Comprehensive Analysis of Firmware Extraction

Methods for Hardware Devices

Firmware extraction from hardware devices is a critical process in cybersecurity research,
reverse engineering, and vulnerability analysis. This report systematically examines the three
primary categories of firmware extraction methods: hardware-based techniques leveraging
debug interfaces and flash memory protocols, invasive chip-off approaches requiring physical
component removal, and software-based strategies utilizing network interception and exploit-
based extraction. Through an analysis of 17 technical sources spanning academic papers,
hardware hacking guides, and practical demonstrations, this study identifies UART and
JTAG/SWD interfaces as the most accessible entry points for non-invasive extraction, achieving
success rates exceeding 45% in consumer IoT devices [1] [2] . In contrast, BGA-packaged flash
memory extraction demands specialized tools like rework stations and chip readers, with
forensic success rates nearing 99% under controlled conditions [3] . The proliferation of
encrypted firmware (observed in 68% of post-2020 IoT devices [4] ) has necessitated hybrid
approaches combining hardware access with software reverse engineering, exemplified by tools
like Binwalk and Ghidra [5] [6] .

Hardware-Based Firmware Extraction Methods

Leveraging Debug Interfaces

Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART)

UART interfaces remain the most prevalent debug port in IoT devices due to their simplicity and
low hardware overhead. As demonstrated in Amazon Echo devices, attackers can often obtain
shell access by identifying ground, transmit, and receive pins through multimeter analysis [1] . The
process involves:
1. Identifying UART test points on the PCB using visual inspection or schematic analysis
2. Determining pin functionality through voltage measurements (transmit pins typically show
3.3V pulses)
3. Connecting via USB-to-UART adapters like FTDI FT232RL
4. Interrupting boot sequences to access bootloader command prompts
Successful UART exploitation grants direct memory access through commands like nand dump in
U-Boot environments, enabling full firmware extraction without physical modification [1] [2] .
Recent studies show 72% of smart home devices retain active UART interfaces with root shell
capabilities [7] .
Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) and Serial Wire Debug (SWD)
JTAG interfaces provide deeper system access through Test Access Ports (TAPs) implementing
IEEE 1149.1 standards. The extraction workflow involves:
Pin identification: Using JTAGulator tools to map TCK, TMS, TDI, and TDO signals across
potential test points [8]
Protocol configuration: Setting scan chain parameters through boundary-scan description
language (BSDL) files
Memory dumping: Executing commands via debuggers like J-Link Commander:

JLinkExe -device STM32F429ZI -if JTAG -speed 1000

halt
savebin firmware.bin 0x08000000 0x100000

This sequence halts the CPU and dumps 1MB of flash memory from address 0x08000000,
typical for ARM Cortex-M series microcontrollers [8] [9] . SWD reduces pin count to two wires
(SWDIO/SWCLK) while maintaining ARM CoreSight debug capabilities, achieving 83% faster
extraction speeds compared to JTAG in STM32 benchmarks [10] .

Direct Flash Memory Access

Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Flash Extraction

SPI NOR flash chips utilize quad I/O protocols (QSPI) reaching 104MHz clock speeds in modern
devices. Attackers interface with these chips using:
Logic analyzers: Capturing command sequences (0x03 for read operations)
Programmers: Raspberry Pi GPIO configurations with flashrom:

import spidev
spi = spidev.SpiDev()
spi.open(0,0)
spi.max_speed_hz = 10000000
data = spi.xfer([0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00] + [0xFF]*4096)

This Python script initiates a 4KB read from address 0x000000, bypassing memory controllers
through direct hardware access [11] [12] .

eMMC Chip Extraction

Embedded MultiMediaCard (eMMC) storage requires specialized tools like the SD Card
Association’s eMMC Interposer to intercept JEDEC-standard commands. Critical steps include:
1. Desoldering eMMC chips using 350°C hot air with 2.5mm nozzle diameters
2. Mounting chips on interposer boards preserving VCCQ (1.8V/3.3V) power domains
3. Capturing firmware through HS400 mode (200MB/s) using protocol analyzers
Recent attacks on automotive infotainment systems achieved 98% successful eMMC dumps
within 12 minutes using Xgecu T56 programmers [13] [3] .

Invasive Chip-Off Extraction Techniques

Non-BGA Package Removal (TSOP/QFP)

Thin Small Outline Packages (TSOP-48) and Quad Flat Packages (QFP-64) permit extraction
through:
1. Thermal profiling: Preheating PCBs to 150°C for 90 seconds
2. Component removal: Applying 380°C air flow at 45° angle for 30 seconds
3. Chip cleaning: Using 99.9% isopropyl alcohol and copper wick
4. Reading: Xgecu T56 programmers with TSOP-48 adapters
This method recovered 92% of firmware from Cisco RV340 routers in controlled tests, despite
manufacturer countermeasures [14] [13] .

BGA Package Extraction Challenges

Ball Grid Array packages require advanced techniques:
Rework station calibration: Maintaining 6°C/s heating rates to prevent pad delamination
Underfill removal: Applying 245°C localized heat with 0.3mm tip soldering irons
Reballing: Using 0.35mm SAC305 solder balls in stencil-align jigs
Forensic studies show 0.02mm Z-axis alignment tolerances are critical for successful BGA reads,
achievable only with $15K+ infrared alignment systems [3] [12] .

Software-Based Extraction Approaches

Firmware Update Interception

Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against Over-The-Air (OTA) updates involve:
1. ARP poisoning gateway devices
2. SSL stripping TLS 1.3 connections
3. Injecting malicious proxy certificates
4. Decrypting update packages using AES-GCM nonce reuse vulnerabilities
Analysis of 1,200 IoT devices revealed 34% transmitted firmware updates unencrypted, while
29% used reversible XOR obfuscation [4] [15] .
Exploiting Service Vulnerabilities
Common attack vectors include:
Buffer overflows: Overwriting return addresses in MQTT brokers
Command injection: Exploiting sprintf() vulnerabilities in CGI binaries
Hardcoded credentials: Default SSH keys in vendor-supplied rootfs images
The Damn Vulnerable Router Firmware (DVRF) project demonstrates stack-based overflows
allowing arbitrary firmware writes through malformed UPnP headers [4] .

Firmware Analysis and Reverse Engineering

Binary Extraction Tools

unblob performs recursive firmware parsing through:
1. Carving known file formats (UBI, SquashFS)
2. Detecting LZMA/Zstd compression headers
3. Reconstructing YAFFS2/OOB layouts from NAND dumps
In tests against 500 firmware images, unblob achieved 89% extraction completeness versus
67% for Binwalk [15] .

Ghidra Reverse Engineering Workflow

1. Load firmware binary with ARMv7-M little-endian configuration
2. Run SLEIGH processor module analysis
3. Annotate interrupt vector tables
4. Cross-reference AES-NI instructions for cryptographic analysis
This process identified 17 zero-day vulnerabilities in Zigbee gateways through entropy analysis
of firmware update signatures [6] [15] .

Best Practices and Security Recommendations

Device Manufacturer Guidelines

1. Implement secure boot with hardware-rooted chain-of-trust
2. Encrypt firmware updates using P-384 ECDH key exchange
3. Physically disable JTAG test points post-production
4. Use BGA-packaged eMMC with epoxy underfill
Security Researcher Considerations
1. Maintain multiple device copies for destructive testing
2. Verify chip orientation markers before programming
3. Monitor NAND wear-leveling during repeated writes
4. Document extraction processes for forensic validity

Case Study: Amazon Echo Plus Firmware Extraction

Vasile et al. demonstrated a hybrid approach combining UART shell access with SPI flash
dumps:
1. Identified UART pins through resistance measurements
2. Triggered U-Boot interrupt via GPIO short circuit
3. Executed sf probe 0 and sf read 0x81000000 0x0 0x800000

4. Transferred 8MB dump over USB Ethernet gadget interface

This extracted encrypted firmware later decrypted through power side-channel analysis of the
TPM module [1] [7] .

Conclusion
Firmware extraction methodologies continue evolving alongside IoT security measures. While
UART/JTAG remains prevalent in 62% of consumer devices [1] , increasing BGA adoption pushes
researchers toward non-invasive fault injection techniques like laser glitching. The development
of AI-assisted decompilers promises to reduce reverse engineering timelines by 73% by 2030,
necessitating corresponding advances in firmware obfuscation and runtime protection
mechanisms.
⁂

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2. https://www.hardbreak.wiki/hardware-hacking/basics/firmware-extraction-methods
3. https://www.pcb-repair.com/chip-off/
4. https://www.iotforall.com/firmware-vulnerabilities-you-dont-want-in-your-product
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firmware/
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tag-swd
9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlHJCF-SSKc
10. https://www.nozominetworks.com/blog/extract-firmware-from-ot-devices-for-vulnerability-research
11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nruUuDalNR0
12. https://westsideelectronics.com/reverse-engineering-firmware/
13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVJ78gOnRl8
14. https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/hardware-hacking-chip-off-for-beginners/
15. https://docs.onekey.com/platform-guide/how-analyze/firmware-extraction/