UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RAYAT BAHRA UNIVERSITY

MOOT COURT FILE

SUBMITTED TO:
MS. MANDEEP KAUR
(ASST. PROF. USL, RBU)

SUBMITTED BY:
Simranpreet Kaur
Reg. No. 1807002021
B.Com LLB (9TH Semester)
 IN THE HON’BLE DISTRICT AND SESSIONS COURT, MOHALI

IN THE MATTER OF

STATE OF PUNJAB …. PROSECUTION

V.

RAMESH …. DEFENDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE

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 Table of Contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
STATEMENT OF FACTS 9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13
PRAYER 20

3
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter

All Alahabad High Court

Cal Calcutta High Court

Cri L J Criminal Law Journal

Cr.P.C. Criminal Procedure Code

Del Delhi High Court

Ed. Edition

Guj Gujarat High Court

IPC Indian Penal Code

Mad Madras High Court

MPH Madhya Pradesh High Court

p. Page No.

P&H Punjab and Haryana High Court

Raj Rajasthan High Court

SC Supreme Court

SCJ Supreme Court Journal

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec. Section

v. Versus

4
 INDEX OF AUTHORITY

TABLE OF CASES

SR. NO. NAME OF CASE AND CITATION PAGE NO.

1 State of M.P. v. Kashiram and others, (2009) 2 Cri.L.J. 13

1530(S.C.)

2 Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 1764 13

3 Sumit Gupta v. State NCT of Delhi, 2014 14

4 Satish Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi 2013[3] JCC 1749 14

5 Balwant Singh & Others v. The State, 1998 [1] JCC 14

[Delhi] 222

6 State of Rajasthan v. Hukam Singh, (2012) 1 Cri.L.J. 14

1159 (S.C.)

7 Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 Cri.L.J. 852 (S.C.) 15

8 George Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerala, Cr.LJ 1057 16

(SC)

9 Sushil Kumar Sharma v. UOI, 2005 6 SCC 281 17

10 Chandrabhan v State, AIR 1954 All 39 17

11 Tr. Ramaiah v. State, 1988 (35) ELT 38 AP 17

12 Anju v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2019 18

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BOOKS:

• Prof. S.N. Mishra, Indian Penal Code (with Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018),

Central Law Publications, 21st Ed. 2018.

• Pillai PSA, Criminal Law, Lexis Nexis, 11th Ed. 2012

• Gaur KD, Indian Penal Code, 5th Ed. 2015

WEBSITES:

• http://www.findlaw.com

• http://www.judis.nic.in

• http://www.scconline.com

• http://www.blog.ipleaders.in

• http://www.legalserviceindia.com

• http://www.casemine.com

STATUTES:

1. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (ACT 2 OF 1973)

2. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (ACT 45 OF 1860)

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The defence has submitted the Written Submissions to the Hon’ble District Court, Mohali that

it has jurisdiction to try this case under Sec 177 r/w Section 209 of Cr.P.C.

Section 177 of Cr.P.C. states- Ordinary place of inquiry and trial-

“Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired and tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it

was committed.”

Section 209 of Cr.P.C. states- Commitment of a case to court of session when offence is

triable exclusively by it-

“When, in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought

before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively

by the court of session, he shall-

(a) Commit the case to the court of session,

(b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody

during, and until the conclusion of, the trial;

(c) Send to that court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which

are to be produced in evidence;

(d) Notify the Public Proecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.

The court also has a power to take cognizance of the matter as per the Section 26(a)(ii) of

Cr.P.C. which reads as “Courts by which offences are triable. Subject to the other provisions

of the code,

(a) Any offence under the Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860), may be tried by-

(ii) the court of session.”

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This is also requested to determine the consequences, including the rights and obligations

of the parties, arising from it’s judgment on the charges raised in the instant case.

The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments from the

prosecution standpoint.

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

For the sake of convenience of this Hon’ble court the facts of the present case are summarized

as follows:

1. That RAMESH (Accused) and Reena (Complainant) were working together in some

private company. Reena belonged to a very rich family and the financial position of

Ramesh was mediocre.

2. That they started liking each other and after sometime got married in 2015. After

sometime the attitude of the respondent became harsh towards Reena (petitioner).

Respondent started making demands of money from the petitioner. He also started

putting pressure upon her to ask her parents to purchase a bungalow in the city for them.

After sometime he also started asking petitioner to get a share in the property of her

father.

3. That the petitioner did not accept the unjustified demands of the respondent.

Respondent started giving physical abusing the petitioner.

4. With the passage of time, the petitioner’s attitude also became harsh towards the

respondent. She stopped taking care of respondent and started reverting back. On 19

November, 2017, at about 9:30 pm a quarrel started between Ramesh and Reena. Reena

threw a shoe at Ramesh and Ramesh threw a statue of stone at Reena. The statue struck

at the head of Reena and she fell unconscious. Ramesh took her to the hospital where

Reena was admitted to I.C.U. However with a great difficulty her life was saved.

5. An FIR was registered and during investigation the fact came out that Ramesh was

already legally married to one Roopa in the year 2003. The charges were framed against

Ramesh under section 307,498A of the Indian Penal Code,1860.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER RAMESH BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 307 IPC, 1860 or

NOT?

2. WHETHER RAMESH BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 498A IPC, 1860 or

NOT?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. NO, THE ACCUSED RAMESH IS NOT GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE OF

ATTEMPT TO MURDER UNDER SECTION 307 OF IPC, 1860.

No, the accused is not guilty for the offence of attempt to murder under section 307 of IPC,

1860. Because the essential ingredient required to constitute an offence of attempt to murder

under IPC section 307 are not fulfilled here. To constitute the offence under section 307 of IPC,

1860 two ingredients must be present:

(a) An intention of or knowledge to the commission of murder;

(b) The doing of an act towards it.

But in the present case there is no such intention and the case is falling under general exception

of private defence under section 96 of IPC, 1860.

Moreover, it is clearly stated that in the facts that he had thrown the statue of stone once only.

It was unfortunate that it hits right into the head of Reena due to which she fells unconscious.

After all this accused have himself taken Reena to the hospital. This shows that there was no

intention to kill Reena. Hence, the accused is not liable for the offence under section 307 of

IPC, 1860.

2. NO, ACCUSED RAMESH IS NOT GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE OF

CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 498A OF IPC,1860.

No, the accused is not guilty for the offence of cruelty under section 498A of IPC, 1860.

Because, it is clearly stated in the facts that Reena’s attitude was harsh towards the accused and

she stopped taking care of the accused and started hitting back.

Moreover, in a fight on November 19,2017 at 9:30 pm, it was Reena who threw a shoe at the

accused. Accused had thrown a statue only in defence. The fight was started by Reena.

Moreover, there was not even a whisper about any cruel conduct of accused which was of such

11
nature so or to drive the Reena to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life or,

limb or health of women.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. WHETHER RAMESH BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 307 OF IPC, 1860 OR

NOT?

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 states that –

307- Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under

such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,

and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender

shall be liable either to

1. [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts

by life convicts.

2. [When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for

life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.]

illustrations:

(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A

would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.

(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert

place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does

not ensue.

(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A

fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he

wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of 3[the first paragraph

of] this section.

(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which

remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places

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the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the

offence defined in this section.

Section 307 deals with the offence of attempt to murder. In order to constitute an offence under

this section, two elements are essential.

First, the intention or knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to

commit the murder. Thus, it may both have the necessary mens rea and actus reus. In other

words, for offences under this section, all the elements of murder must exist, except for the

fact that death has not occurred.

In the case of State of M.P. v. Kashiram and others1, it was held that it is sufficient to justify

a conviction under sec. 307, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in

execution thereof.

But in the present case, both these elements are absent as there is no intention to cause death.

Moreover, the act was done for the private defence only.

1.1 ACT MUST BE CAPABLE OF CAUSING DEATH

To constitute the offence under sec 307, it is necessary to prove that the act done is capable of

causing death. In the case of Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar2, the accused was responsible

for causing injury on the head of the victim with a farsa. The injury was described as a simple

injury. Though the weapon used by the offender was one which was likely to cause death, the

Supreme Court held that the accused could not be held guilty under Section 307, IPC.

In the present case also, the act was not capable to cause death. When Reena throws a shoe

towards the accused, it means she was using a force against accused and then accused have his

right of private defence to repel that force. In such circumstances the accused saw a statue of

stone and throws it towards Reena to defend himself against the use of force by Reena. It

was unfortunate that it hits right at the head of Reena because of which she fell

1 (2009) 2 Cri.L.J. 1530(S.C.)

14
unconscious. This could not be fatal if it hits any other part of body of Reena and thus it can be

said that the act was not capable of causing death.

1.2 INTENTION

The other element to constitute an offence under this section is mens rea. It means there must

be proper intention to cause death of a person.

In the case of Sumit Gupta v. State NCT of Delhi3, it was observed that the only question left

for consideration is whether offence u/s 307 IPC is made out or not. The essential ingredient

of Section 307 IPC is mens rea. Mens Rea can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, the

place of injury, motive etc. to bring home a charge u/s 307 IPC, the onus lies on the prosecution

to prove that the accused caused an act with the intention or knowledge and under such

circumstances that if by that act, death was caused, he would be held guilty of murder.

In the case of Satish Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)4, the appellant was convicted u/s 307 IPC

on account of giving a knife blow on the injured person by kitchen knife on backside. The

injuries were opined to be simple. Under the circumstances, the conviction was altered to

Section 324 IPC.

In the case of Balwant Singh & others v. The State5, also, one inquiry on a part of neck was

given by sharp edged weapon which was opined to be simple, as such it was observed that the

intention of the appellant was not to kill the complainant but only to inflict injury on him, as

such offence falls u/s 324 IPC.

It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in the present case mens rea is missing. Mens rea

i.e. intention to cause death, which is one of the most important element to constitute a crime

under IPC is not present.

3 2014
4 2013[3] JCC 1749
5 1998[1] JCC [Delhi] 222

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In state of Rajasthan v. Hukam Singh6, accused himself taken the deceased to hospital. This

by itself indicates that he had no intention to commit crime and that too, to give gunshots which

would inevitably result in death of victim. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the

judgement of acquittal of court was not perverse and therefore could not be interfered with.

In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab7, a sudden quarrel on the spur of moment arose out of a

trivial reason on chance meeting between the accused and the victim. The accused caused a

single blow by knife in chest of victim resulting in his death. On these facts it was held that the

intention to cause death or causing particular injury could not be imputed to the accused.

In the present case also, it is clear from the facts that there was no intention as the accused

himself have taken Reena to the hospital and steps were to revive her which was in success.

Moreover, that act was done in private defence only.

1.3 ACCUSED HAS LAWFULLY EXERCISED HIS RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE

It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused has lawfully exercised his right of

private defence according to sec 96 and 97 of IPC.

Section 96 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:

96. Things done in private defence: Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the

right of private defence.

Section 97 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:

97. Right of private defence of the body and of property- Every person has a right, subject to

restrictions contained in section 99 to defend-

(First)- his own body, and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the human

body;

6 (2012) 1 Cri. L.J. 1159 (S.C.)

16
(Secondly)- the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person,

against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischeif or

criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal

trespass.

In the present case also, it is clear from the facts that the accused has lawfully exercised his

right of private defence of body under sec 97(1). Because the accused has acted only when

Reena used a force and throws a shoe towards him.

In the case of Geotge Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerala8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

that the question whether the right of defence exercised by an accused is in excess of his right

and whether the accused has caused more harm than necessary, is entirely a question of fact to

be decided upon the circumstances of each case.

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE OF CRUELTY OR

NOT?

The Counsel for Accused would humbly submit before the hon'ble Court that the essential

elements to attract the provisions of 498A I.P.C are below:

“Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman

to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and

shall also be liable to fine. For the purpose of this section, ‘Cruelty’ means: -

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit

suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or

physical) of the woman, or

8 Cr.L.J. 1057 (SC)

17
 (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any

person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable scrutiny

or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand”

From the above section it is clear that ‘cruelty' means: - Any wilful conduct which is of such a

nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to

life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman, or harassment of the woman

where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any

unlawful demand for any property or valuable scrutiny or is on account of failure by her or any

person related to her to meet such demand.

It is clear from the above stated facts that not even a whisper, about any cruel conduct of the

accused which was of such a nature so as to drive the deceased to commit suicide or to cause

grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman nor of any harassment of the woman

which is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand

for any property or valuable scrutiny or is on account of failure by her or any person related to

her to meet such demand, even remotely, which is mandatorily necessary to support the

prosecution version of the facts.

In the case of Sushil Kumar Sharma v. UOI9the Supreme Court lamented that in many

instances, complaints under s.498A were being filed with an oblique motive to wreck personal

vendetta and observed. "It may therefore become necessary for the Legislature to find out ways

how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with". It was

also observed that "by misuse of the provision, a new legal terrorism can be unleashed'

In the case of Chandrabhan Vs. State10 and Tr. Ramaiah Vs. State11, it was observed that

"there is no iota of doubt that most of the complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over

9 2005 6 SCC 281

18
trifling fights and ego clashes. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in their tussle and

ongoing hostility, the hapless children are the worst victims".

In the case of Anju v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi12, the wife of the Petitioner challenged the order

of the Lower Court, whereby the Court discharged the charges against the respondents under

section 498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code. In appreciating the facts of the case, the Court noted

that in the FIR, the wife of the Petitioner in one breath named all members of the family without

any specific role being assigned to any of them. Thus, no details were provided as to when the

recorded instances allegedly occurred, or any facts to substantiate or corroborate the allegations

against relatives of the spouse. The Court also noted that the allegations against the respondents

were fairly general and unspecific. The plaintiff did not mention a date, time, month, or year

when she was subjected to beating them. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances

of the case, the High Court of Bombay upheld the order of the Revisional Court and held that

the Court had made no mistake in concluding that, apart from the general and omnibus

allegations that roped in all relations, there is no recorded material to justify the framing of

charges under Section 498A IPC.

Thus, it is clear from the facts of the case that there are no circumstances of cruelty by the

accused and the allegations are false.

12 2019

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities

cited, it is humbly prayed before the Hon'ble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare

that:

1. The accused is not guilty of the offence under section 307 and 498A of IPC

and the accused should be acquitted.

And/ Or pass any order/ judgement which the Court may deems fit in the light of justice, equity

and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly submitted.

S/d

Counsel for Defence

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