ten tseits. There are three for the sense of the heart, the perception
of the substance of the heart, of its faculty of knowing, and of the
object of its knowledge.
Each of the six senses has ten constitutive forms or parts, viz.:
earth, water, fire, air, colour, odour, taste, fluid, life, and the body
attached primitively thereto. Now there is an action from each of
these forms upon the subject. Thence ten tseits to each of the six
senses.
There are no words so ill defined and so ill understood by our
philosopher as the two words Tseit and Tsedathit. The first in a
moral sense means idea, thought, perception, etc.; in a physical
sense it means that secondary cause created by kan, producing the
living being, the senses wherein reside the moral tseit. Tsedathit,
being the result of ideas, must, of course, have likewise two
meanings. In the first place it will designate the impressions made
upon us by ideas; in the second, it will mean the secondary cause or
life in the body, or the modifications of the principles of corporeal
life.
This being premised, we may a little understand our author when
he says: There are seven tsedathits existing at the same time as the
eighty-one above-mentioned tseits, viz.: pasa tsedathit, so called
because it is the real effect of the tsedathit to attain its object, and,
as it were, to touch it. We may call it the agreement between the
idea and its object. Wedana tsedathit, the feeling of the impression
of an idea; thagnia tsedathit, the comprehension of the object;
dzetana tsedathit, the inclination for the object; eketa tsedathit, the
fixity on the object; dziwi-teindre tsedathit, the observance of what
relates to form and name; and mana sikaramana tsedathit,
consciousness. It is evident, therefore, that the tsedathit is neither
the idea nor the object of the idea, but the result from the idea that
has come in contact with an object. These seven results are, if we
may say so, the third part of the idea. They do not give occasion to
modifications of ideas. But those which really give rise to the
greatest variety of results are the akuso tsedathit, or the results of
evil thoughts and ideas, and their opposite, or kuso tsedathit, or the
consequence of good and virtuous thoughts. To mention here all the
kuso and akuso tsedathit would be but a dry exposition of the
nomenclature of the vices and virtues, such as is met with in the
catalogues of Buddhist moralists. They are all enumerated in the
preceding note.

ARTICLE IV.
OF THE CAUSE OF THE FORM[51] AND OF THE NAME, OR OF MATTER
AND SPIRIT.

The duty of our intelligence is to investigate the cause of all the


modifications of forms and names. This being effected, we are
delivered from all doubts and disquietude. When we perceive such a
form, such an idea, &c., we are able forthwith to account for its
causes. In this study we must copy the conduct of the physician,
who, when attending a patient, sits by his bedside, closely examines
the nature of the distemper and the causes that have given rise to it,
in order to find out counteracting agents or remedies to check its
progress at first, and gradually to uproot it from the constitution. In
the moral order, the philosopher too has to examine the nature of all
moral distempers, ascertain the principles or causes they spring
from, and thereby become qualified to cure those disorders.
The beings that inhabit the three worlds, says our author, must
have a cause. To say that they exist of themselves and without a
cause is an absurdity. The very dissimilarity we observe among them
indicates that their mode of existence results from certain causes.
We, however, cannot agree with our antagonists, the Brahmins, who
maintain that Maha Brahma is the cause of all that exists. This being
is not out of the circle of Rupa and Nam; he is himself a compound
of Nam and Rupa, that is to say, effect but not cause. In vain our
opponents will add that all that is distinct of Maha Brahma is
subjected to a cause, but that the Rupa and Nam, constituting his
essence, are without a cause. This is removing the difficulty a little
further, without advancing a step towards its solution; our answer
must ever be the same.
Before expounding the opinions of our philosopher on this
important subject, it is necessary to state the views entertained by
that class of philosophers whose doctrines appear to have taken root
in these parts. It is easy to perceive that they are modifications of
the opinion of the Hindus on the same subject, and akin to that
respecting the Adi Buddha, or supreme Buddha.
Some doctors maintain that there is a first cause or being that has
made matter and spirit. Others, admitting the eternal co-existence of
matter and of the supreme being, say that he is the remote cause of
the organisation of matter, as we at present see it. But all agree in
this, that no one can ever come to the knowledge of that first cause,
and it is impossible ever to have an idea of it. Hence it is the height
of folly and rash presumption to attempt to come to the knowledge
of what is placed beyond the range of human investigation. It
behoves us to apply all the powers of the mind to discover the
immediate cause that certainly produces existence.
The sage, to be worthy of his sublime calling, must remain
satisfied with striving to find out that immediate cause which brings
into action the form and name, and causes the appearance of all
those modifications which we call beings or forms of existence. He
ought to strive to account for the organisation of matter and all its
modifications, by discovering the hidden spring that effectually sets
all in motion, in action, in combination of existences.
Now, our author puts this important question: What thing is to be
considered as the mover of the forms and ideas? We know, says he,
that the human body has its beginning in the womb of the mother;
we are acquainted with its position in that fœtid and narrow prison;
its being surrounded with nerves, veins, &c., having above it the new
elements, and under it the old ones. The manner in which the body
originates in the womb much resembles the process by which worms
and insects are formed in rotten substances, and in putrid and
stagnant water. But this is not accounting for the real cause of living
bodies. The real causes, according to some doctors, are five in
number, viz., ignorance, concupiscence, desire, kan (the influence of
merits and demerits), and ahan (the aliments). They concur together
in the formation of the living body in the following manner.
Ignorance, concupiscence, and desire give asylum to the body, as
the mother supplies the infant with a refuge in her womb. Kan, like
the father, is the cause productive of the body. Ahan affords
nourishment to the body.
The ideas are but the result of the formation of the organs of
senses. Let us suppose, for instance, the organ of seeing. The
Tsekkou Wignian, that is to say, the life of the eyes, or the ideas
connected with the use of that sense, presupposes two things, the
organ and a form or an object on which the organ acts. These
existing, there necessarily result the idea of vision, the perception,
&c., in a word, all the ideas arising from the action of the eyes upon
various objects. The same mode of arguing is employed relatively to
the other five senses.
Other philosophers argue in the following way. The primary causes
of all ideas and thoughts are disposed under two heads, that of
ideas which have a fixed place, and that of those that have no fixed
place. Under the first head are comprised the six Ayatana, or seats
of senses, and the six Arom, or the objects of senses. Thence flow
all the ideas and consequences that relate to merit and demerit.
Under the second head are placed the causes or agents that
produce ideas and thoughts, the exercise of the intellect holding the
first rank. He who applies his mind to the meditation of what is
good, such as the commands and other parts of the most excellent
law, and labours to find out that all that is in this world is subjected
to change, pain, and illusion, opens at once the door to the coming
in of the tseit, or ideas connected with merit. On the other hand, the
application of the mind to things bad and erroneous, contrary to the
prescriptions of the holy law, generates the idea of demerit. Such
are the causes of the ideas and thoughts. As to the cause of form,
they assert that kan, tseit, fire, and ahan are the sole agents in the
formation of the living body. Kan, as the workman, makes the body
and sets in it all that relates to its good and bad qualities. The tseit,
seventy-five in number, are also principles of the existence of the
body, of which forty-four are called Kamawatzara tseit; they relate to
the demerit and merit of those who are still under the influence of
concupiscence; fifteen rupa watzara tseit, relating to beings in the
seats of rupa; eight arupa watzara tseit, relating to those in the
seats of arupa; eight lokoudara tseit, relating to the beings that have
entered on the four ways of perfection. The Tedzo-dat, or the
element of fire, contributes its share by the head and rays of light,
and ahan by supplying the required aliments.
Some other philosophers account for the causes of form and ideas
following this course of argument. The form and ideas that
constitute all beings are liable to miseries, old age, and death,
because there is generation and death. Generation exists because
there are worlds, worlds exist because there is desire, desire exists
because there are organs, organs exist because there are form and
name, form and name exist because there are concepts, concepts
exist because there is merit and demerit, merit and demerit exist
because there is ignorance. The latter is, indeed, the real cause of all
forms and ideas. There is no doubt but this latter opinion is the
favourite one with our author. It is based upon the theory of the
twelve Nidanas, or causes and effects, and appears to be the
orthodox opinion, and bears the stamp of great antiquity.
Having thus accounted in the best way he could for the existence
of all that relates to the beings in the three worlds, our author fondly
dwells on the benefits that accrue from the knowledge of causes. It
dissipates all the doubts that had previously darkened the mind; it
quiets all the anxieties of the heart, and affords perfect peace. For
want of it, the impious fall from one error into another; the disciples
of Buddha are chiefly perfected by its help.
We read in the Buddhist scriptures that a Brahmin went to consult
Buddha on some points that much perplexed his mind. He said to
him, “I am beset with doubts respecting the past, the present, and
the future. Respecting the past, I ask myself, Have I passed through
former generations or not? What was my condition during those
existences? My answer is, I am ignorant on all those points. What
was my position previous to those generations? I know it not. As to
the present, is it true that I exist? or is my existence but an illusion?
Shall I have to be born again or not? What are those living beings
that surround me at present? Are they but so many illusions which
deceive me by their appearance of reality? On these points I am
sunk in complete ignorance. The future is likewise full of doubts and
most perplexing uncertainties. Shall I have other generations or not?
What shall be my condition during these coming existences? A thick
veil hides from my eyes all that concerns my future destiny. What
are the means to clear up all those doubts that encompass me on all
sides?”
Buddha said to him, “Reflect first on this main point, that what we
are wont to call self, or moi, is nothing but name and form—that is
to say, a compound of the four elements, which undergoes perpetual
changes under the action or influence of Kan. Having acquired the
conviction of the truth of this principle, it remains with you to
investigate carefully the causes which produce both name and form.
This simple examination will lead you at once to the perfect solution
of all your doubts. Behold the difference that exists between the
holders of false doctrines and the true believers. The former, whom
we may almost call animals, never take the trouble to examine the
nature of beings or the causes of their existence. They are
stubbornly attached to their false theories, and persist in saying that
what the ignorant, delivered up to illusion, are used to call an
animal, a king, a subject, a foot, and a hand, &c., is really an animal,
a king, a subject, a foot, and a hand, &c.; whilst all living beings and
their component parts are nothing else but name and form—that is
to say, a compound made up of the four elements. Those impious
are delivered up to error; hence it happens that they follow all
different ways. We reckon among them more than sixty different
sects, all at variance among themselves, but all uniting in a common
obstinacy to reject the true doctrine of Buddha. They are doomed to
move incessantly within the circle of endless and wretched
existences.
“How different is the condition of the true believers, our followers!
They know that the living beings inhabiting the world have a
beginning. But they are sensible of the folly of attempting to reach
this beginning or first cause. This is above the capacity of the loftiest
intelligence. It is evident, for instance, that the seeds of plants and
trees, which are continually in a state of reproduction, have a
beginning; but what that beginning is, no one presumes to
determine. So it is with man and all living beings. They know well,
too, that what is vulgarly called man, woman, eyes, mouth, are all
illusory distinctions, vanishing away in the presence of the sage, who
sees nothing in all that but name and form, the production of Kan
and Wibek, that is to say, of the first and second causes. These two
things are not the man and the woman, &c., but they are the
efficient causes of both. What we say respecting man and woman
may be applied to animals and to all other beings. They are all the
productions or results of Kan and Wibek, quite as distinct from these
two agents as effect is distinct from its cause. To explain this
doctrine, Buddhists have recourse to the comparison of a burning-
glass. When there is such an instrument in one hand, and the rays
of the sun pass through it to the other, fire is then produced; but fire
is quite distinct from the two causes that have concurred jointly in
producing it. Our disciples, too, are aware that the five khandas, or
aggregates constituting a living being, succeed each other at each
generation, but in such a way that the second generation partakes
or retains nothing of the khandas of the first. But the causes
producing them—such as Kan and Wibek—never change; they ever
remain the same. Let us suppose lamps lighted up. If they burn
always, it is owing to the action of individuals that supply them with
oil, and light them as soon as they are extinguished. Such is the
condition of the khandas. Those which belong to one existence have
no more in common with those of the following one than the fire of
the lamp just lighted anew has with that of the fire of the lamp that
has just died away. As to the way beings are reproduced, we say
that when a man is dying, the last tseit having appeared and soon
disappeared, it is succeeded forthwith by the patti tseit or the tseit
of the new existence; the interval between both is so short that it
can scarcely be appreciated. This first tseit has nothing in common
with the last one. It is, let it be well remembered, the production of
kan, or of the influence of merits and demerits, as well as the
khandas above alluded to.”
This article is by far the most important of all. The latter part, in
particular, elucidates in a distinct manner the genuine opinions of
Buddhism on points of the greatest concern. We may sum up the
whole as follows:—
1. There is a first cause that has acted in bringing into being all
that exists; but that first cause is unknown, nor can we ever come to
the knowledge of it.
2. The immediate causes of all the modifications of beings, or
states of being, are ignorance and kan.
3. All beings are but compounds of the four elements. The
intellectual operations are carried on by the instrumentality of the
heart, in the same manner as vision is obtained by the means of the
eye and of an object to act upon.
4. Each succeeding existence is brought on and modified by the
action of Kan, or the influence of merits and demerits.
5. The component parts of a new being are in no way connected
with those of the previous being. This is the key to the difficulty
many persons find in accounting, in a Buddhistic sense, for the
process of metempsychosis. A new term ought to be coined to
express that doctrine.
6. The question respecting Neibban may be theoretically resolved
without difficulty, by application of the principles contained in this
and the preceding article. There is no doubt that the solution forced
upon the mind from what has been above stated is that the end of
the perfected being is annihilation. Horrifying as this conclusion is, it
is not, after all, worse than that which is the terminus of the theories
of some modern schools. What an abyss is the poor human mind
liable to fall into when it ceases to be guided by Revelation!

ARTICLE V.
OF THE TRUE MEGGAS OR WAYS TO PERFECTION.

The subject under consideration is a very important one. It


comprehends and comprises a summary of many particulars already
alluded to in the foregoing two articles. The reader will find the path
he has to follow less rugged, and the ground he will have to go over
not so arid.
Our author seems to lay great stress on this special point. The
sage, says he, who is desirous to arrive at the supreme perfection,
must apply all the powers of his mind to discern the true ways from
the false ones. Many are deceived in the midst of their researches
after wisdom. The real criterion between the true and false ways is
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